History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6

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Title: History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6
Author: Napier, William Francis Patrick
Language: English
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PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR
1814, VOL. 3 OF 6 ***

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

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Volume 1 of this series can be found at
Volume 2 of this series can be found at

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, AND MEMBER OF
THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

VOL. III.

LONDON:
THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.

MDCCCXXXI.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians--Guerilla system
in Navarre and Aragon--The Partidas surround the third
corps--Blake abandons Aragon--Suchet’s operations against the
Partidas--Combat of Tremendal--The advantages of Suchet’s
position--Troubles at Pampeluna--Suchet ordered by Napoleon to
repair there--Observations on the Guerilla system _Page_ 1

CHAPTER II.

Continuation of the operations in Catalonia--St. Cyr sends Lecchi
to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian
war--Of Verdier’s arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau’s
appointment to the command of the seventh corps--Augereau’s
inflated proclamation--It is torn down by the Catalonians--He
remains sick at Perpignan--St. Cyr continues to command--Refuses
to obey Joseph’s orders to remove into Aragon--Presses Verdier
to commence the siege of Gerona--Reinforces Verdier--Remains
himself at Vich--Constancy of the Spaniards--St. Cyr marches
from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a
convoy--Storms St. Felieu de Quixols--Takes a position to cover
Verdier’s operations--Siege of Gerona--State of the contending
parties--Assault of Monjouic fails--General Fontanes storms
Palamos--Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw
succours into Gerona--Monjouic abandoned 17

CHAPTER III.

Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the
French frontier--Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter
Gerona with succours--Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of
Catalonia--Bad conduct of the latter--Blake advances to the aid
of the city--Pestilence there affects the French army--St. Cyr’s
firmness--Blake’s timid operations--O’Donnel fights Souham, but
without success--St. Cyr takes a position of battle--Garcia
Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into
Gerona--Blake retires--Siege resumed--Garcia Conde comes out of
the city--Ridiculous error of the French--Conde forces the French
lines and escapes--Assault on Gerona fails--Blake advances a
second time--Sends another convoy under the command of O’Donnel
to the city--O’Donnel with the head of the convoy succeeds,
the remainder is cut off--Blake’s incapacity--He retires--St.
Cyr goes to Perpignan--Augereau takes the command of the
siege--O’Donnel breaks through the French lines--Blake advances a
third time--Is beaten by Souham--Pino takes Hostalrich--Admiral
Martin intercepts a French squadron--Captain Hallowell destroys a
convoy in Rosas-bay--Distress in Gerona--Alvarez is seized with
delirium, and the city surrenders--Observations 31

CHAPTER IV.

Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord
Wellesley--Junta propose a new form of government--Opposed by
Romana--Junta announce the convocation of the national Cortez,
but endeavour to deceive the people--A Spanish army assembled in
the Morena under Eguia--Bassecour sends cavalry to reinforce Del
Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad
Rodrigo--He is joined by the Gallician divisions--Santocildes
occupies Astorga--French endeavour to surprise him, but are
repulsed--Ballasteros quits the Asturias and marching by Astorga
attempts to storm Zamora--Enters Portugal--Del Parque demands the
aid of the Portuguese army--Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his
reason in detail--Del Parque’s operations--Battle of Tamames--Del
Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were
assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar 55

CHAPTER V.

Areizaga takes the command of Equia’s army and is ordered to
advance against Madrid--Folly of the Supreme Junta--Operations in
La Mancha--Combat of Dos Barrios--Cavalry combat of Ocaña--Battle
of Ocaña--Destruction of the Spanish army 67

CHAPTER VI.

King Joseph’s return to Madrid--Del Parque’s operations--Battle
of Alba de Tormes--Dispersion of the Spanish troops--Their
great sufferings and patience--The Supreme Junta treat sir
A. Wellesley’s counsels with contempt--He breaks up from the
Guadiana and moves to the Mondego--Vindication of his conduct for
having remained so long on the Guadiana--French remain torpid
about Madrid--Observations 86

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia--Distracted state of
affairs in that province--Military position and resources
described--Invasion of Andalusia--Passes of the Morena forced
by the French--Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta--Tumult in
Seville--Supreme Junta dissolved--Junta of Seville re-assembles,
but disperses immediately after--The French take Jaen--Sebastiani
enters Grenada--King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards
marches against Seville--Albuquerque’s march to Cadiz--Seville
surrenders--Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani--Victor
invests Cadiz--Faction in that city--Mortier marches against
Badajos--The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte--Inhospitable
conduct of the bishop of Algarve 101

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia--Pursuit of
the student Mina--Suchet’s preparations--His incursion
against Valencia--Returns to Aragon--Difficulty of the
war in Catalonia--Operations of the seventh corps--French
detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua--Augereau
enters Barcelona--Sends Duhesme to France--Returns to
Gerona--O’Donnel rallies the Spanish army near Centellas--Combat
of Vich--Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of
Hostalrich--Augereau again advances to Barcelona--Sends two
divisions to Reus--Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca--French
troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera--Swartz abandons
Manreza--Is defeated at Savadel--Colonel Villatte communicates
with the third corps by Falcet--Severolli retreats from Reus to
Villa Franca--Is harassed on the march--Augereau’s unskilful
conduct--Hostalrich falls--Gallant exploit of the governor,
Julian Estrada--Cruelty of Augereau 124

CHAPTER III.

Suchet marches against Lerida--Description of that
fortress--Suchet marches to Tarega--O’Donnel advances from
Taragona--Suchet returns to Balaguer--Combat of Margalef--Siege
of Lerida--The city stormed--Suchet drives the inhabitants into
the citadel and thus forces it to surrender 144

CHAPTER IV.

Reflections on that act--Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out
by the French--Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa,
and assassinated after the action--Siege of Mequinenza--Fall
of that place--Morella taken--Suchet prepares to enter
Catalonia--Strength and resources of that province 158

CHAPTER V.

Operations in Andalusia--Blockade of Cadiz--Dissentions in
that city--Regency formed--Albuquerque sent to England--Dies
there--Regency consent to admit British troops--General Colin
Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy
the Spanish lines at San Roque--General William Stewart arrives
at Cadiz--Seizes Matagorda--Tempest destroys many vessels--Mr.
Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz--Apathy of
the Spaniards--Gallant defence of Matagorda--Heroic conduct of a
sergeant’s wife--General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy
Tarifa--French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks,
and drift during a tempest--General Lacey’s expedition to the
Ronda--His bad conduct--Returns to Cadiz--Reflections on the
state of affairs 169

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the operations in Andalusia--Description of
the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the
Tagus--Situation of the armies in Estremadura--Complex operations
in that province--Soult’s policy 188

CHAPTER VII.

Situation of the armies north of the Tagus--Operations in Old
Castile and the Asturias--Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo--Loison
repulsed from Astorga--Kellerman chases Carrera from the
Gata mountains--Obscurity of the French projects--Siege of
Astorga--Mahi driven into Gallicia--Spaniards defeated at
Mombouey--Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca--The
ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain--Massena
assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the
northern provinces--Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad
Rodrigo--Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town--Massena
arrives and alters the plan of attack--Daring action of three
French soldiers--Place surrenders--Andreas Herrasti--His fine
conduct--Reflections upon the Spanish character 201

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington’s policy--Change of administration in
England--Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning--Lord
Wellesley joins the new ministry--Debates in Parliament--Factious
violence on both sides--Lord Wellington’s sagacity and firmness
vindicated--His views for the defence of Portugal--Ministers
accede to his demands--Grandeur of Napoleon’s designs against the
Peninsula--Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the
English ministers--Discusses the state of the war--Similarity
of his views with those of sir John Moore--His reasons for not
advancing into Spain explained and vindicated 215

CHAPTER II.

Greatness of lord Wellington’s plans--Situation of the
belligerents described--State of the French--Character of
Joseph--Of his Ministers--Disputes with the Marshals--Napoleon’s
policy--Military governments--Almenara sent to Paris--Curious
deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart,
and the historian Cabanes--Prodigious force of the French
army--State of Spain--Inertness of Gallicia--Secret plan of
the Regency for encouraging the Guerillas--Operations of those
bands--Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to
South America--England--State of parties--Factious injustice on
both sides--Difficulty of raising money--Bullion committee--Wm.
Cobbett--Lord King--Mr. Vansittart--Extravagance of the
Ministers--State of Portugal--Parties in that country--Intrigues
of the Patriarch and the Souza’s--Mr. Stuart is appointed
Plenipotentiary--His firmness--Princess Carlotta claims the
regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne
of Spain 234

CHAPTER III.

Lord Wellington’s scheme for the defence of Portugal--Vastness
of his designs--Number of his troops--Description of the
country--Plan of defence analysed--Difficulty of supplying the
army--Resources of the belligerents compared--Character of the
British soldier 254

CHAPTER IV.

Character of Miguel Alava--Portuguese government demand more
English troops--Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the
Regency--The factious conduct of the latter--Character of the
light division--General Crawfurd passed the Coa--His activity
and skilful arrangements--Is joined by Carrera--Skirmish
at Barba del Puerco--Carrera invites Ney to desert--Romana
arrives at head-quarters--Lord Wellington refuses to succour
Ciudad Rodrigo--His decision vindicated--Crawfurd’s ability
and obstinacy--He maintains his position--Skirmish at
Alameda--Captain Kraükenberg’s gallantry--Skirmish at Villa de
Puerco--Colonel Talbot killed--Gallantry of the French captain
Guache--Combat of the Coa--Comparison between general Picton and
general Crawfurd 273

CHAPTER V.

Slight operations in Gallicia, Castile, the Asturias,
Estremadura, and Andalusia--Reynier passes the Tagus--Hill
makes a parallel movement--Romana spreads his troops
over Estremadura--Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at
Thomar--Critical situation of Silveira--Captures a Swiss
battalion at Puebla de Senabria--Romana’s troops defeated at
Benvenida--Lascy and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer
but are forced to reimbark--Lord Wellington’s plan--How
thwarted--Siege of Almeida--Allies advance to Frexadas--The
magazine of Almeida explodes--Treachery of Bareiros--Town
surrenders--The allies withdraw behind the Mondego--Fort of
Albuquerque ruined by an explosion--Reynier marches on Sabugal,
but returns to Zarza Mayor--Napoleon directs Massena to
advance--Description of the country--Erroneous notions of lord
Wellington’s views entertained by both armies 296

CHAPTER VI.

Third Invasion of Portugal--Napoleon’s prudence in military
affairs vindicated--Massena concentrated his corps--Occupies
Guarda--Passes the Mondego--Marches on Viseu--Lord Wellington
falls back--Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the
Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar--General
Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the
Alva--The allied army is thus interposed between the French
and Coimbra--Daring action of colonel Trant--Contemporaneous
events in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla--Romana
defeated--Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under general
Madden--Dangerous crisis of affairs--Violence of the Souza
faction--An indiscreet letter from an English officer, creates
great confusion at Oporto--Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese
Regency--He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer
battle--Chooses the position of Busaco 312

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao--Remarkable
panic in the light division--The second and sixth corps arrive in
front of Busaco--Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena
delays--The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive--Battle of
Busaco--Massena turns the right of the allies--Lord Wellington
falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the
French rear--Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego--Coimbra evacuated,
dreadful scene there--Disorders in the army--Lord Wellington’s
firmness contrasted with Massena’s indolence--Observations 325

CHAPTER VIII.

Massena resumes his march--The militia close upon his
rear--Cavalry skirmish near Leiria--Allies retreat upon the
lines--Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra--The French army continues
its march--Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Crawfurd is
surprised at Alemquer and retreats by the wrong road--Dangerous
results of this error--Description of the lines of Torres
Vedras--Massena arrives in front of them--Romana reinforces
Lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions--Remarkable works
executed by the light division at Aruda--The French skirmish at
Sobral--General Harvey wounded--General St. Croix killed--Massena
takes a permanent position in front of the Lines--He is harassed
on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese
militia 340

CHAPTER IX.

State of Lisbon--Embargo on the vessels in the river--Factious
conduct of the Patriarch--The desponding letters from the
army--Alarm--Lord Liverpool--Lord Wellington displays the
greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind--He rebukes
the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and
presumption of the Patriarch’s faction--Violence of this
faction--Curious revelation made by Baron Eben and the editor
of the Brazilienza--Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio
Janeiro--Strengthens the authority of Lord Wellington and Mr.
Stuart--The French seize the Islands in the river--Foolish
conduct of the governor of Setuval--General Fane sent to the left
bank of the Tagus--Lord Wellington’s embarrassments become more
serious--The heights of Almada fortified--Violent altercation of
the Regency upon this subject--The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart
and nearly ruins the common cause 364

CHAPTER X.

Massena’s pertinacity--He collects boats on the Tagus,
and establishes a depôt at Santarem--Sends general Foy to
Paris--Casts a bridge over the Zezere--Abandons his position in
front of the Lines--Is followed by lord Wellington--Exploit of
serjeant Baxter--Massena assumes the position of Santarem--Lord
Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus--Prepares to
attack the French--Abandons this design and assumes a permanent
position--Policy of the hostile generals exposed--General
Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats
again--The French marauders spread to the Mondego--Lord
Wellington demands reinforcements--Beresford takes the command
on the left of the Tagus--Operations of the militia in
Beira--General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps--Joins
Massena at Espinhal--Occupies Leiria--Claparede defeats Silveira
and takes Lamego--Returns to the Mondego--Seizes Guarda and
Covilhao--Foy returns from France--The duke of Abrantes wounded
in a skirmish at Rio Mayor--General Pamplona organizes a secret
communication with Lisbon--Observations 377

BOOK XII.

CHAPTER I.

General sketch of the state of the war--Lord Wellington objects
to maritime operations--Expedition to Fuengirola--Minor
operations in Andalusia--National Cortez assemble in the
Isla de Leon--Its proceedings--New regency chosen--Factions
described--Violence of all parties--Unjust treatment of the
colonies 402

CHAPTER II.

Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz--His
flotilla--Enters the Troccadero canal--Villantroys, or
cannon-mortars, employed by the French--Inactivity of the
Spaniards--Napoleon directs Soult to aid Massena--Has some
notion of evacuating Andalusia--Soult’s first expedition
to Estremadura--Carries the bridge of Merida--Besieges
Olivenza--Ballasteros defeated at Castellejos--Flies into
Portugal--Romana’s divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of
Olivenza--That place surrenders--Romana dies--His character--Lord
Wellington’s counsels neglected by the Spanish generals--First
siege of Badajos--Mendizabel arrives--Files the Spanish army into
Badajos--Makes a grand sally--Is driven back with loss--Pitches
his camp round San Christoval--Battle of the Gebora--Continuation
of the blockade of Cadiz--Expedition of the allies under general
Lapeña--Battle of Barosa--Factions in Cadiz 421

CHAPTER III.

Siege of Badajos continued--Imas surrenders--His cowardice
and treachery--Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara taken
by the French--Soult returns to Andalusia--Relative state of
the armies at Santarem--Retreat of the French--Massena’s able
movement--Skirmish at Pombal--Combat of Redinha--Massena halts
at Condeixa--Montbrun endeavours to seize Coimbra--Baffled by
colonel Trant--Condeixa burnt by the French--Combat of Casal
Nova--General Cole turns the French at Panella--Combat of Foz
d’Aronce--Massena retires behind the Alva 450

CHAPTER IV.

Allies halt for provisions--State of the campaign--Passage of the
Ceira--Passage of the Alva--Massena retires to Celerico--Resolves
to march upon Coria--Is prevented by Ney, who is deprived of
his command and sent to France--Massena abandons Celerico and
takes post at Guarda--The allies oblige the French to quit that
position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa--Combat of
Sabugal--Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between
Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo--His danger--He is released by the
British cavalry and artillery--Massena abandons Portugal 473

CHAPTER V.

Estimate of the French loss--Anecdote of Colonel Waters--Lord
Wellington’s great conceptions explained--How impeded--Affairs
in the south of Spain--Formation of the fourth and fifth
Spanish armies--Siege of Campo Mayor--Place falls--Excellent
conduct of major Tallaia--Beresford surprises Montbrun--Combat
of cavalry--Campo Mayor recovered--Beresford takes
cantonments round Elvas--His difficulties--Reflections upon
his proceedings--He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and
passes the Guadiana--Outposts of cavalry cut off by the
French--Castaños arrives at Elvas--Arrangements relative to
the chief command--Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg,
who returns to Llerena--General Cole takes Olivenza--Cavalry
skirmish near Usagre--Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines
Badajos--Skirmish there--Arranges the operations--Political
difficulties--Lord Wellington returns to the Agueda--Operations
in the north--Skirmishes on the Agueda--Massena advances to
Ciudad Rodrigo--Lord Wellington reaches the army--Retires behind
the Dos Casas--Combat of Fuentes Onoro--Battle of Fuentes
Onoro--Evacuation of Almeida 489

CHAPTER VI.

Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira--Marshal Beresford’s
operations--Colonel Colborne’s beats up the French quarters
in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys--First English
siege of Badajos--Captain Squires breaks ground before San
Cristoval--His works overwhelmed by the French fire--Soult
advances to relieve the place--Beresford raises the siege--Holds
a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to
fight--Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position
at Albuera--Allied cavalry driven in by the French--General Blake
joins Beresford--General Cole arrives on the frontier--Battle of
Albuera 523

CHAPTER VII.

Continuation of the battle of Albuera--Dreadful state of both
armies--Soult retreats to Solano--General Hamilton resumes the
investment of Badajos--Lord Wellington reaches the field of
battle--Third and seventh divisions arrive--Beresford follows
Soult--The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats
to Llerena--Cavalry action at Usagre--Beresford quits the
army--General Hill reassumes the command of the second division,
and lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos.--Observations 542

_Papers relating to the former volumes._

I. Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby 559

II. Note upon the situation of Spain in 1808, dictated by
Napoleon 560

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Returns of the French army in the Peninsula, extracted from the
French muster-rolls 567

No. II.

Extracts of letters from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, and
one from sir John Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in
Portugal 573

No. III.

Extracts from the correspondence of a field-officer of engineers,
employed at Cadiz, and extracts from the official abstract of
military reports from the British commanders at Cadiz 580

No. IV.

Extracts from king Joseph’s correspondence 583

No. V.

Extracts of letters from lord Wellington 586

No. VI.

Extracts from a report made by the duke of Dalmatia to the prince
of Wagram and Neufchatel 603

Intercepted letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor 607

No. VII.

Miscellaneous correspondence of the French marshals and others,
and extracts from general Pelet’s journal 607

No. VIII.

The French officers, prisoners of war at Oporto, to general Trant 623

No. IX.

A letter from lieutenant-general Graham to the right hon. H.
Wellesley, and state of the troops at Tarifa, under his command 624

Extract of a letter from general Frederick Ponsonby, and various
other documents 629

No. X.

Extracts from the correspondence of captain Squires, of the
engineers 638

No. XI.

Extract of a letter from general Campbell to lord Melville 639

ERRATA.

Page 10, line 6, _for_ “Caspe secured the communication between the
wings of the third corps and Fraga, and its
wooden bridge, &c.” _read_ “Caspe secured the
communication between the wings of the third
corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge, &c.”

.. 14, .. last, _for_ “absolutely” _read_ “absolute.”

.. 71, .. 16, _for_ “Bulluno” _read_ “Belluno.”

.. 91, .. 20, _for_ “thousend” _read_ “thousand.”

.. 139, margin, _for_ “Istoria militaire degl’Italiano” _read_
“Istoria militáre degl’Italiani.”

.. 143, .. 10, _for_ “Augereau’s” _read_ “Augereau.”

.. 194, .. 3 from bottom, _for_ “marched” _read_ “march.”

.. 216, .. 15, _for_ “fitting, out &c.” _read_ “fitting out, &c.”

.. 219, .. 6 from bottom, _for_ “even that in case” _read_ “even
in that case.”

.. 249, .. 3, _for_ “denied” _read_ “desired.”

.. 278, .. 14 from bottom, _for_ “him” _read_ “he.”

.. 304, .. 10 from bottom, _for_ “amounted” _read_ “mounted.”

.. 306, .. 11 from bottom, _for_ “only” _read_ “principal.”

.. 319, .. 23, _for_ “severally” _read_ “several.”

.. 382, .. 6, _for_ “where” _read_ “there.”

.. 392, .. 5, _for_ “right bank” _read_ “left bank.”

.. 417, .. 4, _for_ “latter” _read_ “Cortes.”

.. 431, .. 17, _for_ “besieged” _read_ “besiegers.”

.. 443, .. 2 from bottom, _for_ “Dikies” _read_ “Dilke.”

.. 465, margin, _for_ “Campagne de Français” _read_ “Campagne
des Français.”

.. 470, .. 9, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.”

.. 470, .. 17, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.”

.. 512, .. 2, _for_ “eight” _read_ “eighth.”

LIST OF PLATES.

No. 1. Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10 _to face page_ 10

2. Siege of Gerona _to face page_ 48

3. Areizaga’s Operations, 1809 _to face page_ 84

4. Invasion of Andalusia, 1810 _to face page_ 108

5. Defence of Portugal, 1810 _to face page_ 266

6. Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810 _to face page_ 292

7. Operations on the Mondego, 1810 _to face page_ 334

8. Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810 _to face page_ 358

9. Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811 _to face page_ 446

10. Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 _to face page_ 486

11. Battle of Fuentes Onoro _to face page_ 516

12. Battle of Albuera _to face page_ 540

NOTICE.

The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of
original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal
Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,[1] general Graham,[2] general
Pelet,[3] general Campbell,[4] captain Codrington,[5] and colonel
Cox,[6] together with many private journals and letters of officers
employed during the war.

Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from
major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the
description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note
by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my
first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the
arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s retreat from Madrid.

The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. &
VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII.

HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

[Sidenote: 1809.]

When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias
became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s
principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly
used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero,
sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the
sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally,
as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the
war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their
career was one of pains and difficulties.

Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that
the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country
people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the
battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the
Guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired
reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats,
the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards; hoping thus to
cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license, because the
regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the
benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves.

Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, and every range became
the mother of a Guerilla brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps
less numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the Ebro, the
Catalonian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo,
brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca
and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the
Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed
the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts; and
maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed
the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.

On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina,
were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, taking
possession of the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca,
and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain
of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent,
situated on the top of a high rock, near Cariñena, he made a depôt
of provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an
entrenched camp for three thousand men.

On Gayan’s left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy,
established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria
and La Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large
force, with which he cut the direct line of communication between
Zaragoza and Madrid.

Beyond Villa Campa’s positions the circle of war was continued
by other bands; which, descending from the Moncayo mountains,
infested the districts of Taranzona and Borja, and intercepted the
communications between Tudela and Zaragoza.

The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all the country between
Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrennean
valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, and
commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, taken at Zaragoza,
was, by the French, said to have broken his parole; but he, pleading
a previous breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, and from
thence passing with some regular officers into the valleys, took the
command of the insurrection, and succeeded in surprising several
French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan
de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history
as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish
conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the
church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese,
and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under
Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget,
Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment
of the third corps.

All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty thousand armed
men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men,
intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts
of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at
Tortoza, abandoned Aragon to its fate, and proceeding to Taragona,
endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia.

Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments
as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his
scouting parties close up to Tortoza; but finding the dispersion of
Blake’s troops complete, he posted Meusnier’s division on the line
of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so
as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro. Then
crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made
demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging
the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. Suchet,
however, continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and
leaving Habert’s division to guard that line, returned himself in the
latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon.

Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full
effect to his victory; the French General sought to fix himself
firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win
battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system
of civil administration which enabled him to support his troops,
and yet to offer some security of property to those inhabitants
who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to
trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed
with the Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without
relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he
attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that
while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should
also form an army capable of executing any enterprize.

He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having dislodged the Spaniards
from their positions near that castle, in June, supplied it with ten
months’ provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Cariñena, on
the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments; and having
suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at
the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar, during
the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a
detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed
on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert
defeated Perena.

The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed,
and Daroca was occupied by the French. The vicinity of Calatayud
and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from
Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco
Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards at
St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley
of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment
of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French
battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of
Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that chief,
retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without
surrendering himself.

These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of
the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general
proceeded against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and
Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de Guarra, rallied between the Cinca
and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed the
chief command; but on the 23d of September, the whole being routed
by general Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in
Lerida and Mequinenza.

Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candasnos, and Monzon, established
a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some
field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate the
districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would
have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication
with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled
in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated
Partizans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La
Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda,
to meet them; and having reached a certain distance up the valley,
was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his
post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to
kill his sick men, but the townsmen of Graus would not suffer this
barbarity; and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was
not rare in Aragonese towns.

While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of
Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candasnos to be attacked, and some
sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but
the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the
smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side
of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted the
communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud,
rallied Gayan’s troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of
Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished as a
citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod
marched in November, from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two
thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some
advanced posts from Ojos Negros to Origuela; came in front of the
main position at eleven o’clock in the morning of the 25th.

COMBAT OF TREMENDAL.

The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue
of land shooting out, overhung Origuela, and on the upper part of
this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right
and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing
that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open
attack, imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and making as if
he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin.
Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side. In the
night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the
main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, and,
at the same time, Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces
of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish
outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his
guns, as if to cover the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and Villa
Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely
off his guard, when Henriod’s six companies, secretly scaling the
rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards,
killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made
against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district
was disarmed.

Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon,
but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month
of December, Suchet (assisted by general Milhaud, with a moveable
column from Madrid,) took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the
insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was,
in a manner effected. The interior was disarmed and quieted, and
the Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, were recruited,
as well as supplied, from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the
defensive. The Aragonese also were so vexed by the smaller bands, now
dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a
Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, and enabled the French
general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army
of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men; of which, a part
were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortoza, and the rest
about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were, indeed, the only
obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps; and in
them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when
closely pressed by the invaders.

The policy of the Supreme Junta was however, always to form fresh
corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa,
keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and
still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Novarro,
making Tortoza his base of operations lined the banks of the Algas,
and menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood
of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the
Segre. But the activity of the French gave little time to effect any
considerable organization.

Suchet’s positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; and Tudela, Jaca,
and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned; but his principal forces
were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe,
Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of which the
first, third, and fourth were places of strength: and certainly,
whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military
light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only
to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate
the feelings of the Aragonese--confessedly the most energetic portion
of the nation--and to place the third corps, with reference to the
general operations of the war, in a most formidable position.

1º. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on
the right bank of the Ebro; and being situated at the entrance of the
passes leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, from which
Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could
place the Catalonian army between two fires, whenever the seventh
corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.

2º. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third
corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the
means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3º. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida;
and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all
the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation
of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at
Benevarres, could always curb Perena.

4º. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with
the moveable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while
the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent
of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca
and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected
the operations of the third with the seventh corps; and henceforward
we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they
form but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against
the south.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 1._

SUCHET’S OPERATIONS
1809-10.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in
Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student
Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods
in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden
enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon,
one of Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was
at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders
attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system,
ensued. General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of
being in Mina’s pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to
confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the
whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak.

To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France,
the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third
corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually
captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of
the Partidas. “_Espoz y Mina_” took his nephew’s place; and from that
time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were
troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this
celebrated man--undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the
Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient
this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an
auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils.

It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that
it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the
greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those
provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although
less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact
leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be
hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted,
men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own
exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas
of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at
one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often
commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied
half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely
defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable
enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to
be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the
operations of a single “corps d’armée.”

It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a
system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no
people will thus persevere, the aged, the sick, the timid, the
helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also,
be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion
that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in
alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their
victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some
others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of
ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour;
and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the
garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke,
the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and
tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures
resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters
from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their
bands.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct
the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected,
the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was
misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides,
and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons
to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord
Wellington; but that great man, instead of following the example of
the Supreme Junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a
military organization upon totally different principles. The people
were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it
was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just
bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered
subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently
is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government being
unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy.

The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring of disorder, and
disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is
sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of
unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the
rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for
the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency
been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by
politicians, who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high
sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance,
regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the
latter’s discipline.

[Sidenote: Extract from the Life of Mina.]

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one
great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is
permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;--for
one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two
to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers
than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to
slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask
of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: nay, this the
most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other
Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before
related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and
strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity
of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla
system confined to the one side. The following observations of St.
Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable
experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was
greater than the benefit.

“Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans,
I admired them; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason,
their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused
the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without
advantage.”

“When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which
defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come
to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support; but,
without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on
to the field of battle.”--“It is inhuman to place their inexperience
in opposition to hardened veterans.”

“Instead of _exasperating_ the people of Catalonia, the leaders
should have endeavoured to _calm_ them, and have directed their
ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited
them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued
them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to
embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains
and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned
to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people’s
ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great
occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not
to be had.”

“Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their
leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain.
The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in
their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to
the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and
ill-used them when broken by defeat.”

“They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that
they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often
as dangerous to their own party, as to the enemy. The atrocities
committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic,
abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as
the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of
distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at
first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for
the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in
Spain, would never have remounted the throne.”

“The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little
conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the
slaves of their duty, and of the state; certain of death a little
sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of
the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted
warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out
this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves
the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited
by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into
their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a
contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh
corps,--seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally
inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and
helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first
menaced total destruction, ceased entirely.”

Such were St. Cyr’s opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in
Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was
not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

[Sidenote: See Vol II. p. 102.]

The narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the
moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich,
received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had
been relieved by the squadron of admiral Comaso. His whole attention
was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening
general Reille’s preparation for the siege of that place, a second
detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan.

During this time Conpigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made
his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans
and Wimphen, had composed Reding’s left wing, were continually
skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the
Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the
communications in a more systematic manner than before.

Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that
Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had
replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had
reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the
command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information
gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his “Journal of Operations,” he
asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and
his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous
of his rival.

Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the
revolution, imagined, that he had then acquired an influence which
might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that
vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes. But the latter,
although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people,
whereas, Augereau’s address, being at utter variance with those
feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia,
escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette
colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies
that had been posted.

The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan,
and St. Cyr continued to command; but reluctantly, because (as he
affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself
exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon’s ill-will.
The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to
correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the
publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr’s. For these
reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple discharge of his
duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot
be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free
himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was
certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that
the emperor discovered so little jealousy; when a man has once raised
himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his
former comrades, for, as all honours and rewards, flowing from him,
are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even
the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where
the sanction of time is wanting, to identify the sovereign with the
country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is
patriotism.

[Sidenote: See Vol. II p. 363.]

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as
we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake’s
movement against Suchet. This order he refused to obey, and with
reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake’s false
movement to occupy two “Corps d’Armée,” and so retard the siege of
Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia.
Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the
Spaniard’s possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils
of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all
his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege
without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious
in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed
to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in
Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona; which,
seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient.

St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not
exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and
that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless,
considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service
of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would
replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies
which he had himself collected at Vich: he sent all his own
cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry,
and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus
increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again
urged Verdier to be expedite.

These reinforcements marched the 22d of May, and the covering army
diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold
the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the
Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without
skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town, always remained
in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of
resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed
partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments,
which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable
for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by
their fortitude; and, men and women alike, they endure calamity
with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly
admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and,
continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually
projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to
execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more
than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved
to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in
that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and
wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his
reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without
loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry,
then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the
districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the way
of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de
Farnes, lasted two days; and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters
being fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols
was stormed, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another
harbour. The French army was then distributed in a half circle,
extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were
established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas,
Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola; thus cutting off the
communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Conpigny,
Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros.

During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish
battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel,
and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of
Blake’s army; a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day,
being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma.
Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalonian army,
the few troops that kept the field were acting independently, and
Conpigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona. He
and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and
political intrigues than with military affairs, were complaining and
thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were
alike weakened by internal divisions.

Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities
afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within
the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the
6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with
Lecchi’s division, he completed the investment of the place on both
sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus,
at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of his army, was
advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon
from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of
the contending parties were as follows:--Eighteen thousand French
held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about
four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of
communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier asserted that
the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, was
_destitute of a garrison_, when he arrived there from France. A
fact consistent with Lord Collingwood’s description of the Catalan
warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed
to them by others.

[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.]

St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed,
covered the siege with twelve thousand men; and Duhesme, having
about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona.
Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city
and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation.
Blake was still in Aragon; Conpigny, with six thousand of the worst
troops, was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a
few thousand, held the country about the Upper Llobregat. Juan Claros
and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olot and Ripol; and,
in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed
under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own
system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time
of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a
favourable opportunity occurred.

The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, now resorted to
Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched
incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels,
from carrying provisions by the coast. But from Gerona, the governor
did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the _Supreme
Central Junta_, for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; and when
the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand
regular troops: his magazines and hospitals were but scantily
provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was however, of a
lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted.

[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 78.]

The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the
first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition,
patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical
force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness,
common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the
ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the
title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and
to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr,
their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers!
To evince his own resolution, the governor forbad the mention of a
capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only
denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. Alvarez, master of
his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse
to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence
was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain
of cruelty, and rich in honour.

On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, a
mortar-battery, from the heights of Casen Rocca, on the left of the
Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against the outworks of
Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form.
The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would
be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the
conduct of Alvarez.

The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the
French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened
against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca.

The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally
repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men.

The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the
outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken,
abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French
immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the
northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their
works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and
with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the
flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned,
nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon,
in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter
was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of
the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the
storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only
assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these
four days, the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched,
and barricadoed the opening.

At four o’clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping
out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the
fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great
resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that
no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and
rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern
bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but the
obstacles were insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss of
a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was
however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the
garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic
and the city.

About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr’s
knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted
the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of
Souham’s division from Santa Coloma de Farnés, and posted it on the
left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich
were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although
an effort to raise the siege was to be expected. For letters from
Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted,
and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said,
collecting men at Taragona.

Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before
Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take
Palamos. To effect this, general Fontanes marched from St. Filieu,
on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some
squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer
being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the
attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti,
they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not
keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off.

STORMING OF PALAMOS.

This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from
Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works,
although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to
be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted; and the town,
built on a narrow rocky peninsula had but one front, the approach to
which was over an open plain, completely commanded from the left by
some very rugged hills, where a considerable number of Somatenes were
assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town.

Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time,
summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the
Italians immediately stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying
towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, the
latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes’ troops having turned the
town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the
sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving
near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham’s outposts at Santa
Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr’s attention to that side, while a
reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left
of his line into the city. The French general was not deceived; but
the Spaniards nevertheless sent fifteen hundred chosen men, under
the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, to penetrate secretly
through the enemy’s posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied by
an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishmen
also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino’s posts
unobserved. A straggler, however, was taken, and St. Cyr being thus
informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line
of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de
Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point,
and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column.

As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their
march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by
the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the
other troops, when a thousand men were made prisoners: the rest
dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their
arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal, having offered
to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his
men; but the Spanish general Conpigny affirmed that the men abandoned
Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away before he had seen
the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment.
It is also certain that Marshal’s flight was to Gerona, where he
afterwards fell fighting gallantly.

This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle
had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was
thus debarred of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies
as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he
did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Conpigny, and even denounced
his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on
the ground of Blake’s absence, the want of provisions, and the danger
of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona; and
finally adduced colonel Marshal’s unfortunate attempt, as proof that
due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had
been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches,
a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during
that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at
Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Conpigny
nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until
sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as
on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and
this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have
forgotten, that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand
men to man the works, and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at
any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his
approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted
the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the
little fort of St. Juan. But his operations were retarded by Claros
and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French
frontier. To prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade of
Souham’s division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja;
and, on the 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel,
situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort
and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted
the communication between the latter place and the city.

On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the
counterscarp blown in, and the flank defences ruined, the ditch
was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by
storm, but no lodgement was effected. During the day, Alvarez made
an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the
same time, two hundred Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with
provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking
that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion
being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to
descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of
attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A
second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for
storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison
blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained
Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches
and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

Verdier, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his
despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were
unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged
him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches
had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise
expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance
cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the
town; in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding
facts; for the Spaniards indignant at his undeserved contempt,
redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and
while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira,
at the head of two thousand five hundred Miguelettes, attacked
Bascara a post between Figuera and Gerona at the moment when a
convoy, escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde.
The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting some “_gens d’armes_”
and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the
post on the 6th; but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen
back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St.
Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That general
refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion
to censure the system of moveable columns, as more likely to create
than to suppress insurrections, as being harassing to the troops,
weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the
peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better
informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in
these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline
that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is
unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times
requiring a nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement,
was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the
seventh corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is
difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting
the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of moveable
columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient
that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man
doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr’s objections. The emperor’s
views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to
lessen them, go down, with a wonderful authority to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers,
commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and
making a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening
of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of Angeles; but being baffled in
an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the
night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near
St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh
courage to the garrison; yet the enemy’s approaches hourly advanced,
pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the
town still remained inactive.

In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to
themselves; while defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with
inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the
cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and
the Supreme Junta of Catalonia, forwarded their complaints to the
Central Junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of
expression.

“The generals of our army,” they said, “have formed no efficient plan
for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals
here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they
say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty.
Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to
her own feeble resources! If so, her destruction is inevitable; and
should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and
the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they
see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or
in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other
provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when
this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?”--“Do you
not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is
sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most
zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier
be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures,
children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no
longer any real existence.”

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to
lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an
immediate effort to raise the siege. How little did the language of
the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall
find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city;
but the Supreme Central Junta were only intent upon thwarting and
insulting the English general, after the battle of Talavera, and this
was the moment that the Junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic
with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied
by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three
breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of
the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a
force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El
Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the
mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the
Milans; and as he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he
could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand men against the
circle of investment. His arrival created considerable alarm among
the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged, was also among
the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained
many thousand patients. The battalions in the field could scarcely
muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were
obliged to rise from sick-beds to take the command of the brigades;
and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force,
was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded
country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake’s
operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should
oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his
fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St.
Cyr’s best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised
soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution,
decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting
in those original and daring views, which mark the man of superior
genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against
difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed,
“that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed
courage. Blake’s inaction was the thing to be dreaded, for,
notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days provisions could
be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be
necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner,
that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point.
The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the
side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would
probably act immediately. Hence it was necessary to concentrate as
many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and
deliver battle, and there were still ten thousand good troops under
arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing
corps.”

On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no
means spirited, was from frequent defeat, become cautious without
being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the
throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting
that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to
raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia.

He had collected and loaded with flour, about two thousand beasts of
burthen, and placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under
an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Garcia
Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man of considerable promise,
undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the
Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack.
To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O’Donnel to
fall upon Souham’s posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of
August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general
Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Landen to collect the
Miguelettes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession
of “_N. S. de los Angelos_,” a convent, situated on a high mountain
behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack
the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be
assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to
pass.

O’Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of
the position occupied by one of Souham’s battalions at Bruñola, but
the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground.
The Spanish general, being joined by Loygori, renewed the skirmish,
but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St.
Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly
advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly,
that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side;
partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions
might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in
detail during their march. But he argued that his opponent must be
exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his
forces, and broken the covering line at once; and, seeing that such
an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own
troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his
unskilful adversary.

Souham’s division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of
September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and
at eight o’clock, the head of Pino’s division entered this line,
prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At
twelve o’clock, these two divisions were established in position,
and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a
strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on
the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded
by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat
ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the
Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the
Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under
Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed,
and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria,
and look to the security of the parc and the trenches. A thick
fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained
apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather
clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the
heads of Blake’s columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated
at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas.
Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde,
who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains,
crossed the Ter at Amer, and decended the heights of Bañolas with his
convoy. He was now on the flat ground, where there was no other guard
than the two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said,
at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros;
and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy.

Verdier’s reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and
separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish
columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post,
advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge,
put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first
took the direction of the town; but being fired upon, turned towards
the heights of Palau, made for Fornels; and would have gone straight
into Blake’s camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from
viewing that general’s positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with
a battalion from Pino’s division, he instantly directed them back
again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow
Garcia Conde with the reserve; but the latter had already conducted
his convoy safely into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had
destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege
raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town,
into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the
French two days before.

Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge
of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his
parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two
Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired
across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars.
Thus the place was succoured for a moment; but, as Blake made no
further movement, Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The
provisions received, did not amount to more than seven or eight days’
consumption; and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour the
food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz’s troops were flying on the one side of the Ter,
the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the
other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake’s
army was victorious, and the French in flight. Hence, he refrained
from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen,
crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the
garrison, reinforced by Conde’s men, might have filled the trenches,
razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could
have come to their support.

St. Cyr having but one day’s provisions left, now resolved to seek
Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the
mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled
St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first
effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so
contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake’s disposal, that
Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting thenceforth only to
his own heroism, permitted Conde’s troops to go back, or to remain as
they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not
to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation,
he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and
afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused
some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and
citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing
their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in every
thing.

Garcia Conde’s success must be attributed partly to the negligence
of St. Cyr’s subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in
the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself
acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much
danger or difficulty: nor were St. Cyr’s dispositions for the next
day perfectly combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit for
sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he
forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between
the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to
penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men
in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to
the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains
until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been
established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised
on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to
have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took
place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier’s reserve; and
the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the
fugitives themselves.

[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.]

St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so
weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that
he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the
bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice
was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he
himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted
authority. But St. Cyr avows that his soldiers answered honestly to
every call he made; and he was bound, while he retained the command,
to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour. In
other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseemed
his great reputation. It was not so with Blake. The whole of his
operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of
any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to
raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight
skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and
then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned
away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from
Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side,
for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile came out
at daybreak on the 3d of September, with fifteen hundred men and the
beasts of burthen. Halting, for a little time, just beyond the gate,
he examined the country in front with his glass; every thing appeared
favourable and his troops were beginning to move forward, when the
noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was
placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in
the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the
ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light,
and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily
retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next
attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed
Mazzuchelli’s brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the
valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde’s
rear when the latter should again come forth. He also put a battalion
on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it
back either upon Mazzuchelli’s brigade or upon La Bispal, where he
also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino’s division.

The 4th of September one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry,
and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending
the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed
in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva.
Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the
fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because
Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were
part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double
error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the
right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without
hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed,
played their guns upon the rear of his column. Being informed by the
peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La
Bispal, he made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having notice of
his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge
which crossed the Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a
wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their
rear was attacked by Pino’s personal escort, and that fifty men and
some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona; Mazzuchelli’s brigade
and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and
the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French
store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply
could be obtained. Alvarez profitted of this cessation, to retrench
and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier
had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan,
and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the
4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August,
to seize the convent of _Madona de los Angeles_, had fortified that
building, and introduced small supplies of provisions; thus reviving,
in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights
beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated,
by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles, and
with the assistance of Blake’s army, he hoped to maintain an open
communication with the country. A bold and skilful conception, but
he was unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins on
the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French
regiment; and the same day Mazzuchelli’s Italians stormed Madona de
los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who
were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer. He was repulsed with loss,
and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries
having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general
sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches,
and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th,
however, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give
the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes
between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were
rife. The engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable,
those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while
the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins was in
possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted.

Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau,
above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in
a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under
arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers
to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely
better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario.
Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm
provided Calvary were first taken.

[Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations]

Souham’s division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to
make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches
were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier’s troops, in three
columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault.
But the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the
columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell
before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest
breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on
the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the
head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and
the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a
loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice,
and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to
the assault; but that general, asserting that the men behaved
perfectly well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue
the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would
permit. His persevering spirit was not partaken by the council, and
the siege was turned into a blockade.

Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th,
made as if he would raise the blockade; but his object was merely
to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention and
judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let
him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could
reach the town. In this view, Souham’s division was placed behind
Palau and Pino’s division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi’s division of
the investing troops, was directed to meet the Spaniards in front,
while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a
circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of
St. Sadurni, detached ten thousand men, under Wimphen, to protect
the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O’Donnel led the advanced
guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O’Donnel fell upon the rear of
the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached
the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two
French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the
heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned
to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part
of Souham’s division came upon the left flank of the convoy, and,
pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde.
When Pino’s division, running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the
rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete, and Blake made
no effort to save the distressed troops. O’Donnel with a thousand
men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, but the
remainder of the convoy was taken. The Italians gave no quarter and
three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace
Blake’s communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St.
Filieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings
which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without
medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches
open. “If,” said Alvarez, “the captain-general be unable to make a
vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or
Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of
which will afflict posterity!”

St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future
supply, but finding Augereau in a good state of health, obliged that
marshal to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful
was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he
himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found
in the state of Napoleon’s affairs. Peace had been concluded with
Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples
had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming
disposable, not only the seventh, but every “corps d’armée” in Spain
was reinforced.

Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan,
reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course
of the following night, O’Donnel, issuing from the town, on the side
of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham’s quarters,
obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a
junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; having successfully executed
as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable
siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the
spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month,
with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to
surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such,
however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that,
notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th of October took possession once more of the
heights of Bruñola. Souham, with an inferior force put him to
flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of
Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall and towers, defended
by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle. It
was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there
captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off.
This disaster was however, more than balanced by an action off the
coast. Rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of
three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships,
having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October,
was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d. During the chase
several of the smaller vessels were burnt by the enemy, the rest
were driven on shore at different places, and two of the line of
battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and
some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding
nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort,
presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board
disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of
November however, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a
squadron; and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the
whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the
British seventy men killed and wounded.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 2._

SIEGE of GERONA
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became
frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the
governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During
November, famine and sickness increased within the city, and the
French stores of powder were again exhausted; but on the 6th of
December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of
Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the
walls, were carried by the besiegers; and the besieged, confined
to the circuit of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and
Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for some days, roused
himself for a last effort; and, making a general sally, on the 7th,
retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening a way
to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison. The next
day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war
assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded
on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the
troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to
be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners.
Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of
Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that Augereau treated
Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person’s
indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks
were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last
accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the
siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders;
they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being
to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute
them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh
interpretation of the terms.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue
and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in
veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant
Spaniard’s merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the
most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance;
but constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular
progress of the engineer; as I have before observed, the combinations
of science are not to be defied with impunity. But the French
combinations were not scientific; and this, saving the right of
Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the
defence.

2º. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjouic was
ill judged and worse executed, says, “The principal approaches should
have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there, was
easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clifts, and the defences
open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the
Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjouic, the approaches, from
the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the
flying sap, with great loss and difficulty.” If however, the Marcadel
had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been
covered by the Oña, and Montjouic, and the forts of the Constable
and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have
remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor who
defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell,
would have surrendered all, because a lodgement was made in an
isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful;
and certainly, it must always be a great matter with a general, to
raise the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink that of his
adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive
success.

3º. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjouic is less doubtful
than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for
four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules
of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be
observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the
progress of the siege; that during that month disease invaded the
army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted
operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the
trenches.

4º. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted
than that against Montjouic; and considering these facts, together
with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of
Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the mal-administration
of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more
kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken
at all.

5º. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the
besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries
only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely; they endured
unheard of sufferings with constancy; and their refusal to accept
the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an
instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed
are good and evil principles in man; how dependent upon accidental
circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities!
Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona,
was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona
Montjouic, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the
influence of a base court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak
in his character came to the surface; but in times more congenial to
virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man’s nature broke forth.

