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Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume 15: Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
Author: Various
Language: English
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CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, VOLUME 15 ***
[Cover Illustration]
TRIAL
OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
_NUREMBERG_
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946
[Illustration]
_PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY_
_1948_
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
VOLUME XV
_OFFICIAL TEXT_
_IN THE_
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
_PROCEEDINGS_
29 May 1946-10 June 1946
CONTENTS
One Hundred and Forty-first Day, Wednesday, 29 May 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 36
One Hundred and Forty-second Day, Thursday, 30 May 1946,
Morning Session 63
Afternoon Session 100
One Hundred and Forty-third Day, Friday, 31 May 1946,
Morning Session 132
Afternoon Session 169
One Hundred and Forty-fourth Day, Saturday, 1 June 1946,
Morning Session 212
One Hundred and Forty-fifth Day, Monday, 3 June 1946,
Morning Session 253
Afternoon Session 288
One Hundred and Forty-sixth Day, Tuesday, 4 June 1946,
Morning Session 311
Afternoon Session 338
One Hundred and Forty-seventh Day, Wednesday, 5 June 1946,
Morning Session 370
Afternoon Session 400
One Hundred and Forty-eighth Day, Thursday, 6 June 1946,
Morning Session 435
Afternoon Session 474
One Hundred and Forty-ninth Day, Friday, 7 June 1946,
Morning Session 512
Afternoon Session 546
One Hundred and Fiftieth Day, Saturday, 8 June 1946,
Morning Session 574
One Hundred and Fifty-first Day, Monday, 10 June 1946,
Morning Session 610
Afternoon Session 640
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST DAY
Wednesday, 29 May 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal will
adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock in order to sit in closed session.
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr.
President, the day before yesterday the Tribunal asked if we would
ascertain whether or not Document Number D-880 had been offered in
evidence. It consists of extracts from the testimony of Admiral Raeder,
and we have ascertained that it was offered, and it is Exhibit Number
GB-483. It was put to a witness by Mr. Elwyn Jones in the course of
cross-examination, and it has been offered in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. DODD: Also, with respect to the Court’s inquiry concerning the
status of other defendants and their documents, we are able to say this
morning that with respect to the Defendant Jodl the documents are now
being translated and mimeographed, and there is no need for any hearing
before the Tribunal.
The Seyss-Inquart documents have been heard and are now being translated
and mimeographed.
The Von Papen documents are settled; there is no disagreement between
the Prosecution and the Defendant Von Papen, and they are in the process
of being mimeographed and translated.
With respect to the Defendant Speer, we think there will be no need for
any hearing, and I expect that by the end of today they will be sent to
the translating and mimeographing departments.
The documents for the Defendant Von Neurath have not yet been submitted
by the defendant to the Prosecution.
And with respect to the Defendant Fritzsche, our Russian colleagues will
be in a position to advise us more exactly in the course of the day. I
expect that I shall be able to advise the Tribunal as to the Defendant
Fritzsche before the session ends today.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude all questions of witnesses?
MR. DODD: Yes, I believe—at least, we have no objection to any of the
witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; there need not be any further hearing in
open court on the cases of the Defendants Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Von
Papen, and Speer until their actual cases are presented.
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Defendant Sauckel): Mr. President,
I have a technical question to bring up. Yesterday the witness
Hildebrandt arrived, but again it was the wrong Hildebrandt. This is the
third witness who has appeared here in this comedy of errors. It was the
wrong one for Mende, the wrong one for Stothfang, and the wrong one for
Hildebrandt. But this witness knows where the right ones are.
The witnesses had received information in their camp that they were to
appear here and they were then taken to the collecting center for
Ministerial Directors in Berlin-Lichterfelde. Perhaps it will still be
possible to bring these two witnesses here. Especially the witness
Hildebrandt, who can testify about the French matters, would be of
importance if we could still get him.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the name given accurately to the General Secretary?
DR. SERVATIUS: The name was given accurately. The other man’s name was
also Hildebrandt, only not Hubert but Heinrich. He was also a
Ministerial Director...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean only the surname but all his Christian
names.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, one name was Heinrich and the other Hubert, and
abbreviated it was “H” for both, Dr. H. Hildebrandt, which apparently
caused the confusion.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I say the names of all witnesses had better be
given in full; really in full, not merely with initials.
DR. SERVATIUS: I had given the name in full. As to the physician, the
Witness Dr. Jäger, I received his private address this morning. He is
not under arrest. He was at first a witness for the Prosecution. His
private address is in Essen, in the Viehhof Platz, and he is there now.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better take up all these details with the
General Secretary, and he will give you every assistance.
DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the case of Sauckel, I should like to make one
more remark to the Tribunal.
There are about 150 documents which have been submitted by the
Prosecution, and some of them are only remotely connected with Sauckel.
No trial brief and no special charges were presented here orally against
Sauckel, so that I cannot see in detail to what extent Sauckel is held
responsible. The case was dealt with only under the heading of “Slave
Labor,” and so the ground of the defense is somewhat unsteady.
I do not intend to discuss every one of these 150 documents, but I
should like to reserve the right to deal with some of them later if that
should appear necessary. I want to point out only the most important
ones, and then return to them in the course of the proceedings. At any
rate, may I ask you not to construe it as an admission if I do not raise
objections against any of these documents now.
THE PRESIDENT: No admission will be inferred from that. Dr. Servatius, I
have before me here a document presented by the French Prosecution
against the Defendant Sauckel. I suppose what you mean is that that
document, that trial brief entitled _Responsabilité Individuelle_, does
not refer to each of these 150 documents.
DR. SERVATIUS: There was, first of all, a document book, “Slave Labor,”
submitted by the American Prosecution, which is not headed “Sauckel” but
“Slave Labor”; and I cannot say, therefore, which parts concern Sauckel
in particular.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it does say, “...and the special responsibility of
the Defendants Sauckel and Speer therefore...” That is the American
document book. It does name Sauckel.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And there is this other trial brief presented by Mr.
Mounier on behalf of the French Delegation, which is definitely against
Sauckel. But no doubt that does not specify all these 150 documents that
you are referring to.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._]
Witness, yesterday near the end of the session we spoke about a
manifesto—that memorandum which was intended to impress upon the
various offices their duty to carry out your directives and to remove
the resistance that existed. Now, you yourself have made statements
which are hardly compatible with your directives, it seems. I submit to
you Document Number R-124. That concerns a meeting of the Central
Planning Board of 1 March 1944. There, with regard to recruitment, you
said that, in order to get the workers, one ought to resort to
“shanghai,” as was the custom in earlier days. You said:
“I have even resorted to the method of training staffs of French
men and women agents ... who go out on man hunts and stupefy
victims with drink and persuasive arguments in order to get them
to Germany.”
Have you found that?
FRITZ SAUCKEL (Defendant): I have found it.
THE PRESIDENT: Whereabouts in 124 is it?
DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document R-124.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but it is a very long document.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is in the document itself, Page 1770.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got it.
SAUCKEL: That is, as I can see, the report or record of a meeting of the
Central Planning Board of the spring of 1944. During that year it had
become extremely difficult for me to meet the demands of the various
employers of labor represented in the Central Planning Board. At no time
did I issue directives or even recommendations to “shanghai.” In this
conference I merely used that word as reminiscent of my days as a
seaman, in order to defend myself against those who demanded workers of
me, and in order to make it clear to the gentlemen how difficult my task
had become, particularly in 1944. Actually, a very simple situation is
at the root of this. According to German labor laws and according to my
own convictions, the “Arbeitsvermittlung” (procurement of labor)—the
old word for “Arbeitseinsatz” (allocation of labor)—was a right of the
State; and we, myself included, scorned private methods of recruitment.
In 1944 Premier Laval, the head of the French government, told me that
he was also having great difficulties in carrying out the labor laws
where his own workers were concerned.
In view of that, and in agreement with one of my collaborators, Dr.
Didier, conferences were held in the German Embassy—the witness
Hildebrandt, I believe, is better able to give information about
that—with the head of the collaborationist associations, that is to
say, associations among the French population which advocated
collaboration with Germany. During these conferences at the German
Embassy these associations stated that in their opinion official
recruitment in France had become very difficult. They said that they
would like to take charge of that and would like to provide recruiting
agents from their own ranks and also provide people from among their
members who would go to Germany voluntarily. Recruitment was not to take
place through official agencies but in cafés. In these cafés, of course,
certain expenses would be necessary which would have to be met; and the
recruiting agents would have to be paid a bonus, or be compensated by a
glass of wine or some gin. That way of doing things, naturally, did not
appeal to me personally; but I was in such difficulties in view of the
demands put to me that I agreed, without intending, of course, that the
idea of “shanghai” with its overseas suggestions and so forth should be
seriously considered.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did this suggestion come from the Frenchmen, or was it
your suggestion?
SAUCKEL: As I have said already, the suggestion was made by the French
leaders of these associations.
DR. SERVATIUS: If you read on a few lines in the document, you will find
that mention is made of special executive powers which you wanted to
create for the allocation of labor; it says there:
“Beyond that, I have charged a few capable men with the
establishment of a special executive force for the Allocation of
Labor. Under the leadership of the Higher SS and Police Leader a
number of indigenous units have been trained and armed, and I
now have to ask the Ministry of Munitions for weapons for these
people.”
How do you explain that?
SAUCKEL: That, also, can be explained clearly only in connection with
the events that I have just described. At that time there had been many
attacks on German offices and mixed German-French labor offices. The
Director of the Department for the Allocation of Labor in the office of
the military commander in France, President Dr. Ritter, had been
murdered. A number of recruiting offices had been raided and destroyed.
For that reason these associations who were in favor of collaboration
had suggested, for the protection of their own members, that a sort of
bodyguard for the recruiting organization should be set up. Of course I
could not do that myself because I had neither the authority nor the
machinery for it. In accordance with the orders of the military
commander, it had to be done by the Higher SS and Police Leader; that
is, under his supervision. This was carried out in conjunction with the
French Minister of the Interior at that time, Darnand; so as to be able
to stand my ground against the censure of the Central Planning Board, I
used an example in this drastic form. As far as I know, these
hypothetical suggestions were not put into practice.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who actually carried out the recruitment of the foreign
workers?
SAUCKEL: The actual recruitment of foreign workers was the task of the
German offices established in the various regions, the offices of the
military commanders or similar civilian German institutions.
DR. SERVATIUS: You ordered recruitment to be voluntary. What was the
success of that voluntary recruitment?
SAUCKEL: Several million foreign workers came to Germany voluntarily, as
voluntary recruitment was the underlying principle.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, at the meeting of the Central Planning Board—the
same meeting which we have just discussed—you made a remark which
contradicts that. It is on Page 67 of the German photostat, Page 1827 of
the English text. I shall read the sentence to you. Kehrl is speaking.
He says, “During that entire period, you brought a large number of
Frenchmen to the Reich by voluntary recruitment.”
Then an interruption by Sauckel: “Also by forced recruitment.”
The speaker continues, “Forced recruitment started when voluntary
recruitment no longer yielded sufficient numbers.”
Now comes the remark on which I want you to comment. You answered, “Of
the 5 million foreign workers who came to Germany, less than 200,000
came voluntarily.”
Please explain that contradiction.
SAUCKEL: I see that this is another interruption which I made. All I
wanted to say by it was that Herr Kehrl’s opinion that all workers had
come voluntarily was not quite correct. This proportion, which is put
down here by the stenographer or the man writing the records, is quite
impossible. How that error occurred, I do not know. I never saw the
record; but the witness Timm, or others, can give information on that.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer now to Exhibit Sauckel-15. That is Directive
Number 4, which has been quoted already and which lays down specific
regulations with regard to recruiting measures. It has already been
submitted as Document Number 3044-PS. Why did you now abandon the
principle of voluntary recruitment?
SAUCKEL: In the course of the war our opponents also carried out very
considerable and widespread countermeasures. The need for manpower in
Germany, on the other hand, had become tremendous. During that period a
request was also put to me by French, Belgian, and Dutch circles to
bring about a better balance in the economy of these territories and
even to introduce what we called a labor draft law, so that the pressure
of enemy propaganda would be reduced and the Dutch, Belgians, and French
themselves could say that they were not going to Germany voluntarily but
that they had to go because of a compulsory labor service and because of
laws.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the proximity of the front have any influence on the
fact that people no longer wanted to come voluntarily?
SAUCKEL: Of course I came to feel that; and it is understandable that
the chances of victory and defeat caused great agitation among the
workers; and the way things looked at the front certainly played an
important part.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did purely military considerations also cause the
introduction...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Dr.
Servatius, will you ask the witness what he means by a labor draft law.
Does he mean a law of Germany or a law of the occupied countries?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you heard the question, whether you mean a
German law or a law of the administration of the occupied countries?
SAUCKEL: That varied. The Reich Government in some of the territories
introduced laws which corresponded to the laws that were valid for the
German people themselves. Those laws could not be issued by me, but they
were issued by the chiefs of the regional administrations or the
government of the country concerned on the order of the German
Government.
In France these laws were issued by the Laval Government, in agreement
with Marshal Pétain; in Belgium, in agreement with the Belgian general
secretaries or general directors still in office or with the ministries.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, in the other countries, by the German
Government or the German Government’s representatives? You have only
spoken of...
SAUCKEL: The order to introduce German labor laws in the occupied
territories was given by the Führer. They were proclaimed and introduced
by the chiefs who had been appointed by the Führer for these
territories, for I myself was not in a position to issue any directives,
laws, or regulations there.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: How were these laws carried out?
SAUCKEL: The laws were published in the official publications and legal
gazettes, as well as being made known through the press and by posters
in those territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the practical execution. How were the people
brought to Germany?
SAUCKEL: They were summoned to the local labor office, which was mostly
administered by local authorities. Cases had to be examined
individually, according to my directives, which have been submitted here
as documents. Cases of hardship to the family, or other such cases, were
given special consideration. Then, in the normal manner—as was done in
Germany also—the individual workers or conscripted persons were brought
to Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you present—did you ever witness this procedure?
SAUCKEL: I observed this procedure personally in a number of cities in
Russia, France, and Belgium; and I made sure that it was carried out in
accordance with orders.
DR. SERVATIUS: If compulsion was necessary, what coercive measures were
taken?
SAUCKEL: At first, such compulsory measures were taken as are justified
and necessary in every normal civil administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: And if they were not sufficient?
SAUCKEL: Then proceedings were proposed.
DR. SERVATIUS: These were legal measures, were they?
SAUCKEL: According to my conviction, they were legal measures.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have stated repeatedly in documents, which are
available here, that a certain amount of pressure was to be used. What
did you mean by that?
SAUCKEL: I consider that every administrative measure taken on the basis
of laws or duties imposed by the state, on one’s own nation, or in any
other way, constitutes some form of stress, duty, pressure.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not measures used which brought about some sort of
collective pressure?
SAUCKEL: I rejected every kind of collective pressure. The refusal to
employ collective pressure is also evident from decrees issued by other
German offices in the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not true that in the East the villages were called
upon to provide a certain number of people?
SAUCKEL: In the East, of course, administrative procedure was rendered
difficult on account of the great distances. In the lower grades, as far
as I know, native mayors were in office in every case. It is possible
that a mayor was requested to select a number of workers from his
village or town for work in Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is that the same as that form of collective pressure,
where, if nobody came, the entire village was to be punished?
SAUCKEL: Measures of that kind I rejected entirely in my field of
activity, because I could not and would not bring to the German economy
workers who had been taken to Germany in such a manner that they would
hate their life and their work in Germany from the very outset.
DR. SERVATIUS: What police facilities were at your disposal?
SAUCKEL: I had no police facilities at my disposal.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who exercised the police pressure?
SAUCKEL: Police pressure in the occupied territories could be exerted on
order or application of the respective chief of the territory, or of the
Higher SS and Police Leader, if authorized.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was not within your competence to exert direct
pressure?
SAUCKEL: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you exert indirect pressure by your directives, by
cutting off food supplies, or similar measures?
SAUCKEL: After the fall of Stalingrad and the proclamation of the state
of total war, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in Berlin interfered
considerably in all these problems. He ordered that in cases of
persistent refusal or signs of resistance compulsion was to be used by
means of refusing additional food rations, or even by withdrawal of
ration cards. I personally rejected measures of that kind energetically,
because I knew very well that in the western territories the so-called
food ration card played a subordinate role and that supplies were
provided for the resistance movement and its members on such a large
scale that such measures would have been quite ineffective. I did not
order or suggest them.
DR. SERVATIUS: At the meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March
1944 you also stated that, if the French executive agencies were unable
to get results, then one might have to put a prefect up against a wall.
Do you still consider this to be legally justified pressure?
SAUCKEL: That is a similarly drastic remark of mine in the Central
Planning Board which was never actually followed by an official order
and not even by any prompting on my part. It was simply that I had been
informed that in several departments in France the prefects or
responsible chiefs supported the resistance movement wholeheartedly.
Railroad tracks had been blown up; bridges had been blown up; and that
remark was a verbal reaction on my part. I believe, however, I was then
only thinking of a legal measure, because there did, in fact, exist a
French law which made sabotage an offense punishable by death.
DR. SERVATIUS: May I refer to the document in this connection?
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in Document Number R-124?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is on Page 1776, where it says that on the basis of
the law it would then be necessary to put a mayor up against a wall.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know what laws existed in France
compelling co-operation from the French authorities, or whether there
were such laws?
SAUCKEL: Yes, such laws existed.
DR. SERVATIUS: A number of reports, which were submitted here,
concerning the application of measures of compulsion, mentioned abuses
and outrageous conditions allegedly caused by recruitment measures. What
can you say about that in general?
SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand your question.
DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the use of compulsion, a number of reports
were brought up here, and you have heard them; reports setting forth
measures which must surely be generally condemned. You heard of the
burning down of villages and the shooting of men. What can you say to
that in general?
SAUCKEL: All these measures are clearly in contradiction to the
directives and instructions which I issued and which have been submitted
here in large numbers, and to these I must refer. These are methods
against which, when I heard as much as hints of them, I took very severe
measures.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who bears the immediate responsibility for such
incidents?
SAUCKEL: The responsibility for such incidents rests with the local
authorities which did these things.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any other offices besides the local
authorities which dealt with recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: That is exactly what I was fighting for from the very
beginning—to eliminate and combat the intricate maze of offices which,
without restraint or control, recruited workers by compulsion. That was
part of my job.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of offices were they? Local offices?
SAUCKEL: They were offices of all kinds. I myself heard about most of
them only here.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the situation with regard to the Todt
Organization?
SAUCKEL: The Todt Organization for a long time recruited and used
manpower independently in all territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the labor service have anything to do with that?
SAUCKEL: Do you mean the labor service of Reichsarbeitsführer Hierl?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
SAUCKEL: That I cannot say; that was a German military organization for
training for manual work.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were workers taken for the Armed Forces?
SAUCKEL: Workers were employed for local urgent work, of course, by army
groups, by construction and fortification battalions, and so on, which I
neither knew about nor was in a position to control. Road building...
DR. SERVATIUS: How about the Reichsbahn?
SAUCKEL: The Reichsbahn repaired its tracks itself and recruited or
hired the workers for its requirements whenever it needed them.
DR. SERVATIUS: These offices were not under your supervision?
SAUCKEL: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they carry out your instructions or were they
required to carry them out?
SAUCKEL: They were not obliged to carry them out; and for that very
reason I sent out, and in a very emphatic form, that manifesto which was
mentioned yesterday. As, however, I myself had no supervision over the
executive authorities, I had to leave it to the various offices to take
these instructions into consideration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the number of workers recruited in the various
territories in that manner very large?
SAUCKEL: There were certainly very large numbers of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: There were also Reich offices which dealt with the
question of manpower. What about the deportations carried out by
Himmler? Did you have any connection with those?
SAUCKEL: With reference to the question of these deportations, I can
only say that I did not have the least thing to do with them. I never
agreed—I never could have agreed, in view of my own outlook, my
development, and my life—I could not have agreed to the use of
prisoners or convicts for work in that manner. That was absolutely
foreign to my nature. I also have the firm conviction that, on account
of my forcible statements and measures, I was intentionally kept
uninformed about the whole matter, because it was quite contrary to my
own views on work and on workers. I said very often—and it can be seen
in documents here—that I wanted to win the co-operation of the foreign
workers for Germany and for the German way of life, and I did not want
to alienate them.
DR. SERVATIUS: These then were the various offices which, apart from
you, had to do with recruitment of workers?
SAUCKEL: May I make a short statement in that respect? I heard the word
“deportation” a few times in Germany and I always rejected the idea very
emphatically because I knew nothing about such operations. According to
the use of the word in the German language I understand “deportation” to
mean the sending away of prisoners and of people who have committed some
punishable act against the State. I never carried out deportations
because of my own views on the ethics of work. On the contrary, I gave
the workers recruited through my office—and that was the point on which
I finally obtained Hitler’s consent at the beginning of my job, and it
was not an easy matter—I gave all foreign workers legal contracts,
whether they came voluntarily or through German labor conscription. They
should and must receive the same treatment, the same pay, and the same
food as the German workers. That is why I rejected the idea of
deportation in my methods and my program. I can testify here with a
clear conscience that I had nothing at all to do with those
deportations, the terrible extent of which I learned only here.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have pointed out repeatedly that this labor had to be
brought to Germany under all circumstances, that one had to proceed
ruthlessly, that it was an absolute necessity to get the workers. Does
that not show that you agreed with such measures?
SAUCKEL: I should like to point out the following distinction:
My directives and instructions can be clearly seen in numerous
documents. I could issue only these because I had no executive power and
no machinery of my own. All these directives, from the very beginning,
prescribe legally correct and just treatment. It is true, however, that
I used the words “under all circumstances” when communicating with
German offices—the Führer himself had impressed these words on me—and
I used the word “ruthlessly,” not with respect to the treatment of
workers but with respect to the many arguments, disputes, arbitrary
acts, and individual desires which the German offices, with which I had
to contend fiercely, had among themselves and against me. For the most
part they did not understand the importance of the allocation of labor
as an economic measure in time of war. The military authorities, the
army commanders, very often told me, for instance, that it was nonsense
to bring these people to Germany. There was the Vlassov Army under the
Russian general of that name, and the military authorities wanted these
Russian workers to join the Vlassov Army. I opposed that. I did not
consider it right, nor did I consider it sufficiently reliable. These
were the things against which I had to proceed ruthlessly in my dealings
with the German administration in those territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there other circumstances, too, which led to the
transportation of people to Germany?
SAUCKEL: Yes, there were other circumstances which, however, were not
connected directly but indirectly with the allocation of labor, and they
often took me by surprise; for example, the evacuation of military
zones, which frequently had to be carried through at a moment’s notice
or after only a very short time of preparation. And when such an
evacuation had been carried out it was the task of the local labor
offices to put the evacuated population to work in areas in the rear or
to bring to Germany such workers as could be used there.
This sort of labor allocation entailed, of course, considerable
difficulties for me. There were families and children among the
evacuated people; and they, naturally, had also to be provided with
shelter. It was often the very natural wish of the Russian fathers and
mothers to take their children with them. That happened, not because I
wanted it, but because it was unavoidable.
DR. SERVATIUS: And did you always use this labor, or only occasionally?
SAUCKEL: To a large extent those people were used by the local
authorities in those territories and put into agriculture, industry,
railroads, bridge building, and so on.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with resettlement?
SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with resettlement. By a decree of
the Führer that task was expressly delegated to the Reichsführer SS.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not report to you about bad conditions
which existed in his sphere?
SAUCKEL: Yes. I had about four conversations with Rosenberg, at his
request; and he told me about the bad conditions. There was no doubt on
my part that such conditions were to be utterly condemned.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he speak about Koch?
SAUCKEL: The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was mainly involved. There were
considerable differences between the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and Reich Commissioner Koch.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you in a position to take measures against Koch?
SAUCKEL: Koch was not subordinate to me either directly or indirectly. I
could not give him any instructions in such matters. I let him know from
the outset that I could not possibly agree with such methods as I had
heard about, to some extent through Rosenberg, although I could not
prove them.
Koch was of the opinion—and he explained that in his letters to
Rosenberg—that in his territory he was the sole authority. He also
pointed that out to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not think the cause for these conditions
was that your demands were too high?
SAUCKEL: I also spoke to Herr Rosenberg about that. I personally was of
the opinion that, if the demands could be divided up and orderly
recruitment and conscription could take place, it was quite possible to
fill the quotas. After all I had orders and instructions from the Führer
and the Central Planning Board.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever talk about the methods which should be used?
SAUCKEL: The methods that should be used were not only frequently
discussed between us, but I published them in many very clear
directives. I even went so far as to issue and distribute my manifesto
over the head of this higher authority to the subordinate offices so
that they could be guided by it.
I have to point out emphatically, however, that these were incidents
which occurred for the most part before my directives came into effect
and before my appointment.
DR. SERVATIUS: I want to refer you to Document Number 018-PS. That is in
the “Slave Labor Brief,” Page 10.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not Page 10. It is Number 10.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Exhibit Number USA-186. In the English “Slave
Labor” Book it is Document 10. It is a letter of 21 December 1942.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
If you go through that document, you will see that Rosenberg complains
about the methods used by your agents and collaborators. What are these
offices for which you are being made responsible here?
SAUCKEL: There is an error in this letter on the part of Herr Rosenberg,
because it was not I who had offices there but the Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: In other words you are saying that he addressed himself
to the wrong person?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then will you lay that document aside.
SAUCKEL: Rosenberg writes on Page 2, “I empowered the Reich Commissioner
for the Ukraine...”
DR. SERVATIUS: You assume, therefore, that the writer of this letter did
not himself know exactly who the authorities in his territory were?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that was quite possible, because I myself had only been in
office a short time.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do as a result of the complaint which
Rosenberg made? Did you do anything at all?
SAUCKEL: After receiving Rosenberg’s letter I had a discussion with him
immediately. As it was shortly before Christmas, 21 December 1942, I
called by telegram an official meeting at Weimar for 6 January, to which
representatives of the respective offices in the East were invited. I
also invited Reich Minister Rosenberg to that meeting. And at that
conference these officials were again told clearly and unmistakably,
that it was their duty to use correct and legal methods.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that connection I would like to refer to Document
Number Sauckel-82. It is in the Sauckel Document Book Number 3, Page
207. I submit the handbook itself, which contains a number of documents
for judicial notice.
I quote one sentence from the speech on the principles of recruiting
which Sauckel made there before 800 people who were employed in the
Allocation of Labor program.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 800?
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 206.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 8,000 in my copy. Isn’t it 8,000?
DR. SERVATIUS: The third book, Page 206, Document Number 82.
THE PRESIDENT: I am looking at Document Number 82. I thought you said
800 men were employed. I am looking at the beginning of Document 82.
DR. SERVATIUS: It begins on Page 204. He spoke before 800 people, not
8,000. It should be 800. That is a mistake in the translation of the
document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: The following is stated here:
“Principles of our recruiting:
“1) Where the voluntary method fails (and experience shows that
it fails everywhere) compulsory service takes its place....”—I
skip a few sentences.
“It is bitter to tear people from their homes, from their
children. But we did not want the war. The German child who
loses its father at the front, the German wife who mourns her
husband killed in battle, suffer far more. Let us disclaim every
false sentiment now.”
THE PRESIDENT: You have left out some of the document, have you not?
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand.
THE PRESIDENT: You have left out some of the document.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I omitted some sentences and I said so. But I can
read all of it.
THE PRESIDENT: I only mean on Page 206. I didn’t mean the whole
document. On Page 206 you have just skipped two sentences.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have four sentences there. I will read them again:
“Where the voluntary method fails, compulsory service takes its
place.”
Then I omitted two sentences, which I shall now read:
“This is the iron law for the Allocation of Labor for 1943. In a
few weeks from now there must no longer be any occupied
territory in which compulsory service for Germany is not the
most natural thing in the world.”
THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you also leave out the words “experience shows
that it fails everywhere”?
DR. SERVATIUS: I read that the first time; I wanted to save time.
“We are going to discard the last remnants of our soft talk
about humanitarian ideals. Every additional gun which we procure
brings us a minute closer to victory. It is bitter to tear
people from their homes, from their children. But we did not
want the war. The German child who loses its father at the
front, the German wife who mourns her husband killed in battle,
suffer far more. Let us disclaim every false sentiment now.
“Here we must be guided by the realization that in the long run
a high output can be demanded of foreign workers only if they
are satisfied with their lot. I will not tolerate men being
treated badly.
“3) Under no circumstances are you, as the recruiting commission
abroad, permitted to promise things which according to the
directives and regulations issued are not possible and cannot be
carried out on account of the war. It is much better to
introduce labor conscription and say, ‘You must take this upon
yourselves and in return you will enjoy the rights of the
workers employed in Germany.’ Anyone who works in Germany has
rights in Germany, even if he is a Bolshevist. We shall watch
very carefully to insure that the German name be not sullied.
You can demand of me any protection in your field of work, but
none for any crimes. The name of our nation is holy. For the
first time in German history you must represent for the Reich
the principles of German labor. Be conscious of that at all
times.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Apart from the information which you
received from Rosenberg, did you receive any other reports concerning
recruiting methods?
SAUCKEL: Apart from the information from Rosenberg and his letters of
that time, I did not receive any other direct complaints. But I had
issued emphatic orders that any complaints received by my office were to
be forwarded immediately to the competent Reich authorities for
investigation, punishment, and the remedying of the grievances. I should
like to state this: My office received a great many complaints which
concerned me; but they were complaints about insufficient numbers of
workers provided by me. It was my duty to correct this. For the
correction of inadequacies in administration, for eliminating unjust
measures in various fields or various agencies, I could not be
competent, as the Reich authorities themselves were competent in that
respect.
DR. SERVATIUS: But it should have been of great interest to you what
happened there. Did you not hear anything of these incidents? Was
nothing reported to you?
SAUCKEL: That I was interested from a humane and personal point of view
can be seen from the fact that I was concerned about these things,
although they did not come within my office.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you spoke here about one case in which it was
reported to you that a cinema had been surrounded. Perhaps you remember
that case?
SAUCKEL: When on a visit to Field Marshal Kluge, I heard from him that
he had been informed that in the area of his army, or army group, a
cinema had been surrounded and the people attending the cinema had been
brought to Germany to work. I immediately had that case most carefully
investigated, and the investigation took 3 months. Witnesses will be
able to testify to that when they appear here. The result of the
investigation was the following: It was not a case of labor recruitment
for Germany. A construction unit near Rovno was celebrating in that
cinema the end of one of its tasks; and in the middle of that
celebration the order was received that this unit had to be put on a new
job, a different place of work. The contractor thereupon interrupted the
celebration in a very drastic way by having the immediate transport of
these workers carried out by a force of police. That, of course, had
nothing to do with my work and my organization; but it took me 3 months
to discover the true facts of this complaint by Field Marshal Kluge. In
every case where such complaints came to my attention I investigated and
dealt with them and condemned them, because they did not help me.
DR. SERVATIUS: We will leave this matter of recruitment now and turn to
the question of the transportation of these people to Germany. Who was
responsible for their transportation?
SAUCKEL: For transportation the German Reichsbahn and the authorities
designated in my Directive Number 4—regional offices and regional labor
departments—were responsible. Immediately on assuming my office I had a
detailed discussion with Dr. Dorpmüller, Reich Minister of Transport;
his state secretary, Dr. Ganzenmüller; and before him Dr. Kleinmüller;
and it was agreed that the transportation of workers to Germany should
be carried out in an unobjectionable manner; that the transport trains
should be supplied with food for the duration of the journey; that, if
Russians were included in these transports, the cars should under no
circumstances be overcrowded; and that, if at all possible, passenger
coaches should be used for these transports. We agreed on this, though
the Reich Minister of Transport said that he could not be expected to
provide the people with better transport than the German soldiers had;
still, he could at least guarantee that the cars would not be
overcrowded.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have seen the Molotov report, that is Exhibit Number
USSR-51. You know its contents, describing the conditions of these
transports, saying that the cars were overcrowded, that the dying were
thrown out and left lying on the tracks, and that newly born children
died immediately. Were such conditions reported to you, or did you hear
of them in your official position?
SAUCKEL: Such incidents were not reported to me in my official position,
and they could not possibly have referred to worker transports of my
office.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of transports could they have been then?
SAUCKEL: As far as I could determine from the proceedings here, they
must have been transports of inmates of concentration camps who were
being evacuated. I do not know for certain; but I cannot explain it
otherwise because I would not tolerate such conditions under any
circumstances, nor did I hear about them. Such things were of no
advantage to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is that document, USSR-51?
DR. SERVATIUS: USSR-51 is the official report which I received in
printed form. I have a printed German copy. I assume that it has been
submitted to the Tribunal already. If not, I will obtain it and submit
it myself.
THE PRESIDENT: If it has got the Number USSR-51, it must have been
submitted to the Tribunal. That is the exhibit number. I wonder whether
it has got some other number by which we can identify it?
DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution handed me Document Number 054-PS: that is
Exhibit Number USA-198. That is Number 13 in the English “Slave Labor”
Book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] There, on Page 4, mention is made of a
return transport, and in connection with it very bad conditions are
described and censured. Did you find it? The passage begins:
“Very depressing effects on the morale of the skilled workers
and the population are caused above all by people returning from
Germany in a condition unfit for work, or who were already unfit
before they came to Germany.”
SAUCKEL: These can only be incidents which occurred before...
THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had the question yet, have we? The question
didn’t come through, I think.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will put the question again.
In this document mention is made of return transports from Germany to
the East, and two transports are denounced on account of the abominable
conditions which are described. I quote from the document:
“Very depressing effects on the morale of the skilled workers
and the population are caused above all by people returning from
Germany in a condition unfit for work, or who were already unfit
before they came to Germany. Several times already transports of
skilled workers on their way to Germany have passed returning
transports of such unfit persons, and they have stood on the
tracks alongside each other for some time. On account of the
insufficient care given these returning transports (sick,
injured, or weak people, mostly 50 or 60 to a car, often many
days without sufficient care and food, usually escorted by only
3 or 4 men), and through the frequently very unfavorable—even
if exaggerated—statements of these repatriates about their
treatment in Germany and en route, added to what the people
could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear developed
among the skilled workers and others being transported to
Germany. Several transport leaders, especially those of the 62d
and the 63d Transports, reported details in this connection. In
one case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed
with his own eyes how a person who had died of hunger was
unloaded on the side track from a returning transport. (1st Lt.
Hofmann of the 63d Transport, Darniza Station.) On another
occasion it was reported that en route three dead...”
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read all of this to the defendant.
He probably knows it and he can give his answer upon it.
DR. SERVATIUS: You see that reference is being made to a report; will
you please comment on it?
SAUCKEL: Concerning this report, may I say the following: These terrible
conditions had to be investigated at once by the local authorities
concerned. A report on the result of the investigation did not reach me.
This report here was also not made to me. I may point out that the
transportation to Germany of sick people unfit for work was strictly
prohibited by me, because that would have been a crime and an
impossibility from the economic point of view. I could not possibly say
who sent these trains back. It was also not established what kind of
transports they really were. The report describes conditions which
already existed before I came into office. I, personally—and I should
like to emphasize this particularly—issued a decree according to which
sick people or pregnant women—I personally issued orders that, if a
return transport of sick people were necessary, the German Red Cross
were to furnish personnel to accompany these people all the way back to
their native place. These orders can be found among the codes. Such
terrible cases of negligence and crime are, therefore, in contradiction
to the clear regulations issued by the German labor authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not equip Bad Frankenthal for sick people who
could not return?
SAUCKEL: In my own Gau it was not Bad Frankenthal but Bad Frankenhausen,
Kyffhäuser, which I made available for sick Soviet workers. In addition,
I had a large school set aside in Edendorf near Weimar with 100 beds for
typhus patients and Russian prisoners of war. So, on my own initiative,
I myself did everything possible to help in dealing with cases of
sickness and similar matters. It was also prohibited to return people
while they were in a sick condition.
THE PRESIDENT: We had better adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SERVATIUS: When the workers arrived in Germany...
SAUCKEL: May I say something about Document Number 054-PS to supplement
my testimony? It is very important.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
SAUCKEL: On Page 5, near the center of the page, I should like to call
your attention to the following sentence of the reporter—this is a
report within a military authority: “These extreme incidents which took
place in transports in the first few months did not, to our knowledge,
repeat themselves in the summer.” In the first months of the year 1942 I
was not even in office, and my program did not commence until May. In
the summer of that year, as it is correctly stated here, an end was put
to this state of affairs.
Furthermore, I should like to call attention in the same document,
054-PS, I believe on Page 10, to a copy of a letter of complaint which
says, “As I informed you in my letter of 20 April 1942...” It is
evident, therefore, that this letter deals with complaints about
conditions which must have been disclosed before I assumed office.
DR. SERVATIUS: I was going to ask you about the arrival of workers in
Germany. What happened when a transport arrived in Germany?
SAUCKEL: Upon their arrival in Germany the people of the transport had
not only to be properly received but they also had to be medically
examined again and checked at a transit camp. One examination had to be
made at the time and place of recruitment, and another took place at a
fixed point before the border. Thus, from the time of recruitment until
being put to work three medical examinations and checks had to be made,
according to my directives.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the transit camps?
SAUCKEL: These transit camps were camps in which the people from the
various transports came together at the border, and where they were
examined and registered in the proper manner.
DR. SERVATIUS: I submit Document Number UK-39 to you. I have no exhibit
number for it.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a British exhibit?
DR. SERVATIUS: I could not establish whether it already has an exhibit
number; I shall have to check on that. At any rate, it was given to me.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the Number UK-39?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, UK-39.
THE PRESIDENT: It must be a British exhibit number, must it not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
The series is not a British exhibit; our exhibits are “GB.” It is an
earlier series of documents that we have prepared. But we will try to
find out.
DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at this document, it is a letter of the
Reich Security Main Office, dated 18 January 1943, concerning
“Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch.” Then it says, “This camp will be
equipped as a transit and reception camp.”
Was that a place to which your workers were sent?
SAUCKEL: The Allocation of Labor had nothing at all to do with these
camps and concentration camps. This was not a transit camp for workers
but was obviously the transit camp of a concentration camp. These were
not at all known to me. I never had to and never did concern myself with
such transports and transit camps; and I would not have done it.
DR. SERVATIUS: A report of the French Government was submitted here; it
is Document Number UK-78 and French Exhibit Number RF-87. The heading is
“Third Study.” It is a very comprehensive report. I shall quote from my
notes. The report contains the following, roughly: “Immediately, upon
their arrival the workers were taken to these actual slave markets which
were called sorting houses. The living conditions there were miserable.”
Is that one of your transit camps which is so described?
SAUCKEL: That is absolutely impossible; such a camp never existed.
DR. SERVATIUS: How was the distribution of the workers carried out in
practice? I refer once more to the Molotov report, Document Number
USSR-51. The Soviet Delegation says here that this document was
submitted under that exhibit number. The report says that the workers
were taken to the slave market and were sold for 10 to 15 marks. What do
you have to say to that?
SAUCKEL: I believe every German employer who received these workers,
either in agriculture or in war industry, is a witness to the fact that
a procedure of this sort never took place in any form; that it was quite
inconceivable that such slave markets were instituted through the
authority of the Reich Ministry of Labor; but that these workers who
passed through National Socialist labor exchanges received exactly the
same contracts and conditions as the German workers themselves, with
some variations, and in no case were they put to work like slaves
without rights or pay, without a contract, without sickness insurance,
or without accident insurance. That may be seen from the numerous
directives and decrees which were issued by the Reich Ministry of Labor
and by me for every race involved.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the general living conditions of foreign
workers in Germany?
SAUCKEL: The general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany as
far as they were recruited through the offices of the Allocation of
Labor, were exactly the same as those of German workers who were
accommodated in camps. Living conditions were dependent on the
circumstances of war and, in contrast with peacetime, were subject to
the same limitations as applied to the German population. The adjutant
of Herr Von Schirach, a man unknown to me, who appeared here as a
witness yesterday, described conditions in Vienna; those conditions
existed in other German cities too.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the security measures in these camps?
SAUCKEL: In the camps themselves?
DR. SERVATIUS: Well, I mean generally.
SAUCKEL: The security measures were the responsibility of the Police,
not mine, because the camps came under the various industries and the
German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I submit Document Number EC-68. It contains
directives issued by the Regional Food Office of Baden regarding the
treatment of Poles in Germany. This is Exhibit Number USA-205, to be
found in the American Document Book “Slave Labor,” the fourth document.
I shall now read the beginning of this document, which you have already
seen. It says there:
“The offices of the Reich Food Administration—(Regional Food
Office) of Baden—have received with great satisfaction the
result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader
in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941. Appropriate memoranda have
already been sent to the district food offices. Below I
promulgate the individual regulations as they were laid down
during the conference and are now to be supplied accordingly:
“1. In principle farm workers of Polish nationality no longer
have the right to complain; consequently, no complaints may be
accepted by any official agency.
“2. Farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave the
localities in which they are employed.”
Now, I shall omit some points and just confine myself to the essential
parts. I turn to Point 5:
“5. Visits to theaters, cinemas, or other cultural
entertainments are strictly prohibited for farm workers of
Polish nationality.”
Other regulations follow, prohibiting use of the railroad, and under
Number 12 there is a vital provision:
“12. Every employer of Polish farm workers has the right to
administer chastisement...”
Please comment on this document and tell us to what extent you approve
of it.
SAUCKEL: First of all, I should like to point out that this document is
dated 6 March 1941—that is, more than a year before I assumed office.
Such an absurd and impossible decree never came to my attention during
my term of office. But since I am now being confronted with the document
and am learning about it, I should like to refer to my own decrees,
which I issued entirely independently of what had gone before and which
automatically revoked such decrees. In order to prevent these absurd
decrees of some agency in the Reich from being effective, I had my
decrees collected and published in a handbook in which it says—because
of the time factor and out of respect for the Tribunal, I cannot ask the
Tribunal to look at all of them; but they are in direct contradiction to
such views. I would like to ask that I be permitted to quote just one
sentence from the manifesto already referred to, which is directed
against such nonsense and against the misuse of manpower. I refer
particularly to my directives for fair treatment. The sentence reads as
follows:
“...these orders and directives, as well as their supplements,
are to be brought very forcibly to the attention of works
managers and leaders of camps for foreign nationals, as well as
their personnel, at least four times a year by the regional
labor offices. Actual adherence to them is to be constantly
supervised.”
DR. SERVATIUS: Does the manifesto end with that?
SAUCKEL: That is a paragraph from the manifesto which refers
specifically to my orders prescribing just and humane treatment,
sufficient food, leisure time, and so forth.
DR. SERVATIUS: You issued a great number of directives. Did you notice
any opposition to your basic regulations; and, if so, what did you do?
SAUCKEL: As soon as I noticed opposition I made special reference to my
decrees, of course, because they had been approved by the Führer, upon
my recommendations, for my field of activity.
DR. SERVATIUS: As far as care and welfare were concerned, did the
DAF—the German Labor Front—play a special role? What was the task of
the DAF?
SAUCKEL: The task of the DAF was to care for German workers and look
after their interests. In this capacity it had to concern itself, as a
matter of course, with the welfare of foreign workers. That was its
ordinary task; and at the same time it had a corrective influence on
state labor administration, an influence similar to that exerted by the
trade unions on state control, as far as it exists, in other countries.
DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did the works managers have?
SAUCKEL: They had the task of regulating the total production of their
works; and, of course, they were fully responsible for their workmen and
for the foreign workers who had been assigned to them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they primarily responsible, or was the DAF
responsible?
SAUCKEL: The employers were primarily responsible, according to the law
regulating German labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now the workers were mostly billeted in camps. Who
supervised the accommodations in these camps?
SAUCKEL: The accommodations in these camps were under the final
supervision of the German trade inspection office, which was under the
Reich Ministry of Labor. The trade inspection office had the authority
and power to enforce observance from employers who failed to comply with
the orders of the Reich Minister of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself issue any orders or decrees concerning
the camps?
SAUCKEL: I personally issued orders concerning the camps, but they could
be put into effect and supervised only by the Reich Minister of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: So much about the accommodations of the camps. Now what
were the living conditions within the camps? Who was responsible for
them?
SAUCKEL: In the camps themselves the camp leaders were responsible. The
camp leader was appointed by agreement between the DAF and the works
manager, and to my knowledge—this was not within the range of my
duties—his appointment had to be confirmed and accepted by the security
authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: You speak of the security authorities. To what extent did
the Police take part in the surveillance of these camps, the maintenance
of discipline, and such matters?
SAUCKEL: Surveillance of the camp and maintenance of discipline was the
task of the camp leader, and had nothing to do with the Police. The
Police had, as I believe is the case in every country, surveillance and
control rights as regards espionage and the secrecy of the plant, _et
cetera_. Beyond that, the Police had nothing to do with the camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these camps shut off from the outside world? What
was the situation in that respect when you assumed office?
SAUCKEL: When I assumed office, the camps, particularly of the Eastern
Workers, were very much shut off from the world and were fenced in with
barbed wire. To me this was incompatible with the principle of employing
productive and willing workers; and with all the personal energy I could
muster, I succeeded in having the fences and barbed wire removed; and I
also reduced the limits of the curfew regulations for Eastern Workers,
so that the picture which was presented here yesterday could eventually
be realized. Anything else would have been incompatible, technically
speaking, with the workers’ willingness to work, which I wanted.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now the question of food. What was the food of these
foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: The feeding of the foreign workers came under the system that
was applied to the feeding of the German people, and accordingly
additional rations were allotted to people doing heavy, very heavy, or
overtime work.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did this situation exist when you assumed office?
SAUCKEL: When I assumed office and received the order from the Führer
that in addition to the foreign workers who were already in the Reich I
was to bring further quotas into the Reich, the first step I took was to
visit the Reich Minister for Food, for it was obvious to me that
bringing in foreign workers was in the first place a question of
feeding; poorly fed workers, even if they want to, cannot turn out
satisfactory work. I had many detailed conversations with him; and by
referring to the Führer and the Reich Marshal, I succeeded in obtaining
suitable food for the workers, and food quotas were legally fixed. It
was not easy to do this because the food situation, even for Germans,
was always strained; but without these measures it would not have been
possible for me, also from a personal point of view, to carry through my
task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Details with regard to the food situation were mentioned
here which would justify the assumption that extremely bad conditions
existed. Was nothing of this sort brought to your attention, or did you
yourself not hear anything?
SAUCKEL: As far as bad feeding conditions in the work camps of civilian
laborers is concerned I never had any very unfavorable reports. I
personally made repeated efforts to have this matter in particular
constantly looked into. The works managers themselves took the problem
of food very seriously.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, in a decree and letter to the Gau labor
offices and Gauleiter, deal with the subject of good treatment of
foreigners; and did you not on that occasion criticize existing
conditions?
SAUCKEL: Immediately after I assumed office, when the Gauleiter were
appointed as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor in their
Gaue, I called their attention to the food situation and ordered them to
give their attention to that question and also to the question of
accommodation. I heard that in two Gaue my instructions were not being
taken seriously enough. In one case I myself went immediately to Essen
and remedied the situation there—it concerned the barbed wire—and in
another case, in eastern Bavaria, I also intervened personally. Besides
that, I made use of these two incidents to write to the Gauleiter and
the governments of the German Länder and provinces and again pointed out
the importance of observing these instructions.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 19, that is in the English Book
Number 1, Page 54; Document Sauckel-19.
THE PRESIDENT: 19?
DR. SERVATIUS: This is Document Number 19, in the first document book,
Page 54. Only a portion of this is reproduced. In a circular to all the
Gau labor offices and Gauleiter is the following:
“If in a Gau district the statement is still being made that ‘if
anyone in the Gau has to freeze this winter, the first ones
should be the Russians’ (that is, the Russian civilian laborers
employed for work in the Gau), such a statement shows plainly
that in that region of the Gau the contact between the
administrative labor office and the competent political offices
is as yet not close enough. It is one of the most important
tasks of the Allocation of Labor and the collaboration between
you and the Gauleiter as my deputies for the Allocation of Labor
to see to it that the foreign workers recruited for the German
armament industry and food economy are looked after in such a
manner as to enable them to give the maximum of efficiency.
There is, therefore, no question of protecting from want German
fellow countrymen only and being satisfied with inadequate
provisions for laborers of foreign origin. On the contrary, it
is imperative to bear constantly in mind the fact that, in order
to bring about victory, a maximum of efficiency must be demanded
not only of German fellow countrymen but also of the foreign
workers. It would be absurd to bring foreign workers into the
country, at considerable expense, for work for German economy
and then to allow their efficiency to be impaired or ruined
through lack of proper care.”
In conclusion there follows a reminder that Sauckel’s decree must be
observed.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation with regard to the
clothing of foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: The clothing of foreign workers from the western regions gave
us relatively little trouble for these workers were well supplied and
they were also compensated for their clothing. But the clothing of the
Eastern Workers was a problem. On behalf of the Eastern Workers I
applied to the Reich Minister of Economy for a quota of clothing and
provided 1 million Eastern Workers with all necessary under and outer
clothing. To supply this quota of clothing 10,000 workers were required
as well as 30,000 tons of raw materials. Thus, every care was given to
the question of clothing, and this clothing was actually issued.
DR. SERVATIUS: The French Delegation has submitted Document Number RF-5.
It is a propaganda brochure, _Work for Europe_. I had also submitted
this, and the Tribunal took judicial notice of it. I should like to
submit it again and refer to three pictures contained therein. The
essential thing about these pictures is that some of the workers coming
from the East arrived barefoot, and later there are pictures where these
workers are seen well dressed in Germany, and it is evident that the
situation as regards the clothing of these workers had made considerable
progress in Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this Sauckel-5?
DR. SERVATIUS: No, it is a document of the French Delegation, Document
RF-5.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation with regard to
working hours? Who regulated the working hours?
SAUCKEL: The working hours were regulated on the basis of decrees by the
Führer, the Ministerial Council, and later on by Reich Minister
Goebbels. The carrying out of these decrees was my task.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the average working time?
SAUCKEL: One can hardly talk of an average working time in Germany
during the war. There was the legal working time of 8 hours. For
anything beyond 8 hours, overtime had to be paid.
In the year 1943 the average working time per week was at first set at
54 hours; later, as far as it was necessary, at 10 hours per day. When
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels became Reich Delegate for Total War Effort,
against my objections and against the objection of other offices but on
the basis of the authority which he had, he demanded and proclaimed a
10-hour working day for all offices and industries. However this could
not be carried through at all, for in many industries and offices work
had to be regulated according to the difficulties which were already
then appearing—difficulties of raw materials, power supply, and the
amount of work. But in exceptional cases, which were not infrequent, 11
and 12 hours of work were put in where production demanded it. German
workers as well worked longer hours. All workers were then compensated
accordingly.
DR. SERVATIUS: In the French Document Number RF-22, on Page 101 of the
German text, is the following:
“From the interrogations by the agencies of the _Ministère des
Prisonniers_ of deported workers who had returned home, it can
be seen that the average time of work per week was at least 72
hours.”
Then the source of this information is mentioned, but that does not
interest us here.
“Sixty-four-hour weeks were not infrequent. Cases of 100-hour
weeks with 30 to 38 consecutive hours were mentioned.”
What can you tell us about this? Did such cases come to your attention?
SAUCKEL: I cannot comment on these reports, because I do not know
whether they concern people who were being used in concentration camps
or those who were used as civilian workers in the other sector for which
I was responsible. It is correct that in very exceptional cases there
were periods in which long hours of work were put in. That was decided
by the factory and applied also to the German workers. But in such cases
appropriate rest periods had to be interspersed. These long hours were
worked only for the completion of important contracts. Where these
people actually worked, I cannot determine from the interrogation and,
therefore, I cannot give you a precise answer.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the provisions for free time?
SAUCKEL: Free time was at the disposal of the workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who was responsible for regulating free time?
SAUCKEL: The regulation of free time was the responsibility of the DAF
as far as the arrangements of details for free time were concerned.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the situation regarding the employment of
children and young people?
SAUCKEL: By German Reich law children under 12 years of age are not
permitted to work. Children under 14 are only permitted to work a few
hours on the land.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you issue decrees about working hours for children?
SAUCKEL: I issued decrees or confirmed the laws which were already in
existence insofar as they applied to this work.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I shall show you Document Number 345-PS, which is a
letter written by Reich Minister Rosenberg to Lammers, dated 20 July
1944.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Has this been put in before? Has this been offered in
evidence before?
DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted in cross-examination. I
myself have just received it. It deals with the recruitment of young
people of 15 to 20 years of age for employment in the Reich during the
war. Then the document refers to the transfer to the Reich of young
people aged 10 to 14 years; that is the “Hay Action.” And it goes on to
say:
“The object of this action is the further care of young people
through the Reich Youth Leadership and the training of
apprentices for German economy in a manner similar to that which
has already been successfully carried out with the White
Ruthenia Youth Service in co-operation with the GBA”—which
means you.
Please comment on whether you had use made of these young people.
SAUCKEL: No, I had nothing whatever to do with this action; and in the
index of addresses my name is not mentioned. I do not know of this
matter.
DR. SERVATIUS: So you did not violate your own rules by issuing special
directives?
SAUCKEL: No. This was a transaction with which I did not concern myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to submit another letter to you, which
was also submitted by the Prosecution in connection with the Schirach
case. It is Document Number 1137-PS, a letter dated 19 October 1944. On
Page 3 of this document, the following appears:
“In addition to this, other labor was supplied to the German
armament industry earlier—namely, first of all, 3,500 boys and
500 girls to the Junkers Works; secondly, 2,000 boys and 700
girls to the OT...
“The agency under the Hitler Youth has procured from the
Occupied Eastern Territories for the armament industry”—I leave
out what does not interest us—“5,500 boys and 1,200 girls.”
Did you authorize the use of this labor, or did this matter pass through
your hands?
SAUCKEL: No.
DR. SERVATIUS; How was this labor brought into the armament industry?
SAUCKEL: Well, I personally am unable to explain that in detail.
Apparently this took place on the basis of an agreement between offices
of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories or those of
Hauptbannführer Nickel. I have heard only during the proceedings here
that the young people involved were of an age at which work is
prohibited for them. I understood that it was more in the nature of
pre-employment care, but...
DR. SERVATIUS: That is known.
SAUCKEL: It did not go through me or through my office.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the use of foreign women?
SAUCKEL: Women from foreign countries were used in exactly the same way
as German women. No other conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 025-PS has been submitted here. That is
Exhibit Number USA-698, which was also submitted only now and is not
contained in the books. This is the record of a conference which took
place in your office and in which you spoke at length on the use of
female labor. In the third paragraph it says:
“To this end, the Führer has ordered the use of 400,000 to
500,000 female Eastern Workers from the Ukraine, between the
ages of 15 to 35, for domestic purposes; and the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor”—that is you—“has been
charged with the carrying through of this action, which is to be
concluded in approximately 3 months.”
It goes on:
“It is the specific wish of the Führer that as many girls as
possible shall be germanized if they prove satisfactory.”
Will you please comment on this?
SAUCKEL: Yes, this concerns a decree of the Führer to bring 400,000 to
500,000 female Eastern Workers into the Reich for German households, but
especially in order to lighten the work of the German farmers’ wives. I
should like to mention, in connection with this document, that I did not
compile it and that my office did not compile it either. Most likely
these minutes were written on the basis of notes which somebody had
taken. With reference to these proposed 400,000 to 500,000 domestic
servants, it must be said that they were to be brought into the Reich
only on a voluntary basis. Actually some 13,000 to 15,000 only, I
believe, came into the Reich. The idea of “Germanization,” as used here,
also refers only to their free will or wish to remain in Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: What medical attention did the foreign workers receive?
Various things have been mentioned here, for instance: “If the worker
can no longer work, he is no longer a concern of ours,” which is
supposed to have been a principle of yours. Then it is further said that
work, food, and pay must be brought into relationship with each other.
If the worker can no longer work, he is just a dead weight. What can you
say with regard to these accusations?
SAUCKEL: Would you show me where I said that? I am not familiar with it.
DR. SERVATIUS: This is in the transcript of a court session; I have the
page here, in the German transcript, 2789 (Volume V, Pages 394, 395). It
says there that if the worker can no longer work, no concern should be
given to his fate. Did you advocate this principle?
SAUCKEL: On the contrary; there exist hundreds of precise decrees and
orders which I issued. They were published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_,
in special issues sent to the factories and to the labor exchanges and
in special collections, in which it is set down most clearly that the
foreign workers who were brought into the Reich through the Allocation
of Labor had to be treated in accordance with German laws, regulations,
and directives as far as medical treatment and care, including
insurance, were concerned. There were also...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, were you putting to the defendant a
document where it was alleged he had said that after they were unfit to
work, that it is no more his concern? Was it the document you were
putting to him?
DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted to him with regard to the
female workers of whom he is alleged to have said that they were to be
germanized. I am no longer dealing with that document, but have turned
to the question of medical care.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that was in Document 025-PS, Exhibit USA-698?
DR. SERVATIUS: That document, Number 025-PS, refers only to female
workers. This question has already been dealt with. I have turned to the
question of medical care in general and am no longer dealing with the
question of female workers.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you receive reports about abominable
conditions regarding the health and the medical care of foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: No. Not only German physicians were employed as official
physicians in the factories and camps to deal with the hygiene and
health of the workers, but also numerous physicians and medical
assistants from the home countries of the foreign workers were engaged
and assigned to these camps.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you supervise the execution of your decrees, and
what other controlling agencies existed?
SAUCKEL: There were the following controlling agencies: first of all...
DR. SERVATIUS: Just a moment. I should like to refer to Document
Sauckel-2. In it I have made a survey of the control and inspection
agencies concerned with supervision. I shall explain this diagram
briefly:
In the center, there is the Reich Ministry of Labor, under Seldte;
underneath that, the trade inspection boards, including the police
department for trade and town planning. That was the only department
which had police powers—that is, it could take action against any
resistance on the part of those recruited for work. Besides this,
several other official agencies were created to handle the difficult
problem of welfare. There is, first of all, if you look at the
right-hand side, the German Labor Front, an agency encompassing the
interests of the employers, the industry, and the workers, and in some
respects taking the place occupied in the past by the trade unions. From
there matters of welfare were turned over to the factories. A special
inspection board was created, the Reich Inspection Office of the German
Labor Front, with a department for foreign workers which had its own
liaison men in the factories to hear complaints. In the factories
themselves there were also foreign workers who were able to report on
conditions there.
Then, turning further to the right, is the Reich Ministry for Food and
Agriculture which, through the regional food offices, also had direct
insight into questions pertaining to food and welfare. The reports which
went to the Reich Foreign Minister through diplomatic channels were
eventually also passed on to Sauckel, as we shall see later.
Then there is a special department for Eastern Workers under the
Rosenberg Ministry—that is the central agency for the peoples of the
East—and this last letter which we had here, apparently came from one
of the gentlemen in this agency. This central agency for the peoples of
the East in turn also had its agents in the factories and works, and
they made reports directly. All these reports were turned over to
Sauckel.
Now, I turn to the left part of the diagram. Sauckel himself instituted
for inspectional purposes a personal staff which was sent around to
visit factories. We heard from several witnesses that these inspectors
appeared and saw to it that everything was in order. Then he established
a special office, the Reich Inspectorate. Complaints which came from the
German Labor Front and other sources were sent to this inspectorate.
When Sauckel says that he immediately passed on these complaints, they
were sent first to the Reich Inspectorate, which in turn advised the
necessary offices and, if need be, applied the compulsory measures of
the Reich Labor Ministry. Then also the Gauleiter were given the task of
supervision, and the witnesses who have appeared here—witnesses who
were Gauleiter in their time—have confirmed that they exercised control
as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor. Further to the left is
shown the care and control exercised by the Reich Ministry for
Propaganda which had taken over a supervisory function concerning the
direction of the camps and the workers. Then, finally on the far left,
comes the Wehrmacht which had its own supervisory machinery through its
inspectors, who were entrusted with the prisoners of war and who saw to
it that the conventions were observed.
The reports of all these agencies were sent to Sauckel, and he testified
here that abominable conditions were not reported to him, that he could
make his influence felt only through directives, and that he gave his
instructions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, will you ask the defendant whether that
was a correct statement on the meaning of the chart?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, this explanation, which I have given, and this
diagram, which you have seen, are they correct?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: They are correct?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Would you comment now on the activity of the Gauleiter as
plenipotentiaries? How did you supervise the Gauleiter?
SAUCKEL: I could not supervise the Gauleiter themselves, as I had no
disciplinary or official control over them. But I had the Gaue visited
by members of my staff at intervals of about 3 months. On the occasion
of these visits the complaints of the Gauleiter were heard and then
factories and camps were inspected jointly and a check was made to see
how far my directives were, or were not, carried out. I should like to
remark that these inspectors naturally were not allowed any control in
concentration camps and the work in the concentration camps; that was a
different field which was under the control of Obergruppenführer Pohl
and in which I had no authority and no insight.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): I ask permission
for the Defendant Von Papen to be absent from the court sessions
tomorrow morning and afternoon. I need a fairly long consultation with
him for the preparation of his defense which I would not be able to have
otherwise. Dr. Flexner will represent him during the session.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, a report
is made that the Defendant Göring is absent.
THE PRESIDENT: As I said this morning, the Tribunal will rise at 4 this
afternoon.
DR. SERVATIUS: This morning we got as far as the inspections, but I
should like to go back to one question.
You said that the head of the factory was responsible for the workers.
Did that also apply to the prisoner-of-war and concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: No. The Army, or that part of the Armed Forces under the
authority of which these prisoners of war were kept, was responsible for
the prisoner-of-war camps. In the same way, as far as I know, the
concentration camps alone were responsible for their inmates, even if
they worked.
DR. SERVATIUS: You had formed a Department 9 as a Reich inspection
department in the Reich Ministry of Labor. What were the special tasks
of this inspection department?
SAUCKEL: I had set up that inspection department, which had not existed
before in the Ministry of Labor, because I wanted to ascertain the
uniformity and execution of contracts throughout the entire area of the
Reich, as well as in the occupied territories where German undertakings
and German labor contracts were being carried out; also to examine and
control the unified administrative regulations; and, moreover, to see
whether my orders concerning food, lodging, treatment, and care were
being observed and to what extent they were in need of change. All this
was also contained in a directive which I gave to the inspection
department.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Inspection
Department in the German Labor Front—the Central Inspection Department
for the care of foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department of the DAF had the task of
supervising the welfare of foreign workers in the camps in Germany to
see whether they were being fed, and so on, in the prescribed way.
DR. SERVATIUS: If there were any abuses, did the Inspection Department
report that to you; or who received the report?
SAUCKEL: An agreement between the Führer, the German Labor Front, Dr.
Ley, and myself, was added as a supplement to the decree concerning the
formation of the Central Inspection Department, and it stated that where
it was a question of conditions in camps the Central Inspection
Department had to deal directly with the Reich offices concerned, or
with the industrial inspection office in the Reich Labor Ministry, in
order to remedy the conditions; whereas cases of shortage or surplus of
manpower, _et cetera_, were to be reported to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: By this agreement, therefore, your rights were limited?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document 1913-PS, which has been submitted. It is
an agreement between Sauckel and Dr. Ley of 20 September 1943. It is
Exhibit USA-227. It is Document Number 41 in the English document book.
I shall only refer to it, without quoting from it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What other kinds of supervisory offices
existed? I am thinking about the French.
SAUCKEL: Well, after I took office, men were appointed to act as liaison
agents with the foreign workers. These men, in agreement with the German
Labor Front, had the right to visit camps, talk to the workers
themselves, and hear their complaints. A special agreement had been
reached with the French Government in collaboration with the Reich
Foreign Minister.
DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-31. It is on Page 79 of the
English text in the Sauckel Document Book Number 1, “French Agency for
the Care of the French Employed in the Reich.” That is a circular from
Sauckel dated 30 April 1942. I submit the document itself, which is in
this collection. I quote:
“I communicate the following letter from the Foreign Office of
10 April 1942:
“The Government of the Reich has notified the French Government
that it agrees to the following regulations regarding the care
of French voluntary workers in Germany:
“Besides the already existing office for prisoners of war, an
agency for French civilian workers will be established in Berlin
under the direction of Ambassador Scapini. The Reich Government
will furnish a building to house this agency. The agency may
establish branch offices in four other German cities.
“The agency is charged with the care of the French workers in
Germany. It will supervise the fulfillment of the contracts made
by the workers engaged. It may accept proposals from the workers
and transmit them to the competent offices, and see that
unsatisfactory conditions are remedied. It is entitled to issue
certificates and references to the workers for submission to the
French authorities.”
I omit one paragraph:
“Moreover, the head of the French representatives is granted the
diplomatic privileges of personal immunity for the execution of
his tasks, as well as exemption from German jurisdiction and
from coercion by the police.”
That is the citation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] How did that office actually work with
you?
SAUCKEL: That office actually worked with both the DAF and with me. The
representative of that office took part in the negotiations in France
with the French Government. The office changed later to the extent that
the care of the civilian workers was taken over by M. Brunedon in the
place of M. Scapini who looked after prisoners of war only.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, it was only a change of personnel?
SAUCKEL: Yes, it was only a change of personnel. I frequently talked
with these gentlemen and acted according to their wishes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did the Central Inspection Department for the
peoples of the Eastern Territories do?
SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department for the peoples of the
Eastern Territories was an office under the Reich Commissioner for the
Eastern Territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did that office work?
SAUCKEL: It worked in the same way as the French office, except that it
was a German organization and Germans were in charge. It had the
confidence of the Eastern Workers who worked with us as allies.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any complaints from that side?
SAUCKEL: None, apart from the cases which Rosenberg reported to me and
which I discussed with him. Everything was attended to there.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to the question of the maintenance of labor
discipline. What sort of regulations were there in order to maintain
labor discipline—punctuality and good work? What kind of regulations
existed?
SAUCKEL: In Germany the regulations concerning labor discipline was a
matter for the factories themselves. Each factory had its regulations
which in normal times were agreed to between the management, the
foreman, and the workers’ council. This council could take disciplinary
action in the form of fines. During the war labor discipline had become
more strict, because owing to the scarcity of workers it was not
possible to maintain the right of the employer or the employee to give
notice. So the German worker, and German labor and industry were under
wartime decrees and laws. In order to enforce these, I later issued
Decree Number 13 at the suggestion of the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich. This decree, which has been submitted, provides,
first of all, for varying degrees of punishment within the industries
for infractions of labor regulations, tardiness and unexcused absence
from work.
DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-23 in the Sauckel document book;
in the English text, Number 1, Page 62. The witness has given you the
essential contents. I merely refer to it now.
SAUCKEL: These measures within the industries for the maintenance of
labor discipline started with a warning, and then went up to a fine, or
the loss of a day’s or week’s pay.
DR. SERVATIUS: What happened in the case of gross offenses?
SAUCKEL: If they could not be dealt with by the courts of honor of the
Labor Front, cases of constant and obstinate bad conduct had to be
reported to the police.
DR. SERVATIUS: This law applied to foreigners as well as to Germans?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that applied to Germans and foreigners.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done in case of criminal offenses?
SAUCKEL: They also had to be reported to the police. The labor
authorities had no competence in criminal and similar cases.
DR. SERVATIUS: To whom were the complaints sent if the regulations were
not applied correctly; that is, if instead of fines corporal punishment
had been inflicted?
SAUCKEL: Complaints of this kind were sent to the Labor Front, or to the
liaison men for the foreign workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were any such cases reported to you?
SAUCKEL: None were reported to me, because that was not within my
competence.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the labor correction camps?
SAUCKEL: They were institutions of the Reichsführer SS.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who was put into these camps?
SAUCKEL: Those who were punished by the authorities for infractions of
labor discipline which could not be dealt with by the factory
regulations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they the same as concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: No; in my opinion, no. These labor training camps were not
under the supervision of the Reich Labor Ministry, nor under mine. They
were a police institution.
DR. SERVATIUS: You know from these proceedings that quite a number of
workers did, in fact, come into the concentration camps. How can you
explain that?
I shall hand you Document 1063-PS, Exhibit USA-219. It is a letter of 17
December 1942; in the English document book it is Number 28 of the Slave
Labor Book. It is a letter marked “Secret,” sent by the Chief of the
Security Police and the SD to all SS offices; at any rate, not to you. I
quote:
“For reasons of war necessity which cannot be discussed further
here, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police ordered
on 14 December 1942 that by the end of January 1943, at the
latest, at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to
the concentration camps. In order to obtain this number, the
following measures are required: 1. As from now (until 1
February 1943) Eastern Workers, and those foreign workers who
are fugitives, or have broken their contracts ... are to be
brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration
camps....”
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably the witness knows the document.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that document?
SAUCKEL: I saw that document here for the first time.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have not yet looked through it?
SAUCKEL: I saw an excerpt here in Nuremberg for the first time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to draw your attention to the decisive
passage. Will you please read at the bottom of the first page. It says
the following:
“In case of necessity, offices not directly involved must be
given to understand that each and every one of these measures is
an indispensable Security Police measure, and be told the
specific reasons in individual cases, so that complaints can be
prevented, or at any rate eliminated.”
What did you know about that decree?
SAUCKEL: Nothing was known to me about that decree. It explains many
things which puzzled us. It appears to be a letter from Gruppenführer
Müller and, to my surprise, it states quite clearly that other
offices—and they can only refer to my offices or Speer’s—should be
informed that these measures are necessary Security Police measures.
That was downright fraud with the intention of misleading us.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand...
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document—I understood the
defendant to say that workers were sent to labor camps for infraction of
labor rules. That was what you said, wasn’t it?
SAUCKEL: If workers, in spite of repeated warnings and fines in the
factory, did not show improvement or continued the offenses, they were
reported by the factories, not by me, to a police office. As far as I
know, this police office had an agreement with the Reich Minister of
Justice according to which...
THE PRESIDENT: I asked you where they were sent when you said that they
were sent to labor camps for infraction of labor rules, and for no other
reason. Did you say that?
SAUCKEL: For no other reason; for infractions or for criminal offenses.
THE PRESIDENT: Then how do you explain the first words of Paragraph 1 of
this document:
“As from now, all Eastern Workers must be sent to the nearest
concentration camps...”?
SAUCKEL: It says here, in the German text, Your Lordship:
“As from now, until 1 February 1943, Eastern Workers, and those
foreign workers who are fugitives, or who have broken contracts,
or who do not belong to allied, friendly, or neutral states, are
to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration
camps, in observance of the necessary formalities as given under
Figure 3.”
That is the arbitrary directive of that office which I did not know
about.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by “extermination by labor”?
SAUCKEL: I heard that expression “extermination by labor” for the first
time here in the courtroom. Such a concept was of necessity absolutely
contrary to the interests which I stood for in my position.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the employment of
concentration camp inmates?
SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of concentration camp
inmates, and I also told my colleagues that we would have nothing to do
with the employment of that kind of labor. I had nothing to do with
punitive measures of any kind.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who put the concentration camp inmates to work in the
armament industries?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from personal knowledge because I had
nothing to do with it, and I never participated in discussions dealing
with this subject.
DR. SERVATIUS: It has been alleged here that you used the Nacht and
Nebel Order to get workers to Germany.
SAUCKEL: I did not know the Nacht and Nebel Order. I only found out
about it here. It had nothing to do with the allocation of labor and my
duties.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the employment of Jewish workers?
SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of Jews. That was
exclusively the task of the Reichsführer of the SS.
DR. SERVATIUS: I submit the Document R-91. That is Exhibit USA-241, and
Exhibit RF-347. It is not included in the document books. It is a letter
from the Chief of Security Police and SD Müller to the Reichsführer SS,
field headquarters, dated 16 December 1942. It says there, and I quote:
“In connection with the increased assignment of manpower to the
KL”—that should probably read KZ—“which is ordered to take
place before 30 January 1943, the following procedure may be
applied in the Jewish sector: total number, 45,000 Jews.”
Then there is a more detailed specification, and among other things, it
says at the end, “3,000 Jews from the occupied territories of the
Netherlands,” and further, “The number 45,000 includes those unfit for
work....”
What had you to do with that letter?
SAUCKEL: I have just learned of that letter for the first time. I did
not know of it before, and I can only emphasize that these transports
and this procedure had nothing to do with my work, and that I had
nothing to do with them at any time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then we have here Document L-61, which has been
submitted. That is Exhibit USA-177; in the English document book on
slave labor, it is Document Number 6. The document is in the first list
of documents which was made available to the Defense, and it was listed
as an original letter from Sauckel which admitted the deportation of
Jews.
Will you please read this letter to yourself and state your position as
to how far you had anything to do with the deportation of Jews. I shall
briefly state what the contents are. It says there in that letter of 26
November 1942:
“By agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD,
Jews who are still in employment are from now on also to be
evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced
by Poles who are being deported from the Government General.”
This letter ends by saying:
“I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as
this affects the removal of Jews employed in your area, I
request that you take the necessary measures in agreement with
the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and
the SD.”
Then it says, “Signed, Fritz Sauckel.”
Will you state your position with respect to that letter, please?
SAUCKEL: May I say with respect to this document that it was shown to me
already in the preliminary interrogations. I had it only for a short
time then, and when it was presented to me again in the course of the
proceedings I found that it was not an original document which I had
signed. My name is typewritten at the bottom.
Secondly, it appears very peculiar to me that this letter, which I am
supposed to have signed, was not dated by my office. My office, as can
be seen from numerous documents, was in Berlin, in Mohrenstrasse. This
letter was dated by the Saarlandstrasse office.
As far as the contents are concerned, I have to state that I at no time
had a personal arrangement or agreement with the SD and Security Police
in the sense of that letter; neither had I any knowledge of that letter,
and I cannot remember it now either. The only thing in that letter which
is correct is that I was obliged to replace the loss of manpower in
German industry—whether Jews, soldiers, or others—within 2 weeks. It
is possible that this letter came from the Saarlandstrasse office, from
a subordinate office. I cannot say anything else about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: How is it, then, that the ending, “Signed, Fritz Sauckel”
is on the letter?
SAUCKEL: I cannot understand that. If it were an authentic copy, it
would have had to be signed.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original?
DR. SERVATIUS: No, I have not got the original. It has been submitted by
the Prosecution and is therefore in the files of the Tribunal as an
exhibit.
SAUCKEL: The appendix deals with events which also occurred before my
time in office—that is, before I came into office these happenings had
practically all taken place.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any knowledge as to what would happen to the
Jews?
SAUCKEL: Do you mean...?
DR. SERVATIUS: The final solution.
SAUCKEL: No, I had no knowledge of that. It would have made my task much
easier and I would have had much less difficulty if all these people, as
far as they were capable of working, had been brought into the labor
plan in a more reasonable manner. I knew absolutely nothing about this
final solution, and it was entirely contrary to my interest.
DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, who was responsible for
the regulation of wages?
SAUCKEL: I was responsible for the regulation of wages during my term of
office.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of wages were paid? Leave out the Eastern
people for the moment.
SAUCKEL: In principle, all foreign workers were paid the wages which had
been agreed upon by contract with the liaison offices and the
governments, and which were in accordance with the wage scales
recognized as legal in the different regions in Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the so-called Eastern Workers?
SAUCKEL: As far as the Eastern Workers were concerned, when I took
office I found that under the existing regulations most of their wages
were deducted as taxes in favor of the Reich. This was in accordance
with a decree of the Ministerial Council for National Defense.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you satisfied with that, or did you take steps to
improve conditions?
SAUCKEL: It can be seen from the documents—that is to say, from the
decrees which I issued during my term of office—that these regulations,
which I considered intolerable, were improved step by step, as far as I
was able to overcome opposition, until in 1944 the Eastern Worker stood
on the same level as the German worker. The first improvement was made
in June 1942 when wages were doubled, the second in 1943, and the last
in March 1944, by Decree 11.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to the following documents, which I shall
not read: Document Sauckel-50, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 134;
Document Sauckel-17, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 137; Document
Sauckel-52, Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 143; Document Sauckel-58,
Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 156; and finally, Document Sauckel-58(a),
Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 161. I submit the original in a
collection, “Regulations Governing Allocation of the Eastern Workers.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I understood the defendant to say just now
that that Document L-61 was drawn up before he took charge of the labor
commitment.
DR. SERVATIUS: It refers to things which existed before his term of
office and were almost completed at the time when that letter was
drafted—that is, that state of things already existed.
THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing in the document to show that, is there?
DR. SERVATIUS: It can be seen from the date.
THE PRESIDENT: The date is 26 November 1942.
DR. SERVATIUS: The appendix refers to a decree of 27 March 1942. The
second appendix, if we go back further, is an appendix of 21 January
1942 which also deals with that question. What we have quoted here was
only the last letter, the final letter.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. We have not got the full document before us then.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will submit it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Regarding the wages of the Eastern
Workers, did the Eastern Workers receive any remuneration besides these
wages?
SAUCKEL: The Eastern Workers, as a result of my efforts, received
remuneration in the form of premiums for good work, and Christmas
bonuses, in the same way as the German workers; and in addition there
was an agreement with the Eastern Ministry according to which the
families of Eastern Workers were to receive the amount of 130 rubles per
month upon request.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to some documents. They are Document
Sauckel-22, in the English book, Volume I, Page 9; a decree, Document
Sauckel-54, concerning premiums, which is in Volume II, Page 151; and
Document Sauckel-57, concerning Christmas bonuses, Volume II, Page 155.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What remained for the Eastern Workers in
cash wages?
SAUCKEL: When I started in office—that is before the regulations
introduced by me—the Eastern Worker, after his expenses for food and
lodging had been deducted, had about 4 marks 60 pfennigs per week left
over, if one takes as an average example the rate of 60 pfennigs an hour
for an average worker in German industry.
The same worker’s net pay, or “Freibetrag” as it was called, was
increased in June 1942, after I had had an opportunity of looking into
these things, by about 100 percent to 9.10 marks.
May I state that it would have been quite impossible for a German worker
at the same wage level to have had more left over for saving when one
considers his taxes and social contributions, his expenses for rent,
heating, and food. That was the principle laid down for me by the
Ministerial Council for Reich Defense for the payment of this labor. It
was not my wish. However, as early as March or April 1943 the wage of
the Russian worker, again due to my intervention, was increased to about
12 marks, and in the spring of 1944 it was increased to about 18 marks.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to have all this in detail. There
is no particular charge against the defendant that he did not pay any of
the workers, is there? I mean, he says, he paid them and we do not want
the details of the number of marks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the accusation of slave labor has been
made, and this as a rule is unpaid labor. The French report, Document
RF-22, has estimated a loss of 77 milliards which is supposed to have
been suffered by France through the use of her workers. It is
interesting to hear at least...
THE PRESIDENT: You do not want exact details of it, do you?
DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the defendant._] What have you to say about
the facilities for transferring these wages?
SAUCKEL: I first had to create facilities for transferring wages,
because the only real attraction for a foreign worker to work in Germany
was that he could support his family at home by sending part of his
earnings to his native country. That was done on the basis of agreements
reached with the President of the German Reichsbank. He himself has
testified to that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, I refer to Document
021-PS, which has been submitted as F-44. It is not in either of the
document books. It is dated 2 April 1943. It shows how rates of pay were
calculated and deals with the improvement of the wages of Eastern
Workers. I do not want to quote it in detail; but a study will reveal
that serious attempts were made here to bring about an improvement and
an equalization.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the duration of labor contracts?
SAUCKEL: The duration of labor contracts depended on agreements which
had been concluded with the governments in question. For the western and
southern countries the contract was for 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year.
As for the eastern countries and the Soviet workers, when I came to
office, the existing regulations provided for an indefinite period. As I
considered a definite period to be necessary in spite of the greater
distances, here too I finally succeeded in obtaining a time limit of 2
years.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it intended to continue to use this manpower after
the war, and were these foreign workers to remain in Germany? I ask that
question because the French Prosecution quoted the following passage
from the book, _Work for Europe_, Exhibit RF-5, Page 23:
“A large percentage of foreign workers will remain in our
country even after the victory, and then, having been trained
for construction work, they will continue and complete the
projects interrupted by the war.”
From that was it concluded that forced labor was to continue even after
the war?
SAUCKEL: That was partly or entirely the opinion of the author of that
article, but I believe that it was also mentioned that the workers would
return home and there use, for the benefit of their own homeland, the
knowledge and skill which they had gained from new work in Germany. I
had absolutely no intention of keeping foreign workers in Germany after
the war, and in any case I could not have done so. On the contrary, I
even ordered that a card index of foreign workers, a central register,
should be carefully kept on the basis of which, in case of a favorable
conclusion of the war, it would be possible for me faithfully to return
these workers to their native countries and have a record of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: If I understood you correctly, it was not a question of
forcibly retaining the workers, but of keeping them here by recruitment?
SAUCKEL: Yes; it was not reported to me that a large number of foreign
workers wanted to stay in Germany of their own accord. That is an
assumption.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the compulsory labor? What was the duration of
the contracts?
SAUCKEL: There was no difference in pay or length of contract between
voluntary work and compulsory work, or what we called in the language of
the decree, “Dienstverpflichtungen.” This held true for all countries.
If a Frenchman doing compulsory labor had a contract for 6 or 9 months,
he had the same right as the voluntary worker to return after 9 months.
It was possible to extend the period.
DR. SERVATIUS: In which cases was the contract extended?
SAUCKEL: The contract was extended when the worker wanted of his own
free will to continue his services, or when there was an emergency or
shortage of manpower in a particular factory which justified an
extension. Then that had to be arranged with the liaison officers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Besides civilian workers, were prisoners of war also used
in Germany? What did you have to do with that use of manpower?
SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war was quite complicated,
because it had to take place in agreement with the general in charge of
the Prisoners of War Organization. The so-called technique of
transposition caused me difficulties. Allow me to explain this.
There existed the Geneva Convention, or the Hague Convention, according
to which prisoners of war could not be used in armament or ammunition
industries. When, however, we spoke of prisoners of war being engaged in
the armament industry that meant that so-and-so many German women or
workers were transferred to industries in which the Geneva Convention
prohibited the use of prisoners of war, and that prisoners of war took
their place. That was done in agreement with the offices of the general
in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who saw to it that the Geneva Convention was
observed?
SAUCKEL: The general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization and
we ourselves, or the “Arbeitseinsatz” administration, adhered to the
rules of the Geneva Convention and several times compiled a catalog of
the types of work for which prisoners of war could be used. Also during
my time, in 1943 and 1944, a special edition of this catalog was
published, and it can be found in the so-called _Blue Book_.
DR. SERVATIUS: Have you known cases where prisoners of war were used
contrary to the Geneva Convention?
SAUCKEL: Certain agreements were made with the French Government, as far
as volunteers were concerned, and this applied to a certain extent to
Eastern Workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who was responsible for the housing, feeding, and care of
prisoners of war?
SAUCKEL: The offices of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War
Organization were solely responsible.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that millions of prisoners of war had
perished by the time you had assumed office?
SAUCKEL: It had become known to me before I assumed office that a great
number of prisoners of war perished in the so-called battles of
encirclement in the East. These battles lasted a long time, and owing to
our enormous transport difficulties we could not move the prisoners, and
they were left on the battlefield in a state of utmost exhaustion. That
is all I know about that.
DR. SERVATIUS: At the beginning of your activities you had to deal with
prisoners of war, had you not? What did you find out at that time, or
what did you do?
SAUCKEL: I found out that some of the Russian prisoners of war were
terribly undernourished.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do?
SAUCKEL: Together with the general in charge of the Prisoners of War
Organization I arranged for all these prisoners of war—as far as I know
and remember there were about 70,000 in the Reich at that time—to be
billeted with German farmers, in order to build up their strength. The
farmers were obliged to feed these prisoners of war for at least 3
months, without putting them to work. As compensation the farmers were
given the assurance that these prisoners of war would stay with them and
work for them until the end of the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: During the course of the war did prisoners of war obtain
the status of free laborers?
SAUCKEL: Yes. As far as French workers were concerned, I was
instrumental in seeing that they were employed only by agreement with
the French Government. These agreements were concluded under the
sponsorship of the German Ambassador in Paris. The quotas were
negotiated in accordance with instructions given me by the Führer and by
the Reich Marshal. The first quota was 250,000 French laborers and
150,000 skilled workers.
As a compensation for the use of these voluntary workers—and I
emphasize voluntary—50,000 French prisoners of war who were farmers
were to be, and actually were, returned to the French Government in
order to improve the cultivation of French farm land.
That was the first agreement.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the _Relève_?
SAUCKEL: The _Relève_ was an agreement between the French Government and
my office according to which for every three French workers who came to
Germany one French prisoner-of-war was released and sent home by the
Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who brought about this agreement?
SAUCKEL: This agreement was concluded on the basis of a discussion
between the French Premier and myself. I was much in favor of this
agreement, because I myself spent 5 years behind barbed wire during the
first World War.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did it make it easier for the prisoners? Did they return
home?
SAUCKEL: Yes, they returned home.
DR. SERVATIUS: And how did the civilian population react to that? Above
all, how did the workers feel who had to go to Germany?
SAUCKEL: This was an act of comradeship, and according to the reports I
received the feeling was favorable.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then in reality instead of one prisoner-of-war there were
three imprisoned workers?
SAUCKEL: No. These workers could move about freely in Germany in the
same way as the other French workers and the German population.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they have to come to Germany for an indefinite period
of time?
SAUCKEL: No, they stayed according to the length of their contracts,
just like the other workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the average duration of a contract?
SAUCKEL: 9 months.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the result was that after 9 months the prisoners of
war, as well as the other workers, could return home?
SAUCKEL: Yes. This continual exchange necessitated new quotas and new
agreements with the French Government, for there always had to be
replacements.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these negotiations carried on under a certain
pressure?
SAUCKEL: No. I beg you to hear witnesses on this. They were conducted on
a free diplomatic basis.
DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was this _Relève_ carried through? Was it
on a very large or only on a small scale?
SAUCKEL: It was carried out on the basis of 250,000 workers who were to
go to Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: The French Prosecution in their government report said
that only weak and sick people were sent back who could not work anyway.
What have you to say to that?
SAUCKEL: As far as I know, French soldiers who were prisoners of war
were sent back. The sending back and the selection of the soldiers was
not my task but that of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War
Organization. I consider it possible that sick soldiers were also sent
back to their homes in this way if they wished it. But certainly it was
not the intention to send back only sick or older soldiers, but soldiers
in general. That was the basis of the agreement.
DR. SERVATIUS: There was a second course which was chosen—the improved
status which the French called “transformation.” What kind of
arrangement was that?
SAUCKEL: The improved status was a third agreement which included the
provision that French prisoners of war in Germany were given the same
contracts and the same status as all other French civilian workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: When a new French worker came to Germany? The ratio
therefore was 1 to 1?
SAUCKEL: 1 to 1.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did these French workers have to bind themselves
indefinitely, or was there a time limit here too?
SAUCKEL: Exactly the same as applied to the _Relève_.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was this improvement in status welcomed by the French
soldiers, or did they disapprove of it?
SAUCKEL: They did not disapprove of it but welcomed it, according to the
attitude of the individual soldier. A large number rejected it; others
accepted it gladly, for by this measure the workers received high wages
and all the liberties that were accorded outside the barbed wire, and
the like. I myself saw how an entire camp accepted this new status. They
had been told that the gates and barbed wire would be done away with,
the prisoner regulations discontinued, and the surveillance abolished.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could these prisoners who had been turned into workers
also go home?
SAUCKEL: My documents show that they were allowed to go home.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they receive any furlough?
SAUCKEL: Yes, they did. Many of them came back, and an equally large
number did not.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to refer to Document RF-22, German text,
Page 70 of the French Government report. This document shows and admits
that the prisoners received leave to go home at the beginning of this
transformation, and I quote, “The unfortunate men did not return,
however, and therefore this procedure was discontinued.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you heard of the idea, “indirect
forced labor”?
SAUCKEL: No. Please explain it to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the Tribunal._] The French report contains
the argument that those workers who worked in France in armament
industries did so for the benefit of Germany. Sauckel was not connected
with this in any way. This French report, which deals at length with the
economic side of the Arbeitseinsatz, says that it worked according to a
well-conceived and flexible system, and at first negotiations were
friendly. The measures then became harsher in accordance with the
circumstances.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Was there a definite plan? Did you have to
carry out certain instructions, or what system was adopted?
SAUCKEL: I should like to be allowed to explain this. A plan of the sort
you have just outlined never existed. The only thing towards which I
worked was the program which I drew up and which is in the possession of
the Tribunal; a program which I admit, and for which I take all the
consequences and the responsibility, even for my subordinates. This
program was carried out through my decrees, which are also available in
full. The development of the war did not permit me to give full
consideration to the circumstances which now, _post factum_, appear
obvious. We ourselves stood in the midst of the flow of events as the
war developed and did not have time to ponder over such matters.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the “Sperrbetriebe” and the “Ausnahmebetriebe”
in France?
SAUCKEL: The Sperrbetriebe were industries which were the result of an
agreement between Reich Minister Speer and, I believe, the French
Minister of Economics, Bichelonne. They were industries which worked
partly for German armaments and partly for German civilian requirements,
and did not come under my offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the number of workers who were brought to
Germany from foreign countries?
SAUCKEL: The number of workers brought from foreign countries to
Germany, according to careful estimates and the records of the
statistical department of the Reich Ministry of Labor, might be said to
be about 5 million.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you determine how far these laborers were to be used,
and how many were to be brought in?
SAUCKEL: No, I could not determine that, for I did not represent the
German economy, and I myself could not decide the extent of the German
armament and agricultural programs.
DR. SERVATIUS: Apart from the current quotas which you had to supply,
there were certain so-called program orders made by the Führer. Is that
true?
SAUCKEL: Yes, because the Führer drew up the armament program, as far as
I know.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have told me of your programs. I shall read the
figures, and perhaps you can confirm them.
The first program in April 1942: the demand was for 1.6 million workers;
1.6 million were supplied, the entire figure being made up of
foreigners.
The second program in September 1942: 2 million, and 2 million were
supplied, of which 1 million, that is only half, were foreigners.
In 1943: the demand was for 1 million, and 1 million were supplied, the
entire figure being made up of foreign workers.
Then the last program on 4 January 1944: the Führer demanded 4 million,
and the demand met with 0.9 million.
SAUCKEL: Allow me to correct you. The figure should read, demand met
with 3 million.
DR. SERVATIUS: Demand 4 million; demand met with 3 million. And how many
were foreigners?
SAUCKEL: 0.9 million.
DR. SERVATIUS: 0.9 million foreigners. How many workers came from the
East, how many from the West, and how many from other regions?
SAUCKEL: I naturally cannot give you the exact figure here without data
or statistics, but on an average I would say that the figure for each
group might be about 30 percent; the percentage of workers from the East
was certainly somewhat higher.
DR. SERVATIUS: And how were the requirements ascertained?
SAUCKEL: Through the demands of the employers of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what were the employers of labor?
SAUCKEL: They were the Economic Ministry, the Armament Ministry, the
Agricultural Ministry, the various trades, the State Railways, the
mines, _et cetera_, all big undertakings.
DR. SERVATIUS: And to whom did they present their demands?
SAUCKEL: Usually the demand was made simultaneously to the Führer and to
me, or to the collecting agencies provided for by the Four Year Plan.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they the reduced requirements, if their demands had
to be checked, or were they the original demands?
SAUCKEL: I have just said that it varied. The demands were sent in to
me, and at the same time they were almost always sent to the Führer,
because the Führer had to approve these demands.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the position of the Central Planning Board?
SAUCKEL: The Central Planning Board was an office where above all, as
far as I know, the quotas for raw materials were fixed, but where
questions of work and manpower were also discussed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could you receive orders from the Central Planning Board?
SAUCKEL: Yes, the demands which were put to me I had to consider as
orders, for the Führer had laid on me the duty of meeting the demands of
the war economy.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you belong to the Central Planning Board yourself?
SAUCKEL: No, I was only called in when there were to be debates on the
use of manpower.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relationship between your office and
Speer’s?
SAUCKEL: My office had to meet the demands made by Speer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Speer have his own machinery for directing labor?
SAUCKEL: Yes, he had to have that in his ministry, and he did have it.
That was essential.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could you meet all the demands made of you?
SAUCKEL: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were your labor reserves exhausted?
SAUCKEL: According to my conviction, yes; for already in 1943—and it
was one of the purposes of my manifesto—I pointed out that the economic
problems of the occupied countries were very serious and had to be
regulated and settled so as to avoid confusion.
DR. SERVATIUS: What labor reserves were still left in Germany?
SAUCKEL: In Germany after 1943 there were no more really usable reserves
of manpower left. Many discussions took place on this problem, but the
labor most in demand was skilled labor, miners, and workers for the
heavy industries.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what manpower reserves were there to be gotten out of
France?
SAUCKEL: I must say that from our point of view, and according to our
judgment concerning economic and labor questions, there was a great deal
of manpower and very extensive reserves in the occupied territories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you mean that in comparison the economic forces of
Germany were far more exhausted than those of the occupied countries?
SAUCKEL: Perhaps I can show it by a comparison with the first World War.
In the first World War, 10 to 12 million Germans were mobilized for
labor. In this war about 25 million German men and women were used, and
more than half were women. I must add that all the women who did Red
Cross or other welfare work in Germany were not included in my
statistics. They were included in other countries.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have a concluding question: If you view your activity
as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor from today’s
standpoint, what would you say about the use of foreign labor in
general?
SAUCKEL: It is very hard for me to answer this question. I myself and
the entire German people were of the opinion, and had to be, that this
war was neither willed nor brought about by the German people—and, to
be truthful, I must include the Party. Our standpoint was that we had to
do our duty to our people.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is not intended that you should give an explanation in
the wider sense, but that you should limit yourself to the general
aspects of the question of labor allocation, and tell us whether today
you consider your activity justified or not.
SAUCKEL: From the point of view of the war situation and of German
economy, and as I saw and tried to carry out my allocation of labor, I
considered it justified, and, above all, inevitable; for Germany and the
countries we occupied were an economic whole that could not be split up.
Without such an exchange of eastern and western manpower Germany could
not have existed for even 1 day. The German people themselves were
working to the extreme limit of their capacity.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have concluded my questioning of the defendant.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Witness, did the
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories often try to cut down the
labor quotas demanded by you?
SAUCKEL: Not only the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
tried to do that, but I myself tried very hard to do so by intervening
with the Führer and all the employers of labor.
DR. THOMA: I should like to put several questions to you with regard to
Document Number 054-PS, which describes the abuses in the recruiting and
transporting of Eastern Workers. Did you personally take steps to put an
end to the abuses which are specified here?
SAUCKEL: Yes, of course. Please interrogate the witnesses on this.
DR. THOMA: Did you notice that this report deals with the city and the
region of Kharkov in the Ukraine, and do you know that this entire
district was never under the civilian administration of the Ministry for
the Occupied Eastern Territories?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I know that, and I testified that this report was not sent
to me but to an Army office. This Army office had its own labor
department which was directly subordinate to it.
DR. THOMA: In this report did you especially notice the following
paragraph on the first page:
“a) With few exceptions, the Ukrainians who are being employed
in the Reich as individual workers for example, in small trade
enterprises, on farms...”
SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me where it says that?
DR. THOMA: On Page 1, the last paragraph: “Judging from the discussions
with the gentlemen and the reading of the reports, it can be said in
general...”
SAUCKEL: Which documents? There are several documents.
DR. THOMA: I mean 054-PS, of course.
SAUCKEL: Which?
DR. THOMA: I think it is the first, second, third paragraph, “d”—the
second paragraph.
SAUCKEL: Yes, I have found it.
DR. THOMA: It says there that the Ukrainians who were being employed as
individual workers in the Reich, were “very satisfied with the
conditions.” But: “b. On the other hand the Ukrainians living in
community camps complain a great deal...”
Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: Yes. In my testimony I quoted the passage in which the author
of the letter said that this was the case during the first few months
only, for I immediately had the camps inspected and improved. I even
went so far as to get the Reich Labor Minister to issue new camp
regulations, all as a result of this complaint.
DR. THOMA: Did you personally visit the Occupied Eastern Territories on
several occasions and speak to the administrative authorities there; for
example, in Riga, Kovno, Zhitomir?
SAUCKEL: Not only did I speak to the administrative authorities there,
but I compiled this manifesto in Russia and had it published there, and
everything that is contained in the manifesto was communicated to these
offices in the same way.
DR. THOMA: Yes. But is it correct that you emphasized the special
urgency of the Führer decree?
SAUCKEL: That was my duty; that was what I was there for.
DR. THOMA: That is not right from the legal point of view; for your
actual authority came from Göring, as the Delegate for the Four Year
Plan.
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. The official channel was: Führer, Göring,
Four Year Plan—that was the order.
DR. THOMA: Then, if you said it was the Führer’s order, you did so to
give a special emphasis?
SAUCKEL: No, that was not my intention. The Führer commissioned me to
replace the loss of German soldiers, Doctor. These were instructions
which I had received directly from the Führer or Göring on the basis of
the requirements of the employers of labor.
DR. THOMA: Was a written order sent to you?
SAUCKEL: Yes, written orders were also sent.
DR. THOMA: From Hitler personally?
SAUCKEL: Yes, from Hitler and from Göring; from both of them.
DR. THOMA: Do you recall that you made an agreement with Rosenberg to
the effect that Eastern Workers in Germany, after their return to their
own country, were to receive land so that they would not be at a
disadvantage as compared with the people who had remained?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that was agreed between Rosenberg and myself; that is
correct.
DR. THOMA: Was this actually carried out?
SAUCKEL: Just how far this was carried out, I am unable to state. That
was a task for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. I
assume that it was carried out as far as possible.
DR. THOMA: Do you recall that Rosenberg constantly advocated the doing
away with the so-called Eastern Worker’s badge?
SAUCKEL: Rosenberg, as well as I myself, advocated the abolition of the
Eastern Worker’s badge. There is a letter from the Reichsführer SS
refusing this; but I know for certain that at the end of 1943 or the
beginning of 1944 we succeeded in abolishing this Eastern Worker’s
badge, and it was replaced by a national emblem as worn by the other
foreigners.
DR. THOMA: Why was this Eastern Worker’s badge to be abolished?
SAUCKEL: This Eastern Worker’s badge was to be abolished for various
reasons, but above all to eliminate the demoralizing effect produced on
the Eastern Workers by the wearing of a discriminating badge.
DR. THOMA: I have one last question. You said that you did not recall
having received any complaints except those that you discussed with
Rosenberg. Now, numerous complaints were constantly being investigated
by the Central Agency for Eastern People together with the DAF. Did the
DAF report to you on this?
SAUCKEL: The DAF reported that, in accordance with my directives, it had
to put a stop to abuses and bad conditions wherever they were found.
That was its duty. In order to remedy these abuses the DAF had not to
apply to me but to the trade inspection department of the Reich Ministry
of Labor, whose task it was.
DR. THOMA: Did you make sure whether this inspection department stopped
these abuses?
SAUCKEL: I installed my own inspection agencies there, as mentioned by
Dr. Servatius. However, the trade inspection department was the only
authorized agency which had the legal authority to use compulsory
measures and it was supervised by the Reich Labor Minister who had full
authority.
DR. THOMA: I have no further questions. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the emblem that you have been speaking about?
SAUCKEL: The Eastern Worker’s emblem or badge consisted of a
bluebordered square, which bore a blue inscription “Ost.” The
Reichsführer SS first ordered it to be worn on the right side of the
breast; later, on the sleeve. Still later I was instrumental in getting
this changed to a national emblem—blue, I think, or something
similar—like the Russian colors, as the people themselves wished.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Herr Sauckel, the
Defendant Keitel and the OKW are accused by the Prosecution of the
deportation of civilian people for the purposes of the mobilization of
labor. You were also interrogated before the start of this Trial as to
whether the OKW, and Keitel as Chief of the OKW, participated in the
procurement, recruitment, and conscription of people in the occupied
territories.
A number of things which were not clear and which are contained in the
record have been cleared up by your testimony. Especially in answering
the last question of my colleague, Dr. Thoma, you made it clear that the
organizational official channel was as follows: The Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor, the Four Year Plan—Göring, and the
Führer. Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: Generally speaking, yes.
DR. NELTE: I am interested in determining whether in this official
channel the OKW was included, or the Führer in some other function than
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.
SAUCKEL: I myself was not a soldier, and I am not familiar with the
detailed organization of the OKW and the OKH. It was often difficult for
a layman to make the distinction between these things. It is true that
the OKH was competent for the recruitment of workers in occupied
countries controlled by army groups. Therefore, labor regulations for
the occupied countries which were under the authority of the Army had to
be issued through laws or directives by the General Staff.
DR. NELTE: You probably mean the Quartermaster General of the Army?
SAUCKEL: The Quartermaster General was, as far as I know, next to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And by this you mean to say that the OKW and the Defendant
Keitel had no competence concerning the procuring, recruiting, and
conscripting of manpower in the occupied territories?
SAUCKEL: He had no competence in this respect. I came into contact with
Field Marshal Keitel, because the Führer repeatedly instructed me to ask
Field Marshal Keitel to transmit his orders to the army groups by
telephone or through directives.
DR. NELTE: And what about the question of the allocation of workers? Did
the OKW, and specifically the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, have
any competence concerning the allocation of workers at home?
SAUCKEL: No, for the workers were used in those economic branches for
which they had been demanded, and they had nothing at all to do with the
OKW.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic):
Defendant Sauckel, you joined the National Socialist Party in 1925,
didn’t you? Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: I joined the National Socialist Party for the first time, as an
ordinary member, as early as 1923. When the Party was reorganized in
1925 I again became a member.
M. HERZOG: But you had supported the policy of National Socialism since
1921, had you not?
SAUCKEL: From 1921 onwards, I supported a German policy. In 1921 I did
not as yet belong to the Party. I knew about the Party, and I was in
sympathy with its ideas; that is probably the right way to put it.
M. HERZOG: Did you not make speeches in favor of National Socialism from
that time on?
SAUCKEL: From about the middle of 1921 I made speeches in favor of
Germany, not expressly for the Party and only in a very small way, at
small gatherings, and as my conscience guided me.
M. HERZOG: You were Gauleiter, member of the Landrat, Minister of the
Interior, and Governor of Thuringia. Is it correct that in this capacity
you brought about the Nazification of your Gau?
SAUCKEL: I was Prime Minister of Thuringia from August 1932, and I was
Minister of the Interior as well.
M. HERZOG: I am asking you the question again: Is it correct that, in
your capacity as Gauleiter and Governor of Thuringia, you brought about
the Nazification of your Gau?
SAUCKEL: Nazification is a term with which I was neither familiar nor do
I consider it correct. I recruited for the National Socialist Party and
I supported it.
M. HERZOG: You were Obergruppenführer of the organization of the SS,
were you not?
SAUCKEL: I do not quite understand. Of the SS?
M. HERZOG: You were an Obergruppenführer of the SS?
SAUCKEL: I already stated in my preliminary interrogation that I was an
honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS. I myself never served in the SS,
nor did I exercise any functions in the SS.
M. HERZOG: When did you become Obergruppenführer of the SS?
SAUCKEL: As far as I remember I became an Obergruppenführer of the SS in
1934.
M. HERZOG: And you were that until when?
SAUCKEL: Until the end.
M. HERZOG: Among the documents which you have presented in your document
book, there is Document Sauckel-95. I will read the following passage on
Page 252 of the French translation:
“My dear fellow countrymen, our magnificent SA and SS,
persecuted and insulted during a whole decade as the scum of the
German people, have carried through, supported, and sustained
this revolution with an unshakable discipline....”
Is it correct...
THE PRESIDENT: From what are you reading?
M. HERZOG: From Document Sauckel-95 of the defendant’s document book;
Document Sauckel-95, which was submitted yesterday by the learned
counsel for the defense, Page 252 of the French translation. It is in
the third document book of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
M. HERZOG: I put the question again and read:
“My dear fellow countrymen, our magnificent SA and SS,
persecuted and insulted during a whole decade as the scum of the
German people, have carried through, supported, and sustained
this revolution with an unshakable discipline....”
Do you confirm this declaration?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I request that I be shown the document in
cross-examination so that I can define my attitude in detail.
M. HERZOG: This document is taken from your own document book, which you
yourself submitted.
SAUCKEL: Yes, I remember it well.
M. HERZOG: Were the Nuremberg Laws concerning Jews in accordance with
your convictions?
SAUCKEL: I had no influence on legislation such as culminated in the
Nuremberg Laws. My conviction is that every nation and every race has
the right to exist and to demand respect and protection through itself.
What I demand and have demanded for my own people is exactly the same.
M. HERZOG: Did you see to it that the Nuremberg Laws were strictly
applied in the Gau of Thuringia?
SAUCKEL: The Nuremberg Laws could apply to Thuringia only insofar as my
authority to appoint or dismiss employees was involved; and, of course,
according to German law, it was my duty to carry out the law. The
carrying out of this law by me entailed neither ill-usage nor any other
inhuman treatment.
M. HERZOG: Did you approve of Hitler’s theory of living space?
SAUCKEL: The Führer wrote about living space in his book. How far I
agreed or disagreed with him cannot, in my opinion, be dealt with in
this Trial, for I had no influence as to how the Führer himself should
interpret the word Lebensraum.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that you must answer the question,
whether or not you approve of the doctrine of Lebensraum.
SAUCKEL: I am not fully acquainted with the statements made by the
Führer about the doctrine of Lebensraum. I should like to emphasize that
I never thought of Lebensraum in connection with the carrying out of
wars, or wars of aggression; neither did I promote the idea; but the
idea of Lebensraum is perhaps best brought home to us by the fact that
the population of Europe in the last 100 years has increased threefold,
from 150 million to 450 million.
M. HERZOG: Did you, or did you not approve of the theory of Lebensraum?
Answer “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: I did not agree with the theory of Lebensraum if it had to do
with wars of aggression.
M. HERZOG: Did you approve of Hitler’s theory of the master race?
SAUCKEL: I could give abundant proof that I personally always refused to
emphasize the idea of a master race, and said so in my speeches. I am
personally much more interested in proficiency than in ideas about a
master race.
M. HERZOG: Then you did not think that the foreign policy of Germany
should have been conducted according to these two theories; the theory
of Lebensraum on the one hand, and the theory of the master race on the
other hand?
SAUCKEL: I have already stated to my counsel that I did not concern
myself with foreign policy and was not informed about it, as I am not
versed in matters of foreign policy.
M. HERZOG: On the contrary, did you not approve of all the measures of
foreign policy, and did you not participate in them?
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off now, and you can repeat
the question tomorrow.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY
Thursday, 30 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._]
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I
should like to put a request to you. My client comes next in order and
he would like to be excused, if possible, this afternoon and all day
tomorrow, so that he can prepare his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendant Von Papen is absent.
M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I was asking you yesterday whether you
considered that Germany’s foreign policy was based on the Hitlerian
theories concerning living space and the master race.
SAUCKEL: May I ask you to repeat the question? I did not quite
understand it in German.
M. HERZOG: I was asking you yesterday if you considered that the foreign
policy of Germany was based on the two Hitlerian theories, Lebensraum
and the master race.
SAUCKEL: I have understood—whether German foreign policy was based on
the principles of Lebensraum and the master race.
M. HERZOG: Yes, I am asking you to answer whether, in your opinion, it
was so.
SAUCKEL: Not on the principle of a master race. I should like to be
permitted to give an explanation of this.
I personally have never approved of the statements made by some of the
National Socialist speakers about a superior race and a master race. I
have never advocated that. As a young man I traveled about the world. I
traveled in Australia and in America, and I met families who belong to
the happiest memories of my life. But I loved my own people and sought,
I admit, equality of rights for them; and I have always stood for that.
I have never believed in the superiority of one particular race, but I
always held that equality of rights was necessary.
M. HERZOG: That being so, you did not approve of the whole of the
foreign policy of Hitler; and you did not collaborate with him?
SAUCKEL: In answer to the question by my counsel I stated that I never
considered myself to be a politician as regards foreign policy. I
entered the Party by quite a different way and for quite different
motives.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the declaration which you made on 4 September
1945 to two American officers?
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] This declaration is Document Number
3057-PS. It was submitted as Exhibit Number USA-223.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You said the following:
“I have been a convinced National Socialist since 1921 and
agreed 100 percent with the program of Adolf Hitler. I worked
actively to that end; and during the period from 1921 until the
assumption of power I made about 500 speeches, the sense and
contents of which represented the National Socialist standpoint.
It was for me a particular satisfaction to have raised the Gau
of Thuringia to a predominant position with regard to its
National Socialist views and convictions. Until the collapse I
never doubted Adolf Hitler, but obeyed his orders blindly.”
THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. This has been read,
M. Herzog. I do not think you need read all of it.
M. HERZOG: I would ask you then, Defendant Sauckel, if you confirm the
statements which were made under oath, voluntarily and without any
duress, on 4 September 1945, and which contradict those that you made
yesterday and which you have just made to me.
SAUCKEL: I confirm that my signature is appended to this document. I ask
the Tribunal’s permission to state how that signature came about.
This document was presented to me in its finished form. I asked to be
allowed to read and study this document in my cell in Oberursel and
decide whether I could sign it. That was denied me. During the
conversation an officer was consulted who, I was told, belonged to the
Polish or Russian army; and it was made clear to me that if I hesitated
too long in signing this document I would be handed over to the Russian
authorities. Then this Polish or Russian officer entered and asked,
“Where is Sauckel’s family? We know Sauckel, of course we will take him
with us; but his family will have to be taken into Russian territory as
well.” I am the father of 10 children. I did not stop to consider; and
thinking of my family, I signed this document.
When I returned to my cell, I sent a written message to the commandant
of the camp and asked permission to talk with him alone on this matter.
But that was not possible, because shortly afterwards I was brought to
Nuremberg.
M. HERZOG: Is not your signature at the end of this document in which
you declared that you “made the above declarations voluntarily and
without any duress”?
SAUCKEL: That is correct, but in this situation...
M. HERZOG: I think your explanation is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him whether he has read it now and whether
it is true.
M. HERZOG: I asked you a few moments ago, and I ask you now: Are you
ready to confirm that your statements are correct?
SAUCKEL: These statements are not correct in individual points, and I
asked that I might correct these various points; but I was not given the
time to do that.
On the last morning before I left I was told I could discuss this matter
in Nuremberg, and when I was interrogated here I told the American
officer about the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, was this document read over in the Tribunal
during the prosecution?
M. HERZOG: This document was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-223.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, as far as I recall this document was not
submitted. At the time I had a conversation with the American
representative of the Prosecution and told him about these objections.
He did not bring it up at a later session because of these objections;
and the President himself, at the conclusion, asked whether this
document would not be produced, and the prosecutor said, “No. Having
talked it over with the Defense, I will dispense with this document.”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you tell us that it wasn’t read over in court.
DR. SERVATIUS: No, it was not read in court. At any rate I would like to
object to the admissibility of this document, for it was given under
duress.
THE PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, M. Herzog, you may
cross-examine in what way you like upon the document. The Tribunal was
under the impression that it had already been read over. That is why
they stopped you reading it.
M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] In Paragraph 2 you declared:
“After the putting into effect of the Nuremberg Laws, in keeping
with my convictions, I saw to it that all these laws were fully
carried out in the Gau of Thuringia.”
Paragraph 4:
“With regard to foreign policy I have been of the opinion that
the German people has a justified claim for living space in
Europe and by reason of their superior racial level have to
assume a leading position.... I agreed with all the decisions
taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used
and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I
collaborated actively in the execution of this plan.”
SAUCKEL: I could not follow your concluding sentences.
M. HERZOG: I will read it once more:
“...I agreed with all the decisions taken by Hitler and the
NSDAP concerning the means to be used and the measures to be
taken to obtain these ends, and I collaborated actively in the
execution of this plan.”
I ask you to confirm whether you made these statements.
SAUCKEL: I certainly would not have made those statements in the way I
did, if I had been able to act freely and according to my own will.
M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will consider it. Is it a fact that you were
appointed...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, the Tribunal thinks that the document is
before the witness and he should be asked to point out in what way he
says the document is wrong.
M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you heard what the President has said. You
say that this document does not correspond to the truth. Will you kindly
tell the Tribunal in what way it does not.
SAUCKEL: May I take this document point by point? I was 100 percent in
agreement with the social program, and I told my counsel that when he
examined me.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, what the Tribunal wishes is that you should
take the document and point out, sentence by sentence, what is wrong in
it.
SAUCKEL: In Paragraph 1, the year 1921 is incorrect.
I became a member, as my first membership card shows, only in 1923 or
1925. Before the year 1923 I was in sympathy with the Party.
As to being 100 percent in agreement with Adolf Hitler’s program, I
meant 100 percent insofar as the program appeared to me to be justified
legally and constitutionally, and according to ethics and morality.
Just how many meetings I conducted I cannot say. My speeches and
lectures were based mainly on my life and on my experiences. Those were
the only things that I could talk about, and I wanted to reconcile the
German social classes and the German professions to National Socialist
ideology.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I have pointed out to you that what the
Tribunal desires is for you to take the document and say what sentences
in it are wrong, and not to make speeches.
SAUCKEL: In my eyes, all the sentences are wrong. I would not have put
them that way if I myself had been able to formulate them. The way they
stand, I dispute each and every sentence, for I did not write them and I
was not consulted. These sentences were put before me as they are now.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I be permitted to give an explanation
of this matter? This statement is practically a summary of all the
interrogations in which the various points appear as a confession in the
sense of the Indictment. The defendant could not say a word in his own
defense if this were correct. Since it is a résumé and since conclusions
can be drawn from it, he must have the opportunity of refuting these
conclusions; and that necessitates a statement. These are not definite
facts which can be answered with “yes” or “no.”
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has just said that the whole document is
wrong, and he has also said that the document was obtained from him
under duress.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And it is therefore not any use to go through it in
detail. But the Tribunal would like to hear from the American
Prosecution if they have anything to say about the matter.
MR. DODD: I do not have a copy of the document before me in English, but
I...
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Mr. Dodd, M. Herzog has said that it was offered
in evidence under the Exhibit Number USA-223.
MR. DODD: My recollection is that—I will check the record, Mr.
President—my recollection is that in the presentation of the case on
Slave Labor, we included this in our document book but did not offer it
in evidence. I think I said to the Tribunal at the time that we had
decided not to offer it. It had been printed and put in the document
book.
My memory may be faulty, but my recollection is, Mr. President, that the
President of the Tribunal asked me if I did not intend to offer it, and
I then stated that we had thought it over and decided not to use it.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand how it gets an exhibit number if it
isn’t offered in evidence.
MR. DODD: I don’t either. I think it is an error.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Mr. Dodd, do you know whether this is a résumé or
a summary of a number of interrogations which were taken?
MR. DODD: My understanding is to the contrary. I think it was taken
before the Defendant Sauckel was in Nuremberg and before any
interrogations were conducted on the part of the interrogation division
of the American Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Were you aware Dr. Servatius was objecting to the
document on the ground that it was obtained under duress?
MR. DODD: My recollection is that at the time of the presentation of the
Slave Labor case Dr. Servatius made some objection, and I think that is
what brought the matter up at that time; and that is why we did not use
it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you had better pass from it.
M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] You were appointed
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor by an ordinance of
21 March 1942?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that this decree was countersigned by
the Codefendant Keitel?
SAUCKEL: The decree, I believe, was countersigned three times. I believe
that is right. At the moment I cannot confirm it with certainty.
M. HERZOG: Would you kindly explain to the Tribunal under what
circumstances you were appointed to that office?
SAUCKEL: I answered that question when it was put to me by my counsel
yesterday. It was a surprise to me.
M. HERZOG: Did Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments, have anything to
do with your appointment?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from my own knowledge. Bormann’s
announcement said it was at the suggestion of Speer; but I cannot tell
you that from my own knowledge.
M. HERZOG: Do you recollect having made any statement on that subject in
your interrogation on 12 September 1945?
SAUCKEL: At this moment I cannot remember the statement.
M. HERZOG: On 12 September 1945 you were interrogated by Major Monigan;
and you appear to have stated the following—the Tribunal will find this
on the first page of the extracts of the interrogatory which has been
handed them:
“In March 1942 I was summoned rather suddenly by Minister Speer,
who had been appointed a short while previously. Speer told me
that it was urgent that I should assume...”
THE PRESIDENT: Could you move those papers away from the light; you
cannot see the light which is constantly going on.
M. HERZOG: “...Speer told me that it was urgent that I should
assume new functions in connection with the question of labor. A
few days later he asked me to go with him to general
headquarters, and I was introduced to the Führer who told me
that I must accept this new appointment without fail.”
Do you confirm that statement?
SAUCKEL: It is correct; only I cannot say whether that was before a
decision—whether my appointment was previously arranged before these
meetings through the initiative of some other gentlemen; but except for
that, the facts are correct.
M. HERZOG: But you confirm that the Defendant Speer, Minister for
Armament and War Production, took you to Hitler’s headquarters on the
occasion of your appointment.
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct.
M. HERZOG: Yesterday your counsel submitted a chart showing the general
organization of your service and how it was connected with the other
organizations of the Reich. You declared that chart was correct. I would
ask you to confirm, by saying “yes” or “no,” whether you think that
chart is correct.
SAUCKEL: According to my own personal recollection, yes.
M. HERZOG: Have you that chart in front of you?
SAUCKEL: No, I have not.
M. HERZOG: It is the document which was handed up yesterday by your
counsel showing the different offices.
THE PRESIDENT: Which chart is it?
M. HERZOG: It is Chart Number 1, indicating how Sauckel’s department
dovetailed with the other ministerial services.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at Column 6 starting from
the left, the column above which there is the name of the Defendant
Funk? Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Would you go down that column, the third square, representing
the armament inspectors? Is it correct that the armament inspectors, as
shown here, were under the Defendant Funk?
SAUCKEL: Under Funk? Which department do you mean, which division? That
is not quite correct here. It should be moved a bit to the side. Later
it was under Speer. It says Reichsautobahn and highway inspectors. That
did not come under Funk. That is a mistake.
M. HERZOG: Do you see the square beside that one, which connects the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the directorate
of the Reichsautobahn service. It is the square on the right-hand side,
a little above the others. Should it be connected with the
Reichsautobahn service? Should it not be with the square above,
inspectors of armaments?
SAUCKEL: Yes; I cannot understand how this mistake could happen in this
chart. I have not seen this diagram before. This is the first time I
have seen it; that is a mistake. I did not know about that.
M. HERZOG: And you stated it was accurate without having examined it
beforehand, is that so?
SAUCKEL: I assumed it to be the same chart as the one which was put
before me as complete.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, when I presented this chart yesterday, I
mentioned that there might be a few discrepancies. These discrepancies
came in when it was being mimeographed. But I did not see the final...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you can ask any questions if you want to
in re-examination, but there is no ground for objection to questions
which have been put. The questions are perfectly proper.
M. HERZOG: Defendant, you did take part in the conferences of the
Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan?
SAUCKEL: Only in some of them, when labor problems were being discussed.
M. HERZOG: Will you please tell the Tribunal which of your colleagues
accompanied you or represented you at such conferences?
SAUCKEL: That varied—Dr. Timm, Dr. Hildebrandt, Dr. Stothfang; but it
varied.
M. HERZOG: Who among the other defendants also participated in those
conferences? Can you tell us?
SAUCKEL: I can recall with certainty only Herr Speer as being one who
participated in these conferences. Whether Herr Funk actually
participated, I really cannot remember any particular meeting. Perhaps
he did, and perhaps not. I am sorry I cannot say for certain.
M. HERZOG: And the Defendant Göring?
SAUCKEL: At the meetings of the Central Planning Board I personally
never saw the Reich Marshal. I do not know whether certain conferences
which were held at his place had strictly to do with the Central
Planning Board. Some conferences in which he participated took place at
Karinhall, but whether they dealt with matters concerning the Central
Planning Board I cannot say. It was not always clear.
M. HERZOG: But when the Defendants Göring and Funk did not take part in
these meetings were they not represented there?
SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal was represented by Field Marshal Milch, but
whether Reich Minister Funk was represented I cannot remember exactly.
He might have been represented by Herr Kehrl or someone else. There were
many gentlemen there; I did not know all of them personally.
M. HERZOG: Is it not correct to say that, at these conferences of the
Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan, the general decisions
concerning the allocation of labor were made by all the people who were
present or were represented?
SAUCKEL: At the Central Planning Board no general decisions were made.
The demands were made known there and, as there was nearly always a
dispute, the higher authorities had to decide; generally it was the
Führer. That happened frequently.
M. HERZOG: The Central Planning Board had established a collaboration
between you and the other defendants who were present or represented
there, is that not so?
SAUCKEL: That collaboration did not originate there, as those questions
had already been discussed before the formation of this Central Planning
Board. The questions were also discussed there, and demands were
submitted and discussed.
M. HERZOG: Will you please take Document Number R-124. It has already
been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-179. You will
see therein a declaration which you made at the meeting of 1 March 1944.
I read:
“My duty towards the Führer...”
SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me the page from which you are reading?
M. HERZOG: Page 1780. The place is no doubt marked.
“My duty towards the Führer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer,
and you, gentlemen, as well as towards agriculture, is clear;
and I will fulfill it. As a start we have already 262,000 new
workers; and I hope and am firmly convinced that I shall obtain
most of what has been asked. The labor will have to be
distributed, of course, according to the needs of German
armament first, and secondly, German industry as a whole; and I
shall always be prepared, gentlemen, to see to it that closest
contact is constantly maintained here and that closest
collaboration is given by the subordinated labor exchanges, as
well as by the Gau labor exchanges.”
Therefore, you do not contest the fact that the Central Planning Board
did establish collaboration among the various services which recruited
manpower, because you yourself asked for this collaboration.
SAUCKEL: I did not deny that there was collaboration. Collaboration is
necessary in every regime and in every system. Here we were not
concerned with foreign labor only, but chiefly with German labor, even
at that period. I did not dispute the fact that work was being carried
on; but final decisions were not always made there. That is what I
wanted to say.
M. HERZOG: It is correct that you appointed delegates to represent you
in the various German administrative departments?
SAUCKEL: I did not have representatives in the various administrative
departments. I had liaison men, or else the administrative departments
had liaison men in my office.
M. HERZOG: Did you not have such a liaison officer with the Defendant
Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production?
SAUCKEL: The man who was constantly with Speer was not a liaison
officer, but the man who talked over with the Minister questions of
demand, _et cetera_, which were pending. As far as I remember it was a
Herr Berk.
M. HERZOG: And did you have a liaison officer with the Reich Minister of
Labor?
SAUCKEL: I had no liaison officer with the Reich Minister of Labor.
There were two departments in the Reich Ministry of Labor which
concerned themselves with these problems in an administrative capacity.
M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory of 12 September 1945 you said as
follows—the Tribunal will find it on Pages 6 and 7 of the
interrogatory:
“‘I had moreover two officials who acted as intermediaries
between Minister Speer and the Ministry of Labor.’
“Question: ‘Did this liaison officer establish a connection
between your Ministry, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of
Labor?’
“Answer: ‘Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of
Labor...’”
SAUCKEL: Will you please tell me the page?
M. HERZOG: Pages 4 and 5. Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: “Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of Labor...”
THE PRESIDENT: That is surely Page 6, is it not? You said Pages 4 and 5.
It is Page 6, is it not?
M. HERZOG: Page 4 of the German extract, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see.
M. HERZOG: “Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of
Labor there were two counsellors, Dr. Stothfang ... and Landrat
Berk. They were jurists and experts in national economy. Dr.
Stothfang was commissioned to act principally as liaison officer
with the Ministry of Labor...”
Why did you tell me a few minutes ago that you had no liaison officer
with the Ministry of Labor?
SAUCKEL: I made it quite clear that there were two departments which
belonged to the Ministry of Labor, Departments 3 and 5; and this
Ministerialrat Dr. Stothfang was formerly the personal assistant to
State Secretary Syrup. In a few isolated cases he had discussions with
State Secretary Syrup at my request, that is true; but these were not
important. In general the departments themselves were in touch with the
Ministry of Labor.
M. HERZOG: You confirm then, that you had a liaison officer at the
Ministry of Labor and another in Minister Speer’s office?
SAUCKEL: I confirm that for occasional conferences. But these gentlemen
were attached to those departments, and they came to me as my personal
consultants and did not work in that Ministry. I cannot say either
whether in this case the translation is correct. I do not remember
exactly, but in principle it is correct.
But these gentlemen worked with me.
M. HERZOG: And will you please tell the Tribunal what the
Stabsbesprechung was?
SAUCKEL: Stabsbesprechung was a conference on technical questions in
which the various ministries or industrial employers participated who
needed labor and the questions which had to be considered were
discussed. I could not act independently, of course, as you have heard.
M. HERZOG: Who instituted these conferences, this new arrangement, these
staff conferences? Who took the initiative in instituting them?
SAUCKEL: These staff conferences were instituted by me in order to
obtain a clear conception of all these important questions, because in
no regime or government in the world can anything be done in the dark.
M. HERZOG: You confirm then that these various kinds of liaison imply a
common responsibility as to decisions taken by each one of you in the
matter of manpower?
SAUCKEL: This question is not clear to me technically or
administratively, for I could not do anything with the workers. I had to
give them to other people, and I had to discuss the way this was to be
done. But these conferences did not take place with the idea of a
conspiracy or of a criminal act; they were the same kind of conferences
as formerly took place. I have been present at conferences under a
parliamentary system, and matters were dealt with in exactly the same
way.
M. HERZOG: That is not what I was asking you. I was asking you whether
you confirmed that the existence of these liaison officers to Minister
Speer and the Minister of Labor, on the one hand, and the existence of
this new organization that you created, on the other hand, implied a
common responsibility in the decisions regarding manpower taken by
Minister Speer, the Minister of Labor, and by you?
SAUCKEL: I cannot answer this question with a definite “no,” as orders
were given to me which, as a German official, I had to carry out in this
case; and in order to carry them out I had to hold conferences. It was
not possible to do otherwise, for it was not I personally, but German
economy, that demanded and used these workers. This matter had to be
settled in some way, regardless of whether German or other workers were
concerned; and the same situation applied in normal times.
M. HERZOG: Is it a fact that, after you were appointed, you were
authorized to be represented by special representatives in the military
and civil departments of the occupied areas?
SAUCKEL: After 30 October—I cannot state the exact date—at the
instigation of the Führer, I appointed representatives to the
governments in the occupied countries. I mentioned this yesterday
through my counsel.
M. HERZOG: The 30th of October? I think you mean the decree of 30
September 1942. It is a mistake on your part for the decree is dated 30
September.
SAUCKEL: I am sorry, I do not know the exact date.
M. HERZOG: Is it right that these representatives, appointed by that
decree, were directly subordinate to you?
SAUCKEL: Insofar as they were my delegates, that is, for the passing on
of orders, they were subordinate to me.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that they were authorized to give directives to
the civilian and military authorities in the occupied territories?
SAUCKEL: That is correct as far as orders were concerned, but it is not
true in general. It was a technical matter.
M. HERZOG: Who was your delegate with the occupation authorities in
France?
SAUCKEL: The delegate with the occupation authorities in France was,
first of all, President Ritter; he was murdered in Paris. And after him,
President Glatzel.
M. HERZOG: Did you have a representative in Belgium?
SAUCKEL: In Belgium I had a delegate by the name of Schulze; he was with
the military commander.
M. HERZOG: And in Holland?
SAUCKEL: In Holland there were various men. First of all, Herr Schmidt,
and there was another man; I believe his name was Ritterbusch, or
something like that, but I do not recall the exact name.
M. HERZOG: This system of representatives with the occupation
authorities, was that approved of by Defendant Speer?
SAUCKEL: This was at the instigation of the Führer, and I assume that
Speer agreed. He recommended it, as far as I know.
M. HERZOG: To your knowledge, did he take any initiative in the decree
issued by the Führer concerning this matter?
SAUCKEL: Yes. He was present and he recommended it.
M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you said, when speaking about these
representatives, that Speer instituted these agencies for manpower in
1941 or 1942. The Tribunal will find this statement on Page 9 of the
excerpts from the interrogatory. What do you understand by that
sentence?
SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand you.
M. HERZOG: I shall read an extract of your interrogation of 8 October
1945.
“Question: ‘What was the mission entrusted to your
representatives in the labor offices of the military commander
and of the civil governor? Did they merely give technical advice
to the military authorities, which could be rejected at any time
by the latter, or did they have authority to give directives to
the military commanders on technical questions?’”
THE PRESIDENT: On what page is that?
M. HERZOG: Page 9, Mr. President.
“Answer: ‘In 1941 or 1942 Speer instituted this delegation for
manpower.’”
I would merely ask you what you understand by that phrase. What did you
mean when you said that Speer instituted this delegation for manpower in
1941 or 1942?
SAUCKEL: I have to say, in this connection, that I never saw the minutes
again after I had been interrogated. I cannot confirm that sentence
about 1941-42, and I cannot imagine that I expressed myself in that way
during the interrogation.
M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will judge your answer. Is it correct that,
besides your representatives with the civil and military commanders, you
installed administrative offices for labor in the occupied territories?
SAUCKEL: That is not correct. They were already there.
M. HERZOG: You confirm then that besides the delegates who represented
you, there were recruiting agencies for manpower in the occupied
territories?
SAUCKEL: Yes. In the occupied territories, in all regional governments,
either civilian or military, there were departments dealing with
manpower which were a part of the administration; and they were
subordinate to the administration authorities.
M. HERZOG: Can you give an indication of the size of the personnel of
those various services in the occupied areas?
SAUCKEL: Do you mean the total number? I cannot tell you from memory the
separate figures for the personnel of these administrative offices. I
never have known these figures exactly.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference which took place, with you as
chairman, on 15 and 16 July 1944 at the Wartburg with the heads of the
regional labor offices and the labor delegations from the European
occupied territories? On 15 July 1944, in the afternoon, State
Counsellor Börger gave an account of the personnel employed. It is
Document Number F-810, which I submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1507.
I will read on Page 20:
“State Counsellor Börger stated that outside the frontiers of
the Reich there are about 4,000 people engaged in the
administration of labor; Eastern area, 1,300; France, 1,016;
Belgium and Northern France, 429; Netherlands, 194...”
Do you confirm this statement of State Counsellor Börger?
SAUCKEL: Yes, speaking generally it may be true.
M. HERZOG: Apart from your representatives, apart from those services
that we were talking about, did you not create in France commissions
composed of specialists who were entrusted with organizing the
employment of labor on the German pattern? Please answer.
SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat it.
M. HERZOG: I shall repeat it. Apart from your representatives—apart
from the services that we have been talking about—did you not create,
in France particularly, commissions composed of specialists who were
entrusted with organizing the employment of manpower on the German
pattern?
SAUCKEL: I told my defense counsel yesterday about my collaboration with
French units for...
M. HERZOG: That is not what I mean. I am talking about commissions
composed of specialists. Do you not remember that in order to insure the
recruiting of manpower in France you thought of the system of attaching
two French _départements_ to a German Gau?
SAUCKEL: I remember now what you mean. This was the system of adoption
arranged in agreement with the French Government, according to which a
German Gau adopted a French _département_. The main object was to inform
the workers, who were to come to Germany, about conditions in Germany
and to have mutual talks with the economic offices of the French
_départements_ about statistics.
M. HERZOG: I hand to the Tribunal Document Number 1293-PS, which becomes
French Exhibit Number RF-1508.
[_Turning to the defendant._] This is a letter bearing your signature,
dated Berlin 14 August 1943, from which I shall read extracts. The
Tribunal will find it in the document book which I handed to them at the
beginning of this session. I shall first read the last paragraph on Page
1.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I have not got it—1293?
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the documents which figure in my document book
were handed to the Tribunal this morning—unless I am making a mistake,
for which I apologize in advance—in the order in which I intend to use
them.
THE PRESIDENT: I have one. 1293. Is that right?
M. HERZOG: I have attached a slip only to those documents which I think
I shall use several times, so that the Tribunal may find them more
easily. May I now begin to read?
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry but the documents had not been handed up to
me, that is all. None of them had been handed up.
M. HERZOG: I am reading at the bottom of Page 1:
“The solving of these two great manpower problems demands the
immediate setting up in France of a stronger and better German
labor organization possessing the necessary powers and means.
This will be done by a system of sponsorship by Gaue. France has
got about 80 _départements_. Greater Germany is divided into 42
political Gaue, and for the purposes of manpower recruitment it
is divided into 42 Gau labor office districts. Each German Gau
labor office district will take over and sponsor, say, two
French _départements_. Each German Gau labor office will furnish
for the _départements_ it sponsors a commission of specialists,
made up of the ablest and most reliable experts. These
commissions will organize the allocations of labor in these
sponsored _départements_ according to the German pattern.”
I skip one page and continue reading at the bottom of Page 2 of the
French text. That is Page 3 of the German translation:
“There is no doubt that this projected system of sponsorship by
Gaue for the employment of French manpower in Germany, and
especially the transformation necessary in the interest of
Germany of French civilian workers for the German armament
industries, will bring about enormous advantages in France
herself compared with the present system.”
I am passing to the bottom of Page 3 of the French text, and I read
under “d”:
“The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the
representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...”
You told me a short while ago that the German offices for the
recruitment of labor in the occupied territories were not under you as
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but under the local
authorities. How do you explain this sentence?
SAUCKEL: It can be explained very simply. These men were subordinate to
the military commanders in the labor department. They were sent from
Germany, and they were taken from the labor offices and put into the
administration.
M. HERZOG: You say, “The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is,
the representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...” The
Central German Labor Office in Paris was therefore your representative?
SAUCKEL: The Central German Labor Office in Paris was a part of the
civilian administration of the military commander in France. This is not
expressed in this sentence, for it was taken for granted in this letter
that the Gauleiter knew this. The position as I explained it is entirely
correct.
M. HERZOG: I shall continue reading:
“The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the
representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office,
will therefore have in the whole of France a reliable apparatus
which will make it a great deal easier for him to solve his
problems in France, in spite of any possible or even real
passive resistance on the part of the higher or lower French
bureaucracy.”
I skip two lines.
“I have, therefore, charged the presidents or the provisional
chiefs of the newly formed Gau labor offices to set up a
corresponding organization in the _départements_ which they are
sponsoring; and I request you, in your capacity as my
Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, in agreement with
Reichsleiter Bormann, to promote and give your fullest support
to the new task allotted to your Gau labor office. The president
or the provisional chief of your Gau labor office is instructed
to keep you informed of all details concerning the carrying out
of these measures.”
Are not these measures an attempt to subordinate French territory to
German territory as far as the organization of labor is concerned?
SAUCKEL: Yes. But I should like to ask you and the High Tribunal to
allow me to say the following in explanation: On the first page,
Paragraph 1—I quote from the third line—it says, “...with the full
consent of the Führer I am to take far-reaching and urgent measures in
France in negotiation with the head of the French Government and the
competent”—now comes the important part—“German authorities;”—that
is, the military commander’s department, in which these labor
authorities and this delegate were incorporated and to whom they were
subordinate.
And on Page 4, I should like to read about the special purpose of this
system of sponsorship which should have nothing unfriendly about it. I
read from Page 4 in the German text, under the letter “a”:
“Prejudice, suspicion, lack of care, failure to redress and look
into complaints”—that is, complaints by the workers—“which are
prejudicial to the employment of manpower in Germany, all these
things can be very largely eliminated by the relations between
the Gau and its sponsored _département_.”
Now I read under letter “b”:
“Every French worker in such a _département_ knows exactly where
and under what conditions he will have to work in Germany.
German propaganda and explanatory material will tell him about
the locality in which he will have to work and about all matters
which are of interest to him.”
And that was the purpose of that arrangement. It was something I wanted
to do for the French workers, besides looking after German interests.
M. HERZOG: Please answer me “yes” or “no.” Was this arrangement an
attempt to bring about a joint administration between the French
_départements_ and the German Gaue as far as the employment of labor was
concerned? Answer me “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: No. I should like to give an explanation to this negative
answer. The purpose of this arrangement was to clear up unsolved
problems between the French Government, between the French
_départements_, between French industrialists and factories, on the one
hand, and the administrative offices in Germany where the French workers
were to be employed. That was the real purpose—to settle complaints and
clear away mistrust.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. HERZOG: Defendant, is it true that your Codefendant Göring placed
under your control all the organizations of the Four Year Plan which
were concerned with the recruiting of labor?
SAUCKEL: The various organizations of the Four Year Plan which had to do
with manpower were dissolved. Departments 3 and 5 of the Reich Ministry
of Labor continued to deal exclusively with these matters.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that the powers of the Reich Minister of Labor
concerning the employment of labor were transferred to you and that as a
result of this transfer you had powers to issue regulations and laws?
SAUCKEL: Only insofar as the work of Departments 3 and 5 were connected
with my own task. Otherwise the functions of the Reich Ministry of Labor
remained independent under the Reich Minister of Labor.
M. HERZOG: But within these departments you exercised the powers of the
Reich Minister of Labor after your appointment as Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor?
SAUCKEL: Within my office as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor. But I must emphasize that these departments were not under me;
they were merely at my disposal. Great importance was attached to this
difference at the time. The departments continued to work independently
within the whole framework of the Ministry of Labor.
M. HERZOG: But as a result of this situation you exerted administrative
autonomy in matters concerning labor?
SAUCKEL: Not an autonomy; it was done by vote. I could not issue
decrees, but could only give instructions. In every case I had to get
the agreement of the other administrative authorities and Reich
ministries, and the agreement of the Führer or of my superior office.
M. HERZOG: Did you not have carte blanche from the Führer for the
recruiting and the utilization of labor?
SAUCKEL: Not for recruiting and utilization, but for guiding and
directing. If I may express it in this way, it was never a case of the
workers’ agent—that is, of course, what allocation of labor really
means—employing these workers himself. The firms employed the workers,
not the agent.
M. HERZOG: For the recruiting of labor you had carte blanche from the
Führer. Is that not true?
SAUCKEL: Not absolutely, and only after there had been a vote and after
the agreement of the regional authorities concerned had been obtained,
especially in the case of foreign countries. I never recruited workers
in France without the express agreement of the French Government and
with their collaboration. The French administration was used here.
M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you have on several occasions mentioned
the agreements and arrangements made in France with those whom you
yourself call “the leaders of collaboration.” You know better than any
other that these leaders of collaboration, imposed upon France by the
enemy, bound themselves only and that their acts were never ratified by
the French people as a whole. Besides, these leaders of collaboration,
whose testimony cannot be suspect to you, have themselves revealed that
pressure was exerted upon them, and we will discuss that now. Is it true
that on 16 April 1942, that is to say, less than a month after your
appointment, you stated in a letter to the Defendant Rosenberg—which
states your program and which was presented to you yesterday—that you
included the recruiting of foreign workers in your program for the
utilization^{*} of labor?
SAUCKEL: I resent the term “exploitation.”^{*} By strictest orders from
the Führer, it is true that recruitment of foreign workers had to be
included in my program.
-----
^{*} The word _utilization_ used by the French prosecutor was wrongly
interpreted into German as “Ausbeutung” meaning “exploitation.”
-----
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you included the recruitment of foreign
workers in your program of 16 April 1942? You admitted this yesterday,
and I ask you to confirm it.
SAUCKEL: Yes, it is true. I only emphasize that I did it on the
strictest orders from the Führer.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that this program of 16 April 1942, that is to
say, 3 weeks after your appointment, already contained the principle of
forced recruiting?
SAUCKEL: It was done by express order of the Führer, in case voluntary
recruitment proved to be inadequate. I said that yesterday to my
counsel.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree that you issued on 29 August 1942?
This decree dealt first and foremost with the employment of labor in
occupied territories—Decree Number 10 of 22 August by the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. It was submitted to
the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-17 (Document Number RF-17). Do you
remember it?
SAUCKEL: I do remember Decree Number 10.
M. HERZOG: Was this decree applicable to the occupied territories which
were under German administration?
SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I have not the exact wording and the
separate paragraphs before me—it dealt with the regulation of working
contracts drawn up by German firms. The purpose was to prevent a muddle.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in August
1942?
SAUCKEL: That is possible; but I, of course, cannot remember the
individual dates.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in January
1943?
SAUCKEL: That is also possible, even probable.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you went on a mission to Paris in January
1944?
SAUCKEL: Also probable, yes; but I do not know the individual dates.
M. HERZOG: You therefore went on missions to Paris before the French
authorities, the French de facto authorities, had published the
legislative decrees of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1
February 1944. Is that not true?
SAUCKEL: I did not understand your question exactly.
M. HERZOG: I asked you whether it is true, that before the French de
facto authorities published the three fundamental laws on forced labor
of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1 February 1944, you went on
missions to France, to Paris?
SAUCKEL: I only went on journeys to Paris for the purpose of negotiating
with the French Government, and I want to add that for me and in
accordance with my convictions...
M. HERZOG: Do you admit that in the course of these missions you imposed
on the French authorities the laws on forced labor?
SAUCKEL: It is not correct to put it in that way, rather...
M. HERZOG: You therefore contest the fact that the laws on forced labor
were issued under pressure by you?
SAUCKEL: I dispute the word “pressure.” I negotiated most correctly with
the French Government before such laws were published. I expressly
resent the word “pressure,” and there were plenty of witnesses during
these negotiations.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the telephone conversation that the Defendant
Speer had with you from the Führer’s headquarters on 4 January 1943?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably had several conversations with Speer. I do not
know which particular conversation you are referring to.
M. HERZOG: Do you not remember a note that you sent to your various
offices as a result of this telephone conversation of 4 January 1943?
SAUCKEL: Yes. Quite probably I did make several notes. I had to make
notes when I received a telephone conversation containing an
instruction.
M. HERZOG: I now submit Document Number 556-PS, which has already been
submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Numbers USA-194 and RF-67. I
will read that document, or at least its first paragraph:
“On 4 January 1943, at 2000 hours, Minister Speer telephoned
from the Führer’s headquarters to inform me that according to
the decision of the Führer it is no longer necessary, when
engaging skilled and unskilled labor in France, to show any
special consideration for the French. Emphasis or more severe
measures may be used in order to recruit labor.”
I ask you, Defendant, what you mean when you say that it is not
necessary to show any special consideration for the French?
SAUCKEL: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This
was a communication which came from the Führer’s headquarters, based on
a decision made by the Führer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize
that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not
change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to
adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government,
and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how
these negotiations with the French Government were conducted.
M. HERZOG: You will give it later in your examination. Do you remember
the discussion that you had on 12 January 1943, at the German Embassy in
Paris, with the French authorities?
SAUCKEL: As far as I know, I only talked to French ministers in the
German Embassy in Paris.
M. HERZOG: That is exactly what I am asking you. Do you remember this
conversation that you had with the French authorities on 12 January
1943?
SAUCKEL: Not in detail, no; but that I did negotiate is possible.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the persons who took part in this
conversation?
SAUCKEL: Yes. Usually the French Premier, the French Minister for Labor,
Minister Bichelonne, took part in such discussions. On the German side,
the Ambassador; on behalf of the military commander, Dr. Fischer; and,
as my representative, probably Dr. Hildebrandt or some other gentleman.
M. HERZOG: And you do not remember what Laval said to you at this
meeting of 12 January 1943?
SAUCKEL: Very many matters were discussed in great detail during these
conferences, and I do not know what you mean.
M. HERZOG: Well, I will submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is
Document Number F-809, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit
Number RF-1509.
In the course of this discussion Laval made a long statement to you;
more exactly, several statements.
THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find this?
M. HERZOG: It is in my document book, Mr. President. It must be marked
with a slip 809.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I have got it.
M. HERZOG: First, I read Page 7 of the French text and of the German
text:
“Gauleiter Sauckel demands a further 250,000 new workers.
Gauleiter Sauckel knows very well—and his offices have
certainly informed him about this—the difficulties which the
French Government had in carrying out the program last year. The
Gauleiter must realize that as a result of the number of
prisoners of war and workers who are already employed by
Germany, the sending of another 250,000 workers will increase
even further the difficulties of the French Government. I cannot
conceal these difficulties from the Gauleiter, because they are
evident; and the Germans who are in Paris know these
difficulties. When the Gauleiter replies that they have had to
overcome the same difficulties in Germany and when he even
states that French industry must be expanded, it seems to me
that I must remind him that Germany not only demands workers of
France, but is also beginning to take away the machines from
factories in order to transport them to Germany. France may have
nothing left, but until now she still had her means of
production. If these too are taken from her, France loses even
her possibilities for working.
“I do everything to facilitate a German victory”—and you see
Laval could hardly be suspect to you, Defendant—“but I must
admit that German policy makes heavier demands on me nearly
every day and these demands do not conform to a definite policy.
Gauleiter Sauckel can tell the German workers that they are
working for Germany. I cannot say that Frenchmen are working for
France.
“I see that in many fields the French Government is not able to
act. One would almost believe that on the German side they set
no value on the good will of the French and that they are bent
on instituting a German administration throughout France. My
task is being made more difficult every day. It is true that I
do not allow myself to be discouraged; but I consider, however,
that it is my duty to remind the Gauleiter of the gravity of
Franco-German relations and of the impossibility of continuing
along this path. It is no longer a matter of a policy of
collaboration; rather, it is on the French side a policy of
sacrifice, and on the German side a policy of coercion.”
I pass to the next page, Page 11:
“The present state of mind in France, the uncertainty concerning
the means which the French Government possesses, the
half-freedom in which it finds itself, all these do not give me
the necessary authority to furnish Gauleiter Sauckel with an
immediate reply. We can do nothing. We are not free to change
salaries; we are not free even to combat the black market; we
cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming up
against some German authority which has substituted itself in
our place.
“I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself. I am
persuaded that the Führer is unaware that the French Government
cannot act. There cannot be in one country two governments on
questions which do not concern directly the security of the
occupation forces.”
I skip two more pages, to Page 18; and I read only this sentence:
“It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German
measures of coercion.”
That is the document which I submit to you, Defendant, and I ask you two
questions concerning it.
The first question is: What did you answer to Laval when he made this
statement to you?
The second one is: Do you not think that here there is proof of the
pressure which you dispute?
SAUCKEL: To begin with, if the Tribunal would permit it, I should have
to read my reply to Premier Laval. The document proves, and this has
been confirmed to me by Premier Laval on various occasions, that I
conducted my negotiations with him in a proper manner; and in spite of
the fact that I had orders not to conduct political conversations but
only to deal with my actual task, I always reported to the Führer about
these matters. But I think that the tone of my reply was definitely
beyond reproach. These negotiations which I conducted...
M. HERZOG: That is not the question that I asked you. I asked you what
you answered him when he made that statement to you, when he said to
you, for instance, that it was not possible for him to be a mere agent
for German measures of coercion.
SAUCKEL: I would have to read my answer. I cannot remember it now.
M. HERZOG: Do you therefore dispute the fact that this represents
pressure?
SAUCKEL: Premier Laval did not complain about me in this connection. He
complained about general conditions in France, because this was the time
of occupation. The situation was that there was a German occupation. It
was war.
M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to submit to you Document...
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, regarding this document, I should like to
draw your attention to an error of translation which will lead to
considerable misunderstanding. According to this document it says that
the recruitment could be approached with emphasis and more severe
measures, and the word “emphasis” has been translated by “pressure” in
the English. But that is not meant. It is not “Druck,” pressure; it is
“Nachdruck,” emphasis. That means that the next in authority can be
approached with energy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the translation we have got is “emphasis.”
DR. SERVATIUS: “Pressure.”
THE PRESIDENT: I am told the translation is “emphasis.” No, no, the
translation is “emphasis.” It is in this document, and the translation
in English is “emphasis.”
DR. SERVATIUS: Oh, I had the French translation.
M. HERZOG: I am going to submit to you Document...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the PS series?
M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, it is a new document which I am submitting
now, a French document which will bear Exhibit Number RF-1509 (Document
Number F-809).
THE PRESIDENT: Where did this document come from?
M. HERZOG: That document comes, Mr. President, from the archives of the
Majestic Hotel in Paris, where the German offices in Paris were located.
Some months ago these archives were found again in Berlin, and we have
extracted the Sauckel documents.
I submit to the Tribunal the certificate of authentication for the
Sauckel files, as well as for the documents which I intend to submit to
the Tribunal in the course of my cross-examination. Perhaps, as the
document is in French, the Tribunal would like me to read it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it, will you? You mean this procès-verbal? What
is this procès-verbal? Who is it identified by?
M. HERZOG: This procès-verbal is identified by two persons, by
Commandant Henri, French liaison officer at the American Documentation
Center in Berlin, and by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, who, with
Commandant Henri, took these archives.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better read this procès-verbal so that it
will go into the record.
M. HERZOG: “I, Charles Gerthoffer, Deputy Prosecutor at the
Court of the Seine, on duty with the International Military
Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, having gone to Berlin to
the offices of the Ministerial Collecting Center, Commandant
Henri, Chief of the French Mission, gave to me, with the
authority of Colonel Helm of the American Army, Chief of the
6889 Berlin Collecting Center, seven files from the archives of
the German military command in France concerning forced labor
and registered at the M.C.C. under the following numbers: 3 DS,
lumbers 1 to 213; 4 DS, Numbers 1 to 230; 5 DS, Numbers 1 to
404; and two appendices; 6 DS, Numbers 1 to 218; 7 DS, Numbers 1
to 118; and one appendix; 1 to 121; 50 DS, Numbers 1 to 55; 71
DS, Numbers 1 to 40.
“I declared to Commandant Henri that I took the said files in
order to submit them to the International Military Tribunal for
the Major War Criminals so that they might be used in the course
of the proceedings and that they will thereafter be delivered to
the French Ministry of Justice, whose property they remain.
“There are five copies of this document, one of which is to
serve as an affidavit for the International Military Tribunal
for the Major War Criminals.”
Signed, “Charles Gerthoffer,” and Signed, “Henri.”
This represents the certificate of authentication of the files
themselves.
I have a second certificate...
SAUCKEL: May I make a remark regarding the first document, please?
M. HERZOG: I would ask you not to interrupt me.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, the documents came from the Hotel Majestic,
did they?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Hotel Majestic was the place where the...
M. HERZOG: The place in Paris where the offices of the German military
command in France and the various occupation offices were located. These
documents, which had vanished at the time of the liberation, were found
again at the Ministerial Collecting Center in Berlin. The document which
I have just submitted to you is the certificate of authentication of
these files, and I also have the certificate of authentication of the
documents which I have extracted from these files and which I am now
ready to read to the Tribunal, if the Tribunal so desires.
THE PRESIDENT: The Hotel Majestic was the place where the German
military government was established in Paris; isn’t that right?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President, if I am not mistaken. Does the Tribunal
desire that I should read the other certificate of authentication, that
is to say at least in part—the one concerning the document itself?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already read it.
M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President. I am submitting to the Tribunal two
certificates of authentication. The first, the one which I have just
read, is the certificate of authentication of seven files which contain
a very large number of documents. From these seven files we have
extracted only a certain number of documents which we are submitting to
the Tribunal; and that is why, after having presented the certificate...
THE PRESIDENT: The second document only says that the documents which
you are submitting are documents which came from those files?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And the files themselves came from the Hotel Majestic,
which was the place where the German military administration was carried
on. Will you put the second document on the record?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the original German
documents?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Since you still deny the pressure that you
exerted on the government, I will submit to you Document Number 1342-PS.
SAUCKEL: I think that an error in translation has been made here. I
understood that you asked whether I denied that I was putting pressure
on the Tribunal. I respect this Tribunal too highly to try to exert
pressure upon it. I do not understand the question. I understood you to
ask me whether I denied that I exerted pressure on the Tribunal; and, of
course, that question I have to answer with “no.”
M. HERZOG: I said this to you: Since you deny that you exerted pressure
on the French authorities, I will submit to you a new document. It is
Document Number 1342-PS which has already been submitted to the Tribunal
under Exhibit Number RF-63. This document represents the minutes of a
meeting which you held on 11 January 1943 in Paris with various German
occupation authorities. Do you remember that on that occasion you made a
declaration concerning your relations with the Vichy Government? I will
read this declaration to you. It is on Page 4 of the French and German
texts.
SAUCKEL: Unfortunately, I am not able to find it.
M. HERZOG: I will read the declaration:
“The French Government...”—It is the last paragraph but one
before the end of Page 4.—“The French Government is composed of
nothing but adepts at temporization. If the first 250,000
workers had arrived in Germany in time, before the autumn—the
negotiations with the French Government having already been
begun in the preceding spring—we might perhaps have been able
to recruit key men in the Reich earlier and form new divisions;
and it might then not have come to the cutting off of
Stalingrad. In any case, the Führer is now absolutely decided to
rule in France, if need be even without a French Government.”
When you made this declaration, did it not reflect the pressure which
you were exerting on the French Government?
SAUCKEL: This is not a conference with the French Government. This is a
statement of facts.
M. HERZOG: I did not say that it was a conference with the French
Government. I asked you what you meant when you stated that the Führer
was determined to rule in France, even without the French Government.
Was that not pressure?
SAUCKEL: That was a straightforward decision and a statement from the
Führer, for which I am not responsible. I merely repeated it, and in any
case it was never realized.
M. HERZOG: Why did you transmit it to the occupation authorities in
France in the course of a conference that you were holding with them
concerning the recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: Because it was my duty to give a description of the situation
as I saw it at the time.
M. HERZOG: But do you not think that, in expressing to them this
declaration of the Führer, you were using it to exert pressure?
SAUCKEL: I could not exert any pressure by that, because this was merely
transmitting a statement of the situation. I did not tell the French
Government that the Führer would remove them and that therefore they
would have to do such and such a thing. I merely negotiated.
M. HERZOG: But you did state, and I ask you to confirm it, you did state
in the course of that conference that the Führer had decided to rule in
France, if need be, even without a French Government?
Did you say that? I ask that you answer me “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: Yes, I repeated that, but not with the intention of doing that.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the discussion which you had on 14 January
1944 in Paris with various German personalities?
SAUCKEL: Yes; it is possible that I had a discussion there at that time,
but I cannot remember at the moment what it was about.
M. HERZOG: You do not remember a discussion which you had on 14 January,
and you do not remember the German personalities who were present, at
this meeting?
SAUCKEL: Probably there were several conferences, but I cannot tell you
now which one you are talking about. Neither do I remember, of course,
what the actual subjects of the discussions were.
M. HERZOG: On 14 January 1944 you had a conference in Paris with Abetz,
Von Stülpnagel, Oberg, and Blumentritt. Do you remember that in the
course of that discussion you submitted to your listeners the draft of a
law which you had drawn up and which you wanted to impose on the French
authorities?
SAUCKEL: I was not trying to impose it. I was trying to discuss it. I
was negotiating. I was not trying to impose it upon them. The wording of
the minutes shows that quite clearly.
M. HERZOG: Do you dispute the fact that you yourself drafted a law which
you transmitted to the French Government?
SAUCKEL: No, that I do not deny. That I submitted such a draft law and
that I drafted it, I do not deny.
M. HERZOG: You do admit then that you yourself drafted the text?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I cannot tell you which one you mean.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number F-813, which I put in under
Exhibit Number RF-1512. It is the minutes of this meeting of 14 January
1944, Document Number F-813. These minutes are signed by Abetz, Oberg,
Von Stülpnagel, Blumentritt, and you. I read from Paragraph III the
heading: “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor”—which was you—“has drawn up a draft law for the French
Government.”
Do you still dispute the fact that you yourself drew up draft laws which
you submitted to the French Government?
SAUCKEL: That I do not deny; I had to submit a proposal. However, it was
based on mutual negotiations.
M. HERZOG: Do you deny the fact that you imposed this law by pressure?
SAUCKEL: That I imposed this law by pressure, that I do deny. I
negotiated about it.
M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that you gave an account to the Führer of
the mission which you carried out in Paris in January 1944?
SAUCKEL: It was my duty to report when I made such journeys for I was
carrying out the Führer’s orders.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you this report, Document Number 556-PS, which
was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-67. Twice in the
course of this report you speak of German demands. Do you not think that
to give an account to the Führer of German demands having been accepted
is to give an account to him of the success of the pressure which you
exerted?
SAUCKEL: I cannot conceive in what other way a basis for negotiations
could be found. The German Government made demands, and because of those
demands there were negotiations with the French Government which had to
be considered by me as _de jure_.
M. HERZOG: Do you admit, therefore, that the German Government and you,
who were its agent, were making demands? Please answer “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: The German Government was making demands; yes, that is true.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. And those demands, did they not, at times, take
the form of a veritable ultimatum?
SAUCKEL: I am, not aware of that. I can only say that I was very polite
and accommodating when talking to the French Premier and that our
negotiations ran very smoothly. He often mentioned that, and it is in
the record.
M. HERZOG: When you took action concerning the mobilization of the 1944
class, do you not remember that you demanded this mobilization in a
veritable ultimatum? Answer “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: I cannot say so from memory.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, I think you might put to him the last sentence
in the letter of the 25th of January 1944, 556-PS.
M. HERZOG: “I have, however, allowed no doubts to remain that
further and more severe measures will be taken if the demands
for the transfer of workers is not met.”
SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably said that, though not in the form in which it
is put down in this letter.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember that on 6 June 1944, the day of the dawn of
our liberation, you addressed a letter to Ambassador Abetz?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from memory.
M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce this letter. It is the French
document, Number F-822, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit
Number RF-1513:
“6 June 1944. Paris.
“Your Excellency and dear Party Comrade Abetz:
“The long-expected invasion has finally begun. Thus ends also
for the Allocation of Labor a period of waiting which up to now
has served as an obvious, sometimes tacit, pretext for saying
that the sending of workers into the Reich was impossible owing
to the political atmosphere in the country.”
I skip a few lines and I quote again.
“Now that the German soldier must once more fight and bleed on
the Channel coast, now that the struggle may extend at any hour
to many other parts of France, any call or any words from Laval
can have no weight whatsoever. The only language which can now
be understood is that of the German soldier. I beg you,
therefore, in these decisive hours to ask Premier Laval at last
to do something which is obviously very difficult for him; that
is to say, that he should at last sign the order for the calling
up of the 1944 class. I do not wish to be kept waiting any
longer. Neither do I wish to leave with an opinion which might
be unjust but which at the same time is forced upon me,
concerning the temporizing tactics of the French Government.
“I beg you, therefore, most urgently, to obtain by 10 o’clock
tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the
decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform
me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’
I will not accept any delaying excuses, as all technical
preparations regarding the quotas from the _départements_, as
well as the arrangements for transport, have either been made or
are now about to be made, thanks to the joint discussions which
have been going on.”
Do you not call this a veritable ultimatum?
SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as my departure was in question
and nothing else. I could not exert any pressure on Laval or use any
threats.
M. HERZOG: What did you mean when you said:
“I beg you, therefore, most urgently to obtain by 10 o’clock
tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the
decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform
me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’
I will not accept any delaying excuses...”
Is that not an ultimatum?
SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as I could not wait any longer.
I had to leave, because I had orders to leave. I was trying to get a
decision, a “yes” or “no,” nothing else.
M. HERZOG: And to demand an answer “yes” or “no”—you do not consider
that an ultimatum, Defendant Sauckel?
SAUCKEL: I had to leave, and I wanted a decision as to whether the
French Premier would sign it or not.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. The Tribunal will, I am sure, note your answer.
Do you know how many French workers were deported to Germany as the
result of your various actions?
SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I cannot say exactly offhand—there
were 700,000 to 800,000 French workers employed in Germany. However, I
cannot tell you exactly without documents.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Belgium and in Northern France the
deportation of workers for forced labor was regulated through laws of
the army of occupation?
SAUCKEL: I do not know about it being through the laws of the army of
occupation but through labor administration.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that it was the decree of 6 October 1942 which
instituted forced labor in Belgium and in Northern France?
SAUCKEL: We called it “compulsory labor service” in German law. That is
correct.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that General Von Falkenhausen, the German
Military Commander in Belgium and in Northern France, who signed the
order of October 1942, did so under pressure from you?
SAUCKEL: No, he did not sign it under pressure from me, because I talked
to him about it and there was not any argument. This was done at the
request of the Reich Government and the Führer.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you the interrogatory of General Von
Falkenhausen, who testified before a French magistrate on 27 November
1945. I submitted this interrogatory under Exhibit Number RF-15
(Document Number RF-15) in the course of my presentation in January. I
read from Page 1. Question 3:
“Question: ‘Will you swear that you will tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?’
“Answer: ‘I swear.’
“Question: ‘On 6 October 1942 there appeared an order which
instituted compulsory labor service in Belgium and in the
departments of Northern France...’”
I skip two lines.
“Answer: ‘I was Commander for Northern France and Belgium.’
“Question: ‘Does the witness remember having promulgated this
order?’
“Answer: ‘I do not remember exactly the text of this order,
because it was drawn up after a long struggle with Sauckel, the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.’
“Question: ‘Did you have any difficulties with Sauckel?’
“Answer: ‘I was fundamentally opposed to the institution of
compulsory labor service, and it was only after having received
orders that I consented to promulgate the decree.’”
Do you still deny that General Von Falkenhausen issued this order under
pressure from you?
SAUCKEL: I deny the version as it is put before me now, emphatically.
M. HERZOG: You dispute the testimony of General Von Falkenhausen?
SAUCKEL: In this version, yes, because the institution...
M. HERZOG: This statement was given under oath, and your testimony today
is given under oath. The Tribunal will take note of it.
SAUCKEL: I say with full consciousness that to the best of my
recollection this version is not completely correct. Laws regarding
labor in occupied territories were not made on my order but on the order
of the Führer, and I did not have any argument about it with General Von
Falkenhausen. We discussed it in a very friendly way, and he introduced
the law. I do not remember having had any difficulties in this
connection. And in another paragraph he states here that at that time he
gave all his instructions on Hitler’s orders. I myself had neither
arguments nor difficulties with him.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Holland the deportation of Dutch
workers for forced labor was under the jurisdiction of the
Reichskommissariat?
SAUCKEL: Please, would you hear the Defendant Seyss-Inquart about that?
The expression jurisdiction is entirely new to me. In France, Belgium,
and Holland this matter was dealt with through the administration of the
labor departments, that is to say...
M. HERZOG: Who signed the orders concerning forced labor in Holland?
SAUCKEL: I assume that Herr Seyss-Inquart did.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the orders signed by the Defendant
Seyss-Inquart constituted only a local application of the general
program which you were charged with carrying out?
SAUCKEL: A local application in Holland? I do not quite understand it
the way it is put in German.
M. HERZOG: Is it not correct that by signing the orders concerning
forced labor in Holland the Defendant Seyss-Inquart was but implementing
your program of forced labor?
SAUCKEL: It was a realization of the Führer’s labor program as he, the
Führer, had ordered it.
M. HERZOG: Did you go to Belgium or to Holland in order to control the
implementation of the laws on forced labor?
SAUCKEL: Not to control. I was in Belgium and Holland only for a very
short time. I had conferences there with the leading men, and according
to my recollection I visited the labor authorities in Antwerp and saw
how they functioned—the German ones.