6º. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza,
it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of
the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers.
The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less
than those who came against the former city. The regular garrison
of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand; that of Gerona about three
thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least
twenty-five thousand; in the other, they were less than six thousand.
Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza;
the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance,
above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was
taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush
for; the fighting was more successful; the actual loss inflicted
upon the enemy greater; the suffering within the walls neither
wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled
that of Zaragoza; and every proceeding tended to raise instead of
sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule,
more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at
the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of
generous men.

7º. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of
Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter
having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in
the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless
of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona
struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John
Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and
landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary
that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single
march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand
pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post; and that place
being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater
means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have
reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor
more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but
the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing
population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in
their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of
communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of
their convoys, would have rendered the invaders’ task most difficult.

8º. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy
of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference
to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The
local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own
exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain
Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should
be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the
suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular
army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed
irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagena, the governors of this
rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never
even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of
defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually
establishing, at the distance of a few days’ march from Valencia
itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to
revert to the operations of the “_Central Supreme Junta_,” that it
may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives,
and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who
had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAP. IV.

When sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the
calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that
movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but
the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to
establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures
were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport
them to Manilla. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of
this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise,
such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and
temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the
nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was
wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

“_Spain_,” said lord Wellesley, “_has proved untrue to our alliance,
because she is untrue to herself._”--“_Until some great change shall
be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and
in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to
co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”--“No
alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and
national infirmity._”

This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the
conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of
assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government,
apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard
to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in
great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred;
but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter
scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private
emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under
licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation
and some peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a
final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of
patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which
should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members
of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They
proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council,
every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place;
the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire;
and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet,
and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of
resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and
the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the
proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of
lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity,
and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and
government.

[Sidenote: Vol. II. p. 348.]

This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission,
dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that
he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this
history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently
heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was
objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants,
contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity,
raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and
that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult
of access, and insolent of demeanour.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons,
not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh
chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general,
and to be stiled “_The Permanent Deputation of the Realm_.” One of
this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the
Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could
not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in
favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong
in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The “_Permanent
Deputation_,” being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it
must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers
and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it
was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter,
having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not
fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur
Wellesley’s retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay
had applied to lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of
government, and that nobleman also recommended a “_Council of
Regency_,” and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with
this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the
details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the
convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with
a list of grievances, “_a Bill of Rights_” founded on an enlarged
conciliatory policy and having equal regard for the interests of
the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of
this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement
for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first
excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the
government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that lord
Wellesley, condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic
form as for its inefficiency; because the English cabinet never
forgot, that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war
was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of
the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana’s proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October,
announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st
of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March
following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they
joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a
Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded
Romana’s plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies,
trample on the king’s rights, and would never assemble the Cortes;
moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then
enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they
defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which
deceived nobody; for, to use the words of lord Wellesley, “_no plan
had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction
of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of
justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security
of persons and property, and every other great branch of government,
were as defective as the military establishments_.”

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull
the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive
military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush
the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power.
They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout
Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and
in September and October, fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and
Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta’s old army;
the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of
which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and
equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to
the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto
drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded
a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English
stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every
exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha;
but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile
province made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena
on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La
Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occupied the whole of La
Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second
and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at
Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour,
who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to
reinforce the duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces
behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were
sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La
Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and
about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service
of the depôts behind the Morena.

[Sidenote: See Vol. II. p. 427.]

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near
Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese
frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight
hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions
of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men,
completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in
July,) made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de
Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same
time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men,
took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps,
which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the
Tormes and the Esla. In this situation, a French detachment attempted
to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October,
and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards
Ballasteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the
Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming
down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora.
Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from
thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies
of Gallicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were
ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Gallicia a general
disposition to resist the authority of the Central Junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, demanded, through
Perez Castro the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army
should join him; but this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, he
gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which
I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of
the military state of affairs at this period.

[Sidenote: Letter from Sir A. Wellesley, Sept. 23, 1809. MS.]

“The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those
which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but
(adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of
cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and
arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency
even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and
the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great
victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the
defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.

“But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar
advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate
the duke Del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part, or
the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the
different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each
for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the
enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford,
with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult,
which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which
was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the
inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them
from destruction.

“In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced
position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would
the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one
of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate,
or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative
efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the
commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with
any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could
follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions
performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after
the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be
forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought
never to have quitted.

“Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although
prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling
into the enemy’s hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque
any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the
Portuguese government, not to risk Bereford’s army in a situation
which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the
duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only
effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the
enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous
preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march,
in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose
those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence
of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an
attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish
force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk
to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the
other corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was to be saved;
and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact
position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain
that, in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he
could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other
misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other
probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine,
that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be
defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if
not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period, which the
enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize,
and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be
accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were
much more important to all parties, than any desultory successful
operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success
was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would
immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who
must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of
men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully
employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort.”

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence with Don M. Forjas,
October 19, 1809. MSS.]

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the
Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a
positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would
be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish
territories. “_When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese
can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have
the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any
person can engage to carry into execution a military operation._”
“_When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of
the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may
not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the
case when lately in that country._” “_When decided answers shall be
given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors
of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be
sent into Spain._” This was sir Arthur’s reply, which ended the
negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards
Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca,
eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him.
Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell
back to Tamames; taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable
strength, where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and
twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be
accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the
reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible
part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry.
Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive,
moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of
October, and immediately fell upon Del Parque’s left. The Spanish
cavalry fled rather hastily; the French horsemen followed closely,
the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown
into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and
the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them
from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered
the guns, and discomfitted the French with the loss of an eagle, one
cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on
the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers;
but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand,
seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to
be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to
Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st,
when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly thirty
thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned
Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th
crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to
cut off Marchand’s retreat. But that general had timely information,
and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the
defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle’s division was detached
through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps; and Kellerman
was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the
whole.

When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back,
not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar,
which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while
these events were taking place in Castile, the Central Junta having
finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of
unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always
overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy
to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is
immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success,
which continues until the hour of battle; and then when it might be
of use, generally abandons them. Now the Central Junta having, to
deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to
the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might
have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this
their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina
headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence,
that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a
provisionary system for the future administration of the capital,
with a care, that they denied to the army which was to put them in
possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and
Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their
eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation
was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his
courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter
end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as
the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from
Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only
Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when
Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the
duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received
instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and
Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of
Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men
were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan
which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove
disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French,
that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on
the defensive, Areizaga’s irruption may be regarded as an extreme
example of military rashness; and the project of uniting Del Parque’s
forces with Albuquerque’s, at Talavera, was also certain to fail;
because, the enemy’s masses were already in possession of the point
of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque’s rear.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit
of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report
that the British army was to co-operate; and permitted Areizaga to
march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more
untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held
repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of
the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive
operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was
peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their
army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did
not even _officially inform him of Areizaga’s march until the 18th of
November_, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign.
Yet, on _the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance_, and
with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should
instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque’s forces. Sir
Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that
his army would so act; and he assured the Junta, that the diversion
proposed would have no effect whatever.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of
November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces
of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about
eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private
gentlemen, and the baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent,
attended the head-quarters which was a scene of gaiety and boasting;
for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his
social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and
Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any
military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full
of life and confidence; and being without impediments of any kind,
made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling
manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their
route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha
universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.]

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours
of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement
was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what
specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to
France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his
advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to
meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards
Talavera; for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in
deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was
impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.

The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn
from Placentia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and
Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties
watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.

The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence
of Dessolle’s troops; and the other half, under general Liger Belair,
was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the
capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the
one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud’s cavalry at Ocaña.

[Sidenote: Imperial Muster Roll. MSS.]

The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by
marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebenes, a day’s march in advance of
Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour
Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madrilejos, on the road to the Sierra
Morena. The whole army including the French and Spanish guards, was
above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle’s
division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.]

In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six
thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come
down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second
column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the
Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madrilejos. All the
prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was
above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately
concentrated the first corps at Yebenes, but kept his cavalry at
Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and
Madrilejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front
of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back
by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga
continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards
Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of
the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank
of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña,
thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred
cavalry at that point on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired
with the first corps to Ajofrin.

On the 10th, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was ordered to march
from Talavera to Toledo; and the first corps which had reached the
latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus
to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent
six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards
continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them
towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only
Sebastiani’s cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos
Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed
the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus
pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand
and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons which
were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the
whole mass of the enemy’s cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two
hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga’s main body
was, however, coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña. The
next morning he took up a position on some heights lining the left
bank of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered Dos
Barrios, and their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from
the Morena like a stream of lava; and burst into La Mancha with a
rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. But this
swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but
an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or
position, without any plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac
into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling
and bewildered.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his
government of Sebastiani’s stubborn resistance, and of the doubts
which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the
Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the
British army, and commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque
to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately,
and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the
public, that sir Arthur was also coming on.

Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first
incertitude, Areizaga on the 14th, made a flank march by his right to
Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique,
turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern
side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been
concentrated from every quarter.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations. MSS.]

South of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating, but on the north,
the ramifications of the Cuença mountains, leading down the left
bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching
strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for
Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary’s
projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement
unless certain of support from the British army; and therefore kept
the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet’s
report from Oropesa. In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of
a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were rife,
but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was
actually within several marches.

Soult, now judging that although the rumours should be true, his
central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return
by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of
the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps
was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to
concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada
and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be
in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally,
information being received of the duke Del Parque’s retreat from
Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth
corps, Dessolle’s division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in
march, general Liger Belair’s brigade continued to watch the banks of
the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions
on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men
in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement
was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the
Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon
their left flank, and the king’s guards at Madrid, formed a reserve
for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera,
and Dessolle’s division was in the Guadarama on its return to the
capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios,
when Areizaga’s flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new
combinations.

In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made
a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry
over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry
the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in
Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix Areizaga,
and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the
Spaniard, by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and
Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish
general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his
cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and
skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas
also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French
garrison to retire from Guardalaxara upon Arganda, and occupied
the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight
French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march,
surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took
eighty horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata
and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this
time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at
Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to
the duke of Belluno.

The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the
Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on
the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed
the work, withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus,
and on the 18th, (the cavalry of the first corps having reached
Villarejo de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in his
parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la
Zarza.

Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the
unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the
French to fix a field of battle; but now Areizaga’s march to St. Cruz
had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close
together, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with
the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona,
could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga’s rear,
by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger
could arise from this double line of operations, because a single
march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the
latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to
sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were
certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in
march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez.
The fourth corps received a like order. The king, himself, quitting
Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal
French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of
Dessolle’s division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand
men. The same day, the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps
at Villarejo de Salvanés, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa
Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to
repair the broken bridges, near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one
o’clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry
of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps,
passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford.
General Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a
small body of Spanish horsemen; and was thus led to the table-land,
between Antiguela and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of
fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve.
Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at
that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was
immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the
whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these
troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant
when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were
advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani directed Paris,
with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn
and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which
being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused
considerable confusion in the Spanish ranks, and their general
endeavoured to remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But to
effect this he formed his left and centre in one vast column.
Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves,
and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion,
and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and
eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of
the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed,
and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult
to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was
endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of
the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the night, information
from the duke of Belluno, and the reports of officers sent towards
Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to
be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the
Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the
next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement
through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon
the king’s forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the
morning of the 19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry fight,
that the enemy could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same
plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently
half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve,
to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows,
whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this
ravine was the Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez
to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña.
The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some
infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the
direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge _in front_
of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and
rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain,
but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods,
which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish
baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga’s
dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The
whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to
Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one
regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the
command of marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary,
to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded
by general Senarmont. The Royal Guards remained with the King, and
marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before day-break, on the 19th, the monarch marched with the intention
of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At
Antiguela his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left,
gained the table-land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the
Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga’s army in order of battle.
The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the
advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the
divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts fell back, and
were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile
front and opened a sharp fire.

About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry,
and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only
twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and
fifty guns, including the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga’s
position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen
thousand strong, was paralized by the ravine; it could neither attack
nor be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, and the
extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horse, who
were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of
the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the
attack.

BATTLE OF OCAÑA.

At ten o’clock, Sebastiani’s cavalry gaining ground to his left,
turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of
infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed
in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the
olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same
manner, followed Leval in second line; and at the same moment,
general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops,
while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the
skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in
reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two
columns: the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, directed against
and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre
in check; and each being supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at eleven o’clock; at which hour,
Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering
fire on Areizaga’s centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played
at the same time across the ravine against the left; and six others
swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The
Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered
no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their
skirmishing fire brisk; and, from the centre of their line, sixteen
guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval’s and Girard’s
columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To
mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out
at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns,
and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the
Spaniards gave back: their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine
by a flanking fire of grape; and Senarmont immediately drawing the
artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and,
prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga’s right wing in its
whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged
the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing
_behind_ the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before
said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the
whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter
of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with
the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont’s artillery tore
their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless,
encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry
approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, their
fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was
wounded slightly, Leval severely; the line advanced, and the leading
French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso lost no time
in exhortations to Leval’s troops, but, like a great commander,
instantly brought up Girard’s division through the intervals of
the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one
regiment in square on the left flank: for he expected that Areizaga’s
powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge
for the victory. Girard’s fire soon threw the Spanish first line
into disorder; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by
an oblique movement, left in front, seeing the enemy’s right thus
shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side.

The light cavalry of the king’s guard, followed by the infantry,
then poured through the town; and, on the extreme left, Sebastiani,
with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them
to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little
from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide
of battle, now drew off entirely: the second line of infantry gave
ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; and Areizaga,
confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely
fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained,
endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to
reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolle’s
divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady
rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs,
outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion:
finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again
like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments
of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself
across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep
ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction,
continually contracted the space; and the pursuing cavalry arriving
first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand bewildered men, and
forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all
quarters; and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged
to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous
execution was inflicted; and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms,
were desired, in raillery, “to return to their homes, and abandon
war as a trade they were unfit for.” This fatal battle commenced at
eleven o’clock; thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty
carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred
inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken before
two o’clock, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand
of the Spaniards, however, contrived to make away towards the
mountain of Tarancon; others followed the various routes through La
Mancha to the Sierra Morena; and many saved themselves in Valencia
and Murcia.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]

[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30,
1809. MSS.]

Meanwhile, the first corps, passing the Tagus by a ford, had
re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o’clock in
the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed
Areizaga’s traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured
twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand
prisoners, from the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus
informed of the result of the battle, the duke of Belluno halted at
Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward. At La Guardia they joined
Sebastiani’s horsemen; and the whole continuing the pursuit to
Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred
horses. This finished the operations of the day: only eighteen
hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty
thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred
men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand: and, before
nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand
animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and
twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors!

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 3._

AREIZAGA’S
Operations,
1809.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

[Sidenote: Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30,
1809. MSS.]

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the
third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand
dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle
commenced; this body he directed on Madrilegos to cover the retreat
of the fugitives; but so strongly did the panic spread that when
Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz’s men fled,
without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight.
Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all
regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La
Carolina.

CHAPTER VI.

Joseph halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next
day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division
of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St.
Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the fifth corps, by
Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps
guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division,
reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments,
from Aranjuez to Consuegra.

The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolle’s first brigade,
returned, on the 20th, to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La
Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in
Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque
and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolle’s
division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the
uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king
to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del
Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection
in Leon, Gazan’s division of the fifth corps was sent, from Toledo,
through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand’s assistance, and Kellerman was
again directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British army remained tranquil about
Badajos; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada
de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of
being joined by the duke Del Parque. That general, however, who
had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolle’s division
was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and,
therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th,
two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected
him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the
Tormes, and, having reached Alba, the 21st, sent a division to take
possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d
he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry
entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the
troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon
Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the
Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once; but the
infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.]

The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give
battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having
reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without
waiting for the arrival of Gazan’s division, instantly pursued, and
his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army
at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had
passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, it retired upon
the supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable,
brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one
division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two
divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating,
sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other,
charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying
without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of
the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred; but those on
the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his
cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the
fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish
horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry
of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made
good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and
under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the
dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested,
but at day-break a French patrol coming up with this rear, his whole
army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman having,
meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was
complete.

After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains
behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about
twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely
any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for
provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived
on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of
the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many actually died of
want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither
dispersed nor murmured! For Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and
feeble in battle, are patient, to the last degree, in suffering.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809. MSS.]

This result of the duke Del Parque’s operation amply justified sir
Arthur Wellesley’s advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner
the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of
Albuquerque’s advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to
the Central Junta. It might be imagined that the latter would have
received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that
body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before
the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten
thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should _reinforce
Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of
Meza d’Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter_. Meanwhile Del
Parque’s force, thus reduced one-third, could be more easily fed, and
might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive
on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected,
and, as he informed them, only delayed _to protect Estremadura until
the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement_. The only
reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque _immediately
to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the
Guadiana_. Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing
his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and
his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being followed by Del
Parque’s defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur
at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty
thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were
again collected in La Carolina; that the troops (eight thousand),
who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença,
under general Echevarria; and as the numbers re-assembled in the
Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña
considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for
the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain
in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves.
Albuquerque’s retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta
to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura; but it
only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to
engage in serious operations on that side; yet to have retired when
that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable
for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to
quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of
the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand
men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed
him for stopping so long; but it was his last hold on Spain, and the
safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It
was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him
on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809,
saved Andalusia from subjection; and this is easy of demonstration,
for, Joseph having rejected Soult’s project against Portugal, dared
not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his
right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La
Mancha, without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia
was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired
to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who
would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir
Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have
refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole
force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English
forces behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men,
and Albuquerque ten thousand, it is no exaggeration to assume that a
hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole
of the troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to
aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand
English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred
thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the
Morena.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at
the former, the army could protect Lisbon as well as Seville, because
a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the
Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal
object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of
the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal,
their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and
large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and
abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

[Sidenote: Sir J. Moore’s Correspondence.]

[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]

It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore
to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the
northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed
with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some
plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages,
would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the
Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled
command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he
would undertake the defence of Andalusia; conditions they would
not accede to, but, without which, he could not be secured against
the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle
against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion,
that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English; but
political as well as physical resources and moral considerations
weighed in that argument.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during
a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted, at such an
enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet
it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother’s wishes
than his own judgement, that he remained after Areizaga’s army was
assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear
sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley; who, being
in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their
ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of
future exertion, clung longer to the notion, that Spain could be put
in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction
with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting
herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon.
He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever
released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the
Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid.
Kellerman remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the duke
Del Parque; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of
the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echavaria;
but, on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated,
by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined his operations with
general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce
the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none,
and, as the Spanish regiments of the guard fought freely against
their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered
to join the invaders’ colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a
national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made
a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing
to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain.
Spanish authors, indeed, assume that none entered the enemy’s ranks
save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view,
and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have
reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with
the loss sustained in the action.

The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of
offensive operations, which the Austrian war, and the reappearance of
a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in
1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; the enemy again took
the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate
in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted, that it would
join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of
Areizaga’s acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the
fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than
the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when
deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under
the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an
error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal
for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined
with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches,
no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual
resources, and intentions, had taken place.

2º. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous,
momentary, such was Areizaga’s movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly
it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so
strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be
carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle,
unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the
moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general
is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve
the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but
victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory,
rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3º. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with
opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and
ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank,
and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment
in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a
feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole
army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven
across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a
powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the
separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not
completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke
was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason
against moving from the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated
chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could
improve accidental advantages.

4º. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although
intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous
route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers
to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuna, and Henares, only great
rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So
late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions
of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got
between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three
opposed to him approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated
again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by
the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat,
and then Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with
Sebastiani, when the latter had only eight thousand men, now sought
a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of
thirty thousand; the first corps being also in full march upon the
Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked
that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been
on the 9th to the westward at Yebenes and Mora, having moved in ten
days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this
Spanish general, who pretended, to treat his adversaries, as if they
were blind men.

5º. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself
in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of
Albuquerque’s and Del Parque’s operations. If so, his military ideas
do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga’s, and the proposal was
but a repetition of Mr. Frere’s former plan for Albuquerque; a plan
founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were
rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or
Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with
Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia,
which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet
without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were
capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental
line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on
the 18th, and on the 19th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest
part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass
of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga
that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact,
there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of
Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there
was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French
armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The
former was chosen, Areizaga’s army was destroyed, and in the battle
he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen,
he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot,
and when the men undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to
be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field
himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6º. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged,
effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend
movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are
manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points
of this short campaign. Areizaga’s burst from the mountains was
so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries
hesitate; and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps circled
round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in
front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division
of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear
and flank from Mora a week before. That is, during the three days
Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours
march.

7º. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the
valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and
he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore,
the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man
of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos
Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with
which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez,
from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be
acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched
fifty thousand men about like a patrole of cavalry, without the
slightest regard to his adversary’s positions or his own line of
operations.

8º. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in
which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while
they paralized the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers
engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other
trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent.
But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her
troops; why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king,
unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military
genius of his advising general, or was he distracted by disputes
amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos
alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in
estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. MS.]

9º. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this
short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events
at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish
projects promised well. Areizaga’s army exceeded fifty thousand
men, Albuquerque’s ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del
Parque, who, at Tamames had just overthrown the best corps in the
French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of
Cuença were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there were a hundred
thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period,
although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit
to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty
thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies.
Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch
the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy
thousand French covering Madrid! Why then, was sir Arthur Wellesley,
who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise
with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta?
“_Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war._”
He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had
foresaw, to use his own expressions, “_after one or two battles,
and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by
others, that all would have to retreat again_:” yet this man, so
cautious, so sensible of the enemy’s superiority, was laying the
foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through
the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting
Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir
John Moore’s conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged
the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the
chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise
and brave man’s toil has been the sport of fools!

[Sidenote: 1810.]

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In
the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble
structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the
invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir
Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment,
but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to
Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were
trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of
England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next
book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and
every where weak.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided
strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past
inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign
of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great
infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque’s defeat on one side and
Echevaria’s on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British
army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia,
but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the first corps,
which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela.
The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by
this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement
of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers,
guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives.

[Sidenote: Appendix No. IV. Sec. 1.]

Joseph’s vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in
Navarre, under Renovalles and Mina. But lord Wellington, previous
to quitting the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a
matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district;
and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette,
and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, Joseph naturally
suspected it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However,
the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the
Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very
numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were
soon quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British army in the
valley of the Mondego became known, and Joseph seriously prepared
for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than
an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages,
which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were
reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose
troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid
stickler for the Roman maxim, that “War should support war,” paid
only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the
military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the
lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National
Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the
passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the
council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an
opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and the
general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the
approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the
archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published
a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,--that
Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of
France,--that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall
upon the enemy’s rear,--and that a second Baylen might be expected.
But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent
property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their
sittings to that town on the 1st of February.

Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of
a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels,
plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious
purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of
the army in the Morena,--sent Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and
imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of
Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was also confined
in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to
seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a
dungeon, where his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused to
serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command
the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; but most of the other
generals kept aloof, and in Gallicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning
his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. Hence the
public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo,
certain that the people would be against the government under any
circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence
violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but
one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot
of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their
political conduct. The decree for levying a hundred thousand men,
issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of
government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand
poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation
could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces
at the disposal of the Junta, were still numerous enough, if well
directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five
thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close
by, at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and
Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops
at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had
not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders
transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable
plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to
disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions,
intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and
containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and
Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected
on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern
frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it
either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces,
the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbad all military communication
until near the Morena, when, abating somewhat of their surly
grandeur, they left a space through which troops could move from one
province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of
Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal
road to Seville was practicable for artillery. Entering the hills,
a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful
strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and
Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through
the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little
beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were other passes also, but all
falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa
Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes
of the Morena from La Mancha.

To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes
presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From
thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the
hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting
to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or, rather,
paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One, entering the
mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the
La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond
these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura,
begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter,
by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. But the
barrier of the Morena still shut in Andalusia from Estremadura,
the military communication between those provinces being confined
to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, by Llerena, to
Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of
Monasterio and Ronquillo; and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros,
Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through
Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; and all these routes, except that of
Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the
mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose
waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward,
washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, but
then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are
finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in
the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen,
the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes
of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was
established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros
and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill
and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection
of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative
to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men
who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their
profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which
the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to
prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned
by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so
difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man
can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning
the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon
oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If
this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such
as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the
whole of the beaten army are obvious.

Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around
which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed
positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the
summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops
are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the
passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest
advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of
some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion;
nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war
to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some
central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy’s
columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops,
the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they
came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means
to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his
army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against
their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong
detachment, before Areizaga could have been attacked. Nor was
Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an
obstinate defence.

Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred
miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda,
extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow
tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean: and the
intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by
less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending
and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville.
Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand
divisions of country:--1º. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra
Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2º. The lower, or open country, about
Seville. 3º. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the
Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with
sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril,
Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 4._

INVASION
of
ANDALUSIA
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone, 1830._]

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An
army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its
waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending,
the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But, to reach
the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda
must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the
valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys
contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and
Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining
their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy
could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the
lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba,
or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish
army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on
both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while
Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey’s sons,
acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty
man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity,
fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were
matured.

But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided
with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes
in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from that
great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their
communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because
Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital
of the province, and, from its political position, the most important
town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and
all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about
sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements; but the
king was disposed to take a more prominent part, in the military
arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify.
To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps
was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments
pushed into the valley of the Tagus. Two thousand men, drawn from
the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two
battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara.
Gazan’s division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud’s from Aragon;
and the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king’s guards, and the
reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed
upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches,
gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud’s division, coming
by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of
menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of
defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his
advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena;
but, on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela,
and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the
fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz
and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto
del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva
de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and
Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo,
to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first
corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent
patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By
these dispositions, Areizaga’s line of defence in the Morena, and
Albuquerque’s line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles
of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards
rallied behind the Guadalen, one of the tributary torrents of the
Guadalquiver, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains
of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquiver.

In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a
shot, and Gazan’s division crowning the heights right and left of the
Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was
abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured
through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took
possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field
of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the
foolish pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the principal
causes of their subsequent losses.

Meanwhile the duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz,
and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and
Sebastini’s flanking parties communicated also with the fifth corps
at Andujar; and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an
extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced,
and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the
interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo’s partisans were
secretly preparing to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly discovered
a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those
who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz; but the
populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast
that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the
streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to
expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence.
The Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people,
prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while
their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people
that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from
La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise.
Because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque;
and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would
fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena
and gain a great victory.

It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena
was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was
published, it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched
orders for the duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond
Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which
such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on
the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger
of the crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellin, with four
thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos,
and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards
Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; but he
had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and
Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at
Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat
upon Seville.

In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own
artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his
infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to
receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of
which, he disregarded, and others he could not obey; but conforming
to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the
basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that
city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and
immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy’s
progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central
Junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the
quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the
Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and
Montijo were released, and the Junta of Seville being re-established
by acclamation, the Central Junta, committed to their hands the
defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each
as he could; but with the full intention of reuniting and resuming
their authority. On the road however, some of them were cast into
prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the
Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever
revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures
calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his
old army, which was now under the duke Del Parque, made some other
popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a
formal proposition to the Junta at Badajos, inviting them to take
into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, which
was readily acceded to. But the events of war crowding on, overlaid
their schemes; and three days after the flight of the Central Junta,
treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville
Junta, they also disbanded, some remaining in the town; others, and
amongst them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults were then
renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume
the command and defend the city; but he evaded this dangerous honour,
and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville, discovered the
same disposition, as the people of other towns in the Peninsula,
had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had
assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined
city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious; and finally, a
feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready
to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French
corps again received their artillery, but the centre and right wing
of the army remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps,
which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied
his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him
upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with forty-six guns mounted
on the walls. The Spanish general made one more stand; but being
again beaten, and all his artillery captured, his army dispersed.
Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away
their arms escaped to Gibraltar; and Areizaga himself, with a remnant
of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superceded
by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched upon Grenada, and entering
it the 28th of January, was received with apparent joy, so entirely
had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former
enthusiasm of the people.

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, the
king with the centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there
also, as at Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without any
mark of aversion,[7] and thus the upper country was conquered. But
the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened
a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook
to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before
the city. Hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in
Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and
seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with
greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of
the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him
to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful
detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia.

Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen; but the first
and fifth corps, followed by the king’s guards, proceeded without
delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque’s
cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French
approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could
retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being
through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to
Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this
road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th.

Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz,
and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town
with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres,
by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of
February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear
at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties;
for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered
the first corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its
direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the
advanced guards came on that city.

Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, and
the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French
summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. Besides
the populace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly
of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the
town; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on
the 31st, with all its stores, founderies, and arsenals complete, and
on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country
was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast
tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to
subdue.

The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, and the fifth
against Estremadura; and Sebastiani having placed fifteen hundred
men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, a Swiss
battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in
the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish
himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his
measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the
people had imprisoned the members of the local Junta, and headed by
a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight the French, and a vast multitude
armed in all manners took post above Antequera and Alhama, where the
road from Grenada enters the hills.

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence from Gibraltar. MSS.]

As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but
through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at
once, lest the Grenadans having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia
on the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports and fortified
towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. The 5th of
February, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills,
driving the insurgents upon Malaga; but near that place they rallied,
and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under
general Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and
the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished
took refuge on board some English ships of war; the rest submitted,
and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of
field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British
merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened
its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was
quelled; for in every other part, both troops and peasantry, were
terrified and submissive to the last degree.

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such
diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 5th of February, and it is
generally supposed, that he might have rendered himself master
of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the Isla were in
no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir
George Smith’s negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken,
and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque’s
troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in
every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the
authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests.
In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have
defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if
a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the
canal.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz; but when it was known that the Central
Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly
composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as
inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would
not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any
authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were
obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, appointed a
Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. The
Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, but finally,
the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to
acquiesce; and the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general
Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were
appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was
afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the
fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with
usurpation--the public voice added peculation and other crimes;
and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their
papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into
prison, and banished others to the provinces: thus completely
extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate
oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly,
some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of
speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that
men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words have proved to
be mean and contemptible statesmen.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]

Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander
of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to
resist a sudden attack; and the French, deceived as to its strength,
after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with
works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth
corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under
the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town
towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet
were like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, from
national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese
frontier. Mortier disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena,
by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned
it, the 12th of February. Contreras’ detachment had however, arrived
there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his
expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to
Merida.

This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch
of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in
possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception
of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and
Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results
of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained; and the
capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took
ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there appears
no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations
and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages,
greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her
gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town, would
produce the greatest moral effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain,
changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither
in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville, was however
transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz; and Joseph was
deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had
entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to
repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave
a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon
his flank; and resolving first to reduce Seville, he met indeed with
no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only
the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The
first his humanity forbad; the latter cost him time, which was worth
his crown, for Albuquerque’s proceedings were only secondary: the
ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety
of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is
only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his
movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity
than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia
would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed
of the enemy’s movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his
after-march upon Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position;
he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos.

From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he
might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of
taking such a decided part, was dependent upon the state of public
sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque
indeed, imagined, that the French were already in possession of the
place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; but
they could easily have entered it on the 24th: and as he believed
that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in
the people’s disposition. In this view, his determination to cross
the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the
occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered
Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him
marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again
late in deciding; for the enemy’s cavalry, moving by the shorter
road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard: and the infantry would
assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the king had
not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city
therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of
Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now
meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in
the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point;
because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to
recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of
narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to
Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student
Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military
governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between
that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe,
with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza,
while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround
him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa
and Medianoz, cut him off from the Cinca river.

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna
being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line
of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line
of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance,
and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however,
reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division,
under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert
with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied
Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of
the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable
columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high
parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse.
The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when
the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic
simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see
Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of
Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a
methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when
general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops
intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre,
Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions
had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and
the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty
thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against
Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected
at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona,
and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon’s
calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed.
Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth corps,
then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the
seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege.
Nor was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth
corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph’s letter from
Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and
gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting
Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the
king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a
renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted,
and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, undertook
the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first
intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he
detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on
the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed for the moment.

Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base
of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions
of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light
cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused
six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at
Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was
distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the
Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca,
Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four
thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to
link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements
occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate
of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida,
reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column having marched on the 27th,
by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of
Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence of the Valencian
army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of that province, was in
march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five
or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up
on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a
deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon
it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance
of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over
the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca,
and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was
rather more practicable.

Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia,
while Habert’s column was turning his right, sent a division before
daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off
the retreat; but, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the
ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro
fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe the 3d, and
on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from
Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at
Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between
their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after
passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest
and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns, united,
and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb
Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao.

Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection
within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a
baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many
others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were
in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side
of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city,
vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being
inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the
night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe
and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his
rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la
Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed
troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between
Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left
at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th,
by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The
12th, however, the head of Suchet’s column came in sight, Villa Campa
retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza.

During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison
of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered
the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments.
Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several
columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would
have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an
accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.

Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than
would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the
National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble;
and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was
hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the
principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida
and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded:
and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was
drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon’s
avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia
were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at
certain conjunctures, any progress could be made, and one of the
most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the
co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military
topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

[Sidenote: Vol. I. Book I. Chap. VI.]

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the
Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores;
for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from
the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots.
The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts
Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river,
push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona
from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of
Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona,
Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the
defiles, and other military features of this region have been
before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the
principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia;
and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and
rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro
from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida,
Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which,
however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.

Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region
of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most
part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon
walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated
on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer,
Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to
the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and
between Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de
Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a
number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and
Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of
the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from
whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass,
the flanks and rear, of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps,
was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both;
hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications,
and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could
at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while
the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported
by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance
or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the
defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing
by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French
flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat,
or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals
communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles,
and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places,
and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the
French communications; and it was only during the brief period of
lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the
seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona
and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short
incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher
valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing
by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the
communications; and thus obliged the French to retire, because the
country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was
indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their
arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in
advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being
often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor
convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the
momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona,
Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers.
When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau
took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the
high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin’s
squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable
craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army, and
conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return
again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for
the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were
again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention
of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would,
following the Emperor’s design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. However,
when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and
Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced
the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again
to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to
Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a
chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other’s
movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the
high valleys, beating the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at
Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed
a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino’s
division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu;
the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the
French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile
Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of
Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give
the command to Henry O’Donnel, whose courage during the siege of
Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains
of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he
retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free
retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced guard, pursued,
and at Tona, captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on
finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights
of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down the
hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the
next day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his retreat, and the
French general returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to
blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu,
having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five
squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the
roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery,
commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a
second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet,
taking however no military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been
joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall
upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel,
surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa
Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, threw themselves into a
large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach
of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of
Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of
Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he
became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s conduct had been, and sent
him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions
without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former
position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga,
returned to Vich.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat
of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced
extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were
marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated;
the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced
with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d’Erolles, a
native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity.
The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops,
was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly,
and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the
Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours
from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands
in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the
troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from
the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more
than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya,
in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of
Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights
above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with
enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to
them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention
to him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the mountain of
Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French
general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of
the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the
Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy’s posts, on the
side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel,
coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his
guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse
line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right,
intending to outflank Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving
a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry,
and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the
first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in
on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression,
the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him
to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of
the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry
were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in
the head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his
Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led
the whole mass once more against the left; but, at this critical
period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their
ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks,
while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no
retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries
with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and
the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was
afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills,
having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded
twelve hundred of the enemy.

O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular
bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they
were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into
Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable
columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the
Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country
about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by
Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving
only an advanced guard at Ordal.

It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned
by the Spanish general, that the emperor, directed the seventh
corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against
Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment
under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade
Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one
commanding Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to march upon
Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired
once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent
movements.

General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza, the
16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants
abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from
Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their
movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced
to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards
Taragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a
thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the
right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their
quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed
between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his
predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position.
By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men,
against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many
and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but,
being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after
the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by
Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their
destinations, but the others, twelve hundred strong, were intercepted
by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April.
Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the
chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while
Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite
side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations.
Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the
Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed
closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and,
with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached
Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus,
an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to
Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of
them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet,
feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he
should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps
fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on
the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head
of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas
and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of
which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte
accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting
his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles
in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the
order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.

[Sidenote: Vacani Istoria Militáre degl’Italiani in Ispagna.]

In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such
confusion, that, from Taragona, O’Donnel perceived the disorder;
and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French,
followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s
rear guard, covered the retreat successfully, until a position was
attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely,
was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As
these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli
reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more
than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The
situation in which he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such
as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains,
to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were
beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira
and Milans being about San Culgat, cut the communication between
Manresa and Barcelona; and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to
the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus. His
communication with Campo Verde, was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa
Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San
Sadurni, and Igualada.

Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only
rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect
in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the
enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was
put to the sword; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a
timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their
retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the
battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French,
now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him,
although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon
Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising
change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.]

Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been
recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that
and conducting a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia had,
like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau,
afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting
the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head
of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a
hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant,
indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained; and,
with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been
infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken
place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained
at Taragona; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at
Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place.

Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations,
appointed M’Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in
the meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops
in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich,
giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Memoirs.]

This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock,
armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man,
it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first endeavoured to
reduce it by a simple blockade: but, towards the middle of February,
commenced the erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed the
place more vigorously than before, and although O’Donnel, collecting
convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops
to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt
to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity,
and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada,
rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy’s line, an
exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne’s days, and,
as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful.

O’Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being
aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and
made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to
favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving
his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first
made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke
through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich;
but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so
closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with
about three hundred men; many also were killed, the rest dispersed
in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This
courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of
May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the
castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed,
and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at
an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four
sieges.

[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.]

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the
Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event
which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from
port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau’s
career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter,
victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau
endeavouring, to frighten those people into submission, who he had
failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which
every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing
precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more
animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity,
became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling
lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with
crimes.

CHAPTER III.

While Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at
Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia
had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from
France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand,
and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of
Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon,
and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher
valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to
four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the
mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and
direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to
Lerida; the other circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to
Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient,
because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge
over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa
of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro,
was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the
communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although
longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military establishment, the
battering train consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds
of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under
the guard of Habert’s division, which occupied the line of the Cinca.
Leval leaving general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe
Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division.
Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined
by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from
Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were
executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina,
Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by
detachments.

The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval’s division, and
the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts,
there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred
cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish
side, Campo Verde was with O’Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at
Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to
cover Tortoza; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the
Upper Segre.

Such were the relative situations of both parties, when general
Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the
Guadalupe, drove Novarro’s detachments within the walls of Tortoza,
and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that
river at Mora and at Flix, communicated as I have before related,
with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. And while this was
passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns,
one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed
the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides
of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the
left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to
Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence
with the Segre.

Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, and placed a
detachment at Candasnos to cover his establishments from the garrison
of Mequinenza, and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry,
and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert,
descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the
Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same
day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed,
the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected.
Suchet’s line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy
to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than
the consumption; but Augereau’s line, was long and unsafe, and the
produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, contained about
eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from
Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each; it
possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short
distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; its strategic
importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner
commanded the plains of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia.
The regular governor was named Gonsalez, but Garcia Conde had been
appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O’Donnel’s
elevation; and the troops he brought with him had encreased the
garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of
the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch
enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north
side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way,
but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on
the east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty
feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage
of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height,
and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with
ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

The descent from this rock into the town, was gentle, and the works
were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls
could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock
rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly
inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was
squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part
was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen
and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight
hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petrieus encamped
to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort
Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work, with ditches
above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian
hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured
the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good
condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery;
the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta
also had been formed to excite public feeling; and two officers of
artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the
gates of the town.

The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps,
but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance
of Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that
the seventh corps had already retired, and that the burthen would
rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at
Monzon, intending to wait until O’Donnel’s plans should be clearly
indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a
communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league
above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared
materials for the construction of batteries.

Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and
Balaguer, but the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank
of the Segre, at Alcoteletge, four thousand men, including the
cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one
of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; and Harispe,
with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this
disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the
sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of
Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops
occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and
Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle
of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by
patrols.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer,
pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was
stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general
detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for
rumours obtained, that O’Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch,
that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high
valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain
the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred
hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation
to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make
a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to
strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa,
above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega,
forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he
was still uncertain of Augereau’s movements, and like every other
general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure
authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune,
he ascertained that O’Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch,
ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore
returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier
to resume his former position at Alcoleletge. This rapidity was
well-timed, for O’Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with
eight thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, and encamped
at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d. There a
note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn
off, the investing force was weak, reached him, and he being willing
to seize the favourable moment, immediately pushed forward, reached
Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o’clock in the morning of
the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the
cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow
more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village of Margalef, and
from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O’Donnel could
perceive no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to Conde’s
information (already falsified by Suchet’s activity), the Spanish
general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns,
one following the high road and the other two marching on the right
and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back
the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general, charged with his
three hundred hussars, upon the Spanish column, so suddenly, that
it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which
place, the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During
this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but the French
infantry stood firm, and the besieged, seeing the rout of O’Donnel’s
column, returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of
affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred
cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef,
hoping to cut off the Spaniards’ retreat. O’Donnel had, however,
rallied his troops, and was already in line of battle, the artillery
on the right and the cavalry on the left, his second division being,
however, still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of
light artillery, came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and
the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, commanded by
general Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line
of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard,
observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of
the infantry. The Walloon guards made an effort to form square,
but the confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish infantry
threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with
their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the
advanced guard of the second Spanish division; but the main body of
the latter checked their fury, and O’Donnel retreated in good order,
and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch.

This action, although not discreditable to O’Donnel, was very
unfortunate. The plain was strewed with carcases; three Spanish
guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were
captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously
marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish
officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was
dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of
the defeat.

Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the
besieged, attempted the night after the battle, to storm the
redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the
latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando,
from whence the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with
hand grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing it was
agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the
Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was
necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned
the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to
count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners;
but Garcia Conde replied, “_that Lerida never looked for external
succour in her defences_.”

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully ascertained, yet the
victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged
Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to
France by the way of Jaca; the battering train was brought up from
Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed,
the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th
and 27th. The following night, under the direction of general Haxo,
ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen
and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few
guns, but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the
besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed.
Breaching and counter-batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders
were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long
twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four
mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather
was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly,
and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and
two sixteen-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the
Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from the left bank
of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of
investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th of May, six hundred Spaniards, sallying
from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the
trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the
right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in
check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town,
but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of
arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the
river, and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches
from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to
the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six
Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of
the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of
the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at
this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th, the mortars
played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were
dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced
three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three
hundred men stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the
right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far
as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by
the French reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered from
grape, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the
batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the
French only laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel one
hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention
of forming fresh batteries; that being closer under the citadel-rock,
would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a
larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed;
and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoneers.

On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their fire from eight
batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged
replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their
answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendent, the walls of
the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable
magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in
the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, and after
dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought
intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches, were
retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet’s hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high.
He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens,
and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige
the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving
his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed
mobs easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected
to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, to force all
the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they
would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable
fortress: but he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando
and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens,
flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that
side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other
necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius
that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were
ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried
without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell
in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives
at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third
column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered
the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden,
and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that
redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to
the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a
hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries only played into the
citadel, but, at daybreak, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps
were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the
troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect
a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. On
the other hand, the Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake
the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French arrangements being
first completed, at seven o’clock, in the evening of the 13th, four
shells were thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping
out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, two advancing
against the Carmen, a third attacking the Magdalen, and a fourth,
moving close by the river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The
Spaniards, unexpectant of the attack, at first permitted the French
to mount the breaches unmolested; but, soon recovering, poured such
a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the head of the principal
columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged by general Habert,
finally forced their way into the town; and, at the same moment, the
troops on the right and left, being also successful, turned all the
retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, general
Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve,
followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties; the Spaniards
were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat
into the citadel.

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

It was now that the French general put his design in execution.
Harispe’s brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St.
Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the
town; and this done, the French columns advanced from every side,
in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and
stabs, and musquetry, drove men, women, and children before them,
while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then,
flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into
the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of
the rock; but, all that night, the French shells fell amongst the
hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the
carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and
sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag.

At twelve o’clock, the horrible scene terminated, and the
capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged;
but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with
its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole
loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding,
politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of
civilized warfare. For, though a town, taken by assault, be
considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant
of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant
the driving of unarmed helpless people, into a situation, where they
must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless a governor fail in his
duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that he thus spared a great
effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted
siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers’ blood at
the expense of women’s and children’s, and, had Garcia Conde’s nature
been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory
would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight
of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

CHAP. IV.

When Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no
foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient
for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on
the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did,
offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should
have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers’ force, the
corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in
number, it might have baffled Suchet’s utmost efforts. Engineers
require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, should
not be less than four to one; yet here the French invested a force
equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in
the midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications, 1º.
With the armed population of the high valleys; 2º. With O’Donnel’s
corps of fourteen thousand; 3º. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was
posted with four thousand men; 4º. With Tortoza, where the marquis of
Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six
thousand; 5º. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable
army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand
irregular soldiers.

It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed with skill
and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised,
but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to
obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take
such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O’Donnel and
the Valencians in check; but Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do
this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely
venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On
the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon’s instructions could
have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat
similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau, who
had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet
spared six thousand men to pass the mountains; Suchet would then have
been tranquil with respect to O’Donnel, and would have had a covering
army to protect the siege, and these troops, fed from the resources
of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that the blockade of
Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The
danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military
judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application,
because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own
capacity, and Napoleon’s standard only suited the heroic proportions.
One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most
extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military
organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,--the well-arranged
system of fortresses,--the ruggedness and sterility of the
country,--the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population
thrown out of work,--and, finally, the aid of an English fleet,
combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task.
Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly
indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making
another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the
first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona;
and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines,
stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several
dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm
footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong holds; and he had taken
or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the
prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O’Donnel with
abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at
fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San
Felippe Balaguer, and Tortoza the link of connexion between Valencia
and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great
operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength.

Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, the marquis of Lazan
entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have
carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched two thousand
men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards, after a
skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at
Alcanitz, Villa Campa, intercepted four hundred men conducting a
convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the
commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to
abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for
ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty
wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza,
finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band
were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and
sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered
the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death,
but, at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the Alcalde
of Frasno, an old man taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, the next day,
Chlopiski, following Villa Campa’s march from Daroca, reached Frasno.
The Spaniards were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his
forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava, to
Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed
the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred
retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the
side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.