M. HERZOG: And in the course of these journeys you were preparing
detailed measures for the implementation of the labor program, is that
not true?
SAUCKEL: I did not draft them during those journeys; I discussed them
there. Of course, I did some work while traveling.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number PS-556, Exhibit Number RF-67.
It is a letter which you wrote to the Führer on 13 August 1943. In this
you declare, Paragraph 1 of the letter:
“My Führer,
“I take the liberty of informing you of my return from France,
Belgium, and Holland, where I went on official business. After
difficult and lengthy negotiations I have imposed upon the
occupied territories of the West, for the 5 last months of the
year 1943, the program which is indicated below; and I have also
prepared detailed measures for its implementation—in France
through the military commander, the German Embassy, the French
Government; in Belgium through the military commander; and in
Holland through the offices of the Reich Commissioner.”
Do you still dispute, Defendant, the fact that you went to Belgium and
Holland in order to prepare detailed measures there?
SAUCKEL: I have never denied that, I would like to say that I do not
resent the expression, but only the way you present it now and then. It
says quite clearly that they were discussed there; that is what is meant
by preparation.
M. HERZOG: One last question on this matter: What is your estimate of
the number of Dutch workers who were deported to Germany?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you exactly from memory how many Dutch workers
were employed on the basis of contracts with them and on the basis of
these laws. Maybe there were 200,000 or 300,000, maybe more. I cannot
tell you offhand what these Dutch figures were.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. Is it correct that the forced recruitment of
foreign workers was carried out with brutality?
SAUCKEL: Regarding the instructions which I issued, that was discussed
adequately and clearly yesterday. My instructions are available
practically in their entirety, and discountenance any brutal recruitment
which...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were not asked about your instructions,
but you were asked whether brutality was shown. If you know, you can
answer.
SAUCKEL: I cannot know. From time to time I heard about excesses, and I
stopped them at once, and I protested against them when I heard of them.
M. HERZOG: Did you have knowledge of protests concerning the manner in
which the recruitment of workers was carried out in the occupied
territories?
SAUCKEL: I received protests, and that was discussed yesterday with my
counsel.
M. HERZOG: And when you received those protests, what did you do?
SAUCKEL: I had those cases investigated and left any further measures to
the authorities concerned. I did everything on my side to prevent and
stop such occurrences, and that can and will be testified to here.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you appealed for the help of the Wehrmacht
to insure the recruiting of foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: In those areas where the Wehrmacht exercised jurisdiction I
passed on to the military commanders or commanders-in-chief, through the
Quartermaster General of the Army, the instructions I received from the
Führer.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you asked the military authorities to put
troops at the disposal of your offices and services?
SAUCKEL: I have no recollection of troops, but there were labor
detachments there. It is true that in areas where there were uprisings
or partisan fighting I asked that order be restored, so that the
administration which had been disturbed or interrupted could be resumed.
M. HERZOG: You therefore asked that troops should be put at your
disposal?
SAUCKEL: Not at my disposal. It was not my task to bring order to those
areas. I explained that it was essential for the fulfillment of my own
tasks and that I could only carry them out if proper administration were
once more made possible by the establishment of order; it was not for
recruiting purposes.
M. HERZOG: Did you not ask that those troops should participate in the
tasks assigned to the service for the recruitment of labor? I submit to
you Document Number F-815, which I put in under Exhibit Number RF-1514.
It is a letter of 18 April 1944 from General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt
and addressed to you. I read the first paragraph of it:
“On the part of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor...”—that is you, is it not?
SAUCKEL: That is I, but there was another department in France, too...
M. HERZOG: “....the request was made that the Commander, West
should be approached to the effect that in sectors where there
are units belonging to the Commander, West, the commanders of
these units should receive orders to support the execution of
the tasks assigned to the Allocation of Labor by making troops
available.”
Do you still deny that you requested that troops should be put at your
disposal?
SAUCKEL: I personally did not ask for them. This appears to be the
administrative office West.
M. HERZOG: Are you not the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but this order is not known to me personally.
M. HERZOG: Do you know whether this request was seconded by the
Defendant Speer?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number 824-PS...
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you better put that off until after the
adjournment.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I believe that Mr. Dodd has a statement to
make to the Tribunal.
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendant Jodl is absent.
MR. DODD: Document Number 3057-PS, concerning which M. Herzog questioned
the defendant this morning, was in the document book offered by the
United States with reference to the slave-labor program, but it was not
offered in evidence, and I found the reference in the record at Page
1397 of the transcript for 13 December 1945 (Volume III, Page 494) and
the President of the Tribunal particularly asked why we had not read
Document 3057-PS. I answered that we had intended to offer it, but that
counsel for Sauckel had told me that his client maintained that he had
been coerced into the making of the statement, and for that reason we
preferred not to offer it, and were not offering it.
THE PRESIDENT: I want to announce that the Tribunal will rise this
afternoon at half past 4 to sit in closed session.
SAUCKEL: May I be permitted to give my explanation on that document?
M. HERZOG: What document are you speaking of?
SAUCKEL: I am referring to the letter of the Field Marshal Von
Rundstedt. This document represents a letter which is addressed to me...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear you ask any question. Did you ask your
question?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. It is the document which I presented just
before the recess, and the document shows that the official in charge of
the recruitment and allocation of labor—that is he himself—asked that
troop units should be put at his disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Document F-815? Yes, very well.
M. HERZOG: That is correct, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you whether you recognize that this
document establishes the fact that you requested troop units?
SAUCKEL: As far as this question is concerned I cannot answer precisely,
for I personally did not receive this letter. Instead it was sent to
Paris, to the office there. This letter is not initialed by me. But in
order to clarify my position, I should like to emphasize specifically
that I did not demand troops in order to recruit workers. I asked for
troops when in certain areas the administrative procedure could not be
carried through because of resistance activities, _et cetera_. In that
connection there is an error in this letter of Field Marshal Von
Rundstedt. But I did not receive this reply myself. It is initialed by
the office of the military commander in Paris.
M. HERZOG: I submit Document F-824, which I hand to the Tribunal as
Exhibit RF-1515. This Document F-824 is a letter from the Commander of
the West, from his headquarters, dated 25 July 1944. I quote:
“One can conclude from this that on the order of the Führer, and
after the abrogation of all contrary decrees, the desires of the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...”
This Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor is you
yourself; is that not so?
“...and of Reich Minister Speer must in principle be carried
out. Following my telegraphic communication, on the basis of the
conference of ministers of 11 July in the Reich Chancellery,
concerning which the Commander of the West will be informed by
the military commander, the following directives are in force
from now on:
“Without taking into account justified misgivings concerning
security and order within the country, recruiting must start
everywhere where the possibilities referred to in my telegram
present themselves. As an only exception the Führer has decided
that in the actual fighting zone no methods of coercion will be
used against the population as long as the latter are helpful to
the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the recruiting of volunteers
among refugees from the combat zones is to be handled
energetically. Moreover, all means will be considered justified,
in order to recruit as much labor as possible from elsewhere by
means at the disposal of the Wehrmacht.”
Do you again deny that at your request, and at that of Reich Minister
Speer, troop units carried out the recruiting of labor?
SAUCKEL: I should like to remark in this connection that I do not
dispute what has just been described. At that time the
commander-in-chief was under the stress of battle and the evacuation of
the population. But I can testify that after the date of 25 July 1944
these things did not apply any longer, for the withdrawal of German
troops was much too rapid; so that this decree, which had been issued by
the Führer, was no longer in effect.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference, the ministers’ conference of
11 July 1944, to which the document I have just read refers?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I recall it.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the persons who were present at this meeting?
SAUCKEL: Not all of them.
M. HERZOG: I submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is Document
3819-PS, which has been handed to the Tribunal under number...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read the last passage in
Document F-824—that is, not the last, but the last on that page
beginning with “Afin....” It is on Page 346 of the French translation.
M. HERZOG: “In order to make the measures undertaken as
effective as possible, the troops must be informed of the
necessity of the Arbeitseinsatz organization so that they may
put down the many acts of subversive and open resistance. The
field commanders and military administration offices must give
as much aid as possible to the delegates of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor and refrain from encroaching
on their activities which are in conformance with instructions.
I therefore ask you to give the necessary directions to this
effect...”
Do you still deny that at your request the Army was used for the
recruitment of workers?
THE PRESIDENT: There is a passage on the next page, too, in the
supplementary note, Paragraph 1.
M. HERZOG: “Supplementary note by the Commander of the West.
“The Commander of the West reported to the Chief of the OKW on
23 July as follows:
“1) In spite of anxieties concerning internal security, I have
authorized the application of the Sauckel-Laval agreement of 12
May 1944.
“2) I shall issue further instructions for the application of
these measures in the combat zone in agreement with OKW/WFSt/Qu.
(Verw. 1) 2 (West) Number 05201/44, Secret, of 8 July 1944.
“The Commander of the West, signed Von Kluge, Field Marshal.
“Further instructions follow. For the Commander of the West. The
Chief of the General Staff,” _et cetera_.
I come back now to the conference of 11 July 1944. I submit to you
Document Number 3819-PS, submitted under Exhibit Number GB-306. The
Tribunal will find it under Document 3819-PS in the first part of my
document book. It represents the minutes of the ministers’ conference
which took place on 11 July 1944 in Berlin, a gathering of ministers,
chiefs of the Party, and of administration.
You will find on Page 6 of the French translation the list of all the
persons who were there. Do you remember who, among the defendants, were
among those present? Do you recognize the signature of Defendant Funk?
That of Defendant Speer?
SAUCKEL: I have not found it yet.
M. HERZOG: Have you found them?
SAUCKEL: I have not found Speer’s signature yet.
M. HERZOG: Was Defendant Speer present at this conference?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you from memory. I cannot find his name.
M. HERZOG: Were you yourself present at this conference?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I participated.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the proposals which, in the course of this
conference, General Warlimont made to you in the name of the General
Staff? Do you remember the reply that you made to these proposals?
SAUCKEL: I recall a conversation between General Warlimont and myself on
that occasion, and I gave an answer; but I cannot give it to you
verbatim without having some data at my disposal.
M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to read you the text. It is on Page 10. The
Tribunal will find it at the bottom of the page:
“The representative of the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont,
referred to a recent order of the Führer according to which all
German forces would have to be used in the task of recruiting
labor. Where troops of the Wehrmacht are stationed, whenever
they are not engaged exclusively in military tasks—such as the
construction of coastal fortifications—they will be available,
but they cannot be detached solely for the purpose of the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. General
Warlimont made the following practical proposals:
“(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in
addition, have to be used for recruiting labor in the zones held
by partisan bands....”
SAUCKEL: Would you please tell me where that is. I have not this passage
on this page. Will you please show me the page?
M. HERZOG: I will have it shown to you. Point it out to the interpreter
also.
SAUCKEL: Yes, I find the place about General Warlimont, but in the
German translation it sounds entirely different from what you are
reading.
M. HERZOG: It is on Page 3. Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Then I can resume the reading of it.
“(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in
addition, be used for recruiting labor in the zones held by
partisan bands. Any person who cannot give a satisfactory reason
for his staying in that region will be compulsorily recruited.
“(b) If large towns are totally or partially evacuated owing to
food difficulties, all the population capable of work will be
recruited for labor with the aid of the Wehrmacht.
“(c) A special effort for recruiting labor among refugees from
areas close to the front must be made with the aid of the
Wehrmacht.
“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these proposals with gratitude and
expressed the hope that results would be obtained by these
means.”
Do you still continue to claim that the Wehrmacht did not co-operate in
the recruiting of labor?
SAUCKEL: I did not deny that in the combat area, and for the purpose of
maintaining order in the rear areas, these measures were proposed, but
they were not carried through.
M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce a document which refers to 3 or 4
days after this meeting of ministers. It is a telegram from Defendant
Keitel, Document Number F-814, which I submit to the Tribunal under
Exhibit Number RF-1516. It is a telegram addressed by Defendant Keitel
to all military commanders. I call your attention to the fact that it
bears the stamp of the labor department of the military commander in
France. This is dated 15 July and here is the text of it...
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, some of these documents are not tabbed and it
is quite impossible to find them unless you tell us where they are.
M. HERZOG: I have tabbed only those documents which I intend to use
several times, so that the Tribunal will be able to find them easily.
Otherwise, the documents must be in the order in which I use them.
Document F-814 should, therefore, be immediately after Document 3819-PS,
unless I am mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: 3819, you mean?
M. HERZOG: Actually it is after the document marked Document RF-15; it
is the fourth document after Document F-814.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got 815 after that; after RF-15, we have Document
F-815.
M. HERZOG: After 815 we have Document F-823, then F-824, and F-814, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes, now I see it.
M. HERZOG: This document contains the instructions which Keitel gave in
connection with this meeting of leaders. I read the second paragraph:
“The present situation demands the use of all conceivable means
for the procurement of additional labor, because it is the
fighting men who benefit first of all by all armament measures.
In view of this fact, all questions concerning internal unrest,
the increase of resistance and such matters must be put in the
background. We must concentrate on giving every help and support
to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I
refer to my directives for the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in
the procurement of workers from France.”
Do you still contend that the Wehrmacht was not used for the recruitment
of labor?
SAUCKEL: I must emphasize here again that I did not dispute that these
things had been planned and ordered. I did not dispute that fact, and I
should like to emphasize that again. But these measures were not carried
through, and I would like to emphasize that also. And besides that, I
did not send this telegram.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that the German Police proceeded to take
steps to recruit foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: How far the Police carried through their measures in detail, I
do not know, but I do know that they carried through some measures on
their own accord.
M. HERZOG: But is it not true that you recommended your offices to put
themselves in touch with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the SS?
SAUCKEL: I considered both the SD and the Police to be regular and
justified institutions, and I had to ask for their help when it was
necessary.
M. HERZOG: You, therefore, admit that you recommended your offices to
put themselves in contact with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the
SS for the accomplishment of their tasks?
SAUCKEL: To support me in my tasks only where an orderly participation
or the use of the Police was necessary from an administrative point of
view—not for the recruitment of workers as such, but only to remove
difficulties or disturbances in administration.
M. HERZOG: I ask you the question again, and I ask you to answer “yes”
or “no.” Did you recommend your offices to get in touch with the chiefs
of the Police, the SS, and the SD?
SAUCKEL: I can only answer that question with a qualified “yes”—on
occasions when it was necessary to call in police aid; not in order to
carry through the task itself.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that the chiefs of the German Police assisted in
the conferences which you held with the French authorities concerning
the recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: Sometimes representatives of the Higher SS and Police Leader
were present just as in the case of the French, where the Minister of
the Interior or the Minister of the Police was present. I neither
demanded that nor proposed it.
M. HERZOG: But you admit that the representatives of the German Police
were present at these discussions? Can you give the name of one of these
representatives? Do you know Standartenführer Knochen?
SAUCKEL: Standartenführer Knochen was in Paris, and on occasions he was
present at these conferences.
M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the chiefs of the German Police attended
the conferences which the German authorities held concerning labor
problems?
SAUCKEL: To my recollection they attended various conferences, but that
occurred at the proposal of the military commander, under whose
direction these conferences took place.
M. HERZOG: Was there a representative of the Police at the conference of
chiefs on 11 July 1944, which we mentioned just now in Document 3819-PS?
SAUCKEL: Do you mean the meeting at Berlin?
M. HERZOG: Yes, the Berlin meeting on 11 July 1944.
SAUCKEL: I believe Kaltenbrunner attended that conference. The meeting
had been called by Reich Minister Lammers.
M. HERZOG: Did you never ask Himmler, in the presence of the Führer, for
the help of the SS in the recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: At a discussion with the Führer in January, Reichsführer SS
Himmler was present. On this occasion, as far as I recollect, I pointed
out that the program for the year 1944, which had been drawn up by the
Führer, could not be carried through by me if the partisan menace and
obstruction in certain areas were not removed. And that, of course,
could only be done by the authorities who had jurisdiction there.
M. HERZOG: You admit, therefore, that you asked Reichsführer SS Himmler
to put his police forces at your disposal?
SAUCKEL: No, it is not correct to put it in that way. I have to
contradict you there. Neither I nor my offices could have police forces
put at our disposal. I merely asked for help in those areas where I was
supposed to carry through administrative measures and where a
pacification and restoration of order was first necessary. Otherwise, I
could not carry out my task.
M. HERZOG: I am going to show you Document Number 1292-PS. It has
already been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-225. It
is the minutes of a meeting held in the presence of the Führer on 4
January 1944. In my document book it is a little way after the marked
document and is also marked with a tab.
On Page 3 of the French text, Page 5 of the German text, you declared:
“Success will depend mainly on what German executive forces are
made available. My action cannot be carried through with native
executive forces.”
Do you recognize that declaration?
SAUCKEL: Will you please indicate the place to me? I have not found it
yet. Which page in German?
M. HERZOG: It must be on Page 5 of the text which was given to you.
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. That is a statement, a rather abbreviated
statement, probably made by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. But I should
like to say emphatically that it can be interpreted only in this way: In
those areas, which were very numerous at the time, I could not put into
effect an administration to deal with manpower until order had been
restored through executive forces. This statement, therefore, is not
quite correct as presented here.
M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you said to us only yesterday that you
were formerly a worker. Did you ever consider that a worker could be
taken to his work handcuffed?
SAUCKEL: No, I never thought of such a thing. I hear now for the first
time that I am supposed to have sent, or had workers sent to their
places of work handcuffed. I do not remember that. In any case, I never
decreed anything like that; that much I can say.
M. HERZOG: On 30 August 1943, you made a speech in Paris to the
Allocation of Labor staffs which you were setting up in France. I give
you Document Number F-816, which I submitted to the Tribunal this
morning, and I ask you to look at it again. I ask you to read...
Mr. President, I think I have made a mistake. I do not think I submitted
that document, and, therefore, I submit it now, under the Exhibit Number
RF-1517.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please look at Page 10 of the photostat
which has been given to you—Page 38 of the French translation, the last
line on the page:
“The most severe measures for recruiting labor—police action or
the use of handcuffs—must be applied by us in the most
unobtrusive manner.”
That is what you declared on 30 August 1943 to the Allocation of Labor
staffs when they met in Paris.
SAUCKEL: I have not found the place. Will you please have it shown to
me?
M. HERZOG: It is on Page 10, some 14 lines down. Have you found it now?
SAUCKEL: Yes; I have found it.
M. HERZOG: And you considered that handcuffs could be used in the
recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: It can only be a statement regarding cases of flagrant
resistance to the authority of the state or to the execution of some
administrative action. Experience shows us that this has been found
necessary the whole world over. I merely said that everything should be
done in an orderly and correct way. I did not call that a rule to be
applied for the recruitment of labor. It cannot be understood in any
other way.
M. HERZOG: But you said that to the Allocation of Labor officials in
France. The Tribunal will judge that.
SAUCKEL: Yes, but it must be interpreted as being applied only if there
were flagrant resistance to an executive authority; otherwise it was
never intended.
M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will form its own opinion.
Defendant Sauckel, have you ever created any special police for the
recruitment of labor?
SAUCKEL: No, I established no special police; I explained that
yesterday. That was a suggestion put forward by the French units
themselves for protection. At a conference I exaggerated and called it
“police,” but it was not a police force.
M. HERZOG: Have you heard of a “Committee for Social Peace”?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that was talked about.
M. HERZOG: Have you heard a committee mentioned which was called the
“League for Social Order and Justice?”
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Have you ever drafted any order or sent any instructions
which advised the institution of these committees?
SAUCKEL: It was proposed, yes, and it was discussed. As far as I
remember that was in the spring of 1944.
M. HERZOG: And you claim that you never set up these committees, or
drafted any instructions concerning the setting up of these committees?
SAUCKEL: I have already said that I did that.
M. HERZOG: You admit that you drafted instructions concerning the
formation of these special police forces?
SAUCKEL: That was done on the basis of discussions which I had with
these French units.
M. HERZOG: So you did do this?
SAUCKEL: Yes, in agreement with these French units.
M. HERZOG: Very well.
I submit to the Tribunal Document Number F-827, under Exhibit Number
RF-1518. These are instructions of the Defendant Sauckel for the
formation of these special police forces. The document consists of
several sets of instructions. On Page 6, there is an order of 25 January
1944 by the Defendant Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
M. HERZOG: On Page 6, immediately after Document 1292 in my document
book, you will find the instructions of the Defendant Sauckel. I read:
“Berlin, 25 January 1944. Secret.
“Subject: Formation of a protection corps for the execution of
the tasks of the Allocation Of Labor in France and in Belgium
during the year 1944.
“1) To the Military Commander in France, Paris.
To the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France,
Brussels.
“In order to secure the carrying out of the necessary tasks of
the Allocation of Labor in Belgium and France, especially the
assignments for Germany, and to strengthen the executive, a
protective corps, the Committee for Social Peace, is to be
created in France and Belgium. This protective corps is to
consist of indigenous forces with a nucleus of German police who
will act as leaders. This protective corps will consist of
approximately 5,000 men in France, and approximately 1,000 men
in Belgium. I give the following provisional instructions for
the formation of this protective corps and the accomplishment of
its tasks:
“I. Selection of members of the Protective Corps.
“The selection shall be made in close agreement with the
competent Police and SD offices, which shall approve the
candidates, especially from the point of view of their loyalty.
The selection shall be made especially among the members of
political movements favorably disposed to collaboration with
Germany.
“II. Organization of the Protective Corps.
“The Protective Corps will be directed from central offices to
be set up in Paris and Brussels. The heads of these offices
shall be designated by me.”—That is to say, by you, Defendant
Sauckel.—“They shall take orders from my delegates in France.
In purely police questions, the Protective Corps shall be
directed by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The regional groups
of the Protective Corps shall take orders from the commanders of
German police forces, and the latter will receive technical
directions from the Feldkommandantur and from the recruiting
offices as to their participation in tasks concerning the
Allocation of Labor. The German Police and the services of the
SD will deal with instruction in police matters; technical
training, as far as the Allocation of Labor is concerned, will
be given insofar as is necessary by the experts of the
Feldkommandantur and the recruiting offices.
“The members of the Protective Corps will not wear uniform; they
will however, carry firearms.
“III. Execution of orders.
“The members of the Protective Corps assigned to the recruiting
offices or to the Feldkommandantur shall be employed in such a
way as to insure maximum efficiency in the execution of measures
ordered. For example, they must be informed immediately if
Frenchmen who have been summoned by German offices do not
appear. They must find out the domiciles of these persons and
bring them to report in accordance with instructions from the
German police leader in collaboration with the French and German
police. Furthermore, they must track down immediately all those
who have refused to appear when summoned, and those who have
broken their contracts. In the interests of an effective
executive, it is expedient that they receive regularly lists of
persons summoned and persons liable for service, to enable them
to act immediately in cases where German directives have not
been complied with.
“It is to be presumed that these quick methods, coupled with
fitting punishment and immediate publication of the punishments,
will have a more deterrent effect than that achieved by tracking
down the men afterwards, as has been done up to now.
Furthermore, members of the Protective Corps are to keep the
German offices informed of any particular difficulties in
recruitment....”
And all that, Defendant, is signed “Sauckel.” Do you still claim that
you did not form a special police corps in France and Belgium?
SAUCKEL: I already told my attorney yesterday that in agreement with
French organizations such a protective corps was set up, so that on the
one hand people who wanted to work could be protected, and on the other
hand administrative measures could be carried out. Since the Frenchmen
themselves declared that they were ready and willing to collaborate, I
did not see anything unfavorable in this or anything that was in any way
out of order.
It was to alleviate the conditions of the indigenous people themselves.
M. HERZOG: I ask you to answer my question “yes” or “no.” Do you admit
that you set up this special police service?
SAUCKEL: I admit that I suggested this Protective Corps, and that it was
set up, but only on a small scale.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you issued instructions, or imposed measures
of constraint against those who evaded the compulsory labor service?
SAUCKEL: I did not issue them myself, but rather the French Government
did. That is correct; for in every occupied territory—and that is true
the whole world over—the authority of the occupying power must be
respected.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that you demanded that the death penalty should be
applied to officials who, for instance, hindered your action?
SAUCKEL: It is true that at a conference with the French Premier Laval,
I demanded, by way of negotiations, the death penalty in cases of very
serious obstruction.
M. HERZOG: Then you admit that you demanded the application of the death
penalty in the case of these officials?
SAUCKEL: Yes, if a serious case of sabotage was in question—according
to martial law.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that your task was to procure for the German war
industry the labor it required?
SAUCKEL: That was one of my tasks.
M. HERZOG: In this respect were you responsible to the Defendant Speer,
Minister for Armaments and Munitions, for the carrying out of your task?
SAUCKEL: I was responsible to the Four Year Plan and to the Führer, and
I had instructions from the Führer to meet the requirements of Reich
Minister Speer as far as it was possible for me to do so.
M. HERZOG: Did the Defendant Speer approve of all the steps which you
took in recruiting foreign labor?
SAUCKEL: At all events he agreed, or he demanded, that workers should be
put at his disposal. Sometimes, however, we did not entirely agree as to
how it should be done; for instance, we did not agree about the
protected factories in France.
M. HERZOG: We will come to that later. I ask you to tell me whether you
always succeeded in satisfying the demands for workers which were made
to you by the different sections of German industry?
SAUCKEL: No, I was not always successful.
M. HERZOG: And when you failed, did the orders that were sent to you by
Defendant Speer have to have priority over all others?
SAUCKEL: Yes, they had to have priority.
M. HERZOG: Were there not incidents in this respect? For instance, did
it not happen that some transports of workers were diverted from their
original destination on instructions from Defendant Speer?
SAUCKEL: It did happen that, contrary to my instructions, labor
transports were stopped, or transferred to other regions or to other
factories. But whether the order always emanated from Herr Speer, or
from an armament commission, or from another office, I do not know. It
was not always from the same quarter.
M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you declared, however, that the
original destination of these transports was sometimes changed in order
to satisfy the demands of Speer’s offices. Do you confirm this?
SAUCKEL: Yes; but I meant by that something rather different. In that
case I was informed about it. There were two kinds of changes, or
deviations: those which I did not know about, and those which were
agreed upon.
M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what was understood by the “red
ticket” system?
SAUCKEL: The red ticket system was applied when there was a demand for
workers, mostly specialized or skilled workers, which had to take
priority over all other demands because the work was necessary.
M. HERZOG: The system of the red ticket was applied to the armament
industry, was it not?
SAUCKEL: The red ticket system was applied to the armament industry...
M. HERZOG: And it was established by agreement between the Defendant
Speer and yourself?
SAUCKEL: That was a system which, in my opinion, was always intended to
meet emergencies; there were variations, such as lists or red tickets.
Originally, there were only lists, and the red ticket was added by
decree.
M. HERZOG: You therefore admit that by these various systems you share
with the Defendant Speer the responsibility of having compelled workers
to work in German factories for the needs of the war which Germany was
fighting against their own native lands?
SAUCKEL: I should like to emphasize particularly that this red ticket
system did not apply only to foreign workers; it applied especially to
German workers too—German skilled workers.
M. HERZOG: But it was applied also to foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: It applied to foreign workers as well, if they were specialists
and declared their willingness.
M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what is meant by the “blocking” of
factories?
SAUCKEL: A factory was “blocked” if it was manufacturing articles which
were not essential for war, or if it was a question of so-called luxury
articles.
M. HERZOG: I do not think you understood my question. What were, for
instance, the “S” factories in France—the factories protected by Speer?
SAUCKEL: “Sperrbetriebe” known as “S” factories—is that what you mean?
M. HERZOG: Yes.
SAUCKEL: Sperrbetriebe were factories which worked for Speer in France,
which had been agreed to by the French Minister Bichelonne, and they
were blocked as far as labor recruitment was concerned.
M. HERZOG: Did you not exert strong pressure on the Defendant Speer to
get him to abandon the practice of blocking industries?
SAUCKEL: I asked him and I urged him, but I could not succeed in putting
an end to the blocking of these factories.
M. HERZOG: Did you ever bring up the matter with Hitler and insist that
Speer should give up his position?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I was very insistent with Hitler about it, but I had no
success.
M. HERZOG: In this connection did you not ask the Führer to increase
your powers at the expense of the Defendant Speer?
SAUCKEL: I did not ask for a general extension of my powers, but I asked
that conditions should be allowed to remain as they had been previously,
for—I ask to be permitted to explain this to the Tribunal—my task was
to bring workers from France to Germany—may I make this statement:
The departments under Speer demanded skilled workers from me. There were
skilled workers already in the factories which Speer had blocked.
Similar industries in Germany would, of course, be worse off if instead
of having skilled French workers they were supplied with unskilled
French workers, or men without experience in that particular trade. I
had to procure workers in any case, but I considered it wiser for German
economy to procure for it the right kind of workers and not workers who
were unskilled.
M. HERZOG: I beg the Tribunal to turn back to Document Number 3819-PS,
the second part of 3819-PS. It consists of two letters, each addressed
to the Führer, by the Defendant Sauckel and by the Defendant Speer, on
this subject of the blocking of industries.
First of all, I will read to the Tribunal some extracts from Sauckel’s
letter, which happens to be the second.
THE PRESIDENT: Have these not both been read already?
M. HERZOG: I think they have already been read, Mr. President; I cannot
affirm it, but believe so. Document Number 3819-PS has already been
submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number GB-306. If the Tribunal
wishes, I can limit myself to very short extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: You need not read them for the purpose of your question
of the defendant.
M. HERZOG: [_Turning to the defendant._] In this letter, on Page 27, you
asked whether you could obtain in a general manner a free hand for the
rational utilization of labor.
Do you admit that you asked the Führer for this free hand?
SAUCKEL: I have not found the place. I could never have asked for a free
hand, but I did ask to be permitted to recruit as before. I cannot find
the place that you are quoting.
M. HERZOG: You will find it on Page 27.
SAUCKEL: In this German text it says: “In this situation, it is
absolutely necessary that I should again have a free hand.” That means
that I should have a free hand once again, as I had had before the
blocked industries were instituted. That is correct, for I was
interested in a rational use of labor.
M. HERZOG: That is what I asked you to confirm. Did you ask that your
powers should be increased at the expense of those of your Codefendant
Speer? Will you answer “yes” or “no,” if you can?
SAUCKEL: I do not understand the question. Was it obtain them or ask for
them?
M. HERZOG: Ask for them.
SAUCKEL: Yes, I asked for them, for it was to Speer’s advantage.
M. HERZOG: You asked for that?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I asked for that in the interests of my tasks.
M. HERZOG: And do you not remember that on other occasions, the
Defendant Speer likewise asked that his powers should be increased at
the expense of yours?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that might have happened also.
M. HERZOG: You declared in your interrogatory that the very close
relations between Speer and Goebbels after the fall of Stalingrad made
Speer want particularly to have you under his authority. Can you confirm
this?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Is it true that your general program for recruiting labor
included the employment of prisoners of war?
SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war as far as they should and
could be put to work under the care of the Wehrmacht.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree which we mentioned this morning,
your Decree Number 10, which stipulated the order of priority of work
and gave priority to armament? Was this order applicable to prisoners of
war as well?
SAUCKEL: As I explained yesterday, this decree was applicable to
prisoners of war only by way of exchange, and to the extent as set forth
in the rules of work issued by the OKW and by me in a catalog of work.
M. HERZOG: But Article 8 of this decree stipulates only that it was
applicable to prisoners of war.
SAUCKEL: Yes, in accordance, of course, with the other decrees which
existed; that was a matter of course.
M. HERZOG: You spoke to us yesterday about inspectorates. Is it true
that in September 1943 you came to an agreement with Dr. Ley concerning
the setting up of a central inspectorate for foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: Yes, for the purposes of their welfare.
M. HERZOG: In consequence, you admit that you are responsible for the
measures concerning the treatment of foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: I am responsible for the directives which I issued; they are
all available.
M. HERZOG: Do you consider yourself responsible for the feeding of
foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: I consider myself responsible for the directives which I issued
regarding the feeding of foreign workers. The actual feeding of these
people was not the task and responsibility of the labor authorities.
That was the responsibility of the factories, or the camp leaders who
had been charged by the factories to look after this.
M. HERZOG: I am going to have submitted to you Document Number 025-PS.
This document was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number
USA-698. You already had it yesterday. It consists of the report of a
meeting in the office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor—that is to say, you yourself—on 3 September 1942. The
document is dated 4 September.
This document, Mr. President, is at the end of my document book, after
Document F-827, the last page of the French translation. I read:...
THE PRESIDENT: The last page is Document F-857, is it not? The document
called 857—the last page I have got. It is just in front of Document
2200-PS. Did you come across that? It is just after Document 1913-PS.
M. HERZOG: After Document 1913-PS, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
M. HERZOG: I read:
“The Führer cannot understand that, in the struggle for the
future of Europe, the country which has to bear the brunt of
this struggle is the one to suffer most from hunger; whereas in
France...”
THE PRESIDENT: It is on Page 1 or Page 4?
M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, on Page 4 of the French text—that is to
say, on the last page.
“The Führer cannot understand that, in the struggle for the
future of Europe, the country which has to bear the brunt of
this struggle is the one to suffer most from hunger; whereas in
France, in Holland, in Hungary, in the Ukraine, or anywhere
else, there is no talk of hunger. He desires that it should be
the reverse in the future. As regards the foreign workers living
in the Reich—with the exclusion of the Eastern Workers—little
by little their rations must be reduced and made to correspond
to their output. It is not admissible that lazy Dutchmen or
Italians should receive better rations than good Eastern
Workers. In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must
apply equally to feeding.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you what you meant when you stated
that, “In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must apply equally
to feeding?”
SAUCKEL: There was a standard ration in the Reich which was increased by
additional rations based on output or performance. I fought for the
principle that these additional rations, which the workers from the West
were already largely receiving, should be granted to the workers from
the East as well; and that where western workers—that is, Dutch and
Belgian workers—did not keep up their output in the same way as the
Eastern Workers, these additional rations should be cut down
accordingly, but not the standard ration which applied to the German
people as well.
M. HERZOG: You therefore consider that if the output of one worker is
smaller than that of another, his food rations must be smaller. Is that
what I am to understand?
SAUCKEL: No, it is not right to interpret it that way. I should like to
explain the system again. In Germany each worker received his ration as
fixed by the Reich Minister for Food. In addition to that there were
special increases as a reward for increased output. At the beginning
these additional rations were not granted to Russian workers, and it is
these additional rations we are dealing with here; not with starving
people, or cutting down their standard food rations—additional rations
for increased output.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
MARSHAL: If it pleases the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendant Raeder is absent.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, do you anticipate being able to conclude your
cross-examination before half past 4?
M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President, I think that I might even finish before
that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I offered in evidence this morning
Document Number F-810, which is an account of the conference which you
held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at Wartburg with the heads of the regional
labor offices. Do you remember?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I remember.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember whether during this conference the question
was raised as to the discipline to be imposed upon the workers?
SAUCKEL: It is possible that during this conference—or
conferences—this question was discussed. I cannot remember exactly; I
did not participate in all the sessions.
M. HERZOG: Do you know Ministerialrat Dr. Sturm?
SAUCKEL: Ministerialrat Dr. Sturm is not personally known to me.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the statements made at the conference of 15
and 16 July 1944 by Dr. Sturm?
SAUCKEL: I cannot remember any particular statements by Dr. Sturm.
M. HERZOG: I shall hand you once more the minutes of that meeting. It is
Document Number F-810 which was presented this morning under Exhibit
Number RF-1507. Will you please look at Page 25 of the German text. It
is also Page 25 of the French version. There you see—I read the first
line: “Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work
discipline.”
I shall pass to the next page, where I read, “We are working with the
Gestapo...”
THE PRESIDENT: Where is this?
M. HERZOG: Document F-810, Mr. President; it is a document which is
marked...
THE PRESIDENT: I know it is 806, but I thought you told us that they
followed on.
M. HERZOG: 810, Sir, 810.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got that.
M. HERZOG: Page 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
M. HERZOG: With your permission, I will begin again.
“Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work
discipline...”
And on the following page: “We are working with the Gestapo and the
concentration camps, and we are certainly on the right track.”
Did you make any observations when that statement was made?
SAUCKEL: I did not hear that statement myself. He gave a specialized
report on questions of labor legislation, as it says at the beginning. I
am seeing the record for the first time in my life. There were several
parallel meetings at the same time. I did not hear it myself, but it
stands to reason that some sort of ruling regarding penalties had to be
made, as is done in all labor legislation.
Perhaps I may read to you from the same document, the beginning:
“Measures regulating the employment of labor and wages are only
possible on the basis of a healthy working morale. Regulations
of a disciplinary and penal character for securing such morale
require unified handling, the details of which will be dealt
with at a subsequent meeting of experts on penal law.”
That is, of course, not one of my offices.
M. HERZOG: I asked you what you thought of Dr. Sturm’s statement.
SAUCKEL: May I read in connection with Dr. Sturm’s statement, at the end
of the first page...
M. HERZOG: Will you please answer my question first? What do you think
of this statement?
SAUCKEL: I have already answered.
M. HERZOG: Please answer my question. What do you think of this
statement?
SAUCKEL: I did not know of this statement, as Sturm, I believe, came
from some other department. I do not know whether he belonged to the
Ministry of Labor itself, or to some other department; that I cannot
say. I did not hear these statements...
THE PRESIDENT: Watch the light. Do you not see the light in front of
you?
M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that an agreement was reached between you
and the Chief of the Police and SS to hand over to the Gestapo those
workers who were guilty of leaving their work?
SAUCKEL: Well, there had to be an authority in Germany which dealt with
workers who left their places of work without being entitled to do so.
It could not have been done by any authority other than the Police;
there was no other way. In connection with this document I beg to be
allowed to read some more from Page 1:
“Apart from that, the number of penalties imposed by the
authorities on German workers, such as reprimands, fines,
concentration camps, and legal penalties, was relatively
surprisingly small. In cases dealt with by the public prosecutor
the penalties inflicted amounted on an average to 0.1 to 0.2 for
every 1,000 workers.”
M. HERZOG: What has that to do with the question which I asked you about
your relations with the Gestapo and the concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: But there was no other authority except the police who could
make an arrest if it were necessary and legally justified by court
rulings.
M. HERZOG: You admit, then, that it was with your agreement that the
Gestapo proceeded to arrest workmen who had broken what you call their
contract of work, and send them to concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: Not to concentration camps, no, but into the custody which was
prescribed. The penalties were decreed in accordance with certain
regulations. I made no other agreement.
M. HERZOG: I submit in evidence Document Number 2200-PS; which becomes
Exhibit Number RF-1519. It is a service memorandum of the Gestapo
addressed to the district police officials of the Cologne and Aachen
districts. It refers to the struggle against breaches of contract on the
part of foreign workers. Mr. President, it is the fourth document from
the end in my document book. I read from it:
“The considerable number of refractory foreign workers ... is
dangerous to the security of the Reich.... There is always
danger of actual sabotage in such cases, ... the Reichsführer SS
and Chief of the German Police has reached an agreement with the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor that all
charges of absenteeism against foreign workers shall be dealt
with by the Gestapo.
“...the district police authorities are expected to examine
anything bearing on this matter. They are authorized by me to
give warnings to absentees by order of the Gestapo State Police
office, Cologne, and to order corrective custody up to 3 days
for all cases of minor importance. The instructions concerning
the attitude to be taken toward the individual groups of foreign
workers are to be noted....
“In more serious cases of absenteeism the district police
authorities will submit the files concerning the cases to the
competent Gestapo office (Cologne, Aachen, or Bonn) for
decision. The Gestapo will examine the matter and order the
necessary measures—detention, sending to corrective labor
camps, or concentration camps.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you still deny that it was with your
agreement that refractory workers were first handed over to the Gestapo,
and then sent to concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: I did not deny it, but as stated in the first paragraph, this
only happened if public order was disturbed by punishable offenses, that
is in serious cases, or when there were breaches of working contracts.
There was nobody except the police to undertake the search for such
people, and I consider the procedure to be perfectly correct.
M. HERZOG: You think that it is a correct manner of procedure to hand
over foreign workers to the Gestapo and to concentration camps? I note
your answer.
SAUCKEL: Only in the case of serious offenses. It says “in serious
cases” in the document. That was the demand imposed on me.
M. HERZOG: At what period did you learn about the atrocities which were
committed in concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: I can say with a good conscience that I gained knowledge here
of the cruelties which were committed in the concentration camps; after
the collapse of the Reich.
M. HERZOG: Do you think that it was the same with all the Hitlerite
chiefs?
SAUCKEL: I cannot speak for the others. I myself did not know of such
measures, which I abhor and which I only learned of here.
M. HERZOG: Do you think that the Reichsführer SS Himmler, for example,
was aware of the atrocities which were committed in the concentration
camps?
SAUCKEL: I cannot say whether the Reichsführer SS knew of them, whether
he himself instigated them. During the whole of my career I hardly ever
spoke to the Reichsführer SS because our personal relations were rather
strained.
M. HERZOG: During the interrogation by your counsel yesterday you
declared that you once visited the concentration camp of Buchenwald; did
you not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, in 1937 or 1938. I cannot tell you that from memory now.
M. HERZOG: You declared you made this visit in the company of an Italian
commission, did you not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct.
M. HERZOG: Do you know that there is in existence an album of official
photographs of the concentration camp in Buchenwald?
SAUCKEL: I do not know that.
M. HERZOG: I offer that album in evidence to the Tribunal under Exhibit
Number RF-1520. It bears the Document Number D-565. It is a document of
the British Delegation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you recognize yourself in these
photographs?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I recognize myself in this picture.
M. HERZOG: With whom are you there?
SAUCKEL: That is the Reichsführer SS.
M. HERZOG: Himmler?
SAUCKEL: Himmler, yes.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. And you contend that you, a Gauleiter and
Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, visited the Buchenwald Concentration
Camp in the company of the Reichsführer SS, and—I call your attention
to this—in the company of the commander of the camp, without knowledge
of what was happening inside the camp?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you when this picture was taken or whether it was
taken in the camp itself. I was once outside the camp together with the
Reichsführer SS—there was another large site there—but I was never
inside the camp together with the Reichsführer SS. I was there only once
with an Italian commission.
This picture does not show that there was an inspection. Here you see
some troops lined up...
M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will decide about that.
I offer in evidence under Exhibit Number RF-1521 the certificate
establishing the origin of this album.
In October of 1945 you were interrogated on the expulsion of Jews from
industry. You said this:
“I never had anything to do with it. I had nothing to do with
the question of the eviction of Jews from industry. I had no
influence in this matter. It was an enigma to me.”
Can you confirm this declaration?
SAUCKEL: That is perfectly correct. I did not say the eviction of the
Jews from industry was a secret to me; I said that, to the best of my
recollection, I had nothing to do with it.
M. HERZOG: Your counsel gave you a document yesterday, Document Number
L-61, which you thought you had to contest.
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: The point that you raised against this document was that it
was dated 1942, and that it dealt with questions prior to your
appointment. Did I understand you correctly yesterday?
SAUCKEL: The enclosures to the document deal with questions that had
already been started before I was appointed.
M. HERZOG: I offer in evidence Document Number L-156, which becomes
Exhibit Number RF-1522. It is a letter written under the authority of
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, which is you. It is dated 26 March 1943. It is
addressed to the chiefs of the regional labor offices, and it deals with
the question of the eviction of Jews. It begins thus:
“In agreement with me and the Reich Minister for Armaments and
Munitions, the Reichsführer SS, for reasons of state security,
removed from their place of work at the end of February such
Jews as were not living in camps and who were working as free
workers.
“They have been formed into working units or assembled for
deportation. In order not to endanger the efficacy of this
measure, I have avoided issuing any notification beforehand, and
I have notified only those regional labor offices in whose
districts free Jewish manpower was employed in large numbers.
“So as to have a general view of the effect of those measures on
the manpower position, I ask you to let me have, as from 31
March 1943, returns showing how many Jews were removed from
their work, and how many it has been found necessary to replace
by other workers.
“When giving the numbers of the factories and of the Jews
employed by them, one should take into account the situation
which existed before the evacuation. The enclosed form should be
used for making reports, _et cetera_.”
Do you still say that you had no part in the matter of the eviction of
Jews and their replacement by foreign workers?
SAUCKEL: Here again I must state emphatically that this letter was never
put before me. It has no signature, and here again it comes from a
subdivision in the Reich Ministry of Labor at 96 Saarlandstrasse. Some
official dealt with it there. I myself have absolutely no recollection
of having ever had knowledge of this letter. I did not write it, it does
not come from my office, it has been written “by order,” and the
signature is not mine.
M. HERZOG: Will you please look on the left in the corner. It says:
“The Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor.” Is not that you? You talk of a subordinate.
Are you trying to throw the responsibility on one of your subordinates?
SAUCKEL: No, I do not want to do that. I merely want to say that the
letterhead belongs to some office, but I have never known anything about
the letter. This is the first time in my life that I have seen it, and I
myself did not have it written. I can say that under oath.
M. HERZOG: With this letter is an application form for replacement for
the expelled Jews. Who else but you could have anything to do with this,
you who were the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?
SAUCKEL: Yes, my department—I told my counsel yesterday that my
department, of course, had to furnish replacements if workers were taken
away from a concern, either by being called up for service or for some
other measure. I did not always know the details.
M. HERZOG: You are not answering my question, the fact that this
letter...
SAUCKEL: Yes, I have answered your question properly.
M. HERZOG: The fact that this letter contains an application relating to
the replacement of workers, is that not proof that it comes from your
department, you being the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor?
SAUCKEL: Such a request could not come from my department. The
evacuation of Jews was entirely the responsibility of the Reichsführer
SS. I had only troubles because of such measures, as it was very
difficult to replace workers. I had no interest in it.
M. HERZOG: In short, you deny that you ever proposed special working
conditions for Jews?
SAUCKEL: That is just what I am denying. I had nothing to do with it. It
was not my task.
M. HERZOG: Would you please refer once more to Document Number F-810,
which I offered under Exhibit Number RF-1507? We will hand it to you if
you have not got it. Please look at Page 16, under the heading:
“Gauleiter Sauckel.” I quote...
SAUCKEL: I have not the document at hand—oh yes, I think I have it.
M. HERZOG: It was passed to you about 2 minutes ago. If you have not got
it, it will be handed to you again.
SAUCKEL: Will you please give me the number again?
M. HERZOG: Document F-810, but I do not think it is marked on the
photostat you have. Have you that document?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Under the heading “Gauleiter Sauckel,” I read—it is on Page
16 of the document:
“Sauckel objected very emphatically when it was said that the
inmates of concentration camps and the Hungarian Jews
constituted the best manpower on constructional work. This is
not true to fact, because they produce on an average 65 to 70
percent of the work of a normal worker; never 100 percent.
Besides, it is unworthy to put the German worker and the German
moral conception of work in the same category as this pack of
traitors. To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew,
work is not a mark of nobility. Things cannot be permitted to
reach the point where inmates of concentration camps and Jews
become articles in demand. It is absolutely essential that all
concentration camp inmates and Jews working on building sites be
kept apart from the remainder of the workers, including
foreigners.
“Gauleiter Sauckel ended by pointing out that as a matter of
fact he did not object to the employment of Jews and
concentration camp inmates, but only to such exaggerations as
mentioned above.”
I would ask you, Sauckel, you who yesterday described your own life as a
workman, what you meant when you said: “To an inmate of a concentration
camp and to a Jew work is not a mark of nobility.”
SAUCKEL: I want to say most emphatically that this paragraph is a very
condensed and free rendering, and not a shorthand report. I raised an
objection because I assumed that inmates of concentration camps would be
traitors. My only object was that these people should not be taken to
the same places of work as the other workers, the Jews either. But I did
not employ them; that was the business of the Reichsführer SS. I was
speaking at a conference of leaders and in the interests of workers with
a clean record and the other foreign workers. I objected to their being
put to work together.
M. HERZOG: I ask you this question again. What did you mean when you
said: “To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew work is not a
mark of nobility?”
SAUCKEL: By that I meant that the work of men who had been found guilty
of offenses should not be compared with the work of free workers with a
clean record. There is a difference if I employ prisoners in custody or
if I employ free workers, and I wanted to see the two categories
separated.
M. HERZOG: So that Jews were prisoners in custody, were they not?
SAUCKEL: In this case the Jews were prisoners of the Reichsführer SS.
Actually, I regret the expression.
M. HERZOG: You dispute, therefore, that this phrase is an expression of
the hostility which you showed to Jews for instance?
SAUCKEL: At that time I was, of course, against these Jews, but I was
not concerned with their employment. I was against these workers, whose
employment was the concern of the Reichsführer SS, being put with the
other workers.
M. HERZOG: Did you ever conduct any propaganda against the Jews?
SAUCKEL: I conducted propaganda against the Jews with regard to their
holding positions in the Reich which I considered should have been
occupied by Germans.
M. HERZOG: I will submit to you an article which you wrote in June 1944,
a time when I think in your Germany there were not very many Jews still
occupying important posts. This article appeared in a newspaper, _Die
Pflicht_, which you published in the Gau of Thuringia. It is Document
Number 857 which I offer to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-1523. I
shall read extracts from this article.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
First extract from Page 1, Column 1, the last paragraph but one:
“The old and finest virtues of the sailors, airmen, and soldiers
of Great Britain can no longer stop the Jewish plague of
corruption which is making such rapid ravages in the body of
their country.”
Then, on Page 2, Column 2, the last paragraph but one:
“There is no example in the history of the world to show that
anything of lasting value has been created in the course of
centuries by the Jews and their foolish followers who were bound
to them and corrupted by their customs and their women.”
I ask you, Defendant Sauckel, what did you mean by the “Jewish plague of
corruption”?
SAUCKEL: I meant that it was the outward sign of disintegration within
the nations.
M. HERZOG: I ask you again my question. What do you mean by the “Jewish
plague of corruption”?
SAUCKEL: It was my opinion that disintegration had set in among the
nations owing to certain Jewish circles. That was my view.
M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will draw its own conclusions. Mr. President, I
have no further questions.
MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
I would like to make a general summary of your activities in your
function of Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
Tell me how many foreign workers were employed in German economy and
industry at the end of the war?
SAUCKEL: As far as I can tell you without documents, not counting
prisoners of war, there were about 5 million foreign workers in Germany
at the end of the war.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You already quoted that number during your direct
interrogation by our counsel. I believe that number applies not to the
moment of the capitulation of Germany but to the date of 24 July 1942. I
shall quote somewhat different data on that subject and will use your
own documents. You were nominated Plenipotentiary General on 21 March
1942. On 27 July 1942,—that is to say, 3 months later—you submitted to
Hitler and Göring your first report. In this report you stated that from
1 April to 24 July 1942 the requested mobilization quota of 1,600,000
persons was even surpassed by you. Do you confirm this figure?
SAUCKEL: I quoted that figure, and as far as I can remember that did not
include only foreigners but also German workers.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In the final part of your report you state that the
total number of the population of the occupied territories evacuated to
Germany, up to 24 July 1942, numbered 5,124,000 persons. Is that number
exact? Do you confirm it?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I believe that figure at the time included prisoners
of war who had been employed in industry. Then I must say in this
connection that in the case of all neutral, allied, and western
countries there was a continuous exchange, because these workers worked
either 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year in Germany, and at the end of the
period agreed on they returned to their own countries. That is why this
figure may have been correct. Toward the end of the year, however, they
could not have increased very much because this continuous exchange has
to be taken into consideration.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the fact remains that, according to your figures,
the population evacuated to Germany numbered 5,124,000 persons up to 24
July 1942; is that not so?
SAUCKEL: If it says so in the document, then it may be true. It is
possible, or rather it is probable, that this takes into account the
prisoners of war employed. I cannot say that without any records.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you later another document referring to
this matter. On 1 December 1942, you compiled a summarized report on the
utilization of manpower up to 30 November 1942. In this summary you
quote a figure referring to the number of workers assigned to German war
industries from 1 April to 30 November 1942, and these workers number
2,749,652. On Page 8 of your report you state that by 30 November 1942,
in the territory of the Reich, 7 million workers were employed. Do you
confirm these figures?
SAUCKEL: I cannot confirm the figures without records. Again, I assume
that French and other prisoners of war were once more included.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the figure 7 million employed in German
industry—foreign workers employed, even if you include the prisoners of
war—is that figure exact? Will you now say how many workers were
brought to Germany from occupied territories during the year 1943? Tell
me that figure.
SAUCKEL: The number of foreign workers brought to Germany during the
year of 1943 may have amounted to 1½ or 2 million. Various programs had
been made in that connection which were being continually changed.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now interested to know approximately how many
workers were brought to Germany in 1943. You need not give an exact
figure. Approximately.
SAUCKEL: I have already said from 1½ to 2 million. I cannot be more
exact.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. Do you remember what task was assigned to
you for the year 1944?
SAUCKEL: In 1944 a total of 4 million, including Germans, was demanded.
But of these 4 million only 3 million were supplied, and of these
approximately 2,100,000 were Germans and 900,000 foreigners.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now can you give us at least a general summary of your
activities? How many persons were brought to Germany from the occupied
territories during the war, and how many were employed in agriculture
and industry at the end of the war?
SAUCKEL: As far as I know and remember there were 5 million foreign
workers in Germany at the end of the war. Several million workers
returned to neutral and allied and western countries during the war, and
they had to be replaced again and again, which was the cause of those
new programs which were constantly being made. That is the explanation.
Those workers who were already there before my time, and those who were
brought in, probably might have reached a figure of 7 million, but
during the war there were several millions who returned to their home
countries.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also, a large number perished as a result of hard
slave labor! That is not what I have in mind at the moment. In your
documents you probably meant actual manpower and not those who perished
or those who were absent. Could you tell us how many were brought to
Germany from occupied territories during the war?
SAUCKEL: I have already given you the figure.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Five million?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You continue to assert that that is so?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I maintain that at the end of the war there were,
according to my statistical department and as far as I can remember, 5
million workers in Germany, because millions of workers continuously
returned. The experts can give you a better answer than I. The contracts
with the others were only 6 and 9 months, you see.
THE PRESIDENT: Your question is, is it not, how many were brought into
Germany, how many foreign workers, during the whole of the war? Is that
the question you are asking?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, it is, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your answer to that?
SAUCKEL: I have already stated that, including the workers who were
there before my time, before I came into office, and including those who
were there at the end, there may have been about 7 million. In
accordance with my records, there were 5 million at the end, because the
others had gone back.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is not what you are being asked. You are
being asked: How many persons were brought to Germany from foreign
countries during the whole of the war? You say there were 5 million at
the end of the war, and there were constant changes in the preceding
years. It follows that there must have been more than 5 million people
brought to Germany in the course of a year.
SAUCKEL: I would estimate 7 million, but I cannot give you the exact
figures because I am not sure about the figures before my time. At any
rate, there must have been millions who returned home.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Up to 30 November 1942 you quoted the figure of
imported labor at 7 million...
SAUCKEL: Workers employed in Germany, and that includes prisoners of
war, in 1942.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: All right, including prisoners of war, 7 million. Is
that right, 7 million by 30 November?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you for certain. It may be correct, but I cannot
tell you without documentary evidence.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you the document tomorrow. Today, please
answer my question. You said that during 1943 approximately 2 million
additional workers were imported.
SAUCKEL: In 1943?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, in 1943.
SAUCKEL: I said 1½ to 2 million.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is to say, 7 million plus 2 million make 9 million
in all. Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: No. I said expressly that some were going back all the time,
and I did not add the prisoners of war to the new imported labor.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not seem to understand me. I am speaking of
those who were brought to Germany from the occupied territories, who
passed through your hands. To answer this it is of absolutely no
importance how many of them perished in Germany, or how many left. That
does not change the total number of workers brought to German territory
from abroad.
If, therefore, by 30 November 1942 there were 7 million workers in
Germany, and, according to you, in 1943 a further 2 million were brought
in, and in 1944, as you just said, 900,000 were again brought in; then,
according to you, the total number of workers imported into Germany
during the war must have amounted to 10 million. Is that right?
SAUCKEL: I can say that only with the reservation that I do not know how
many were actually there before my time. That may be correct as a guess,
and including all prisoners of war who were assigned for work. You have,
however, to deduct the prisoners of war from the civilian workers who
were brought into the country.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 31 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD DAY
Friday, 31 May 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Sauckel resumed the stand._]
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, I did not get a satisfactory answer
yesterday to my question as to how many foreign workers were imported
into Germany from the occupied territories. You will now be handed
Document Number 1296-PS. It is your report of 27 July 1942. In addition,
Document Number 1739-PS will also be handed to you. It is your survey of
conditions as of 30 November 1942. I wish to explain to you that in this
case we are dealing with the number of foreign workers imported into
Germany, including prisoners of war. The loss of this manpower in this
case is of no importance, since it will not change the number of persons
imported into Germany. They were brought to Germany, but later perished
either as a result of work beyond their strength, or else were returned
as incapable of work. Did you receive these documents?
SAUCKEL: Yes. Please let us have a look at the documents, as we are
dealing with figures.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Pray do so. In Document Number...
SAUCKEL: I have not yet finished. I cannot...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not essential for you to acquaint yourself with
the contents of all the documents. In Document Number 1296-PS, on the
last page of the report, at the end, you will find Section V. It is
entitled, “General Summary...” Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: No, I have not yet found the passage. Which document, please?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Document Number 1296-PS. Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I have found this passage.
GEN. ALEX ANDROV: It gives the total figure as 5,124,000. Is that
correct?
THE PRESIDENT: 12 million, did you say? 12 million?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: 5,124,000 persons.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The translation said 12 million.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was an error.
SAUCKEL: In connection with this document I must state emphatically that
the figure here is indicated as 5,124,000. It includes 1,576,000
prisoners of war, but the latter do not rank with the civilian workers.
The prisoners were the responsibility of the Armed Forces and during
their employment, or during their employment by the generals in charge
of the prisoner-of-war camps, they were housed and cared for in the
individual military areas.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: They were employed in the German industries. Please
read after me Subparagraph V: “General Summary of Foreign Workers ... at
present employed in Germany.”
SAUCKEL: Yes. That is correct.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is all I want. Now take...
SAUCKEL: Please, have I your permission to explain that these prisoners
of war were not housed and cared for in the factories or by the DAF
(German Workers’ Front) but were billeted in the camps which were under
the jurisdiction of the generals in charge of prisoners of war in the
military areas, and they were consequently not included with the
civilian workers in my statistics.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: As far as the number of prisoners of war working in
your organization is concerned, a supplementary question will be asked
later on. Actually, I am interested to know how many civilians and how
many prisoners of war were employed in the German industries. Do you
confirm this figure of 5,124,000? Is this figure correct or not?
SAUCKEL: That is a correct figure for this particular time. But in order
that the Tribunal may get an exact picture of the procedure I should
like to be allowed to refer to a very accurate document. That would be
Document Number 1764-PS. It deals with the exact enumeration of
individual workers from individual countries, and of prisoners of war
about 6 months later. I submitted it to the main Reich offices, and to
the Party offices in Posen. It was also submitted to the Führer and to
the Reich offices...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have to interrupt you...
SAUCKEL: I beg you to allow me to complete my explanation. I must
completely clarify these matters here and now. My conscience demands
that I do so before the entire world.
For February 1943, that is half a year later, there appears on Page 7 of
Document Number 1764-PS another exact enumeration with a figure of
4,014,000 civilian workers and 1,658,000 prisoners of war. The sum
total—this figure was very accurate—was 5,672,000. That in spite of
the inclusion of more foreign civilian workers this figure was not
materially increased has been proved by the fact—as I already stated
yesterday—that civilian workers from western, southern, and
southeastern territories for the most part had labor contracts binding
them for 6 months only. Whenever possible, when under my charge, these
contracts were observed; for otherwise, had I failed to keep to the
contracts, that is, if I had not insisted on doing so, I would never
have obtained any more workers.
If I employed several hundred thousand workers in half a year and then
sent them back again, this figure would always disappear again because
they went home. Therefore, far more civilian workers entered Germany
than officially stated at any one time—than appeared in the total
amount—for the number of those returning would always have to be
deducted, and there were very many of them.
A French document has been presented which is a report from the Envoy
Hemmen in Paris. My counsel will be good enough to tell me the PS number
later. It shows that French workers, about 800,000 of them came to
Germany; but these figures are not in accordance with those issued by my
department, but in accordance with a statement from the French Embassy.
In 1944 there were only 400,000 left in Germany as, owing to the time
limits of their contracts, these contracts were expiring every day and
thousands were returning home daily. Roughly 50 percent of the contracts
would expire while another 50 percent would still be working. That is an
exact explanation of this statement, made in all conscience.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: As to what these labor contracts actually were, those
so-called labor contracts, I shall mention at a later date. My French
colleague, during his examination, sufficiently proved the criminal
methods used in the mobilization of workers in the West. How this was
done in the East I will tell you a little later on. I should now like
you to confirm the figures of your report—5,124,000 persons. Is this an
exact figure, or is it not? I am not asking for any superfluous
explanations. You are asked to state only whether this figure is correct
or not.
SAUCKEL: It is correct for the time this statement was made, but it
changed constantly for the reason I have mentioned.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: This figure is dated 24 July 1942; that is quite clear
to everybody. Now, take the second document, 1739-PS. The last page of
1739-PS, where you will find the following sentence:
“Only then can we be sure that the immense number of foreign
workers, both men and women, in the territory of the
Reich—which has now reached 7 million, including all working
prisoners of war—will furnish the greatest possible assistance
to the German war industry.”
Does this sentence occur there? Is the number of 7 million given there?
SAUCKEL: The figure of 7 million is quoted here and includes all
prisoners of war employed as labor at that particular time...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know what is written there. I am asking you: Is this
figure of 7 million contained in the document or not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, it is written in this document.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is the correct figure?
SAUCKEL: It is the correct figure, and I am asking the Tribunal that I
be allowed to read the two following sentences as well because you are
accusing me of resorting to criminal methods. I, on my part, did all I
could, and used all the influence I had, to prevent the use of criminal
methods. This is proved by the two following sentences which I shall now
read, and which state...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am obliged to interrupt you once more.
SAUCKEL: Please, may I add to the explanation I have already given, in
accordance with the possibilities granted to me by the Tribunal, two
more sentences in support of my declaration: “...undernourished half...”
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel...
THE PRESIDENT: Let him read the two sentences he wants to read.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: They have absolutely nothing to do with the question of
the number of workers imported into Germany...
THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the translation of the document, so I
cannot tell. I want to hear him read the sentences...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then read them, please.
SAUCKEL: “...half-desperate Eastern Workers would be more of a
hindrance than a help to the war economy.
“It is essential that all the government offices, right down to
the factories concerned”—for these, I must add, I was not
responsible—“should be quite clear on the subject, and that is
my constant endeavor.”
I merely wanted to show my conscientiousness by those two sentences, and
how sincerely I endeavored to carry out my task which was an extremely
difficult one for me.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Defendant, will you kindly answer the questions and
only give explanations when it is necessary to explain the answer. All
you were asked was whether the figure of 5,124,000 in the first document
was correct and whether the figure of 7 million in the second document
is correct, and you said both of them were.
Now go on, General.
SAUCKEL: I have already answered that it is correct, that the figure of
7 million is given in this document...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not want any more explanations.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I can understand perfectly well that you are not
interested in increasing these appalling figures even by a single point,
let alone by several millions.
Yesterday you stated that in 1943, 2 million more foreign workers came
to Germany, and in 1944 a further 900,000 persons.
SAUCKEL: I must definitely correct that. I did not say that, but it is
true that from July 1942 until the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign
workers came to Germany, not in 1943 only. From February 1943, for
instance, until the end of 1943 only 1 million came to Germany because
we were experiencing considerable difficulties at the time. But from
July 1942 until the end of 1942 about 1½ million arrived, so that in 1½
years 2 more million were added to the first number which I mentioned
yesterday.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is already known how many you received in 1942.
Yesterday you stated quite definitely that in 1943 about 2 million
workers came to Germany. Is that correct? I am talking of 1943.
SAUCKEL: If I am supposed to have said that yesterday I do not remember
it, for it is not true; but the truth is that from about July 1942 until
the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign workers were sent to Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal is not really interested in the
exact number of foreign workers who came to Germany. It does not seem to
us to make very much difference whether 5 million or 6 million or 7
million came there. It is extremely difficult to follow the figures.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not intend to determine the numbers of workers
brought to Germany with mathematical precision. I do, however, consider
it quite indispensable to realize the scale on which these crimes were
committed. I would like the Defendant Sauckel to state definitely how
many workers were brought to Germany during the war.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just told you we do not consider it important.
You say that you do not want to ascertain with mathematical accuracy,
but we have spent a considerable time in attempting to do so.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: This can be explained by the fact that the Defendant
Sauckel does not give a precise reply to the questions put to him.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Tell me, do you consider such methods of
warfare, the mass driving into slavery of millions of people from the
occupied territories, to be in accordance with the laws and customs of
war and human morality in general?
SAUCKEL: I do not consider slavery and deportation admissible. Please
allow me to add the following explanation to this clear reply.
Personally, I was firmly convinced that it is no crime...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please do not evade the question.
SAUCKEL: I am not evading the question, but I may and I have the right
to give an explanation of my reply; I have already given the answer.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Give a direct answer.
SAUCKEL: It is necessary for my defense...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not think it is necessary. Answer directly: Do you
consider these methods criminal or do you not?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, General, you asked the defendant whether he
considered it honorable. Let him answer it in his own way. It is not a
question whether a thing is honorable. He is entitled to answer it
freely.
SAUCKEL: Now that I have given a clear reply to the effect that I could
not be convinced in all conscience that I was committing a crime, I ask
permission to read out the relevant sentences from Document Sauckel-86
in Document Book 3. They contain the instructions which I gave to my
department and to the industrial concerns:
“We are not concerned”—I quote—“with material things but, and
I would emphasize this again very definitely, with human beings,
with many millions of human beings, every single one of
whom—whether we want it or not—makes his criticism from his
own point of view, be he a German or a foreign worker.
“On the other hand, the output of the individual, be he a
Volksgenosse”—that means a German—“or not a
Volksgenosse”—that means an alien—“be he a friend or an enemy
of Germany, will always depend on whether he admits to himself
that he is being treated justly, or whether he comes to the
conclusion that he has been exposed to injustice.
“Be just”—I may add that this was my order to my
departments—“Be just! There are many questions which you cannot
always answer by merely studying my instructions, or the
_Gesetzblatt_, or the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_....”
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to go into a very long speech, you know,
about a question like that. I mean, you do not want to read all your
instructions to your subordinates again.
SAUCKEL: No, I only want to read two more sentences, Your Lordship:
“The worker’s life is so rich that it cannot be comprised even
in many thick volumes. But every human breast harbors a feeling
which says to him, ‘Have you been treated with kindness and
justice...’”
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is enough. We have heard enough of that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, in July 1944 a conference was held
at Hitler’s headquarters to deal with the question of the treatment of
foreign workers in case of a further successful advance of the Allied
armies. Do you know anything of this conference or not?
SAUCKEL: May I ask once more—what was the date?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am asking you about the conference which was held at
Hitler’s headquarters in July 1944. Do you know anything about this
conference or do you not?
SAUCKEL: I cannot remember for certain. I must ask you to place some
document before me. I cannot remember any meeting in July because from
20 June 1944, or thereabout, I was no longer admitted to the Führer for
any discussions.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is enough for me. That means that you do not know
anything at all about this conference?
Tell me, for what purpose, for what kind of work were the foreign
laborers employed who had been imported into Germany? Is it correct to
state that they were primarily employed in the armament and munitions
industries?
SAUCKEL: Workers were brought to Germany for employment in the armament
industry. The armament industry is a very wide term, and is not
identical with the manufacture of arms and munitions. The armament
industry includes all products—from matches to cannons—that have
anything to do with supply for the army. It is, therefore, necessary,
within this broad, far-reaching term, to limit or isolate the
manufacture of arms and munitions.
Moreover, workers were brought to Germany for all other branches of
civil economy essential to the war effort, such as agriculture, mining,
skilled trades, and so forth. We made three distinctions: War economy,
which meant the entire German economy in wartime; armament economy
meant...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, we do not want a lecture upon that, you
know. All you were asked was whether they were brought there for work in
the armament industry.
SAUCKEL: A part of them.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I should like you to answer whether the workers brought
to Germany were primarily employed in Germany’s war industries and for
military purposes? Is that right or not? I mean in the broad sense of
the word.
SAUCKEL: In the broad sense of the word, yes, including the entire
economy in wartime.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then the utilization of imported manpower was
subordinated entirely and fully to the conduct of the war of aggression
by Germany? Do you admit that?
SAUCKEL: That is stretching the idea too far. My own views, according to
which I acted and could only act at the time, excluded the word
“aggressive.”
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer briefly if it appears to go too far. Tell
me do you admit it or do you not?
SAUCKEL: I have already answered.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your part as organizer of the mass drive into slavery
of the peaceful population of the occupied territories is sufficiently
clear. I should now like to pass over to the elucidation of the part
played by the individual ministries in this matter. Please enumerate the
ministries and other government organizations which directly
participated in carrying out the requisite measures for the mobilization
and utilization of foreign manpower. Mention has already been made of
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, of the War Ministry
and of the OKW, so that it is not necessary to speak about them again.
Kindly enumerate the others.
SAUCKEL: On the plan, which has also been submitted to your delegation,
Mr. Prosecutor, there are some small inaccuracies, inaccuracies made by
the draftsman. I have not seen the completed drawing, but I took it for
granted that the original drawing, as submitted to me, was correctly
made by the draftsman. These small inaccuracies and deviations can be
rectified, and the plan will then be unmistakably clear and offer the
soundest explanation.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has stated here that this plan is
not sufficiently accurate. It is precisely for that reason that I ask
you this question and request you to explain which ministries and other
government offices played an immediate part in the mobilization and
utilization of foreign manpower, over and above those which I have
already indicated.
THE PRESIDENT: General, he says that it is substantially correct, and
that there was only one minor alteration suggested in it. Surely that is
sufficient for us.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Sauckel’s defense counsel has himself
stated that there are a number of inaccuracies in the plan. I will,
however, endeavor to facilitate this task.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell me how the Foreign Office was
connected with this matter.
SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office was connected with this matter in the
following way:
It had to establish connections with countries where embassies,
legations, or German delegations were acting. Negotiations would then
take place under the chairmanship of the head of an embassy or
delegation. The Foreign Office always made every effort to conduct these
negotiations in a suitable way and in a proper manner.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 4 January 1944 a meeting was held with Hitler. This
is Document 1292-PS. It is written in Subparagraph 4 of the minutes of
this meeting, “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
must, before taking measures, contact the Minister for Foreign Affairs.”
What did that mean in this particular case?
SAUCKEL: In this case it meant that if I had to negotiate with the
French or the Italian Government, I would first have to get in touch
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: After this meeting, which was held with Hitler on 4
January 1944—on 5 January 1944 you sent a letter to Lammers in which
you related the question regarding the necessity for issuing a special
directive as a result of this meeting, in order that all aid should be
given you by the following authorities—I will enumerate them: The
Reichsführer SS, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Field Marshal Keitel, the Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, Rosenberg, the Reich Commissioners, the Governor General,
and others. Do you remember this letter?
SAUCKEL: I remember that letter; will you be kind enough to put it
before me. I cannot, of course, remember the contents in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of that document, General?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is Number 1292-PS, Page 6 of the Russian text.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you found the passage?
SAUCKEL: Yes. It is on the last page? May I ask if this is correct?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: This means you considered that all these organizations
were to participate fully, one way or the other, in the execution of
measures for the recruitment and utilization of manpower. Is that
correct?
SAUCKEL: That is correct and I ask permission in this connection to give
the following explanation: It is obvious that I myself, in my office,
could not do certain things without informing the high-ranking
authorities of the Reich. It merely proves that I was attempting to work
correctly, and not to interfere wildly within the Reich, or in other
administrative departments.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to explain the following: When the
Hitlerite government resorted to these criminal measures for driving off
into slavery the population of the occupied territories, did practically
all the government organizations of Hitlerite Germany—besides
yourself—and the Party machinery of the NSDAP participate in these
activities? Would it be correct to say so?
SAUCKEL: I protest against the words “driving off.” Please hear my
defense counsel on the subject in rebuttal.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not a question of the words used. Answer me—is
it correct or not?
SAUCKEL: The words are extremely important.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the entire machinery of the German State
participate in this matter or not?
SAUCKEL: In this form I must answer your question in the negative. There
was...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No other reply is demanded of you.
SAUCKEL: In the—I might explain this. For the recruiting of manpower,
that is in the registration according to German orders, it was the
chief, duly authorized and appointed for this purpose at the time, of a
territorial government, a Reich commissariat, or the like, who
participated—for I emphasize that I was unable to issue any laws in
that field and was not allowed to do so. I could not interfere in any
government department; that is impossible in any government system in
the world.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes. But you were obliged to co-ordinate the activities
of all these representative organizations in Germany. That was the task
assigned to you?
SAUCKEL: Not to co-ordinate, but to instruct them: and to ask for their
co-operation where the case arose, if it came within their jurisdiction.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is not quite so. I did not wish to touch on this
question, but I must revert to it now as you have somewhat minimized
your part in this matter.
SAUCKEL: I request permission to reply to the word “minimize.” The
distribution and direction of manpower in the Reich was my principal
task. It included, with the German workers, 30 million persons. I do not
wish to minimize this task, for I did my best to introduce order into
this mass of workers, as dictated by my sense of duty. I do not wish to
minimize anything. It was my task and my duty towards my people.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: We need not argue on this subject. It would be much
simpler to consult the document. An order by Göring will be handed to
you in a moment.
SAUCKEL: I wish—I must apologize to you if you have misunderstood me.
I—I have no intention of arguing. I am only asking for permission to
clarify my conception of duty with regard to this task, for it was the
most personal task I had.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is quite apparent in this order by Göring of 27
March 1942. It is Document Exhibit Number USSR-365. It will be handed to
you in a minute. I will read a brief excerpt from it, showing the powers
you were endowed with.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of it?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is Exhibit Number USSR-365.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. This is a Soviet exhibit.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please read Subparagraph 4 which clearly
states:
“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor for the
execution of his tasks is given authority through power assigned
to me by the Führer to issue instructions to the highest
authorities of the Reich and to their subordinate offices, as
well as to the offices of the Party and to its organizations and
affiliated organizations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor
General, the military commanders, and the heads of civil
administration.”
That is what we read in Subparagraph 4 of this order. I believe,
therefore, that on the strength of this order you were appointed
Plenipotentiary General, with extraordinary powers, for the Allocation
of Labor. Is that correct or not?
SAUCKEL: That is correct. I should like to add that this authority was
limited to my own special sphere, and I take the liberty of reading the
following sentence: “Orders and directives of fundamental importance are
to be submitted to me in advance.”
Also I might point out that a restriction was imposed on my deputies
later in the autumn. There is a witness who can make a statement to that
effect.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not talking about your deputies. Your powers are
only too clearly defined in Subparagraph 4 of Göring’s order.
Now, will you enumerate which of the defendants, at the same time as
yourself, directly and in his own sphere of action participated in the
execution of measures for the mass deportation into slavery of the
population of the occupied territories and their employment in Germany.
Name them in succession. Did Defendant Göring participate in all these
crimes, as your immediate chief and leader?
SAUCKEL: I want to point out most emphatically that I could not possibly
have been aware that entire populations had been carried off by means of
lawful recruitment and service engagements based on legal decrees. I
deny this. I had nothing to do with measures concerning prisoners, _et
cetera_, but...
THE PRESIDENT: The question was, did the Defendant Göring participate
with you in the bringing of foreign workers into Germany? You do not
seem to me really to be answering it at all.
SAUCKEL: I was directly subordinate to the Reich Marshal of the Greater
German Reich in the question of the introduction of foreign manpower.
THE PRESIDENT: Then why do you not say so?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: So the Defendant Göring participated in the execution
of these criminal measures?
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, when you want to ask a question of
that sort I think it would be much better that you should not allege the
fact that it is a crime. If you want to know whether the Defendant
Göring took part with this defendant in the work that he was doing you
can refer to that without calling it a crime; and then he perhaps will
answer you more easily.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
participate in carrying out these measures on diplomatic lines, and did
he sanction the violation of international treaties and conventions
where the utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war in the
German industries was concerned?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there again, these defendants are saying that there
was no violation of international law; so the question you should put to
him is: Did Von Ribbentrop participate with him in these measures as far
as diplomacy was concerned?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now asking what was the connection between the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the allocation of labor, and I would like
to receive an answer to this question from the Defendant Sauckel.
SAUCKEL: The part played by Defendant Ribbentrop consisted in holding
conferences with foreign statesmen or foreign government offices in the
occupied territories as well as in neutral and friendly foreign
countries; and he considered it highly important that these conferences
should be conducted in a correct manner and that the aim should be to
obtain the best possible conditions for foreign workers.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will question you about that a little later, when the
question arises concerning the employment of prisoners of war in the
German industries.
Please tell me now, what was the attitude of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
regarding these measures?
SAUCKEL: In this connection I met the Defendant Kaltenbrunner on one
single occasion during a conference—the date of which I cannot at
present remember—at the Reich Chancellery with Minister Lammers. I
believe it was in 1944. Apart from that, I had no interview of any kind
with Kaltenbrunner, nor did I reach any agreements with him on questions
concerning the employment of labor.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yet the Defendant Kaltenbrunner placed police forces at
your disposal for carrying out the recruitment of labor, did he not?
SAUCKEL: I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the recruitment of
workers was no concern of the Police. I must ask my defense counsel to
submit the relevant regulations, of which there are numerous specimens
available. They prove quite clearly and unequivocally and irrefutably
the division of tasks between the Police and my department.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Police participate in the execution of these
measures or did it not? I am not reproaching you now.
SAUCKEL: In my opinion the Police participated only in cases where the
execution of administrative duties was rendered impossible in partisan
areas. In White Ruthenia alone 1,500 local mayors were murdered by the
partisans. This is seen from the document.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But was recruitment, even in normal circumstances, not
carried out by police methods? Did you know nothing at all about that?
SAUCKEL: I will tell you exactly what I know about it. There were in the
occupied territories of Europe about 1,500 districts—here I mean areas
or departments, the Feldkommandanturen, which we in German
administration would describe as being the size of a Kreis
(district)—and these 1,500 districts contained 1,500 administrative
centers staffed partly by local and partly by German personnel. In
addition to this personnel, in the territories of the Soviet Union
alone, 1,000 Russian workers who were previously employed in Germany
were acting as recruiting officers. Now if each of these administrative
centers, which would correspond to a German Landkreis and have a
population of 40,000 to 70,000 inhabitants, selected in a proper way,
examined, and tested five persons daily, that alone would amount to 2
million people a year; a perfectly clear method of administration, such
as I ordered, organized, and carried out to the best of my
administrative possibilities.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving needlessly detailed explanations in
reply to these questions, and under such conditions the interrogation is
being greatly prolonged. I consider it necessary that you answer
briefly. You are perfectly able to do this, for I am putting the
questions to you clearly.
SAUCKEL: I am trying to answer as briefly as possible. I regret that a
specialized field is always difficult to understand and calls for
explanations; I found it very difficult myself.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer: What part did the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner play in the execution of measures on the allocation of
labor? Did he participate in this or did he not?
SAUCKEL: I have already given you that answer.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I did not understand you. Did he participate or did he
not?
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. He said that he only met Kaltenbrunner
on one occasion and that the task of the recruitment of labor was not
one for Police. That is what he said.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not necessary to multiply the number of meetings
in order for Kaltenbrunner to have participated in the execution of
these measures. He did not have to meet Defendant Sauckel frequently.
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I do not want you to argue with me. I
have told you what his answer was. It seemed to be an answer to your
question.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not arguing. I am merely explaining the reason for
this question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] As far as the participation of Defendant
Rosenberg is concerned, I shall not ask you any questions, as Defendant
Rosenberg gave sufficiently clear answers when questioned by my American
colleague, Prosecutor Dodd. Now tell me, what part did Defendant Frick
play in the execution of these measures?
SAUCKEL: Defendant Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior—I do not
know how long he remained in office—scarcely participated at all. As
far as I can remember I had discussions with his Reich Ministry of the
Interior concerning the most necessary laws to be promulgated within
Germany for German workers and the validity of those laws. Apart from
that, he had no further part in this task; his work was quite different.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are discussing the question of foreign manpower. It
was not merely by accident that you mentioned, in a letter to Lammers
written after a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on the 4 January 1944,
that the Ministry of the Interior was among the government offices
detailed to operate with you. That is why I ask you, what part did
Defendant Frick play in the execution of these measures for the
recruitment of labor? You yourself asked for the co-operation of the
Ministry of the Interior. Then how was this co-operation to be
expressed?
SAUCKEL: To my very great personal sorrow Frick was at that time no
longer Reich Minister of the Interior, but Himmler—if I remember
correctly.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What co-operation did you expect from the Ministry of
the Interior?
SAUCKEL: It is, I believe only natural that in every form of government
the internal and the general administration should be kept informed of
events occurring and should participate as well, and so important a
sphere as the employment of human beings calls for many ordinances. I
could not possibly issue legal decrees, nor had I authority to do so. I
had to submit them to the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich. I could only issue technical directions, and that is quite a
different thing altogether.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were Defendant Funk, as Minister of Economics, and
Defendant Speer, as Minister for Armaments, the principal intermediaries
between the industrialists and yourself as suppliers of manpower? Is
that correct?
SAUCKEL: The end of your sentence contains a very erroneous conclusion.
They were not middlemen between myself and the industries, but the
industries were responsible to the Ministry for Armaments. Of course
there were personal instructions issued about this in the course of
years. I did not negotiate with the industries. The industries asked for
workers and they got them, as did the agricultural industries.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please tell me, what part did the Defendants Funk and
Speer play in the execution of these measures? I do not want any long
drawn-out explanations. Answer me briefly.
SAUCKEL: Those two ministers were heads of the various business
enterprises inside German economy which came within the jurisdiction of
their ministries. They received their workers, and that was the end of
my task.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Defendants Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Neurath
participate in the execution of these measures for the allocation of
labor in such territories as were under their jurisdiction? I mean the
territories of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, and Holland. Is that
correct?
SAUCKEL: These gentlemen, within the framework of their duties inside
their own territories, supported me in issuing decrees and laws, and
they themselves attached great importance to the proper and humane
drafting of these laws and decrees.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by Defendant Fritzsche?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I only met Dr. Fritzsche in Germany on
one occasion—and that a very brief one—in, I believe, 1945, the
beginning of 1945. I never spoke to him at all about my work, nor do I
know whether he had anything to do with it. I can only state that I made
repeated applications to the Reich Ministry for Propaganda to have my
instructions and directives—as contained in the document books
submitted by my defense counsel—widely circulated, particularly to the
industries and other circles which received these workers.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But one defendant is left—Bormann—and he is missing.
What part did he play? He placed at your disposal the entire Party
machinery of the NSDAP, did he not?
SAUCKEL: No, he did not. He placed the Gauleiter at my disposal. The
instructions which I issued to the Gauleiter and the letters which I
addressed to them—three of which are available here, and there never
were many more of them—were to the effect that I was entitled to call
on the Party for assistance in insuring the welfare, feeding, and
clothing of the workers, and to see that they received everything that
was humanly necessary and all we could possibly supply in view of
existing wartime conditions. That was the role played by the Party, to
the extent that it was asked to do so for me. Thus it was a form of
control for the benefit of the foreign and German workers employed in
Germany. Otherwise the Party had nothing to do with it. Incidentally, I
did not much like interference on the part of outside offices.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is incorrect. I would remind you of your program
for the allocation of labor which was issued in 1942. This is Document
Number USSR-365 which states that the Gauleiter are appointed as your
plenipotentiaries where the question of manpower is concerned, and that
they will utilize this manpower.
SAUCKEL: Where does it say that? I could not appoint my
plenipotentiaries myself.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be shown the document in one moment. I do not
quote the paragraph, I merely mention the contents, the gist of the
paragraph, where it states that the Gauleiter will use the Party
organizations in the districts subordinate to them. I therefore assume
that the Party machinery as a whole participated in the execution of
these measures.
SAUCKEL: It does not say so at all, Mr. Prosecutor.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you found it: “The plenipotentiaries ... make use
of their...”?
SAUCKEL: Yes, and I did this only for the purpose I have described. Will
you be good enough to read on?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Read it yourself.
SAUCKEL: Thank you.
“The leaders of the highest departments of the state and of
economy which are competent in their respective Gaue shall
advise and instruct the Gauleiter on all important questions
dealing with the allocation of labor.”
That means within the scope of their spheres of duty; and then the
latter are specified:
“The president of the Regional Labor Office”—that is not a
Party but a government department—“the Trustee for Labor”—not
a Party but a government department—“the Regional Peasant
Leader”—not a Party but a government department—“the Gau
Economic Adviser”—now, that is a Party department...
THE PRESIDENT: Please observe the light, to be sure the interpreters are
getting it.
SAUCKEL: I apologize, Your Lordship.
“...the Gau representative of the Labor Front”—a department of
the Labor Front—“the Regional Leaders of the Women’s League...”
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Everything is perfectly clear, you need not enumerate.
I should like to draw your attention to Subparagraph VI. It clearly
states that the Gauleiter, functioning as plenipotentiaries for the
allocation of labor, will, in their own Gaue, make use of the Party
organizations under them. Is it written there?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It next enumerates the methods by which this task was
executed, also through what institutions and what authorities. I
conclude from this subparagraph, which states that they will utilize the
Party institutions under their control, that the entire organization of
the NSDAP participated in the execution of these measures, and I wish
you to answer “yes” or “no.”
SAUCKEL: No.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: There is no more to say.
SAUCKEL: No. May I supplement this reply of “no.” You, in your first
reply, told me that my description was not quite correct. My description
is absolutely correct, that the Party was employed to deal with the
welfare of German and foreign workers and to see to it that they were
properly cared for and supplied. The Party organizations here mentioned
were only entrusted with this kind of task, and could have had no other;
and I, a former workman myself, was eager that these workers, both
German and foreign, should be cared for as well as wartime conditions
allowed. Hence this employment of Party organizations and no others.
Therefore, my reply was absolutely correct.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the district leaders of the Hitler Youth also
participate in the execution of these measures?
SAUCKEL: The district leaders of the Hitler Youth participated in order
to protect and care for the young people as expressly required by
Reichsleiter Schirach and later by Reich Youth Leader Axmann. Protection
had to be provided for the young people against any danger. The Hitler
Youth did this, including young people employed from foreign countries.
I must expressly emphasize this.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you personally approve of the policy of the
Hitlerite Government with regard to the deportation into slavery of the
population of the occupied territories in order to insure the waging of
a war of aggression? Did you approve of that policy?
SAUCKEL: I am forced to consider your question in the light of an
accusation.
I personally have said over and over again that I had nothing to do with
either foreign or domestic politics; nor was I a soldier, I meant to
say. I received a task and I received orders. As a German, I tried to
carry out that task correctly for the sake of my people and its
government and to carry it out to the best of my ability, for it was
made perfectly clear to me that the fate of my people depended on the
accomplishment of this task. I worked with this in mind, and I admit
that I did my utmost to accomplish that task in the manner which I have
pointed out here. I conceived this to be my duty and must acknowledge
this fact here.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order to define your personal attitude to these
crimes, I would like to remind you of a few of your own statements.
These are taken from Document Number USSR-365. This document is a
program for the utilization of labor in 1942, Page 9. You will now be
shown the passage which I am about to quote: “I beg you to believe me,
as an old and fanatical National Socialist Gauleiter...” Is it written
there?
SAUCKEL: That is written there.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now we will go on to Document Number 566-PS. It is your
telegram to Hitler dated 20 April 1943 which you sent during your flight
to Riga. This telegram will now be handed to you and you will be shown
the excerpt which I am about to read:
“I shall devote my entire strength with fanatical determination
to the accomplishment of my task, and to justify your
confidence.”
Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: It is correct. I saw in Hitler, whom at that time I revered, a
man who was the leader of the German people, who had been chosen by the
German people; and I, as a German citizen and a member of a German
government department, considered it my duty to justify by my work in my
own sphere the confidence placed in me by the head of the State. I might
say regarding this telegram...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No explanations are needed about this telegram. I am
not interested in your attitude towards Hitler. I am only interested in
your personal attitude to those measures for compulsory labor which were
carried out by you. It is essential to keep all questions within these
limits. Now follows Document Number 1292-PS. This is a record of the
meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on 4 January 1944...
SAUCKEL: I request the permission of the Tribunal to add a few words to
your last statement, Mr. Prosecutor. I was unable to see a criminal in
Hitler at that time, and I never felt he was one; but I did feel obliged
to do my duty, nothing else. As a human being and as the result of my
upbringing I would never have supported crime.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, General? Simply whether this was
a telegram sent to Hitler?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked about the telegram, from which I have read one
sentence into the record, in order to obtain a confirmation from the
Defendant Sauckel that this telegram had been sent. I was not interested
in anything else.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The next document is 1292-PS. Have you got
this document?
SAUCKEL: No.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have already been shown the passage I am about to
read. Your statement reads as follows: “GBA Sauckel declared that with
fanatical determination he would attempt to secure this manpower.”
You were, at that time, speaking of the mobilization of 4 million
workers. It says further: “He would do everything in his power to obtain
the manpower desired for 1944.”
Did you say that? Is the statement correctly rendered in the minutes of
the report?
SAUCKEL: I did say that, and I ask to be allowed to add the following to
my affirmative reply. I knew that the German people, and they were my
people, were in dire—may I add an explanation to my clear reply,
stating why I answered as I did? I am entitled to do so.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, you accompany every answer you give
with lengthy supplementary explanations. You are merely delaying the
interrogation. I am quite satisfied with your reply; what you have told
me is perfectly sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: General, he has given a perfectly clear answer that he
did say it, and I think he is entitled to give some word of explanation.
It is perfectly true that his explanations are intolerably long, but he
is entitled to give some explanation.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, if every answer is to be accompanied by
such extensive explanations...
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I have said that he is entitled to
give some explanation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now then; please make it short.
SAUCKEL: I knew that the German people were engaged in their most bitter
struggle. It was my duty to carry on with my task with all my
strength—that is what I meant by “fanatical.” I further explained, in
another sentence, that I could not accomplish my task that year. As far
as I was able to accomplish it in 1944 two-thirds were German workers,
not mainly aliens but more than two-thirds Germans; and I was trying my
utmost to put all German women to work, as far as they were capable of
working, and in 1944 there were over 2 million of them.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In April 1943 in order to accelerate the deportation of
manpower to Germany from the occupied territories you visited Rovno,
Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Simferopol, Minsk, and Riga. In June
of the same year you visited Prague, Kiev, Kraków, Zaporozhe, and
Melitopol. Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: That is true, and during those journeys I personally satisfied
myself that my departments were working properly. That was the object of
my journey.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you personally organized the deportation into
slavery of the peaceful population of the occupied territories. Is that
correct too?
SAUCKEL: I must protest against that statement in the most vehement and
passionate way. I did not do that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then why did you go to all these towns and inhabited
places? Did you not do so in order to enforce the deportation of the
people in the occupied territories?
SAUCKEL: I visited these areas to satisfy myself personally as to how my
offices in these cities—I should not say “my,” but the labor offices of
the local administrations—were working; whether they were
conscientiously carrying out their obligations towards the workers;
whether they were attending to medical examinations, card indexing, _et
cetera_, according to my instructions. That is why I went to those
towns. I negotiated with the chiefs in the matter of quotas, that is
quite true, since it was my task to recruit workers and to check the
quotas, but during my visits to these cities I inspected the offices
personally to satisfy myself that they were functioning properly.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also to insure the speedy deportation of compulsory
labor to Germany? Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: To employ the best possible methods for the purpose in view.
That is indisputably stated in my orders, and the manifesto which has
been submitted to the Tribunal was written on this very journey which
you have just mentioned.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You specially visited these cities in order to improve
the methods of compulsory recruitment? Have I understood you correctly?
SAUCKEL: I went to these towns to see for myself whether the methods
were correct or not, and to discuss them with the departments. That is
true, for it was not necessary for me to visit Kharkov, Kiev, or any
other town to discuss my task in terms of figures. For that I would only
have to talk to the reporter for the East, whose office was in Berlin,
or with the Reich Commissioner—whom I did not contact as he was
sometimes in Rovno.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In your statements to your defense counsel you declared
that no cases of criminal or illegal methods of compulsory recruitment
had ever come to your knowledge. Then what was the reason for such
extensive trips to the occupied territories? Does it mean that some
indication had already reached you that large-scale, illegal practices
were taking place in the process of labor recruitment? Was that the
reason for your journeys? You visited over 10 cities.
SAUCKEL: May I inform you, Mr. Prosecutor, while we are on this subject,
that my defense counsel has already asked me that question and that I
answered it with “yes,” and that, generally speaking, whenever
complaints reached me I discussed them with Rosenberg, and that wherever
a wrong could be righted it was righted. Please hear my defense counsel
and my witnesses in this connection...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: The witnesses will be called on the decision of the
Tribunal. I should now like to ascertain that you took those trips in
order to improve methods of recruitment. I have come to the logical
conclusion that in all these towns, prior to your arrival, a certain
lawlessness had prevailed and crimes had been committed during the
recruiting of manpower. That is what I am speaking about. And now will
you give me a definite answer as to why you visited these places?
SAUCKEL: I have already answered that question in every respect.
However, I would add that I assume that you, Mr. Prosecutor, have
yourself had sufficient administrative experience to realize that in
every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter
of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not
need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human
organization; a control must be exercised all the same.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: If you deny that you went there in order to improve
conditions and to suppress the crimes perpetrated in the course of labor
recruitment, then you must have gone there to accelerate the deportation
of manpower into Germany. It is one thing or the other. Choose for
yourself.
SAUCKEL: No, I must emphatically deny that. I undertook these journeys
in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task
was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as
for instance—as I once told my defense counsel during my
interrogation—I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge.
But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give
appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best
evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey.
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, can you tell the Tribunal how much
longer you will be?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am afraid to make an exact statement, but I should
imagine about 2 more hours.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not losing sight of the fact, are you, that we
have already had a thorough cross-examination by the French Prosecutor?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes that you will try to make your
cross-examination as short as possible, and the Tribunal will adjourn
now.
[_A recess was taken._]
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, tell us what attitude you, as
Plenipotentiary General, adopted toward the employment of Soviet
prisoners of war in the German industries?
SAUCKEL: I must reply to your question by saying that I had no
collaborators in the employment of prisoners of war, for I did not
employ prisoners of war.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And you never saw to their mobilization; you never
registered them?
SAUCKEL: As the authorized mediating agency I had to have the
administrative measures carried out through the labor offices, or the
Gau labor offices, which served as intermediaries between the factories
and the Stalags or the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war affairs,
who in their turn supplied prisoners of war for the industries.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And what were these organizations? What kind of
organizations were they?
SAUCKEL: They were either the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war
establishments in the military administrative districts, or the
organizations of the industries, or the factories themselves. These
worked through the respective ministries, such as the Reich Ministry of
Food and Agriculture, in which case the majority of the prisoners were
billeted with farmers for work on the land or in war industries.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you had nothing to do with it? I would
remind you...
SAUCKEL: I had to include the labor offices and the Gau labor offices to
the extent that they had undertaken to act officially as intermediaries,
but only if they did not act directly between the factories and the
Stalags.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote an excerpt from your report to Hitler
on 27 July 1942. It is Document Number 1296-PS. In this report, Part
III, there is a particular section. It is entitled...
SAUCKEL: II or III, please?
GEN. ALEX ANDROV: III. It is entitled: “Employment of Soviet Russian
Prisoners of War.” You write there:
“In addition to the employment of civilian manpower, I have
increased the employment of Soviet prisoners of war, according
to plan, in co-operation with the Prisoners of War Organization
of the OKW.”
And further on.
“I particularly stress the importance of a further increased and
expedited deportation of the maximum number of prisoners of war
possible from the front to work within the Reich.”
Is this correct?
SAUCKEL: That is correct, and it corresponds exactly to what I have
stated before.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It does not altogether correspond.
SAUCKEL: But it does.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mentioned that you did not have anything to do with
the employment of prisoners of war in the German industries and now, in
your report, you give perfectly different data. So I am asking you, in
connection with what I have read into the record: Did you not plan in
advance the employment of Soviet prisoners of war as workers in the
industries? That was provided for in your plans and your report covers
that. Was that so, or was it not?
SAUCKEL: I must point out one fundamental error on your part. Labor
procurement, the whole world over, whether operated by the state or by
private individuals, is not an organization or institution which
exploits workers, but rather which procures workers. I must establish
this fundamental error. It was my duty to provide the necessary
connection, so that prisoners of war in Stalags in the occupied
territories—let us say in the Government General—could be registered
by local generals in charge of prisoner-of-war establishments, for work
contemplated in Germany in certain agricultural or other sectors, and
then allotted accordingly. Employment of labor in factories was not
under my supervision and had nothing to do with me.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you participated in supplying Soviet
prisoners of war for utilization in German industry. Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: That is not correct, according to my use of the German
language, as I understand you. Rather, to act as agent is quite a
different thing from utilization; concerning this, other gentlemen would
have to comment. I can only speak as far as agency is concerned. In
Germany this was managed by the State. In other countries it is managed
privately. That is the difference, but I have never exploited anybody.
As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I did not employ
a single worker.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know that the Soviet prisoners of war were
being employed in the armament industries in Germany?
SAUCKEL: It was known to me that Soviet prisoners of war were being
employed in the German war industry for this industry was vast and
widespread, and covered the most varied branches.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted, in particular, with the directive
of Defendant Keitel regarding the employment of Soviet prisoners of war
in the mining industry? This directive is dated 8 January 1943. Do you
know anything at all about this directive?
SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect it in detail. I have not got it. Will you be
good enough to put it before me?
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you read it?
SAUCKEL: I have read it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It clearly mentions the employment of Soviet prisoners
of war in the mining industry for military purposes. Is that correct?
SAUCKEL: It refers to the employment of prisoners of war in the mining
industry in Germany.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: For what purpose? It is clearly stated in this
document.
SAUCKEL: For employment in the mining industry.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But for what purpose? What purpose was it to serve? It
is clearly stated here.
SAUCKEL: For work, I presume.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In the interest of the war?
SAUCKEL: Well, as a matter of fact, the German mining industry did not
only work in the interest of the war; Germany also supplied quite a lot
of coal to neutral countries. It varied according to circumstances.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Follow this document; read it with me:
“For the execution of the expanded iron and steel program the
Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee...”
SAUCKEL: I have not been given the part you are reading.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: “For the execution of the expanded iron and
steel program the Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute
guarantee of the coal and means of production needed. For this
purpose he has also ordered that the necessary manpower be
supplied by prisoners of war.”
Now, have you found the place?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I have read it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus the Soviet prisoners of war were to be employed in
the mining industry for the purposes of the war. Is that right? The fact
is definitely established by this document.
SAUCKEL: Yes; it says so—I might remark that this document is not
addressed to me.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked you whether you knew of this document. You said
“yes,” did you not?
SAUCKEL: I am not acquainted with it—no; I do not know it now. I did
not know it previously as it was not addressed to me.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You said that, broadly speaking, you did know about
this directive and you asked me to allow you to acquaint yourself with
it in detail. This is how it was translated to me.
SAUCKEL: No; I told you—and I should like to emphasize this—that I did
not remember; I only asked that this document might perhaps be placed
before me. The document is not addressed to me. The office to which it
is addressed is clearly indicated and according to that it never came
into my hands nor reached my office.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order that you may fully understand this question, I
shall give you Exhibit USA-206. That is your directive of the 22 August
1942 with regard to supplying manpower by means of importation from the
occupied territories. Do you know about this directive?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: One minute, please. Unfortunately I have no information
about the PS number. All I have is the USA Exhibit Number, which is 206.
Defendant Sauckel...
THE PRESIDENT: Have the United States prosecutors got the corresponding
number to USA-206?
MR. DODD: I could have it in a few minutes, Mr. President. I do not have
it right at my fingertips, but I will obtain it.
THE PRESIDENT: Right; thank you.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, Subparagraph. 8 of this order
states: “This order applies also to prisoners of war.” Does it contain a
reference of this description?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Therefore, you yourself did not differentiate between
prisoners of war and the civilian population as far as their utilization
in the German war industries was concerned. Do you admit that?
SAUCKEL: Yes, and I have already replied to my defense counsel, I think
it was yesterday, that a catalog was given to me and the Ministry of
Labor in general showing how prisoners of war might be employed. But
this Paragraph 8 has nothing to do with this document, for that was an
agreement or an order which did not come to me and was also not
addressed to me.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Exhibit USA-206 bears the following
number: 3044-PS.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In addition to those statements to your
defense counsel which you have just mentioned, you also declared that,
although employing prisoners of war in the German war industries, the
requirements of the Geneva and Hague Conventions were nevertheless
observed. Do you remember saying that?
SAUCKEL: Yes, and it is also proved by documentary evidence that in the
Reich Ministry of Labor, and in my offices, the directive was issued and
circulated that the Geneva Convention was also to be observed with
regard to Soviet prisoners of war.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not differentiate at all between Soviet
prisoners of war and civilian workers? Does that result from the
foregoing?
SAUCKEL: No, that is not so at all.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, a violation of these conventions
occurred in the utilization of manpower, inasmuch as they, the prisoners
of war, were treated by you in the same way as the civilians, and were
utilized in industries for the purpose of waging war.
SAUCKEL: In that case, I must have misunderstood you, or you may have
misunderstood me. I particularly declared that I did attach importance
to it, and that it was printed and that during the time I was in office
a special copy was published for the factories and the interested
parties in which it was stipulated that the Geneva Convention was to be
observed. I could do no more than that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel questioned you in connection with
the operation known under the code name of “Hay.” You answered his
question as follows and I quote from the transcript: “Sauckel: No, I had
nothing to do with these particular measures.”
I shall now hand you a letter from Alfred Meyer dated 11 July 1944. This
is Document Number 199-PS. It is a letter addressed to you. Will you
please study Subparagraph 1; it reads:
“Army recruiting staff ‘Mitte,’ hitherto stationed in Minsk,
must continue its activities with regard to the recruitment of
young White Ruthenian and Russian workers for military
employment within the Reich. The staff has the additional task
of bringing into the Reich young folk from 10 to 14 years of
age.”
Have you found this passage?
SAUCKEL: I have read the passage and my reply is that the letter, to be
sure, is addressed to me, but only for my information, and I had nothing
to do with those proceedings either in my office or personally. I
have—that was—it has been mentioned already in the case of the
Defendant Schirach—that was carried out within those offices, and the
Allocation of Labor, as an office was not involved in it. I personally
do not remember it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: What were your relations with the army recruiting staff
Mitte? Was that your staff?
SAUCKEL: I do not understand your question. What staff do you mean?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: The staff referred to in Alfred Meyer’s letter, staff
Mitte, dealing with the employment of labor.
SAUCKEL: I cannot find the word “staff.”
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Right in the beginning of the sentence: “It is
imperative that the army recruiting staff...”
SAUCKEL: The army recruiting staff Mitte is a term completely unknown to
me. I do not know what it was, or whether it was a military or a civil
office. It had nothing to do with me. I do not know it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified here that the Reich Security Office
had introduced special identification badges for people brought in from
the occupied territories. For the Soviet citizens the badge was—can you
not hear me?
SAUCKEL: I cannot understand the translation.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified before the Tribunal that for people
brought in from the occupied territories special identification badges
were introduced. For the Soviet citizens the marking was “Ost,” for
Polish citizens it was the letter “P.” You testified that you were not
in agreement with the marking. What did you do to stop this insult?
SAUCKEL: I persistently tried to avoid the identification markings
altogether. But the Reichsführer SS categorically demanded—to the best
of my knowledge there is a letter from him to that effect—that these
foreign workers who, at my request, were free to move about Germany,
should bear a distinguishing mark when they went out of their camps. It
was no insult. I should like to emphasize expressly that I did not look
on this as an insult.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is your point of view. Did you discuss the matter
at all with your immediate superior, the Defendant Göring?
SAUCKEL: I can no longer remember today whether I spoke directly to
Göring or not. I can only declare that I made repeated efforts to stop
the practice, and that in the spring of 1944, in March I believe, my
efforts were actually crowned with success and the small badge “Ost” was
changed to a national badge on the sleeve, as had been suggested by
liaison officers for the various peoples in the East.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked you whether you discussed the matter with
Göring?
SAUCKEL: I cannot remember. Perhaps I did; perhaps not. It was
frequently discussed.
THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I think you might pass on from this.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In reply to questions by your defense counsel and by my
French colleague in regard to Speer’s attitude to your appointment as
Plenipotentiary General, you mentioned that you did not know anything at
all about it. You will now be handed an article from the newspaper,
_Völkischer Beobachter_. This is Exhibit Number USSR-467 and I am
submitting it to the Tribunal. This article was published on 28 March
1942 in connection with your appointment as Plenipotentiary General. It
has even got your photograph, as you can see for yourself. Have you
found the passage with the following statement:
“The appointment, at the wish of Reich Minister Speer, of
Gauleiter Sauckel was also due to the extraordinary importance
of labor allocation in the armament industry.”
We assume that you must have read the article. Did you read the article?
SAUCKEL: I really cannot say so positively at this moment. It is however
possible or probable. I did not have much time to read the papers then.
But I should like to tell you very definitely, Mr. Prosecutor, that
during my term of office I transferred over 5 million German workers
from the most widely different branches of German industry to the
armament industry. Therefore, it was a task which dealt principally with
German workers and their transfer.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I was interested in something else: Why was Defendant
Speer interested in your personal appointment as Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor? That is what I wanted to ascertain. Can you
tell me anything in this respect?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you why Reich Minister Speer was interested in my
appointment. I have already told my defense counsel that I myself was
surprised at the time.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel acquainted you with Document EC-68
during the session of May 29. This document deals with the treatment of
foreign workers of Polish nationality. I shall not dwell upon the
subject, since your defense counsel has already quoted the document in
detail, and I will limit myself to your reply intended for your defense
counsel, as it appears in the transcript of that session.
I read from the transcript:
“Sauckel: First of all, I should like to point out that this
document is dated 6 March 1941—that is more than one year
before I assumed office.... Since this document, Number 4, has
been submitted to the Tribunal, I must add supplementary
documents to my case which confirm that I automatically
destroyed all such unnecessary directives.... In such a case I
could not have issued orders of this description to any
government office in the Reich.”
Do you remember these depositions given at the session of the 29th of
May the current year?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I am told that this is an incorrect translation.
It was “revoked” and not “destroyed.” You said “destroyed,” did you not?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am reading from the Russian transcript and perhaps
there are certain inaccuracies in it, but I do not object to replacing
“destroy” by “revoke.” The meaning remains the same.
SAUCKEL: May I ask for the context to be repeated? It is not quite
clear.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I do not want to revert to Document EC-68. All I
want is to establish what you said in reply to your defense counsel in
connection with this document. You do not contradict your testimony
which I have just read into the record? Does it correspond to the
statement you made here on the 29th of May?
SAUCKEL: No. But I do not understand what the term “destroyed” has to do
with it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: We should not read “destroy,” but should use the word
“revoke.”
SAUCKEL: That is possible.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: So you confirm the testimony which I have just read
into the record from the transcript.
Now, tell us, do you remember the living conditions you imposed on the
Ukrainian women and girls from the occupied territories, on those who
had been mobilized for work in German agriculture?
I shall now hand you Document Number USSR-383.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the PS number?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, Sir; that is a USSR document.
[_Turning to the defendant._] There is an addendum, Number 2, to your
directive dated 8 September 1942. This addendum is entitled, “Memorandum
for housewives concerning the employment of domestic workers from the
East in urban and rural households.” Do you know this document? This
memorandum?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts in order to describe
the conditions which you imposed on those Ukrainian women and girls who
had been sent to work on agricultural tasks in Germany. Please find
Section B, “Registration with the Police, Identification, Supervision.”
Have you found that section?
SAUCKEL: No, not quite.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Section B. Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Page 4?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Section B, “Registration with the Police,
Identification, Supervision,” contains the following instructions:
“The Eastern female worker is obliged to wear the identification
badge ‘Ost’ on the right breast of each of her outer garments.”
SAUCKEL: I cannot find it. I have not found it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will find it later. That order is included there.
SAUCKEL: Yes; but, please, I must be able to follow you.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now Paragraph 4. It is entitled “Labor Conditions.” It
is written there:
“Women domestic workers from the East employed in the Reich are
under special working conditions.”
We shall see later on what these special conditions were. Please find
Paragraph 9, Sentence 1, “Free Time.” The opening sentence states:
“No claim to free time exists.”