But these petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the
Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet’s power in Aragon.
His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that
province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the
nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable,
the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel,
it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided
measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only
O’Donnel’s army, but Campo Verde’s and all the irregular bands. The
Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force, on the Upper Segre
the very day of the assault; eight hundred Miguelettes attacked
Venasque three days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by
Agramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and
Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.

Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the
Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at
Tremp; and general Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo
Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. But, if
the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O’Donnel, less hasty, had
combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with
Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster;
whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening
upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures
to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza, which, by its
situation at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the
latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The
French general could not advance in force against Tortoza, nor avail
himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall.

Suchet’s activity was extreme; one detachment, sent the day after the
assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before
the place, and general Musnier’s division, descending the right
bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the
investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of
the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and
strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the
only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra
de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing
as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and
overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water.

This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being
inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered, on a
third, by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a
high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to
the parent hills; and the rampart on that side, was bastioned, lined
with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way
with palisades.

No guns could be brought against this fort, until the country people,
employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills,
and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile
the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, at Alcanitz, arrived on the
right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of
May, general Rogniat, coming from France, with a reinforcement of
engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also
reached the camp, and, taking the direction of the works, contracted
the circle of investment, and commenced active operations.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2d of
June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which
six were twenty-four-pounders, being brought over the hills, the
advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle, and,
during the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place,
under a destructive fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely;
and, while this was passing on the height, approaches were made
against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot
of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the
water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation;
yet eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property,
quitted the town, and nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the
breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised,
from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the
castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced;
but, in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the
operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened
chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for
batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the
castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The
troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry
with such effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison quitted it;
both it and the tower were then escaladed without difficulty; and the
Spaniards all retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in
the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and
although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from
above; they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were
completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a
small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th Suchet, who had been
at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on the 8th, sixteen pieces
of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The
Spaniards answered with such vigour, that three French guns were
dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and, at
nine o’clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the
rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up
the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the
interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment,
that, at ten o’clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men
became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, large stores of powder and
of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were
found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie,
commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, with
his brigade, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it
on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence,
had left that important fortress, commanding one of the principal
entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison.
When it was lost, general O’Donoju, with a division of the Valencian
army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works
were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place
of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1º. A
fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and
Valencia; 2º. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance
to those provinces; 3º. The command of several fertile tracts of
country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4º. The co-operation of
the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage
beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of
Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land
with Valencia, and to destroy O’Donnel’s base. The first could only
be attained, by taking Tortoza, the second by capturing Taragona.
Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by
the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the
emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles
arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region
of Catalonia, was increased by O’Donnel’s measures, and that general,
still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by
past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His
harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful to the people, but
he was watchful to confirm the courage, and to excite the enthusiasm
of his troop’s by conferring rewards and honours on the field of
battle; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations
had more effect.

Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good
officers, and the full strength and importance of every position
and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these
helps O’Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortoza, and found
full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year.
Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified
places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to
strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had
before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military strength were however, deeply cast in
Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards,
and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to
land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action,
would at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralized the operations
of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortoza,
Taragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of
the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily
were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy,
but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular
armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with
suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed
elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern
coast of Spain.

Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English
ministers were still ignorant of every military principle; and yet
too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until
after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory
of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even
Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgement,
although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose
narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole
responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

Suchet’s preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and
the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too
late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring
the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the
Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake,
waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the
fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the
course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, but those of the
Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence, captured at Victoria. MSS.]

During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the
fourth in Grenada, Dessolles’ division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda,
and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some
horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by
marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry, to
different points, and received from all the great towns assurances
of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the
army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money
and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them,
especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to
discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they
were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections.
The people exasperated by disorders, and violence, and at the same
time excited by the agents of their own and the British government,
suddenly rose in arms and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain,
became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.

The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first to resist, and this
insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda,
and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar,
and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command
of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps
across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the
former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars
of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From this place, the
insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the
other extremity Blake marching from Almeria, took Ardra and Motril.
The mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba at the same time interrupted
Dessolles’ communications with La Mancha.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.]

These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king
and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across
the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril,
while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off
his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same
time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and
the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to
restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the
detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of
March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered
Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy,
and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came
down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth.
It had however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed
to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening
a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and
all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a
part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha,
the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in
the invader’s service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, fearing
an offensive movement, by the Valencian and Murcian armies, but
after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia then remained
chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system
of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the
Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual
incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported
by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold,
but this will be better shewn hereafter; at present, it is more
convenient to notice.

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault on the Isla,
spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of
contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The
towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed
are too numerous, and in their relative bearings, too intricate for
minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I
shall endeavour to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched
positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first,
having its left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from
thence carried across the Almanza, and the Chiclana rivers, to the
Zuraque, on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly
wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad.
This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers,
and by a number of navigable water courses or creeks, was also cut in
its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the
upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles
long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float
a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the
marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the
bridge of Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken
and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the
Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour
mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save
by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and
served as an advanced post. On the left hand the castle of Santi
Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangular
island, the base of which rests on that channel, the right side on
the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex points towards
Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong
ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town
of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi
Petri, offered the second line of defence.

From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about
five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz
stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the
Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered
a third line of defence. The fourth and final line, was the land
front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified.

On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only
separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the
Santi Petri, the French having their chief depôts in the town of
Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might
force the passage of the channel, because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and
Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation.
The thick woods behind, also afforded the means of constructing an
armed flotilla, and such was the nature of the ground bordering the
Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could
only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between
the salt-pans of the marsh.

The central French or Puerto Real division extending from the Zuraque
on the left, to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete
on the right; measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the
town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the
marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle.
Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles
long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus
of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or
canal of Troccadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour,
and at its extreme points stood the village of Troccadero, and the
fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz
a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city
was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was
only twelve hundred, it was the nearest point to Cadiz and to the
isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From
thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire and
throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their
flotilla safely moored in the Troccadero creek, could make a descent
upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between
it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned
Matagorda.

The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of
the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle
of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the
right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the
mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and
the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered
way, concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with three
hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were
occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz,
was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead. The second
commanded the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade,
Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina
Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced
posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the
position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of
events within the blockaded city.

[Sidenote: Albuquerque’s Manifesto.]

The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency and
the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already
touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor,
commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have
unlimited power; but in reality, possessed no authority except over
his own soldiers, and he did not meddle with the administration. The
regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal
energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the
Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, talents, or
patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue
for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the
public stores.

[Sidenote: Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz. 1810. MSS.]

Albuquerque’s troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had
been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms,
accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies,
the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke
affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and
the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to
attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta
replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in
reasoning; for although they had elected the duke president of their
own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from
Carmona too quickly; and they finished with an intimation, that,
supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to
wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to
a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former
being sent ambassador to England, died in that country some months
after of a phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at
the unworthy treatment he received.

But the misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions,
the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the Junta, the
apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity
of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many
favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place
Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have
led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish
store-houses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British
troops into the city.

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.]

At the same time, general Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John
Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his
country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English
garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of
San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algesiras should be
demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and
permanent interests of England; but the first especially, because
it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure
harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected
population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandize to
the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily
destroyed by bombardment; and Ceuta which was chiefly garrisoned
by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works
miserably neglected, had only six days’ provisions, and was at the
mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the streights.
The possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways,
especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries
were exceedingly active.

[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.]

General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February,
with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar,
and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved sir
George Smith’s perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere’s
unskilful management of the Central Junta, had alone prevented a
similar measure the year before. The 17th of February, a Portuguese
regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the
city, and Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies. Two ships
of war, the Euthalion and Undaunted, arrived from Mexico with six
millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment
of artillery, and more native troops, having joined the garrison,
the whole force assembled behind the Santi Petri, was not less than
four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards. Yet
there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this
time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or
had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered
at Ferrol, had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay,
twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates
were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all
things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to
little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and
a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish
armies and governments.

General Stewart’s first measure, was to recover Matagorda. In
the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen
and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the
ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain
M’Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking
possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a
solid lodgement, and although the French cannonaded the work with
field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire
of Puntales, was immoveable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet
the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh
meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest,
beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail
of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on
shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary’s. One ship of the line was
taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats
from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth
English regiment fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an
immense booty.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 3, Sect. 1.]

Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary
arrived, and on the 24th of that month, general Graham coming from
England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately
caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then
appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was
quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts
of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts,
and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three
months, were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards had only
worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgement; their
batteries in the marsh were ill placed, their entrenchments on the
tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of contemptible
strength, and the Caraccas which they had armed with one hundred
and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by
carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected,
and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda, and
the Troccadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the
junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal Causeway, in the marsh,
that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and
consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water
and land.

It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and
offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent
to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination,
paralized their allies, and would have lost the place, had the enemy
been prepared to press it vigorously. Nor were the English works
(when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and
rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a
paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of
the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor
implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from
the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the
war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation
on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always
expected to “make bricks without straw,” and thus the laurels of the
British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success
of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance
and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring
operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st of March, and both
sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony,
and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many persons
were forced to quit Cadiz, and two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte
to collect provisions on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, which,
though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded
the completion of the enemy’s works at the Troccadero point. This
small fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs
insufficient for the garrison, and with one angle projecting towards
the land, was little calculated for resistance, and, as it could
only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed
flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The
French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the
Troccadero, and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing
shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst
of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter
under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and
mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort
of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before
this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted
hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy
shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken
six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the
angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors,
besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the
slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the
tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were
down, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected
impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion
was then blown up, under the direction of major Lefebre, an engineer
of great promise, and he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted
the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which
it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A
sergeant’s wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded
men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the
well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel
from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a
shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and
fulfilled her mission.[8]

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.]

After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but
Sebastiani’s cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and
he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d of April, when
Blake retired upon Alicant and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French
covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for
provisions, and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa,
drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle.
The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment,
but their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred
foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the
horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle
during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to
five hundred men, joining some guns, and placing the whole under the
command of major Brown of the 28th.

In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted
in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent
against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks,
above fifteen hundred men saved themselves, in despite of the fire
from the allied fleet, and from Puntales, which was continued
after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures,
thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty,
and, being all of Dupont’s or Vedel’s corps, were prisoners only
by a dishonourable breach of faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder
was daily increasing. The Regency having recalled Cuesta to their
military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central
Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world, that the
course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state.
Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered
by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops
were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure
of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla,
and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and
discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta
consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should
commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla.

[Sidenote: General Graham’s Despatches. MSS.]

English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand
Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or, rather, army now
within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, and
the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of
Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy’s works. It
was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged
plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy was
embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to
aid the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. These people had
been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed
by captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers,
sent from Gibraltar, and general Campbell offered to reinforce Lacy,
from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were twenty
thousand males fit to carry arms. The French were only two thousand,
and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve
guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only
supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise,
but demanded that eight hundred men, from Gibraltar, should make a
diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved
on Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English armament sailed
under the command of general Bowes. Lacy made good his movement
upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified
it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no
enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand
mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so
disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these
operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an
insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion;
but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and general Rey,
marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him
off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men
at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July.

Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the
naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in
the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish
soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in
Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty
thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably
placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of
the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of
operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for,
even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to
Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from
fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to
paralize this mighty power.

It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable
localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet
and army, and troops disembarking, also require time to equip for
service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms
for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the operations would
always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities,
and lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal,
experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to
direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the
seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted,
if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty
thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents,
the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the
operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas,
the slight expeditions of this period, were generally disconcerted by
the presence of a few French companies.

In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased to eight thousand
five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command
of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and
constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de
Barameda, made no attacks, and his works, have been much censured,
as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however
a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade
the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations, was at
the Troccadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were
necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive
the citizens of good water, which, in ordinary times, was fetched
from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing
at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms,
as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be
considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not
with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops,
but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other
parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this
intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or
ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of
Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper’s government,
while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a
narrow corner of the province. Moreover the preparations at Matagorda
constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was
necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured,
that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now
if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the
French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham’s
division, consisting of excellent soldiers would have been set free,
instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number
of French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly,
and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and
if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as
there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

While the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required
a garrison, and in March, six hundred infantry, under colonel
Remond, and two hundred cavalry, commanded by the duke D’Aremberg,
were despatched from thence, against the viscount De Gand, who was
still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had four
thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left
through Gibraleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado
de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated
at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had
hitherto drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to Ayamonte,
sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being replaced by general Copons,
who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower
Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The
vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents
on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered
Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of
that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was
ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles
reduced the struggle to a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was not
so in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war
so onerous, that one of Joseph’s ministers, writing to a friend,
described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands.
Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various complicated movements
and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as
being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may
be divided into three parts.

1º. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana. 2º. From Badajos to
the Morena. 3º. From the Morena to the sea. Each of these divisions
is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is
mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double
chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara,
Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish;
Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and
Elvas, the Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in
the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the
Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to
all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country,
it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese
side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly
Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the
two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the
fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The
Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin,
and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled,
the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of
Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.]

When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was
near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight’s
blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only
brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could
not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and
therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza.
In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his
cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard
slain. Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and the 27th, and Mortier
then leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect
himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the
Guadiana.

It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by general Mermet,
occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the
invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through
the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and
Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching
the duke Del Parque, in the early part of January; but withdrew
to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the
Mondego, and the duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera with a weak
division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men,
through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete
on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned
Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left
on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this
movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus,
by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult’s
brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge
of Arzobispo, and advancing by Caceres, surprised some Spanish
troops at Villa del Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close
to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by
degrees; general Reynier then took the command, and, as I have said,
was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at
Merida, and prepared gabions and facines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who
advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre, and
Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del Parque’s
army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act
against the communications of the French.

His first division, commanded by Charles O’Donnel, brother to the
Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel,
was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five
thousand Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the
fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached
to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier’s communication with
Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a
detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to
Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth
at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras’
movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida,
and the 10th, Romana, advanced again towards Albuquerque; but having
pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by
general Foy. The 14th O’Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy, but the
latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto
de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.

At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the
Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence
of Suchet’s retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence
of Andalusia, and the latter, after holding a council of war with
Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and
retired to Seville, leaving Gazan’s division at Monasterio. Reynier
having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres
the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at
Torremacho, and O’Donnel returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1º.
The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos,
Monasterio, and Ronquillo. 2º. A shorter, but more difficult, road,
which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by
Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel
routes, have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the
Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to
Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. When,
therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to
Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united
corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by
Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th of March, came up with Gazan,
and fought an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards
being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the
high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to
Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Gerard’s division drove
him back to Araceña, and defeated him there; yet again entering the
Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the
Tinto river.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.]

Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the
communication of the fifth corps with Reynier, but that general,
marching with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to
Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2d of
April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while
Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that
O’Donnel, immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back.
Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so
completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the
14th, with only two thousand men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by
a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña. The 20th, Reynier
marched to Montijo, and O’Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear
guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would
have been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not come to his
aid, when Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida.
The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians
remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the
government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura.
While on the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his
successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier’s rear; Ballasteros
remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre; and Romana encamped,
with fourteen thousand men, near Bajados, where a Spanish plot was
formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was
to have executed the atrocious deed escaped.

Notwithstanding Romana’s presence, Reynier and the younger Soult,
passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry,
and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the
whole Spanish army; and at the same time, Mortier’s advanced guards
arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men
joined the second corps from Toledo. But as the want of provisions
would not permit the French to remain concentrated, Mortier returned
to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment
again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and
would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to
Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced
Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three
hundred men.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the
frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing
at Gibraleon, and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the
possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros’ movements, yet the
advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted,
at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the
first corps; and O’Donnel having made an attempt during Reynier’s
absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque
with great difficulty. It would be perplexing, to trace in detail
all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two
circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning
of July, when Lacy was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near
Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against
Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph’s
service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the
Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one
of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for
the mediation of the British authorities, have come to blows, for the
mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save,
when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter’s demands for aid
were continual, and most of his projects were ill judged, and
contrary to lord Wellington’s advice. On the 26th of June however,
Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo
Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known that his
corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion
of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of
transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he was going
to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well
in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he
crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of
Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the
after operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated
of in another place.

Although, apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were
simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos,
is separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range of heights,
connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque, and the
country between those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys,
and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To
profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier,
whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as
Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor, presented a barrier, from
behind which, the Spaniards supported by the fort of Albuquerque,
could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act
accordingly; hence O’Donnel’s frequent advances and retreats.

Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth
corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida,
on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but
Mortier’s base of operations, being in Andalusia, his front, was
spread, from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to
draw provisions from about Llerena; but the road of Xeres de los
Cavalleros was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances
of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier’s line of
communication. The clue of affairs was this; Romana, holding Badajos,
and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French,
and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of
his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague
and injudicious, lord Wellington forbad Hill to assist, except for
definite and approved objects.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]

To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier had only to unite the
two corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege
Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage
of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he
ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake
any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden
insurrections and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either marshal
was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier
and Reynier united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry,
fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent
troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque,
could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must
have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the
latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond
Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and
lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north, the
king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate
consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere further conquests were
attempted, the great province of Andalusia, should be rendered a
strong hold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his
attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement,
provided for the current consumption of his troops; vast reserve
magazines were filled without overwhelming the people; and the
native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of
police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon
their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing
from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general
labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this could not be the work
of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult’s orders, being
employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control
of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations,
because, thus only could they be distinguished; whereas the duke
of Dalmatia while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain,
by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia,
was also well assured, that, in fixing a solid foundation for
future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able
administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence. MSS.]

His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals,
than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp
at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in
person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror.
But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult,
guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king’s
demands, and thus excited the monarch’s hatred to an incredible
degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s
confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of
the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually
tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and
considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully
employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal
of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of
lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered
for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of
a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce
was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and
finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon
itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia
soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the
advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection
that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five
thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July,
would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and
it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him
directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men
in the invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of
this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative
advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent marriage with the Austrian
princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the
other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish
affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes,
he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I
have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason,
why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before
the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal.
It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than
the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not
directed by a single hand.

CHAPTER VII.

The operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those
which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for
previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in
one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly
discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera
in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the
Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also,
issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French
foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and
beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about
ten thousand), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa
Franca, and Astorga, and menaced the right flank, and rear, of the
sixth corps. Mahy was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the
Asturias, the captain-general D’Arco, commanded seven thousand men,
three thousand of which were posted at Cornellana, under general
Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long,
was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at
Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese
troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept
their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable
columns, and thus menacing all the important points without
scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France,
continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where
Ney had resumed the command, and was supported by Kellerman with the
force of his government, and by an eighth corps under the duke of
Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement
of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier, menaced
Cadiz and Badajos, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering
the Asturias, threatened Gallicia by the Concija d’Ibas. At the
same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and
Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed
Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Gallicia by Puebla
de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces
five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched
against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte’s force
at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements
alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by
Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of
his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca,
to support Mahi.

Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and
Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to
Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the
eighth corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but
he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise
in the capital during the king’s absence, and Mahi and Garcia being
apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge
of the mountains, thinking that they might relieve the Asturians
by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. But as Loison
still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object,
and, after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to
Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when
general Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia,
leaving Mahi to command in Gallicia, marched himself with the remnant
of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajos. Meanwhile
Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and
Ney’s force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving
him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. But it is
unnecessary to trace all these movements, for the French, while
preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false
reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead
the allies, and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion
of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged, until
a later period, yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the
attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes
designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced,
for the invasion of Gallicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and
descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the
second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo.
But whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were
frustrated partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of
Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for
here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally, and every where it
was plainly seen that the French corps d’armée, however formidable in
themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in a
general system.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Correspondence, MSS.]

When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old
Castile, Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes, Kellerman
retired to Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained
the communications between Ney and Junot, and the latter, having
drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand
infantry, two thousand cavalry, eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four
pounders, and two mortars. His covering-divisions were placed, one at
Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria,
and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the
Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen
hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the
flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak. The
Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that
it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; but it now
appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill
provided, and prone to desertion.

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer of courage; his
garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides
cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been
strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition,
scarcely twenty days’ rations, and nothing outside the walls, capable
of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain,
and had three suburbs: Puerto de Hierro, to the north; St. Andreas,
to the east; and Retebia, to the west. On the two last Junot made
false attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against the front,
between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. The place was invested the 22d
of March; and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies
repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month.
A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became
unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses
of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless,
the town suffered from shells, and the wall was so much broken, on
the 20th of April, that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on
Retebia had failed; but Santocildes was distressed for ammunition,
and, during the preparations for storming, offered to capitulate.

Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o’clock in the evening
of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach; but it was
well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy,
and the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The
storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay
on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks, and in
front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the
musketry from Retebia, would have been totally destroyed, but for
the scarcity of ammunition, which paralized the Spanish defence.
Three hundred French fell on the breach itself, but the remainder
finally effected a lodgement in the ruins, and, during the night,
a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication
was opened from the parallels to the lodgement, and strong
working-parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into
the town, when the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would
have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre,
where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the
24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from
Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter,
and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo.
Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored
Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during
the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians,
and once more menaced Gallicia by the road of Concija, and by that
of Sales; several slight actions ensued; but the French did not
penetrate farther, and the Junta of Gallicia reinforced the Asturians
with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was concentrated at
Salamanca, a strong detachment of Kellerman’s troops siezed the pass
of Baños, and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English
light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were
commencing, and the line of communication with France, was encumbered
with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train,
collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca;
general Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps,
reached Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrennees with a ninth
corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in
Spain; and these were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial
guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor
himself was coming to take the chief command.

Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all
parties, and credited both by Joseph’s ministers, and the French
ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; and a leader for the
projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed
that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the
impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal,
that the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious,
frustrated his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes
of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the
Peninsula: that his marriage, and some important political affairs,
diverted him from that object, and that Massena, prince of Esling,
was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and partly
that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger
to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was
known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to
dread the formidable presence of the French emperor.

That Massena’s base of operations might not be exposed to the
interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military
governments, of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were
placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in
the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the
troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king; and it would
seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed
in the French councils, because, in the imperial muster-rolls, the
head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres
in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that
army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly
indicating Napoleon’s intention to assume the command himself. The
northern line was, however, definitively adopted; and, while the
prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed
the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.]

This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning of the year, by
a person whose conduct had been so suspicious, that lord Wellington
demanded his removal. But don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor,
was a veteran of fifty years’ service, whose silver hairs, dignified
countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose
courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance.
His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the
citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern
bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and
stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of
an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and
without other flanks than a few projections containing some light
guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a “_fausse
braie_,” with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first; but was
placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer any cover to the
upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine,
and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he
secured as he might.

Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of
Francisco, defended by an earthern entrenchment, and strengthened by
two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place.
The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west;
and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson,
which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred
and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater
Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred
yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the
bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was
easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which
the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the
castle-gate. But the Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia,
and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods;
and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel
deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet
deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks.

During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they
had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a
camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city;
and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose: and these
portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when
fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing
two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve
of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps
invested the place; the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, and
other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river;
but the battering train and a great escort was still two days’ march
in the rear; for the rains inundating the flat country between the
Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges
were established on the 2d and 7th of June; the one above, the other
below the town; and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater
Teson. The 22d, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to
contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda,
which had hitherto been but slightly watched. But that night, Julian
Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the
castle-gate, and, crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French
posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light
division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This
event, induced Ney, to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and
a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general
Crawfurd the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened.

[Sidenote: Intercepted French Correspondence. MSS.]

Ney’s plan, was to breach the body of the place without attending to
the Spanish fire. Salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed
on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; but the
besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson,
shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches,
and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th, the
prince of Esling arrived in the camp, and summoned the governor to
surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so
good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the 1st of July, when
Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the
engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the
Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp, and
pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the
new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried
after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked,
taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted
on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of every thing
beyond the walls.

During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the
French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the
breach, and strengthened his flank defences: but, on the 9th of July,
the besieger’s batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson,
re-opened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of
the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames,
a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown
in by a mine, on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch filled by
the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. At this moment,
three French soldiers, of heroic courage, suddenly running out of
the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having
thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged
their muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their
comrades.

The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated
by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three
men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the
signal. A few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of
the city, when the white flag waved on the rampart, and the venerable
governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his
gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully,
while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver
hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to
massacre and devastation.

Six months had now elapsed, since the French resuming the plan of
conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of
sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle
they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the
Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most
obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; and the only hope of
deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How
he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile,
the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related
in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous; and that he has been
led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters
spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the
circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been
called the Spanish military policy: and, without accurate notions on
that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the
man who, like Milton’s phantom, paved a broad way through the chaotic
warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most
unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it
is the province of history to record, foolish as well as glorious
deeds, that posterity may profit from all: and neither will I
mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of
my country’s arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable
spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue
the fortitude of a noble people; for in their constancy, in the
unexampled patience, with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by
a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards
were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their
battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their
prisoners with humanity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their
generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth,
when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause!
Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years
that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume
that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle
the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him!
Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure.
Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the
opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune,
that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more
rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the
English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched,
with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own
existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to
arrest the conqueror’s progress, the snows of Russia destroyed three
hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost
half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground,
Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from
him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what
incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and
her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for
independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered
to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England
enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment, over the principles
of the French revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

The defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous
combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto,
by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and
deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious
estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then
to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his
operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his
military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident
in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project,
unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the
imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men,
who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his
measures and to ruin his designs.

[Sidenote: Lord Castlereagh’s Statement]

[Sidenote: Mr. Canning’s Statement]

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly
to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war,
but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted
the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley’s departure was caused by the state of
politics in England, where a change in the administration was about
to take place,--a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected; because
the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by
many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition,
was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched
personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James’s
the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning,
the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly, denounced lord
Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the
public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him.
Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation
on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most
powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became
evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition,
Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue
thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised
as “_a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and
private_.” This was followed by a duel; and by the dissolution of the
administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool were then empowered
to form another Cabinet; and after a fruitless negotiation with lord
Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered
the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley.

Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had
opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which
were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have
been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of
some powerful friend in the administration, embued with the same
sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute, to support
him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and
commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own
personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising
so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first
proceedings in parliament justified his policy.

[Sidenote: See Parliamentary Debates.]

Previous to the change in the Cabinet, sir Arthur Wellesley had been
created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours,
although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party
as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the
opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general,
personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits,
they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash;
his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had
delivered Portugal, cleared Gallicia and Estremadura, and obliged
one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and
concentrate about Madrid!

Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised
skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter’s dispositions at
Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action; and
some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to
leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so
sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect
to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always
open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly,
so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed
rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they
would have cast away as a thing of no worth!

This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side:
there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread
of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his
inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a
public sensation: _any thing provided blood was spilt_. A calm but
severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with
the writer, discovered the general’s abhorrence of this detestable
policy; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord
Wellesley’s accession to the government, was essential to the success
of lord Wellington’s projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of
Europe; and every step made towards their accomplishment merits
attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as
that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and
to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now
it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune
in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her
peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he
met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon
solid grounds, that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it
was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and
firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be
adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the
ministers were yet unchanged, lord Castlereagh, brought, by continual
reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had
demanded lord Wellington’s opinion upon the expediency, the chance of
success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached
the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required
many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country;
and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was
necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of
the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return
from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that lord
Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had
succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. Badajos, 14th Nov.
1809. MSS.]

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula,
he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great
disaster, the former _could not then make an attack upon Portugal_;
yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that
moment in the latter might defend it. “But the peace in Germany,” he
said, “might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely,
when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only
in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in
proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength
would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in
that case, _until Spain should have been conquered and rendered
submissive_, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to obtain possession of Portugal, _provided England employed her
armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military
service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable._
But the number of British forces employed should not be less than
thirty thousand effective men. Although the Portuguese regular force,
actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three
thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia
amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the ordenanças.”

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. “The actual
yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of
transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million
sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence
the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and
supporting the Portuguese military, and civil services. The British
government, had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the
rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of
twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place
at the service of the English commander-in-chief.

“But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army
efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was
between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between
fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six
millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of
the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt
and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances
already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars;
there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after
a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal;
and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed,
gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to
the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the
English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese
army from disbanding from want of food.

“It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and
yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so
impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue
or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes
already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch
of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of
the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This
transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and,
therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should
afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency.

“Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The
officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that
their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace
nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and
lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others
arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary
discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese
officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated,
additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was
not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the
necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the
pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or
against whom, they were to fight.

“If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to
grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to
enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers;
and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added
a further subsidy of about three hundred thousand pounds, to supply
the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English
cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese
troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred
and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of
the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he lord Wellington,
felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the
Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto
incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country
extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

“There remained two other points to consider--the re-embarkation of
the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the
Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he
could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry
and artillery, those could not be carried off, if the embarkation
took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances,
the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the
animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated
Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the
contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although
I,” he said, “_consider the Portuguese government and army as the
principals in the contest for their own independence, and that
their success or failure must depend principally upon their own
exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in
my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British
officers and troops, I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should
now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged
to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate
consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably
without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the
state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain._ If, therefore, it
should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the
British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would
recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the
Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than
continue, by their means, the contest in this country.”

Peniché and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event
of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the
operations, and lord Wellington’s opinion as to the facility of
carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral
Berkeley’s assurances that the embarkation would not take longer
than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of
that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could
sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all
the ground above Passo d’Arcos, which, from the circumstance of
its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian’s for an
embarkation. But the admiral’s views, as I shall have occasion to
observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the
Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which,
from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they
truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of
England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington’s proposals,
undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to
advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus
pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they
with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the
subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military
establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of
complete efficiency.

Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence
to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana,
took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal,
and he expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a
regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already
reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the
Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually
under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand; nine thousand were
in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the
effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parcs, were
established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry, was quartered,
by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico,
and Santarem. General Hill, was left with five thousand British, and
a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the
infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was
distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The plans of the English general, were--at first, grounded, upon
the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern
line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations,
against the Peninsula, that is, _attack Portugal from the side of
Old Castile_, rather than _Andalusia from the side of La Mancha_. In
this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon,
his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every
part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms.
Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were
crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left,
scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of
the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of
invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected
the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment
Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh
instructions, reiterating the question, whether _Portugal should be
defended at all_, but at the same time transmitting, one of those
clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the
ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise;
statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present
events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful
accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has
attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes,
which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.]

“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no
doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and
dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any
action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even
expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and
the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue;
Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist
within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the
French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left
Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to
draw the ministers’ attention.

“They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms
could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand
men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the
armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within
the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment
of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very
insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the
militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this
should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence
in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by
military experience.

“When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to
that pass, _that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility
existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale
as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each
part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French
force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather
than an advantage to the French government_. Thence arose this
question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford
any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of
benefit to the allies?’

“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree
of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the
regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and
they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country
would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which
the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese
had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to
their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually
determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be
certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority
of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced
in military affairs.”

Under these circumstances, and _adverting to the approaching
subjection of Spain_, he demanded to know whether “_the enemy,
bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country
should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off
all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could
be found_. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army
could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.”

[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative].

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 12.]

Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord
Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which,
with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in
disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal
could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that
country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to
answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier,
being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a
superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal,
Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check
the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c.
which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own
mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could
alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in
Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “_because the
latter was without a military force_,” and if it were otherwise, from
the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on
their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only
to the _state of affairs existing at that moment_, being expressly
founded on the _miserable condition and unpromising character of the
Portuguese military_, Spain also being supposed conquered.

[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.]

Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the
termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John
Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to
Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular
troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war
in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in
the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature
consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia,
Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still
uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts
with reference to this question, were still in possession of the
Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to
the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy
then in the Peninsula, provided _an enormous additional subsidy and
a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one
earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation_.
And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, _although
success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the
Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted_.
Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance,
and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as
temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was
between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan
of action.

[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative.]

“_The French_,” said sir John Moore, “_will find the Spaniards
troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little
more than a march to subdue the country_.”

[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.]

“_The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be_,” said
lord Wellington, “_the probable consequence of any action in which
either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to
engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the
war of Partisans will probably continue._”

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.]

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending
on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first
indication of Joseph’s march, designed to make a movement similar in
principle to that executed by sir John Moore on Sahagun, that is,
by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy’s rear, in such
sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer
his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred
from this project, by the knowledge, that fresh troops were entering
Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men
had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to
doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose
before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into
line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction
of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it,
and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers
then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if
not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta’s operation,
as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already
explained. He abandoned his own,--

1º. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not
arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill’s
division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the
field. Hill’s division, however, could not be moved without leaving
the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,--a danger,
which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia,
would only increase.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.]

2º. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger
and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned.
To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization,
destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other
hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the
troops of Kellerman’s government, lord Wellington knew to be at least
thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass;
and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and from
Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to
give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning
was sound shall now be shewn.

[Sidenote: Rolls of the French army.]

Mortier’s march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if
the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre,
had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, was only
part of a general movement throughout Spain; and when the king placed
himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman
marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the
sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley
of the Tagus, and at the same time, the second corps coming down
that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Baños, and
with the fifth by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold
of Andalusia, three _corps d’armée_, namely, the sixth, second, and
fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency,
be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord
Wellington’s. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; for,
in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with
fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted,
but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with
Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross,
the western Pyrennees.

Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the
field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth
corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes,
advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the
plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman,
have overwhelmed the British army; but for that sagacity, which
the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards,
with ingratitude, have termed “_The selfish caution of the English
system_.”

Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a
machine, as a British army, with all its national reputation to
support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day,
dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, incapable
of attaining, and consequently, incapable of losing, any military
reputation.

CHAPTER II.

The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the
idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole
attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of
circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its
defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother,
rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and
throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general.
The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by
which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the
compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to
comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many
difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them;
for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and
fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled
politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion.
Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even
thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the
story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but
England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative
of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the
respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to shew how
great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and
with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

_State of the French._--France victorious, and in a state of the
highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish double the number of
men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many
years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved,
it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies,
disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years,
yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession,
the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of
dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully
demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a baron
Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French
police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter,
influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the
attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government.
The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula
were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious,
and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be
equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which,
though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much
as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most
important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive
king.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards
never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but
it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his
true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he claimed the
treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a
tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have
refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic
firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then
to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without
ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in
Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a Spanish party for
himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands
of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while
the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen
submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was
it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed
through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for
conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his
throne.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]

Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon
principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the
French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of
those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests
clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies,
they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so
strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended
to fall on the emperor’s troops. Thus civil contention weakened the
military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command
in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon
inspection prove perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the
actual state of affairs.

He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great man’s genius to their
own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals
and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those
disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point
to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in
regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that
the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole.

To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s measures, it would
be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political
position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the
world, to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his
situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required
extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was
not merely a conqueror, but the founder, of a political structure
too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with
its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital
stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s
policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters;
avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public
credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without
hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the
only resource left was to make “_the war maintain the war_.”

[Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 420.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Sections 2 and 3.]

But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers,
were much opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds always
applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy;
yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been
impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate
course, and formed what were called “_particular military
governments_,” such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia;
in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the
civil and military power: in short, he created viceroys as he had
threatened to do when at Madrid; and, though many disadvantages
attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and
consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon’s
measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended
the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party;
that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive
only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of
the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it
as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to
the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts
to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the
emperor.

[Sidenote: Memoires de St. Helene.]

On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general
equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period,
the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the
Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies,
and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were
feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the
resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to
make the success of each “_corps d’armée_,” and the reputation of
its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it
was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the
sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as
Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all
necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly
not have been attained under the supreme government of the king,
because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy,
obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.

I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were
included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people,
extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result
of personal enmity; and facts, derived from less interested quarters,
as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer
reach in their policy than the king could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered.
Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh
government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the
small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered
amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to
re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the
military governments of Spain. The marshal’s sway, however, wisely
adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and
violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula
once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful
government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a
deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away
the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which
they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could
introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the
constitution of Bayonne.

[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this
system, were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were
exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of
succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise
have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The
Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty
arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although
regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of
soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by
the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the
king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands
in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the
Regency answered, by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had
strong grounds for what they did: the Junta, because the defence of
the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas; Joseph, because the
latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and
were, by the Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and, indeed,
all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became
inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of
being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he
might destroy the mother and the infant together! And such things
were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring
in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of
the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no
quarter on either side.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 5.]

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the
marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to
complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals,
especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter,
which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety;
namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; by which,
infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited,
without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military.
Another object of Almenara’s mission was to ascertain if there was
really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and
this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being
intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he,
in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulated
the style and manner of Napoleon’s state-papers, and composed a
counterfeit “_senatus consultum_” and decree for annexing the
provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph,
whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile,
his distress for money was extreme; and his ministers were at times
actually destitute of food.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the
intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning
the king’s French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less
than _three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand
horses_. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four
thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly
two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms,
ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve,
eighteen thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. In May,
this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus
distributed:--

_Governments or Armies in the 2d Line._

Total Strength.
1. Catalonia Seventh corps Duke of Tarento 55,647
2. Aragon Third corps Gen. Suchet 33,007
{ Detachments and }
3. Navarre { a division of the } Gen. Reille 21,887
{ Imperial Guards }
4. Biscay Detachments Gen. Caffarelli 6,570
5. Old Castile, { Divisions of the }
comprising Burgos, { Imperial Guards } Gen. Dorsenne 10,303
Aranda, and Soria { and Cavalry }
6. Valladolid, &c. Detachments Gen. Kellerman 6,474
7. Asturias One division Gen. Bonet 9,898
-------
Total for the governments 143,786
-------

_Armies in the 1st Line._

_Army of the South_, composed of the first, fourth, and
fifth corps, under the command of Soult 72,769

_Army of the Centre_, composed of the Royal Guards, two
divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the
personal command of the king 24,187

_Army of Portugal_, composed of a reserve of cavalry and
the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of
Massena 86,896

The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, distributed,
by divisions, along the great line of communication from
Vittoria to Valladolid 23,815

A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable
column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal 10,605
-------
218,272
-------

Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines,
namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the
south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the
interior circle was still held by the French; and their lines of
communication were crowded with troops.

[Sidenote: Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.]

_State of Spain._--On the right, the armies of Valencia and
Catalonia, were opposed to the third and seventh corps; but the
utmost efforts of the last could only retard, not prevent the sieges
of Taragona and Tortoza. In the centre, the Murcian troops and
those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance
of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana,
supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare
from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to
Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Gallicia and
Asturias, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared
his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the
frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the
armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through
the country moveable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige
the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this
severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England,
Gallicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]

But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the
vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and
surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many
persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from
a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French
columns; and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system
to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each
province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions
in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by
the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also
appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline
and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with
the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was
divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being
to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force;
and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act
in mass.

The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable
loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was
a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert
with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of
Andalusia; Franquisette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad
Real, and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril,
descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of
Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French
posts, close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the
very gates of that town.

On the other side of Madrid, the Empecinado, with twelve hundred
cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured
sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable
in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of two thousand men,
harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain
of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado,
was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia, the two first
acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria.
In the Asturias, Escaidron, continually hanging upon the flanks and
rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with
Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last
chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders
of Gallicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled
the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French
fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence,
slew numbers of the Guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were
robbers who, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely
harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though
all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point!

But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the
entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly
and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and
provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula
were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence
of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance
of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were
withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious
colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of
expecting Napoleon’s innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their
own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few
divisions, to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at
three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and
Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and
Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

_England._--The contentions of party were vehement, and the
ministers’ policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1º.
The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2º. The furnishing
money for the expenses; and, 3º. The recruiting of the armies. The
last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809,
which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia
to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this
was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but
the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition, in
parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The
desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were,
indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest
in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy
of Beresford’s report of the numbers and efficiency of the native
forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful
resistance, assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and
doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully
encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the
smallest difficulties encountered by the English general.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in
parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like
men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or
wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries
in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury
newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought,
plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never
attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains
of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of
the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and
violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was
expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained,
his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the
enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing, that consummate
art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle
reason, was neglected.

[Sidenote: Paper against Gold.]

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The
country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon’s
continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually
rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are
the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible
to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to
investigate the matter, made early in the following session, a report
in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the
depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning
to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at
least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending
a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted
in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William
Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly,
and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government
endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question,
but lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose
leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the
hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative,
of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts
adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the
instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house
voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling, were equal in
value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light
guineas were openly selling at twenty-eight shillings. This vote,
although well calculated to convince the minister’s opponents, that
no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in
the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of
raising money, and no resource remained, but that of the desperate
spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he
supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the
war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world’s commerce
by sea, and the ministers affirming, that, the country, was in a
state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like
of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or
reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of
their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first
bullet might have extinguished for ever.

_State of Portugal._--In this country, three parties were apparent.
That of the _people_ ready to peril body and goods for independence.
That of the _fidalgos_, who thought to profit from the nation’s
energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the
_disaffected_, who desired the success of the French; some as
thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere
baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and
Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed; for those noblemen,
in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot’s
time, under the authority of the prince regent’s edict to that
effect. Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear
arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and
Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in
the military archives at Paris.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors
and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but
the fidalgos, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and
supported by the regency, were a powerful body, and their political
proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock, demand notice.
The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the
marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other
member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly
afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception
of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses;
and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only
a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was
necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited
by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties
in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular
army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to
organize the militia, and ordenança, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless,
the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively
zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas,
who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a
centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither
few, nor inactive, gathered. The times, obliged the government, to
permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon; it naturally
followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded,
and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were
printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus
a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of
misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country
depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas’ resignation, four new members were added to the
regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called, Principal Souza, the
Conde de Redondo, the marquis de Olhao, and doctor Noguiera. The two
last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless,
irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the
utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the
British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose
violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence
amongst the people was still very considerable.

An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, whose object was to
obtain the supreme direction, not only of the civil, but military
affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde
Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the
Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier
Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, don
Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency;
so that playing into each others hands, and guided by the subtle
Principal, they were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues; and
their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with
a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley’s energetic
interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition,
yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they
durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers was replaced as
envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced
in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies
which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political
agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine
understanding, and resolute temper, to forward the views of lord
Wellington. It is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis
which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a
diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the
plans of the commander had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in
Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it was a question of interest more
than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great
body of which perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with
the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather
to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same
people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat
the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces
(of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of
the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating
against this design.

Another spring of political action, was the hatred and jealousy of
Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties
during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous
effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For
when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese
were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they
had no feeling in common with their neighbours.

Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife
to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed, not only
the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother’s
death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the
whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the tribunals
to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza’s mission to
Cadiz. The council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish
Regency, readily recognized Carlotta’s pretensions in virtue of the
decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique
law of Philip the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to
them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled,
by corruption obtained an acknowledgement of the princess’s claim.
His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by lord
Wellington, who foresaw that his success would not only affect the
military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control
of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if
power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one
family. Moreover, he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to
embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from
the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should
reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of this plan,
she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain
that arrogance, deceit, and personal intrigues, were common to the
Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the
same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shewn
in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 9.]

When lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to
defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed, rather
than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that
he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of
the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how
passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he
would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free
promises of their governors, but insisted that his own authority as
_marshal-general of Portugal_ should be independent of the local
government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English
and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or “ordenanças;”
for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by
extraordinary means.

Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money
supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency, to revive and
enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men
were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that
the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills,
to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their
fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on
whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be
deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of
all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort,
that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet
be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population,
converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should
cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident, that if the French could find, or carry,
supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves until the British
commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark or giving battle
be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to
pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further
struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary
to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could
neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers,
nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could
be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The
mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated,
furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of
all the positions, had been made under the directions of sir Charles
Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French colonel Vincent’s
minutes, shewing how they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington’s
possession; and from those documents the original notion of the
celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but
the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be
made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It
was lord Wellington, who first conceived the design, of turning those
vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein
to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present
it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and
redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous
country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the
most gigantic part of the English general’s undertaking. He was a
foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power
under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; he was vehemently
opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the
nobility of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak position,
he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses
engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole
people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own
lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power
of modern times.

Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of
the _fidalgos_, the ancient military laws were revived, and so
effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross
number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of
which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand
militia, and the remainder “ordenanças;” but this multitude was
necessarily subject to many deductions. The “_capitans mor_,” or
chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty,
the total number of “ordenanças” really assembled, fell far short of
the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the
militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets:
and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived
at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely
twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colours. Of the
regular troops the whole were in good condition, and thirty thousand
being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed,
disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers;
but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual
number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three
thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the
disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one-half of
which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula,
exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded
thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, but six thousand were in
hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The
latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty
thousand men, while the army, on whose exertions the fate of the
Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British; such
was the policy of the English Cabinet; for this was the ministers’
and not the general’s arrangement. The ordenanças being set aside,
the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, cannot be
estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to
defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles
long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take
advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence,
shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to
invasion:--

1º. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes,
extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro.

2º. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of
the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.

3º. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal on the
Tagus.

4º. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers, stretching, in one line
from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military
aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the
distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass
to Rosaminhal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying
between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main
body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being
considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of
the whole, but had each a separate system for itself, based on the
one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the
best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action,
while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the
invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described,
Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre
Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line,
except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from
Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus,
the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to
describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of
the enemy.

An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria,
or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications
could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of
Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños, and
the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps
could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way
at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between
the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles
against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella,
lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic
arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit
is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers
cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually
oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could
penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following
directions:--

_From Ciudad Rodrigo._--1º. By the valley of the Douro.--2º. By the
valley of the Mondego.--3º. By the valley of the Zezere.

_From Coria._--1º. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus;
and, 2º. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement
through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to
an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh
base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement
could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The
first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and
Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of
the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by
Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or
the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for
artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land
offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side
of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position
of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the
passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and
that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the
savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable
for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by
the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the
positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the
Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few,
the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite
impracticable for artillery of any calibre.

Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it
would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the
threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending
army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles,
while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two
marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with
an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier
consists in this, _the Tagus along its whole course is, from June
to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the
lines_. A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at
any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier
positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of
the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria,
and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in
the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the
Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons _the frontier of
Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers_.

Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of
the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal
attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while
an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco
upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following
dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniché,
Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were
garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant,
Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces
beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the
garrison of Valença, on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the
lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of
militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In
the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were
stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves.
There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing
the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on
both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular
Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and
Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

But the British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of
cavalry, were distributed as follows:--

Men.
1st Division General Spencer, about 6000 Viseu.
2d Division, including } General Hill, ” 5000 Abrantes.
the 13th Dragoons }
3d Division General Picton, ” 3000 Celerico.
4th Division General Cole, ” 4000 Guarda.
Light Division Robert Crawfurd, ” 2400 Pinhel.
The Cavalry General Cotton, ” 3000 { Valley of
{ Mondego.
------
Total 23,400 under arms.
------

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and
ordenança, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The
Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry
posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of
thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in
two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position
and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as
short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus
thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the
enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from
Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura,
across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over
the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach
that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an
arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello
Branco is over difficult mountains; to have repaired the roads
between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than
to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to
penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after
throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying
Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line
of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to
the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was
recrossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now
the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the
distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by
Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet
much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed
by the engineers, was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy’s march by the north bank were
preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha, enabled not only Hill to
pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank
movement in less time than Reynier, but it also provided a lateral
communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find
of vital importance in the combinations of the English general,
supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales,
which otherwise would have been adopted.

The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication
between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally
forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños,
and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties
sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

But, notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration,
the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier,
because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo,
before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a
battle lost there, would, in the dry season, decide the fate of
Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have
been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy;
but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the
very basis of lord Wellington’s defence, and all his dispositions
were made to oblige _the French to move in masses_, and to _gain time
himself_, time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines,
time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give
full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança, and,
above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the
public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his
combinations will shew, that they were well adapted to effect these
objects.

1º. The enemy durst not advance, except with _concentrated masses_,
because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter
above twenty thousand men.

2º. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana’s
troops and even forced back Hill’s, the latter passing the Tagus
at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage
of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no
regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without
first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3º. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without
sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at
Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill
could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this
line, save by a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not
to be expected; for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira
and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of
heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river,
with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the
mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the
valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back.

4º. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to
gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to
the valley of the Mondego, and moreover the road from Belmonte
towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and
obstructed.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 5._

Defence
of
_Portugal_
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty
miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined.
Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel,
run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and
Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity,
that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen
into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But
the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading
army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the
lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open; if the French
adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and
by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, when they would have to
choose between the right and the left bank. If the latter, they must
march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they
reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego,
and behind which they would find the allied army in a position of
surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of
the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter
noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having _interior
lines of communication_, could, as long as the Belmonte road was
sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra.
Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to
be apprehended; and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly
and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier; for the latter
having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful
evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth
corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the
allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing Hill across the Tagus,
furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the
southern bank of that river.

In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the
enemy’s actual situation, and expecting the invasion in summer;
but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and
the roads deteriorated, the defence would be different; fewer
troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus, and the Zezere, the
Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the
allied troops, could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn
resistance made on the northern line.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.]

Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord
Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour
of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during
the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people
and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the
final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with thirty
regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the
enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his
retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were
however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident
as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be
expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest
with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at
their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a
third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand
tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the
British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity
for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens
as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source
of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have
supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies;
there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country
but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others
overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in
this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass
unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first
to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal
there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the
people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some
cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be
obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a
manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships
and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable
war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle
against famine, while near the sea, but at a distance from that
nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated
the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in
Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the
only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a
certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva
de Pena Cova, on the Mondego; and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on
the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by lord Wellington, and
his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico,
Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred
miserable bullock-cars and about twelve thousand hired mules,
organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike
stores and provisions to the armies; when additional succours could
be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount
of transport.

With such means and with such preparations was the defence of
Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial
observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number
of intricate combinations, lord Wellington’s situation was not one
in which a general could sleep, and that, due allowance being made
for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his
talents and steel-hardened resolution.

In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force
of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched,
and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more
than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The
unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence
of the emperor,--the erroneous views of the king,--the rivalry of
the marshals,--the impediments to correspondence,--the necessity of
frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,--the iniquity of
the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most
part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could
not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers, over
and above the ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate
reward.

For the English, the quicksands were--the memory of former failures
on the continent,--the financial drain,--a powerful and eloquent
opposition pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general
dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a
panic amongst the ministers which all lord Wellesley’s vigour would
be unable to stem,--the intrigues of the Souza party,--and the
necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for
the sake of defending a _European cause_. Finally, the babbling of
the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew
the most certain information of the strength and situation of the
army.

On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified
towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to
crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the
recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French
dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the
educated classes did not shrink less from the British government’s
known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained
for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people
to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the
armies,--the chances of another continental war,--the complete
dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,--the
recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription
with two links in the chain instead of one; and, not least, the
ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of
Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as
general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of
the British soldiers, I will set down what many years’ experience
gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier
of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815,
observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies
of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he
sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with
incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are
required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements
free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military
bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not,
indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to
dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although
he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend
his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute
in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers
in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the
result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling.
Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon’s troops fought in
bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but
the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy;
no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the
applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was
uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore!
Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills,
sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with
incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving
that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount
of honour was also full and fresh within him!

The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial
writers of different nations have given the first place, amongst the
European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the
troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that
the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the
world.

CHAPTER IV.

In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer
back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations
on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted,
in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it
right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous,
and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up.
Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent
of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity
of zealously seconding the English general; yet, in the manner of
doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and, as he
was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always
honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]

It will be remembered that, in February, Ney threatened Ciudad
Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill
advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; lord Wellington immediately
reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light
division across the Coa, to observe the enemy’s proceedings. The
Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops;
but lord Wellington replying that the numbers already fixed would
be as great as he could feed, took occasion to point out, that the
measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were
neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, and that the carriages
and other assistance, required for the support of the British
soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he
urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops;
and, at the same time, as the Regency in the hope of rendering him
unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the
punishment of offenders into his own hands; he informed them that,
although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be
made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were
sufficient for the purpose.

When the siege of Astorga was commenced by the French, the Portuguese
army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern
provinces, were ordered to concentrate at Braganza to guard the Tras
os Montes. Ciudad Rodrigo, being soon afterwards seriously menaced,
lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and
transferred his own quarters to Celerico, intending to succour
Ciudad if occasion offered; but the conduct of the Portuguese
Regency cramped his operations. The resources of the country were
not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain
his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his
remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish
Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera: lord Wellington was,
however, in a different situation.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]

Writing sharply, he told them that “their conduct was evasive and
frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain
without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle
or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for
private interests; that the resources were in the country, could
be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was
desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and,
to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes.” Then, issuing
a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both
magistrates and people, and by this vigourous conduct procured some
immediate relief for his troops.

Meanwhile, Crawfurd commenced a series of remarkable operations. His
three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult
service; they had been for several years under sir John Moore, and,
being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great
man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms that, in six
years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system.
But the enemy’s posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the
light division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the Coa, unless
some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico. Crawfurd
proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth
division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that general would
not quit his own position at Guarda; and lord Wellington approving,
and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to
succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel, and
reinforcing Crawfurd with the first German hussars, (consisting of
four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb
troop of horse-artillery, commanded by captain Ross, gave him the
command of all the outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support
him, if called upon.

In the middle of March, Crawfurd lined the bank of the Agueda with
his hussars, from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right,
a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river.
The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between
Almeida and the Lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Conception,
and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores soon afterwards arrived,
making a total of four thousand men, and six guns. The French at this
period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and
Salamanca, but they did not occupy the pass of Perales; and Carrera’s
Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawfurd,
whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. From Navas
Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain,
and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at
Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at
Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba
del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two
first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate
under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and
on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a
few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing
any numbers.

This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that
river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without
apparent reason: when it was fordable, Crawfurd always withdrew his
outposts, and concentrated his division; and his situation demanded a
quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has never
been surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under
arms in the middle of the night; and a quarter of an hour, night or
day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the
baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear.
And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times
and certain.

The 19th of March, general Ferey, a bold officer, either to create
a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or
to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close
to the bridge of San Felices, and, just as the moon, rising behind
him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of
the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and, with incredible
speed, ascending the opposite side, bayonetted the sentries, and fell
upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting
into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still
echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great
the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each
soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand; and
their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and
daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight,
urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the
French column was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the descent.

This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy
could gain nothing by slight operations; but it was difficult
to keep in advance of the Coa: the want of money had reduced the
whole army to straits, and Crawfurd, notwithstanding his prodigious
activity, being unable to feed his division, gave the reins to
his fiery temper, and seized some church-plate, with a view to
the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic act he was immediately
rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed; and
the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it
convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned.

When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter
end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his
head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin
Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; being, however, menaced there
by Kellerman’s troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero
on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division,
which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco.
Crawfurd and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should
concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if unable to maintain
themselves there, unite with the Spaniards at Nava d’Aver, and
finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the
Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to
Guarda.

It was at this period that Massena’s arrival in Spain became known
to the allies; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak
of the emperor’s commanding in person; yet all agreed that serious
operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as the river continued
unfordable, Crawfurd maintained his position; but, towards the end
of May, certain advice of the march of the French battering-train
was received through Andreas Herrasti: and, the 1st of June, Ney,
descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge, on trestles, over the
Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above; and, a few days
afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As
this concentration of the French relieved the northern provinces of
Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments of militia were brought down
from Braganza to the Lower Douro; provisions came by water to Lamego,
and the army was enabled to subsist.

The 8th of June four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda,
Crawfurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the
Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village. It was
at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could
scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate
front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to
desert!

Nothing could be more critical than Crawfurd’s position. From the
Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and
scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there
were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour’s
march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods
in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close
upon the village; while wide plains behind, almost precluded hope,
in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery.
The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered more security
on his left, because the channel of the former river there became a
chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge
of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank
on the enemy’s side was highest, and, to obtain a good prospect, it
was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge
of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the
streams. The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as
the enemy occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his bridge
at Carboneras, and making preparations for the siege of Rodrigo,
Crawfurd, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the
surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous
position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and
protecting the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa
from the enemy’s foraging parties.

On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices,
and other points; and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to
the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez,
breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. On the 25th, the French
batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the
Azava, and Crawfurd withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th,
it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and
five hundred wounded; and, the 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French
posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: “_O venir
luego! luego! luego! a socorrer esta plaza_.” (“Oh! come, now! now!
now! to the succour of this place.”) And, on the 1st of July, the
gallant old man repeated his _“Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez_.”

Meanwhile, lord Wellington (hoping that the enemy, by detaching
troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo)
transferred his quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between
Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack; and
Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for
carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English
general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of
securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a
point in his operations; his army was close at hand; the garrison
brave and distressed; the governor honourably fulfilling his part.
To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a
grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms;
the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a
proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their
own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an effort, lest the
world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a
hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord
Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade; and thus
proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind.

It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had
undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government
would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it
himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand
men: of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the
remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the
Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought
into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had,
at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass
the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the
Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington
to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve, and
these and Hill’s corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand
men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty
thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also take the army
two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from
that place, hence, a division must have been left at Guarda, lest
Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section I.]

Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes
of using them. 1º. In an open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret
movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have
assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single
bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering
train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without
dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information was so good that he
knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana’s visit,
such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the
early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when
the enemy were on the Azava.

An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing
over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers,
must have exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the Agueda,
because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of
the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then
for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers,
when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over
the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed
to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five
thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would
have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the
battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a
poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual
state of affairs in that country?--The militia deserting in crowds
to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the
measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public
mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and
advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him?

Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired
that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared
careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that
he was afraid!--that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared
to carry him away--that he was a man, who, insensible to military
honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without risking a shot
to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety
failed; lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. “If
thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a
great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!”

Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and
meanwhile the enemy pushing infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired
to the Dos Casas river, and Crawfurd, reinforced with the sixteenth
and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and
concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear.
From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida
by San Pedro or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa.
Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could
keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks
on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then
sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the
ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the
enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come
up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, on the
4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and
a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at
full speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets. The enemy
then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon
Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of British and a troop of German
hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up on a hill
half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed
the road to Alameda; in a few moments a column of French horsemen
was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as
it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the
most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from
the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge.
The English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; and
the gallant German rode full speed against the head of the advancing
columns with his single troop, and with such a shock, that he killed
the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole
back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a
squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from
the third caçadores.

This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawfurd took a
fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception.
His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera’s divisions,
were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew
behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding
parties however entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco
for three nights successively; and Crawfurd, thinking to cut them
off, formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de Puerco with six
squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo, and disposed
his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third
caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos
and even in advance of it.

A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were
observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of
cavalry at Barquillo. An open country on the right would have enabled
the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and
their point of retreat. This was circuitous, and Crawfurd preferred
pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road: the
enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the
French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather
steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge, as not to be seen
until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived,
galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but
failed. The troopers received the fire of the square in front and on
both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain Guache
and his serjeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully.

Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy’s cavalry came out of
Barquillos, and the two squadrons riding against it, made twenty-nine
men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile
colonel Talbot mounting the hill with four squadrons of the
fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain Guache; but the
latter again opened such a fire, that Talbot himself and fourteen
men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made
good his retreat; after which Crawfurd returned to the camp, having
had thirty-two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in
this unfortunate affair. That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and
the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light
division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana; but
Crawfurd assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida,
and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington
replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his
ground; but that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper of the
man, he repeated his former orders _not to fight beyond the Coa_.

On the 21st, the enemy’s cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was
blown up, and Crawfurd fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to
cross the Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving
the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division, for three
months, within two hours march, of sixty thousand men, appropriating
the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit,
only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish
thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior
power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of
sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved,
in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to
fight on the right bank.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

Crawfurd’s whole force under arms consisted of four thousand
infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position,
one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards
the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his
right on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished
tower, eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of
that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the
channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in
the bottom of the chasm.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched
with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire,
when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the
cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy’s
approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French
infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery
were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was
immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine;
but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawfurd’s false disposition,
came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a
powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back,
and Loison’s division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the
centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes
were made on the English side, part of the troops were advanced,
others drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably placed
within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high,
situated on the left of the road with but one narrow outlet about
half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the firing
in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the caçadores
successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the
ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A
few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded;
but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness
and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the
general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful
effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column
of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen; there
was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle,
every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and
joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole
presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no
regular command; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of
those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a
common discretion and keeping together with surprising vigour.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers.
It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what
vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste
a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and
numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns
ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars,
galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring
every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow
this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off
the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge
him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that
only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have
availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an
independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena’s
knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with
singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from
their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping
and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way
through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their
enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in
amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the
walls or scrambled over the rocks.

As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more
open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the
shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and
some of the right wing distant. Major M’Leod, of the forty-third,
seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the
passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth,
and at the same time, two other companies were posted by
brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road, these posts
were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers,
made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the
right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge,
which was still crowded with the passing troops, M’Leod, a very young
man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse
round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode
with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the
distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a
mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole
army had been at their backs, and the enemy’s skirmishers, astonished
at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover
from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M’Leod,
following at full speed, gained the other side also without a
disaster.

As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose
order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the
summit and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the
right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and
beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended
that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a
division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those
places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was,
however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat
farther.

The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting
fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides
played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless
echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense
arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling
fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his
columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon
was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from
the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating
between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The
monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and in another
instant, the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge.
A drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward
together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the
ravine at first deceived the soldiers’ aim, and two-thirds of the
passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet
a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of
the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column
pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the
killed and wounded railed together, until the heap rose nearly even
with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than
gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently
answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than
the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range
was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude
was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men
only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the
brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon
coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief
and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was
his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his
still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt.
The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too
apparent, and this last effort, made with feebler numbers and less
energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 6._

CRAWFURD’S
_OPERATIONS_
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French,
as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed
the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One
of the enemy’s guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and
many continued to fall on both sides until about four o’clock; when
a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire the men amongst
the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased,
and Crawfurd retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese,
two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers,
were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that
lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which
had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured: but
that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great
intelligence, passed all the enemy’s posts, and, crossing the Coa at
a ford, rejoined his regiment.

In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at
the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken
two pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns intended to
arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at
the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison
of Almeida, not to the light division, and that they were not
mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; the enemy’s
cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left
of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have
been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured
by Crawfurd, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more
vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged
by the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled
together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have
killed both.

During the fight, general Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawfurd
desired the support of the third division; it was refused; and,
excited by some previous disputes, the generals separated after a
sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawfurd’s
situation was one of extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena
might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello
Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it, between
the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawfurd were, however, not
formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance,
robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere
demeanour of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick
figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of
the second; nor, indeed, did they often meet without a quarrel.
Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters
and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command,
both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from
inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory.
They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising
and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling
troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after
distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and
being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since
their death, been injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great
leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and
Crawfurd more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate
command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed;
but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of
the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended
the profound military and political combinations he was conducting;
the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa; and the
other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

CHAPTER V.

During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the
Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army,
under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria; acting in concert
with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier,
seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast,
near Santander. Mahi’s movements could not be well opposed by either
Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a
strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread
over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the
eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions,
enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were driven
into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla
Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but
Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla,
fell back to Zamora, and the eighth corps re-occupied the country
between the Tormes and the Agueda.

Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on
the frontier of Gallicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the
expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña,
the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander
itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and
ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains
of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with;
sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions
against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious
interruption of the French communications was planned, but never
realised.

Meanwhile, general Reynier passed the Tagus with the second corps,
but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June;
for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that
month, and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia,
when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment,
at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its
succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry.

But, at this period, the insurrection caused by Lascy’s expedition to
the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville
to that side, the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had fallen back
behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions
on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of
returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres
de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena
against Ballasteros, the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Araceña,
and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a
hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was
beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D’Aremberg
and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer; and Reynier, going back to
Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus.

His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected
this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to
cover the operations both from Hill’s division which was concentrated
at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river,
a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and
the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter.
Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo
and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage; his
rear guard following on the 16th.

This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill,
who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second
corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of
Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. But the passage of the
Tagus being thus effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel
movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and
meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the
command of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and
two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England.

Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached a force, by
Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill,
having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on
the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by
a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under general Fane, encamped,
with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in
front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard in Castello Branco;
his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese
infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to
cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the
Zezere: and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were
in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus.

Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra; but
being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between
Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of one hundred and
fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio
Del Monte, and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether
he meant to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join
Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned to Araceña, Imas to Xeres
de los Cavalleros, O’Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d’España
cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however,
soon obliged to concentrate his troops again; for Mortier was on
the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the
situation of the armies in the beginning of August; and when Massena
was assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the sixth
corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to
the combat on the Coa; during which, Loison, imagining the governor
to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English:
“_that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese_.”

Lord Wellington’s situation was critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished
the French with a place of arms; they might disregard Almeida: and
their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great
magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of
so doing. But Massena’s dispositions were such as rendered his true
designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve
cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida; but, by telegraphic intercourse
with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and
the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison’s advanced
guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawfurd’s action; the second
corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats,
near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river
and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would
join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. The eighth corps and
the divisions of Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the
Esla, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while
the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check: and this
was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would
have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror,
opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid
all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general
must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he
attacked Ney; an unpromising measure, because of the enemy’s strength
in horse: in fine, Massena had one hundred and sixteen thousand men
and the initial operations in his power, and lord Wellington was
obliged to wait upon his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward;
yet to retire at once would have seemed timid: hence lord Wellington
remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although
the enemy’s posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. But the
28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry
withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which
remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other
divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the
Portuguese troops being a day’s march behind. The sick and wounded
men transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free
from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa
de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but
finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the
garrison on the 3d of August, left the communication with Almeida
again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier’s horse was
encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese
cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken.

On the side of Gallicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro
Contrijo, and detachments from Serras’s division penetrated towards
Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to
Braganza. But Silveira, marching on Senabria, defeated the enemy’s
cavalry there on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on
the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras was
coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken,
and Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have given battle to
Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed at such rashness, had not sent
him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he effected with some
difficulty.

This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in
Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect
lord Wellington’s counsels, were now less so than before, from the
discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed
upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission
that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with
leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he
had shewn him that Hill’s departure greatly augmented the necessity
of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros; and, as their
united force amounted to fourteen thousand infantry and fifteen
hundred horse, the English general immediately foresaw that they
would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of
the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden’s brigade
of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance.

Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, but Romana’s advanced
guard had been already intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost six
hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera
arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged them. The whole then
retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the
French pursued and slew or took four hundred more. The following
day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The
enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with
three thousand men from Cadiz convoyed by Capt. Cockburn of the
British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the duke of Aremberg
towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although
the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was
withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra.
This affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid description in
Cockburn’s despatches obtained for it a momentary celebrity.

It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier’s movements
to develope his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered
Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida; and lord Wellington
immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the
British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at
Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting
a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the
enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would
give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had
intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging
the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the
garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole
army: Crawfurd’s rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so
dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did
not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena’s tardiness
and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led
lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen
body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly
forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering
train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving
this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster
broke his measures.

SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.

[Sidenote: Colonel Cox’s Narrative.]

This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions,
ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely
defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some
near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might
be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of
the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not
secure; but with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion,
there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor,
and his garrison composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a
body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four
thousand men.

On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack,
and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced)
sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at
once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to
extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained,
little military damage was sustained, and towards evening the
cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground
suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave
vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the
whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had
caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible.
The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into
the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and
only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of
the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at
the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing
that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the
governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls with the help of
an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the
French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the
27th, two officers appeared at the gates, with a letter from Massena,
offering terms.

Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped
that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could
impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of
refusing the prince of Esling’s offer, when a mutiny, headed openly
by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by
José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time
in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The
remainder of the native officers disturbed by fear, or swayed by the
influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose
their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution
to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force,
endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros’
treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros
immediately informed Massena of the true state of garrison, and never
returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that
the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain
prisoners of war.

[Sidenote: Justification of Colonel W. Cox.]

[Sidenote: Note by Gen. Pelet. Appendix to Vol. XII. Victoires et
Conquestes des Français.]

While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the
articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place.
This act, unjustifiable and strange, because Massena’s aide-de-camp,
colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing
commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission
of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also
asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the
militia were violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that
when the garrison still amounting to three thousand men perceived
the marquis d’Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest
part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under
general Pamplona. Yet, so easily are men’s minds moved by present
circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they
afterwards saw the allied armies.

Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De
Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the
orders of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited
this chastisement, yet the principal evidence against him was an
explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool, by Cox, while a
prisoner at Verdun.

The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of
fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp; but
the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th,
when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the
glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position
behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa,
the powder-magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also
exploded and killed four hundred men; and, on the 1st of September,
general Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello
Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, suddenly
reached Sabugal. The British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the
following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy’s plans
seemed to be ripe for execution; and lord Wellington transferring his
quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed
his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at
Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and,
throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the
French projects in obscurity.

Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces,
and he seemed at first, either disinclined to commence the invasion
or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the
surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days,
the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an
intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he
expected further inaction: “Lord Wellington,” he observed to Massena,
“has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it
would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can
balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall
boldly on after having _well observed where the blow may be given_.
You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery
as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a
proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca,
and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant,
and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you
should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English
can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight
thousand men.”

This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but
Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting
Portugal forward in the press.

Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached
him; but to understand his operations it is essential to have a
clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced
positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de
Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco: no
enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious
attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat
of the whole, in concentric directions towards the Lines. But, if
Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move
either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord
Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great
as the enemy’s perpendicular line of march would be.

To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up,
a Portuguese brigade placed in Fundao, and general Leith’s corps
was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which
formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those
positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies
to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind
the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and
falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong,
the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella
closely hugs the left bank of the Alva.

Hill’s line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, has been already
noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road
constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from
Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one
long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The
ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella,
and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front.
In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes
it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of
smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired
and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried
across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was
established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between
Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable,
because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella
to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the
enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and
Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.

But lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind
Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his
rear close to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the Mondego
was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass
it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also
one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or
Caramula. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to
Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line, and
in approaching Coimbra sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the
Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and
barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner
that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route
to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep
tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the
Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba
near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from
Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra.

Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point
was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass
of his forces there. But Massena was ill-acquainted with the military
features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras.
Indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only
vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English
army; and many British officers imagined that the campaign was
only to cloak the general’s intention of embarking when he reached
Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that he would do so:
the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it;
and the British minsters seem to have entertained the same opinion;
for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose
instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown
to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:--“_As it is probable that the
army will embark in September._”

CHAPTER VI.

THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay
of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops
present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men.
From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and
province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid,
eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly,
the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand
strong, which, organized as a ninth corps had only entered Spain in
August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general
Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed
seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is
borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five
thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the
eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the traces of
the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid
was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard.

This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a
rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made
bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care.
Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his
line of communication had been strengthened with three additional
fortresses,--namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he
employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept
more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of
the army destined to make what is technically termed “a point” upon
Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his
hold of Spain.

Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida,
into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both
sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September.
Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same
time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia,
he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of
the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot’s march in 1807,
warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the
three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu.

[Sidenote: Note by General Pelet.]

The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as
were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to
Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the
French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by
Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered
the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to
assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days’ bread to the
soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the
Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join
lord Wellington.

In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to
concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s,
and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By
this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies
being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to
gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not
more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from that town
was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to
keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused
Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew
again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former
feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier
was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the
boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal.

On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on
the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the
enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time
the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and
the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord
Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious
progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in
Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, despatched his final orders for Hill
and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering
the Mondego; and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s
horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico,
drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço;
but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading
squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching
off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took the
latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But
this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to
the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the
enemy’s motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate
through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement,
and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of
his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the
true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring
officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s troops during this
day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of
the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the
baggage of a general.

The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the
first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy
cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao,
in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred,
that night, to Cea.

The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to
pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde;
but the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for
ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades
of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to
harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, with about three
thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading
through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra,
on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the
mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless
population hidden amongst the highest mountains.

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of
Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at
Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a
brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from
the enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks,
a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post
which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and
following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick
men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena,
relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry,
artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon
the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to
cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on
the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however,
the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry
passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were
distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the
third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and
Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place,
connecting the light division with Pack’s brigade.

But the eighth corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga;
and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main
road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general Spencer, with the
first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join
him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith
arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for
having discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, at the same
time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus
had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating lord
Wellington’s orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting
his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th,
and was there joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and
judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from
Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry
in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied
army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy
entered Viseu; and, although the French horsemen were on the Criz,
the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising
Coimbra was baffled.

Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences
from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from
day to day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles from
Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of
destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with
a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the
20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, from whom he learnt that the
convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the
rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging the head
of the escort, took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy
then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow
that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time, a
resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia
were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men,
and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers,
the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to
be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched
to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and
quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally
reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost two most important
days.

While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small
expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in
collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged
to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the
loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the
French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville.
Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired; but was
beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on
the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the
whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese
cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers with signal gallantry,
overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained
time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered
Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo,
on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions
into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in
no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to
repair to Valencia d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.

Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo
laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this
moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh
insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada the castles
of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the
Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he
was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number
inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially
that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from
England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve
for the allies, of more than five thousand British troops. Wherefore
the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to
Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis
glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to shew
how encreasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original
plan of the English general.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been
checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity
to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings.
Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been
carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending
that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party
hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall
were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the
public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence
of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills,
and endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction
even on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more
readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying
the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected
the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing
delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at
the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there
wanting either accident or indiscretion to encrease the growing
confusion.

When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend
at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in
front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more
were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being
immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English
merchants, that one and all applied for ships to carry their families
and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was
obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the
commotion. To dry this source of mischief lord Wellington issued
proclamations; and, in the orders of the day, declared that he would
not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being
assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any
repetition.

To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and
severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his
communications, and informing them that he would never “_permit
public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest
degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after
mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the
only one likely to produce a good end_.” But this remonstrance only
increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct,
that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell
them, “_their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his
own government to withdraw the British army_.”

Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful,
that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still
contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing
winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to
attempt a removal of their property.

Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders
on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated.
But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of
moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had
to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent
commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable
multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to
save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in
the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame
the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was
discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion
to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general
officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to
fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord
Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more
than half of which were untried soldiers.

The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated
by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain
every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and
the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent
it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him
to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting
himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the
northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable
him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by
the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French
could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s
resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if
either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some
palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.

Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right
bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon
their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the
first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of
the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching
the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready
to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had
repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord
Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de
Busaco for his position of battle.

This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the
Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by
a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road
along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena
Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego
permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge,
behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for
defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could
play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit
suitable for a small body of cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen
of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend
with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also
unfavourable to an attacking army.

After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a
wide order of battle, to Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending
ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last
by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish
the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that
twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite
side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first,
unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village
situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to
Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough
ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large
convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second
on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St.
Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second,
followed the Mondego to Pena Cova.

When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed
their fears that Massena would not assail it. “_But, if he does,
I shall beat him_,” was the reply of the English general, who was
well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard
was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass
on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so
celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position,
make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt
a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also
to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious
for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna’s and
Pamplona’s false reports, as to the nature of the country in his
front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz,
and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy
re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged
the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind
Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry
were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over
the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he
recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth
divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St.
Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. But the light division
falling back only a league, encamped in a pine-wood, where happened
one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were
attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near,
no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a
phrenzy, started from sleep, and dispersed in every direction; nor
was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some
persons called out that the enemy’s cavalry were amongst them, when
the soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion
was instantly dissipated.

The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and skirmished with the
picquets in front of Montagao, when the light division, again
retiring four miles, occupied strong ground, and, in the evening,
some of the enemy’s cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a
squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of
twenty or thirty men.

Early on the 25th, Crawfurd moved down from his post, and appeared
somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa; for the enemy’s
cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry
columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Mortagao,
coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds
of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed
that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full
march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging
pistol-shots, when lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered the
division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the
retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and
Ross’s troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose:
the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and
guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general
and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear
guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously
engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a
sharp cannonade, and an hour’s march, brought everything back, in
good order, to the great position; but, almost at the same moment,
the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps,
and the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the
steep ascent on which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier,
taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had
retired, arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third
division, and before three o’clock, forty thousand French infantry
were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the
skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath.

Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that
the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any
strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great
part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with
that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up
of unknown ground. He desired to make an early and powerful attack;
but the prince of Esling was at Montagao, ten miles in the rear, and
an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affairs,
after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been
informed) told that everything must await Massena’s arrival. Thus
a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of
the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge; Leith’s
troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing
the Mondego; Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely twenty-five
thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals
between the divisions.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.]

Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in concert to Massena,
on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The prince
of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o’clock,
bringing with him the eighth corps, with which, and the cavalry,
he formed a reserve, connecting the sixth and second corps, and
then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded
carefully to examine the position from left to right.

The situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill’s corps,
having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over
the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of
defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the
third division, supported by Champlemond’s Portuguese brigade, was
next to Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the
highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The
fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to
Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment
only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack’s
brigade, forming an advanced guard to the first division, was posted
half way down the descent, and the light division, supported by a
German brigade, occupied a piece of ground jutting out nearly half a
mile in front of and about two hundred feet lower than the convent,
the space between being naturally scooped like the hollow of a wave
before it breaks. Along the whole of the front skirmishers were
thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery
were disposed upon the salient points.

Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but
Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought
that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and the
prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the valour
of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next
day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and
the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack the light
French troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of
the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded
dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the
picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and
caçadores checked this, but similar attempts made with more or less
success at different points of the position, seeming to indicate a
night attack, excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it
otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the
weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on
either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more
than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of
attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under
Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three
miles asunder. Reynier’s troops had comparatively easier ground
before them, and were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers
of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to
be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played
along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French
were close upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing
power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every
thing that opposed their progress. The right of the third division
was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces,
and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just
between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions
immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and
a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit
of the sierra, but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to
open with grape upon their flank, while a heavy musketry was still
poured into their front, and, in a little time, the forty-fifth and
the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh
men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with
their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties,
mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour
and confusion; the dead and dying strewing the way even to the bottom
of the valley.

Meanwhile the French who first gained the summit had re-formed their
ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse
side of the Sierra, and thus the position was in fact gained, if
any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third
division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty
cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst
the rocks, could not be seen, except by general Leith. That officer
had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he
perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he
was now coming on rapidly; yet he had two miles of rugged ground to
pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping
the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the
right of the French; but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile
colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the critical state
of affairs, formed the ninth regiment in line under a violent fire,
and, without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the
grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with
a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with
excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the
position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it
was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action.
The victory was, however, secure. Hill’s corps edged in towards the
scene of action; the second brigade of Leith joined the first, and a
great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had
neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney’s attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain
upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the
valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult
than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawfurd, in a happy mood of
command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him
and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third
and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile
behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade
of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance
on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments,
some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in
which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the
hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the
two Portuguese caçadores battalions.

While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep
hollows separating the armies; and when the light broke, the three
divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below
and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers; soon afterwards
Marchand’s division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as
if to turn the right of the light division, Loison’s made straight up
the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve.

General Simon’s brigade, which led Loison’s attack, ascended with a
wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly
with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the
first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its
speed in the least abated. Ross’s guns were worked with incredible
quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round,
and the enemy’s shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the
skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the
edge of the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, and the
victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the
summit. Crawfurd, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been
intently watching the progress of the attack, then turned, and in a
quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge. The
next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen
hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill.
Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each
man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten
soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They
could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned
and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the
English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards’ distance
completed the route. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and
broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the
British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down
the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his
guns from the opposite height killed some men, and thus warned the
rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over
the hill, and the light division resumed its original position.

Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand’s
people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses,
gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of
their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that
Simon was defeated. Such however was the difficulty of ascending,
that Pack alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up,
Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards which forbade any hope of
success; and from the salient point of land occupied by the light
division, Crawfurd’s artillery took the main body of the French in
the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining
this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The
desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two
o’clock Crawfurd having assented to a momentary truce, parties of
both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded
men.

Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal
audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light
division, refused to retire; which so incensed Crawfurd that, turning
twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for
half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished
honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of
the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes.
Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage
character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day.
A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and
very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass,
loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army.
She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation,
and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity,
totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely
understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops,
for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her.

In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing efforts of
valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength
of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and
their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great.
General Graind’orge and about eight hundred men were slain, generals
Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made prisoner, and the sum total may be
estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies
did not exceed thirteen hundred. For on the one side musketry and
artillery were brought into full activity, but the French sought to
gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 7._

OPERATIONS
on the
MONDEGO,
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

After this Massena judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and
to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass
that river quicker than himself. But a peasant informed him of the
road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he
resolved to turn lord Wellington’s left. To cover this movement
the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a
general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious
display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up
of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly
indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when
the enemy’s masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his
cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project
became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by
Espinal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in
the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was
evacuated before the 29th, the guns followed the convent road, and
the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos,
when the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them.

Massena’s scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it
has been erroneously asserted, that Trant’s absence from Sardao alone
enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however
at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before one o’clock on the 28th;
but having, through a mistake of Baccellar’s, marched from Lamego, by
the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through
San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could
bring only fifteen hundred militia into line; hence his absence or
presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had,
as lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself.

Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British
horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patroles, and the next morning
drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga. When
Massena’s main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched
upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city,
commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condexa and Pombal.
The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from
Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; the light
division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the river; and
Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern
provinces upon the Vouga.

But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the urgent, and even
menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese Regency
had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days
that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants
had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was
still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice
but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced
in the proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the
most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers,
with children of all ages; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even
lunatics, went or were carried forth; the most part, with little
hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending
armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine,
and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the
most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the
object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left,
and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from
the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on
entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the
British cavalry were drawn up in line, but with no serious intention
of fighting, and were soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet
somewhat unskilfully; for the French following briskly, cut down some
men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from
forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men
fell.

This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily
through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at
the end of the bridge; and all the inhabitants who had not before
quitted the place rushed out, each with what could be caught up in
the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with
sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was
so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the
prison; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding
to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their
hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic
manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased,
and the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford below, were
distinctly heard.

Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s staff, burst the
prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops
forced their way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the up-hill
road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even
of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed
a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion;
and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the
division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally
incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side.
At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank,
and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it
was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although
the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night
at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria.

Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions
abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already
commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools
were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were
plundered by the troops and camp-followers; and, at Condeixa, a
magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or
abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ancle
deep, with rum, the light division and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at
the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their
own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor.

Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand.
Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and
some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were
forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command,
aided by the fine weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored
order amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the reverse of
the English general’s, introduced the confusion of a retreat in
the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste;
and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good
arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months: and,
during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous
flank march to Boyalva was lost.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. “_Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to
strike._” This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon’s letter
of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations
should be judged.

2º. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the
route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French
general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth
day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a “_a vigorous attack_.”

3º. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward
position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or
before that event, because the complement of mules for the service
of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent
upon the country carts; and when the first retrograde movement took
place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing
infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy
contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but,
intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the
English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have
beseemed his reputation, or suited his political position.

4º. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and
Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were
situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his
adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and
jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the
circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The
French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having
the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely.

A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French
army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined
lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own
army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle,
his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the
left by the slopes of the Estrella, on the right by crossing the
Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill
and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and
least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the
difficulties of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the allies
to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be
attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike
was therefore not “_well considered_,” and it is clear that Massena
did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise.

5º. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on
the prince of Esling’s view, two fresh questions were to be solved.
Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing
himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to
keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until
better combinations could be made? The last question has been already
discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon
Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the
conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned,
a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military
view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his
adversary’s rashness.

With respect to the attack, sixty-five thousand French veterans had
no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced
troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were
impregnably posted. It would have been no overweening presumption
in the French general to expect, that three corps well disposed,
supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as
Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an
error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the
light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of
artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the
attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten
miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle
in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without
artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even
with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded.

6º. “_An army should always be in condition to fight._”

“_A general should never abandon one line of communication without
establishing another._”

“_Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious._”

These maxims of the greatest of all generals have been illustrated
by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta,
Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by
his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate
crisis of affairs should be shewn, to warrant such a departure
from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another
art says, “_genius begins where rules end_.” But here genius was
dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate
game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a march by Viseu
upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; while in
that by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow
defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as
I have been informed by an officer of marshal Ney’s staff) with much
disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the
artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging
amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the
night season when every difficulty is doubled. His “_army was not,
then, in a condition to fight_.” He was making “_a flank march within
reach of an enemy in position_,” and he was “_abandoning his line of
communication without having established another_.”

7º. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the
defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent
the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular
troops, and Trant’s militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand
men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile; while the second,
third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao,
assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to
his political position. War is full of mischances, and the loss of a
single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon
the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically
dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view
the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous
to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in
fine a political battle.

8º. Massena’s march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied
army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and
the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence lord
Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra
and Espinhal roads. But the prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima
and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division
being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in
many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his
march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly
on to Leiria, by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808,
against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut:
terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the
patriarch’s faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must
have been risked before the Lines could be reached.

9º. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of
retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general’s
hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the
ninth corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with
that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards,
extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his
hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not only would the
campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner
could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary’s political and
military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and
hailed the renewed advance of the French army, as the rising of a
heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the horizon beneath.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 2.]

Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence
of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was
open for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, when Junot,
Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal,
were present, better information was not obtained; but every part
of this campaign illustrated Massena’s character, as drawn by
Napoleon:--“Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but
in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious,
filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good
administration, and, consequently, disliked by the troops; his
dispositions for battle were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to
the last degree, and he was never discouraged!”

10º. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when
the fourteen days’ bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and
it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to
carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would
not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it
ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous
discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men
are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret
of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs
and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous
habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were
upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but
fear.

CHAPTER VIII.

From the 1st of October until the 3d, the French army was in
disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria,
leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about
four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was
established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the
river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach
the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains.
But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and
Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear,
occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off
all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from
Pombal, and, the next morning, pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to
create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles,
by a succession of parallel ravines, captain Somers Cocks took
advantage of one, to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him
until general Anson’s brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull’s troop
of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three
columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while
the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult
to pass; Bull’s artillery played well into the principal body, and
Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great
number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the
enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many
miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten.
During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the
right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor,
the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force,
under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in
one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as
daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the
war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion
to its base.

SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.

Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with
Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing
that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to
attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at
Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at
full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass
the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of
whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated
at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the
enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa
Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the
prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals,
and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst
which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell
into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and
Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication,
and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant
conducted his to Oporto.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII.]

During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence
on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers
have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his
uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed
it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives
under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the
falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to
colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.

This disaster made no change in Massena’s dispositions. He continued
his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry
picquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no
heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have
taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion
ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of
the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the
skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the
British retreated.

Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth,
and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division
on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill’s corps on the right by
Alhandra. The light division and Pack’s brigade should also have
entered by Aruda. But Crawfurd, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th,
was still there, at three o’clock, p. m. on the 10th. The weather
being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of
marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into
the Lines; yet no guards were posted, no patroles sent forward, nor
any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in
a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt.

Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched
the height in front, and, about four o’clock, observed some French
dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was
given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly
had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from
whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the
mountain behind. The enemy’s numbers increased every moment, and they
endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This
feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments
to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun
range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were
still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the
division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven
headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops,
a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the
soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the
first confusion had abated.

Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy’s
infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town
on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets
in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear
skirmishing, Crawfurd commenced a retreat. The weather was, however,
so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and
the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain
is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the
most terrible results in another quarter.

The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafaes, followed
the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank
march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda,
which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry
patroles from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of
the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was
cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of
Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy’s scouts on that side. This
information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line,
and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda;
he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch
the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to
circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the
Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance
of eight or nine miles, was quite disgarnished of troops. The true
state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained
Alhandra before day-light on the 11th.

During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the
former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier’s
movements were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of
Alhandra, and his picquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next
day; but general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in
the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the
eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied
the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some
entrenchments close under the centre of the allies position.

It is however time to give a more detailed description of those
celebrated works, improperly called

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

[Sidenote: Memoranda of the lines, &c. by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal
Engineers, printed for private circulation.]

It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct
ranges of defence.

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the
Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the
hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in
rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth
of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from
Passo d’Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast.
Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand
yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation
with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather;
and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian’s (whose high ramparts
and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to
enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army.

The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these
works at Passo d’Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two
long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon,
where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the
embarkation.

Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its
strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others
only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an
advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable
the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or
pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the
frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour
and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his
opponent’s charge there.

The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into
five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right
to left.

1º. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This
distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge,
defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered
inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along
the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions
under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla
of gun-boats, manned by British seamen.

2º. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte.
This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient
mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in
the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable
of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here; the
defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawfurd and the light
division.

3º. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent
country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the
first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated
from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing, the
left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre
overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned
by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three
smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around. The
garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack’s
brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about
four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was
posted in reserve.

4º. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position,
seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only
when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first
line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well
defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now
become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for
a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of
troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted,
under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself; and his
head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on
which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the
Lines.

5º. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.
The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town
of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting
forty guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously
planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the
sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but
the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found
in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its
banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the
foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres
Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of
the _first_ line of defence; the _second_ was still more formidable.

1º. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven
miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially
scarped, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable
ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and
commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive,
a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a
road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

2º. On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of
Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong,
and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of
fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well
considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground,
and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of
above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts,
obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3º. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of ten or twelve
miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is
choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the
centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road,
conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold
than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça,
and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was
extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights,
parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position,
which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting
road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on
the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right,
must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted
of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in
advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches,
and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly
impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were
considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like
manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas,
being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad
mule road that led over them.

4º. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly
defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection
of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretches to the
right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual
slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the
flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half
wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts,
water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts
with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the
whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to
the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the _first
line_ of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and
one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça,
there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the _second
line_, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and
Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works
was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting
positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army.
These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the
_first line_ would not have been injurious, save in reputation,
because the retreat was secure upon the _second and stronger line_,
and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on
common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to
the enemy.

The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works.
But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the
great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first
line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting
direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the
narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded
by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his
forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not
transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra,
although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would
require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the
Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour
down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And
this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by
the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of
signals were established, by which orders were transmitted from the
centre to the extremities in a few minutes.

Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting _the Lines_, too
little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general
history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works,
more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly
that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British
engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord
Wellington’s measures of defence were not, as some French military
writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been
stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have
been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.

To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty
forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number
of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines
sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese
heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura
furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and
the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second,
and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied
the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and
aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from
the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered
the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British
army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and
remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire
to see in a dangerous crisis.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 8._

LINES
of
_Torres Vedras_
1810.

_Published by T. & W. Boone 1830._]

It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the
appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana
that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the
latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under
his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of
October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara
de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed
in a few days: and thus, before the end of October, not less than one
hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the
Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely
disposable and unfettered by the works.

Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army,
reinforced by Madden’s Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra.
Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Araceña; and Mortier,
ignorant of Romana’s absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th,
for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined,
with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance,
and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment
when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most
important point.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence
of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon
them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights
of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of Calandrix
and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn
Hill’s position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the
second line; yet the abattis and the redoubts erected, and hourly
strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; while
the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not
ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several
demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to
oblige Crawfurd to shew his force. That general, by making the town
of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his
true situation without a serious affair; and, in a short time, his
division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner
really worthy of admiration.

Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet
thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley
of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is
usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts,
dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for
several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human
strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances,
to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the
summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including
the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in
thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could
have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men.

The next points that drew Massena’s attention were the Monte Agraça
and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period
at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first
line, no outworks had been constructed; and the valley of Zibreira,
and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it
was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position
of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were
protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops
permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill’s
corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come
into action.

Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras
forbad any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained
for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca
and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest
points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the
whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The
second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended
its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered,
at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth
corps; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the
lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre
as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of the two
armies being nearly in contact.

Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his
dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially
near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge
the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were
repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which
were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the
eight corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing
its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted
to one hundred and fifty; of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral;
that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey
was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed
the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and
promise.

The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena’s object
being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord
Wellington’s to starve the French before succour could arrive.
The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for
provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his
principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the
militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their
right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their
left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he
prevailed on Carlos d’España to cross the Tagus, and act between
Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely
enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army.

To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish
light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to
Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary
state of defence, and garrisoned by three hundred Portuguese,
under major Fenwick; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters,
issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy’s
marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a
considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were
thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole
country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable
quantities.

[Sidenote: See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.]

Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet,
although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington
had four British divisions and Romana’s corps, forming a mass of
twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral, and, by directing the
greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions, at Bucellas,
upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men
there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in
conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check; while the
twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça,
from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have
enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the
sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious
and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus
happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness
and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive
attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of
men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their “earnest and manly
co-operation.”