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I must ask you to read on. It says exactly the same as
in the case of the German household staff, who also...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now read the whole of Paragraph 9 into the
record.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I do not think you should interrupt him when he
is making a legitimate explanation. You should wait until he has made
his explanation, and then draw attention to anything in the rest of the
document that you wish to. Now, what did you wish to say, Defendant?
SAUCKEL: I asked for a further part to be read. There is a sentence in
which it is stated a weekly outing can nevertheless be granted. May I
read the sentence once more:
“Women domestic workers from the East may, as a matter of
principle, only go outside the confines of the household when
attending to household matters. However, on a probationary
basis, as a reward, the opportunity may be given them once a
week to remain outside the household for 3 hours without having
work to do.”
The same also held good for German domestic workers at that time. Free
time amounts to the same thing.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is written differently here. No free time was
allowed them. It says:
“...as a reward, the opportunity may be given them to remain
outside the household once a week 3 hours without having work to
do. This outing must end before darkness falls, but by 2000
hours at the latest.”
So there is no mention here of a day off, but of 3 hours off. Now find
Paragraph 10.
SAUCKEL: But I did not say that. Because of the blackout, this curfew
applied also to German employees during the war.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now find Paragraph 10: “Leave and return home.” That is
the heading of this particular passage. Have you found it? It is
written:
“For the time being no leave shall be granted. Women domestic
workers from the East are recruited for an indefinite time.”
SAUCKEL: I should like to add, in this connection...
THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you can pass on from this. You
know—this is not a matter of very great importance.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I should like Defendant Sauckel to
explain the discrepancies which have arisen in his testimony with regard
to Document EC-68, and with regard to what was written in his directive
concerning the employment of Ukrainian women for domestic service in
Germany. I wish to receive this reply in order to eliminate the
discrepancies which have arisen.
SAUCKEL: I am in a position to answer that question very precisely.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes?
SAUCKEL: This directive was not composed by me alone. Quite a large
number of paragraphs were introduced at that time by the Reichsführer
SS. Already as far back as the spring of 1943 I succeeded in having
these paragraphs altered and the indefinite time of employment for the
Eastern Workers was limited to 2 years. Furthermore, in a document which
I believe my defense counsel will also submit to the Tribunal, it is
proved that the removal of the restrictions applied to the Eastern
Workers was the result of my endeavors. I tried to remove these
restrictions in the very beginning, as I correctly stated in my first
answer, so that the Eastern Workers stood on equal footing to other
foreign workers and to the German workers.
That was my aim and my conception of my duty as I performed it. I was
particularly glad to do this for the Eastern Workers as they were the
best workers we had in Germany.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now go on to the next question. On 18 August 1942 you
had a meeting with Defendant Frank in Kraków. I shall read out what has
been written about this meeting in Frank’s diary. That is Document
Number USSR-223. In the diary for 1942, Volume III, Page 918, is
written:
“I am happy to be able to inform you officially that we have so
far transported more than 800,000 workers into the Reich.
“A short time ago you applied for 140,000 more workers.
“Over and above this figure of 140,000, however, you can next
year count on a further number of workers from the Government
General, for we shall employ the Police for recruiting
purposes.”
Does that tally with the actual facts? Did such a conversation between
you and Frank take place? Has it been correctly entered in his diary?
SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly confirm an entry which I have never seen
before, and details of which I cannot possibly recollect. I therefore
cannot say that all of it is correct. Those were future possibilities
visualized by Herr Frank. I can, however, on the strength of the
documents before me, say that the employment of Polish civilian
workers...
THE PRESIDENT: If you do not remember, why can you not say so and stop?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: But did he speak to you about resorting to police
methods in the recruitment of manpower, or did he not mention it? Do you
remember this, or do you not?
SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly remember this communication which took place
in 1942. Conditions at that time were so utterly different.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: In his activities, where the recruiting of manpower was
concerned, did Defendant Funk resort to police measures or not? Do you
know about it?
SAUCKEL: I cannot, from my own knowledge, tell you whether the Governor
General solved this problem by the employment of police forces or not.
Please ask him himself.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am submitting a document to the Tribunal, Document
Number USSR-469, which describes the methods of labor recruitment as
applied in the territory of Poland. This document is an official
directive, printed by the Kreishauptmann of the Minsk and Warsaw
district. It is dated 2 February 1943. This directive was handed to
Kazimir Navak, who was born on the 6 May 1926, and resided in Dyzin in
the Kolbey community. It reads:
“Pursuant to the compulsory service decree dated 13 May 1942
_Verordnungsblatt_, GG, Page 255, I direct you to labor service
in the Reich.”
The following stands at the bottom of this page:
“In case of insubordination...”
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a document you are putting in evidence now for
the first time?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: This document is being presented for the first time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have not got the document. Have you any copies
of it?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, it should have been handed to you. The document,
Mr. President, is not included in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it now for the first time, or is it
already in evidence?
Did you not hear that?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I hear you, Mr. President. This document is being
presented for the first time.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not seem to have it anyhow. I mean, I have not a
copy of it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: The original document has just been handed to the
defendant, and he has got it. The copies in German were handed to the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I have it now in German.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is stated at the bottom of this decree:
“Should you disobey this compulsory service decree, the members
of your family (parents, wife, brothers, sisters, and children)
will be placed in a punitive camp and will be liberated only
after you have presented yourself. Moreover, I reserve for
myself the right to confiscate your personal and real property
as well as the personal and real property of the members of your
family. Moreover you, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the
above-mentioned decree, will be punished with confinement in
prison, or with penal servitude, or with internment in a
concentration camp.
“Kreishauptmann Dr. Bittrich.”
Did you know anything about the application of such methods for the
recruitment of manpower in the territory of Poland and of the existence
of Defendant Frank’s decrees?
SAUCKEL: I can openly and clearly answer that the threat of such
penalties in this form was completely unknown to me and that I would
never have mentioned it. If I had learned of it, I would have stopped it
immediately. I must, however, beg permission to tell the Tribunal that
this appendix at the end of the document, regarded as coming from my
office, is incorrect, and was not sanctioned by me. The first paragraph
of this document reads correctly and I request permission to quote it.
It is in keeping with German labor legislation and runs:
“Pursuant to the compulsory service decree, _Verordnungsblatt_,
GG, Page 255, dated 13 May 1942, I direct you to labor service
in the Reich.
“Your employment in the Reich will be under properly regulated
working conditions and your wages will be paid according to a
regular scale. Wage savings can be transmitted regularly by you
to your home. Close relatives, to whose support you have
hitherto been substantially contributing, may apply to the labor
office for special allowances.”
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Was that written at the bottom of the decree?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need the details.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I want to remind you now of certain directives which
were issued with regard to the so-called recruitment of labor,
directives which were issued by your government organizations in
Germany, and personally by yourself in your own famous program. The
document is Document Number USSR-365, and you wrote the following...
SAUCKEL: I have not got it here.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be helped to find it.
Have you been shown the passage which I am now going to read into the
record?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is written there:
“It is therefore unavoidably necessary to exhaust completely the
manpower reserves now available in the conquered Soviet
territories. If it is not possible to obtain required workers on
a voluntary basis then steps must be taken immediately to
conscript them or bring in compulsion.”
Did you issue these instructions?
SAUCKEL: I have not found these passages so far. They have not been
pointed out to me properly.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will at once be shown the passage again.
Did you ever issue these instructions?
SAUCKEL: I myself was not able to issue orders for compulsory service in
the occupied territories; that had to be done by the district
authorities. But by compulsion I did not understand that penalties would
be threatened to the extent as stated in that one document signed by
Bittrich, but that they would be in keeping with German regulations.
That is a very substantial difference.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Was that which I have just read out to you included in
your program or not?
SAUCKEL: It is in my program—but I have expressly stated that I was
directed to do that by the Führer.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Let us proceed. In the letter of 3 October 1942
addressed to Gauleiter Meyer you wrote—this document, Number 017-PS
will be handed to you in a moment. Please follow me when I read:
“I do not underestimate the difficulties connected with the
execution of the new task, but I am convinced that with the
ruthless employment of all means”—I should like to underline
that ‘all means’—“and with the absolute devotion of all
concerned, the new quota can be filled by the date fixed.”
Did you write that?
SAUCKEL: I wrote that, yes. But I want you to let me give you an
explicit explanation: In all my directives I invariably demanded the
most considerate treatment for the workers; that has already been proved
in the Trial. When I refer here to the ruthless use of all means, I only
mean the ruthless use of all technical means and propaganda, because I
had been told from different sources that such means were not available
there to a sufficient degree. This is an explanation of what led up to
this letter.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 31 March 1942 you addressed a letter to the Reich
commissioners. This letter will be presented to you in a few minutes. It
is Document Number USSR-137. Here you wrote as follows:
“I request that the recruitment, for which you together with the
commissioners are responsible to me, be speeded up on your part
by adequate measures, if necessary by the application of
compulsory labor in the severest form, so that the recruitment
figures may be trebled in the shortest possible time.”
Did you issue this directive?
SAUCKEL: That is my directive and I issued it. By the severest use of
compulsory labor I meant no wicked or criminal measures, but rather, if
it was necessary that it should be used, it was with reference to the
number, the number to be made up.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts from the documents of
other people. I shall begin by reading an excerpt from a speech by
Defendant Rosenberg, Document Number USSR-170, which was delivered at
the conference of the German Labor Front in November 1942. I shall quote
a brief excerpt from this speech:
“...millions of Russians, trembling with fright, react in the
same way...”
SAUCKEL: I have not found it.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be helped in one moment.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. NELTE: I should like to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the
following fact: General Alexandrov this morning referred to Document
Number 744-PS. First of all a document was given me which was described
as a German translation. That translation contains things which are
obviously impossible.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you said 744?
DR. NELTE: 744-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t got any note that he referred to that document.
I don’t know whether he—did you refer to 744-PS this morning, General
Alexandrov?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I referred this morning to the document in question. It
was a directive of the Defendant Keitel, dated 8 July 1943, referring to
the employment of prisoners of war in the mining industry.
DR. NELTE: Then the Russian Prosecution presented me with the original,
that is the photostatic copy of a letter dated 8 July 1943, signed by
Keitel. I now have two German versions before me. Not only do they
differ greatly as far as the contents are concerned, but also the
translation contains something additional which is not in the original,
namely that to the heading of the letter, “Chief of the High Command of
the Wehrmacht,” is added “Army General Staff.”
I do not want to delay you by reading the other incorrect translations,
but I must assume that you have before you the texts in the foreign
languages, which, as I see from the translation back into German, are
incorrect. As this document, the original, is the evidence and is not
being objected to, I should like to ask you to order that the
translations in the foreign languages, which you have before you, be
checked in order to find out to what extent they differ from the
original document.
THE PRESIDENT: Had the document been put in evidence before? Had it been
offered in evidence? Was it an exhibit?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: 744-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that does not mean that it has been put in
evidence. That only means that it is identified in that way. Had it been
offered in evidence before?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know the U.S.A. number of this document, but
according to the data at my disposal I am able to state that it was
submitted in evidence to the Tribunal. In the German copy, presented in
the German language, it is written that the German translation was made
on 26 November 1945 by Second Lieutenant of the U. S. Infantry, Fred
Niebergall. As Dr. Nelte has discovered certain inaccuracies in the
translation, I consider that the Translation Division should be asked to
check these divergencies.
DR. NELTE: I am convinced, Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the best thing to do, to have it checked
by the Translation Division. We will order that that shall be done at
once.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: [_Turning to the defendant._] The transcript of
Defendant Rosenberg’s speech will be handed over to you immediately. I
shall limit myself to a very short excerpt from this transcript. Please
read after me:
“Part of them imagine that the road to Germany is somewhat
similar to the road to Siberia.”
And further:
“I know that if 1½ million people are brought here, they cannot
be given the best accommodations. The fact that thousands of
people are badly housed or badly treated is obvious. It is not
worth while worrying about that. However, this is a very
reasonable question, and I believe that Gauleiter Sauckel has
already discussed it, or will do so. These people from the East
are being brought to Germany in order to work and to endeavor to
reach as high a level of production as possible. This is quite a
reasonable transaction. In order to reach this production
capacity one should naturally not bring them over three-quarters
frozen or let them stand for 10 hours. One must rather give them
enough to eat that they will have reserve strength.”
Does Defendant Rosenberg correctly describe the conditions in which the
workers you brought from the occupied territories found themselves, or
do you consider that Defendant Rosenberg has not described them
correctly?
SAUCKEL: I cannot say and do not know when Rosenberg made this speech. I
myself did not hear it or receive a copy of it. I can, however,
definitely state that as soon as I came into office I made most
extensive arrangements, so that the conditions which Rosenberg discusses
here—and which can have nothing to do with my term of office—might be
avoided under all circumstances. It was for that purpose that I issued
those most comprehensive orders. To prevent such conditions I planned
hundreds of valid and binding instructions of a legal nature, affecting
every nationality working in Germany, which would make such conditions
impossible. That is what I have to say to that. It cannot refer to
conditions during my term of office.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I shall limit myself to this one single
excerpt from the speech of the Defendant Rosenberg, and I shall not
avail myself of the numerous documents already presented to the
Tribunal, documents which confirm beyond all manner of doubt the
criminal methods applied—with the full cognizance of the Defendant
Sauckel—for the mobilization of manpower in the occupied territories
and for the exploitation of the workers as slaves in Germany.
I shall only submit to the Tribunal one single new document, listed as
Document Number USSR-468. This document is a worker’s identity card
issued by the German authorities in Breslau to a Polish citizen, Maria
Atler. This card is characterized by the fact that it is stamped on the
reverse side with the image of a pig. Maria Atler has stated on oath
that such worker’s identity cards were issued to all foreign workers in
1944 by the German authorities in Breslau. Together with this original
document I am submitting a certificate of the Polish State Commission
which quotes the testimony of the witness Maria Atler.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Sauckel, have you looked at that
worker’s identity card? Have you found the image of a pig on that card?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
GEN. ALEX ANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such workers’ cards,
stamped with the image of a pig as an insult to human dignity?
SAUCKEL: I did not have cards like that, and I knew nothing about it. I
cannot quite make out what this image is meant to be. I have nothing at
all to do with this. I am not familiar with such an identification mark
on a card and do not know what I am to say about it. I do not know
whether it was possible for some labor administration office to use such
identification marks or not. I should like permission to see the
original.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such cards and of
their utilization?
SAUCKEL: No, I had no idea of the existence of such cards with images
like that. It was not to my advantage, and I had no reason at all to
offend such people who were working in Germany. I had no idea of that,
and I do not know what this was meant to be.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a brief excerpt from Document Number
USSR-170. This is a transcript of the minutes of a conference held with
Reich Marshal Göring on 6 August 1942. I shall quote that part of the
statement in which the Defendant Göring expresses his appreciation of
your activities. I quote:
“To that I must say that I do not wish to praise Gauleiter
Sauckel; he does not need it. But what he has done in this brief
time to collect workers from all over Europe and bring them to
our factories with such rapidity is a unique feat. I will say
this to you all: If everybody in his own sphere would apply a
tenth of the energy which Gauleiter Sauckel has applied, then
indeed the tasks which have been assigned to you would be easily
fulfilled. That is my inner conviction and not mere words.”
Did you hear such an appreciation of your activities from the lips of
Reich Marshal Göring?
SAUCKEL: It is possible that the Reich Marshal said that. I cannot
remember the details of a meeting that took place so long ago. What is
correct is that I, as a human being and as a member of my nation, was
obliged to do my duty. My documents prove that I tried to do my duty
decently and humanely. I did my utmost to do that.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now submit to the Tribunal a document listed as
Document Number USSR-462. It is an article by Dr. Friedrich Didier,
published in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ of 1944. This is an official
publication of the Reich Ministry of Labor and of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor. The article is entitled “Fritz
Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.”
I do not intend to quote this article as it is written entirely in
praise of Sauckel’s activities, and there is no reason to dwell on it. I
only wish to ask you, Defendant Sauckel, are you acquainted with this
article?
SAUCKEL: I do not know this article. I cannot say what is in it. I was
not always able to read through the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_—it wasn’t
published by me. It is an old institution of the Labor Ministry which
contains all the decrees published by that Ministry and also my decrees.
The decrees in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ all testify to my concern for
foreign and for German workers.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then you will have to acquaint yourself very rapidly
with the contents of this article. It will be handed to you immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: What document is this he is reading?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is an article in the _Reichsarbeitsblatt_ entitled
“Fritz Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.” We are submitting this
document for the first time as Document Number USSR-462.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Are you now conversant with it? Tell us,
does this article correctly characterize your political and governmental
activity?
SAUCKEL: The author of this article is not an expert. I cannot make any
further comments on the contents of a birthday article. It contains a
very cursory description of my career and my sphere of work.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: And now, one last question. In your speech at the first
meeting of the staffs for the Allocation of Labor, held in Weimar on 6
January 1943, you stated—and I quote from the third document book of
your defense counsel, Document Number Sauckel-82:
“Now, where the foundations of our work are concerned...”—I
skip the first paragraph and pass directly to the second—“We
are true to our Führer and to our people. This loyalty justifies
us in the execution of the harshest measures.”—And then, at the
end—“In this respect I will assume ever-increasing
responsibility.”
Tell us now, are you assuming responsibility for the enforced mass
deportation into slavery of the population of the occupied territories,
for the suffering and misery of the millions you drove into slavery, for
the grim period of slaveholding which you revived in the twentieth
century?
SAUCKEL: I am most grateful to you that you quoted this document at this
very moment. Would you show me this document so that I can give the
correct explanation of my views as contained therein?
GEN. ALEXANDROV: If necessary, your defense counsel will acquaint you
with this document.
Mr. President, I have finished my cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you want to re-examine?
DR. THOMA: Witness, what was Rosenberg’s role, as Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, in the execution of the Allocation of
Labor?
SAUCKEL: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in carrying
out the Allocation of Labor, had to pass on my wishes and demands to the
offices under him in that Ministry insofar as they related to my tasks.
I cannot, of course, comment on the other departments in the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which I do not know.
DR. THOMA: Did not Rosenberg tell you repeatedly that he would give
Reich Commissioner Koch directions to make use of his authority?
SAUCKEL: That is correct. It was one of Rosenberg’s tasks to give orders
to Reich Commissioner Koch, who was under him, in every field of
administration there.
DR. THOMA: So that the way you understood it was that he was to give him
instructions. In what way?
SAUCKEL: Rosenberg did and should—as we had expressly agreed—give
instructions to Koch to put a stop to any wild and objectionable methods
which were contrary to my instructions; and that Rosenberg did, as far
as I know.
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg, by referring to the authority of the Reich
Commissioner, meant that he was to prohibit your recruiting methods and
no longer permit your recruiting units to bring away Eastern Workers?
SAUCKEL: Rosenberg never said that to me, rather he denied it; for these
commissions, while they were in the Ukraine, were subordinate to and
part of the labor allocation department of Reich Commissioner Koch. Koch
was the supervising authority and the administrative authority for such
matters. Those are the undeniable facts.
DR. THOMA: May I point out to the Tribunal that a Document,
Rosenberg-10, shows that Sauckel did not understand this statement of
Rosenberg’s.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you refer to some document there, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-10.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the re-examination of the witness by the
defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg must limit itself to new
matters which have been brought up and are the subject of argument.
There was every opportunity, when his client was in the witness stand,
to clarify these questions. At the time I wanted to clear up this
question on my own initiative, but I was informed that I ought to ask
Sauckel. He made a clear statement here, and in my opinion there is no
cause once more to come back in this connection to documents which
belong to a previous period of the defense. I object to such
questioning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, I think you had better go on and ask
your next question. I have not got the document before me yet that you
are putting to the witness, or referring to. What is your next question?
DR. THOMA: Witness, did you not in your program assume full
responsibility for the Allocation of Labor?
SAUCKEL: I assumed responsibility, and I acknowledge it, for what came
within the limits of my power—I cannot do more than that—and for what
I ordered and for what I caused to be done. This collection of decrees,
Dr. Thoma, has been submitted and was shown to Herr Rosenberg...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant has been over this all before.
He has been all through this before—about his responsibility.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I point out that regarding the question of
responsibility, there is a certain paragraph—the decisive
paragraph—which has not yet been read. It is Document 016-PS concerning
the labor allocation program, and it says on Page 21, Figure 1...
THE PRESIDENT: Just say what the document is again, will you Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: 016-PS, Page 20 of the German document. It says:
“All technical and administrative procedure of labor allocation
is subject exclusively to the jurisdiction and responsibility of
the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, the
regional labor offices and the labor offices...”
SAUCKEL: Inside Germany, Doctor. Outside Germany I was, of course,
subject to the competent chiefs of the areas in question. That is quite
obvious.
DR. THOMA: In reply to that answer I draw the attention of the Tribunal
to Page 15 of this labor program. This Figure 1, which I have just read,
comes under the paragraph, “Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.”
SAUCKEL: To the extent that they were employed in Germany.
DR. THOMA: May I point out that it states clearly under Figure 1:
“All technical and administrative procedure of labor allocation...”
SAUCKEL: And may I point out that it was not possible for me to
interfere with Reich Commissioner Koch’s authority. He had said
expressly that he would not permit that.
DR. THOMA: Witness, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan gave you special
powers concerning conscription in dealings with all authorities and, in
my opinion, it is not right that you should now deny these methods of
recruitment and pass responsibility for them on to the Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.
I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the defense counsel for Defendant
Rosenberg may engage in cross-questioning, but it does not appear to me
to be the right moment for him to make a speech of accusation against my
client.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am well aware of the facts that there have
been two cross-examinations, and I have no desire to go on with another
one. However, we do have one document that we think is of some
importance and which was turned over to General Alexandrov, but I think
there must have been some language difficulty. The translation of it was
not presented. I would like the permission of the Tribunal to ask one or
two questions of this defendant about it and to present it. I think it
is rather important that it be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that this ought to
create a precedent, but in view of your statement that the document was
supplied to General Alexandrov and that, for some reason, he did not
deal with it, we will allow you to cross-examine upon it.
MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.
Witness, do you remember an occasion in 1942, just after your
appointment, when you met with some officials of the Ministry of Labor
and you discussed with them the program which you were about to
institute and for which you were about to take responsibility? Do you
recall it?
SAUCKEL: I cannot, of course, remember details of that discussion.
Various points of the program were discussed, and I might also say in
connection with the comments made by the defense counsel for the
Defendant Rosenberg since what he has been quoting is...
MR. DODD: Just a minute, just a minute. I simply asked you if you
remembered this meeting, and you said you did not, and now there is the
document.
SAUCKEL: Details of that conference I do not remember.
MR. DODD: And now take a look at the minutes of the meeting.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document?
MR. DODD: This is EC-318.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number? Has it been offered or not?
MR. DODD: I am now offering it. I was waiting to get the number from the
secretary.
I will have to get the number a little later, Mr. President. I had not
made preparations to submit this document, so I did not have the number
in advance.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want to call your attention
particularly to a few passages. You start out by telling the officials
who were gathered there that you want to co-operate closely with them;
and then, moving along, you give some idea of the number of workers whom
you intend to recruit. You say there is an estimated requirement of 1
million; and you also made perfectly clear that day that you were to get
most of your people, most of these workers, from the East and
particularly from Soviet Russia.
You told these officials that you had talked for several hours with the
Führer and for 8 hours with the Reich Marshal, and that you all agreed
that the most important problem was the exploitation of the manpower in
the East.
You further stated—do you see that in there?
SAUCKEL: Where does it say exploitation? I cannot find that word.
MR. DODD: Well, do you find where you say you had discussed your task
with the Führer in a conversation that had lasted for several hours? Do
you find that?
SAUCKEL: I cannot find it.
MR. DODD: You have the German there before you, have you not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but will you please be kind enough to tell me the page?
MR. DODD: In the middle of Page 2. Have you found it?
SAUCKEL: Mr. Prosecutor, I want particularly to point out to you the
difference in German between the words “Ausnutzung” and “Ausbeutung.”
“Ausbeutung” (exploitation) is a word which, in the language of the
workers, has a rather bad implication, but “Ausnutzung” (use of) is
quite an ordinary concept; to use something means making it useful. That
is a great difference in meaning in the German language.
MR. DODD: Well, we will stand by ours and you may stand by yours, and
the Tribunal will ascertain between the two of us who has the correct
translation.
In any event, whether you said “use of” or “exploit,” you did say that
the most important solution was either the use of or the exploitation...
SAUCKEL: But that is not the same thing, Mr. Prosecutor. In German there
is a fundamental difference in meaning. I must point out that the word
exploitation is a word which I did not use and did not want to use.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, would you speak a little bit lower. You quite
drown the interpreter’s voice.
SAUCKEL: I beg your pardon, My Lord.
MR. DODD: I am not concerned with whether or not you agree with the word
“exploit.” That is a very unimportant part of this document, as I think
you probably already recognize.
SAUCKEL: I beg to contradict you. That word is most important from the
humane point of view.
MR. DODD: I don’t care to have any argument with you at all. We...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal is perfectly well able to
understand the difference between the use of the words, and you have
told us the translation you say is right.
MR. DODD: Now, if you move down a little bit, do you recall having said
that 1 million Russians would have to be brought into Germany as rapidly
as possible, to become available even prior to the offensive?
It is the next sentence or two there in your text. You won’t see it by
looking at me. Do you read the next sentence?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I should like permission to read the next sentence:
“The necessary condition for taking on the task would be the
assurance that Russians would be given approximately the same
rations as have been in force for the German civilian
population.”
MR. DODD: You have skipped the sentence that I want you to read. I know
that one comes along, but I want you to read the one where you say you
would have to bring 1 million Russians into the Reich as rapidly as
possible, and that is the very next or almost the next sentence after
the one you have been discussing, about the word “exploit” or “use of.”
SAUCKEL: “...must be brought to the Reich as quickly as possible.”
MR. DODD: That is all I want to know. Do you remember saying that?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I said that. I must say in connection with this that this
is a record which I have never seen before or checked. Someone made it,
but the record itself I was not familiar with, and it was never
submitted to me.
MR. DODD: Well, I suppose it could be truthful even though you didn’t
make it.
Let us move on here to the next to the last paragraph, and you will find
a sentence which says or suggests:
“They”—referring to the Russians—“will have to be handled so
roughly by the German administration in the East that they will
prefer to go to Germany rather than stay in Russia.”
Do you find that?
SAUCKEL: Will you tell me where that sentence is?
MR. DODD: Well, it is right after the sentence where you talk about your
negotiations with Himmler. Maybe that will help you.
Do you find where you say you had negotiations with the Reichsführer SS?
You succeeded in getting him to remove the barbed wire. Surely you have
read that.
Now you find the sentence, do you?
“They would have to be handled so roughly by the German
administration in the East that they would prefer to go to
Germany rather than stay in Russia.”
Do you remember saying that?
SAUCKEL: I cannot say that I used these specific words in speaking to
him, for, as I have already stated, it is a record of statements of a
problematical nature which I myself did not check, and I cannot be sure
how a third person came to write this record from memory. These are not
shorthand minutes; it is merely a record which is not signed by anyone
and in which...
MR. DODD: I don’t think you need to give us any long dissertation on the
fact that it is somebody else’s minutes. It is not offered to you as
being your own.
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I have the right and am obliged to say that.
MR. DODD: I wish you would wait a minute and let me put a question to
you once in a while. I have not suggested that these are your minutes. I
have merely put it to you for the purpose of determining whether or not
on seeing it you remember it. And do you, or do you not remember it?
SAUCKEL: I certainly do not remember that passage. I can merely read
here something written by a third person, and I do not know who it was.
This person may quite well have misunderstood me; that is possible...
MR. DODD: Well, you also find you did have some conversations with the
Reichsführer SS. Do you remember having said that, in the course of this
conversation or speech or whatever it was that you were making?
SAUCKEL: The Reichsführer SS put me off on several occasions, and I had
to insist to get the Reichsführer SS to remove the barbed wire fences. I
did that. From the very beginning of my term of office I moderated the
orders of the Reichsführer SS; and that, of course, caused vigorous
arguments between us.
MR. DODD: Then that part of the minutes of this meeting is correct,
isn’t it? The reporter, or whoever it was that took this down, correctly
reported what you said about your negotiations with the Reichsführer SS,
did he? You find no fault with that?
SAUCKEL: What he wrote down in detail about what I am supposed to have
said I have not yet read.
MR. DODD: Now, listen. You read back and look at that paper at which you
have just been looking. You find fault with the sentence that reports
that you said they were to be handled roughly in the East, but you do
not find any fault with the sentence ahead of it which says you had the
barbed wire taken down, isn’t that so?
You seem to be complaining about the fact that this was somebody else’s
report and not yours. Have you read it?
SAUCKEL: No.
MR. DODD: Well, it is the sentence just before the one we have just been
talking about.
Do you really mean you cannot find it? Do you want help?
SAUCKEL: Two pages appear in duplicate here.
MR. DODD: All I have asked you, Witness, is whether or not the sentence
about your meeting with Himmler is a fairly accurate report of what you
said. Is it?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you from memory. I very seldom spoke to
Himmler and then only cursorily. It may have been negotiations carried
out by my office on my order. That I cannot tell you.
MR. DODD: Well, your answer to all of this is, then, that you don’t
remember what you said there; this doesn’t help you any to remember.
SAUCKEL: You cannot possibly expect me to remember exactly events which
lasted very briefly and took place so long ago.
MR. DODD: I am perfectly willing to let it rest there. There is the
written record against your failure of memory, and I will leave that
with the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think you should put to him...
SAUCKEL: With which, however, I was not familiar before this.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should put to him the next paragraph,
“Thirdly...” which follows after the sentence about handling them so
roughly.
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, if you will keep your finger on that
place that you have there, you won’t lose it, and you will find the next
sentence is—begins:
“Thirdly, he termed intolerable the wage rates previously
decreed by the Reich Marshal, and has persuaded the Reich
Marshal that Russians should have the possibility of earning up
to one half of the wages of German workers.”
With reference to that statement, what had the Reich Marshal suggested,
by the way?
SAUCKEL: Before I took up my office—and I have talked about that at
length with my defense counsel—there existed decrees of the Ministerial
Council regarding wage regulations, and I continually improved those
wages—four times, in fact, as far as I could manage it, during my term
in office.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question you
were asked was: What had the Reich Marshal suggested as wages for these
workers? You can answer that.
SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal did not make any suggestions to me. When I
entered office I found regulations in existence which I considered
insufficient.
MR. DODD: Well, tell us a little more about it. What do you mean
insufficient? You used here the word intolerable. What was the situation
when you came into the office with respect to wages?
SAUCKEL: I already explained that yesterday, during the examination by
my defense counsel, and I gave as an example the fact that an Eastern
Worker, when I came into office, drew wages of about 60 pfennigs per
hour, which, after deductions for food and lodging, would leave him
about 4½ marks in cash. I altered that after I came into office and
doubled the cash payments. The purpose of the instructions which existed
before my service was probably to prevent too great a circulation of
money for reasons concerning currency. I do not know the details.
MR. DODD: This exhibit, Mr. President, becomes USA-881.
I have no further questions.
DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I am replacing Dr.
Horn for Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
I have a few questions to put to the witness.
Yesterday in cross-examination you spoke about a French diplomatic
organization, formed under the French Ambassador Scapini, for Frenchmen
in Germany. Is it true that it was at Defendant Ribbentrop’s wish that
this organization was formed?
SAUCKEL: At our mutual wish and agreement. We both had the same
interests. That is correct.
DR. BALLAS: Can you tell me the reasons which caused Von Ribbentrop to
create this organization?
SAUCKEL: The reason for this was, in my opinion, to bring about an
understanding between the French and German populations by giving
assurance that particular care would be taken of Frenchmen working in
Germany.
DR. BALLAS: This diplomatic organization was also responsible for the
treatment of French prisoners of war? Can you tell me for what reasons
the German Foreign Office decided on so unusual an arrangement at a time
when a state of war still existed between France and Germany?
SAUCKEL: There were conferences between the French Government of Marshal
Pétain and the German Government, and both nations tried conscientiously
to bring about an understanding.
DR. BALLAS: And because of that came these unusual measures concerning
prisoners of war?
SAUCKEL: Not only because of that; I considered it a particular
necessity, and I might mention in this connection that this organization
was later divided or supplemented. In addition to M. Scapini, who took
care of French prisoners of war in particular, a M. Broehne took special
charge of French civilian workers.
DR. BALLAS: Is it true that Defendant Von Ribbentrop in the Foreign
Office created an organization to bring into Germany from occupied
countries artists, lecturers, newspapers, books, _et cetera_, for
foreign workers so that these workers would return home well inclined
toward an understanding with Germany?
SAUCKEL: It was the purpose of an agreement established by the Reich
Foreign Minister in collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda,
the German Labor Front, and my office, to improve the leisure time of
the foreign workers by means of foreign artists and lecturers. Many
Russian artists were in Germany for this purpose. It also had the
purpose of bringing libraries and periodicals to these people from their
home countries.
DR. BALLAS: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, in order to rectify an error in a chart in
Document Sauckel-1, I just want to have the witness’ confirmation.
[_The document was handed to the defendant._]
Witness, among the employers of labor you mentioned the departments of
Minister Funk, did you not?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And going down you find written in the third square
“armament inspectorate,” and under that, “Reichsautobahn.” These two
squares have been incorrectly put in. They do not belong there. Is it
true that these two squares should be crossed out?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: I therefore ask that the chart be rectified by having
these two squares crossed out. They belong to Speer’s Ministry, but I
have not given any close attention to that side, and I do not wish to
discuss it here.
Then, from the Buchenwald photograph album there were a number of
pictures submitted which show the defendant together with Himmler.
Witness, can you tell from the picture the approximate time of that
meeting? There are certain indications which you discussed with me
yesterday. Will you briefly describe these?
SAUCKEL: Yes. The left-hand top picture shows that construction is still
going on; I can see unfinished roadbeds and the like. This may therefore
be during the construction period.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what can you say about the time from the dress of the
various people?
SAUCKEL: The dress shows quite clearly that this is at a time before the
war, for Himmler is wearing a black uniform which he never wore during
the war. Apart from that he is wearing a sword, which was forbidden
during the war. It is quite clear that this meeting took place before
the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are these people wearing decorations?
SAUCKEL: I cannot see whether they are wearing decorations; no.
DR. SERVATIUS: And so I can conclude that this picture was taken
sometime before the war?
SAUCKEL: Quite definitely sometime before the war, because I myself did
not wear an SS uniform during the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number F-810 was submitted yesterday. That is a
report about the meeting at the Wartburg. Beginning on Page 25 of the
German text there is a report by Dr. Sturm, which was shown you and in
which it is said among other things that there was collaboration between
the Gestapo and the concentration camps and that that was the right road
to take. You were asked whether that was your view too, and whether such
collaboration was correct.
What did you understand by that? Do you mean that you agreed to the
methods used in concentration camps, as practiced by Himmler?
SAUCKEL: Under no circumstances, I wanted to indicate that it was
correct, as the document shows, that workers’ discipline should be
enforced step by step, as provided for in cases of disobedience: First a
reprimand, then small fines imposed by the factory, as laid down, in
fact, in my Decree Number 13, which I want to submit as documentary
evidence. Only then, after reprimands and small disciplinary penalties
at the factory had proved inadequate, should there be further treatment
of these cases, as is mentioned in the document, by having them brought
to court by the public prosecutor. I called a proper penal procedure
correct. By no means did I want thereby to characterize methods in
concentration camps as correct. I was not at all familiar with these
methods at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have a document, Number 1764-PS, before
me. I have not been able to ascertain when and if it has already been
submitted. I have just received it in the form of a photostatic copy. It
is the so-called Hemmen report, a report which Envoy Hemmen made about a
sector of the labor allocation in France. I want to read a short passage
to the defendant which deals with the number of Frenchmen employed in
Germany, and I want him to confirm it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, I shall read you a passage and
ask you to...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, it is not usual to allow documents to be
put in re-examination. Why was this not used in examination-in-chief?
DR. SERVATIUS: The figures were questioned during the cross-examination,
not before. I attach no great importance to finding out in detail how
many hundred thousands came or went. I can omit this question and come
back to it in the final pleadings.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal was not saying you could not use it now. As
it arose out of the cross-examination, I think you may be able to use
it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like briefly to read to you the
relevant passage; and I want you to tell me whether the views presented
there are correct.
Envoy Hemmen reports here, in a letter received at the Foreign Office on
6 February 1944, under Paragraph III as follows:
“Allocation of Labor in Germany:
“It started with the voluntary recruitment of workers which, up
to the end of 1942, produced 400,000 men. During the first half
of 1943 two further voluntary recruitments of 250,000 men each
were effected. The first, by granting the privileges of the
_relève_—which allowed leave for prisoners of war at a ratio of
1 prisoner to 3 recruits—or the granting of worker status,
produced some 200,000; whereas the second could be carried out
only by using the new compulsory service law, that is to say,
coercion, and produced only 122,000 men.”
I skip the end of the page and read from Page 8:
“As the total result of the Sauckel Action 818,000 persons all
told, mostly men, went to Germany; 168,000 of them owing to the
compulsory service law. Of all these there were only 420,000
still there at the end of January 1944.”
As far as you can recollect, are these statements generally correct?
SAUCKEL: May I remark in this connection that the Envoy Hemmen at the
Embassy in Paris dealt with these questions there, and they are given
correctly. Finally, you meant to say 420,000 and not 420, did you not?
DR. SERVATIUS: Thousand.
SAUCKEL: The decisive point is that because of the short term of the
contracts, the French workers were changed every 6 months, thus only one
half could be here at a time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, you have already said that.
SAUCKEL: As an explanation I should like permission to tell the Tribunal
that while there was a ratio of 1 to 3—meaning that Germany gave back 1
prisoner-of-war in return for 3 workers—both the prisoner-of-war and
the French civilian workers who had replaced him for the most part had
returned to their own country after 1½ years, as each stayed for only 6
months.
It was very hard to win the Führer over to this regulation.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear some supplementary applications
for witnesses and documents at 2 o’clock on Monday.
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I should like to come back briefly to Document
D-565, that is to say, to the photographs showing, the Defendant Sauckel
at the Concentration Camp of Buchenwald.
The Prosecution has never claimed, and does not claim now, that these
photographs date from a period during the war. Quite the contrary, the
original, which has been shown to you, has the date of these photographs
and the year is 1938.
The defendant, when he was examined by his counsel, told us that he
visited Buchenwald in the company of Italian officers. I do not see a
single Italian officer in these photographs; I simply see the
Reichsführer SS Himmler.
However, I do not dispute, and I never claimed that these photographs
dated from a year other than 1938.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have one last question in connection
with Exhibit Sauckel-82 from Document Book Sauckel 3, Page 206 and
following. On Page 207 we find a statement under Number 3 which I should
like to put to the defendant again, because the prosecutor for the
Soviet Union has stated that Sauckel declared here that he gave no
protection against crime. I should like to read the sentence to the
defendant again and ask him for an explanation. I myself have already
quoted it once before; apparently there is a misunderstanding. It is a
very short sentence; it reads: “You can demand of me every protection in
your labor area, but no protection for crimes.”
Does that mean, Witness, that you did not grant protection against
crimes?
SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it can be seen very clearly from that document
that I did not tolerate any crime. I would not protect these people, who
were not subordinate to me, if they committed crimes there. They were
not to do that; that was what I prohibited...
DR. SERVATIUS: I believe that the German shows very clearly that this
explanation, as the defendant has just given it, is correct.
I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Sauckel, I want to ask you a number
of questions. And will you try to speak a little more quietly, and will
you listen carefully to the questions and try to make your answers
responsive to the questions?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, first, I am going to ask you a little
bit about your personnel. You had one large central office, I take it,
did you not—one large central office?
SAUCKEL: I had a small central office, Your Honor.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): A small central office. And how many
people...
SAUCKEL: An office of my own.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many employees were in that office?
SAUCKEL: In this personnel office, Your Honor, there were two personnel
experts; a Ministerialrat, Dr. Stothfang; a Landrat Dr....
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Just a moment; how many, just how many?
SAUCKEL: Two higher officials and about eight middle and lower officials
as assistants and registrars.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did your inspectors work out of that office?
SAUCKEL: The inspectors belonged to Department 9 of the Reich Ministry
of Labor which had been installed there. That was a special department
which was established in the Reich Ministry of Labor at my request, with
higher officials who...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now the inspectors worked, I suppose, under
your instructions and reported to you, did they?
SAUCKEL: The inspectors reported first to Department 5 in the Reich
Ministry of Labor. I was informed in important cases. The inspectors had
the right and the duty to correct bad conditions on the spot when they
were confirmed in the labor administration.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many inspectors were there?
SAUCKEL: There were in Department 9, I believe...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, no—in all, how many in all?
SAUCKEL: There were various inspection offices, Your Honor. This
inspection...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): One moment, Defendant. Just listen to the
question. I said how many inspectors in all the inspection offices were
there?
SAUCKEL: From my own knowledge I cannot say how many there were in the
Labor Front. The extent of inspection offices in the Labor Front would
have been a matter for Dr. Ley to explain. That I do not know in detail.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, do you know about how many inspectors
were working to inspect the labor work. You must know about how many
were there, don’t you?
SAUCKEL: I cannot give you accurate figures, but it may have been
approximately 60 or 70, if you take all of them together including those
of the German Labor Front.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, did they go outside of Germany, or did
they work only in Germany?
SAUCKEL: These inspectors worked for the most part only in Germany.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And they would inspect such matters as food
and travel and conditions of the camps, and so on, would they not?
SAUCKEL: That was their task.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. And the important reports would come to
you?
SAUCKEL: No. According to an agreement the reports had to be sent to the
highest competent Reich authorities for bad conditions to be corrected.
For bad conditions in industry and in camps the competent authority was
the Industrial Inspectorate under Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. That
was the highest...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, did not any of them come to you?
SAUCKEL: Complaints were also brought to me, but I could do nothing but
send them back to the competent offices and ask that everything be done
to remedy the conditions; and that is what I did.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the inspectors’ reports come to you, any
of the inspectors’ reports?
SAUCKEL: The reports did not come to me directly; they went through
channels to those offices which were concerned with correcting such
abuses.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, I am asking you not whether they
came directly; but did they come to you eventually? Did you get them?
Did you see them?
SAUCKEL: Such reports came very seldom to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you do not know what the conditions were
then, since you did not get the inspectors’ reports, is that right?
SAUCKEL: Four times or twice a year I also sent my assistants and these
inspectors in person to the Gauleiter in the German Gaue, and I received
reports on what they discussed during these private conferences with the
regional offices and on what they inspected and observed. There was
nothing of a catastrophic nature, merely shortcomings in the execution
of the directives which I had issued. I was informed about things of
that sort...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you are telling us that you never got any
reports or complaints of a catastrophic nature; is that right?
SAUCKEL: I did not quite understand that question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You never got any reports or complaints of
what you call a catastrophic nature; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Within Germany—I received reports and complaints such as I
described to my counsel from Field Marshal Kluge, or else they were made
known to me in discussions with Rosenberg. Immediately I took the
necessary measures. But that was not frequently the case...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, if you would listen to the
question and try to answer it, I think we would get along much faster.
You used the expression “catastrophic nature”; those were your words.
Did you get any reports of a catastrophic nature?
SAUCKEL: I learned through Field Marshal Kluge, and through reports,
which have been mentioned here, from Rosenberg, about a few cases which
I considered catastrophic and tried to correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): These were what you call catastrophic cases?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What were they?
SAUCKEL: There was the case in the East which Field Marshal Kluge
reported to me, where motion picture houses were surrounded by
recruiting agents. I considered that catastrophic. The second case was
the case of the returning transport, where according to the report—it
is called the later report, but I do not remember the number of the
document—children are said to have died on the way and been placed
outside the train. I considered that catastrophic. But there could...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have answered.
SAUCKEL: But...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have answered that now.
Did you get any complaints about Koch?
SAUCKEL: I received complaints about Koch at times from the Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and also from another
source. Koch, of course, always defended himself very vehemently.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then you had complaints from several people
about Koch?
SAUCKEL: Yes. I could...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the complaints said what Koch was doing,
did they?
SAUCKEL: I did not receive complaints from many sides about Koch, but
rather from one side...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait...
SAUCKEL: But from several people...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait. Won’t you answer the question? I did
not ask you if you have received many complaints. I said, “The
complaints said what Koch was doing.” Is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, in some cases.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what did you do with those complaints?
SAUCKEL: As far as my field of work was concerned, when I received
complaints such as have been discussed here, I called a conference in my
office. That was the case immediately after the complaints from
Rosenberg, and on that occasion I adopted the attitude which my defense
counsel cited and pointed out with respect to the conference of 6
January 1943.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the Koch matter ended after the
conference, I take it? That was all you did?
[_There was no response._]
That was the end of it as far as you were concerned?
SAUCKEL: As far as I was concerned, I personally pointed out to the
Führer on several occasions that I considered it quite out of the
question to treat the Eastern Workers and the people in the East badly;
and by means of the decrees which I issued continually, and which are
contained in my documents, I did whatever I could to protect them. I
ask...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I have asked you about your central office.
Did you have any branch offices?
SAUCKEL: No, I had no branch offices. Two departments of the Ministry of
Labor, 5 and 6, were put at my disposal for the carrying out of my tasks
of an administrative and technical nature.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. That is enough.
SAUCKEL: There business matters of an administrative nature were carried
on. I ask...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. Now, were the recruitment
offices in the Ministry of Labor?
SAUCKEL: No. In the Ministry of Labor there were...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind. That is all you have to say.
Where were they, where were the recruitment offices?
SAUCKEL: The recruitment offices were in the occupied territories.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. But under what office?
What administration? What department?
SAUCKEL: The departments for labor were themselves incorporated in the
administration of these territories. That can be seen very clearly from
my Decree 4, for that had been done in the same manner before I came
into office. They were integral parts of the local administration.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the local administration? When you
mentioned the 1,500 district offices, were those the recruitment
offices?
SAUCKEL: Those were the offices in all the various territories which
represented these various administrations on the lowest level, as I have
just mentioned.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not answer the question. I asked you
whether they were recruiting offices. Were they recruiting offices?
SAUCKEL: They were not only recruiting offices, they were the offices of
the territorial labor administration on the lowest level.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So they did administration and recruiting?
[_There was no response._]
They did recruiting, did they not?
SAUCKEL: I understand that that was one and the same thing. The
recruitment was carried on according to German principles as part of the
administration. Outside the administration recruitment could not be
carried on.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They were recruiting offices, then? The
answer is “yes,” is it not? They were recruiting offices?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. You should have said that in the
beginning. That is what I wanted to know. Now, I want to know the
relation of your offices to the Party offices. The Gaue and the
Gauleiter worked in co-operation with you as plenipotentiaries, working
with you, did they not?
SAUCKEL: No, Your Honor, that is a mistake. The Gauleiter had nothing to
do with recruiting, that was...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait. I said nothing about recruiting. I
asked you the relation of your offices to the Gauleiter. The Gauleiter
co-operated with you in the general program, did they not?
SAUCKEL: Not in the general program, Your Honor; only in the program of
caring for German and foreign workers.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. The Gauleiter, then, had nothing to do
with recruiting; is that right?
SAUCKEL: No; that is right.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right? They looked after the care and
comfort of the men who were recruited, is that right?
SAUCKEL: If they were working in the Reich, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the Reich?
SAUCKEL: In the Reich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the Gaue outside the Reich in the
occupied territories also work for you, or do you consider that they
were part of the Reich?
[_There was no response._]
Let me ask the question again. I do not think it is very clear. Certain
of the occupied territories had been incorporated into the Reich, had
they not?
SAUCKEL: In the East only the territories Wartheland and West Prussia
were incorporated into the Reich...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now again I am not asking you the number that
was incorporated; I just said certain of the occupied territories,
certain parts of them, were incorporated into the Reich. Is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, and when you say the Gauleiter in the
Reich, that includes, does it not, the Gauleiter in those territories
which had been incorporated into the Reich; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but in this case they could not function in their capacity
as Gauleiter, but only if they were Reichsstatthalter, that is, only if
they had a state administration under them. These were two entirely
separate institutions with different personnel.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did each Gauleiter have a labor office
connected with his Gau, in his Gau?
SAUCKEL: May I ask if you mean all German Gaue, or only those Gaue of
which we have just spoken, Your Honor?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean only the Gaue of which we have spoken.
They each had a labor office, had they not?
SAUCKEL: They had a labor administration at the head of which there was
a Gau labor president.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That’s right. That is enough. Now, do you
know the organization of the Gau in the labor administration? Did they
also have a Kreisleiter who attended to the labor work?
SAUCKEL: No, they did not have that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I take it there were no Ortsgruppenleiter
that worked on the labor program, then?
SAUCKEL: No, that was not the case; rather that was a strictly separate
administrative concept...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all right.
SAUCKEL: But that was...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, that is all right.
Now I would like to know a little bit about what you call this private
recruitment. Who appointed the agents who were to do private recruiting?
Who appointed them? Did the employers hire agents to get workmen for
them?
[_There was no response._]
Do you know what I mean by private recruiting?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That was done by agents, was it not?
SAUCKEL: Only in one case: In the year 1944 in France and in part in
Belgium, by way of exception, I permitted agents to act on the basis of
agreements with these French organizations.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Again, Witness, I did not ask you that at
all. You do not listen. I said: Who appointed these agents that worked
as private recruiting agents? Who appointed them?
SAUCKEL: In those countries, the commissioner for labor allocation
appointed them—I myself could not appoint them—together with the
French organizations. That was an understanding, not a set
appointment...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. And they would be paid on, I think you
said, a commission basis; is that right? They would be paid, in other
words, so much per workman? Every workman they brought in, they would
get a fee for that; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes. I do not know the details myself any more, but for the
most part that is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I take it when you used the word
shanghai, which you referred to and explained, that simply means private
recruiting with force. That is all it means, is it not?
[_There was no response._]
That is all it means, is it not? Private recruiting with force?
SAUCKEL: No...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait a minute. Can you shanghai a man
without using force? You do not mean that you shanghaied them by
persuasion? Did you?
SAUCKEL: Yes, for I wanted to recruit these French associations in just
this voluntary, friendly way, over a glass of beer or wine in a café,
and not in the official offices. I don’t mean shanghai in the bad sense
as I recall its being used from my sailor days. This was a rather
drastic expression, but not a concrete representation of the actual
procedure. Never, Your Honor, in France or anywhere else, did I order
men to be shanghaied, but rather...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I know you did not order it. That was not
my question. You mean that “shanghai” just meant that you had a friendly
glass of wine with a workman and then he joined up? Was that what you
meant?
SAUCKEL: I understood it in that way. I described it to the Central
Planning Board in a somewhat drastic form in order to answer the demands
made of me with some plausible counterarguments as to the efforts I was
making.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why did you object to this private
recruitment? What was the objection to it?
SAUCKEL: In this case I did not object, but it was contrary to German
ideas concerning the procurement of labor. According to German
principles and...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was it contrary to German law?
SAUCKEL: It was against my convictions and contrary to German laws.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I am not interested
for the moment in your convictions. I said: Was it contrary to German
law? It was, wasn’t it, against law?
SAUCKEL: It was in general contrary to the German labor laws. As far as
possible no private recruitment was to take place. But may I say as an
explanation, Your Honor, that after the workman had been won over, he
nevertheless entered into an obligation on the basis of a state
contract. Thus it must not be understood to mean that the worker in
question came into the Reich without a contract approved by the state; a
contract was granted to him just as it was to all others.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean, a laborer that was shanghaied by
private agents had the same rights, once he was in the employment, as
anyone else; is that what you mean?
SAUCKEL: The same rights and assurances that everyone else had.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now I am going to come to
another subject for a moment. I simply want to understand your defense
and what your point of view is. Now see if this is correct. You did no
recruiting yourself. The Police did no recruiting. Your main job was, in
the first place, to see that everything was done lawfully and legally.
Was not that right, that was your important function?
SAUCKEL: That was my endeavor.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In order to do that you had to arrange to
have the proper laws passed so as to have the recruiting done under the
law; that is right, isn’t it? That was your job?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. And very often those laws—by the way,
those laws were simply decrees, of course. They were just orders that
were signed by the Führer, or by you, or by some of the ministers. When
you say laws, you mean, of course, decrees?
SAUCKEL: The laws in the occupied territories for the recruitment of
manpower had to be decreed by the Führer and issued by the chiefs in the
territories.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What I mean is, in order to make this use of
foreign labor lawful, you simply had to get certain decrees signed; that
was part of your duty, to get them signed? Now...
SAUCKEL: I did not sign these decrees...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I did not say you signed
them. I understand that. You have explained that in great detail. Now
let us see where the Police came in. They had nothing to do with the
recruiting. Once a decree was signed, it became law, did it not? When a
decree was signed, it was law?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And if any man resisted being brought in as a
workman, or did not register, or did not live up to his contract, he
became a criminal. That is right, isn’t it?
SAUCKEL: In this case he violated the law. We did not call it a crime,
but rather an offense.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But he broke the law?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean he did not commit a crime? Did he or
did he not commit a crime? Supposing a man failed to register when he
was told to register for work, was that a crime?
SAUCKEL: No, that was not a crime. We called that an offense in Germany.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And then when he committed this, he was then
turned over to the Police. Is that right?
SAUCKEL: Not immediately; in the preliminary proceedings he was told by
the local labor office to appear and to report and...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you explained all that. He got 3 or 4
days, and then if he did not finally register, for the offense he was
turned over to the Police? Is that right?
SAUCKEL: How that was actually handled in the various territories I
cannot say. It differed greatly, and was in part very lax.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You told us already in your cross-examination
that if a man broke the law that was when the Police came in. The Police
were there simply to see that the law was not broken. That is right,
isn’t it? That was their function?
SAUCKEL: No, that was not my task; that was the task of the service
authorities.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why do you always say, “it was not my
task”? I did not ask you if it was your task. I am just talking about
the Police; I am not talking about you. Now when those labor decrees
were violated, then it was, at a certain time, that the Police began to
function. Isn’t that right?
SAUCKEL: That would have been the normal way, the correct way.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Good. Or after the men—let us say in
Paris—were rounded up, if they offered physical resistance, then the
Police had to be called in, had they not? If there was physical
resistance you had to call in the Police, had you not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but I can say that that was hardly ever reported to me. In
most cases the men were then released. It can be clearly seen from the
lists of the workers’ transports—for instance, in the year 1944—that
of a large program not even 10 percent came to Germany. Then there was
nothing else for us to do but to shanghai.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Please don’t go on. You have given all that
evidence before. I just want to get a picture of the whole system. Now
the Army. I think you said the role the Army played was where there had
been sabotage or resistance in the occupied territories the Army would
have to clean that out, so that the labor administration could work.