CHAPTER IX.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

The presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed
the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional
subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself
to direct the house of Sampayo to furnish provisions to the troops
on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest
exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom
arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in,
destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for
in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand
tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain
from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the
obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to
regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade
with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus
to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands
and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the
coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war,
a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil,
and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally,
to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the
transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of
Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an
imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his
faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the
fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington’s
firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been encreasing
as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the
retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some
officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their
feelings; and the letters of general Spencer and general Charles
Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted
them to lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon
their contents, shewed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.

Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant.
Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these
letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which
he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before
pointed out to the minister he was addressing; then shewing that,
up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out
by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide
in his judgement of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his
own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to
trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into
both his own and the enemy’s designs, and with such a judgement and
sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his
anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other
records of lord Wellington’s genius to be lost, it would alone
suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 3.]

Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he,
with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the
patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic,
foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly, that they were
unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened
_to withdraw the British army altogether_, if the practices of which
he complained were not amended.

“The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had,” he said,
“entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he
would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he
would not alter his plans to meet the _senseless suggestions of the
Regency_. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide
food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil.”
“With principal Souza,” he said, “it was not possible to act, and,
if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either
the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he
would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he
would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency.”

[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 4.]

“He had hoped,” he resumed in another letter, “that the Portuguese
government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of
endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of
the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure
the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals,
they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of
approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey
censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to
provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and
to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and
their families who were obnoxious to the enemy.” “I have,” he said
“little doubt of final success, but _I have fought a sufficient
number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain,
even with the best arrangements_.” These reproaches were neither too
severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance,
and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency,
was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord
Wellington’s complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of
those intrigues which have been before touched upon.

[Sidenote: Appendix No. V. Section 8.]

Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that
the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they
should have been removing the people and the provisions from the
line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military
operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their
error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon
the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the
names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who
were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at
head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.

When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves,
but made the execution referable to the general, without his
knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating
with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy’s
advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone
enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were
addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and
soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and
rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington,
however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from
the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the
plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should
shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the
fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink
from the trial, “should seek popularity with the populace at the
expense of the best interests of the country.”

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English
government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be
taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of lord Wellington, that
their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the Regency, and that
the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead
of the native authorities. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his
seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the
marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas’
faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to
control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal
Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against
the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every
measure proposed by lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by
the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was
incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared,
that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and
that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native,
whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies,
notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the
Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested
against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The
dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of
October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract
has been given above.

Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity,
and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established
a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington’s plans
of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of
doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton
ravages, that, in despite of the general’s utmost efforts, had marked
the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly;
and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for
the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons
preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate
the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently
hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had
formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by
the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the
fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible;
there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a
national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.

To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in
the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite
the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself
wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to
incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature
of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time
by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the
_Brazilienza_.

Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the
Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the
ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to
lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had
sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke
of Brunswick appointed generallissimo in Portugal; that they had
also endeavoured to engage the duke of Sussex to take a leading
part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset;
that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in
London, as the _Brazilienza_ was to have been in Lisbon; that in
their correspondence lord Wellington was designated under the name
of _Alberoni_; lord Wellesley, _Lama_; Beresford, _Ferugem_; Mr.
Stuart, _Labre_; the Patriarch, _Saxe_; Antonio Souza, _Lamberti_;
colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under secretaries of state,
as _Thin_ and _By-Thin_. That after Mr. Villier’s departure, the
intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a
different plan; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the
council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or
Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and
transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares
and the chevalier Souza; these persons undertaking to represent the
information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of
St. James’ and Rio Janeiro.

The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this
plan; he made open display of his hostility to the English general;
and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every
measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate
to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom
they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the
prince regent’s, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations
in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer’s name to be
kept secret; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although
strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons
suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons.
Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a
traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a
London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a
direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many
innocent persons were oppressed.

All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to
prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with
the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed,
lord Wellington’s power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings
approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain
Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy
at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed
under his and Mr. Stuart’s control; admiral Berkeley was appointed
to a seat in the Regency; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the
condition of a vassal state. A policy which could never have been
attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been
willing to acquiesce; but firm in their attachment to independence
and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this
temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of
the man, who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with
one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other.

Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but
with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this
great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely
necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not
perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of
affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 5.]

From the strength of the Lines, it is plain that offensive operations
were far more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of
the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist,
more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely
retreat upon his own resources. Now lord Wellington had repeatedly
urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their
dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near
the banks, and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all
things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect
a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles
were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the
commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon
that river; both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and
what was worse forty large boats on the right side, by which the
French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially
of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions. But while
the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of
Palmella, St. Felippe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines.

Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom
four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three
pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties
attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the
Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança
would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their
allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of
ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the
Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the
governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his
garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.

This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord
Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the
Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured,
peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This
retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and
consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming
from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the
alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general
Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill
spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all
the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and
patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere,
kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements.

Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number
of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious
inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the
English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England
in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this
time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before,
stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada,
he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was
in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary
lines on that side.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.]

Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was
the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied
that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been
relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the
line deserted between April and December, and the militia and
ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as
no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force
against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want
became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British
stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 10.]

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the
Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to
fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the
Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the
Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in
the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his
passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after
this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to
resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the
feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch,
whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion
to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the
people which were evidently for no other purpose than _to nourish the
war in the heart of the kingdom_.”

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.]

But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really
nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in
time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena
could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat
would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures
previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas
now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem
was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but
little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the
deep mortification to find that his well considered design was
frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect
the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe
that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions
until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him.
“_It is heart-breaking_,” was the bitter reflection of the British
general, “_to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy
and folly_.”

CHAPTER X.

The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British
deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced
Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great
reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular
forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to
despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage
of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with
an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have
long made war, the French general maintained his forward position,
until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then,
reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in
which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched
more distant countries for food.

Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect
boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun’s cavalry,
stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions,
and stored them at Santarem, and both there and at Barquiña (a creek
in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed and
boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another;
but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress
was necessarily slow. Meanwhile Fane, reinforced by some infantry,
watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d’España came down
from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of
Ourem, and Wilson’s Portuguese militia so infested the country from
Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison’s division was detached upon
Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and
other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem,
and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete
to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred
infantry and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, moved against
Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards
Sobreira Formosa. The allies’ bridge of Villa Velha was foolishly
burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for Pena Macor, and
the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having
undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon;
a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and
address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were
attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss.

The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th; but the
enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, not only restored
it, but cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena
then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because
his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of
Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation
of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the
movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, Montbrun’s
cavalry marched upon Leiria and his detachments scoured the roads
to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other.
Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar,
and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a
brigade of dragoons.

These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral
during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps
passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of
some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on
the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from
Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps
marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas.

This movement was not interrupted by lord Wellington. The morning of
the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he
perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability
of the French general’s operations. Fane had reported on the 14th
that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at
the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from
Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy’s intention was not clearly developed. It
might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte
Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the
allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the
principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and
light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to
Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer, at the same time calling up
his cavalry, and requesting admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of
the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the
other bank, if necessary.

[Sidenote: Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th
Dragoons.]

Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the
one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre,
it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether
he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete
and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In
either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before
the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad
Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately
brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division
and cavalry marched in pursuit, four hundred prisoners were made,
principally marauders; and a remarkable exploit was performed by
one Baxter, a serjeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having
only five troopers, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who
were cooking. The Frenchmen ran to their arms, and killed one of
the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them so strongly, that
Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made forty-two
captives.

The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, the
head of the second corps reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some
false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the
troops at Santarem only a rear guard. This information seeming to
be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus,
which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that
Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that
he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross
the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move
upon Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march
of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were
directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack’s brigades upon
Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle, a village on the
Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear guard was formed, and an unequal
engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the
commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body
on the heights of Santarem.

Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security of the Lines with a
jealous eye, acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the
French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack,
although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines,
or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and
light divisions and Pack’s brigade vigorously against the enemy’s
rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at
Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, lord Wellington, whether
deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement,
this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small
force, to assail what he conceived the rear guard of an army in full
retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any
farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his
situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement,
and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.

Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost
precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In
front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the
Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side
to within a mile of the Tagus, but there they unite and flow in a
direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between
being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem.

In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the
Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway,
eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French
position. On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy
marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered
the French left. On the other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor
overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh,
covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered
only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy’s end, by an
abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the
whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary
step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the
great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with
its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain
of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison’s division of the sixth
corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of
communication with Punhete. On Reynier’s right, in a rugged country,
which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de
Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line
with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete,
the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where
Massena’s head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the
cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at
Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson’s militia to
retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal.

Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain
of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de
Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies
at Santarem, commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the
eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra,
with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened
a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through
Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving the
power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or
of turning the Monte Junta by his right, he necessarily paralized a
great part of the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, to
take the offensive.

His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between
Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a
distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might
penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from
the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off
his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the
Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected
the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and
then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders,
proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of
Reynier’s baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to
the Zezere, which, corresponding with lord Wellington’s high-raised
expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not for a general
attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army,
but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a
small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard.

On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the
Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy
marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the
causeway, and Pack’s Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered
to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and
turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack,
and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots
with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns
belonging to Pack’s brigade had not arrived; and lord Wellington,
not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary’s force,
after three hours’ demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to
their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French
were determined to maintain this position. Every advantageous spot
of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced centinels boldly
returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were
descried, some in arms, others cooking, the strokes of the hatchet,
and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills,
and the commencement of a triple line of abattis, and the fresh earth
of entrenchments were discernible in many places.

On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy’s
intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and
orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left
bank of the Tagus. General Crawfurd, however, still thought it was
but a rear-guard at Santarem; his eager spirit was chafed, he seized
a musket, and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the night
along the causeway, commencing a personal skirmish with the French
piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last
that the enemy were not yet in flight.

Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to
Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the
allies, satisfied himself, that no great movement was in agitation;
wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed
Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which instantly obliged
lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack’s brigade
to Cartaxo; and the light division was also held in readiness to
retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the
second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of
troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy
rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of
Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have
rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew
here that they acted wisely and like great captains.

It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination
of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of
points and to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were
other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected
momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to
his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position, touching
upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to his
reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that
of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to
communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance.
He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem
and Alcanhete; but he judged that his adversary would not venture
such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements,
with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in
great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he
calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that
does not understand this part of war is but half a general.

Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and
political effect, that his menacing attitude would have. While he
maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he
also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it has been estimated
that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines
during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected,
and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal,
thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that
few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At
this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving
the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the
opposition in parliament, it was most important that the arguments of
the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position
of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was
to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in
holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed
great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he
proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.

On the side of the British general, such were the political
difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded.
Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both
in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate
the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle
incessantly against their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of
the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering;
but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now
gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and
again shut up the allies in their works.

Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been
tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that
the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, at Almada, were
most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the
Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the
discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England,
as any serious military check would have caused the opposition
to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this
balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many
great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of
advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who
had received some reinforcements from Hallifax and England, had
indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the
enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if
we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found
that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring
more soldiers into the fight.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]

In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had
been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten
thousand, the recruits thirty thousand; the numbers were therefore
increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased.
The Spanish auxilliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at
open discord with the Portuguese, and their general was neither able
in war himself nor amenable to those who were.

While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus
could not be watched with less than twelve thousand men; and as from
Alcanhete the march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo,
two British divisions were employed to protect the Lines; during
the attack upon Pernes, Reynier also might break out from Santarem,
and ten thousand men were required to hold him in check: thus, the
disposable troops would have fallen short of forty-five thousand,
comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits. Lord
Wellington’s experience in the movement of great armies was not
at this period equal to his adversary’s, and the attack was to be
made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alviella,
the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain,
furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and the means
of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the
attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of
his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If lord Wellington
failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula.

He judged it best to remain on the defensive; to strengthen the
Lines; and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward;
meanwhile, quieting the troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to
perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and improve the
organization of the militia in rear of the enemy. In this view, the
light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and
the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the
English end of the causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking
straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery
and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing
five hundred infantry: thus the causeway being blocked, the French
could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption
from Santarem.

On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the
inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio
Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson’s cavalry was stationed
in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede. In
rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied
by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the
Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what
are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which,
the other divisions were disposed in succession; the first and the
head-quarters being at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle; the
remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always
occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round
the Monte Junta.

Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build
boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with
impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men,
with which general Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This
reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in
Castile when the army entered Portugal, marched by Belmonte and the
Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of
the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on
either side would have opened the communications, and secured the
junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança,
and deceived by a false rumour that general Hill was in Abrantes,
ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such
haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost
many men.

Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by
the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem,
which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and
to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner.
General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing
the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without
difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot occupied Leiria and
Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps, and on the 9th of
December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however,
baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade
the Tras os Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the
Coa with the ninth corps, and Massena’s patroles appeared again on
the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the
spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south
was to have place near Madrid.

These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to
file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements
coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over
the Mondego, and occupy the northern country also. It was known that
a tenth corps was forming at Burgos; the head of the fifth corps was
again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were
numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great
forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus.

It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty
thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena; and preparations
were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea
Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes,
Palmella, and St. Felippe de Setuval had been at last provisioned;
and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on
the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers
had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of
Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable,
soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could
be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington wrote
earnestly to lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating
the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on the receipt
of his letter, five thousand British were ordered to embark for
Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily.

Sickness obliged general Hill to go home in December; and, as Soult
was known to be collecting a disposable force behind the Morena,
the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and
marshal Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese army was
now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force,
composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five
regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen
thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d’Espana’s brigade, which, being at
Abrantes, was under the marshal’s orders.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 1.]

To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication
between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by
Vellada if in retreat; and by Abrantes if in advance; were the
instructions given to Beresford; hence, fixing his quarters at
Chamusca, he disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by
Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, establishing signals
between his different quarters. He also beat the roads leading
towards Spanish Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse
with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; organized good sources
of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and especially at Thomar,
and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries
opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against the advice of the
engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and
in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the
enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem,
without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth
regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere,
disposing fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that
nothing could pass without being observed.

On the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the
Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of
both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson’s cavalry, however,
acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos
towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy’s foraging parties; and in the
Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the
militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of
lord Wellington’s combinations.

It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour
Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier
of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the
communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost
all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of
Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras’ division that
the Tras os Montes were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to
the Lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former
garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to
their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and
made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed.

In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad
Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile,
for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching
its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible,
and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th,
general Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of
cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel,
and, supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards
Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro
Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took
many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united
with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne
pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from
Cardigos in a panic.

Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena’s
command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into
Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed,
of his intention to penetrate the Tras os Montes; the 17th December,
however he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two
thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near
Gouvea, the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under general
Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied
Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops
under Gardanne, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th.

Hitherto lord Wellington’s communications with Baccellar, had been
carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson
on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the
ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being
enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal,
established his division at Leiria; and then spreading towards the
sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern
provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter
from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival,
and of the state of Massena’s army; intimating also, that a great
operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily
expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was desired to seize Guarda, to
forage the neighbouring villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte;
and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him.

Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with
his former successes, had indeed, already attacked Claparede, and
was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the
side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, then
recalled Miller and Wilson. The first moved upon Viseu; the last who
had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of
Drouet’s division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile,
Silveira again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from
the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over
the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before
any troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet when Baccellar
brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller’s and Wilson’s corps
reached Castro d’Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, being
followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having
relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os
Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller died at Viseu, but
Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy’s parties.

Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions,
seized Covilhao; while Foy, who in returning from France had
collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry convalescents,
was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable
perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the
loss of his despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda
entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed by colonel Grant with a
corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered
nothing here by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the
mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where
affairs were working to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being always more or
less flooded, the armies continued in observation; but Massena’s
positions were much strengthened, his out posts were reinforced, and
his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing
necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor,
any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season
advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January
(some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a
fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced
Junot to drive the out posts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of
affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he
returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign.

Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scouring
all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near
Pedragoa; while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below
Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off four hundred oxen
and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions
gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of
the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the
British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle and brought in
a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of
general Clausel’s.

Meanwhile, Massena, organized a secret communication with Lisbon,
through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help
of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of
selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed
by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa.
Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained
a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had
excellent information.

In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander
impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to
act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events
hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject
of another book.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. “_War is not a conjectural art._” Massena forgetting this,
assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon,
and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the
battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the
soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would
re-embark if pressed; the Lines put an end to his dream; yet once
awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with
reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity
was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what
thirty thousand additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus
could have done, had they arrived on the heights of Almada before
admiral Berkeley’s error was discovered: the supply of provisions
from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from
Lisbon to the French armies, and the fleet would have been driven
from the Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the
British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little
chance of final success would probably have induced the British
general to embark.

2º. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have
easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and
sent the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable
as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords
impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a
weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would
have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the
entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied
forces, would have been neither a safe nor certain operation;
moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the
ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps.

3º. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat,
had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered
himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to
support essential objections to his operations: yet, many have been
urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy’s quarters more
effectually at Santarem; and that Hill’s corps, passing through
Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the
Zezere cut off Massena’s reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon
his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at
the time by colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability,
perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination.

As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not
so certain; the Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of
leaving the Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty
large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere,
is apparent; Hill’s corps must then have been replaced, and the army
before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated
attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was
the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty;
the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and
the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at
Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank.

4º. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy’s
numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy
thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus
at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while lord
Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas.
It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy
thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst
of the enemy’s extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could
scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty
thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought
down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor
could scarcely have escaped the enemy’s notice; exact concert, in
point of time, was essential, yet the eighth corps could have held
the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem,
and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and
the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable
from rain during December; in January, Soult, of whose operations
I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and a
disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy’s
difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works
of art; accessaries, however splendid, must be rejected when not
conducive to the main object. That judgement, which duly classes the
value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general,
and lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his
genius and his courage were both subservient; without it he might
have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but could
never have conducted the war to a successful end.

BOOK XII.

CHAPTER I.

In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed,
although lord Wellington’s combinations were deeply affected by them.
The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz,
presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies
were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the
most important point, their wings, could reinforce the centre, unless
the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously
on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity,
pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command
of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at
Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña; and how far this warfare
relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show.

The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of
Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men when arms
or stores were demanded from England; but there were never more than
ten or twelve thousand in line, and, although Serras’ division, of
only eight thousand, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to
the Agueda, during Massena’s advance, no stroke of importance was
effected against it; the arrival of the ninth corps, in October, put
an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although
the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi
there was, however, a second army, from four to six thousand strong,
embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, in the
latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular
bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet’s
movements.

That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never
maintain himself there; because the country is a long defile, lying
between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a
succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for
partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. Thus, if he penetrated
towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing
troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always
form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and
excite insurrections on his rear.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to withdraw
from Castropol, after he had defeated general Ponte at Sales, about
the period of Almeida being invested; and the advantages of such
operations being evident, the British government sent sir Home Popham
to direct the naval, and general Walker the military affairs at
Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force,
under Renovales, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander; the
Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time; a battalion
of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when
taken; and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras,
however, threatened the frontier of Gallicia, and Mahi remained in
suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the
Spaniards, and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed the
expedition until October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other
chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September.
Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet,
aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo,
and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon.

On the 16th of October Renovales sailed but with only thirteen
hundred men; accompanied, however, by general Walker, who carried
ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering the
harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels; and Porlier,
coming up on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners.
The next day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded
his landing, and he returned to Coruña the 2d of November, with only
eight hundred and fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with
the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all
the Spanish naval force along the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked
even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil’s
division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the
Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province,
and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he
effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through
Oviedo, to the borders of Leon.

[Sidenote: Abstract of General Walker’s Military Reports from
Gallicia. MSS.]

In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the Junta of the Asturias
continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and
indifference to the public good; their province was in a miserable
and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on
the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them
and general Walker; and gave opportunity to the Junta to interfere
improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Gallicia was
comparatively rich, but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge
of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province,
and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course
of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both
the Local Junta and the General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an
aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in
an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña
was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and
the army was more employed to overawe these factions than to oppose
the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish
operations in the north, and general Walker, despairing to effect any
thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at
his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal.

These expeditions from Coruña naturally encreased the audacity of the
inland partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having
a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements,
or embarking save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre
of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable
numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of
Biscay, and directed, as we have seen, the corps d’armée, in their
progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries
to the right and left. The ninth corps was thus employed during
the months of August and September, but when it passed onward,
the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and
Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers
sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to
aid them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession
of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the
best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain
promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been
made very strong; it would have cut off Bonet’s communication with
France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from
whence to vex the French coasts; and it offered a point of connexion
with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.

[Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool. 7th May, 1811. MSS.]

Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a
corps of four thousand men to secure it; but, having first demanded
lord Wellington’s opinion, the latter “earnestly recommended that
no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For,” said he,
“unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to
effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take
possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect
any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations
which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those
equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships
must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in
this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the
first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms,
ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses,
means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a
right to require from them; and, after all, _this extraordinary and
perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition
to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the
whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be
ready_.”

Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli’s reserve to enter Spain,
ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements
from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent marshal
Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth
governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet’s division,
the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.]

The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded seventy thousand, of
which fifty-nine thousand men and eight thousand horses, were present
under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was
especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance
to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of
Spain.

In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately
under the king, at first about twenty thousand, was, before the end
of the year, carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of
French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had
taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court,
watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the Guerillas of
the interior.

The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons
before-mentioned, the period of greatest activity with these
irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around
the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated
men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their
destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines
of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which
run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of
Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the
army of the north; through Guadalaxara and Calatayud to the army of
Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the valley
of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the fifth corps during its
incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry, was also generally
stationed at Truxillo.

As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises
and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived
from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not
less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling
affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands: and
the latter being almost always beaten; at the close of the year, only
the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained
any reputation, and the country people were so harassed, that
counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 4.]

The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid
Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or,
at least, supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph,
troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was
also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except
Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with
Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military
operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his
court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and
Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was
thwarted by his brother’s regulations; plots were formed, or supposed
to be formed, against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the
secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural
gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and
devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so
irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France,
a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such
being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces,
it remains to trace the more important military operations at the
southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably
situated to press the left flank of the invaders.

Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of
the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was
obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although
the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence
a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country
bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, on the one flank by
Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque, on the other by the
Murcian army, and, in front by continual descents from the sea;
yet, from the shallowness and length of their position, unable to
concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian
army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon the cities of Murcia
and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada
by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter
was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or
Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast.

To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada,
where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions,
sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces
on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to
the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands,
where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a
sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured
to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a
state of defence; yet Estipona and Marbella were defended by the
Spaniards, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally
reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison, of one hundred
men, took refuge on board the Topaze frigate. But Sebastiani’s hold
of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the
coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with
Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville, and to impede these, general Campbell
sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the
wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were
marred by Lascy’s misconduct.

The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer
of 1810 have been already noted, but, in October, general Campbell
and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed
the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a
flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined against the islands
near Ceuta. The French depôt for the siege of Marbella was at
Fuengirola, which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was judged
that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and
the more surely, as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force
at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda.

EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.

[Sidenote: General C. Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. XI.]

On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the Topaze, sailed from
Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a
brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of
the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and
the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all fifteen hundred
men, including serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was
directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy
come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing
was effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving
only three hundred men in Malaga: lord Blayney was as instantly
apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two
days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, although the
heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had failed to make
any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions
betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day,
while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not
exceed two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani’s column,
made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the
investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed,
rallied his men, and retook the artillery; but at this moment two
squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking
them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately
made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, and would have
been sabred but for the opportune arrival of the Rodney with the
eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately
disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment,
untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without
loss; but, of the British, two officers and thirty men were killed
or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly
two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well
contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and
terminated in disaster and disgrace.

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence. MSS.]

Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the marquis of
Portasgo appeared in the Ronda, an insurrection commenced at Velez
Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned
from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men,
towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately
furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked a thousand stand of arms
for the people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also sent to
cruize along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved from the fear of a
descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on
before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for
general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind
the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated
on the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the same time, a
contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast
to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of
Murcia ceased.

In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade
of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura.
Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de
Neibla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the
ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his
efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had
not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the
Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war
there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under
cover of which, Romana’s army protected his line of operation, and
sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of
Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended.

Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz Estremadura and the
Condado de Neibla their points of offence. The want of provisions, or
the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption
of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Huelva,
always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros
brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, the advance of
Romana towards the mountains brought them to Estremadura; but Romana
had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth
corps alone was disposable either for offensive movements, or for the
defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with
such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently,
however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from
permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia.

In October, Romana entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and
Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier,
unconscious of Romana’s absence, had retired across the mountains,
occupied Merida. He would also have established himself in the yet
unwasted country about Llerena; but the appearance of a moveable
column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and,
on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French
then fortified Gibraleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla;
Girard’s division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by
the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena:
whereupon Mendizabel took post at Zafra with nine thousand infantry
and two thousand cavalry, including Madden’s Portuguese brigade.
Meanwhile, Copons, who had four thousand men, was totally defeated at
Castillejos by D’Aremberg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman.

At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair
of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed,
and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in
September; but all men’s hopes and expectations had been wonderfully
raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure
both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years
of intrigues and delay, the National Cortes was assembled, and
the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard.
Nevertheless the members of the Cortes could not be duly and legally
chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members
were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons
unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen:
a new principle of election, unknown to former Cortes, was also
adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not holding office
or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by
debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if
chosen. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided
to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six
persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent
those dependencies.

Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and
immediately took the title of Majesty: it afterwards declared
the press free in respect of political, but not of religious
matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed
captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in
the spirit of republican freedom. These things, aided by a vehement
eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the Cortes,
and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up
under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The
Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency,
had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while
claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert
the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated,
yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and
the reformations, by outstripping the feelings and understandings
of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to
the French. It was not for liberty, but for national pride and
from religious influence, that the people struck. Freedom had no
attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the
merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old establishments and
violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created
active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced
resistance to Napoleon.

In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war,
in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies,
there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination,
negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were
soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was
openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the
clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal
privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes
was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn
between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the
prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was
a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government,
which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon’s hands,
if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia.

The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little pleased with the
inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of
the republican spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency towards
innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of
Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him
to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours
of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the
Local Juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the Cortes. The
latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, obliged
the duke to quit Spain, and soon afterwards displaced the Regency
of Five; appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Cisgar, and Pedro Agar
in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes
were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty
about taking the oath to the Cortes, was immediately declared to
have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the
Cortes proceed.

Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic
spirit than their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power
in their own hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazils’
claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side; for the republicans
were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority were
so subtilely dealt with by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge
Carlotta’s hereditary claim to the succession and to the immediate
control of the whole Peninsula; and, as I have before noticed, would
have proclaimed her sole Regent, but for the interference of lord
Wellington.

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and
commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of
the Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing
force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to
Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions
to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of
those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the
British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to
lord Wellington, that colonel O’Neal was sent to remonstrate with
the Regency; and, by shewing that the fall of Estremadura, and the
total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue,
obtained a momentary respite.

In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the
administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable
of acting cordially on any mature plan; but with respect to the
colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty,
and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British
government, the first Regency had published, in May, a decree,
permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under
certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be
suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her
assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, and its
resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, in June, disowned
their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the
printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated
at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues
of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very
displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their
discontent, and then the authorities in the Mother Country, throwing
off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret
views. “It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects
now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain,” was the
proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the
Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that,
if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper America must
follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself.

When the Cortes met, America expected more justice; she had
contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war,
and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also
been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta,
and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the Great National
Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first
of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was
a mere form. “The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over
for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand
years,” and “I know not to what class of beast the Americans belong:”
such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when
the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better
to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain
if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in
every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public
documents, and openly acted upon; for, when repeated insults,
treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend
their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England
for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the
fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of
the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried
up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field,
offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a
colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England.

CHAPTER II.

While the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the Cortes,
the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was
perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and
a week’s provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful,
and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto
Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person
to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and
gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet,
passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore
batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But,
to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the
duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo
Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland;
and in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports
were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however,
alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of
the highest reputation.

At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some
notable pieces of ordnance called cannon-mortars, or Villantroys,
after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and,
being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as
to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards.
But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with
lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective
explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and
were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult’s real design was first
to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then
pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between
the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side
of besieged there was neither concert nor industry.

Two drafts, made, in August and September, by lord Wellington, had
reduced Graham’s force to five thousand men, and in October the fever
broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult’s preparations became formidable,
reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end
of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were
still behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident, 1º. that, with
due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire
should be silenced. 2º. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla
than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be
maintained. 3º. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the
garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt
of the Cortadura was lost.

[Sidenote: Graham’s Despatches MSS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4.]

To ensure a superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the
armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general
Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and
he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley; but neither their
entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the
apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from
Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only
sixteen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of
twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from
being assisted, were vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December,
and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave
to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence,
although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from
the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while
the duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events
in Portugal prevented the execution of his design.

[Sidenote: The King’s Correspondence, captured at Vittoria]

When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France
became so uncertain, that the emperor’s principal source of
information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the
first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then
that the army of the north was directed to support the army of
Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the
latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between
Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke
of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move
through the Alemtejo, to his assistance. The emperor seems even to
have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration
of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would
have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula,
because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in
Portugal, than to hold any particular province.

Massena’s instructions reached him in due time, Soult’s were
intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive
before the end of December; a delay affording proof that thirty
thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty
of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz,
the duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour
Maubourg’s cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps.
His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined
any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate
his plan to which Soult’s was to be subordinate. But no certain
intelligence even of Massena’s early proceedings had reached Seville,
and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity
of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his
operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the
two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and
situation of the other.

[Sidenote: Marshal Soult’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.]

The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full,
and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the
side of Neibla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more
than twenty thousand men, represented to the emperor that with such
a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and
Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on
his rear; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could
bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to
besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was
taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles’ division
had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot
took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under
general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla,
was given over to general Daricau, and a detachment under Remond
was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of
sixteen thousand infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about
four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d
January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen
hundred carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and
Soult’s administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy
of five thousand young Spaniards, called “_escopeteros_” (fuzileers)
to maintain the police of the province.

SOULT’S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 5, 6.]

Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January,
Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of
orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal.
Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on
Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of
the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove
Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well
those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult’s
intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at
Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord
Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave
Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling at Seville
at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were
the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura,
terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill
provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and,
in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the
Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of
half its defenders at the moment of invasion.

Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated,
the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the
passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being
neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of
Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry,
and while Latour Maubourg’s dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the
side of Badajos, Briche’s light horsemen collected cattle on the
side of Estremadura; Gazan’s division, still posted near Frejenal,
protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye’s
brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo,
marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from
Arzobispo to Alcantara.

FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.

This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a
covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a
good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns
mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little
importance to the French, yet, as containing four thousand troops, it
was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed
Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the
means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but
Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into
the place.

It was invested the 11th of January; an abandoned outwork, three
hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession
of the first night; and breaching batteries of eight guns, and
counter-batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches
were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap
against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the
scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th,
when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works
could be properly advanced.

On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching
batteries opened their fire; two mortars also threw shells into
the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the
counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos skirmished
unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg’s horsemen, and, on the 21st, the
mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch.

Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros’ division to
relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, and Romana sent Carlos D’España’s
brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own
Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor
of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain
the place to the last moment; but the next day he capitulated, having
still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one
hundred effective soldiers. The 26th Soult marched against Badajos.

Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by
Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp
battle, driven with the loss of a thousand men over the Guadiana. The
Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry
took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola; and, that nothing might be left
to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency recalled Copon’s
force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve
thousand men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French
designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made
prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult’s expedition.

For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had striven
to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode
of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his
counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing
into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of
Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were all neglected. Romana,
however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier, and they
reached Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel’s orders
to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; and the 24th Romana died of
an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts,
although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss,
yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his
authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops,
and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his
revenues did not suffer by the war.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 6.]

Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana’s
orders to adopt lord Wellington’s plan, which was still to
concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten
thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the enemy appeared on the
right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great
natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of
St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the
Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor immediately in rear of the
left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched
on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English
general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the
communications of the town, yet, knowing well the people he dealt
with, prophetically observed, “_with soldiers of any other nation
success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation
in which Spanish troops are engaged_.”

When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, and another
in Valencia d’Alcantara; Carlos d’España was in Campo Mayor, and
Virues, with Romana’s divisions, at Montemor. When Soult drove back
the outposts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with
six thousand men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been
expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. It was,
however, still possible to execute the English general’s plan, yet
no Spaniard moved, and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the
Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications
with Campo Mayor and Elvas!

FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the
Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first is a noble river five hundred
yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet
high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the
waters, and the town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens
between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and
bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good
counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the
Guadiana the outworks were, 1º. the Lunette of San Roque, covering
a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be
commanded; 2º. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated
beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3º.
the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower
Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two hundred yards from the ramparts.

On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort
three hundred feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the
interior of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther down the
stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a
bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on
every side.

[Sidenote: Conquête de l’Andalusie, par Edouard Lapéne.]

Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of
the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town the 28th,
two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The
29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather
spoiled the works. Gazan’s division was distant; the infantry before
the place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous
sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared
the trenches. Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round the left
of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired.

[Sidenote: Siege de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.]

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Correspondence. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

In the night of the 2d of February a violent tempest flooded the
Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses,
damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest
distress. The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer
forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive
by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness, and,
on the 3d, the Spaniards, making a second sally from Pardaleras,
killed or wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the parallel.
The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being
withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of
rigorous weather, the communication was re-established with Elvas,
and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance.
Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d’España, and Madden
united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida
from Upper Estremadura.

In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person;
passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the
troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen still on the
right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed
that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry
entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again neglecting lord Wellington’s
counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but
to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this until the next
day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided
fortress; for Latour Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported,
turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss. Badajos now
contained sixteen thousand men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and
Carlos d’España, at the head of five thousand infantry and three
hundred cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst
carried the trenches and the batteries; the soldiers fought with
surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of
the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined
all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns, and
when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of
the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city,
having eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers killed and
wounded; the enemy also lost several engineers and four hundred men.

While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg
occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut
off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his forces
were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabel, leaving
the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho,
pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to
this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous
to themselves; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled
in great numbers while the communication was open, but left behind
their provisions; which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without
difficulty.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 2.]

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.]

Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources
of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a
change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters
to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; on the 12th, he
sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo; and,
on the 14th, threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which
obliged Mendizabel to remove from the heights in front of that fort.
Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general
of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana’s soldiers:
they had long considered themselves independent of the central
government, and in this mood, although the position behind the
Gebora, recommended by lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little
attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had
expressly advised Mendizabel to increase the great natural strength
of this position with entrenchments; for his design was that the
Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations,
should have an impregnable post, whence they could safely aid in the
defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the
Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he
expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise
the siege. Mendizabel, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his
nation, rejected this counsel, and hung twelve days on the heights of
Christoval in a torpid state; and, when driven thence by the French
shells, merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither
cast up entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor disposed
his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon
him.

BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.

The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position; this
did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and
surprise the camp. But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of San
Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries
again threw shells on the 17th: yet the swell of the rivers would not
permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the
18th, when the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from
Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry,
four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations
were so exactly executed, that, at daybreak, on the 19th, six
thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were in order of battle
on the right bank of the Guadiana; the Gebora was however still to
be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry,
a considerable artillery, and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many
armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than
fifteen thousand.

A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance,
and Soult, riding through the French ranks, and exhorting the
soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His
cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry passed
in two columns, on the right and left of the ruined bridge: a few
shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the
instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was
complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the
line of battle.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 8.]

At eight o’clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the
sun and the certainty of victory, flashed together on the French
soldiers; for the horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left;
and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together,
were waving to and fro in disorder; while the right having fallen
away from San Christoval was unsupported. In one moment, Girard,
with three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and the fort; the
artillery roared on both sides; and the French bore forward as one
man to the attack: six battalions pressed the centre; Girard moved
perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg charged the left.
Thus surrounded, Mendizabel’s people instinctively crowding together
on the centre, resisted, for some time, by their inert weight;
but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the
horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken,
divided, and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, even Madden’s
Portuguese, either from panic, or from hatred of their allies,
disregarded alike his exhortations and example, and shamefully turned
their backs. At ten o’clock the fight was over; Virues was taken,
Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made
good his retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men; a few more
reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos, by the bridge, and
nine hundred bodies strewed the field: eight thousand, including
armed followers, were made prisoners; and guns, colours, muskets,
ammunition, baggage, all, fell into the enemy’s hands.

It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter,
Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a
strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in
constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over
the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to
attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed
them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have passed through
Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole
army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers.

In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments,
posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important
position they had gained; and the next day the works of the siege
were renewed with greater activity; yet the difficulty of Soult’s
undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual
rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ
a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two
thousand French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in
this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The
body of the place was entire, the garrison nine thousand strong,
and, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; and
there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and
confident; the season rigorous for the besiegers; no communication
had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary
expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient
to bring on a crisis; meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia’s power, in
Andalusia, was menaced in the most serious manner.

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 5.]

When general Graham was aware of Soult’s departure, and knew, also,
that the fifth corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert
with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force,
sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined,
in rear of the enemy, by the troops from Tarifa under major Brown,
and by three thousand Spaniards, from Algesiras and San Roque under
general Beguines; but contrary winds detained even the vessels
carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced,
the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice
of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to
retake Medina and Casa Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve
thousand men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon
Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The first corps was thus
increased to twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were
before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina, Sidonia, and
other quarters. Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, ten thousand
infantry and near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again
embarked at Cadiz; being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear
of the enemy’s camp at Chiclana. Meanwhile, general Zayas, commanding
the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a bridge over the
San Petri, near the sea mouth; Ballasteros, also, with the remains of
his army, was directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands were
to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections were expected in all
quarters.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.]

The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but, landing
at Algesiras, marched to Tarifa the next day. Being there joined
by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and
eighty-second regiments, somewhat more than four thousand effective
troops (including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one
hundred and eighty German hussars) were assembled under general
Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and
of a ready temper for battle.

General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven thousand Spaniards,
and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command,
although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the
whole, moving forward about twelve miles, passed the mountain ridges
that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of
San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana: but being now within
four leagues of the enemy’s posts, the troops were re-organized.
The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of
Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the
British were confided to Graham; but the cavalry of both nations,
formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the
Spanish service.

[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter of General Werlé to Sebastiani, Alhama,
March 12.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 6.]

The French covering division, under general Cassagne, consisted of
three battalions and a regiment of horse at Medina, with outposts at
Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña’s arrival, the
irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had even
taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry
from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal of
action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces,
perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in
their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba; following
the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially
active; Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his
head, concentrated a column at Estipona as a good covering point to
the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor
manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero
with a mixed force, of refugee French, juramentados, and regular
troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana,
taking post between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the
development of the allies’ project.

At first, La Peña’s march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard
stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and the troops from
Algesiras, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry, besides several
hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to him; encreasing his force
to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four
guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia
was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French
from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his
movement, and at nine o’clock on the morning of the 5th, after a
skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a
French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the
English, the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the
sea mouth of the Santi Petri.

Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast, about one mile
and a half, and overlooking a high and broken plain of small extent.
This plain was bounded on the left by the coast clifts, on the right
by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine-wood, beyond which
rose the narrow height of Bermeja, filling the space between the
Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill, could be reached either
by moving through the wood in front, or along the beach under the
clifts.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]

At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would surely come out of his
lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short
marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the
enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day’s march
from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides,
had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been
still more fatiguing. The troops came up in a straggling manner,
and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his
colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating
by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced
by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the
Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his bridge there on the 2d,
and commenced an entrenchment; but, in the following night, being
surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla: hence the
movement of the vanguard was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal,
however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three
hundred men, forced the enemy’s posts between the Almanza creek and
the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas.

Graham was extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height, as the
key both to offensive and defensive movements, and he argued that no
general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking
the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied in force. Lascy, the chief of
the Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, La Peña
commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to
Bermeja. With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous order; and
leaving the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second, under
major Brown, as a guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in the
full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona’s division and
the cavalry at Barosa; and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was
still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered
the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of
battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired
himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and
protected only by a rear guard of four guns and five battalions.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 7.]

During these movements, Victor remained close in the forest of
Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that
they could see no enemy; Graham’s march therefore, being only of
two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly
watching the allies’ progress; having recalled his infantry from
Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily
expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of success, that the
cavalry at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other
places, to cut off the fugitives after the approaching battle. The
duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine
thousand excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and
Villatte; from these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves,
attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division
of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the other to the division of
Laval, which formed his centre. Villatte’s troops, about two thousand
five hundred in number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were
posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of
the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja.

BATTLE OF BAROSA.

When Victor observed that Graham’s corps was in the wood, that a
strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with
all the baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from
Vejer; he took Villatte’s division as his pivot, and coming forth
with a rapid pace into the plain, directed Laval against the English,
while himself, with Ruffin’s brigade, ascending the reverse side of
Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, and
drove the whole of the rear guard off the height towards the sea;
dispersing the baggage and followers of the army in all directions,
and taking three Spanish guns.

Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem
the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, sending notice of what
was passing to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, being
then near Bermeja, answered, that he was to fight; and instantly
facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity,
expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry,
on the height: but when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin, flanked
by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side,
the Spanish rear guard and baggage flying in confusion on the other,
the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close
on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see no where. In this
desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus
bring the enemy, pell mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge,
must be disastrous, hence, without a moment’s hesitation, he resolved
to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the
enemy’s possession.

Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire
against Laval’s column, while colonel Andrew Barnard, with the
riflemen and the Portuguese companies, running out to the left,
commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any
attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed
two masses, one of which under general Dilke marched hastily against
Ruffin, and the other under colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan’s
guns ravaged the French ranks; Laval’s artillery replied vigorously;
Ruffin’s batteries took Wheately’s column in flank; and the infantry
on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry;
but, when near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the
British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding
its extreme valour, drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of
ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the
same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the
right, remained to cover the retreat.

Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had marched headlong
against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the
enemy’s first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke’s
column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopt even to
re-form the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a
fierce mood, when the whole run up towards the summit; there was
no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their
gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful,
fight ensued, but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen
grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded; the English bore strongly
onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from
the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers.

The discomfitted divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and
with infinite spirit endeavoured to re-form and renew the action;
but the play of Duncan’s guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered
the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat, and the British
having been twenty-four hours under arms, without food, were too
exhausted to pursue.

While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña
looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery,
nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet
menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him and weak.
The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some
Guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as
the action ceased; and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an
Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as
much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish
sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two
hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under
Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division,
have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that
colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German
hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle,
charged the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met,
overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to
sabre Rousseau’s chosen battalions.

Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour
and a half, but most violent and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty
serjeants, and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than
two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded; and from the latter,
six guns, an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded) were
taken, together with four hundred other prisoners.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]

After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still
hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory,
which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand
men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri; hence
the Spanish general was at the head of twelve thousand infantry and
eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only
the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest
disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct in La
Peña, Graham would no longer endure such command. The morning of the
6th saw the British filing over Zaya’s bridge into the Isla.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 9._

BATTLE of BAROSA
_5^{th} March, 1811_.

_London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._]

[Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Military Reports, MSS.]

On the French side, Cassagne’s reserve came in from Medina, a council
of war was held in the night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a
disponding nature, proposed another attack; but the suggestion being
ill received, nothing was done; and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing
his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every
fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession
of the latter place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the French
camp; the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of
his lines, and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San
Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked. If La Peña had
even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a
simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero; but the 6th and 7th passed,
without even a Spanish patrole following the French. On the 8th
Victor returned to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the
Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment on the side of
Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged
to retire to Algesiras.

All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked,
that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La
Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham,
whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so
sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution.
The original plan of the enterprise having however been rather rashly
censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. “Sebastiani, it
is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed
them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity.” This
is weak. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve
under another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections
in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district to succour
Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The
distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas, from
Sebastiani’s nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the
real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed
the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 5.]

Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason
to expect several days of free action; and thus indeed it happened,
and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade: more
than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would
have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija; and
they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia.

Victor’s attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, vigorous;
with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the
allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this
disaster; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even
hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an
enclosure; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the
San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in
all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña’s misconduct,
that the French, although defeated, gained their main point; the
blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that, during the action, a
French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty,
and brought back prisoners; thus proving that with a few more troops
Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had
gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the
Aroche hills, by Daricau.

In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the
Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the
previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation
of the English general, and the latter’s retreat into the Isla
he indicated as the real cause of failure: Lascy and general
Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and
even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham,
stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña
in a letter to the British envoy; and when Lascy let fall some
expressions personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his
sword; but having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all
points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command
to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington’s army.

CHAPTER III.

While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued.
Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the
Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by
sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the
counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no
manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity
and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to
retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of
the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing
seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, on the evening of
the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were
carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was
killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse
could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the
besiegers’ works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement
was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the
fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March
the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatch.]

At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a
strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the
siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter,
and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that
Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually
in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were
plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army
reduced, by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to
less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and instantly
surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus
obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers
should march out of the breach, it was granted, and he was obliged
to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so
covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while
consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to
infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s
indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial,
but they made the process last during the whole war.

When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour
Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six
hundred prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle
of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having, in fifty days, mastered
four fortresses and invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten
thousand men, and having taken twenty thousand with a force which, at
no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners: yet great and daring
and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of
his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord
Wellington’s combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror.

While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in
the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general,
certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must
soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting
for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men
against Soult; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and
changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not
then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve
Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out,
but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two
armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of
raising the siege by a detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack
Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford,
crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he hoped thus to force
back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to
drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until
the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain
expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would
have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had sir Joseph
Yorke, the admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage
of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on
board; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed,
and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks.

[Sidenote: See Vol. II]

On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very
perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that
fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a
moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena
could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or
to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For
sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of
the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats
on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm
Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general
relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his
lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was
before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness
wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the
troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance,
and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain
was by no means relinquished.

Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave
way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than
would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted
at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important
than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the
co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal,
by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming
directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure;
this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of
the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on
Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul
and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese
regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at
lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops
upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have
baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now,
if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have
defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four
garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank
and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of
Barosa.

The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency of his
means to oppose the English general’s combinations. The French army
reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of
Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its
extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington;
and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the
English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those
troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated
the position of Santarem.

[Sidenote: Muster-Rolls of the French Army.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.]

At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled.
The king’s force was diminished; the army of the south increased;
general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the
fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier;
the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under
the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army
of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command
of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; and
Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo,
to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the
imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to
hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with
strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that
intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received.
Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good
to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the
execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later
period.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM.

Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1º. He
could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by
fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2º.
He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and
open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of
Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and
Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances.
4º. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that
river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto
through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was
perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The
second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira,
and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the
flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but
his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he
was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten
thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary
before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a
manner bespeaking the great commander.

Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that
could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees,
upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the
same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when
the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly
assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as
if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement
that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the
second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete,
in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and
Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next
morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by
the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat;
the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a
position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was
thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although
aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take
any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary.
Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the
5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of
Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army.

Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their
boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart
crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s
corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades
of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached
Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of
the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on
the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and
Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at
Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly
pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to
halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons
followed the eighth corps, taking two hundred prisoners.

This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house,
situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled
with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk,
and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of
whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat
the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first;
all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but
the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving
the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight
imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared
patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the
bodies of those who first died, with decency and care.

While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and
fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes’
boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and
the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed
to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve
Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near
Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that
purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead
of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps
and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the
light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German
horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners.

Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was
now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was
necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve
Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the
untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire
with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received
that morning, from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient
state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the
question.

The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for
the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade
of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of
Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was
concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena
could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was
the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to
fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed
one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four
marches, and completely organized his system of retreat.

SKIRMISH AT POMBAL.

Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth,
sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were
attached, like the ancient Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion,
to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on
the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure
river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through
that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that
the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a
height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle
of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was
moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by
a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which
was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along
the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting
Massena’s line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the
operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the
ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after
some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town
with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge,
although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the
loss of the enemy was somewhat greater.

In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a
regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the
reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the eighth
corps; and the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed
of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been
ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to
seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now
appointed for that service.

Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he
designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige
Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an
event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were
still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the
heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing
to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the
country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined
by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the
weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney,
with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill,
illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war.

Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles
of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the
British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney
had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and
some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings
were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops;
his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha,
which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the
village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and
a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged
heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village,
were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and
a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the
appearance of a very considerable force.

COMBAT OF REDINHA.

After examining the enemy’s position for a short time, lord
Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by sir
William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right:
in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second,
the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the
forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their
skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French
battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy
rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third
French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer,
during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the
skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron,
sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in
the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done,
even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry.

Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six
guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French
right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with
two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights
protecting the French left, and thus Ney’s position was laid bare.
Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived
as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops
into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s skirmishers,
and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if
we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the
village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry
and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both
sides remained for about an hour, when, three shots were fired from
the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most
splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with
troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three
gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but
bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while
horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre
and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the
French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and
when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen.

Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed
Picton’s foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment,
withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained
the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of
Picton’s skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled
them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One
howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village
of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm the
courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person
superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the
loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for
the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops
of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the
river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the
latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh
disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third
division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main
body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear.

The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and
wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might
have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke
of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his
first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of
his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the
extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general
handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and
produced a palpable effect upon the after operations.

On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o’clock
discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal
excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat had
arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind
him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella,
were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated
on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being
only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow
against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a
palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown
up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while
Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and
either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and
the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British
away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north,
should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French
general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary
assumed the superiority.

When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to
the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to
abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable,
retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated,
and taking care to remove or to destroy all boats and means of
transport. Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having
destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed
guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the
enemy’s passage; for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the
river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close
upon the heels of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Campagne des Français en Portugal.]

As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the
suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually
forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French
officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the
other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place
along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to
feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape.
The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there
were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the
bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part
of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy
with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the
reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent
by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra
was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it
during the advance.

Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter
too readily crediting his opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished
the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the
Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front,
and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had
carried Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five
miles on his left; situated at the point where the Anciao road
falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and
being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of
communication with the second corps while Ney held Condeixa, he
considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed
filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney,
and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as
instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over
the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left.

For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in
repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire
Condeixa at a certain hour when all the divisions were simultaneously
to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular
to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards
three o’clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a
mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the
French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke
arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal
Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees
and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of
fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with
smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the
skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the
enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte
Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the
prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking
the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light
troops.

Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards
Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off
Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army
kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up
to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose
presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out,
and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for
Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night
was dark, it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to
the rear, and being so reported to sir William Erskine, that officer,
without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at
day-light on the 14th.

COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.

The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the
distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was
heard on the hills in front; and it being evident that the French
were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus
advancing without orders and in such a fog; but Erskine, with an
astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple
column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even
before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped
suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately
lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops unconsciously
passing the enemy’s outposts had like to have captured Ney himself,
whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a
few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into
the same gulf; when the rattling of musketry and the booming of
round shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the
fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without
support, in the midst of the enemy’s army.

At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn
the left of the French, for their front position was very strong,
and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca
river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a
road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was
already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate
with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain the sources of the
Deuca and Ceira rivers: between the fourth division and Casal Nova
the third division was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank;
and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it
marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit
Erskine’s error forced on this action, and the whole of the light
division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second.

The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick
and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was
necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in
every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an
equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to
prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained
amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side; some
advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially
turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near
and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first,
fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery,
came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his
rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge
with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and
with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the
British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and
the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained
the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the
main body of the French.

Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra
on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed
over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very
difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was eleven
officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater,
and about a hundred prisoners were taken.

During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the
fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella; and Cole having effected
a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing
lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda,
and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed
and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the
Mondego; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of
ammunition and baggage; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and
the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the
passage with a few battalions; yet charged him not to risk an action.
Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank, ten or
twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns.

COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE.

The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach
the Ceira, before four o’clock in the evening, and the troops, as
they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking that
Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right
rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon
the village of Foz d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid
glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack’s brigade, to
hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left,
and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a
rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney’s left
wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third
division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards
the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and
were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to
death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the
action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to
use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile
darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on
each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the
British. The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, of which
one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed
of the river when the waters subsided.

In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney,
notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of
the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up
seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself,
with a weak rear guard, on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the
first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French
commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed
infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington’s Despatches]

I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de
Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns
covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be
attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat:
but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to
the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and,
although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such
examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly
done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a
spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror
that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress,
conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from
water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited
violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on
his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty
once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French
general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number
of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged
with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to
starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day.
The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these
poor creatures’ looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers;
and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by
a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any
prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct
cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war to listen to the
passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted
by an accidental combination of circumstances.

CHAPTER IV.

On the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was
swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the
troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The
latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days’ bread; the
allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the
difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who
was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the
ill conduct of the Portuguese government; who, deaf to the repeated
representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed
the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their
magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence,
after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been
unable to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under general Pack
and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the
enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died
of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction,
the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general’s
means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and an imperative
necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had saved
Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged
country, and, with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong
position; and this, by a series of movements, based on the soundest
principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which
Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge
defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes
of the mountains by Picton’s flank march on the 13th; and again by
Cole’s on the 14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes in
rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could
scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength
of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. He who
receives battle in the hills has always the advantage; and he who
first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle.

In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese
army and to Badajos; for lord Wellington, having saved Coimbra, and
seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on
very advantageous terms, had detached a brigade of cavalry, some
guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the
Alemtejo. He had, therefore, actually less than twenty-five thousand
men in hand, during the subsequent operations. In the night of the
13th, also, he received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered,
and, feeling all the importance of this event, detached the fourth
division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford
should immediately retake the lost fortress: but, as the road of
Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we have
seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena’s flank and
rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate
destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving
up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the enemy’s line of
retreat, forbad his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand
either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his
flank and rear.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 9.]

[Sidenote: Ibid.]

Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military
horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that
Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to
draw together, at Zamora, above seven thousand men, and menaced an
invasion of Gallicia; and, although Mahi had an army of sixteen
thousand men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the
south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the
disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel,
proved that, from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to be
expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly
expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom
it had been delivered, under an engagement of honour, entered into
by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected
and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and two
hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend
this fortress, which required a garrison of five thousand regulars.
Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be
considered.

Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the
17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty,
while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in
the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in
position immediately behind the Alva and on the Sierra de Moita,
and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella and the bridge near Pombeira;
while the second corps moved towards the upper part of the river,
and Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance,
designing to halt for several days. Nevertheless the first, third,
and fifth divisions were directed on the 18th, by the Sierra de St.
Quiteria, to menace the French left, and they made way over the
mountains with a wonderful perseverance and strength, while the sixth
and light divisions cannonaded the enemy on the Lower Alva.

As the upper course of the river, now threatened by lord Wellington’s
right, was parallel to the line of Massena’s retreat, that marshal
recalled the second corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also,
concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up
the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while separated and
in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the
heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy’s masses.
The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded
in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division
immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira; and at the
same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and
Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego.

Massena now recommenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being
desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda
betimes, he again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned
even his more distant foraging parties, who were intercepted and
taken, to the number of eight hundred, in returning to the Alva:
for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had
immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army
was assembled there the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th,
through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry;
the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant
who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was
about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve,
but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions,
sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The
French reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry,
and immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting
detachments of horse on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who
had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the second corps.

Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his
retreat may be said to have terminated; but he was far from wishing
to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general,
and shorn of half his authority; because Bessieres commanded the
northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion,
had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal,
and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of
position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other
incumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda,
make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga;
establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the
valley of the Tagus with the king.

[Sidenote: General Pelet’s Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et
Conquêtes des Français.]

But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he
could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun,
Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other
and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been
requested to secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal,
carrying with him Claparede’s division; Marcognet’s brigade was then
ordered for that operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun
undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by
his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent.
Reynier’s dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers
carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it
to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his
authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of
Marcognet’s brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the
position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged that,
far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the
signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised Massena to
maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer. The personal
risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position,
would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was
observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the
French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from
the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have
been frantic to have delayed his movement.

At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent
altercation between the prince and the marshal; and at Celerico,
Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the
retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to
Coria; and even marched his troops in a contrary direction. Massena,
a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his
command, giving the sixth corps to Loison; and each marshal sent
confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the
emperor. From both of those officers I have derived information,
but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by
Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have,
therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each,
without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the
acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus
judging, it appears that Massena’s general views were as superior to
Ney’s as the latter’s readiness and genius in the handling of troops
in action were superior to the prince’s. Yet the duke of Elchingen
often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander
than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by
him the least important.

From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not two days longer march
than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to
the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its
fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of
invasion: whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping
out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished.
A close and concentric direction would also have been given to the
three armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and
a powerful demonstration effected against Lisbon, which would
inevitably bring lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the
conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos,
and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of
the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of
Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders,
on the 23d, for the execution; but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him.

Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering round Celerico,
made, in different skirmishes, a hundred prisoners, and killed as
many more; and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel.
The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at
Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of
the Estrella.

Ney’s insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the
Elga; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with
the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications
with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions
in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being
able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone;
and, independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold
Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez
to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left
Almeida with only ten days’ provisions. Lord Wellington’s ready
boldness, however, disarranged all the prince’s calculations.

The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the
reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division.

The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at
Celerico, and, driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the
villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post
on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while
the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up
the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on
the 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of
light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle
round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all
leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and
left of the enemy; they were supported on one wing by the militia,
on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first
and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney
was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied columns
threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a
shot, this great and nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had
the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how
the second corps could have rejoined Massena; but Reynier quitting
Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication with a loss of
only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and
cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. Much
more could however have been done, if general Slade had pushed his
cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required.

On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and
reached the Coa; but the French general, anxious to maintain at
once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the
side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on
the right bank of that river. The sixth corps was at Rovina, with
detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon,
and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of
the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The second
corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates,
but having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford
of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at Alfayates, and a post was
established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second
and the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed
on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and
both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated
in a sharp bend of the stream: by holding Alfayates, Massena also
commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria.

Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a considerable river, the
banks are rugged, but the ravine continually deepens as the stream
flows; and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied
a line parallel to the enemy’s right, which could not be attacked.
Meanwhile Trant and Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated
between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, as if the passage of
the river was to be made on that side. Lord Wellington’s aim was,
however, against the other flank, and, to protect the left and rear
of the army, he placed the sixth division opposite the sixth corps,
and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Seceiras.

At daylight, on the 3d of April the cavalry under general Slade,
being on the extreme right, was directed to cross the Upper Coa; the
light division was ordered to ford a little below; the third division
still lower; and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force
the bridge of Sabugal; the first and seventh, with the exception of
the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. The English general
having thus, ten thousand men pivotted on the fifth division at
Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier’s left, to separate him from the
eighth corps, and to surround him before he could be succoured by the
sixth corps. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred
this well-concerted plan, and brought on the

COMBAT OF SABUGAL.

The morning was so foggy, that the troops could not gain their
respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is
so essential to success; and in the light division no measures were
taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction:
the brigades were not even held together, and he carried off the
cavalry and the third caçadores without communicating with colonel
Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the first brigade, being
without any instructions, halted at a ford to await further orders,
and at that moment a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily
asked, why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an
enemy in his front he could make no reply, and instantly passing
the river, which was deep and rapid, mounted a very steep wooded
hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led in
skirmishing order, and were followed by the forty-third regiment;
but the caçadores and the other brigade, being in movement to the
true point, were already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in
rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes.
The attack was thus made too soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none
of the divisions of the army had reached their respective posts. It
was made also in a partial, disseminated, and dangerous manner, and
on the wrong point; for Reynier’s whole corps was directly in front,
and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of
riflemen, was advancing against more than twelve thousand infantry,
supported by cavalry and artillery.

Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact
and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third; the
weather cleared at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt
all his danger; but he met it with a heart that nothing could shake.
Leading a fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and the summit of the
hill was attained, but at the same moment two French guns opened with
grape at the distance of a hundred yards, a fresh body appeared in
front, and considerable forces came on either flank of the regiment.
Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the
convenience of water, placed his principal masses in the low ground
behind the height on which the action commenced; his renewed attack
was therefore up hill; yet the musketry, heavy from the beginning,
now encreased to a storm; the French sprung up the acclivity with
great clamour, and it was evident that nothing but the most desperate
fighting could save the regiment from destruction.

Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third,
immediately ran out to the right, and with admirable presence of mind
seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding
the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were
approaching. His first fire was so sharp, that the assailants were
thrown into confusion; they rallied and were again disordered by the
volleys of this company; a third time they endeavoured to form a head
of attack; when Hopkins with a sudden charge increased the disorder,
and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second
regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line.
Meanwhile, the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously
engaged and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head,
and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost
of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men,
in a loud cheerful tone.

The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, but the
French fell fast, a second charge cleared the hill, a howitzer was
taken, and the British skirmishers were even advanced a short way
down the descent, when small bodies of French cavalry came galloping
in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body
of the regiment. The English line was instantly formed behind a stone
wall above; yet one squadron of dragoons surmounted the ascent, and,
with incredible desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act
of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid
nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however
a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of
the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer which was
on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no
man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third’s fire.
Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the two battalions
of the fifty-second charging upon the flank of the assailants,
vindicated the right of the division to the height. A squadron of
French cavalry, which had followed the columns in their last attack,
then fell in amongst the fifty-second men, extended as they were from
the circumstances of the action, and at first created considerable
confusion, but it was finally repulsed.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 10._

MASSENA’S RETREAT
Combat of Sabugal
1811.

_London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._]

[Sidenote: Official Despatch.]

Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending
up his troops piece-meal, put all his reserves, amounting to nearly
six thousand infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and
outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the
contested height. But, at this critical period, the fifth division
passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the
hills beyond the enemy’s left, and general Colville with the leading
brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier’s
right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate
of the day. The French general hastily retreated upon Rendo, where
the sixth corps, which had been put in march when the first shots
were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates,
pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody
encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred
killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous; three hundred
dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round
the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded;
so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant
was the English fire. Although, the principal causes of this
disproportion undoubtedly was, first, the heavy rain which gave the
French only a partial view of the British, and secondly, the thick
wood which ended near the top of hill, leaving an open and exposed
space upon which the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was
no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, “that this was one of the
most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in.”

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.]

The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to
feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria;
but Massena was in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th
crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour of the French
discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men
who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one
continued course of violence and devastation, passed an imaginary
line of frontier, and became the most orderly of soldiers; not the
slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing
demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two
shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he
was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and
moderation.

While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant crossing the
Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from
Almeida, when the river suddenly flooded behind him. Near fort
Conception, there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been
employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to
Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant’s dangerous
situation, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire
on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters,
desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with
Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be
up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed
between the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter
were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction
appeared inevitable; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to
the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a
retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull’s troop of
horse-artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military
order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones,
yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their
dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of
march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped
over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of three
hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The prince of Esling
had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and lord Wellington now
stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to
others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt.

CHAPTER V.

Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his
reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed
the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal
cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might
have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand
were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained
by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha,
Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army
would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army
should fight as little as possible.

When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy
artillery, and convalescents, again augmented his army to more than
fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want
of provisions, would not suffer him to shew a front to the allies;
wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell
back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light
division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were
disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters
were transferred to Villa Formosa.

Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the
retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had
refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly
mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house
he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his
master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly
desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French
army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of _gens
d’armes_, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in
the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he
galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he
was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the
road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and,
thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some
encouraging him, others firing at him, and the _gens d’armes_, sword
in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed,
between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled
his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he
reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage
to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII.]

Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres,
sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable
to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes,
disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded
Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and
daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of
the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any
amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond
the Agueda.

The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva
on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico,
from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way
of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and
Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be
supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult,
and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of
the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad
Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers
behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended.
The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted
letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for
a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord
Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to
relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed.

[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.]

The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers;
and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future
efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required
the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain,
occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had
presented themselves to his mind.--1º. Under the supposition that it
would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on
Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the
army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell
to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so
fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at
once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia
and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would
have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for
thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken,
the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base
momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the
Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or
two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain.

Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded
reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design
into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret
aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness
of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great
difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert
and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the
Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers,
so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed
combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action
in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his
proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.

His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether
Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new
combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to
recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected
the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the
above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling
the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he
probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after
operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions,
and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to
interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command
of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the
Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the
most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear
notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when
Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.

[Sidenote: Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar.
25th.]

[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811.
MSS.]

Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos,
leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville
and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province,
and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been grievously shaken
by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and
Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had
been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and
gloom were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for
some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the
fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was
finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry
to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de
Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed
Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas
was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to
Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command,
Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united
corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred
cavalry, were called the _fourth army_. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying
his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa,
re-formed a weak corps, called the _fifth army_; during these
proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara,
and carried on the

SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR.

This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a
hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at
once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese
engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made
such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches,
battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with
eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At
the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill
seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being
summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours
to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the
21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour
Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores
to Badajos.

Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford who had quitted the
northern army after the combat of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre
with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen
guns.

His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza
and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal,
being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the
besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion the
23d. In the morning of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry,
supported by a detachment of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came
suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching
out in confusion, with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions of
infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering train of thirteen
guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of
ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on
either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel
Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the
enemy, but colonel Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was
on the left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway with
two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was
in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly
charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on
the Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did
these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted
by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite
side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner
to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than the
French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse
and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares.
Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering
train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up beyond the French
line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry
would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to
charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed
their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued
the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge
of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were
followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies
one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the
enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and
the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper
of the thirteenth.

_To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly
with his advanced guard in an offensive movement._ When this combat
commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a
staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the
thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his
cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up
the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was
enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open
and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were
easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps
justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the
unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.

Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left
eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also
evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely
dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south:
indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it,
that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow
at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was
necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to
recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential,
because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches
obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished.
Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four
hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos;
thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier’s
numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he could not
therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected
provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon
Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication
by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been
inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of
the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons
guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even
have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained
his object.

Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into
quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of
the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been
marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed
and exhausted.

He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over
the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to
invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken
not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually
reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that is
to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and
transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable
craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which
had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas;
and that all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now
appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed;
that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta’s
boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable
craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon,
were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the
passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions,
that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army.

All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line
of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left
bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil
state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of
an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division
for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the
circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary
effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without danger
even have been left behind.

Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means
of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered as the
first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which
afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers
of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one
of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the
trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; meanwhile
Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops,
covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines.

Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the
Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in
the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats;
wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford,
to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge
being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods
near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly
swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable,
and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately
procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges
for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight
narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken
from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion
was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army
commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of
the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which
was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet.

During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in
securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended
fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of
Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish
than of the French method of making war: for it is evident that a
moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry,
could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on
the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations.
The allied troops, being most numerous, should have been carried
over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient
force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge
was attempted: it is not easy to say which general acted with
most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in
unnecessarily tempting fortune.

When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French
general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred
cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on
the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before.
He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in
front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange
shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of
more than twenty thousand men!

During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia
d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and
Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was
appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived
at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford,
but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief
command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like
authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim.
Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult
circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest
Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the
Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the
field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in
chief.

Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced out
entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered
his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner;
brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works;
left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese
horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the
army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford
summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but
the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round
the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare
battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now opened with
Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s
division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to
Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then
retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general
Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of
nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera;
communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his
cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos.
The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was
sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies.

The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being
placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly
noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable
before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards
kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of
three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at
discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of
Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera,
was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway.
This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut
off general Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of
Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated
him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards
Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies
approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments
of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had
reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were
suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six
miles so vigorously that three hundred were killed or taken, without
the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.

On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army
being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the
18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena,
and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the
allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from
Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza,
and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after
drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The
presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops;
they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any
adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without
being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and,
including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least
twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than
ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide:
yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten
days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the
garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and
other materials for the defence, at his pleasure.

Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana
just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s
Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some
infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort
was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a
hundred men, and the convoy reached the town.

Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour
to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent
of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations,
before he would commence the investment of the place. 1º. That
Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los
Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left.
3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should
observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra,
by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch
the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish three
battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida,
to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army should be
in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically
situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos,
should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole
of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily
taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence
was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that
fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as
the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge
at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the line of
communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until
settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 10.]

Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay
the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses
in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were
pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of
Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to
seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish
Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s
strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the
two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural
slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and
Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s plans:
meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again
in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford
to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in
their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British
reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the
Agueda.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed,
while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The
allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great
part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by
the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda
by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that
river, near its confluence with the Douro.

Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat
upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments
of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without
consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from
San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition,
his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, with
reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation
was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane
of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and
continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities
with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked
rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him; his
opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly
expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena vainly
demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of
his campaign.

A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of
April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded
in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the
Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of
two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded by
the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place.

Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by
Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps
joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining
eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the
command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having collected all his
own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres,
prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made
to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion
towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately
resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva,
the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the
sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in
this situation, colonel O’Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade
were taken by Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said,
preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service.

On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry
marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the
bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained by captain
Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-second and some riflemen.

On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his
advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja
to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately
concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river.
The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued
to feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters
having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out
of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight
skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement,
from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country
immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos
Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the
enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat.
As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division
remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain
until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the
Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had
escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied
alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was
well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep
regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving
only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly
population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly
felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards
collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the
injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his
blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the
army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior
numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the
valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired over
the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a
battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to thirty-two
thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and
forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French
horse, to oppose the enemy’s march.

The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones
and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite
to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole
distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine,
protected the front of this line, and the French general could not,
with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against
Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of
Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him
into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained
by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave
the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division
opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a
gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the
steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the
Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.

FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the sixth
corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth
and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to
menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light division, after
passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison
however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes
Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops,
detached from the first and third divisions.

Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the
ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence,
overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet
the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so
heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely
maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the
commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming
very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the
seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position, charged
so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe
contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the
night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the
seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village,
where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the
French had fallen.

On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with
twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined
all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was
to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, but to
turn the right with the remainder of the army.

Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces
of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of
the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very
audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on
such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was
indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his
communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank,
the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a
considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads
leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could,
therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at
once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack
them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and
the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would
have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his
communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding
to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing
out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez
to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general
Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length,
besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered
the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually
obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to
Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The
left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village
of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused.

BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the
night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the
5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements
were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and
supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the
village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and
Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a
division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and
the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston; while
the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the
sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh
division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of
Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when
the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored
the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced
forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the
hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the
Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his
lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy,
making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and
shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but
when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned
the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry,
which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by
an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as
orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not
more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock,
in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel
Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the
cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being
thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s
horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division
instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French
horsemen were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could
be effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some
were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a
loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy
recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed
amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion
towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud
cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated
some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently
agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and
Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses
breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his
guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in
close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant
action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the
wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing
turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost,
if the original position was not immediately regained.

In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh
division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to
Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry
to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions,
placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before
described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.

General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light division,
first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones,
and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British
cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the
enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood
surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel
Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge
against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many
times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares,
but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all
this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole
of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused
multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for
there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of
the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by
curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out
of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by
the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of
artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of
the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the
wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the
latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet’s
divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps attacked the
light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general
charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been
driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to
have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks.

No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered about
Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post
behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the
right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks
to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada
and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.

At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French
stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great
execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British
guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated;
their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry
attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed
by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all
this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena
had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when
Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two
hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments
made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little
accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were
pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken,
colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town
was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the
rolling of the musketry was incessant.

Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s division
thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through
the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been
forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord
Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable
masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French
continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the
sixth corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when
several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on
the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another
upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the
enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the
main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the
defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and
eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy
mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the
French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the
lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British
maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon
shot from the stream.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3. Plate 11._

Battle of
FUENTES ONORO
_5^{TH} MAY, 1811._

_London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._]

When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the
regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second
corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion
of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation.
Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were
prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was
estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated
calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four
hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash
estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses
at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not
more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third
of which were British.

During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida,
being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington
sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb
the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect,
and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light
division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while
lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was
immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would
have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking,
was not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British
right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well
as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too
distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been
at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this
ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting
to a butchery.

On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no
demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction,
the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew
his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but
still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without
being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth
and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps
by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the
imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont
assumed the command of the army of Portugal.

Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the
passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank,
obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to
relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The
English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was
successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering
the blockade of Almeida) was attained.

Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages.
Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that,
with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to
that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the
errors of the English general’s position, stopped short at the very
moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been
attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded
by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his
army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would
not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison
neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions
in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the
machinery of battle being shaken, would not work.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 8.]

General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry
against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting
that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to
retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the
notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas,
including Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It
may be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch
some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal,
against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the
communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport
belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general’s
position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the
second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it
had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected
the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however
adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors
and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks,
furnished illustration of this truth.

Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria, which
would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added
Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost
Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line
of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At
Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable
combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s negligence
placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of
Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to
undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above
his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill
were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not
stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the
uncertainty of war.

EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged,
was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro,
his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly
with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be
signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in
the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named
Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind,
to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade,
carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general
had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the
British general placed the light division in its old position on the
Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William
Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while
general Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth
division and with general Pack’s brigade.

Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently
executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth
regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the
retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at
Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open
country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty,
yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to
render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined
all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his
artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at
one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of
another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a
loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting
notice.

At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines,
sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and
passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that
proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General
Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him
with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column,
which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough
country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment,
just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that
some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the
right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus
occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of
blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the
mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous practice;
but Pack’s fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was
close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde
Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier,
having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British
regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace,
that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending
the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured
about three hundred, and even passed the bridge in pursuit; there
however the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting
Brennier’s approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty
men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders,
the French column would have been lost.

Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several
previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance
to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are
as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:--“_The officers of
the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed
is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been
printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies,
unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of
any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies
being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons._”

CHAPTER VI.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.]

When Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew
the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then
leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under general
Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and
the second German hussars upon Badajos: and on the 15th, hearing that
Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to be entirely on
the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out
himself for that province; but, ere he could arrive, a great and
bloody battle had terminated the operations.

While awaiting the Spanish generals accession to lord Wellington’s
plan, Beresford fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos; but Latour
Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties were foraging
the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was,
therefore, reinforced with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne
was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish
guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and
to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular
talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in
concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy’s
parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French
troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the
other frontier towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so
much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand,
abandoned Guadalcanal also and fell back to Constantino.

Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to
surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt,
was like to have carried it; for, riding on to the drawbridge with a
few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant
to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish
army which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French
officer, amazed at the appearance of the party, was yet too resolute
to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed,
galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the
mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss.

During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded to lord Wellington’s
proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros
was at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the
bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed
for the

FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested this place, on
the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six
field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, while the formation of
the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery.

On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand
Spaniards under Carlos d’España, encamped in the woods near the
fortress; but Madden’s Portuguese remained in observation near
Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was
attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and
Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and
re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it was however again drawn
over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some
French horse had come down the river.

The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with
a brigade of the fourth division, four light Spanish guns, the
seventeenth Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted
from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless the troops did not arrive
simultaneously, and sixty French dragoons, moving under the fire of
the place, disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after a sharp
skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry.

Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in
the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English
government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of
prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer officers were exceedingly
zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution
and customs of their corps tending rather to make regimental than
practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in
the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting
on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service.
Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who
knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled
to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and
scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest
soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner,
to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government,
always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest
care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on
by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the
commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers.

Colonel Fletcher’s plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while
batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take
the defences in reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and
Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches;
but it was necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the
batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. X. Section 3.]

In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is
essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush
each in detail, yet neither in the investment nor in the attack was
this maxim regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided with
tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the
night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only
four hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire
of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he
continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy,
making a furious sally, carried his battery. The French were, indeed,
immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were
taken in front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred men.
Thus five engineer and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the
line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to
this Moloch; and only one small battery against a small outwork was
completed! On the 11th it opened, but before sunset the fire of the
enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the
besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this
single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for
the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two
distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice
of the enemy.

To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against
the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile
Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was
again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On
the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the
labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle:
the intelligence was, however, true, and being confirmed at twelve
o’clock in the night, the working-parties were again drawn off, and
measures taken to raise the siege.

SOULT’S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 11.]

The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard
of Beresford’s being in Estremadura; the tardiness of the latter not
only gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but permitted the
French general to tranquillise his province and arrange a system
of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, he
commenced additional fortifications at Seville, renewing also the
construction of those which had been suspended in other places by
the battle of Barosa, and thus deceived Beresford, who believed
that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his
own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy
thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted
Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise
in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing
with him eleven thousand men.

All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with thirty
guns, three thousand heavy dragoons, and a division of infantry,
reinforced by a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the first corps,
and by two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the fourth corps.
The 11th he entered Olalla, where general Marasin joined him, and at
the same time a brigade of Godinot’s division marched from Cordoba
upon Constantino, to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling
back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne’s operations. The
13th a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the
command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the fifth
corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters
reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty miles of Badajos,
Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to
give notice of his approach to the garrison; but the expedient failed
of success, and the 15th, in the evening, the army was concentrated
at Santa Marta.

Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty
until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege,
contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who
promised to put him in possession of the place in three days, if
he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had
been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches:
his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for
carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and
the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at twelve
o’clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank,
having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines
were burnt, and the flying bridge removed. These transactions were
completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards,
continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear guard
was ready to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after severely
handling the piquets of Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, learned that the
siege was raised. But of the cause they were still ignorant.

Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde,
on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village
of Albuera. Ballasteros’ and Blake’s corps having already formed a
junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and
Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before twelve
o’clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an
arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was
arranged that Blake’s army should watch the roads on the right; the
British and the fifth Spanish army guard those leading upon the
centre; and that Madden’s Portuguese cavalry should observe those
on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the
British being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a
half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from
Badajos; but the enemy being, on the 14th, at Los Santos, was eight
leagues distant from Albuera: hence, Beresford, thinking that he
could not be forestalled on any point of importance to the allies,
continued to keep the fourth division round the fortress. Colborne’s
moveable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired
to Talavera Real, Blake’s army reached Almendral, and the allied
cavalry, under general Long, fell back before the enemy from Zafra
and Los Santos, to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the dragoons
of the fourth army.

In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the
position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having
the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The
right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards
Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in
all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance
of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former
commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten’s brigade. The
second division, under general William Stewart, was drawn up in one
line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road
passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of
battle was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under
general Hamilton and colonel Collins.

The right of the position, which was stronger, and higher, and
broader than any other part, was left open for Blake’s army, because
Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of
the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to
secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry
of the fifth army were still before Badajos, but general Cole had
orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas; to throw
a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade,
which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above
Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first
notice.

In this posture of affairs, about three o’clock in the evening of the
15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole
mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light
horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried manner, and passing
the Albuera abandoned all the wooded heights in front to the enemy,
whose dispositions being thus effectually concealed at the distance
of cannon-shot, the strength of the position was already sapped.
Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry
and artillery, stretching his piquets along the road to Almendral,
and sending officers to hasten Blake’s movements; but that general,
who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised
to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at
night; and his rear was not there before three o’clock in the
morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force
on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders
failed to reach the latter, but, at six o’clock in the morning, the
former reached the position with the infantry of the fifth army,
two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth
division; the third brigade, under colonel Kemmis, being unable to
cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The
Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, and the two
brigades of the fourth division, were drawn up in columns behind
the second division. The Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel
Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in
front of the left wing; and, as general Long seemed oppressed by the
responsibility of directing the troops of so many different nations,
general Lumley assumed the chief command of the allied squadrons,
which were concentrated in rear of the centre.

The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, above two
thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which
eighteen were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division
being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength
of battle, did not amount to seven thousand, and already Blake’s
arrogance was shaking Beresford’s authority. The French had fifty
guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen
thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one
discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition
amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general’s
talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary’s.

Soult examined Beresford’s position, without hindrance, on the
evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was
left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the
17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all
the weakness of the English general’s dispositions for battle.

The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly
the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front;
but the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, trending
backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the
line of battle. Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could
be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied
army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow
ravine of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the
retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete
the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French
approximated to each other, being only divided by a wooded hill,
about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies
by the Albuera, and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria.
This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult.
During the night he placed behind it the artillery under general
Ruty; the fifth corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under
Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men and forty
guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and yet
that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as
to the real plan of attack.

The light cavalry; the division of the first corps under general
Werlé; Godinot’s brigade, and ten guns, still remained at the French
marshal’s disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along
the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera, and
Godinot was ordered to attack the village and bridge, and to bear
strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract
Beresford’s attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his
right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed.

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with
above sixteen thousand men; but so defective was the occupation of
the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this
circumstance, and, a little before nine o’clock in the morning,
Godinot’s division issued from the woods in one heavy column of
attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry,
and followed by Werlé’s division of reserve, and, making straight
towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to force
the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars,
drew further down the river to observe colonel Otway’s horse.

The allies’ guns on the rising ground above the village answered
the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which
were crowding without judgement towards the bridge, although the
stream was passable above and below. But Beresford observing that
Werlé’s division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that
the principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, sent
Blake orders to form a part of the first and all the second line of
the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles
to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the
left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten,
and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of
battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth
dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge,
and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The
horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also
took ground to the right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns
on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an
oblique line about half-musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford
galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front
and, with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order,
that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had
sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as
fruitless as the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing had
been done. The enemy’s columns were, however, now beginning to appear
on the right, and Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to
make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford,
impatient of his folly, took the direction in person.

Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the
troops could be put in order the French were amongst them. For
scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten’s brigade, when Werlé, leaving
only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the
thirteenth dragoons and to connect the attacks, countermarched
with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of
the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the
allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted
Godinot’s column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge,
ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of
the fifth corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face
of Lumley’s squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render
Beresford’s position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were
in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right,
and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was
still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain
that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance
to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns
opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry,
outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards
in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and
Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his
columns, while his reserves also mounted the hill, and general Ruty
placed all the batteries in position.

At this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot
of the height with colonel Colborne’s brigade, which formed the head
of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above,
desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent,
but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgement, led up
without any delay in column of companies, and attempted to open out
his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being
under a destructive fire the foremost charged to gain room, but a
heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and
four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had passed the right
flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line
at the instant of its developement, and slew or took two-thirds of
the brigade. One battalion only (the thirty-first) being still in
column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French
horsemen, riding violently over every thing else, penetrated to all
parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal,
a man of great strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his
saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the
mischief was perceived from the plains by general Lumley, who sent
four squadrons out upon the lancers and cut many of them off.

During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great
was the confusion, that the Spanish line continued to fire without
cessation, although the British were before them; whereupon
Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, seized an
ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet
the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being
released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne’s
brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the
field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His
cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire
of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed
of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them
on the plain, while Colborne still maintained the heights with the
thirty-first regiment; the British artillery, under major Dickson,
was likewise coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had
escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill
with general Houghton’s brigade, which he brought on with the same
vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster
order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured
into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the day
was yet to be won.

Houghton’s regiments soon got footing on the summit, Dickson placed
the artillery in line, the remaining brigade of the second division
came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward.
The enemy’s infantry then recoiled, yet soon recovering, renewed the
fight with greater violence than before; the cannon on both sides
discharged showers of grape at half range, and the peals of musketry
were incessant and often within pistol shot; but the close formation
of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would
not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment of time to open their
ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was
twice hurt, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was slain, and
the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking,
fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle
continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two other
officers, and more than four hundred men out of five hundred and
seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone,
and the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third
were standing in any. Ammunition failed, and, as the English fire
slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right
flank; the play of Dickson’s artillery checked them a moment, but
again the Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. And in this
desperate crisis, Beresford, who had already withdrawn the thirteenth
dragoons from the banks of the river and brought Hamilton’s
Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, wavered!
destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were
exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated
mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, and it was urged by
some about him that the day might still be redeemed with the fourth
division. While he hesitated, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered
general Cole to advance, and then riding to colonel Abercrombie, who
commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed
him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast,
Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle was continued.

The fourth division had only two brigades in the field; the one
Portuguese under general Harvey, the other commanded by sir W. Myers
and composed of the seventh and twenty-third British regiments, was
called the fuzileer brigade. General Cole directed the Portuguese
to move between Lumley’s dragoons and the hill, where they were
immediately charged by some of the French horsemen, but beat them
off with great loss: meanwhile he led the fuzileers in person up the
height.

At this time six guns were in the enemy’s possession, the whole of
Werlé’s reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column
of the French, and the remnant of Houghton’s brigade could no longer
maintain its ground; the field was heaped with carcasses, the
lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the
upper part of the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an
English regiment in mutual error were exchanging volleys: behind all,
general Hamilton’s Portuguese, in withdrawing from the heights above
the bridge, appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few brave
men soon changed this state of affairs. Colonel Robert Arbuthnot,
pushing between the double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that
mischief, while Cole, with the fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of
the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill,
dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on
the right of Houghton’s brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on
the left.

[Illustration: _Vol. 3, Plate 12._

BATTLE of ALBUERA
_16^{TH} MAY, 1811._

_London Published by T. & W. BOONE Nov^r 1830._]

Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly
separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled
the enemy’s heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing
onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then
vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their
front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery
whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole and the
three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and
the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and
staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they
closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a
strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult,
by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest
veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice
their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair
field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving,
fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen
hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line.
Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of
undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability
of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in
their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful
volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening
shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of
the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage it
was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest
edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the
struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts
only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving
way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain
flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred
unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British
soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!

CHAPTER VII.

While the fuzileers were thus striving on the upper part of the
hill, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and
Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, battered by Lefebre’s guns, retired
before them, yet still threatening the British with their right,
and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of
Lumley’s horse. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge’s decision
had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured
to secure a favourable result. Blake’s first line had not been at
all engaged, and were ordered to move upon the village; Alten’s
Germans and Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese were thus rendered
disposable, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men with which
the English general followed up the attack of the fuzileers and
Abercrombie’s brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions of
Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was
the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy’s infantry were never
attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general
Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious
activity, while the fifth corps still made head, and, when the day
was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and
protected the passage of the broken infantry.

Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line
with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had
advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops
were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight
continued at the village, but Godinot’s division and the connecting
battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn,
and the action terminated before three o’clock.

The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space
of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand
of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were
wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be
left on the field. On Beresford’s side only two thousand Spaniards,
and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded; hence
it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they
had only fifteen hundred men left standing out of six thousand! The
laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it
on his bleeding front.

The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a
howitzer, and several stand of colours; the British had nothing of
that kind to boast of; but the horrid piles of carcasses within their
lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors, and all
the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the
woods on each side, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of
dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front
line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded
that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter’s
piquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In
this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance
from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that
general’s breast, and he refused; saying it was customary with allied
armies for each to take care of its own men.

Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations,
the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines
still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on
the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies; and
the dark masses of Soult’s powerful cavalry and artillery, as they
covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the
victory: the right of the French also appeared to threaten the
Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another
attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth
division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the
second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde
and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated.

He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men
too deeply wounded to be removed; but all that could travel he had,
in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road,
through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio: then, protecting his
movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he
filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of
Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered
the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of
the wounded men by the royal road.

The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at Solano. His intention
was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive
reinforcements from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although
Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, lord Wellington
would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save
that fortress. On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle
of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa
Marta, and he now continued this work; designing to form a head of
cantonments, that the allies would be unable to besiege before the
French army could be reinforced.

When Beresford discovered the enemy’s retreat, he despatched general
Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected
at day-break the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the
allied cavalry, supported by Alten’s Germans, followed the French
line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente
del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off some of his men
menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the
same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the
marshal to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning to Elvas
himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were
already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on
the right bank.

Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos,
where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not
opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army,
together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and
discontent; the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to
maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the duke of
Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction
of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, his cavalry
being near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was
a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed
being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from
his superior cavalry; the mountains behind him were so strong he
had nothing to fear from an attack; and by Belalcazar and Almaden,
he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he
expected Drouet’s division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear,
by which he could draw reinforcements from Cordoba and from the
fourth corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose
their left flank by marching on Monasterio.

From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partizan
corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at
the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country
beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for that town, built upon
a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and
rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side,
and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the
river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank,
with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the
passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this
object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of
dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was
lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments
had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebre’s guns opened on them,
and the third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them in front
while Madden’s Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown
at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being
choked by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support,
the fugitives, turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save
themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river;
there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite
side, seeing their distress, opened a fire of carbines and artillery
that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed,
above a hundred wounded, and eighty prisoners were the fruits of this
brilliant action of general Lumley’s, which terminated Beresford’s
operations, for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced
the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal’s presence.
General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the
command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the
troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in
person.

OBSERVATIONS.

No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of
military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity
and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were
conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered
his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who
followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change
and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination
of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and
others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general
feeling was right.

When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon
Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos,
was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington’s order,
resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed
his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want
of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San
Christoval belonged to Beresford’s arrangements; and he is especially
responsible in reputation for the latter, because captain Squires
personally represented the inevitable result, and his words were
unheeded.

During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct
intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was
remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales
of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which
the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their
information. Thus he was incredulous of Soult’s enterprise, and that
marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given
for the commencing of the main attack of the castle of Badajos.
However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities
of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly
removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable
and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shewn as much
magnanimity in what followed.

When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of
fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of
consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving
battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without
danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to
fight; affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable
state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter
Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued
that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and
ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would
endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to
push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a
fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear;
a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and
after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of
food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as
the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the
stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the
army endangered to protect their passage.

But these plausible reasons were but a mask; the true cause why the
English general adopted Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper
of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the battles
under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division
were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division
were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During
Massena’s retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the
combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them.
Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not
the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his
troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and
unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so
strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his
own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral
obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can
stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable.
Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of
troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit
which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare
gift of nature.

Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the
army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that
the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military
principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of
Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English
general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would
have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on.
The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should
be deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord Wellington’s
combinations and his great and well considered design for the
deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow.
To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the
commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was
mere trifling. Soult, with twenty or even thirty thousand men, durst
not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four
thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle
of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps,
before Beresford broke up from Badajos, hence he was certain that
additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed,
the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the
23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and
the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to
analyze the chances of success.

Soult’s numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained
that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops. He had also
a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was
peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial character of the man
was also understood. Now the allies could bring into the field more
of infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they were of various
tongues, and the Spanish part ill armed, starving, and worn out
with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very
troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of
movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command
of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy,
each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of
spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could marshal
Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter
were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total
destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and
heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated
upon them alone for victory in such circumstances?

To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with
skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel
Colborne’s brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and these was no
certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not
arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division
not until six o’clock. Kemmis with three fine British regiments, and
Maddens cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the
whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force
to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the
keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense,
was a great error; it was only an accessary, and yet the success of
the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead
of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on
from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when
Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the
point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies
scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their
march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably
have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without
waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis’s brigade. Why, then, did the
French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to
attaining his object without one? and why did he neglect to operate
by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate
or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the
English general’s dispositions were so faulty that no worse error
could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope
for a great and decided victory; a victory which would have more than
counterbalanced Massena’s failure. He knew that only one half of the
allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the
ground, every thing promised the most complete success.

Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle
above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it
in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry
were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was
not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of
error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of
infantry on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, and three
times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in
number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake’s conduct was
very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart’s error cost
one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a
man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops
than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect
of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position,
was Beresford’s own error and a most serious one; so also were the
successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the
fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in
critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel
Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie’s brigade
orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and
the astonishing firmness of Houghton’s brigade in defence that saved
the day; the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every
where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was
seen no where.

Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not
take Badajos, that prize was the result of many great efforts,
and many deep combinations by a far greater man: neither did he
clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to
Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal
of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank
of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh
divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not
have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the
price of seven thousand men. Now lord Wellington fought two general
and several minor actions, with a smaller loss, and moreover turned
Massena and seventy thousand men out of Portugal!

Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result
of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of
Jerumenha, but, had the hill on the right been carried in the battle,
the Valverde road would have been in Soult’s possession, and the
line of retreat cut; and, had it been otherwise, Beresford, with
four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never
have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the
north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied--a
French force fixed on the south of the Tagus--Spain ruined--Portugal
laid prostrate--England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord
Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with
these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and
twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the
superlative vigour of the fuzileers. The battle should never have
been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without
reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an
action, or at least without risking an unequal one.

But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at
Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors.
His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the
Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after
that, the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted
in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of
France. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so,
that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance
of Houghton’s brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from
a total defeat? The fire of the enemy’s columns alone destroyed
two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have
swept away all!

It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second
Soult with sufficient vigour; the latter certainly did not display
any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten’s Germans,
who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of
Portuguese. Latour Maubourg’s movements seem to have been objected
to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and
overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep
in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in
numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill
and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation,
and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to
marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of
the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the
support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so
well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour
Maubourg’s proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If
he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebre’s guns, he must
have been thrown into confusion in passing the Aroya at the moment
when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have
opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged,
or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case,
great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could
have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of
cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious
impression against the three arms united.

On the other hand, a repulse might have been fatal not only to
himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would
have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour
Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like
manner, have exposed the flank of Soult’s infantry, and his movements
would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and,
(in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really
happened,) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By
keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to
time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he
gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and
kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he
covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted
that, with such superior numbers, he might have more closely pressed
Lumley.