That would be right, wouldn’t it?
SAUCKEL: In so-called resistance areas in which the administration was
handicapped by resistance movements, not only in the field of labor
allocation but also in other directions, and the public safety of German
troops could no longer be guaranteed.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not interested in other functions. I am
interested particularly in the field of manpower at this time. So that,
for instance, in Poland or Russia, where it was impossible to recruit
people on account of the resistance to the recruiting or the resistance
to the Army, the Army would go in and help with the recruiting. It would
not be unfair to say that, would it?
SAUCKEL: One can say that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now, by the way, did any of
these workmen who resisted or who broke the law or who did not register
after 3 days, were they ever tried by a court, or were they simply
handled by the Police if necessary? They were never tried by court, were
they?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you in detail or in general. Probably there
were various ways of handling that. I do not know the details.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get that in particular. Did any
of your decrees provide for trial by a court of such persons?
SAUCKEL: No, my decrees did not do that. I was not authorized to issue
such decrees within the territories with regard to court proceedings,
because I was not the competent regional authority.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. I am not very clear on this
picture of camps. Let us look at that for a moment. There were what you
called, I think, distribution or transition camps, were there not?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you from memory.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, of course not; but do you think there
were more than a hundred?
SAUCKEL: No, I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Hardly. But perhaps nearly a hundred?
SAUCKEL: No, I do not think that is quite correct either.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You could give no figure on that?
SAUCKEL: I assume that perhaps in the Reich there were 30 or 40
transition camps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In the Reich?
SAUCKEL: In the Reich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were those transition camps also in the
occupied territories, or in France?
SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories? Whether there were any transition
camps in France and, if so, how many, that I cannot say. In the West,
along the border, there were reception stations; and in the East, along
the border, there were transition camps which had as their purpose an
additional physical examination, delousing of clothing, and...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think that is enough. I think you have
answered that enough. Now there were also what you called the labor
training camps. Do you remember, you said there were also labor training
camps?
SAUCKEL: These training camps...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Can’t you say “yes” or “no”?
SAUCKEL: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many?
SAUCKEL: Of that I have no idea...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you have no idea of that? Maybe 50 or 100?
SAUCKEL: No. I cannot tell you even approximately how many because I
have never received a list. They were not under me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): To whom were they subordinate?
SAUCKEL: They were subordinate exclusively to the Police, that is, as
far as I know, to Gruppenführer Müller.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I presume that they were staffed and
officered by the SS, as were the other concentration camps?
SAUCKEL: I have to assume that also, but I cannot say definitely because
I have never seen any such camps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But that would not be improbable, would it?
SAUCKEL: No. These camps were subordinate exclusively to the Police.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): To the Police. Now who went to the labor
training camps? Who was sent to them?
SAUCKEL: As far as I know—I heard very little about that—people were
sent there who in a number of cases had committed violations of the
labor regulations, or of discipline in the factories, and so on.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. That is fine. Thank you very
much. That is all I want to know about that point. In other words,
people who did not turn up for registration, or who broke their
contracts, were sent for training. Now what was the training? What does
that mean, “training”? How are you trained?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I assume that they had to work. A
period of time was provided of from about 8 days to 56 days, I believe;
I cannot say exactly. I also heard about that in this courtroom for the
first time.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get a little more light on that
subject. You see, you were after all, were you not, Plenipotentiary, so
you must have known something about these matters. There were labor
camps as well as labor training camps, were there not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, and I want to distinguish between them...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I will distinguish. Let me ask you the
question. The labor camps were camps where workmen were sent and housed
who were working in industry; isn’t that right? They were simply camps
where workmen were housed and lived. Is that right?
SAUCKEL: They were camps where workers were billeted; where they lived.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right; and labor training camps were
different from the labor camps, weren’t they?
SAUCKEL: They were basically different. The labor training camps were an
institution of the Reichsführer SS; the labor camps, in which they
lived, were set up by the factory or group of factories where the
workers were employed.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when a man was sent to a labor training
camp, he was not sent simply to labor; he was being punished, wasn’t he,
for having broken the law? That must be right, is it not?
SAUCKEL: To my knowledge, he came to a labor training camp in order to
be trained to be punctual at work, and at the same time it was a
punishment for his offenses at the factory.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were there any decrees with respect to the
labor training camps, any regulations?
SAUCKEL: I know of no regulations. They had to be issued by the
Reichsführer SS, by the Chief of Police. I issued no regulations.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So, although part of your duty was to look
after the foreign laborers who were brought over here, that stopped
after they were turned over to the Police, and you had no more
jurisdiction; is that right?
SAUCKEL: That is right; but in one respect I have to correct that. I did
not have the task of looking after the workers; I merely had the task of
getting workers for the industries. The supervision of the camps and the
care of the workers was in no way my task. I have...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Stop, Defendant, we clearly understand that.
You had practically no executive functions, but you repeatedly said that
you passed decrees—by the hundreds, you said—for improving the
condition of the men. Now, we know that you didn’t have the job to feed
them or to house them; but you did have one of your main jobs—one of
your main jobs was to try to keep them in as good condition as possible,
and that was the reason you were interested in any complaints. We all
understand that, don’t we? That is correct? One of your functions was to
do that, wasn’t it?
SAUCKEL: I had taken over this task; it was not one of the duties with
which I had been entrusted. The complaints with which I was confronted
every day were to the effect that there were not enough workers
available. My task was the direction and the acquisition of workers, but
in my own interest I pointed out the necessity of caring for the workers
and keeping them in good condition.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see, that was a voluntary job on your part.
It was not part of your duty, but nevertheless you did it. But, now, let
me come a little bit to the workers themselves. I think we are very
clear, or comparatively so, as to the numbers that were brought in. I
want to know how many were voluntary and how many were involuntary. Now,
before you answer that, I mean those workers who were brought in, not
under law, but simply who volunteered for work of their own accord.
There were not very many of those, I suppose, were there?
SAUCKEL: Yes, there were a great many workers who volunteered without
legal compulsion, as the result of propaganda and recruitment and
because of the fact that in Germany wages and such things were
comparatively high and regulated. There were a great many workers...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, let us take a look at that. There came a
time when the laws applying to German workers were applied to workers
for foreign countries; is that not true?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean, every German had to work, had he not,
under the law? Right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, that is right.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that law was finally applied to foreign
workers as well, as you just said. Right?
SAUCKEL: That law was also introduced into the occupied territories.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. For everyone alike. So that after that
law was introduced, there was no such thing as voluntary work because
after that law was introduced everyone had to work, had they not?
SAUCKEL: Yes, as far as demands were made for them in the occupied
territories and elsewhere, according to need.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when you were talking about involuntary
work, that must have applied to the time before that law was passed?
Right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, however...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was the law passed?
SAUCKEL: That law was introduced at various dates in the late autumn of
1942. I cannot tell the exact dates in the various territories, but I
should like to say that under this law, as well, voluntary workers still
came voluntarily, to Germany. They...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You are right. If they had not, they would
have gone involuntarily, wouldn’t they?
SAUCKEL: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not?
SAUCKEL: Only certain quotas were raised but not all the workers were
demanded for Germany.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then those certain quotas that were
requested would have to have gone involuntarily; right?
SAUCKEL: No. There was also voluntary recruitment carried out, and that
means that among the workers...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait, wait, Defendant. Don’t let us fool over
this. It is quite simple. If there was a law which made it necessary for
men to work when their quotas had been called up, they had to work, had
they not? Right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, they had to work, in their own countries first of all, but
they also could volunteer to work in Germany instead of working in their
own country. And we attached great importance to this.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In other words, a man had a choice of forced
labor in an industry in France or in Germany, so in that sense it was
voluntary; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, just two or three more questions. You
have answered clearly, I think. I just want to ask you about three
documents. I think that is all. I am not going into detail. Do you
remember the document known as R-124, which was the conference on March
1st of 1944? You remember that conference?
Would someone show him the German notes of that, please, if you have
them?
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you remember the conference? Have you
looked at the notes?
SAUCKEL: That was the conference about the Central Planning Board.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, that is right. Did you look over those
notes?
SAUCKEL: Now?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do they tell about what took place in
substance? In substance, there was an account of the conference, wasn’t
there?
SAUCKEL: Yes, at this moment—I beg to be excused—I cannot remember the
concrete topic of discussion at that conference.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, did you find anything in the notes, as
you read them, over, which you thought in substance was a great mistake?
SAUCKEL: I cannot tell now what subject is meant.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Have you read the notes? Have you read them?
SAUCKEL: I did not read all the notes about the Central Planning Board.
At that time the notes about the Central Planning Board were not
available to me. Therefore I did not know that notes were taken about
the Central Planning Board.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Don’t go on with all this talk. I simply
asked whether you read them and you said you had not read them all. That
is all we need.
SAUCKEL: No, I have not read them all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the portion that you read, did you find
any mistakes?
SAUCKEL: I found inexact passages, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Inexact passages?
SAUCKEL: Inaccuracies. For instance, the report of my interpolation
“200,000 to 5,000,000”; that is an utterly impossible proportion.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Quite. Now, you used one expression in those
notes which I did not understand; and I am going to ask you what you
meant by it. You spoke of your special labor supply executives. Was that
the committee for social peace that you spoke about yesterday—about a
thousand people in it? Do you remember?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the same thing? That was the
committee that you said had to be specially trained by the SS, I think,
and by the police in France, or wherever they were used?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): By the way, you spoke of them being armed.
Why were they armed? Why did they carry arms?
SAUCKEL: For their own protection and for the protection of those whom
they recruited; they had to have some means of defense against attacks.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not usually have anything to do with
the Police, did you? Why did you organize this police corps? Why did you
help organize this police corps, an armed police corps? Why did you do
it?
SAUCKEL: That was not an armed police corps in the usual sense, rather
it was...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind describing it. We know what it
was. Why did you organize it? I thought you kept away from police
measures.
SAUCKEL: In order to have protection for these people and for these
places which frequently were raided, demolished, or harassed by the
resistance movement.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see what you mean. This was an organization
to protect the recruiting that was going on; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. Now, I just want to ask one question
about another manuscript, 016-PS, dated 20 April 1944, which was the
labor mobilization program. That is the program which you issued and
signed, is it not? You look at it. That is the program you signed?
SAUCKEL: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It is not? I do not know what you mean.
SAUCKEL: I have not understood you correctly, I believe. I understood
1944. It was...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, no, on 20 April 1942. You issued the
labor mobilization program. Is that the program signed by you, shown in
the Document 016-PS? That is the program, is it not?
SAUCKEL: The program—may I say the following in this connection: It was
a program which did not become effective immediately...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, please answer the question. All I
want to know is, first, you did issue a mobilization program, did you
not?
SAUCKEL: That I did, but...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. And that is the one shown in that
exhibit, is it not? I am simply identifying it.
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. I wanted to ask you a little bit about
bringing the youths of the occupied territories into the Reich. Certain
of the youths were brought in, were they not?
SAUCKEL: Youths were brought in, but against my...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Against your desire, you said. How many were
brought in?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot possibly say from my own knowledge. I do not
know. There were youths...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, what were the ages? How young were
they?
SAUCKEL: That I cannot say either—what age the youths were—because
they were with their families who came into the Reich as a result of
refugee measures or the evacuation of other localities. Then another
time, in connection with the so-called “Hay Action” in 1944, youths came
to the Reich, but without my having anything to do with it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You know there were young adolescents, of
course, young adolescent children, do you not? You know that, do you
not?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the purpose of bringing them in?
Were they recruited for labor, or were they to be trained in the Reich
and educated?
SAUCKEL: There are various explanations for the fact that youths were
brought into the Reich. Some of these youths were not recruited or
brought in by agents; rather they came with their families, at the
latter’s wish, when refugee and evacuation measures were carried out.
Others came...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. We will leave out the ones
that came with the families. Some were recruited for labor, were they
not? Some for work, were they not?
SAUCKEL: Youths under the legal age of 14 years could not be brought in
for work. By agreements, such as can be found in the documents, other
offices brought youths in to train and care for them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You just do not answer the questions. I asked
you whether some were brought in for work. Children over 14, who were
still under 20, were brought in for work, were they not—recruited for
work?
SAUCKEL: But only volunteers were brought in.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Only volunteers were brought in?
SAUCKEL: Youths were supposed to be brought in only as volunteers.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not recruit any youth involuntarily;
you mean that?
SAUCKEL: I did not.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not mean you personally; I mean the
administration.
SAUCKEL: No, the labor administration was not supposed to bring in any
youths, especially girls, by compulsion; only voluntarily. Domestic
servants were only volunteers.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Some were brought in to be educated in
Germany and to become German citizens, were they not?
SAUCKEL: That I found out from the documents; but I was not responsible
for that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not know about that before? Did
anyone advise you that it was in accordance with international law to
force people in occupied countries to come to Germany to work?
SAUCKEL: I was expressly urged by the Führer to take that measure, and
it was described to me as admissible. No office raised any objections to
or had any misgivings about this measure; rather it met with the
requirements of all offices.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I asked you whether
anybody advised you that it was in accordance with international law.
SAUCKEL: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You knew, did you not, that the Foreign
Office had to consider such matters?
SAUCKEL: I spoke with the Foreign Office on various occasions and this
was found to be in order, because we were convinced that in these
territories, on the basis of the terms of surrender, the introduction of
German regulations was permissible and possible under the conditions
prevailing and in view of existing agreements. That was my belief.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you say that you were advised by the
Foreign Office that you were entitled under international law to force
people to come from Russia to work in Germany?
SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office never told me anything to the contrary; but
the Foreign Office, I believe, was not competent for questions
concerning the East: I do not know.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Whom did you ask for advice on the subject?
SAUCKEL: I found these regulations in existence before I took office.
These regulations had already been issued. The Führer expressly charged
me to carry them out.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, the answer is that you asked nobody? Is
that right?
SAUCKEL: I did not ask anybody. I could not ask anybody, because all
offices wanted these measures and accepted them. There was never any
discussion to the contrary.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you say that it was not the task of
the Police to enforce recruiting for labor?
SAUCKEL: It was not the task of the Police to carry out recruitment.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why did you say at the conference on 4
January 1944, which is reported in the Document 1292-PS, that you would
do everything in your power to furnish the requested manpower in 1944;
but whether it would succeed depended primarily on what German
enforcement agents would be made available, and that your project could
not be carried out with domestic enforcement agents? Does that not mean
that the Police would have to enforce your recruitment programs?
SAUCKEL: No, it means—the reproduction of these minutes is not very
exact—I explained to the Führer that I probably would not be able to
carry out his program because there were very large partisan areas; and
as long as these partisan areas were not cleared up, so that a regular
administration could be established there, no recruitment could take
place there either. First of all, therefore, normal administrative
conditions would have to be established again. That could be done only
by those organs whose task it was.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What did you mean by German enforcement
agents?
SAUCKEL: By German enforcement agencies I meant the normal
administration as such, but in some territories that was too weak.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, why was it that the Reichsführer
SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal were
extremely few, if those enforcement agents were not police agents?
SAUCKEL: I did not understand the question correctly in the first place.
The Reichsführer, I believe, said—according to my recollection—that
for the pacification of these areas he did not have troops enough
because they were all at the front. That did not refer to the
recruitment and management of compulsory labor, but to the
re-establishment of normal conditions in these areas.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well then, are you saying that it was not the
task of the Police to help you in recruitment, but that it was the task
of the military?
SAUCKEL: That differed greatly depending on the various regulations in
the territories. There were areas in which the military commanders had
the sole executive power, and there were areas in which civilian
authorities had the executive power on the German side. There was a
third kind of area, military operational zones with rear areas, in which
the commanders of the armies had the executive power.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, either it was the Police, or it
was the military, or it was some other force which was going to carry
out your forcible recruiting; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Yes, but in these areas as well, the machinery of the civilian
administration was available, which was not identical with the military
or with the Police, but represented within these Wehrmacht organizations
separate branches of the administration under a special administrative
chief.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I don’t understand then what you meant
by saying that your project could not be carried out with domestic
enforcement agents.
That is all I have to ask. Then the defendant can return to the dock.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am asking the Tribunal to look at
Document Sauckel-3, which is a list of Sauckel’s offices, to see the
position of the witness whom I am about to call.
Under Sauckel in the Reich Ministry of Labor there were various
departments, one of which, the department of the witness Timm, was the
so-called Europe Office, which had three subdepartments—one for the
West, one for the East, and the third for the South and Southwest.
With the permission of the Court, I call the witness Timm.
[_The witness Timm took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
MAX TIMM (Witness): Max Timm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you worked in the Reich Labor Ministry in the
Allocation of Labor department?
TIMM: Yes, that is correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you already there when Sauckel took office?
TIMM: Yes, and I had been in the labor administration for some years
before that.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the impression you had of your new superior when
Sauckel took over the office?
TIMM: When Sauckel assumed office, I had the impression of a very
energetic, hard-working man, who was inclined to get excited at times,
even angry no doubt, and who demanded much of his co-workers, but also
made great demands on himself.
DR. SERVATIUS: How was he in carrying out his measures?
TIMM: When he assumed office there was a good deal of confusion in the
field of labor allocation. Everybody had something to do with labor
allocation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the reason why that office was created?
TIMM: The previous chiefs had not had enough force to push their program
through against the opposition of various offices; and Sauckel was the
strong man, and particularly the strong political figure, who was to put
things in order.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did Sauckel approach this new task? Did he adhere to
the administrative regulations, or did he do it in his own way, in—as
one says—an unrestrained new manner?
TIMM: He considered his task very much a political task, but he always
did his best to handle administrative matters in an orderly way. He was
known generally as a Gauleiter who was friendly to the civil servants.
Also, in order to instruct all the offices under his administration, he
held so-called staff meetings at regular intervals in which the most
important things were discussed.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was your position in that office?
TIMM: In the Allocation of Labor department I had first a subdepartment
and later a department.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did that department deal with?
TIMM: That department had to deal with all questions concerning the
assignment of labor, particularly the classification of skilled workers,
training of workers, vocational advice, and employment agencies for
apprentices.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was your office called the Europe Office?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have an over-all view of what went on in the
office?
TIMM: Not completely, owing to the fact that Gauleiter Sauckel at the
same time remained Gauleiter in Thuringia and he worked in Berlin in
Thuringia House, whereas the special departments put at his disposal
remained in the Ministry of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: No, you did not understand my question. The question was
whether you, from your office, had an over-all view of what went on in
the field of labor allocation without regard to Sauckel’s activity.
TIMM: Yes, but not entirely, because we were not informed about all
events, due to the separation of the offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the staff meetings? Who took part in them and
of what kind of people were they composed?
TIMM: For the most part the liaison men of the various branches were
called to staff conferences.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of people were they?
TIMM: There were various kinds of people, civil servants but also
economists, and the like.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you should tell us from what offices these people
came, or were they people who were in Sauckel’s office?
TIMM: They were mostly people from other branches, as, for instance, a
representative of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the
representatives of the Ministry for Armament and War Production, of the
Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and of other departments.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the so-called specialist labor staff?
TIMM: That was the specialist labor staff.
DR. SERVATIUS: About how many people were in it?
TIMM: In my estimation there were probably about 15 to 20 people.
DR. SERVATIUS: Besides that, Sauckel had a personal labor staff. What
kind of people were in that?
TIMM: The personal labor staff consisted mostly of men whom Sauckel had
brought with him from Weimar, men of his own immediate circle.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he also have consultants? Who were these?
TIMM: He had two personal consultants, Landrat Berch and Ministerialrat
Dr. Stothfang.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what position did Dr. Didier hold?
TIMM: Dr. Didier, as far as I remember, was the press expert.
DR. SERVATIUS: How were these staff meetings carried on? What was
discussed?
TIMM: At those staff meetings all matters of labor allocation, that is
the entire German labor allocation program, were discussed; and the
sessions were generally opened with a complete report by Herr Sauckel,
in which he explained his plans for the future.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were questions of recruitment in occupied territories
also discussed; and what is of importance here, the difficulties which
existed then, and the methods of which we have heard? What was said
about that?
TIMM: Questions of recruitment were generally not discussed there so
much but rather questions concerning the Reich.
DR. SERVATIUS: I asked you first about the occupied territories. Was,
for instance, that case discussed which has been brought up here, the
surrounding of a motion picture house and the seizing of people there,
and similar cases?
TIMM: Yes, the case of the motion picture house is known to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: That was discussed?
TIMM: Yes, that was discussed.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done about it?
TIMM: Sauckel at once instructed several gentlemen—I don’t remember
whom—to make all possible investigations in order to clarify the case.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were other cases reported?
TIMM: There were no other cases which could be compared in seriousness
with that case which has just been described.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there also discussion about the question of labor
conditions in Germany for foreign workers?
TIMM: There were discussions at the staff conferences about labor
conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: And was it not reported there that conditions existed in
individual camps or industries which were objectionable?
TIMM: Cases of that kind were discussed. In general they concerned
clothing, nutrition, and similar things.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did these reports come to the staff conferences? Who
reported them? From what source did one find out about them?
TIMM: Herr Sauckel always attached importance to having these things
examined on the spot, and he maintained an extensive system of
inspection in order to get an accurate picture of these questions; and
these inspection reports were then discussed in detail at the staff
conferences.
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make.
Upon consideration of the motion of the Prosecution, dated the 21st of
May, and the memorandum of the Defense Counsel in reply thereto, dated
the 29th of May, the Tribunal makes the following order:
The motion of the Prosecution that arguments as to the guilt or
innocence of the individual defendants be heard at the conclusion of the
evidence relating to the individual defendants and before the
introduction of evidence relating to the accused organizations is
granted. The Tribunal, however, will not decide the question of the
guilt or innocence of any defendant until after all the evidence has
been heard; and, if any of the evidence relating to the accused
organizations is thought by counsel for any defendant to support his
defense, he may ask to be heard further with regard thereto. The
Tribunal, at the conclusion of the evidence relating to the individual
defendants, will accordingly hear first the argument in their behalf,
and then the summing up of the Prosecution. The statements of each of
the defendants in his own behalf will be heard at the conclusion of the
Trial before judgment.
The Tribunal is of opinion that the argument relating to the guilt or
innocence of the individual defendants will be more helpful if heard
immediately at the conclusion of the evidence bearing thereon, and
before the Tribunal has departed from this and goes into the branch of
the case relating to the organizations. This arrangement, furthermore,
will give the commissioners, who are taking the evidence as to the
organizations, further time in which to complete their work. The
defendants will not be prejudiced in any way by this arrangement; for,
apart from the fact that their cases are essentially different from the
cases of the organizations, they will be allowed to call to the
attention of the Tribunal any circumstance developed on the hearing of
the organizations which is thought to be helpful to their defense. The
Tribunal finds nothing in the Charter which forbids this procedure, and
Article 9 leaves to the discretion of the Tribunal the manner of hearing
evidence on behalf of the accused organizations.
Counsel for the individual defendants will not be permitted to
cross-examine the witnesses called by counsel on behalf of the
organizations, or to take part in such proceedings save when specially
authorized to do so by the Tribunal.
That is all.
The Tribunal will sit tomorrow at 10 o’clock in open session until 1
o’clock.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH DAY
Saturday, 1 June 1946
_Morning Session_
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask permission for the Defendant Von Papen to be
absent on Monday and Tuesday to prepare his case.
He will be represented by my colleague Dr. Nelte.
[_The witness Timm resumed the stand._]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, yesterday we were speaking, at the end, of the
staff conferences. I should like to leave this question now, but we will
come back to it later when we talk about controls. First, I should like
you to explain the relationship of Sauckel’s office to the higher
authorities. Whom did Sauckel come under?
TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was under
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what did he have to do with Hitler?
TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General kept in the closest touch with Hitler,
and as far as possible he presented his plans to Hitler at personal
discussions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there a constant connection with the Four Year Plan
through a liaison man, or how was that done?
TIMM: There were various ways of keeping the contact active. There were
liaison men on both sides. The Plenipotentiary General sent men from his
select staff to the office of the Four Year Plan for a preliminary
co-ordination of his plans, and on the other hand, as far as I can
recall, there were almost constantly delegates from the office of the
Four Year Plan who took part in the staff conferences.
In addition, the Plenipotentiary General frequently had personal talks
with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.
DR. SERVATIUS: How was the co-operation with the other ministries
conducted? With Goebbels, to begin with?
TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General felt in principle that it was
important to keep as close a contact as possible with the other
departments and to have his plans and intentions co-ordinated
beforehand. Co-operation with the Ministry of Propaganda was no longer
so good, especially at the time when the Minister, Dr. Goebbels, was
Delegate for Total War Effort.
DR. SERVATIUS: After the proclamation of total war was Sauckel
subordinate to Goebbels?
TIMM: The relationship was never quite clear. In my opinion it had to be
looked at this way: The Delegate for Total War Effort received
comprehensive powers for all tasks, and was therefore in fact superior
to the GBA (Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor).
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relation with the other authorities, for
instance with the Reich Ministry for Food?
TIMM: The co-operation with the Reich Ministry for Food was very good.
The relations with State Secretary Backe especially were always very
good as far as I could judge. There were also continual conferences
between the experts of both offices on questions of feeding in general.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, what was the date of the proclamation of
total war?
DR. SERVATIUS: Does the witness know when total war was declared?
TIMM: I do not remember the date.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was after the fall of Stalingrad. I cannot give you
the exact date.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, please.
DR. SERVATIUS: As to relations with Himmler, what co-operation was there
with that office?
TIMM: I know nothing of any close personal relations between the GBA and
Himmler. On Sauckel’s labor staff there was a liaison man from the
Reichsführer SS, especially for any general police questions that might
arise concerning the allocation of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of questions were there?
TIMM: All kinds of questions; especially the question of badges in
connection with the employment of foreigners.
DR. SERVATIUS: And probably also questions concerning barbed wire?
TIMM: Yes; questions concerning barbed wire, and all the questions which
arose in police spheres.
DR. SERVATIUS: And also the question of labor training camps?
TIMM: As I was not an expert on those questions I cannot remember very
well, and I do not know whether there were any detailed conferences
about them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I should like to pass on to the connection of the
authorities with the occupied territories.
With whom were negotiations carried on and to whom did one apply when
making demands on the occupied territories?
TIMM: One had to apply to the respective district governments at the
time—military commanders, Reich commissioners or something similar.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of position did Sauckel’s deputies have?
TIMM: The deputies were organized and intended to be men who were to
exert a direct and vigorous influence on the execution of Sauckel’s
plans, instructions and orders.
This goal, however, was not reached as they were not able to succeed. I
remember that the Plenipotentiary General therefore intended to ask
Hitler for more comprehensive instructions and more comprehensive
powers.
I seem to recall that the Plenipotentiary General once announced that he
had learned from Hitler himself, or from his entourage, that Hitler was
not inclined to extend these powers as he could not release the local
governments, especially the military commanders, from their
comprehensive responsibility and powers; so the Plenipotentiary General
had only one recourse, that of putting forward his wishes through the
channel of direct negotiations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Why were the deputies not able to succeed?
TIMM: The deputies could only try to consult with the existing regional
governments, but the opposition was so strong that they could not carry
any weight.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did these deputies not hold another position at the same
time?
TIMM: As they could not attain an independent position, the deputies
were generally incorporated into the existing local administration by
way of negotiations. With few exceptions they were entrusted with the
management of the labor section, or were incorporated into the section
for economy and labor.
Generally they were placed within the staffs of the military commanders
as administrative officials and that was the position which they held
ostensibly.
DR. SERVATIUS: So it was a combination of two or more positions held by
one person?
TIMM: It was, to a certain extent, a combination of different positions
held by one person, of which, without doubt, the most important was the
position of section chief in the existing regional government.
DR. SERVATIUS: With whom did this arrangement of a dual position
originate?
Was it Sauckel who insisted on it, or the responsible regional
authorities?
TIMM: As far as I know, it resulted from talks with the regional
governments on the question of the position of the deputies. The
regional governments wanted on no account to have any men in their
districts who were independent of their administration and had special
powers.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that curbed the initiative of the deputies?
TIMM: Their initiative as originally planned was no doubt checked.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did Sauckel exercise his authority to issue
instructions?
TIMM: The authority to issue instructions to the offices abroad was
generally exercised by means of sending instructions, directives, and
decrees through normal administrative channels via the central offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could he issue instructions to cover everything that
happened there, or were there other offices which dealt with the
recruitment of labor?
TIMM: At that time, unfortunately, the situation was such that even
after the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor other agencies there repeatedly interfered in labor matters or
carried on recruiting too—that is, agencies which had neither the power
nor the authority to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is he talking about; he says “at that time”?
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I say what time. He said “at that time.” At what time?
What time is he speaking about?
DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] What time are you speaking
about?
TIMM: It was at the time when the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor was appointed.
DR. SERVATIUS: When was he appointed?
TIMM: He was appointed in March 1942.
DR. SERVATIUS: How was the recruiting carried out? Was it voluntary? How
would you differentiate between the types?
TIMM: In principle, recruiting was carried out on a voluntary basis
because from the technical point of view—that is, from the point of
view of the utilization of the labor recruited—only voluntary
recruiting could lead to success. That is to say only voluntary
recruiting could bring people who were happy and willing to work, and
who could achieve the output necessary for production.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the point of view which Sauckel emphasized?
TIMM: During the whole time that I worked with Sauckel in the Ministry
of Labor I never heard of any events which indicated any other point of
view. He repeatedly emphasized that the basis of recruiting must be
voluntary.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. He issued many directives and held many speeches.
But did he not within the select circle...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, and Witness, will you try and pause
between the sentences, and between the questions and the answers? The
witness’ sentences seem to me to be running on, whereas if he would
pause it would give the interpreter some chance.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] Sauckel issued a number of directives and
made speeches to that effect. Did he not give you more precise
instructions for the guidance of the department?
TIMM: The instructions which we received always agreed in principle with
the instructions which he issued to larger circles at presidential or
similar conferences.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of voluntary recruiting? Did the
workers come solely on the basis of that recruiting, that is on the
basis of the conditions as described to them?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: About how many were there?
TIMM: It is, of course, not possible for me to give exact figures.
Thinking it over I believe I can say that about 2 to 3 million workers
might be considered voluntary workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Other workers came by virtue of the compulsory service
laws which were introduced in those countries?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you estimate the number of those people to be?
TIMM: I can hardly give an estimate. As about 2 to 3 million may be
considered volunteers, the rest must reach this figure too.
DR. SERVATIUS: People were deported too. Do you understand what is meant
by deportation?
TIMM: If I may ask, does that mean the people who were transported for
military or similar reasons? I am not quite clear as to what you mean by
that.
DR. SERVATIUS: You do not know what deportations are?
TIMM; You mean forcible deportations, do you not? I cannot remember and
do not know anything about such measures in connection with the activity
of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: In connection with the obtaining, recruiting, and
conscription of labor, there are quite a number of serious charges
concerning abuses which occurred. To what extent did you learn of them?
TIMM: I understand your question to mean abuses in the recruiting
itself?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
TIMM: I have no practical knowledge of the recruiting itself. As far as
I had a general view of the situation, serious abuses, such as you
mention in your question, were not reported to the GBA. Yesterday in an
answer I pointed out that I knew of the case of the surrounded cinema,
and that I could recall no events surpassing that case in gravity.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to conditions in Germany. Did you hear
anything about conditions of the worst kind there? You probably read the
papers and know what these charges mean. You were one of the people most
closely involved there, so what did you learn?
TIMM: Complaints about the treatment of foreigners came through various
channels to the GBA too. They referred in general to questions of
clothing and food, and that of barbed wire which came up repeatedly, and
the question of badges, the marking of foreign workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution is speaking here of Crimes
against Humanity.
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are those only things which happened daily in a normal
administration, or are they, so to say, things which were reported?
TIMM: Such things as you call catastrophic, Doctor, did not come to my
knowledge, because if they had, I should still remember them now.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the execution of the orders, and how did
that come to your knowledge, or how should that have come to your
knowledge?
TIMM: Various authorities were concerned with supervising the work of
foreign workers. These were five or six different offices. There was in
particular the German Labor Front, which, on the basis of a so-called
Führer decision, claimed for itself the question of the treatment and
care of foreign workers. And I may mention in this connection that it
repeatedly said this assignment went beyond the order given by the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to the German Labor
Front, and that to a certain extent it was bound by a higher authority
to carry out this task of welfare and control of treatment, _et cetera_.
On this fundamental question there were repeated conferences between the
office of the GBA and the German Labor Front, and these later led to an
agreement according to which the GBA also transferred this question to
the German Labor Front. To settle these matters, the German Labor Front
established a central inspectorate whose mission it was to look after
foreign workers throughout the whole Reich. In addition to this central
inspectorate, the Office for the Allocation of Labor within the German
Labor Front was still functioning.
DR. SERVATIUS: We will come to that in a minute.
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What connection was there between Sauckel’s office and
this inspectorate of the Labor Front? How were contacts maintained?
TIMM: In the first place, a man from the German Labor Front worked as
liaison man on Sauckel’s technical staff...
DR. SERVATIUS: Who was that?
TIMM: That was Herr Hoffmann. And secondly, the central inspectorate of
the German Labor Front constantly had conferences on their inspection
activities to which an official of the GBA was invited.
DR. SERVATIUS: This liaison man, Hoffmann, presumably reported on what
he heard from the Labor Front?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did he report?
TIMM: The things which he reported covered the same ground as I have
already told you about.
DR. SERVATIUS: The German Labor Front already had this task before
Sauckel’s office was set up?
TIMM: The German Labor Front was of the opinion, as I, for several...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must answer me. The German Labor Front had
this task before Sauckel came?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did it consider that its authority was restricted by the
fact that Sauckel was appointed?
TIMM: I was just about to explain that it considered its task a general,
comprehensive one; and when the newly appointed Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor occupied himself so intensively with these
matters, it did see in this a certain encroachment on its task.
DR. SERVATIUS: And was this agreed upon between Ley and Sauckel?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: At whose instigation was this agreement reached?
TIMM: As far as I can recall the suggestion was the outcome of a wish of
the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the aim?
TIMM: Of course, I can give only my personal opinion. I believe that the
aim was in any case to express the fact that the German Labor Front was
generally competent for these questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who presented the agreement, Sauckel...?
THE PRESIDENT: Have we not got the agreement between Sauckel and Ley?
DR. SERVATIUS: It was submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: If we have it, we do not want to have his personal
recollection of it, do we?
DR. SERVATIUS: The witness goes back too far. I would like to know who
suggested it and drew it up, and when it was signed. There are two dates
at the foot of this document as far as I remember today.
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the document which is being mentioned now was
submitted to the Tribunal. It is Document Number 1913-PS.
DR. SERVATIUS: It is in my document book, in the first document book,
Page 79. In the English book it is Page 74. Here in the first text may
be found...
THE PRESIDENT: What are you after? There is no use in getting the
evidence of a witness, who said he does not remember in detail about it,
about a document which we have got before us. It does not seem to me to
be in the least bit useful to know who suggested that the agreement
should be entered into.
DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] There were still other
inspectorates. For example, the Gauleiter was an authorized agent for
the Allocation of Labor Department. To what extent did the Gauleiter
report things which occurred in their Gaue during the allocation of
labor?
TIMM: The Gauleiter were appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor by virtue of his Decree Number 1, to be his
authorized agents, with the task of applying themselves precisely to
this question.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did they report?
TIMM: I do not know of any written reports from the Gauleiter on this
question; at least, not to any extent worth mentioning. Hardly any
written reports from the Gauleiter came in on this question; at least,
not to our office.
DR. SERVATIUS: At this opportunity I should like to clear up the
question of the position held by the Gauleiter as authorized agents for
the Allocation of Labor in relation to the Gau labor offices. Was the
Gauleiter president of the Gau labor offices, or in what relation did
they stand to each other?
TIMM: In administration and matters of personnel, the president of the
Gau labor offices was undoubtedly subordinate to the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor, or to the Reich Minister for Labor.
But the Plenipotentiary General had made it the duty of these presidents
to keep in closest contact with the Gauleiter and to make constant
reports on the things which occurred in their sphere of work. In
particular, if there were any tension or difficulties in the Gau, they
were to apply to the Gauleiter for aid.
DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, the Party as such had
nothing to do with the actual utilization of labor itself?
TIMM: I believe that is so. If the question is to be considered in that
way, I would say that the institution of a Plenipotentiary General
emphasized the political aspect of the Allocation of Labor, and that the
Gauleiter, according to their varying personal opinions, concerned
themselves to a greater or lesser extent with the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: As an organ for care and control?
TIMM: Yes; for all questions concerning labor allocation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you will understand that your testimony
concerning your knowledge of the events submitted by the Prosecution is
received with great skepticism. Did you not unofficially hear and see
things which, if they did not come to your attention officially,
certainly should have given you cause to investigate them more
thoroughly?
TIMM: Of course, one heard here and there of cases where foreign workers
were allegedly ill-treated in some way. As far as such things came to my
attention I always considered them official matters, and made out a
report accordingly or had them attended to. In such cases, the necessary
investigations were made immediately and everything necessary was done
to clear up the matter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these individual cases not symptoms of conditions as
a whole?
TIMM: I do not believe so. At any rate, events which one might call
catastrophic never came to my attention. As I have already said, they
were nearly always only things which were connected with the question of
treatment—that is to say, questions of accommodations in camps,
clothing, and so forth.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the output and the morale of the workers?
TIMM: The output achieved by foreign workers varied. The output of the
Eastern Workers was especially good. In general, because of this output,
the demand for Eastern Workers was great. The output was also very good
in particular of the skilled French workers...
DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. Now, I must come back again to your
connections with the occupied territories. Did you take part in
negotiations with authorities in the occupied territories?
TIMM: Not in the East. A few times I went on journeys in the West with
the Plenipotentiary General and took part in negotiations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you with him once when he visited General
Falkenhausen?
TIMM: Yes, I was present at the negotiations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Of what nature were these negotiations, as far as the
atmosphere was concerned? Were they tense, were they friendly, or what
were they like?
TIMM: The conferences with General Falkenhausen at which I was present
were generally comparatively short. I had the feeling that the two
gentlemen did not care for each other...
THE PRESIDENT: What does it matter whether they were tense or friendly
or short?
DR. SERVATIUS: General Falkenhausen made an affidavit, which was
submitted here, in which he said that Sauckel gave him orders and
negotiated with him in a manner which caused him to offer the strongest
opposition.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to contradict Falkenhausen’s affidavit you
can put it to the witness, if that’s what you are trying to do.
DR. SERVATIUS: I do not have it here at the moment. I will forego that
question.
[_Turning to the witness._] You were in France?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you present at negotiations with the French
authorities?
TIMM: I was present at negotiations with Laval, who was Premier at that
time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Of what nature were these negotiations?
TIMM: One can certainly say that the negotiations were carried on in a
very friendly manner.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the French not bring any complaints?
TIMM: Individual complaints were made. I remember that the complaints
were especially about the question of the transfer of wages.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to ask you whether complaints about
treatment, the methods of recruitment, coercive measures, and so
on—whether complaints were made about those things?
TIMM: No, I do not remember any complaints of that sort. I should
certainly remember them if there had been any.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions concerning Sauckel’s
relations with the Central Planning Board and with Speer. You yourself
repeatedly represented Sauckel at the Central Planning Board. Is that
correct?
TIMM: Yes, a few times.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Planning Board as
far as Sauckel was concerned?
TIMM: The Central Planning Board was a branch of the Four Year Plan. Its
task, as far as the GBA was concerned, was to collect the demands for
workers made by the big employers, and to adjust these demands at
regular sessions. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor could not judge himself the importance of the use made of workers
by the various industries, this question was decided in the Central
Planning Board. An attempt was made, for certain periods of time, for as
long a time as possible, to work out a balance of workers, I might say,
and in connection...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Sauckel told us all about this already, didn’t
he?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then there is no need to go into it with another witness.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know Speer’s position?
TIMM: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was Speer’s position in relation to Sauckel and vice
versa? Could Speer give orders to Sauckel in particular?
TIMM: Speer was Plenipotentiary General for Armament while Sauckel was
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, and Speer held the
point of view that he, as Armament Minister, should have decisive
authority in all matters pertaining to the production of armaments, that
is raw materials, coal and consequently also the allocation of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could Speer give Sauckel orders and instructions, or did
he actually give them?
TIMM: Yes, as a matter of form. As I have just said, the question was
not quite clear, and the two conceptions were opposed. In reality there
was always a certain tension between the two men because the Armament
Ministry wanted more or less to claim the power to issue instructions.
This tension was generally cleared up through talks, or the exchange of
letters between the two men. Sometimes it led to what one might call
“agreement conferences,” headed by Reichsminister Lammers, as he was at
that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of these conferences, these agreement
conferences?
TIMM: These conferences led to agreements which, as far as I remember,
were several times taken down in writing, and in my opinion they led to
an increasingly strong influence by the Armament Ministry on questions
concerning the allocation of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel want to ask any more questions?
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, in connection
with your last statement, I should like to ask one question. You have
testified to tension between the Defendants Sauckel and Speer because
Speer claimed the right to give instructions. Do I understand you
correctly if I assume that the tension arose from the fact that Sauckel
energetically disputed this right to issue instructions?
TIMM: As I wanted to express in my last answer, the difficulties
consisted in the fact that Speer, as Plenipotentiary General for
Armaments said: “I must have control of all the things which belong to
actual manufacture. So it is essential for me as regards the direction
of labor allocation...”
DR. FLÄCHSNER: I understood that, Witness; my question is only, did this
tension arise from the fact that Sauckel emphatically refused to
recognize this right to issue instructions which you say was assumed by
Speer?
TIMM: As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel
felt himself competent and responsible for all questions concerning it.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: With regard to the demands of the Armament Ministry which
he did not feel he could consider justified, did Sauckel not hold the
point of view that he was responsible only to the Führer?
TIMM: I do not remember anything so definite. He was Plenipotentiary
General for...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely this is very far removed from anything we have got
to deal with. He says that the tension was cleared up by conferences.
What more is there to discuss?
DR. FLÄCHSNER: That was the last question I wanted to ask the witness.
Witness, you spoke of conferences which are supposed to have taken place
with Minister Lammers. In the minutes of the session of 11 July 1944 and
of 4 January 1944, which have been previously submitted here, there is
no mention at all of such differences. I would be grateful to you, if
you could tell me what session with Lammers you have in mind?
TIMM: Unfortunately, I cannot give the dates of the sessions exactly. I
know only that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
several times wished to report these circumstances to the Führer, and
that the two men, as far as I can remember, agreed that these questions
should be discussed with the Führer. Then, however, in order to avoid
always taking things to the Führer they agreed to have matters talked
over with Reichsminister Lammers.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: You cannot give any details about that?
TIMM: Only if—I remember, for example, that the question of the blocked
industries in France was discussed.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine the witness?
M. HERZOG: Witness, were you a member of the National Socialist Party?
TIMM: Yes.
M. HERZOG: From what date?
TIMM: In 1933 I applied for admission. My application was at first
refused, and as far as I remember it was approved in 1934 or 1935.
M. HERZOG: Were you a member of the SA?
TIMM: I was a member of the SA for a short time. I left the SA when
proceedings for my expulsion were instituted against me in the SA, and I
resigned.
M. HERZOG: Were you a member of the SS?
TIMM: No.
M. HERZOG: What were your functions up to the time you entered Sauckel’s
office?
TIMM: I was employed in that branch of the Reich Ministry of Labor which
had the employment agency, the office for vocational guidance, and the
training agency.
M. HERZOG: When did you first meet Sauckel?
TIMM: As far as I can remember, I saw Sauckel for the first time when he
visited State Secretary Syrup in the Reich Ministry of Labor, and the
individual officials were invited to meet him.
M. HERZOG: At what time did this take place?
TIMM: I cannot give the date exactly. I believe it was about a few weeks
after the appointment of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor.
M. HERZOG: What was your position at the time when Sauckel was appointed
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?
TIMM: I was in the department for employment and unemployment
relief—the employment department...
M. HERZOG: And at the end, what was your position?
TIMM: At that time I was a Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of
Labor.
M. HERZOG: Will you tell me where Sauckel’s offices were in Berlin?
TIMM: I did not understand the question.
M. HERZOG: Will you tell me where Sauckel’s offices were in Berlin?
TIMM: In Berlin, Sauckel himself worked in Thuringia House, while the
special sections made available by the Reich Ministry of Labor were in
the building of the Reich Ministry of Labor at Saarlandstrasse 96, and
some, after a part of the building had been destroyed, were in
alternative quarters near Berlin.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. The offices at Saarlandstrasse 96 therefore came
under Sauckel’s administration? Is that right?
TIMM: The office at Saarlandstrasse 96 was not a new office; it was the
Reich Ministry of Labor. The two sections had been made available by a
Führer decree to carry out the tasks of the GBA.
M. HERZOG: A document headed “Delegate for the Four Year Plan,
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Berlin SW 11,
Saarlandstrasse 96” therefore comes from Sauckel’s office?
TIMM: I did not quite understand.
M. HERZOG: A document which has the following heading: “Delegate for the
Four Year Plan, Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...”
THE PRESIDENT: Why not show him the document?
M. HERZOG: I show you Document Number L-61, which was submitted to the
Tribunal in the course of the last few sessions. This document bears, as
you see, the following heading at the top on the left: “The Delegate for
the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor.” On the top in the right-hand corner, “Berlin SW 11,
Saarlandstrasse 96.” It is dated 26 November 1942, and comes, therefore,
from Sauckel’s offices. Is that right?
TIMM: This document comes from the GBA, therefore from Sauckel’s office.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. Did you represent Sauckel at the conferences of
the Central Planning Board for the Four Year Plan?
TIMM: I either represented him, or I went with the GBA to take part in
the sessions. Not always, but frequently.
M. HERZOG: When you represented him there, you received instructions
before going there, did you not?
TIMM: When we had to go to larger and more important conferences, we
were informed by Thuringia House that there were to be sessions, and we
received our instructions as to how we were to represent the GBA at
these sessions.
M. HERZOG: And when you came back from these meetings, you gave Sauckel
a report on them, did you not?
TIMM: After the sessions we either reported the results of the
conference to him personally, or through his personal advisers.
M. HERZOG: Sauckel then had to take the responsibility for the
declarations you made at the various meetings? Is that right?
TIMM: As an official, it was always my duty to make sure when I made
reports in a session and to ascertain...
M. HERZOG: That is not what I asked. Will you answer my question? You
received instructions before the conferences began. You reported to
Sauckel afterwards what was discussed at these conferences. Consequently
Sauckel was responsible for what was discussed there, was he not?
TIMM: If I might be allowed to explain about this...
THE PRESIDENT: Is not that really a matter of law, not a matter of
evidence?
M. HERZOG: Yes, of course, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the witness._] You declared a short while ago that the
conversations at which you had been present in Paris were of a friendly
nature. Do you remember taking part in the conference of 12 January
1943?
TIMM: At the moment I cannot remember just from the date whether I took
part, but I could tell from the subject of the discussion whether I was
present or not.
M. HERZOG: I have already submitted Document Number F-809 to the
Tribunal. It contains the minutes of this conference. In the course of
the conference, Laval, among other things, said to Sauckel:
“It is no longer a matter of a policy of collaboration; it is
rather, on the French side, a policy of sacrifice, and on the
German side a policy of coercion...
“We cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming
up against some German authority which has substituted itself in
our place.
“I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself...
“It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German
measures of coercion.”
Do you think that those are friendly remarks?
TIMM: I did not understand one word. “Do you believe that those...”?
M. HERZOG: “...friendly remarks.” You said that these conversations were
friendly. I have given you an extract from the contents of these
conversations. Do you still say that they were friendly?
TIMM: I can only confirm the spirit of the negotiations in which I took
part. I do not recognize these statements in the form you give them to
me.
M. HERZOG: If you had known them, would you still have said that they
were friendly conversations?
THE PRESIDENT: He was not there. He just said that he did not know about
it. We can judge for ourselves whether the tone of it is friendly.
M. HERZOG: Witness, you stated earlier that you had no knowledge of
forced deportations.
TIMM: I said that I knew of no forced deportations under the authority
of the GBA; and I do not know of any deportations.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember a conference held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at
Wartburg, which you attended, and at which Sauckel, a number of chiefs
of Gau labor offices, and people who worked with Sauckel were also
gathered?
TIMM: At Wartburg there was a conference of the presidents of the Gau
labor offices. I was there for that conference.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember having spoken there?
TIMM: Yes.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the statements you made about recruiting
methods?
TIMM: I do not recall that so well; no.
M. HERZOG: I will now show you Document Number F-810, which I submitted
to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number RF-1507. The Tribunal will find
the extract I want to submit to the witness on Page 10.
You were speaking of the conferences which the Plenipotentiary General
for Allocation of Labor was having with the Wehrmacht about its
co-operation in compulsory recruiting, and you said: “The Führer has
approved the use of measures of coercion to the fullest extent.”
Do you deny that you knew that workers were being recruited for forced
deportations?
TIMM: I ask for a moment’s time. I have not yet found the place. It was
not shown me before.
These are notes made by some one present, presumably the Military
Commander in Paris. I have not my statements on this question at hand,
but I should imagine that the GBA, in view of the difficult...
M. HERZOG: Will you please look at Page 8, Paragraph IV?
TIMM: Page 8, yes.
M. HERZOG: Under Paragraph IV, on Page 8:
“As regards the employment of European labor and the problems,
methods, and means for the same, Timm made the following
remarks: 1) Northern Europe; 2) Southeast; 3) Italy; 4) France.”
Then we come to the passage about which I am asking you for an
explanation, because you made this statement. Will you answer that? Do
you still deny your knowledge of the fact that these deportations were
forced?
TIMM: I have no intention of denying anything. I can only say that
Sauckel probably had powers from the Führer to use all reasonable means
to speed up the procurement of workers.
Measures were introduced and carried out in France which, even if they
were approved by Laval, the Premier at the time, might nevertheless be
termed compulsory.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. I have one last question to ask you. In this
quotation you say, “The Führer has approved....” If the Führer approved
something, it means, that something was suggested to him. Is that not a
fact?
TIMM: As far as I can remember, Gauleiter Sauckel always reported the
results of his talks in Paris to the Führer. It is possible that he
reported to the Führer the question of recruiting methods which he had
discussed with Laval; and it was customary for him, as I have already
said in my testimony, always to make sure of the Führer’s approval, so
that he did not work against the Führer’s ideas.
M. HERZOG: Thank you. I have no more questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the document which was last submitted to you,
L-61, from Saarlandstrasse, is not in the original, but it contains the
words: “Signed, Sauckel.” The Defendant Sauckel has informed me that it
is possible he did not sign it himself, but that he may have been
informed, in a general way only, that there were letters about one thing
and another—routine office correspondence—and he might have given
authority for them to be signed. Is that possible?
TIMM: It was like this; the departments in Saarlandstrasse...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, did Sauckel state that in evidence, or are
you telling us simply what he said to you? Do you remember?
DR. SERVATIUS: I cannot say exactly whether he stated that here.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on then.
DR. SERVATIUS: [_Turning to the witness._] Answer the question.
TIMM: Yes. As Sauckel continued to exercise his functions as Gauleiter
in Weimar, it sometimes happened that things did not reach him. The
sections in Saarlandstrasse submitted their drafts to the personal
adviser in Thuringia House, and it is quite possible—as I know from my
own knowledge of conditions—that the contents of the drafts were
transmitted by telephone, and that the personal advisers were authorized
to sign the name of the Plenipotentiary General.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the mail so extensive that he did not take exact
cognizance of individual letters?
TIMM: That is hard for me to judge.
DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. One more question:
Führer—Sauckel—Speer. Is it true that the Defendant Sauckel told you
that the Führer had ordered him to fulfill all Speer’s demands?
TIMM: I do not know whether exactly such a statement was made.
DR. SERVATIUS: We have shown you the document in which Laval complains
about the conduct of the German authorities. Did this complaint refer to
Sauckel’s activities, or was it not that he had told Sauckel of these
complaints and was thanking him personally for his attitude?
TIMM: I recall from the talks with Laval, that Laval repeatedly
expressed his gratitude to Sauckel for having put into effect measures
and means for facilitating matters which he had suggested. Laval
attached special importance—to use his own expression—to putting the
climate and the atmosphere in order, and to having talks with Hitler
himself as soon as possible; and he asked Sauckel to pave the way for
him. As far as I know, Sauckel did actually arrange for talks of this
kind and Laval thanked him for doing so.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for this witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The job of the GBA was to get workmen to
replace the men who had been taken into the Army out of industry. That
was largely your work, was it not?
TIMM: The task of the GBA was much more comprehensive, as previously all
the tasks...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I understand, but that was part of your
work, was it not?
TIMM: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now, you were therefore told
beforehand the number of people that the Army was taking out of
industry, weren’t you, so you could make up your estimates?
TIMM: The numbers were adjusted in the Central Planning Board. It was
precisely the task of the Central Planning Board, that the plans made in
the OKW...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I don’t care who examined the
figures, but your organization certainly had knowledge of the needs of
the Army, of the number of people the Army was taking out of industry.
You had to have that information, had you not?
TIMM: The number of men to be drafted was reported to the Central
Planning Board.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right, reported to the Central Planning
Board. Now then, they were taking people out of industry also who were
not needed for the Army, weren’t they? I mean Jews. They were taking
Jewish people out of industry, were they not? Sauckel said yesterday
that Jewish people were being taken out of industry. You admit that,
don’t you?
TIMM: Yes. Jews were eliminated from industry.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; and I suppose the Central Planning
Board was given the number of Jewish people that were taken out of
industry, were they not?
TIMM: I do not know that. In the conferences at which I was present...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not assume that that must have been
the case, if they had to find the number of replacements. It must have
been so, mustn’t it?
TIMM: I cannot judge as to that because I learned only the total number
of men to be drafted, independently of the Jewish question. I will not
venture an opinion; I do not know.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know that Himmler and the SS told
the Central Planning Board the number of Jews that were being taken out
of industry for whom replacements were needed? You know that as a fact,
don’t you?
TIMM: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not?
TIMM: No. I know only that we received certain statements from the
Reichsführer SS that people were being taken out of industry, and owing
to the objections of the Plenipotentiary General, who had to supply the
replacements—I remember that this measure was partly withdrawn.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you do know that one of the duties of the
Reichsführer SS was to withdraw Jews from industry? You know that?