When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera,
the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly
handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the
greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost eight thousand
men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms, and his artillery
and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the
allies, only fifteen hundred British infantry were standing; the
troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been
feeding on horseflesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue
and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they
had gone over in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping
thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when
reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander
as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great
effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all.
Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the
British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be
wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been
deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations
they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed
they followed the fuzileers with alacrity, and at no period did they
give way with dishonour.

Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could
not be equal to a second desperate struggle, a renewed attack on
the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French; and
so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the
16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a
certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he
maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication
of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had
Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity,
Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake
of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more
essential in war than a confident front; a general should never
acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always
looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of
what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in
Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out
in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans!
Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field,
gathered all the fruits of a real victory.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FORMER VOLUMES.

_Letter from major-general F. Ponsonby to colonel Napier._

After the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my
name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear
extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my
silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself
which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson’s
brigade is substantially correct; you have given the reason for
it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which
are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other
respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the
French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they
charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following
day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third
attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain
torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain,
was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third,
though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the
columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the
right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the
ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the
intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay
occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were
in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general
attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact
truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your
description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that
the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and
that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the
twenty-third.

Believe me
Very sincerely yours,
F. PONSONBY.

_Malta, Dec. 30, 1829._

_Note sur la Situation actuelle de l’Espagne._

_Rochefort, le Août, 1808._

1º. Les événemens inattendus du général Dupont sont une preuve de
plus que le succès de la guerre dépend de la prudence, de la bonne
conduite, et de l’expérience du général.

2º. A la seule lecture du rapport du colonel d’Affry, on avoit
diviné tous les événemens; après une perte aussi considérable, on ne
peut être surpris que le roi et les généraux jugent convenable de
concentrer l’armée et d’évacuer Madrid.

En examinant avec attention, non les rapports mensongers des
individus qui parlent dans leur sens, mais les faits tels qu’ils se
sont passés, on est convaincu: premièrement, que le général Castaños
n’avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupe de ligne et de
quinze mille paysans; un jour on sera à même de vérifier ce qui sera
avancé ici. Secondement, que si le général Dupont les eut attaqués
ou se fût battû; avec tout son corps réuni, il les eut complettement
défaits.

3º. On pense qu’on aura tout le tems d’évacuer les blessés de Madrid
qui arrivent à Aranda; il faudra occuper aussi longtems qu’il sera
possible les hauteurs de Buitrago, afin de donner le temps au
maréchal Bessières de revenir de son mouvement de Gallice; qu’il faut
réorganiser la province de Burgos, les trois Biscayes, et la province
de Navarre; elle comprendront facilement que, dans ce moment plus que
jamais, elles doivent rester fidèles et se bien conduire sous peine
d’être traitées avec toute la rigueur de la guerre.

4º. On pense que l’armée doit être divisée en trois corps, _le
corps principal_, ou de centre, où commande le roi, qu’on porteroit
à 30,000 hommes campé à Aranda; le corps de droite, du maréchal
Bessières d’environ 15 mille hommes faisant face à ce qui pourroit
arriver de Gallice ou d’Estramadura, occupant Valladolid par une
division, ayant une autre division intermédiaire avec le corps du
centre, et une troisième division de plus sur sa droite, selon les
circonstances; enfin le _corps de gauche_, ou d’Arragon destiné à
maintenir la Navarre et le pays environnant, occupant Logrono et
Tudela et liant sa droite au corps du centre, par une division qui au
besoin renforceroit ce corps et devra maintenir Soria par un corps
volant.

Le corps du centre, et le corps de droite doivent s’appuyer sur
Burgos et le corps d’Arragon doit avoir son appui sur Pampelune.

5º. Pour organiser le corps du centre dans ce bût, on croit qu’on
doit le renforcer de la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne,
200 chevaux et 8 pièces de canon, qu’on tireroit du corps devant
Saragosse; de la brigade du général Mouton composée du 4^{me} legère,
15^{me} legère, du bataillon de Paris, et de huit pièces de canon;
de la brigade commandée par le maréchal Ney, et qui est déjà à une
marche en avant de Bayonne, composée du 43^{me}, et du 51^{me} de
ligne, du 26^{me} de chasseurs, et de 6 pièces de canon; enfin de
4 escadrons de marche de dragons et d’une régiment Polonais de la
garde; on réuniroit le 3^{me} bataillon aux deux premiers de tous les
régimens d’infanterie, et on méleroit les jeunes soldats aux anciens.

On évalue à environ dix mille hommes de renfort que recevroit le
corps du centre, qui seroit alors composé: savoir des

18,000 qui le forment à présent 18,000
Du renfort évalué à 10,000

Le détachement du depôt du 4^{me} legère, 15^{me} legère.

14^{me}, 44^{me}, 43^{me}, et 51^{me} de ligne, le 2^{me} et 12^{me}
legère rejoindront insensiblement et porteront ce corps à 30,000
hommes.

Ces trente mille hommes ne sauroient être en meilleure mains, que
sous les ordres du maréchal Ney, hormis une réserve de 4 à 5 mille
hommes destinés à la garde du roi, et que le roi conserveroit auprès
de sa personne et feroit marcher avec le général Saligny, ou avec le
général Savary quand il le jugeroit nécessaire.

Le corps du centre ce tiendrait à la hauteur d’Aranda, ses
communications bien assurées avec le maréchal Bessières à Valladolid,
des têtes de pont bien établies à Aranda et à Valladolid. Ce corps se
nourrira par Burgos et devra non seulement maintenir la tranquillité
dans cette province, mais encore assurer ses communications avec le
corps de Saragosse qui occupera Tudela et Logrono.

Le corps du maréchal Bessières, fort de quinze mille hommes, devra
occuper Valladolid en faisant face à ce qui arrivera d’Estramadure et
de Castille, ayant ses trois divisions en échélons et se nourrissant
de la province de Valladolid, Placentia, et Leon.

On enverra le maréchal Moncey pour commander le corps du général
Verdier, et on chargera le maréchal du commandement de la Biscaye et
de tous les derrières.

On estime qu’on peut retirer du camp sous Saragosse le 14^{me} et
44^{me} de ligne, 200 chevaux, et 8 pièces de canon, le reste doit
être formé en trois divisions, et destiné, à maintenir la Navarre. La
position de Logrono est trop près, il faut occuper au moins jusqu’à
Tudela pour soumettre la Navarre, et tout ce qui bougeroit. Dans
l’ordre offensif, deux divisions peuvent se porter en marche forcée
sur l’armée.

6º. Il ne faut point faire une guerre timide, ni souffrir aucun
rassemblement armé à deux marches d’aucun corps d’armée. Si l’ennemi
s’approche, il ne faut point se laisser décourager par ce qui s’est
passé, se confier dans sa supériorité, marcher à lui et le battre.
L’ennemi prendra lui même probablement une marche très circonspecte:
il y sera réduit du moment qu’il aura eu quelque exemple.

Dans cette situation de choses, toutes les fois qu’on seroit
sérieusement attaqué par l’ennemi, on pourra lui opposer le corps du
roi, qui doit toujours être ensemble, et les deux tiers du corps du
maréchal Bessières. Se maréchal doit toujours tenir un tiers de son
corps, à une demi journée, un tiers à une journée du corps du centre,
et un tiers sur la droite, suivant les circonstances, également, un
tiers du corps du général Verdier doit se tenir à la gauche du roi,
pour le joindre si cela étoit nécessaire, de sorte que dans un jour
le roi puisse réunir 40 mille hommes.

7º. Il faut débuter par des coups d’éclât, qui rélévent le moral
du soldat et qui fassent comprendre à l’habitant qu’il doit rester
tranquille, un des premiers coups le plus important à porter, et qui
seroit utile pour réléver l’opinion et compenser l’évacuation de
Madrid, seroit que la brigade du 14^{me} et 44^{me} qu’on rappelle
de Saragosse, aidée d’une détachement du corps du centre, soumette
Soria, le désarme et le fasse rester tranquille. Attaquer et culbuter
tout ce qui se présentera doit être l’instruction générale, donnée
au maréchal Bessières, au maréchal Ney, et au général Verdier, de
sorte qu’à une marche, ou à une marche et demie du corps François,
il n’y ait aucun rassemblement d’insurgés; on est d’opinion que si
l’avant garde du général Castaños s’avance sur l’Aranda et dépasse
les montagnes de Buitrago il faut, avec tout ce qu’on réunira dans
un jour, marcher à lui sans lui donner le tems de s’y établir
sérieusement, le culbuter, le jetter au delà des montagnes, et si
l’affaire est décisive, se reporter sur Madrid. L’ennemi doit essayer
de déloger l’armée Françoise de cette position, par trois points,
par la Gallice et l’Estramadure, par la droite d’Aranda, et enfin
par les rassemblemens des provinces d’Arragon, de Valence et autres
de Castille. Toutes ces combinaisons sont difficiles à l’ennemi,
et si on dissipe ces rassemblemens à mesure qu’ils se formeront
sur tous les points et qu’on les tienne à distance d’une ou deux
marches du cantonnement François, si alternativement les François
prennent l’offensive, tantôt à leur droite, en renforçant le maréchal
Bessières, pendant que le centre se tiendra dans une bonne position
derrière la rivière, et à l’abri de toute attaque, tantôt au centre
avec le corps du roi, les deux tiers du corps de droite, et un tiers
du corps de gauche, l’ennemi sera bientôt obligé à la plus grande
circonspection.

8º. On auroit pu aussi conserver Madrid en renforçant le corps qui
s’y trouve, du 14^{me} et 44^{me} de ligne, de la brigade du général
Mouton, de celle du général Le Fevbre, qui en dernier lieu a été
renvoyée au marshal Bessières, et enfin du renfort qu’amène le
maréchal Ney. On auroit ainsi renforcé le corps de Madrid de plus de
14 mille hommes, et il est douteux que l’ennemi eut voulu se mesurer
avec des forces aussi considérables et s’exposer à une perte certaine.

9º. Si de fortes raisons obligoient d’évacuer Aranda, on perdroit
l’espoir de rétablir ses communications avec le Portugal. Dans le
cas où un évènement quelconque porteroit à évacuer le Duero et à se
concentrer sur Burgos pour se réunir là avec le maréchal Bessières,
le corps du général Verdier peut communiquer par l’Ebre, et avoir
toujours son mouvement isolé pour maintenir la Navarre, contenir
l’Arragon, tous les rassemblemens de ce côté, et protéger la route
principale.[9] Pendant cet intervalle des renforts journaliers
arriveront à l’armée, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin les divisions de la grande
armée qui sont en marche, soient sur les Pyrénées.

On a recommandé de tous tems le petit fort de Pancorvo. Il est
nécessaire de l’occuper, même quand on ne garderoit pas la ligne
de l’Ebre, c’est une vedette d’autant plus utile qu’elle domine la
plaine, et seroit un obstacle si jamais l’ennemi s’en emparoit.[9]

10º. La troisième position qui se présente à l’armée, c’est la
gauche à Pampelune, et la droite sur Vittoria, maintenant ainsi
ses communications avec les places importantes de St. Sebastien
et de Pampelune. Au reste toutes ces notes peuvent difficilement
être de quelque utilité, les évènemens modifient nécessairement les
dispositions, tout dépend d’ailleurs de saisir un moment.

11º. Résumé. Le premier but est de se maintenir à Madrid si cela est
possible.

Le second, de maintenir ses communications avec le Portugal en
occupant la ligne du Duero.

Le troisième, de conserver l’Ebre.

Le quatrième de conserver ses communications avec Pampelune et St.
Sebastien afin que la grande armée arrivant, on puisse en peu de tems
culbuter et anéantir tous les révoltés.

LIEUT.-GEN. BERTRAND.

_Rochefort, 6 Août, 1808._

APPENDIX.

No. I.

SECTION 1.--GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA,
EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER ROLLS.

King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809.

Present under
arms Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Prison. Men. Cav. Draught.
180,814 28,091 10,407 3,165 46,109 4,124 237,330 23,196 8,060
Deduct for the governments 10,407 3,165
------- ------
Real total 226,927 28,091
------- ------

15th July, 1810.

273,403 52,336 29,462 7,846 47,107 4,915 349,972 41,848 18,334
In march to join
6,121 736 ” ” 636 ” 6,757 736
------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------
279,524 53,072 29,462 7,846 47,743 4,915 356,729 60,918
------- ------ ------ ----- ------ ----- ------- ------

15th August, 1810.

279,639 52,063 25,340 6,017 46,982 5,995 351,961 41,446 16,634
In march to join 1,957 681 511
------- ------ ------
Total effective in Spain 353,918 42,127 17,145
Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the
frontier 16,006 1,447 ”
------- ------ ------
Grand total 369,924 43,574 17,145
------- ------ ------

_Note._--By this state it appears that allowance being made for
casualties, the reinforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace
with Austria, were not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men.

15th Jan. 1811.

Present under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Cav. Draught.
295,227 52,462 17,780 4,714 48,831 361,838 41,189 15,987

15th April, 1811.

276,575 46,990 15,121 2,166 40,079 331,776 37,855 11,301

These states shew a decrease of nearly thirty thousand men in three
months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of
Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took
place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses
sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of
its greatest activity, the Guerilla system was more harassing than
destructive to the French army.

SECTION 2.--STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.--Head-quarter Caceres. Massena, Prince of Esling,
commanding.

Pris-
Under arms. Detached. Hosp. oners. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Draught.

2d corps d’armée
18,372 4,449 1,119 132 1,628 7 21,126 3,520 1,061

6th Ditto
33,759 10,159 496 110 5,086 349 39,690 3,140 3,129

8th Ditto
28,045 7,070 25 ” 5,976 99 34,145 5,312 1,758
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total active army
80,176 21,678 1,640 242 12,690 455 94,961 15,972 5,948

Imperial guards
17,380 3,800 174 15 733 ” 18,287 2,831 954

Province of St. Ander
13,464 752 276 ” 1,774 377 15,891 15,752 ”

Province of Valladolid
4,509 124 123 ” 859 145 6,136 ” 126
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total under Massena’s command
116,029 26,254 2,213 257 16,056 977 135,275 19,555 7,056
---------------------------------------------------------------------

15th May, 1810.

Etat major et gend’armes
229 241 ” ” ” ” 229 241 ”

2d corps Reynier
16,903 2,921 992 231 1,337 42 19,232 2,186 966

6th do. Ney
28,883 5,421 1,224 964 4,940 357 35,067 2,152 4,233

8th do. Junot
30,782 4,228 7 30 5,642 75 2,643 2,142 2,116

Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun
4,776 4,851 246 189 95 ” 5,117 5,040 11
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total active army
71,573 17,662 2,489 1,414 12,014 474 86,076 11,761 7,315
---------------------------------------------------------------------

15th August, 1810.

Etat major, &c
199 222 ” ” 3 ” 202 222 ”

2d corps
16,418 2,894 2,494 397 3,006 ” 21,913 1,969 1,304

6th corps
23,456 2,496 1,865 577 5,541 193 30,862 1,701 1,372

8th corps
18,803 1,959 436 169 4,996 98 24,235 2,016 1,112

Reserve of cavalry
4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 31 5,441 4,907 246

Artillerie et genie et du siege
2,724 2,969 205 159 409 ” 3,339 108 3,128
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total active army
65,746 15,862 6,139 2,119 14,112 302 85,997 10,815 7,162

6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras
12,693 3,045 639 20 1,775 641 15,107 2,931 134

Asturias et St. Ander. Bonet
12,913 ” 1,394 15 1,578 107 14,885 434 ”
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total under Massena
91,352 18,907 8,172 2,154 17,465 1,050 115,989 13,746 7,296

9th corps, Drouet Comte D’Erlon
19,144 2,436 24 ” 3,147 ” 22,315 2,436 ”
---------------------------------------------------------------------
General Total
110,496 21,343 8,196 2,154 20,612 1,050 138,304 16,616 7,296
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th
October.

The reserve of cavalry, and the artillery of siege to the 1st
September only.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught.

Etat major
192 219 ” ” 4 196 219 ”

2d corps
16,575 2,921 2,397 287 2,214 21,186 1,872 1,336

6th do.
23,224 2,478 1,708 600 5,418 30,350 1,730 1,348

8th do.
18,807 2,958 663 140 4,656 24,126 2,027 1,071

Reserve of cavalry
4,146 4,322 1,138 831 157 5,441 4,907 246

Artilleries of siege
3,022 3,115 206 159 409 3,637 146 3,128

Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2d of October
” ” 474 16 ” 474 16 ”
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total
65,966 16,013 6,586 2,033 12,858 85,410 10,917 7,129

9th corps
19,062 2,072 413 ” 3,516 22,991 1,755 317

Division Serras
8,586 1,015 269 35 1,750 10,605 1,050 ”
--------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total
93,614 19,100 7,268 2,068 18,124 119,006 13,722 7,446
--------------------------------------------------------------

Army of Portugal--1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

2d Corps, Head-quarters Santarem.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught.

Merle’s division, 9 battalions
4,368 ” 150 ” 1,549 6,067 ” ”

Heudelet’s do. 12 do.
5,718 ” 451 ” 2,646 8,815 ” ”

Lt. cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons
1,146 993 523 537 231 1,900 1,530 ”

Artillery and engineers
1,284 1,121 52 9 189 1,425 112 1,018
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total
12,516 2,114 1,176 546 4,515 18,207 1,642 1,018
--------------------------------------------------------------

6th Corps, Thomar.

Marchand, 11 battalions
4,987 28 529 ” 1,121 6,637 28 ”

Mermet’s, 11 do.
6,252 ” 743 ” 1,077 8,104 ” ”

Loison, 12 do.
4,589 ” 1,037 ” 3,291 8,917 ” ”

Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons
652 651 663 663 117 1,432 1,314 ”

Artillery and engineers, 28 companies
1,769 1,372 47 78 165 1,981 52 1,398
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total
18,272 2,051 3,019 741 5,771 27,094 1,394 1,398
--------------------------------------------------------------

8th Corps, Pernes.

Clausel, 11 battalions
4,007 18 484 ” 3,989 8,627 18 ”

Solignac, 14 do
4,997 ” 1,953 ” 3,337 10,346 ” ”

St. Croix’s dragoons, 12 squadrons
981 1,024 698 698 238 1,917 1,722 ”

Artillery and engineers
1,106 859 24 4 359 1,522 151 712

On leave
” ” ” ” ” 206 ” ”
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total
11,108 1,901 3,159 702 7,956 22,605 1,191 712
--------------------------------------------------------------

Montbrun, Ourem.

Reserve of cavalry 24 squadrons with artillery
2,729 2,871 1,486 1,466 178 4,533 4,337
-------------------------------------------------------------
Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army
1,546 614 ” ” 283 2,090 614
-------------------------------------------------------------

9th Corps, Leiria.

Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida
7,863 11 369 ” 432 8,714 ”

Couroux, 12 battalions, Leiria
7,592 27 447 ” 1,299 9,338 27

Fournier’s cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro
1,698 1,591 60 67 114 1,872 1,658

Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo
670 464 ” 72 742 ” 464
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total
17,823 2,093 876 139 2,637 19,924 2,149
--------------------------------------------------------------

_Note._--Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of
Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the
sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal.
The total amounting to 2,354 men and 1,102 horses.

Present under arms.
Men. Horses.
General Total of the army of Portugal in the
position of Santarem 46,171 9,551
9th Corps 17,823 2,093
------ ------
63,994 11,644
Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal 10,231 2,066
------ ------
Real numbers under Massena 53,763 9,578
------ ------

Army of Portugal--1st April, 1811.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men.

8th corps, Junot 13,448 ” 992 ” 5,719 20,159 ”
6th do. Marmont 13,984 ” 1,374 ” 1,576 16,934 ”
2d corps, Reynier 10,837 ” 1,350 ” 4,318 16,505 ”
Montbrun
{ Dragoon, 23 squadrons
{ 4,173 4,404 ” ” ” 4,173 4,404
{ Light cavalry, 14 squadrons
{ 3,636 3,906 ” ” 38 3,636 3,906
{ 1 squadron of gens-d’armes
{ 190 72 ” ” 5 102 72

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men.
Artillery and Engineers
{ Foot artillery. Almeida and Rodrigo
{ 936 ” ” ” 88 1,055 ”
{ Horse artillery
{ 410 425 ” ” 23 453 425
{ Artillery of the train
{ 2,181 2,378 ” ” 237 2,448 2,378
{ Workmen
{ 259 ” ” ” 25 295 ”
{ Engineers
{ 1,448 60 ” ” 140 1,623 ”
{ Military equipage
{ 596 897 ” ” 60 668 897
--------------------------------------------------
Total artilleries, engineers, &c.
5,969 3,335 ” ” 573 6,542 2,760
Total of infantry
37,269 ” 3,716 ” 11,613 53,598 ”
Total of cavalry
7,999 8,382 ” ” 43 7,911 8,382
---------------------------------------------------
General Total 51,237 11,717 3,716 ” 12,229 68,051 11,142
---------------------------------------------------

_Note._--In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of
Portugal for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be
added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April,
and the prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry
as he pleased, provided the brigade of general Fournier, from the
9th corps, was kept in the reserve. The detached men were in the
government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of
Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7,253 horses,
and 4,620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of
fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes
Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers,
engineers, &c. are deducted.

SECTION 3.--ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Draught.

1st of January 55,602 12,092 5,744 1,999 6,412 67,758 10,868 3,223
-------------------------------------------------------
15th May 75,133 13,124 3,915 1,336 11,420 90,468 12,156 2,304

Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north
11,917 1,619 ” ” ” 13,310 1,220 399
------------------------------------------------------
Real total of the army of the South
63,216 11,505 3,915 1,336 11,420 77,158 10,936 1,905
------------------------------------------------------

SECTION 4.

5th Corps, 15th January.

Under arms. Detached.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses.

18,766 6,158 3,035 640

16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de
Badajos, avec tout le 5^{em} corps d’armée, 8 régimens de cavalerie
formant 2,600 chevaux pris dans les l^{ere} et 5^{em} corps d’armée
sous les orders de general Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63^{em}
regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d’artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de
sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et trois escadrons de cavalerie
Espagnols.

SECTION 5.

1st Corps before Cadiz.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Men. Men. Cav. Train.

15th February, 1811
20,572 1,886 1,331 681 1,254 23,457 1,495 1,072

Reinforcement on the march from the Governments
5,209 775 ” ” 743 5,952 712 62
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 25,781 2,661 1,331 681 1,997 29,409 2,407 1,035
------------------------------------------------------------

4th corps, 15th Feb.
16,706 4,007 741 397 1,699 19,143 3,618 793

Reinforcement on the march from the Governments
6,620 1,457 ” ” 878 6,854 1,451 ”
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 22,726 5,464 741 397 2,577 25,998 5,069 793
------------------------------------------------------------

_Note._--A reinforcement of more than one thousand men likewise
joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION 6.--ARMY OF THE NORTH--BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.

Under arms. Detached. Hosp. Effective. Horses.
Men. Horses. Men. Men. Men. Cav. Train.

1st February, 1811
58,515 8,874 1,992 6,860 67,767 7,979 1,079
-----------------------------------------------------------
15th April, 1811
53,148 6,930 2,221 5,350 60,719 6,065 879

SECTION 7.--ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L’ESPAGNE 1^{me} CORPS.

Situation des présens sous les armes à l’époque du 22d Mars 1811.

(Part 1 of 2)

Etat des Dans les Emplacement des Troupes
Designation des presens Forts et dans les Forts
Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes. et Redoutes.
armes.
9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000
24^{me} do. do. 800 400 Depuis et compris le Fort
St. Catherine jusqu’au
Rio St. Petro
96^{me} do. do. 1,100

Division 2. Regimens
16^{me} do. do. 350 350 Xeres et la Cartuxa
8^{me} do. do. 713
45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 Depuis et compris le Fort
Napoleon jusqu’à Chiese fe
54^{me} do. do. 820
Bataillon d’Elite 236

Division 3. Regimens
27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400
63^{me} do. do. 845
94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 Depuis et compris la Redoute
jusqu’à cette de Vellati
95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et
Conil
Régiment de Marine.
43^{me} Battalions de 900 900 Au Trocadero
marine
2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615 Do.
5^e Chasseurs 320

Cavalrie.
1^e de Dragoons 230 50 De Montesà, Alcazar de Xeres
2^e do. do. 218 72 Do. et à la Cartuxa

Artillerie
à pied à Cheval 678 500 Sur la ligne du Blocas
Sapeurs 323 323 Au Trocadero
Mineurs 77 77 Do.
------ -----
14,611 5,153
------ -----

(Part 2 of 2; columns 1, 2 and 3 repeated)

Etat des Dans les
Designation des presens Forts et Disposeables.
Division 1. Regimens sous les Redoutes.
armes.
9^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,000 1,000 Sta Maria.
24^{me} do. do. 800 400 400 Do.
96^{me} do. do. 1,100 1,100 Do. San Lucar, Esta,
Chipiona, la Viala
Atta.
Division 2. Regimens
16^{me} do. do. 350 350
8^{me} do. do. 713 713 Port Reale au
Trocadero.
45^{me} do. do. 1,072 744 328 Port Reale.
54^{me} do. do. 820 820 Chiclana.
Bataillon d’Elite 236 236 Do.

Division 3. Regimens
27^{me} Infantrie ligne 1,400 1,400 Do.
63^{me} do. do. 845 845 Port Reale.
94^{me} do. do. 1,500 650 850 Chiclana.
95^{me} do. do. 1,414 472 942 Do.

Régiment de Marine.
43^{me} Battalions de 900 900
marine
2^e do. d’Ouvriers do. 615 615
5^e Chasseurs 320 320 Vejer et Conil.

Cavalrie.
1^e de Dragoons 230 50 180 Xeres.
2^e do. do. 218 72 146 Arcos.

Artillerie
à pied à Cheval 678 500 178 Santa Maria, Puerto
Reale, et Chiclana.
Sapeurs 323 323
Mineurs 77 77
------ ----- -----
14,611 5,153 9,458
------ ----- -----

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but
was found amongst Colonel Lejeune’s intercepted papers, it appears
that Victor had above nine thousand disposable troops seventeen days
after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about eleven
thousand disposable before that action, and Cassagne’s detachment
being deducted leaves about nine thousand for the battle of Barosa.

SECTION 8.--STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH
APRIL, 1811, EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S RETURNS.

Under arms. Sick. Detached.
Men. Men. Men.
Cavalry 4 regiments 1,525 274 542
Infantry 41 battalions 20,700 8,880 3,214
Artillery 1,378 144 1,156
------ ----- -----
Total of all arms 23,613 9,298 4,912
------ ----- -----

Guns 24 British, 18 Portuguese Total 42

_Note._--There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the
battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation
to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese
and the Partida of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in
line will be about thirty-five thousand men of all arms.

* * * * *

No. II.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION 1.

“_November 30, 1809._

“I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had
with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army
with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke Del Parque in
this plan of diversion.

“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty’s
ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that
I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could
have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

“The first official information which I had from the government of
the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his
defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which
I now enclose a copy.

“I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march
from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the
Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my
conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation,
however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty
thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility
of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your
lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to
think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of
general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to
make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general’s
own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the
10th instant.”--“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British
army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking
that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy
from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my
future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have
requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke
D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower
part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render
it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do
not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences
of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be
secure after I shall move.”

SECTION 2.

“_December 7, 1809._

“----I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the
duke D’Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might
occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz
and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to
Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually
the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and
would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther
opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have
long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till
the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D’Albuquerque which I
had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke
Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government
have given orders to the duke D’Albuquerque to retire with his corps
behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus
leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the
loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of
it.”

SECTION 3.

“_January 31, 1810._

“----There is no doubt that, if the enemy’s reinforcements have not
yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the
Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one
of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making
a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to
reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss
in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the
enclosed copy of a letter to M. Frere, have obliged me to refrain
from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given
up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution
hereafter, if circumstances will permit.”

SECTION 4.

“_January 12, 1811._

“My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was
apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make
any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the
enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been
directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and
Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to
defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was
in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some
days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been
disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida
appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry.”

SECTION 5.

“_January 19, 1811._

“At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville
general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the
21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under
his command into the Condada de Niebla. The force in Estremadura
was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered
insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza.”

“The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship
that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved,
and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with
corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and
upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely
be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabel
received of the assembly of the enemy’s troops at Seville was from
hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or
defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the
Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla,
which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult
broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to
Seville.”

SECTION 6.

“_February 2, 1811._

“The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no
calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the
Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any
other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation,
(the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt
of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from
attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on
this service.”

SECTION 7.

“_February 9, 1811._

“General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by
the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of
the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to
the left of the Guadiana. I don’t believe that the strength of the
enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if
they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be
apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos,
and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided
with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been
expected for the last year.”

SECTION 8.

“_February 23, 1811._

“Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the
effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the
frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent
disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army
and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially
altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula,
and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in
which they were, much less in that in which they would have been,
if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this
melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not
behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden
did every thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain.”
“The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior;
and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain
towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have
not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular
funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.”

SECTION 9.

“_March 21, 1811._

“It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of
Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison
had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very
satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements
to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was
delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal
Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed
principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the
garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Gallicia, in
which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under
general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that
general will make no defence, and that Gallicia will fall into the
hands of the enemy.”

SECTION 10.

“_May 7, 1811._

“Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state
of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I
don’t know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of
restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government
in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed
as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince
regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who
have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing
proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the
amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these
evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of
money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much
more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are
engaged.”

“I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of
co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have
been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the
siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified,
or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence.”

“Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your
operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon
which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be
offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander
must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish
authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some
resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish
armies.”

SECTION 11.

“_May 22, 1811._

“On the night of the 15th instant I received, from marshal sir
William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which
reported that marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the
10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the
reports which had been previously received, that he was busily
occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city,
by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain
on the defensive in Andalusia.”

SECTION 12.

_Letter from sir J. Moore to major-general M’Kenzie, commanding in
Portugal._

_Salamanca, 29th November, 1808._

SIR,

The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castaños and Blake,
the one in Biscay and the other in Arragon, have been beaten and
dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird’s corps
impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone,
to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against
this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head
against it.

I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark,
and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched
from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by
taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time,
the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward
that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior
numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that
you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as
possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now
with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence;
colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday,
that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some
are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D.
Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to
send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general
will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence
with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It
will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers
what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible,
and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my
defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon
this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but
generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico,
Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use,
and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os
Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had
better remain at Lisbon; but, if he does not write to him, this,
together with colonel Murray’s letter to colonel Donkin, will be
sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us
not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies
of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as
little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from
England, to join us through Portugal: this will do at first, but
gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of
money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.
J. MOORE.

P.S. Elvas should be provisioned.

* * * * *

No. III.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS,
EMPLOYED AT CADIZ.

SECTION 1.

“_May 7, 1810._

“We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a
loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left
England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning
works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence,
even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men.
These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute
either stores or workmen to the general cause, has kept us so long
inactive. We have now one thousand three hundred men at work, and the
Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools.”

SECTION 2.

“_Isla, June 1, 1810._

“We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if
all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we
have only British troops at work on this important position, and our
numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs
requires.”--“We have in our respected general (Graham) a confidence
which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted
to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could
not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although
our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his
merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have
kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and
kept an enterprizing enemy off with very inadequate means, should
be rewarded by his country’s good opinion, although none but those
who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions.
On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not
security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory.”

SECTION 3.

“_June 29, 1810._

“I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery
officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground
near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which
include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to
propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of
the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the
enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this
would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks
and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good
redoubts at every seven hundred yards, this is what they propose,
although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot
they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt,
if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is
not attended to. We have now been here three months, and although
they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak
tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun
upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at
that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly
fortified, so as to resist an army of from fifty to one hundred
thousand men, which I am convinced it is capable of.”--“We have
now one thousand three hundred labourers of the line and eighty
carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are supplied with
from our ally, is so bad that these artificers produce not more than
one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials
were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose
them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and
I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself.”--“Of our
seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are obliged,
therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that
the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to
have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and
with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army.”

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE
BRITISH COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION 4.

_General William Stewart, March 13, 1810._

“The enemy’s force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage
could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the
Spanish troops.”

_General Graham, March 26, 1810._

“The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had
been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences,
very precarious.”

_May, 1810._

“General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced
some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had
been very deficient.”

_October, 1810._

“The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very
formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy,
and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line.”

_General Graham to lord Liverpool, Cadiz, January 2, 1811._

“----As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers
under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be
satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for,
besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures
of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry
into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the
Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant
contests.”

* * * * *

No. IV.

EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH’S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION 1.

_The duke of Santa Fé to the King, Paris, June 20, 1810._

(Translation from the Spanish.)

“Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have
arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution,
very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards
attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty
consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial
it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that
such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgement, and
that it will soon subside, being void of probability.”

SECTION 2.

_Ministerial letter from the King to the marquis of Almenara._

(Translation from the Spanish.)

“_September 21, 1810._

“The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not
only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in
the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose
preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from
which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the
general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas,
which are found in the province of Valladolid, the governor,
Kellerman, has taken possession of them.” “Those archives, from the
time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the
treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient
manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles
of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in
short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation,
and privately to individuals.”

SECTION 3.

_The Spanish secretary of state to the duke of Santa Fé._

“_Madrid, September 12, 1812._

“----Si l’Andalusie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte
de Cadiz exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale
influence, on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations,
et aux-trames ourdies par la junta et l’Angleterre au moment où
parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Febrier, qui établit des
governmens militaire dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Arragon, et la
Catalogne. Quelques governeur Françaises ayant traité ces provinces
comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie.”

“----Mais combiens n’est il pas dementi par la conduite de certains
governeurs qui paraissent s’obstiner a prolonger l’insurrection
d’Espagne plutôt qu’a la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne
se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi, en faisant
administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur mais ce qui est pire,
on à exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia,
pretassent serment de fidelité et d’obeisance à sa majesté impériale
comme si la nation Espagnole n’avoit pas de roi.”

SECTION 4.

_Memorial from the duke of Santa Fé and marquis of Almenara to the
prince of Wagram._

(Translated from the Spanish.)

“_Paris, September 16, 1810._

“----The decrees of his majesty the emperor are the same for all the
generals. The prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces
to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense
magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of
provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the
arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required;
and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the prince of
Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces
through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and
humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war
demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless
vexations.”

SECTION 5.

_Intercepted letter of comte de Casa Valencia, counsellor of state,
written to his wife, June 18, 1810._

“Il y a six mois que l’on ne nous paie point, et nous perissons.

“----Avant hier j’écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le
pryant de m’accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si
non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures
dans son antichambre esperant un reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut
qu’il n’avait rien.”

“----Rien que la faim m’attend aujourd’hui.”

* * * * *

No. V.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON.

SECTION 1.

“_Celerico, May 11, 1810._

“----I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the
inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of
ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences
of this description will not induce me to desist from making the
movements which I might think the defence of the country would
require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot
procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from
the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the
deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has
rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has
been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there
is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no
money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army
has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had
refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely
the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and,
however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and
the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any
situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or
to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured.
I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country
to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the
government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to
their public duties rather than to their private interests in this
time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government
so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am
of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower
orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests
and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any
omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher
classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and
no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful,
should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of
their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are
strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious
or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be
aware, from the sentiments of his majesty’s government, which I have
communicated to them that the continuance of his majesty’s assistance
depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual
effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I
have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this
subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties
which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas.
I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although
there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that
some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has
enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to
be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely
in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head
quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted
without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which
I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or
rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect
to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:--1st, refusing
to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly,
refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the
enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrates to proceed
to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th,
desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, &c.;
5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed
to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates
may be classed as follows:--1st, disobedience of the orders of their
superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving
bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions
upon them.”

SECTION 2.

_Lord Wellington to M. Forjas._

_Gouvea, September 6, 1810._

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me
that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch
of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected
news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned
with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to
succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression
of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the
quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the
efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of
the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that
I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to
depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my
intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had
not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request
the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much
as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly
made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan
of operations which have been determined, after the most serious
deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the
allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to
believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as
well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in
removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I
should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to
the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic
to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan
of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and
which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a
good end.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 3.

_Gouvea, September 7, 1810._

----In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I
beg that you will inform the government that _I will not stay_ in the
country, and that I will advise the king’s government to withdraw
the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere
in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford’s staff,
for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or
with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with
marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I
propose, also, to report to his majesty’s government, and refer to
their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese
government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political
arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military
operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the
destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested
by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government
upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the
subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures
may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the
Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed,
but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal,
and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render
useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military
officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this
part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it
is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must
be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it
is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last
twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make
difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of
the enemy’s force in the country. But it appears that the government
have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become
impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the
Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had
the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending
to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe;
and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only
chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest
attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government.
I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the
government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently
introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with
me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the
subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this
conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this
letter that you may think proper to the regency.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 4.

_Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810._

----You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all
the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having
entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with
the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or
any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to
station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and
I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon
any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they
are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which
they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to
provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army
and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy.
As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have
had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since
he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a
course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful
termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that
no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one
moment after I shall have obtained his majesty’s leave to resign
my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the
government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country
or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that
the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be
made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I
have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government
was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that,
instead of endeavouring to render all farther defence fruitless,
by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have
done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of
the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they
add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of
approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

WELLINGTON.

P.S.--All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the
town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will
be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt
of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles
to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the
best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt
preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy’s way those
persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into
their hands.

SECTION 5.

_Pero Negro, October 28, 1810._

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have
been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are
still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M.
Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall
be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what
steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and
have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of
the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and
punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature: first,
they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon
information that they are absent from their corps without leave;
secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers
in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and,
lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by
the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend
upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard
of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which
the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry
into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them
to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without
leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace
any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for
their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and
to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers
absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of
the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures
without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any
one regiment, and to execute the laws _bonâ fide_ upon the subject;
and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe
that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we
are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large
subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which
those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the
head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people
to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is
placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to
put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be
false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save
their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and
persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the
military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into
execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military
persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be
punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the
innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the
defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of
active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an
additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the
Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the
enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and
a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still,
in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably,
not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial
of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and
soldiers at great inconvenience, for the purpose cannot possibly be
concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit
might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or
number of them. The defect in the administration of the military
law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy
for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by
the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much
better if there was no law for the government of the army than that
the existing laws should continue without being executed.

WELLINGTON.

SECTION 6.

“_October 29, 1810._

“----In answer to lord Wellesley’s queries respecting the Portuguese
Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the
Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power
to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to
dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power
which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They
ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and
their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought
to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or
subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels
of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting
Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of
persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that
it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it
excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any
official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary
evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through
the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and
he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed.
If we should succeed in removing the principal (which _must_ be
done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave
better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no
interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there
is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to
interfere themselves, or that the Prince Recent should interfere,
they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry
them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will
be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be
responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the
part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal
Souza’s detailed instructions for his “_embuscados_” on the left
bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or
somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose
in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in
the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government,
is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to
have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of
that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost because
the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which,
however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom
it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these
persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their
valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country,
every thing which can enable the enemy to remain in the country.
In answer to Mr. de Forjas’ note of the 22d, enclosed in yours,
(without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by
the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are
detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese governors, or its
officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages,
contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are
stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the
carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will
not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon
shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles
required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages
must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in
particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left
to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him,
if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places
above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should
be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to
frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my
entering so particularly into this point.”

“WELLINGTON.”

SECTION 7.

“_Pero Negro, October 31, 1810._

“----I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that
they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps
as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of
the militia. The _ordenanza_ artillery now begin to desert from the
works although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care
of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No.--, of 29th,
is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid
here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of
time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what
they have found in places from which there existed means of removing
every thing, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are
stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they
can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements
which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the
ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may
be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is
brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the
chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!”

“WELLINGTON.”

SECTION 8.

“_Pero Negro, November 1, 1810._

“I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers
to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which
the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would
state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for
not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after
the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency,
conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier,
contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in
the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to
the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army
would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with
me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and
omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of
the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants.
Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed
that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant
of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of
the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of
the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family
to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and
they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them
referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing
that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and
they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing
from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco
he must have been in his present situation long before the order
could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct
was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt
a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the
country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of
the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and
upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that
I was the author of that measure, and the government might have
sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the
government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not
aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the
country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot
agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the
secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in
this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into
complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army
was in that province, and the means of transport were required for
its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to
which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not
an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills
upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered
useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of
maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and
they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In
this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having
a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of
water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many
places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their
property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the
moment the enemy approached its banks; the inhabitants have fled from
their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances,
without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have
left behind them every thing which could be useful to the enemy, and
could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly,
the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their
communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military
body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of
which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be
joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem
and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having
the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for
their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the
difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till
the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may
not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity
of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same
manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the
property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has
been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and
has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they
commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the
enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to
me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an
instruction of the ----, to which I propose to draw the attention of
his royal highness the Prince Regent and of his majesty’s government.
His royal highness and his majesty’s government will then see in what
manner the existing Regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The
additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures
from Mr. Forjas, shew the sense, which the Regency themselves
entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to
the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the
system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal
Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the
capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than
I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the Prince
Regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot
doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know
that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is
not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will
shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore,
they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence
in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed,
they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince,
to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should
neither thwart them by opposition, or render them nugatory by useless
delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction
of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and
I regret that, his royal highness the Prince Regent should have
been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to
the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the
operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that
the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over
any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any
measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as
circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw
the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the
ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the
opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands
a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting
the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not
had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of
the different description of troops in this country; and it would
be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to
marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements.
The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause
of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought
forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not
reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been
attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they
would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment,
which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was
necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune,
and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as
usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred
stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time,
their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering
in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the
nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under
the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a
detachment to the left of the Tagus.”

SECTION 9.

“_December 5, 1810._

“All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles:
First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese
army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la
Foéns, I hold the command of that army independent of the local
government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made
by the governors of the kingdom with the king’s government, when
sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command
the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief
of the British army should direct the general operations of the
combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of
marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the
operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief
of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the
operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it
follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been
separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of
directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was
intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss,
which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and,
undoubtedly, his majesty’s government never intended to give over
the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and
drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to
my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must
prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that
they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by
me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with
the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the
influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with
me the propriety of my military arrangements.”

“WELLINGTON.”

SECTION 10.

“_Cartaxo, January 18, 1811._

“It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the
Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments
which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the
meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated
on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, ‘which
were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the
heart of the kingdom.’ It must be recollected that these discussions
are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed
those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom
his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his
kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in
the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those
in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made,
provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think
it most important that the British government, and the government
of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we
have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption
of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds
for the maintenance of his royal highness’s armies, because a war
may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the
Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered
this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled
from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that
they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two
most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in
which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it
was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence
of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio
Saltar de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was
probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as
that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose
him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could
be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and
that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which
went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he
expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he
recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had
occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided
for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose
consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved
in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of
alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political
system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems
in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made
war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose
government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and
properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the
instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon
his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been
relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in
the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the
independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties
of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty
has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this
nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest,
nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever
forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to
the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously
adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered
in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the
miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with
their sentiments when they expatiate on ‘the inutility of laying
fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other
purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.’ The
patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions
which have principally involved his country in the contest when he
talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third
time, been brought into ‘the heart of the kingdom.’ Although the
Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government
approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810,
according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made
the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence,
or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of
the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the
Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties
and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position in
this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to
our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and
had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have
literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at
this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign
in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have
suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into
discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if
my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have
been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard
that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation
have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had
for its object the deliverance of the whole. The Patriarch may,
however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive
that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the Prince
Regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be
a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under
the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion,
but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in
laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry
on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his
eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of
the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the
resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and
systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be
able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are
concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of
transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently
in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense
of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army,
including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable
them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty.
The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have
known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have
been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the
provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise
occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the
armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the
necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become
more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should
annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then
to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to
decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in
any manner. By desiring his majesty and the Prince Regent to remove
me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour
to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the
duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of
the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the
contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up
the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and
properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is
in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon,
on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by
refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the
funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I
request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency,
and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the
Prince Regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I
have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives
either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration
of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the
independence of his country.”

“WELLINGTON.”

* * * * *

No. VI.

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF
WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

SECTION 1.

“_Seville, August 4th, 1810._

“Par une décision de l’Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S.
M. détermine qu’à compter du 1^{er} Janvier toutes les dépenses
d’administration générale du Genie et de l’artillerie seraient au
compte du gouvenement Espagnol; aussitôt que j’en fus instruit
je sollicitai S. M. C. d’assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je
ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore le
Roi entendait il que les payements ne remontassent qu’au mois
de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n’ai
cessé d’en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l’Intendant
Général; nos demandes n’ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir
autant que possible la différence j’ai du avoir recours aux recettes
extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols.
J’espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques
sommes. L’état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvremens
qui out été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel
à l’époque du 1^{er} Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000
f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour
au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses
d’administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J’avais
fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l’Intendant Général des
Valeurs pour plus d’un million qui devait servir à payer une partie
de l’armée. Mr. l’Intendant Général justifie de l’emploi de toutes
ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C.
n’admettent pas les comptes que je présente; d’abord ils ne veulent
pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée a l’article
des dépenses d’administration générale, s’appuyant sur ce sujet sur
la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu’au
mois de Fevrier, quoique l’empereur ait expressement entendu que le
mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non
plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent
en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. Il
n’est pas dans mon pouvoir d’admettre leurs motifs, la décision
de l’empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation
délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m’obligera de pourvoir aux
besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes
qui ont eu lieu en Andalusie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de
l’artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l’administration
générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu’on ait absolument
rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j’ai en même temps pu faire payer
trois mois de solde à l’armée, c’est sans doute bien peu quand il
est du 8 à 10 mois d’arrière à la troupe et que l’insuffisance des
moyens oblige à augmenter encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien
je crois qu’il m’était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle
même convaincue si elle veut s’arrêter un moment sur l’apperçu que
je vais lui donner des charges que l’Andalusie supporte. On consomme
tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations
de fourrage; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de
Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l’Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel
on a construit un grand camp retranché; tous les châteaux sur les
bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu’à Fuengirola, le château
d’Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d’Olbera
et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de
Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de
l’Estremadura qu’on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses
que les travaux devant Cadiz et la construction d’une flottille
occasionment. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique
d’armes, laquelle jusqu’à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite
sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la
fonderie et l’arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers
sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et
d’affûts. J’ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait
exploiter toutes les nitrières de l’Andalusie, à présent on compte
aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu’aux
bombes de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit
les affûts nécessaires pour l’armement des batteries devant Cadiz.
On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d’habillement
dont la troupe a profité. J’ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules
qui out été données à l’artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au
Génie. J’ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de
montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets
et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d’armée. La totalité de
ces dépenses ainsi qu’une infinité d’autres dont je ne fais pas
l’énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays
les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des
recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu’il y a possibilité
dont l’application a lieu en faveur de l’administration générale
de l’armée, du Genie, de l’artillerie, des états majors, des frais
de courses et des dépenses secrettes. Ces charges sont immenses et
jamais le pays n’aurait pu les supporter si nous n’étions parvenus à
mettre de l’ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et
consommations; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être
même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire; c’est au point
que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire
venir du bled des autres provinces, le produit de l’Andalusie
étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de
l’armée. Cependant S.M.C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement
instruits de cette situation ont voulu attirer à Madrid les revenues
de l’Andalusie: je dis les revenues car leurs demandes dépassaient
les recettes; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence
aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me suis trouvé dans
l’obligation de m’opposer ouvertement à l’effet de cette mesure dont
l’exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l’armée,
mais occasionné peut être, des mouvemens séditieux; d’ailleurs il
y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j’ai l’honneur
de mettre sous les yeux de V.A. extrait d’une lettre que j’eus
l’honneur d’écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que
j’adressai à Monsieur le marquis d’Almenara, ministre des finances,
le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait
l’état désespérant des finances de S.M.C. Je supplie avec instance
V.A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du
présent rapport à S.M. l’empereur.

“J’aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s’est
fait en Andalousie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus;
mais j’ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails
se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur
l’intendant général sur l’administration. Cependant d’après ce que
j’ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives
et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l’état de ses troupes et
des embarras de ma situation: elle est telle aujourd’hui que je
dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S.M. au nom même de son
service de daigner la prendre en considération: j’ai des devoirs
à remplir dont je sais toute l’étendue, je m’y livre sans réserve
mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où
je me trouve je puisse la soutenir; en effet j’ai à combattre des
prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec
ceux de l’armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l’empereur; je suis
forcé par mes propres devoirs de m’opposer à l’exécution des divers
ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J’ai aussi
constamment à lutter contre l’amour propre des chefs militaires,
que souvent peuvent différer d’opinion avec moi et naturellement
prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations
me font regarder la tâche qui m’est imposée comme au dessus de
mes forces et me portent à désirer que S.M. l’empereur daigne me
faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et
mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l’Espagne, un chef
plus capable que moi d’en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai
seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de
l’empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont
dans le midi de l’Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu’aux deux mers suivent
le même système d’opérations, et soyent par conséquent commandés
par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l’empereur,
et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui
serait fait opposition d’une manière quelconque, il puisse se
conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué;
tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionera
inévitablement des désagréments qu’on peut autrement éviter.”

“J’ai l’honneur, &c.
“(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.”

SECTION 2.

_Intercepted Letter from marshal Mortier to the emperor, 13th July,
1810._

SIRE,

L’état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie,
major général, a pris l’initiative de tous les movemens même le
plus minutieux de 5^{eme} corps rend ici ma presence tout à fait
inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d’excellentes troupes
animées du meilleur esprit, disseminées dans toute l’Andalusie et
perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni résultat. Dans
cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra des
me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s’il ne juge pas à
propos de m’accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que
reclame ma santé à la suite d’une maladie grave dont je suis à peine
convalescent.

J’ai l’honneur, &c. &c.
LE MARESCHAL DUC DE TRÉVISE.

* * * * *

No. VII.

SECTION 1.

_Extract from an intercepted despatch of Massena, dated July 10,
1810._

“Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to lord Wellington’s
head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his Lines.”

_General P. Boyer to S. Swartz, July 8._

“We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its
position and works, and which has been attacked with but little
method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons,
does not move: we compose the corps of observation; we are on the
look out for them.”

SECTION 2.

_Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet, premier aide-de-camp du
maréchal prince d’Essling._

“1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.--Le capitaine du génie Boucherat
arrive du 2^e corps; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807.
Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à
Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu’il en a dressé.
Il prétend ces routes très difficiles; les rivières très encaissées,
et inabordable sur les deux rives du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d’eau,
doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien
difficiles, et en certains endroits il n’y a pas plus de 20 toises
de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos;) mais la
rivière n’est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La
route d’Idanha, Castelbranco, &c. mauvaise, cependant non absolument
impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux,
profond jusqu’à Abrantés * * * * Au dessous de cette ville, ou
plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage
s’élargit; il n’y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout
est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines
peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres
à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu’à la mer pour celles de
Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute
les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les
directions. J’ai fait copier cet itinéraire.”

“1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.--Causé avec le général Loison des
position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince.”

“1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l’ennemi se retranche à
Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de
Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d’après de
bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais
copier.”

SECTION 3.

_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling. Sur la hauteur en arrière
de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½._

J’ai l’honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir
du général Reynier et copie d’une réponse.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du général Reynier
adressée à votre excellence.

Je vous renouvelle, prince, l’assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Elchingen. St. Antonio, le 26
Septembre, à 8 heure du matin._

Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on apperçoit sur le Serra au
delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte
et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s’est
éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon
et un détachement d’infantrie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de
tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s’étend depuis le chemin qui monte du
village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du
6^e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6^e
corps; mais comme on ne les apperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger
de leur nombre.

On ne peut deviner s’il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d’après
l’organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et qui
a des pentes rapides de chaque côte il ne doit pas avoir de terrain
pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me parait une
arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des
dispositions pour l’attaquer avec succès. J’attends des nouvelles
de ce que l’ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si
vous jugez que c’est une arrière garde et que vous l’attaquiez,
j’attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d’attendre les ordres
de Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, j’attendrai aussi, comme
je pense qu’il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire
parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.

J’ai l’honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le maréchal, d’agréer
l’hommage de mon respect.

(Signé) REYNIER.

_A Monsieur le Général Reynier. Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira,
le 26 Septembre 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin._

Je reçois à l’instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour.
Je pense qu’une grande partie de l’armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé
la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de
Moira. Un paysan dit qu’il existe de l’autre côté de ces montagnes
une plaine assez belle d’une demi-lieue d’étendue, et très garnie
d’Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l’ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble
diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d’Oporto; cependant
il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le
couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12^{ne} de pièces
d’artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce courent.

J’ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au prince d’Essling pour
lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu’il serait nécessaire
qu’il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j’avais le commandement,
j’attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher
général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant
sur la droite de l’ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car
c’est véritablement par ce point qu’il faudrait le forcer à faire sa
retraite.

Je vous renouvelle, &c.
(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D’ELCHINGEN.

SECTION 4.

_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée
de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Décembre, 1810._

Monsieur le prince d’Essling, le général Foy que vous avez expédié
est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté
et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s’est passé et votre situation.

Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d’Almeida avec
un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le compte d’Erlon avec les divisions
Claparede, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda
vers le 20 Novembre.

L’Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez
établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le Zézère,
défendu sur les deux rives pas de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté
pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous
occupez devant l’ennemi; qu’Abrantés se trouvant à 800 toises du
Tage, vous l’aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le
siège. L’Empereur vous recommande d’établir deux ponts sur le Zézère,
de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux du
Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d’opérations et de communications
devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère,
passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et
Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera
pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau l’ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs
fois au duc de Dalmatie, d’envoyer le 5^{me} corps sur le Tage
entre Montalveo et Villaflor, pour faire sa jonction avec vous.
L’Empereur croit qu’il serait nécessaire de s’emparer d’Alcantara,
de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le
Tage, d’assurer toutes vos communications en saississant les points
favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites
positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes,
soient à l’abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d’Essling, l’avantage de
régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de
la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher
sur lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour
l’obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou
enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure
de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier,
en vous occupant d’organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos
communications avec Madrid et Almeyda.

L’armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur
Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas
difficiles.

Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée
sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de
Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui,
indépendamment d’une consommation énorme d’hommes et d’argent, se
trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours
une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut
donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la
position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde;
ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même
de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles
de Portugal, parvenues par la voie de l’Angleterre, datées du 12
Novembre.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 5.

_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée
de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810._

Je vous expédie, Prince, le général Foy que l’Empereur a nommé
général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous y verrez que
nous apprenons par les nouvelles d’Angleterre qu’au 1 Décembre, vous
vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem.

L’Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez
constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le
Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations
militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de
leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles
des journaux Anglais, il parait qu’il y a beaucoup de malades dans
leur armée, ils ne comptent que -------- 27 à 28 mille hommes sous
les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et
l’artillerie. La situation de l’armée Anglaise en Portugal tient
Londres dans une angoise continuelle, et l’Empereur regarde comme un
grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de
leur faire perdre du monde dans des affaires d’avant-gardes, jusqu’à
ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je
réitère encore au maréchal duc de Trévise l’ordre de marcher sur le
Tage avec le 5^{me} corps.

Le comte d’Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad-Rodrigo, va profiter
de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l’offensive et
battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos
communications et sur vos flancs.

Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos
opérations la plus naturelle parait devoir être par la rive gauche de
cette rivière.

Le général Foy, à qui l’Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera plus
de détails.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 6.

_A Monsieur le maréchal d’Essling, Commandant-en-chef, l’armée de
Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811._

Je vous préviens, Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de
ce mois, l’Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l’Espagne, dont le
commandement est confié à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie qui va
établir son quartier général à Burgos.

L’arrondissement de l’armée du Nord de l’Espagne est composé:--

1º. De la Navarre formant le 3^e governement de l’Espagne.

2º. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander,
formant le 4^e gouvernement.

3º. De la province des Asturies.

4º. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e
gouvernement.

5º. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et
Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement.

6º. De la province de Salamanque.

Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes
Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de
l’arrondissement des armées du centre et de l’Arragon.

Cette disposition en centralisant le pourvoir, va donner de
l’ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d’activité aux opérations
dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l’Espagne; et Monsieur le
maréchal duc d’Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les
communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.

Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le maréchal duc
d’Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service.

D’après les ordres de l’Empereur je préviens Monsieur le duc
d’Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer
l’armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours; je le préviens aussi
que le 9^{me} corps d’armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce
corps rentrerait en Espagne.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 7.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811._

Vous verrez par le moniteur d’hier, Monsieur le duc de Dalmatie, que
les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l’année dernière dans
la même position. L’Empereur me charge de vous renouveller l’ordre
de vous porter au secours du prince d’Essling, qui est toujours
à Santarem; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que
les eaux soient diminuées pour en jetter un sur le Tage. Il parait
certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord,
c’est-à-dire, par Almeyda.

L’Empereur _espère que le prince d’Essling aura jetté un pont sur le
Tage_; ce que lui donnera des vivres.

Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupé
par le corps du général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé
entre nos mains, comme l’a fait la place de Tortose; alors Sa Majesté
_pense que le_ 5^{me} corps et une partie _du_ 4^{me} pourront-se
porter au _secours_ du prince d’Essling.

Le Major Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 8.

_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811._

Je vous préviens, prince, que Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie
s’est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 9^{me}
corps d’armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour
se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes
ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz; je mande au duc de
Dalmatie qu’après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans
perdre de tems sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous
donner les moyens d’assiéger et de prendre Abrantés.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 9.

_Au Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général, Paris, le 6
Fevrier, 1811._

Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d’aujourd’hui
au duc de Dalmatie, au duc de Trévise, au général Belliard, au duc
d’Istrie, aux commandans de Cuidad Rodrigo et d’Almeida, aux général
Thiébaut, et aux généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au
duc d’Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu’il y
trouvera les dernières nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du
13; que tout parait prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz
a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de _Dalmatie a pû se
porter sur le Tage, et faciliter l’établissement du pont au prince
d’Essling_; qu’il devient donc très important de faire toutes les
dispositions que j’ai ordonnées afin que le général Drouet avec ses
deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du prince
d’Essling. Ecrivez en même tems au duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire
connaître la situation du duc d’Istrie, et lui réitérer l’ordre _de
favoriser le prince d’Essling_ pour son possage du Tage; que j’espère
que Badajoz aura été prix dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le
20 _Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage_, avec le prince
d’Essling; qu’il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du
4^{me} corps; _qu’enfin tout est sur le Tage._ Sur ce je prie Dieu,
mon cousin, qu’il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.

(Signé) NAPOLEON.

P.S. Je vous renvoie votre lettre au duc d’Istrie, faites le partir.

SECTION 10.

_A Monsieur le maréchal prince d’Essling, commandant-en-chef l’armée
de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février_, 1811.

Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les
dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu’au
13 Janvier, et annoncent _que tout prend une tournure avantageuse.
Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est
probable, le duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur
le Tage, et vous faciliter l’établissement d’un pont._ Je lui en
ai donné et je lui en réitère l’ordre; l’Empereur espère que la
_jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous
sur le Tage_.

Les deux divisions d’infanterie du corps du général Drouet, vout
rester entièrement à votre disposition d’après les ordres que je
donne à Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, commandant en chef l’armée
du nord de l’Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général
à Valladolid, d’établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la
province de Salamanque afin d’assurer d’une manière journalière
sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Cuidad Rodrigo et
Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui
pourront parvenir à l’armée de Portugal.

Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6,000 hommes
qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo
et d’Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda,
empêcher qu’il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du
9^{me} corps et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette
frontière du Portugal.

De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d’où
elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle
se trouvera d’ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant
les circonstances.

De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle
sera en mesure d’appuyer la première et de réunir le reste de la
garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.

Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d’infanterie du
9^{me} corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec ce
secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtems la position que vous
occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d’agir
comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur
le nord de l’Espagne, puisque le duc d’Istrie sera à portée de
marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des
circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.

Dès que le duc d’Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra
un officier au général Drouet, pour l’en instruire et lui faire
connoître qu’il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.

Le général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec
4 bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre.

Le Prince de Wagram et d’Neuchâtel,
Major Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 11.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811._

Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du
Portugal, l’armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné; et avec
toute ma volonté et la patience de l’armée, je crains de n’y pouvoir
tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne.

J’écris à Mr. le Cte. d’Erlon pour qu’il fasse approvisionner Almeyda
et Rodrigo; ces deux places n’auraient jamais dû cesser d’avoir pour
3 mois de vivres aux quels ou n’aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun
prétexte; et ma surprise est extrême d’apprendre qu’il n’y a que
pour 10 jours de vivres à Almeyda. Je lui écris aussi de prendre une
position entre Rodrigo et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions; vous
sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu’il se place à portée de marcher
au secours d’Almeyda.

Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières
d’Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l’ai dit, je ne vois
guère la possibilité d’y rester....

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 12.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811._

Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l’armée occupe ne pouvant en aucune
manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer
en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et
l’itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d’armée....

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 13.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811._

Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l’armée sur Ciudad
Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain; et je
suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnments de Rodrigo
200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d’ordonner de
remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et
Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j’ai
eu soin de vous faire connaître. J’espère que vous aurez bien voulu
faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d’y faire préparer
des vivres, seul moyen d’y faire maintenir l’ordre.

Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l’ennemi ne
s’approcherait pas des places.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 14.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811._

Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante;
les places appellent des secours; je ne reçois pas de réponses de
vous à aucune de mes demandes; et si cet état de chose se prolonge,
je serai forcé de faire prendre à l’armée des cantonnements où elle
puisse vivre, et d’abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de
défendre et encore bien moins d’approvisionner, mes troupes manquant
absolument de vivres.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 15.

_A Monsieur le maréchal due d’Istrie, Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811._

Le general Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, ainsi
que les deux aides-de-camp du maréchal prince d’Essling, le capitaine
Porcher, et le chef d’escadron Pelet. Il parait que le prince
d’Essling avec son corps d’armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte,
et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid et
l’Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s’établir facilement avec
l’armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu’on ne prévoit pas,
le prince d’Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l’armée Anglaise,
l’empereur pense que _vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15ne. de
milles hommes_. L’armée du centre doit avoir poussé un corps sur
Alcantara. L’armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà
fait partir, et d’après le prince d’Essling, elle va se trouver assez
forte pour ne rien craindre de l’ennemi....

(Le reste est sans intérêt.)

Le Major Général,
(Signé) ALEXANDRE.

SECTION 16.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811._

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Le général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le
général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me
rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise
ont pris position aux environs d’Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait
encore des vivres pour une 20^{ne} de jours, et que les Anglais et
les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des
dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler
cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher maréchal,
de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l’armée de
Portugal n’étant en état de rendre aucun service; je vous demande de
plus une division d’infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou
le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir
de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi, s’il nous attend dans
ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de
faire faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à
celles de l’armée de Portugal pour attaquer l’ennemi; si on ne peut
leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l’eau de
vie à la suite de l’armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces
d’artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d’état
de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l’ennemi ne soit déposté
et chassé hors des frontières de l’Espagne et au delà de la Coa.
Mon cher maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour; je suis sans le sol,
vous pouvez tout; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l’eau de
vie, du pain et de l’orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrons
manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de
marcher au secours d’Almeyda. C’est à vous à donner vos ordres; et
vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui
sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 17.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811._

MON CHER MARECHAL,

J’ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi
s’évanouissent donc dans le moment où j’en ai besoin, ravitailler
Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1^{re} opération et la seule qui peut
nous donner la faculté de rendre l’armée de Portugal disponible,
lorsqu’on n’aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y
jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs
colonnes mobiles; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie; on
peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l’armée d’Andalousie. Mais ne
serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres,
en présence de deux maréchaux de l’Empire? Je vous ai déjà prévenu
de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l’impossibilité où se trouvent les
chevaux d’artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que
je dois envoyer le 9^{me} corps en Andalousie; je voulais aussi le
faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez
vous, mon cher maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m’envoyer de la
cavalerie et des attelages d’artillerie? Si vous voulez garder votre
matériel? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement
le 26? et vous paraissez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma
part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à
la guerre est beaucoup; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses
qu’on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions; c’était
pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importans occupés par les corps
d’armée; mais de la cavalerie et de l’artillerie sont un secours
dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher
maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages
d’artillerie à marches forcées. Réflechissez qu’une fois les places
réapprovisionnées, je pourrai disposer des ⅔ de l’armée, et que cette
opération passe avant tout.

En m’offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous
aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher maréchal y comprendre ceux
nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.

(Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 18.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811._

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l’armée sera réunie
le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d’Almeida est du plus haut
intérêt pour les armes de S. M; et il eut été bien à désirer que
les secours que j’ai en l’honneur de vous demander nous eussent été
envoyés. L’ennemi parait avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de
cette place. Vous dire que je n’aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800
hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l’armée, c’est
vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m’eut
été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et
pour la tranquillité du nord de l’Espagne. Je n’ai pas ménagé mes
instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n’étaient pas heureux; votre
dévouement pour le service de l’Empereur, vous ferait certainement
regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous
m’aviez fait espérer, avant que j’en eusse besoin.

(Signé.) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 19.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc d’Istrie, Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811._

MON CHER MARECHAL,

Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que
vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me
dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et
que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle
que je reçois à l’instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et
votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière
de Salamanque; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini; et
vous me témoignez vos regrèts de n’avoir pû y coopérer. Convenez,
mon cher maréchal, que si l’armée de Portugal recevait un échec,
vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de
l’artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la
cavalerie; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande.
Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille.
Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu’il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la
défense et de l’approvisionnement des places d’Almeida et de Rodrigo.
Je n’aurais pas mieux demandé que d’employer l’armée de Portugal sous
me ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l’armée du
midi; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J’ignore quelle pourra
être l’issue de ce mouvement; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la
journée de demain, votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient
toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après
demain 1er Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans
s’arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n’aurez pas
manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces
ressources comme beaucoup d’autres, arrivent à Rodrigo; cette place
n’aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d’ici, il faudra que
des convois considerables y soient envoyés.

(Signé) LE PRINCE D’ESSLING.

SECTION 20.

_A Monsieur le maréchal duc de Raguse, Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811._

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,

Vous trouverez ci-joint l’ordre de l’Empereur qui vous donne le
commandement de l’armée de Portugal. Je donne l’ordre au maréchal
prince d’Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée.
Saisissez les rènes d’une main ferme; faites dans l’armée les
changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L’intention de l’Empereur
est que le duc d’Abrantes et le général Reynier restent sous vos
ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses
généraux, pour être persuadé qu’ils vous seconderont de tous leurs
moyens.

L’Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le duc de Raguse, que le prince
d’Essling en quittant l’armée n’emmène avec lui que son fils et un de
ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d’état-major, le général Fririon,
le colonel Pelet, ses autre aides-de-camp, tous le officiers de son
état-major doivent rester avec vous.

Toutefois, Monsieur le duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une
confiance entière.

Le Major Général, &c.
(Signé.) ALEXANDRE.

* * * * *

No. VIII.

_Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison,
Rue S. Jean, à Monsieur le Général Trant, Gouverneur de le Ville et
Province d’Oporto._

MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,

Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la
maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu’il vous a désirerait
vous offrir individuellement l’expression de sa reconnoissance. C’est
nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur
organes et nous sommes d’autant plus flattés de cette commission
agréable qu’il n’y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier
n’ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter
que vous agréerez favorablement ce foible témoignage de notre
gratitude et les sincères remerciments que nous venons vous présenter
pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n’est pas
sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ,
mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que
votre solicitude s’étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant
votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets.

Ce n’est pas, monsieur le général, d’après l’étendue de notre lettre
qu’il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnoissance; nous sommes mieux
en état de sentir que d’éxprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque
des circonstances plus heureuses nous rameneront vers notre patrie,
nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître
la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous
êtes donnés pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la
continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d’agréer
l’assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles
nous avons l’honneur d’être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et
très obeissants serviteurs,

Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre.

FALLOT,
Docteur médecin des armées Françaises attaché au
grand quartier général de l’armée de Portugal.

Le colonel sous inspecteur au revues des troupes Françaises,

CATELOT.
H. DELAHAYE,
C^{om.} de la marine.

* * * * *

No. IX.

SECTION 1.

_Letter from lieut.-general Graham to the right honourable Henry
Wellesley, Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811._

SIR,

You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy
for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which
you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by
the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late
expedition.

But a copy of a printed statement of general La Peña having been
shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of
the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes
indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.

Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of
Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with
a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other
observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much
unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.

Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most
anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in
an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but
when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations
to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the
4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near
Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent
forward with a proper escort.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those
frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the
way occasioned.

When the British division began its march from the position of
Barrosa to that of Bermeja, _I left the general on the Barrosa
height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it_; and, when
I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to
support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to
be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack,
which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be,
and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was
not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army.
The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were
given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish
army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this
unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy
expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon
guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division,
brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their
utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.

Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery,
been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to
envelop the enemy’s left; had the greatest part of the infantry been
marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what
success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The
enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning
any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed
himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered,
his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general
dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close
pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would
have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana.
This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour’s ride of the
scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing,
_and nothing was done!_ Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form
any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it
was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it
was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British
division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of
its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to
justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in
the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition?
I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself
and the British division under the direction of the Spanish
commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I
should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to
risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But
I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from
what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous
co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the
troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success
of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost
efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise,
_had we been supported as we had a right to expect_?

There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have
relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa,
to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was
within our grasp as it were.

The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are
universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty
and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever
be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.

I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at
head-quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention
to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was _that the
opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was
lost_; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no
risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.

In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed
in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper
to remark on the report published relative to the enemy’s number at
St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat’s division,) that, by the concurrent
testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat’s division
had charge of the whole line,--what, then, must be the strength of
that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order
to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been
disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the
reports of various officers of this division.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.
(Signed) THO^S. GRAHAM,
Lt.-General.

P.S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having
spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending
for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a
very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish
troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the
difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.

With this I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of
Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my
judgement, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by
making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmeja position,
while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.

SECTION 2.

_Adjutant-general’s state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under
the command of the lieut.-general Graham, 25th Feb. 1810._

Number of
Designations. bayonets. Commanders.

Two squadrons of 2d } ” Major Busche.
German Hussars. }

Detachment of artillery. Major Duncan. 10 guns

Detachment of engineers 47 Captain Birch.

Brigade of guards, reinforced }
by a detachment } 1221 Brigadier-gen. Dilke.
of the 2d battalion 95th }
rifles }

1st battalion 28th foot; }
2d battalion 67th; 2d }
battalion 87th; reinforced } 1764 Colonel Wheatley.
with 2 companies }
of the 20th Portuguese }

Flank battalion composed }
of detachments of the }
3d battalion 95th rifles } 594 Lt.-col. A. Barnard,
and two companies of } 95th regt.
the 47th foot }

Two companies of 2d battalion }
9th regt.; two }
companies of 1st battalion } 475 Lt.-col. Brown, 28th regt.
28th regt.; two }
companies of 2d battalion }
82 regt. }

One Company of the royal } 33 Lieutenant Reid.
staff corps }
----
Total number of bayonets 4114
The hussars were about 180
----
Total of sabres and bayonets 4294, with 10 guns.

SECTION 3.

_Extract from a letter of general Frederick Ponsonby._

“I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the
Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army.
We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly
abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from
it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was
gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the
French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if
we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry
would not have returned to their camp.”

SECTION 4.--STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.

(Part 1 of 3)

[A] Genereaux de Brigade.
[B] Colonels.
[C] Chefs de Bt. ou Escadron.
[D] Capitaines.
[E] Lieutenants.
[F] Sous Lieutenants.
[G] Sous Officiers et Soldats.
[H] Total.

(Part 1 of 3)

----------------------------+-----------------------------------++
| ||
| Tués. ||
| ||
+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++
| | | | | | | | ||
|[A]|[B]|[C]|[D]|[E]|[F]| [G] | [H] ||
| | | | | | | | ||
----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++
St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | | | 3 | 3 ||
{Etat Major | | | | | | | | ||
{ {Etat Major | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 2 ||
{ {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 14 | 15 ||
{ 1 {24 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | | 33 | 35 ||
{ {96 Ligne | | 1 | | 1 | | | 39 | 41 ||
{ {1 Br. Elite | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 ||
{ {Etat Major | | | | | | | | ||
{ {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | | | 7 | 8 ||
5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 63 | 74 ||
{ {54 Ligne | | | 1 | 2 | | | 26 | 29 ||
{ {Etat Major | | | | | | | | ||
{ {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | | 1 | | 20 | 21 ||
{ 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | 1 | | 9 | 10 ||
{ {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 1 | 1 ||
{ {1 Regt. | | | | | | | 2 | 2 ||
{Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 3 | 3 ||
{ {Artillerie | | | | | | | 16 | 16 ||
Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 10 | 10 ||
{Artillerie| | | | 1 | | | | 1 ||
Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 ||
8 Dr. {95 | | | | | | | 4 | 4 ||
+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++
| 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 ||
----------------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++

(Part 2 of 3)

----------------------------+----------------------------------------++
| ||
| Blessés. ||
| ||
+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++
| | | | | | | | ||
|[A]|[B]|[C]| [D]| [E]| [F]| [G] | [H] ||
| | | | | | | | ||
----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++
St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 32 | 37 ||
{Etat Major | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 3 ||
{ {Etat Major | | | | | | | | ||
{ {9 Infr. Ligne| | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 70 | 74 ||
{ 1 {24 Ligne | | 1 | | 4 | 2 | | 214 | 221 ||
{ {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | 199 | 205 ||
{ {1 Br. Elite | | | | 2 | | 3 | 136 | 141 ||
{ {Etat Major | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 2 ||
{ {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 44 | 44 ||
5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | 2 | 6 | 3 | 622 | 633 ||
{ {54 Ligne | | | | 4 | 5 | 1 | 284 | 294 ||
{ {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | | | 1 ||
{ {27 Infr. Ligne| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 150 | 157 ||
{ 3 {94 Ligne | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 49 | 52 ||
{ {95 Ligne | | | | | | | 32 | 32 ||
{ {1 Regt. | | | | 3 | 1 | 2 | 30 | 36 ||
{Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | | | 12 | 12 ||
{ {Artillerie | | | | | 3 | | 31 | 34 ||
Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | | | | 43 | 43 ||
{Artillerie| | | | | | | 2 | 2 ||
Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | | 29 | 29 ||
8 Dr. {95 | | | 1 | | | | 18 | 19 ||
+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++
| 1 | 3 | 5 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 1997 | 2008 ||
----------------------------+---+---+---+----+----+----+------+------++

(Part 3 of 3)

----------------------------+---------------------------++-------
| ||
| Restes sus les Champ ||
| grièvement Blessés ||
+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++-------
| | | | | | ||
|[A]|[B]|[D]|[F]| [G] | [H] || Total
| | | | | | ||General
----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++-------
St. Petri, 4 {95 de Ligne| | | | | 5 | 5 || 42
{Etat Major | | | | | | || 3
{ {Etat Major | 1 | | | | | 1 || 3
{ {9 Infr. Ligne| | | | 1 | 18 | 19 || 108
{ 1 {24 Ligne | | | 2 | 1 | 21 | 24 || 280
{ {96 Ligne | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 || 249
{ {1 Br. Elite | | | 1 | | 59 | 60 || 203
{ {Etat Major | | | | | | || 2
{ {45 Ligne | | | | | 3 | 3 || 55
5 Mars{ 2 {8 Ligne | | | | | 19 | 19 || 726
{ {54 Ligne | | | | | | || 323
{ {Etat Major | | | | | | || 1
{ {27 Infr. Ligne| | | | 2 | 21 | 23 || 201
{ 3 {94 Ligne | | | | | | || 62
{ {95 Ligne | | | | | 1 | 1 || 34
{ {1 Regt. | | | 1 | | 3 | 4 || 42
{Dragoons {2 Regt. | | | | | 4 | 4 || 19
{ {Artillerie | | 1 | | | | 1 || 51
Puerta St. Maria {45 Ligne | | | | 1 | 27 | 28 || 81
{Artillerie| | | | | 6 | 6 || 9
Medina, 9 Mars, {94 | | | | | | || 33
8 Dr. {95 | | | | | 1 | 1 || 24
+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++-------
| 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 180 | 202 || 2551
----------------------------+---+---+---+---+-----+-----++-------

Certified copy by Count GAZAN.

Total 2551

_Note by the Editor._--
Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri 45
” ” at Puerta Santa Maria. 81
” ” at Medina 64
----
190
----
Remains loss at Barrosa 2361

SECTION 5.

_Intercepted papers of colonel Lejeune._

ORDRE.

Il est ordonné à Monsieur le colonel baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C.
de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et
parcourir l’Andalousie et l’Estramadure.

Monsieur le colonel le Jeune se rendra d’abord à Grenade auprès de
Monsieur le général Sebastiani, commandant du 4^{me} corps d’armée,
et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent.

De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadiz, et
verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son
retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l’Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune
remettra à Monsieur le maréchal duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui
lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadiz, soit partout où
il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5^{me} corps d’armée commandé par
Monsieur le maréchal duc de Trévise en Estremadure: le corps doit
être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage.

Monsieur le Jeune prendra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et
de celle des troupes de l’armée du centre commandée par le général
---- qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en
communication avec l’armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles
que l’on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté.

Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour
pouvoir réprondre à toutes les questions de l’Empereur, sur la
situation des choses en Andalousie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure,
d’où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission.

LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHATEL,
Major-général.

_Paris, le 14 Février, 1811._

SECTION 6.

_Extracts from Lejeune’s reports._

CADIZ.

“Montagnes de Ronda foyer d’insurrection entre le 4^{me} corps et le
premier.”

“Les obusiers à la villantrois portent à 2560 toises: l’obus doit
peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre: on charge
l’obusier à poudre d’un ⅓ du poids de l’obus pour obtenir cette
distance. Il n’y en a que le 4 en batterie: à la redoute Napoleon on
en a 12 en fondus: mais il manque de projectilles et de la poudre en
suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n’éclatent pas en ville.”

“Le pont de St. Pestri a été traversé le jour de l’affaire par un
sergent du 24^{me} qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l’on a pris.
Le moment eut été favorable pour s’emparer de l’Isle.”

“Le duc de Bellune bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner: bon
général mais voyant les choses trop en noir.”

SECTION 7.

_Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811._

MON CHER GENERAL,

Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en
état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le réçit que j’ai eu
l’honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois.

L’une des choses qui mérite d’abord de fixer votre attention, est la
composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup
assaillis. J’ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles
était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que
de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette
flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain
sans aucun accident. Il parait que les Anglais en réunissant les
garnisons d’Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes
venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit
corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le général
Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l’avant garde
de l’expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de
10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et
de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer
le 5. Il parait que Monsieur le maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que
tard de la vraie direction prise par l’armée ennemie. Il arriva à
Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de
la 1^e et 2^{de} division: le plan d’opérations auquel il s’arrêta
fut d’envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de
cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver
l’ennemi, de lui résister foiblement pour l’engager à suivre notre
mouvement de retraite et de l’attirer ainsi sous la position St.
Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation
extrêmement desavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le
maréchal Victor s’était lui-même porté avec la 1^{re} et 2^{de}
division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la
Torre Barrosa avec l’intention de couper à l’ennemi la retraite des
montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l’armée, qui finissait de
se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui
se rencontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les
Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et
dans l’impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et
attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos
deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes.

Cependant Monsieur le maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la
victoire qu’avant d’attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient
à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Conil, pour ramasser le reste
des trainards; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu’ils
pouvaient rencontrer.

Le projet d’attirer l’ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n’avait pas mieux
réussi du côté de la division Villatte; car si cette division fut
d’abord assaillie par presque toute l’armée combinée, les généraux
Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur le maréchal
les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes
sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d’Almanza, et
là, naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n’eurent à
garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on
pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que des
le commencement de l’action, nos lignes de St. Petri, n’étant pas
défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes
fraiches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la
division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du Moulin d’Almanza
laissèrent au reste de l’armée combinée la liberté de se retourner
tout entière contre l’attaque de Monsieur le maréchal Victor. Ainsi
se termina la battaille du 5, l’ennemi coucha sur son champ de
battaille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur
retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le général Rufin
que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été
porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux jours de léthargie, il
a donné signes de vie; on dit qu’il va mieux.

La perte de l’ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais,
et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup
des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les généraux _Grâm_ et
Stuart ainsi que le général Peña blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour
nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous
être très funeste; mais l’ennemi se contenta d’occuper avec 2000
hommes, le fort de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment
abandonnés; la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations
d’attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700
hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui
fût sommé de se rendre; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier
Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu’il allait
prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la
porte. Elles courent faire une action d’éclat en brulant et réduisant
la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n’était point gardée; enchantés
de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s’attendait bien
à être attaqués le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en
conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea
mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils
furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Réal avec
la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1^{re} division à St. Marie
pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le
5^{me} regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina
à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance; il y rencontra une poste de
cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya
de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y
envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l’évacuèrent sans opposer de
résistance.

Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St.
Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits
6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils manquaient,
quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces approvisionnements,
en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne;
les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l’affaire du 2 Mars, ont
détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié
leur pont de Radeaux, des ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme
avant les hostilités.

_Du 21 Mars, 1811._

Il est surprenant que l’armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le
5, bien plus surprenant encore qu’elle ne nous ait point attaqués le
6 au matin; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d’abord
que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais,
qui ont eu un grand nombre d’officiers et même leurs généraux
mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n’ont pas osé venir seuls nous
attaquer. Le général _Grâm_ voulait cependant les y contraindre le
lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traité de lâches,
de gens indignes d’être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu’ils feraient
une sortie de la Isla si l’on voulait mettre le tiers d’Anglais
ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d’Espagnols, le général Anglais
a répondu qu’il n’exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des
troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais
et Portugais de se retirer.

A Cadiz ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il parait même que le lendemain
les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être
à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le général
_Grâm_, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois
officiers des moins blessés, n’a pas dissimulé qu’il les chargeaint
d’exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier
de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans
bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n’est pas vrai, au moins
sommes nous certains qu’une grande mésintelligence règne entre les
Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé
une sortie de la Carraca mais sans succès; ils s’y prennent un peu
tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font
semblant d’embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n’agissent pas
et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques
bataillons du 4^{me} corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont
aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que
M. le maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant
Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux.

LEGENTIL.

Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j’écris de mon lit,
dans une posture gênante.

_Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville._

SECTION 8.

_Extracts from the intercepted report of general Garbé, commanding
the French engineers, at the Blockade of Cadiz._

_25 Mars, 1811._

“On avait apperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi partant
de la baye de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait
à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait
joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbate et dans les
environs de l’Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour,
l’ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en
même temps, il effectua vers l’embouchure de St. Petri, un passage
pour faciliter l’établissement d’un pont de radeaux et d’une tête de
pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l’Isletta del Coto, et
s’occupa d’y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division
du général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à
Médina Sidonia. Celle du général Laval, s’établit en avant de Puerto
Real, et le général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana.
Ce jour on n’apperçut aucun mouvement de l’ennemi. Tous les ouvrages
de la ligne étaient gardes par les garnisons qu’on avait désignées
auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive
gauche.

“Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du
45^{me} régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu’on avoit armés.

“Le 4 Monsieur le maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l’ennemi
dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4
compagnies du 95^{me} régiment qui s’emparèrent de l’ouvrage, firent
prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que
si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait
le pont et l’Isle de Léon. L’ennemi fut si disconcerté qu’il avait
abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat
paraissait être d’un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. On
fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja.
On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n’avait rencontré
personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le
mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d’opérer la jonction de ce
corps d’armée, avec celui qui était resté dans l’île. Le 5, avant
le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu’on occupait à moitié
chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet
endroit, Monsieur le maréchal donna l’ordre au général Villatte de
rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y
maintenir l’ennemi qui y paraissait en force, pendant qu’il dirigeait
sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu
de cavalerie qu’il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne
tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de
la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de
ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent.
Le général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où
l’ennemi paraissait s’établir. Quand les deux divisions furent
formées, elle se trouvèrent en présence d’une armée, beaucoup plus
nombreuse qu’on ne l’avait cru d’abord. L’artillerie n’était pas
encore arrivée, et celle de l’ennemi commençait à jour de toute
parts. Le général Vilatte n’avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri,
qui étaient au moment d’être prises, n’étant alors défendues que par
un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d’infantrie légère.

“Cette division fut obligée de se replier et de repasser le ravin
dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d’Almanza. Ce mouvement
empêcha le général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions,
qui n’ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essuyaient un feu terrible de
la part de l’ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d’autant plus sensible que
le nombre des combattans n’était que le tiers de celui de l’ennemi.
Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu’on eut pu entamer
la ligne des Anglais. Il n’y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille
hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut
penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs
en avant de Chiclana, où l’on fit camper une division pendant la
nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l’île
de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d’occuper notre position du
Moulin d’Almanza et de St Petri. Si l’ennemi voulant continuer ses
opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne
heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions
après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d’évacuer le terrain
jusqu’à Puerto Réal, où on aurait pris la position dont j’ai parlé
plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations
ont manqué d’ensemble. Il s’est contenté de rentrer dans l’île et
pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient
un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine,
qui n’eut d’autre résultat que d’enlever une batterie défendue par
quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de
St. Marie. Monsieur le maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif,
ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun
rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus
d’effet, sur l’armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions
qu’on auraient pu prendre.”

* * * * *

No. X.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS.

SECTION 1.

“_March 1, 1811._

“I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth
of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade
of nine pounders to arm them.

“Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries
from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington,
and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their
construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the
confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy’s bridge is
about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by
measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned
with an eight-gun battery.”

SECTION 2.

“I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly
routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th
February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos.
Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well,
reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was
playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we’ll go and look at it
to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised.”

SECTION 3.

“May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and
was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the
Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard
and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties,
and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at
the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In
spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and
shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in
completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning
of the 11th, at four, a. m. its fire was opened. The enemy’s fire
was, however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the
three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little
attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other
side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we
sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal,
when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was
a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist until
our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all
our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am
satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should
have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant
batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the
place, but they scarcely excited the enemy’s attention; our little
corps bore the brunt of the enemy’s exertions, which were great and
spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been
from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted,
mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed.”

* * * * *

No. XI.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

“_Gibraltar, October 23, 1810._

“The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved
upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place
of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted
two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading
it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression
had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the
artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was
surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a
gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this
moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he
retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French
cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was
surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way,
and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field.”

END OF VOL. III.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY W. MARCHANT, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

[2] First aide-de-camp to marshal Massena.

[3] Admiral sir Edward Codrington.

[4] Lord Lynedoch.

[5] Lieut.-gov. of Gibraltar.

[6] Governor of Almeida.

[7] Dupont’s proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume,
have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled “_Annals
of the Peninsular Campaigns_.”

Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba
was sacked, calls it “_a gratuitous atrocity_,” and “_an inhuman
butchery_” and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of
Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms,
that, _capacity and cruelty are rarely united_; that _Dupont was a
fool_, and that _Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon_, but that
he must have “_dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal
scorn and hatred_.”

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont,
although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became
minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed
by the author of “_the Annals_,” _as the era of good government in
France_. But I rejected Foy’s authority, 1st, because his work,
unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the
impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont.
Secondly, because he was not an eye witness, and his relation at
variance with the “_official journal of Dupont’s operations_” was
also contradicted by the testimony of a _British general of known
talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few
months subsequent to the event_.

“Some time after the victory, _order was restored, pillage was
forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained
the police_.”--Journal of Operations.

_Cordoba was not pillaged_, being one of the few places where the
_French were well received_.--Letters from a British general to
colonel Napier.

On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the
“_Annals_,” after contrasting my account with Foy’s, thus proceeds,
“It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given
by colonel Napier _without any quotation of authority_.”

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, _six
months_ previous to the publication of the _Annals_, colonel Napier,
hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the
author of that work, _because there was no quotation of authority_,
transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had
authority for every _statement_, and that he would willingly _furnish
the author with any or all of them_: no notice was taken of this
offer!

[8] An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found
in a small volume, entitled, “_Sketches of a Soldier’s Life, in
Ireland_,” by the author of “_The Eventful Life of a Soldier_.” This
last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as “_The
Life of a Sergeant_.”

[9] [Note in Napoleon’s own hand.] On ne doit pas oublier qu’en
approchant de France tout favourise la desertion.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnote [9] is referenced twice from page 563.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

To save space in the wide tables in Note I of the Appendix, the
headings ‘Hospital.’ and ‘Cavalry.’ have been abbreviated to
‘Hosp.’ and ‘Cav.’.

The original table in Note I, section 7, was quite wide and has been
split into two parts. The original table in Note IX, section 4, was
very wide and has been split into three parts.

In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some
corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e,
and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling has been left unchanged.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Table of Contents:
Pg v: ‘Captain Hollowell’ replaced by ‘Captain Hallowell’.
Pg x: ‘maratime operations’ replaced by ‘maritime operations’.
Pg xii: ‘retreats to Lerena’ replaced by ‘retreats to Llerena’.

Main text:
Pg 3: ‘Pyrennean vallies’ replaced by ‘Pyrennean valleys’.
Pg 3: ‘into the vallies’ replaced by ‘into the valleys’.
Pg 5: ‘Nuesta Senora’ replaced by ‘Nuestra Senora’.
Pg 11: ‘the commucations of’ replaced by ‘the communications of’.
Pg 13: ‘being unqual to’ replaced by ‘being unequal to’.
Pg 14: ‘very essense of’ replaced by ‘very essence of’.
Pg 18: ‘on the ocsion’ replaced by ‘on the occasion’.
Pg 21: ‘occupied by Coupigny’ replaced by ‘occupied by Conpigny’.
Pg 33: ‘calamity befal’ replaced by ‘calamity befall’.
Pg 47: ‘was betowed with’ replaced by ‘was bestowed with’.
Pg 54: ‘and carelesssly’ replaced by ‘and carelessly’.
Pg 61 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’.
Pg 63: ‘the Portugese’ replaced by ‘the Portuguese’.
Pg 64 (Sidenote): ‘Wellesly’ replaced by ‘Wellesley’.
Pg 73: ‘subborn resistance’ replaced by ‘stubborn resistance’.
Pg 86: ‘from Aranjues to’ replaced by ‘from Aranjuez to’.
Pg 92: ‘whose procedings’ replaced by ‘whose proceedings’.
Pg 96: ‘at Yevenes and’ replaced by ‘at Yebenes and’.
Pg 125: ‘war of invavasion’ replaced by ‘war of invasion’.
Pg 138: ‘evacuted the town’ replaced by ‘evacuated the town’.
Pg 139: ‘to recal them’ replaced by ‘to recall them’.
Pg 143 (Sidenote): ‘des Française’ replaced by ‘des Français’.
Pg 174: ‘Toccadero creek’ replaced by ‘Troccadero creek’.
Pg 179: ‘soldiers, and and a’ replaced by ‘soldiers, and a’.
Pg 197: ‘from about Lerena’ replaced by ‘from about Llerena’.
Pg 237: ‘required extrordinary’ replaced by ‘required extraordinary’.
Pg 237: ‘merely a a conqueror’ replaced by ‘merely a conqueror’.
Pg 242: ‘dictinct lines’ replaced by ‘distinct lines’.
Pg 243: ‘Gallicia and Asturia’ replaced by ‘Gallicia and Asturias’.
Pg 247: ‘in misrepresentions’ replaced by ‘in misrepresentations’.
Pg 261: ‘having Silviera and’ replaced by ‘having Silveira and’.
Pg 280: ‘secorrer esta plaza’ replaced by ‘socorrer esta plaza’.
Pg 304 (Sidenote): ‘Cox’s Narative’ replaced by ‘Cox’s Narrative’.
Pg 307: ‘lost a quadron’ replaced by ‘lost a squadron’.
Pg 331: ‘Portuguese caçadore’ replaced by ‘Portuguese caçadores’.
Pg 356: ‘3º. From Bucellas’ replaced by ‘4º. From Bucellas’.
Pg 359: ‘Massena, suprised’ replaced by ‘Massena, surprised’.
Pg 366: ‘own governmennt’ replaced by ‘own government’.
Pg 380: ‘Frenchmen run to’ replaced by ‘Frenchmen ran to’.
Pg 380: ‘with the assistace’ replaced by ‘with the assistance’.
Pg 396: ‘when Bacellar brought’ replaced by ‘when Baccellar brought’.
Pg 414: ‘Moguer and Heulva’ replaced by ‘Moguer and Huelva’.
Pg 454: ‘the posisition of’ replaced by ‘the position of’.
Pg 464: ‘the abler tactitian’ replaced by ‘the abler tactician’.
Pg 473: ‘from distruction’ replaced by ‘from destruction’.
Pg 485: ‘immediately run out’ replaced by ‘immediately ran out’.
Pg 514: ‘seventh divison’ replaced by ‘seventh division’.
Pg 583: ‘de St. Fernado’ replaced by ‘de St. Fernando’.
Pg 588: ‘wish to emove’ replaced by ‘wish to remove’.

Appendix:
Pg 608 Note VII: missing heading ‘SECTION 2.’ inserted before
‘Extrait du Journal du C. de B. Pelet’.
Pg 615 Note VII: ‘SECTION IX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 9’.
Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XVIII’ replaced by ‘SECTION 18’.
Pg 621 Note VII: ‘SECTION XIX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 19’.
Pg 622 Note VII: ‘SECTION XX’ replaced by ‘SECTION 20’.
Pg 628 Note IX: ‘SECTION II’ replaced by ‘SECTION 2’.
Pg 628 Note IX: ‘Brigadier-gen. Dilkes’ replaced by
‘Brigadier-gen. Dilke’.
Pg 629 Note IX: ‘SECTION III’ replaced by ‘SECTION 3’.
Pg 635 Note IX: ‘SECTION 7’ replaced by ‘SECTION 8’.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, vol. 3 of 6" ***

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