TIMM: I know from statements in reports that Jews were to be withdrawn
from industry.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire and the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
[_The witness Hildebrandt took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
HUBERT HILDEBRANDT (Witness): Hubert Hildebrandt.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were working in the office of Sauckel, is
that correct?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were subordinate to Timm. What was your special
field?
HILDEBRANDT: In the Reich Ministry of Labor from 1930 I dealt with
questions concerning labor for the iron and metal industry, the chemical
industry, and the textile industry. After 1940 I also dealt with
questions concerning workers in the West.
DR. SERVATIUS: Regional questions in the West?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes; in France, Belgium, and Holland; some of those
questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: You must remember to pause before you answer. Did you
have any general idea about what happened in Sauckel’s office?
HILDEBRANDT: No; I did not.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you participated in the staff conferences?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes; I was present at most of those.
DR. SERVATIUS: And in that way you found out, to a certain extent, about
what happened in other offices?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I want to ask you especially about conditions in France.
What was the position of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor in France?
HILDEBRANDT: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in
France, just as in other occupied countries, had appointed special
deputies who transmitted his wishes, and helped to carry out these
wishes and these tasks. The organization of the entire labor strength
from the occupied western territories remained in the hands of the
German military or civil administrative offices there.
DR. SERVATIUS? So he did not have an organization of his own?
HILDEBRANDT: The first deputy in France tried to establish an
organization of his own, but after a short time he met with the
opposition of the German administrative offices, and the offices which
he had established in the meantime were taken over by the military
commander.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the military commander?
HILDEBRANDT: The military commander was and remained responsible for the
entire allocation of the labor in his district, and also for the labor
sent from his district to Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the German Embassy?
HILDEBRANDT: The German Embassy took the leading part in all
negotiations which were to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General
or his deputies, with French Government offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the French Government as regards
the allocation of labor?
HILDEBRANDT: The French Government made agreements with the
Plenipotentiary General concerning the carrying out of his programs, and
ordered its own offices to carry out certain tasks, especially when
compulsory labor was introduced in France. It published the necessary
decrees and gave the necessary directives to the subordinate offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who had the executive power to recruit labor? Was
that done by the French or the Germans?
HILDEBRANDT: One must distinguish between two periods. When it was still
a question of recruiting volunteers, until the fall of 1942 these
volunteers could report to German offices as well as to French offices;
and also to recruiting offices which had been established by German
firms, and some by branches of the Wehrmacht. After the introduction of
compulsory labor, the administrative executive for the carrying out of
the decrees rested solely with the French authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what happened when somebody did not report?
HILDEBRANDT: Then a first summons to appear was received from the French
authorities, and then repeated summonses, and if these proved to be
unsuccessful the French authorities called in the French police.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were those who did not come brought before the courts?
HILDEBRANDT: I assume that that may have happened sometimes. I do not
know for certain.
DR. SERVATIUS: German or French courts?
HILDEBRANDT: French courts, according to French regulations.
DR. SERVATIUS: What would be your estimate of the number of voluntary
workers who came from France to Germany?
HILDEBRANDT: The number of voluntary workers from France, until the
middle of 1942—but I can only give approximate figures from memory...
DR. SERVATIUS: Please, just the approximate figure.
HILDEBRANDT: Something over 200,000. After the compulsory labor decree
had been introduced in the course of 1942, there were still voluntary
recruitments as well on a fairly large scale. The number of volunteers
was, at times, considerably larger than the number of conscripts, so
that altogether more than half of all the labor recruited in France
consisted of volunteers. It is noticeable that women were only recruited
if they volunteered. There was no compulsory service for them. With
regard to the compulsory labor assignments moreover, it must be pointed
out that a number of them were only formal. In reality these people had
come voluntarily, but for economic reasons, or out of consideration for
their relatives and friends in their home towns, they attached
importance to being conscripted. We had compulsory labor assignments
which were only put on an official basis afterwards. Such requests
reached the German labor offices especially during the last months
before the end of the war; and the Foreign Office requested the
Plenipotentiary General to approve such demands, and that was done.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear anything in your department about recruiting
measures such as the surrounding of churches, cinemas, and similar
places in France?
HILDEBRANDT: No; I do not know of any such recruiting measure. I know
that in France, as well as in Belgium, identity papers were controlled
among members of the age groups which had been called up to register.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were also probably in Paris, and you spoke to the
German authorities there; is that right?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes. Every time I was in Paris I took the opportunity to
talk to members of the offices about current events.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not tell you about things which must have
surprised you?
HILDEBRANDT: With each major task we carried out we had some
difficulties, of course, and certain excesses. Once it was reported to
me, among other things, that there were impossible conditions in the
“Pépinière”—a camp, a kind of transit camp for people who had to leave.
These conditions were reported immediately to the Town Major of Paris
who remedied matters. Then there were irregularities in the recruiting
in Marseille, where recruiting agents used blackmail. This was also
stopped immediately.
Beyond that, a fairly large number of individual cases were brought to
me. These were minor difficulties about vacations, salaries, and so
forth, which I transmitted each time to the competent offices for
further action.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it part of your official duties to follow these
things up?
HILDEBRANDT: As far as they came within my sphere, I took the necessary
steps immediately. As far as it was the business of other departments I
immediately transferred them to those departments for further attention.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I did not ask what you did, but whether it was
your official duty to look after these things.
HILDEBRANDT: The general problems of recruiting and statistical checking
of programs came within my field of duty. Questions of housing, pay, and
transport were dealt with by other departments. Of course, when I found
out about bad conditions it was my duty to investigate them at once, if
only in the interests of further recruiting.
We considered it of the greatest importance that every abuse should be
stopped immediately, because it was only in this way that further
recruiting of volunteers could be guaranteed. Labor conscription was
therefore looked on as a last resort.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I would like to know whether it was your
official duty, or your moral duty to look after these things?
HILDEBRANDT: In this case it was my moral duty as well as my official
duty.
DR. SERVATIUS: As regards the way transports were effected, I have one
question. Mention has been made of irregularities on transports. That is
why I would like you to tell us what steps you took to have the
transports that came from France supervised and directed. Can you
describe that briefly?
HILDEBRANDT: A special department was created in the office of the
military commander in France for the carrying out of transports. For
each man who went to Germany, it was already settled to what firm he was
to be sent. The recruiting was effected on the basis of planned
contracts and definite working conditions, so that it was known what
route could be chosen for the journey. Transports were assembled to
include as many as possible, so that a definite number of workers would
go in the same direction and to the same firm.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these details are of less interest to me than
the question of how you conducted these transports and kept a check on
them when something irregular happened on the way.
HILDEBRANDT: In giving a few details, I only wanted to indicate that
there was a detailed check made of every person intended for Germany.
For each transport there was an exact list of the persons and of the
firms to which they were sent. The transports were given guides who
brought them to their destination, and there they were turned over to
the presidents of the regional labor offices whose duty it was to take
further care of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to put a concrete case to you. A case has
been reported here of a transport train which was left in the Saar
district, and when it was opened, after a few days, most of the people
had been frozen to death. Did you have control of such trains? Should
that have been reported to you? Could that train have been sent upon
your orders? How do you explain that?
HILDEBRANDT: Such an incident would have become known to us immediately.
As the coming of transports was reported beforehand to the presidents of
the regional labor offices, we were informed immediately when they did
not arrive. That happened frequently, namely, when difficulties arose
because of some emergency on the way, and a transport was held up—for
instance, in the last days of the war, when traffic obstructions caused
by bomb damage had to be cleared away, and so on. We could then
immediately have inquiries made concerning the transports, which was
always done. I know nothing of the case which you have just mentioned.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must speak more slowly. The interpreters
cannot possibly follow.
Will you state your opinion as to the incident, which I have described,
of the train with the people who froze to death in the Saar district.
HILDEBRANDT: The incident could not possibly have occurred on transports
of labor recruits. The transports were well prepared.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have said that before.
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: How do you explain then, the case of that transport?
HILDEBRANDT: I learned for the first time through the press during the
last few months that the SS also conducted transports to Germany, and
that conditions such as you have just described are said to have been
present.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you present during the negotiations between
Sauckel and Laval?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes, I was frequently present.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what kind of atmosphere were these negotiations
conducted?
HILDEBRANDT: These negotiations were conducted in a friendly manner; but
occasionally, especially when promises on the part of the French
Government had not been kept, quite violent disputes occurred. Any real
difficulties, however, did not as a rule arise during these
negotiations. Arrangements were made concerning the number of people who
were to be sent to Germany. As a matter of principle, Laval was always
willing to put manpower at the disposal of Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what, in particular, were the relations between Laval
and Sauckel? Did Laval speak well of Sauckel or not?
HILDEBRANDT: M. Laval expressed his gratitude from time to time for the
way in which things had been made easier for France, too. For instance,
as regards the status of French prisoners of war, the permission given
to the wives of French workmen to visit their husbands, and the taking
over of welfare work for the relatives of the French workmen in Germany.
All these things, as I have said, took the form of agreements whereby
one party put labor at the disposal of the other party, and that party
in return gave back manpower or granted other advantages. Laval
certainly expressed repeatedly his urgent wish to do more for Germany if
he could only be given political advantages for it. Therefore, he asked
the Plenipotentiary General repeatedly to make it possible for him to
have discussions with the Führer in order to create a favorable
atmosphere in France for further efforts.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did these friendly relations prevail until the end?
HILDEBRANDT: Until the last negotiation, which I think took place at the
end of 1944.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I believe the question of relève and
“transformation” has been clarified sufficiently, so that I need not
question the witness about it again.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, in what manner did the negotiations
with the German military commander take place? Did Sauckel give orders
there? Was he the highest authority, or was it the military commander?
HILDEBRANDT: The negotiations were never carried out in the form of a
transmission of orders. The Plenipotentiary General described the
situation in Germany and what needs...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you can be very brief.
HILDEBRANDT: I only want to say the following: Of course, the military
commander, as was the case with the civil administration in Holland, was
more interested in receiving orders to be filled than in sending
manpower to Germany, and that led to conflict. The authorities, however,
had to be convinced in each instance that manpower must be sent to
Germany—for agricultural work, for example, which could not be done in
Holland, and also for a number of branches of the German armaments
industry.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a few questions now concerning Belgium and
Northern France: Was the position of Sauckel as regards the chief
authorities there the same as in France on the whole; and was everything
conducted similarly, or were there any differences?
HILDEBRANDT: No, the conditions were the same as in France, only that
the deputies of the Plenipotentiary General were, from the very
beginning, incorporated into the military administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any reports or discover anything yourself
about irregularities in that territory?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes. There were isolated cases of irregularities. For
instance, I was informed one day that reprisals were to be taken against
relatives of members of age groups who had not appeared when they were
called up. We stopped that immediately by discussing the matter with the
representatives of the military commander.
DR. SERVATIUS: And how did Sauckel negotiate with the military commander
there?
HILDEBRANDT: He also told him what he wanted. Von Falkenhausen was, of
course, also interested in the first place in having orders for the
German armaments industry carried out in Belgium; but it was also agreed
that manpower should be sent to Germany. He certainly made frequent
efforts to protect students, school children, and members of younger age
groups.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I will show you the minutes of an interrogation
of General Von Falkenhausen on 27 November 1945. I want you to look at a
few sentences. If you take Page 2, you will find there in the middle of
the page, in answer to the question: “Is the witness in a position...”
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Number RF-15.
[_Turning to the witness._] It is the following question:
“Is the witness in a position to define to us the limitations of
his powers and the competence of the administration for the
Allocation of Labor?”
Answer by General Von Falkenhausen:
“Up to a certain time there was a labor office in my territory
which was concerned with the recruiting of voluntary workers. I
cannot remember the exact date any longer—it may have been in
the fall of 1942—when the labor office was put under Sauckel;
and from then on I had only to carry out the orders I received
from him.”
Is this position of the military commander in relation to Sauckel
correct?
HILDEBRANDT: It is not quite correct in several points. In Belgium there
was not just one labor office, but a number of labor offices which dealt
with the recruiting of volunteers, and also a number of recruiting
offices which worked with them. But from the very beginning these labor
organizations worked under the supervision of the Feldkommandanturen in
Belgium. These Feldkommandanturen were offices of the military
commander. There was no question of the Plenipotentiary General taking
over the work. Before he appointed his deputies he could only send his
requests directly to the military administration, to General Von
Falkenhausen, but not directly to a labor office.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the conditions in Holland? Who was the
competent district head there?
HILDEBRANDT: It was the Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: And was there a deputy of Sauckel’s with him?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes, a deputy was appointed there too, who was a member of
the administration of the Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who issued the labor service decrees there?
HILDEBRANDT: The Reich Commissioner.
DR. SERVATIUS: And who carried out the recruiting? German or Dutch
offices?
HILDEBRANDT: As far as I remember there were Dutch labor offices. The
heads of these labor offices were Germans; the rest of the personnel was
mainly Dutch. These offices took the necessary steps for the allocation
of labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have one more question concerning Germany. The
metal industries came into your field, did they not?
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Krupp, for instance.
HILDEBRANDT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of reports did you receive about conditions in
the Krupp works as far as the welfare of the workmen was concerned?
HILDEBRANDT: I had no unfavorable reports about Krupp. The personal
adviser of the Plenipotentiary General, Landrat Berk, visited the Krupp
works frequently and informed me of the requests made by the firm and of
the impressions he had received, but he never said that proper care was
not taken of foreign workmen. I myself never visited the Krupp firm
during the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the German counsel want to ask questions?
Prosecution?
M. HERZOG: Mr. President, we have the same problems here. The Tribunal
has already heard explanations on these points. The Tribunal is in
possession of the documents which I have submitted, and I have,
therefore, no questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. SERVATIUS: Then with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the
witness Stothfang.
[_The witness Stothfang took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Would you state your full name?
WALTER STOTHFANG (Witness): Walter Stothfang.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat these words after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, what was your position with Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: I was personal adviser to the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: When did you assume that position?
STOTHFANG: One year after the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor had assumed office; that was on 19 April 1943.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the witness Timm there when you came?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And the witness Hildebrandt?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What orders did you receive when you came?
STOTHFANG: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor did
not give any special personal directives because his general principles
could be clearly seen in his decrees and in his program, and I only
started work 1 year later.
DR. SERVATIUS: Before that, had you already been in the Ministry of
Labor?
STOTHFANG: Yes, I had been connected with that type of work since 1926;
and for the last 8 years I was the personal assistant of State Secretary
Dr. Syrup in the Ministry of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it a considerable change when you came to Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did your colleagues in the office tell you about the
whole work, and Sauckel’s attitude to the work?
STOTHFANG: The work, as such, was carried out according to principles
and decrees which were not essentially different to previous ones. In
practice of course, they were much more far reaching than anything
hitherto.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you work very closely with Sauckel in your sphere?
You were his personal assistant.
STOTHFANG: As far as that was necessary for carrying out the task of the
Plenipotentiary General for the war effort. Sauckel was not only
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but at the same
time he had remained Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter in Thuringia.
Besides that, during the last 1½ years of his activities, he was very
much occupied with the construction of an underground factory in Kahle,
in Thuringia; so that he...
DR. SERVATIUS: We will come back to that later.
STOTHFANG: ...could only be in Berlin from time to time; at the most 1
day a week, and often only half a day.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was your task as his personal adviser?
STOTHFANG: We had to receive incoming mail, sort out what had to be
reported, and pass on the rest to the competent departments. We also had
to submit newly arrived drafts to the Plenipotentiary General.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who called staff conferences? Do you know that?
STOTHFANG: That was generally done by the office.
DR. SERVATIUS: You always attended these conferences?
STOTHFANG: Yes, from the time I first came into the office.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you participate in conferences to which individual
members returned from so-called inspection trips and made their reports?
STOTHFANG: Later that no longer happened or only very seldom. It was
only in the beginning.
DR. SERVATIUS: That you were present, or that inspection trips took
place?
STOTHFANG: No; that reports were made.
DR. SERVATIUS: There were fewer reports later?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the reason for that?
STOTHFANG: I do not know the reason.
DR. SERVATIUS: During the period when you were present, did you learn of
anything particularly shocking as regards irregularities in Germany? We
will include transports to Germany, transit camps, the work shops
themselves, the camps, and the factories.
STOTHFANG: I myself found out about some irregularities on the occasion
of inspection trips which I made on orders, but these were at once
discussed with the competent offices and steps were taken to put a stop
to them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel had to work with a number of offices. Was there
any special opposition to overcome here?
STOTHFANG: With the exception of two cases, no.
DR. SERVATIUS: What cases were these?
STOTHFANG: One was the Party Chancellery; and the other was the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Secret State Police.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of specific instances in the case of the
Reichsführer SS?
STOTHFANG: The general treatment of foreign workers—particularly of
those coming from the East—as far as it was determined by the
Reichsführer SS or the principles laid down by the Reichsführer SS, was
contrary to the ideas of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation
of Labor. The Reichsführer SS was not inclined to meet the far-reaching,
definite demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor. The same thing happened, in other directions, in the case of the
head of the Party Chancellery.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what directions?
STOTHFANG: For example, where social insurance was concerned. In this
case the Party Chancellery was of the opinion that equality with German
workers was not justified on either practical or political grounds; nor
was as high a rate of pay.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Sauckel say to that?
STOTHFANG: He tried, again and again, to regulate all these matters
according to his principles. In some things he was definitely
unsuccessful, and in others he was successful only after great efforts.
I would remind you of the equal status given to the Eastern Workers
which was actually only put into effect in March 1945 through a decree.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special reports from the Gauleiter
who were appointed deputies for the Allocation of Labor, or did you
speak to the Gauleiter?
STOTHFANG: There were instructions that on inspection trips the
competent Gauleiter of the district visited had to be seen, so that any
relevant questions could be discussed with him.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take part in meetings of the Central Planning
Board?
STOTHFANG: I went to one single meeting of the Central Planning Board
with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have just mentioned March 1945 as the date
when the Eastern Workers were given equality with the rest of the
workers. Are you not mistaken in the year—1944? I will show you the
decree.
STOTHFANG: As far as I remember, it was March 1945.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I will have it shown to the witness in a
moment; we are looking for it.
[_Turning to the witness._] What was the relationship between Speer and
Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: Apparently the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor was due to a suggestion which Minister Speer had
made to the Führer.
DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 58, in Document Book Number 2, Page
167 of the German text, and Page 156 of the English text. That is the
decree concerning the conditions of employment of Eastern Workers, of 25
March 1944, and I read Paragraph 2:
“Wages.
“For Eastern Workers the same conditions apply for wages and
salary as for other foreign workers. Eastern Workers are paid
wages only for work they actually do.”
THE PRESIDENT: How did the wages compare with the wages of the German
workers?
STOTHFANG: It was a fundamental rule that they must be based on the
German wages for the same type of work, in order to avoid additional
profits for the industries which employed Eastern Workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you remember a conference at which Goebbels stated his
opinion to Sauckel as regards the latter’s policy concerning social
questions and questions of wages?
STOTHFANG: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you describe it to us?
STOTHFANG: I myself did not take part in that conference. I only knew
about it from the description given by my colleague Dr. Hildebrandt, who
was present at the meeting with Gauleiter Sauckel.
It was the first discussion between the two gentlemen after Reich
Minister Goebbels had become Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Effort.
At this conference Minister Speer was also present, and in the course of
the conference Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels reproached the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the fact his
previous measures...
THE PRESIDENT: He is now telling us, is he not, what Hildebrandt told
him?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Hildebrandt has been in the witness box and he has
not been asked about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: There has been confusion of the two witnesses. They
arrived only a short time ago. I ask permission for this witness to say
what Hildebrandt told him. It can be explained by the fact that the
witness was here for only a very short time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal does not think that you ought
to be allowed to ask him that question.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any difficulties with Speer?
STOTHFANG: Not at the beginning. In the course of years difficulties
arose because of the fundamentally different ideas of the two men.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the relationships between Sauckel and Speer
gone into elaborately.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. I will withdraw that question.
[_Turning to the witness._] What did the offices have to do with the
employment of concentration camp prisoners? Did they deal with that?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not receive reports that manpower was
disappearing from other industries, and in this way became concentration
camp workers?
STOTHFANG: No reports were received about that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are you aware that concentration camp workers were
employed in large numbers for work?
STOTHFANG: It was the general practice of the Police to put prisoners to
work.
DR. SERVATIUS: You did not receive any reports about that, did you?
STOTHFANG: No. An effort was made to gain influence to the extent of
having reports sent to the offices of the labor administration
concerning the employment of concentration camp prisoners, so that they
could be considered in the general planning of labor allocation. But
these reports were not received by the labor offices.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I have only a few more questions concerning the
control offices, and other control agencies, which had been established
in order to investigate conditions among the workers in Germany. Do you
know how far foreign workers themselves were included in that control
system? I am thinking first of all of the office of Ambassador Scapini.
How did this office work? Did you hear anything about it?
STOTHFANG: I do not know many details about the office of Scapini. I
know of its existence, but to the best of my knowledge Scapini’s office
was chiefly occupied with the welfare of French prisoners of war rather
than with the welfare of French civilian workers, because for the latter
a special office existed under M. Brunedon. But generally the foreign
workers were represented by the German Labor Front. So-called Reich
liaison offices were set up everywhere, from the central office via the
Gaue to the small districts, and each employed several people who
visited the camps, listened to complaints and negotiated with the
offices of the German Labor Front, or with other offices of the labor
administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Those were German employees that you mentioned?
STOTHFANG: No; they were foreign employees from countries abroad, in
fact from almost every country.
DR. SERVATIUS: In the factories themselves, did the workmen have any
representatives who had contact, as liaison men, with the supervisory
offices of the German Labor Front?
STOTHFANG: Not to my knowledge.
DR. SERVATIUS: For the Eastern Workers there was also a control office.
Do you know that office?
STOTHFANG: In Rosenberg’s department there was a special one for that
purpose.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did that office work? Did you hear anything about it?
STOTHFANG: Yes. It had regular contact with the technically competent
offices of the labor administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: And whom had this office to contact if it received
complaints? The Labor Front, Sauckel’s office, or the Minister of Labor?
To whom did they have to go?
STOTHFANG: That depended on the nature of the irregularities, or the
complaints which were made.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will give you an example—complaints about labor
conditions.
STOTHFANG: In that case one had to go first to the competent local labor
office in order to have detailed inquiries made into the case, and to
see about the general conditions, or the actual conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: And if it was a matter of housing and nutrition, to whom
did one go?
STOTHFANG: First to the offices of the German Labor Front, which, by a
decree of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor—I
believe it was Decree Number 4—was given the general task of looking
after the foreign workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: And did the Labor Front report to you further?
STOTHFANG: Within the scope of their capacity they tried to put matters
right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the Labor Front itself, in fact, was the highest
authority for questions of complaints about the welfare of workers?
STOTHFANG: If you put it like that, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the treatment of prisoners of war? Did the
complaints come to Sauckel?
STOTHFANG: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who had charge of that?
STOTHFANG: The High Command of the Armed Forces.
DR. SERVATIUS: The Reich Inspection Board was also a control office.
What did Sauckel have to do with the Reich Inspection Board?
STOTHFANG: That must be an incorrect designation. I do not know what you
mean by the Reich Inspection Board.
DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the Trade Inspection Board, the Reich Trade
Inspection Board.
STOTHFANG: In Germany the trade inspection boards in principle were
competent for labor protection in factories. As far as labor protection
in factories was concerned, they had to see that the decrees which had
been issued, and were in force, were carried out and obeyed. Therefore
in case of complaints they were the competent authorities.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was Sauckel accused by other offices of looking after the
workmen too well? And was there not, in some cases, even envy of the
situation of certain foreign workers?
STOTHFANG: Yes. Such accusations came from three places. First, from the
two offices I mentioned before, which offered general objections and
resistance to the far-reaching demands of the Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor. Then Bormann’s office, and Himmler’s
office. It went so far that the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor was even suspected of being pro-Bolshevik.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defense counsel wish to ask any questions?
[_There was no response._]
Does the Prosecution wish to?
[_There was no response._]
The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I do not know whether the witness Jäger
has arrived yet.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told not.
DR. SERVATIUS: I assume that he will be here by Monday, and I would
suggest that I be permitted to submit some documents now, or perhaps an
interrogation of the witness Goetz, which is in the document book.
Perhaps I may refer to several passages. It is a very long affidavit,
and it throws some light on the matter in this connection and will make
it easier to understand.
THE PRESIDENT: You probably have some remarks to make about your
documents, have you not, which will take you up until 1 o’clock?
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the document books contain primarily the
decrees which Sauckel issued, and they cover what has been said here by
the witnesses and by the defendant himself as a witness. As far as
possible, the book is divided up into sections dealing with special
subjects, but as the decrees which were issued frequently applied to
several subjects at the same time, the separate divisions overlap in
this book.
I refer principally to Volume I, to all the decrees included there,
which I do not want to read individually. I should like only to call
special attention to the decrees about police matters. That is Document
6, which is on Page 16; Document 10, on Page 20; and Document 15, on
Page 25. These documents...
THE PRESIDENT: You understand that you must offer in evidence each
document or number of documents that you want to put in evidence? It is
not sufficient to put it in your document book. So please state the
document which you wish to put in evidence.
DR. SERVATIUS: These documents are included in a collection of laws
which has already been submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The whole thing you mean? The whole thing has been
submitted?
DR. SERVATIUS: It has, as far as I know. That is Document Number
3044-PS: “Enactments, Decrees, Announcements.”
THE PRESIDENT: Well, probably only a small part of 3044-PS has been read
and, therefore, unless it is translated into the four languages, it does
not form part of the record. Dr. Servatius, if you will go into the
matter and offer what you want to offer in evidence on Monday morning,
that will be quite satisfactory.
DR. SERVATIUS: But may I refer to them now, and then submit the
documents on Monday?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: These three decrees and enactments of the Reichsführer SS
I have submitted in order to show how efforts were made at improvement
even in this difficult field. Decree Number 6 was issued shortly before
Sauckel came into office, and one must assume that this was done in
order to produce a _fait accompli_.
The next decree, Document Number 10, already shows an improvement. It
deals with the barbed wire and the workers’ outings, and this is even
more relaxed in the next document. Document Number 15, that is Decree
Number 4, which has already been submitted, is probably the most
important first decree, which describes the fundamental authority and
directives, as well as recruiting methods, transportation, and treatment
in Germany.
Decree Number 16 deals with the employment of Eastern Workers and gives
the first basic regulations, because until then there was no definite
legal regulation of a uniform type.
Then I come to Document Number 19, which is on Page 54 in the English
text. This is a decree and a letter from Sauckel to the Gau labor
offices and the Gauleiter, of 14 October 1942, concerning good treatment
for foreign workers. This letter is an intervention on the part of
Sauckel to remove poor conditions and to correct certain abuses of which
he had been informed. I quote here in the German text on Page 59 the
following...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that document has been quoted already I think,
hasn’t it?
DR. SERVATIUS: A part of the document has already been mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Which part has not been quoted?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Page 59 in my book; in the English text, Page 54.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 54 is only the heading.
DR. SERVATIUS: Heading: “Decree and letter of Sauckel dated 14 October
1942,” and on the next page the text begins. The first page contains
only the title of the decree.
THE PRESIDENT: But Page 55 in the English text, the beginning of the
document has already been read.
DR. SERVATIUS: The beginning has already been read.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what did you want to read?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to read the whole thing in order to show
how far Sauckel...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, beginning with the words, “If in a Gau
district the statement was recently still made,” that has been read
already, down to the bottom of that paragraph.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have here only a short note. If it has already been
read, then I need not read it again. I will dispense with the reading.
Document Number 20 on Page 56 in the English document book deals with
compulsory labor service for foreign female domestic help and shows the
regulations in force at that time...
THE PRESIDENT: Which document?
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 20.
THE PRESIDENT: Continue.
DR. SERVATIUS: ...whereby it is pointed out particularly that a forced
transfer of foreign women for domestic help would not be carried out;
and the statement made by Sauckel emphasizes that only voluntary workers
should be taken for domestic employment.
Decree Number 21 introduces the labor book. That is in the English text
on Page 57. The purpose of the labor book was, as Sauckel has stated
here, to facilitate a registration of manpower, so that one could review
it and not lose control. Above all, in connection with this, there was
to be an allocation of land to the Eastern Workers, as the Defendant
Sauckel has explained. A central file was to be compiled, and with the
help of this the regular transportation of the workers home again was to
be arranged at a later date. That was the preparatory measure of the
labor book.
Then we come to Document Number 22, of 23 July 1943, which deals with
the limitation of the duration of employment of Eastern Workers. It is
said in this connection that the duration of employment should be for 2
years, with certain modifications, and that there should be facilities
for leave, and premiums should be given for the work done. There was to
be leave in Germany, and, under certain conditions, home leave. For
vacations in Germany, as can be seen here, special leave camps were set
up for Eastern Workers. The reason was that, on account of transport
conditions and other circumstances, these workers could not go home,
especially if they came from territories which in the meantime were no
longer occupied by Germans.
Then there follows Decree Number 13. That is Document Number 23, Page 62
in the English document book. This decree deals with the keeping of
order in factories and works. It is the decree on the basis of which
measures could be taken for the maintenance of discipline. I have
submitted it in order to show that it was valid both for German and for
foreign workers, and is not a decree which discriminates against Eastern
Workers.
Now I will refer to Document Number 26. That is Page 66 in the English
document book. This is a decree of 25 July 1944 according to which the
position of female domestic workers from the East was in principle to be
equal to that of the German domestic help. Working hours are regulated
and also time off. It reads: “Every week the female Eastern Worker is to
have an adequate amount of free time.”
The question of vacations is regulated in Paragraph 7, to the effect
that they will be granted leave after 12 months’ work in Reich
territory.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those figures right in Document 26, Page 67 in the
English document book? Working hours to fall between 6 o’clock in the
morning and 9 o’clock at night?
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “The regular working hours, including rest
periods and preparation for work, are to fall between 0600 and 2100
hours, unless special conditions call for other arrangements.” That does
not mean that the work is to be done from 6 o’clock in the morning until
9 o’clock at night. It means that between these two time limits these
people have to work. They cannot work before 6 o’clock in the morning,
and these girls cannot work after 9 o’clock at night. It cannot...
THE PRESIDENT: I am only asking if the figures are correct.
DR. SERVATIUS: The figures are correct.
Document 27 deals with the position of foreign workers in factories. It
is a decree of the German Labor Front and there are one or two basic
statements made in it. Here for example:
“The pleasure they take in their work and the willingness of
German workers must in no circumstances be endangered by
preferential treatment for foreign workers.
“As regards the treatment of foreign workers, it must be taken
into consideration that they came to Germany voluntarily and are
giving us their services for the carrying out of tasks of
military importance. In order to maintain their pleasure in
their work, the conditions of their contracts must be respected,
and absolutely fair treatment and comprehensive care and
attention must be given them.”
Document 28 is the agreement between Ley and Sauckel instituting the
supervision by the Central Inspectorate. It has already been submitted
by the Prosecution.
Document 30 deals with the tasks in detail and it states:
“The Reich Inspectorate, with regard to allocation of labor,
affairs of the Reich Trustee, and administration, is entrusted
with the following tasks:
“The supervision of the execution of my regulations and decrees.
On the basis of the practical knowledge gained, the Reich
Inspectorate is to make suggestions, propose improvements and
foster mutual exchange of experiences.”
The last document in this book deals with the establishment of French
offices. It is in the English document book on Page 79, and is entitled,
“French agencies for the care of the French workers employed in the
Reich.”
I believe I have already read the document here. With that, I have
finished Document Book 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH DAY
Monday, 3 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Jäger is to appear in about
half an hour. I shall read some other documents from my document book,
if it please the Tribunal.
In the last session I had read all the documents from the first document
book with the exception of Document Sauckel-16, which I left out by
mistake. It is a leaflet for Eastern Workers. I need not read it, but I
shall refer to it.
I have submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-1 the _Handbuch für die
Dienststellen_ ... (_Manual for Labor Employment_), and in this exhibit
we find the following documents which I have read in part, and shall
read some now: Documents Sauckel-12, 13, 15, 22, 28, 58(a), 67(a), 82,
83, 85, 86, and 88.
Then, I have submitted Exhibit Sauckel-2, _Sonderveröffentlichung des
Reichsarbeitsblattes_ (_Special Publication of the
Reichsarbeitsblatt_)—namely, _Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter, sowie
der sowjetrussischen Kriegsgefangenen_ (_Conditions for the Employment
of Eastern Workers and Soviet Russian Prisoners of War_), which contains
the following documents: Documents Sauckel-6, 32, 36, 39, 47, and 52.
Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-3, I have submitted the _Manifest des
Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz_ (_Manifesto of the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor_), Document
Sauckel-84.
Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-4, _Arbeitsgesetze: Textsammlung des Deutschen
Arbeitsrechtes_ (_Labor Laws: Collection of German Laws_), which
contains Documents Sauckel-16, 31, and 49.
As Exhibit Sauckel-5, I have submitted a book, _Fritz Sauckels
Kampfreden_ (_Fritz Sauckel’s Battle Speeches_). That is Document
Sauckel-95.
As Exhibit Sauckel-6, _Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in
Thüringen, 1932-33_ (_National Socialist Governmental Activity in
Thuringia, 1932-33_), has been submitted. It is contained in Document
Sauckel-96.
Exhibit Sauckel-7, _Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in
Thüringen, 1933-34_ (_National Socialist Governmental Activity in
Thuringia, 1933-34_), is contained in Document Sauckel-97.
I have once more submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-8 the publication entitled
_Europa arbeitet in Deutschland_ (_Europe Works in Germany_), which has
already been submitted as Document RF-5.
Then I shall submit an affidavit of Sauckel’s son, Dieter Sauckel, which
is very short. It refers to the evacuation of the Buchenwald Camp which
Sauckel is said to have ordered. I shall read the eight lines of the
affidavit:
“Between 4 and 7 April 1945, approximately, I was present when
my father, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, had a conference in his
study. On this occasion the question of the Buchenwald Camp was
discussed, and the following was decided: A certain number of
guards should remain in the camp until the arrival of the enemy
in order to hand the camp prisoners over to them.”—This is
Sauckel Document Book 3, Document Sauckel-94, Page 247.
“I swear to the truth of the preceding statement for the purpose
of having it submitted to the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg.
“I am ready to swear upon oath to the truth of my statement.
Schönau, 22 March 1946. Dieter Sauckel.”
I submit this as Exhibit Sauckel-9.
In Exhibit USA-206, Document 3044-PS, which has been submitted already,
the following documents of Volume II are contained, which I shall read
later: Sauckel-7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 27, and 41.
The documents which have not been read yet are in the official
collections of laws. I have had the individual laws laid aside in the
library. I do not know whether it is necessary to submit them
individually, or whether it is sufficient for me to state here in what
volume of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ they can be found.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they in your document book?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. They are short excerpts from the official legal
gazettes. In each case the relevant passages have been extracted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I think it would be convenient if you gave
their exhibit numbers, if they are in your book; but I do not quite
understand how you are arranging these. You told us that Number 1
contained a great number of other numbers. Now is Number 1 the exhibit
number?
DR. SERVATIUS: Number 1 is the exhibit number, and this exhibit contains
these documents with the numbers they have in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: In the books?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand. So that you are only submitting—up
to the present you have only got as far as nine exhibits.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And then you are going to give these various laws which
you have in your books additional exhibit numbers. They will be 10 to...
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not know whether it was necessary to submit these
Reich legal gazettes as exhibits. As far as I know they have already
been submitted because they are an official collection of laws from the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ of 1942 and 1940. Of course, I can take out these
individual issues and submit them here.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be best if you submitted them as, say,
Exhibit 10, and then told us the numbers in your books which are
contained in Number 10?
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it would be necessary to submit the original text of
the collection of laws. I wanted to avoid that.
THE PRESIDENT: We can take judicial notice of them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them.
I shall point out in what volumes these documents can be found. That
will be _Reichsgesetzblatt 1942_ in which Documents Sauckel-8, 11, and
17 are contained; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1940_ which contains Document
Sauckel-45; _Reichsgesetzblatt 1943_, which contains Document
Sauckel-21...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Which was the first _Reichsgesetzblatt_?
The one which contained 8, 11, and 17?
DR. SERVATIUS: 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: The second was _Reichsgesetzblatt 1940_, with Document
Sauckel-45. The third was _Reichsgesetzblatt 1943_, with Document
Sauckel-21. The fourth is _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1940_, Document
Sauckel-33...
THE PRESIDENT: What year, though?
DR. SERVATIUS: 1940. _Reichsarbeitsblatt_, Document Sauckel-33. The
fifth is _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942_, which contains Documents Sauckel-9,
35, 40, 46, 50, 51, 64(a). The sixth, _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943_,
contains Documents Sauckel-20, 23, 37, 42, 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 57, 60,
60(a), 61, 62, 64, and 68.
And the last, _Reichsarbeitsblatt 1944_, has Documents Sauckel-26, 30,
38, 58, 59, 65, 67, and 89.
I shall now go briefly through the document book. I begin with Sauckel
Document Book 2, Document Sauckel-32, “Orders and Decrees Concerning the
Employment of Prisoners of War.” That is the agreement of 27 July 1939.
This is an excerpt concerning the work of prisoners of war, and in
Article 31 prohibited labor is listed.
In the next document, Sauckel-33, there is a decree of the Reich
Minister of Labor, “Use of Prisoners of War in Places of Work.” There
the types of work for which these prisoners of war are being used are
listed in detail. Among the types of work not included is the
manufacture of arms; but included is work in factories, agriculture,
forestry, work on roads, canals, and dams of importance to the war, work
in brickyards, and so forth, as can be read in detail.
In Document Sauckel-35 we can see how the employment of prisoners of war
took place, namely by co-operation between the prisoner-of-war camp and
the contractors, and how a contract regulated in detail the conditions
under which the employment of prisoners of war took place. It can be
seen from this that Sauckel’s labor recruitment had nothing to do with
that.
In Document Sauckel-36 we find a circular decree concerning the
treatment of prisoners of war—a memorandum concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war—which was drawn up jointly by the OKW and the Ministry
for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda:
“Treatment of prisoners of war: Prisoners of war must be treated
in such a way that their full production capacity may benefit
industry and food economy. To insure this, sufficient
nourishment is necessary.”
This I wanted to underline.
Document Sauckel-37 deals with the question of an improved status,
namely the conversion of prisoners of war into civilian workers for work
of importance to the war in Germany. It shows that in this case they get
special allowances, such as an allowance of money for maintaining a
separate household—a so-called compassionate pay. It shows that these
workers were treated like civilian workers.
The next document, Sauckel-38, is along the same lines and deals with
the visits of relatives to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war
and to Italian military internees in the Reich. It says there:
“Visits to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war as well
as to Italian military internees are permitted only for wives,
parents, children, and brothers and sisters, who work in Germany
or have their homes in Alsace or Lorraine, and then only on
Sundays and holidays.”
This shows that actually the prisoner-of-war status had ceased.
Document Sauckel-39 is a memorandum with respect to general conditions
valid for the employment of prisoners of war. It deals with the working
hours: “The daily working hours, including the time of marching to and
from work, should not be excessive.” And in another passage it says,
“The prisoners of war have a right to a continuous rest period of 24
hours, to be granted on Sundays when possible...”
Under Paragraph 7 it is stated that neither the employer, nor his
relatives, nor his employees are entitled to carry out any punitive
measures against prisoners of war.
Then there follows an excerpt about housing and other accommodation in
camps. It is Document Sauckel-40, which decrees—on the basis of
Sauckel’s Order Number 9—the inspection of housing, food, heating, and
upkeep of the camps by workmen employed at the camps. It is dated 14
July 1942. It says:
“By 10 August 1942 an inspection of all industrial
establishments employing foreign labor must be made by all labor
offices in their respective districts to determine whether they
have duly carried out regulations and decrees governing housing,
feeding, and treatment of all foreign male and female workers
and prisoners of war. It is my desire that the offices of the
NSDAP and the DAF should participate in this inspection to a
proportionate extent. Where shortcomings are discovered, the
manager of the works is to be given a time limit within which
such shortcomings are to be remedied.”
Further on, under 2(a) it is stated that provision should be made for
feeding in winter. And finally: “All factories are to make provision for
camps and billets to be heated when cold weather sets in and to see that
the necessary fuel is ordered in time.” The decree states at the end
that workmen, paid by the factories, are to be employed in the camps to
see to the upkeep of the camps.
Then there is Document Sauckel-18, a memorandum for works managers and
Eastern Workers, which contains camp rules. The introduction says:
“In response to a wish of the Plenipotentiary General for
Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, I recommend that the
officials satisfy themselves from time to time that the
regulations issued with respect to the employment of Eastern
Workers are being adhered to within the establishments.”
That shows that control was emphasized here once again.
The camp rules then go on to say:
“Eastern Workers, you are finding in Germany wages and bread,
and by your work you are safeguarding the maintenance of your
families....”
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you not summarize these documents more
shortly?
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-41 shows that caring for the Eastern
Workers was especially the task of the German Labor Front, which is
explained here in detail.
Document Sauckel-42 deals with the same subject. It stresses above all
the importance of trade inspection and says that all necessary measures
for the welfare of foreign workers must be taken immediately and all
shortcomings remedied at once. The inspection officials and the local
authorities have to arrange matters together with the Labor Front. It is
issued by Reich Minister of Labor Seldte, not by Sauckel, which makes it
evident that Sauckel had not become the Reich Minister of Labor.
In Document Sauckel-43 there are explanations of the camp regulations to
which I shall refer in detail later. But in Document Sauckel-43 I should
like to stress again the position of the Trade Inspection Board. Here
the question of responsibility for hygienic conditions and for the
extermination of vermin is regulated; and it says at the end: “The
supervisory authority in accordance with the new regulations is the
Trade Inspection Board....”
Document Sauckel-44 contains specifications about sleeping quarters:
Their size, the number of beds, and the administration of medical care.
This again is signed by the Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, and
not by Sauckel.
The next group of documents deals with food. Document Sauckel-45 is the
meat inspection law which deals with the question of how far meat of
inferior quality is fit for consumption. That law too has a certain
importance with regard to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, about the inspection of meat, we do not
require any further information about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-46 shows merely that the foreign workers
received their food ration cards when away from the camp.
Document Sauckel-47 is a decree by the Reich Minister for Food and
Agriculture, and shows that he was responsible for determining the food
quotas. The document also gives the rations. I mention only a few: For
the ordinary workers, 2,600 grams of bread per week. That increases, and
it may be read here, if questions of importance...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 128 shows that prisoners of war are employed in the
armament industry, does it not? Page 128.
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “Food rations of Soviet prisoners of war
working in the armament industry or in trade industries, if they are
accommodated in camps...” and then follows a list of rations. I cannot
see how far that shows...
THE PRESIDENT: 128 in English, Page 128, Lines 4 to 12: “Treatment of
the sick. All prisoners of war and Eastern Workers, male and female, who
are employed in the armament industry...”
DR. SERVATIUS: It says there, “All prisoners of war or Eastern Workers
... who are employed in the armament industry...” Armament industry is
not the manufacture of weapons.
Document Sauckel-48 only refers to a law—I see the translation
department has left out a short paragraph, but I can do without that.
The heading indicates the subject. It refers to taking food for the
journey home. It thus concerns supplies for the return journey.
Document Sauckel-49 shows a regulation whereby additional food could
also be given; and special diets in the hospitals were also provided.
In the next group, questions of wages are dealt with. The first decree
is Document Sauckel-50.
THE PRESIDENT: How far you go—it seems to me sufficient if you give us
a group, and then tell us what it deals with.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. That is from Documents Sauckel-50 to 59, omitting
Document Sauckel-56. The questions of wages and scales of wages are
included here. One will have to look at these more carefully if these
questions become crucial. Therefore, I shall not make any further
specific statements about that now.
Sauckel Document Book Number 3 is a group of documents containing legal
orders. Documents Sauckel-60 to 68 refer to medical care. I believe here
also I need not go through the individual documents, because they become
of interest only when the subject is dealt with.
THE PRESIDENT: Give us a group and tell us what it is about, and then we
can look at it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. It deals with medical care; and as I said, the
details become of interest only when the question becomes important.
There is no point in speaking of them now.
The next group is speeches made by Sauckel on the subject of labor
allocation, and they are contained in the manual. I should like to refer
to one in particular—a speech of 6 January 1943 which was made after
the conference between Sauckel and Rosenberg. It says there at the
beginning: “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor on 5 and
6 January...”
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is 204 in my book, and in the English text it should
also be Page 204.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably that 8,000 should be 800.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, it should be 800. I have also mentioned that
document already, and read the main parts.
Documents Sauckel-82 and 83 have also been mentioned already in their
essential parts.
Document Sauckel-84 is a manifesto which has already been presented in
detail.
Document Sauckel-85 shows the generally valid and binding principles
followed by Sauckel, all of them well-known principles. The main fact is
that after 1943 they showed the same tendency as they had before.
Document Sauckel-86 is a later speech—a speech of 24 August 1943—to
the presidents of the Gau labor offices. Here again in his speech to the
responsible Gau labor presidents Sauckel stresses his basic attitude, as
he has often stated it here. He adheres to the same attitude on 17
January 1944—that is, Document Sauckel-88—when he again emphasizes to
these presidents, that:
“The foreign workers must be treated better. The reception camps
are not to be primitive; rather they must be a recommendation
for us.”
And at the end:
“The more I do for the foreign laborers working in Germany, the
better I treat them, the more I influence them—the greater the
extent of their available production capacity.”
And that was shortly—2 months—before he succeeded in putting the other
foreign workers on an equal footing with the German workers.
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard the Defendant Sauckel explain...
DR. SERVATIUS: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: ...that the work was carried on. And will you tell us
where the group of speeches—how far does the group go?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is Document Sauckel-89.
Document Sauckel-94 I have read already. Documents Sauckel-95, 96, 97 I
have already read to the extent necessary. And that brings me to the end
of the presentation of documents.
Now, comes an affidavit of the witness Karl Goetz, which is included in
the document book. I submit it as Exhibit Number 10, the affidavit by
Karl Goetz. This is an interrogatory which was submitted very early and
was therefore considered in a very abridged form, as the details had not
become apparent at that time. Consequently, the witness answered very
shortly and could say nothing specific to a number of questions. Where
he did answer the questions, he refers to an introduction which he
wrote, and in answering the questions raised by the Prosecution he also
refers to that introduction. Therefore, I believe that I might also read
this introduction as far as is necessary.
The affidavit is of 20 March 1946. In this introduction, on the second
page, I should like to call attention to a conference in Paris. This
witness Goetz was a bank expert in Weimar. He had known Sauckel before
and had worked on his staff of experts. He had been with him in Paris
and had taken part in the negotiations with Laval. He says here:
“The negotiations led to an extensive talk, which was conducted
in a proper and polite manner as far as I could judge. Laval
took note of Sauckel’s proposals and agreed to accede to his
request. But he made counterproposals...”
I do not think I need go into detail, because what was then negotiated
is of minor significance. He says on the third page:
“During a later conference in Paris the proceedings were
similar. Laval assumed a stiffer attitude, and he pointed out
the great difficulties which would impede the recruitment of
additional workers. He emphasized in particular the necessity of
not stripping the French labor market of its best forces.”
I think I can go on to Page 4. The witness says there under 5:
“My last mission, at Sauckel’s request, was to ascertain whether
it was possible by means of using our banking connections to
purchase an additional amount of grain in Romania and
Hungary—about 50,000 to 100,000 tons was the figure given. This
grain was to be used as additional food for foreign laborers in
the form of a light afternoon meal.”
Then he says that that project failed due to circumstances. He gives a
general impression of Sauckel, and says briefly:
“Sauckel approached that task with the energy and vigor peculiar
to him. He pointed out repeatedly what conditions were necessary
for the success of the task and repeatedly emphasized that it
was the major duty of all authorities to see that correct
treatment was given to workers at their places of employment.”
Then he describes the details:
“Above all, he demanded that foreign workers should not be given
the feeling of being imprisoned in their camps. He demanded the
removal of all barbed wire fences.”
He continues by saying:
“...Sauckel said that the workers must return to their native
countries as propaganda agents.”
Then the witness gives an important statement concerning information as
to atrocities and bad conditions. I should like to read something from
Page 6 to show what kind of person this witness Goetz is. He says...
THE PRESIDENT: What page is your excerpt from?
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 6, or Page 266 of the document book, at the top of
the page.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: He says:
“I feel also that I should mention that following my arrest by
the Gestapo, after the affair of 20 July 1944, Sauckel spoke on
my behalf to the RSHA (Kaltenbrunner). I cannot say to what
extent my release from the Ravensbrück Concentration Camp was
brought about by this.
“I wish to state further that I did not receive from Sauckel any
material remuneration, awards, or decorations.
“I found it expedient to conceal from him my own inner political
convictions and my connections with Goerdeler and Popitz. In his
blind obedience to Hitler—and in spite of our old
friendship—he would otherwise no doubt have handed me over to
that Gestapo from which he endeavored to free me in November
1944.”
I have read this in advance and I return now to Page 265, because the
witness, who was then working on Sauckel’s staff, states his attitude to
that question which is of great interest to all of us. He says:
“Now that the extent of atrocities in concentration camps has
become known to me from publications, I ponder and rack my
brains as to how the picture drawn above can be made to tally
with the events now brought to light. Although I have thought it
over for weeks, I can find no explanation for this.”
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this? Page 265?
DR. SERVATIUS: Page 265. It is near the top of the page. Where it is in
the English text, I cannot say; but it should be Page 265.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: “On one side I see the foreign workers, men and
women who move freely about in great numbers and associate with
the German population. Frenchmen and Belgians, with whom I spoke
out of personal interest, were usually happy to hear their
native tongue, conversed freely, hoped the war would soon end,
and criticized their work, but rarely sharply. On the other side
appears the totally unbearable sight of the recently revealed
mass atrocities. One had heard that foreign workers were tried
and sentenced—they were certainly subject to the same
arbitrariness and the same methods of punishment as were the
natives—but not that mass sentences were passed. But that
really had nothing to do with the Allocation of Labor. I find it
impossible to reconcile what I heard and what I saw in those
days with the present revelations. Either this was a development
which took place in the last year and a half, when I was not
able to observe the situation because of my arrest and my
retirement to the country, or else there existed, besides the
regular Allocation of Labor, an employment of concentration camp
inmates on a vast scale. It is also possible that Sauckel was
not able to supervise things and was not informed or that he
deceived himself with his general orders and oral statements,
which I could not comprehend.”
I considered these statements of particular importance, because the
witness stood on the side of the men of 20 July 1944 and certainly
observed carefully, and great importance has to be attached to his
judgment.
As to the questions themselves, Question Number 1 and its answer I
consider irrelevant; also, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All of these are answers
which are of minor importance.
To Question Number 10, Page 276:
“Who was responsible for the billeting, treatment, and feeding
of foreign workers after they had arrived at the place of work?”
The answer is:
“The only thing I heard was that from the moment work was
started responsibility for that rested with the factory
managers, and in most cases with special employees under them.”
Question 11 is:
“What kind of orders did Sauckel issue for the treatment of
workers in the factories?”
The witness in his answer refers to the introduction which I have read.
The next questions—13, 14, 15, 16, and 17—are irrelevant.
Question 18 is:
“Did Sauckel receive reports about irregular conditions? What
measures did he take? Do you know of any individual cases?”
The answer is:
“I remember only one case. Sauckel was informed that the workers
of a certain factory were still housed in a camp surrounded by
barbed wire. I cannot recollect the name of the place or the
factory concerned. I heard that he ordered the immediate removal
of the fence.”
Then we come to the questions which are put by the Prosecution. I
consider that Question Number 1 is not relevant because it deals with
personal, unofficial relations with Sauckel, and how he became
acquainted with him. He made his acquaintance when a prisoner of war.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, Mr. Biddle thinks that the Prosecution
ought to be asked to read anything they wish to out of those
interrogatories.
M. HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any
excerpts from this interrogatory.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you know that the witness Jäger is
present, do you not?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, he is present.
THE PRESIDENT: You know he is present.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call
the witness Jäger.
[_The witness Jäger took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
DR. WILHELM JÄGER (Witness): Dr. Wilhelm Jäger.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the war you worked as a doctor with the
firm of Krupp, in Essen, and were entrusted with the medical care of the
camps of foreign workers? Is that true?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who put you in charge there?
JÄGER: I was appointed by the firm of Krupp which employed me when a
change in the care of foreign workers was brought about through the
public health administration having to take it over.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you not also appointed to this post by the German
Labor Front?
JÄGER: No. The contract which the firm of Krupp made with me was made
through the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, you did not conclude the
contract directly with the Labor Front; but you were under obligations
to the German Labor Front, were you not?
JÄGER: I have never felt that I had anything to do with the Labor Front
in that respect.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not continuously send reports to the
German Labor Front about the conditions in the camps?
JÄGER: That happened only in a few cases, as far as I can remember. I
generally sent these reports to the public health authorities and to the
firm of Krupp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not also report to the Trade Inspection Board?
JÄGER: Not always. I reported just a few cases to the health office of
the city of Essen, but only in individual cases when it appeared
important to me that the health office should be informed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the office for public health and medical
care?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: With what office was that connected?
JÄGER: That was in Essen.
DR. SERVATIUS: I do not mean the locality, but with what office was it
connected? Was it not with the German Labor Front?
JÄGER: I cannot say that precisely. I know only that it was a
subdepartment of the public health administration in Essen.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that the foreign workers were under
the care and control of the German Labor Front?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Also with respect to their health?
JÄGER: On only one occasion did I meet a commission from the Labor Front
in my camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the institution of Gau camp doctors?
JÄGER: An institution of that kind was to have been created in Essen,
but it did not happen. At that time, when we had just had a typhus
epidemic, I suggested to the health officer—who was then Dr. Heinz
Bühler of Mühlheim—that something of the sort should be instituted.
Then also at a meeting I spoke about my idea, but I did not hear
anything more about this Gau office for camp doctors.
DR. SERVATIUS: That will do. How many camps did you supervise?
JÄGER: That varied. First, there may have been 5 or 6, then later maybe
17 or 18, and later again it fell to a lower figure. But I am not able
at this moment to give you the exact figure.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the nature of your task?
JÄGER: Above all, I was supposed to assure the medical care of foreign
workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the treatment of the
sick?
JÄGER: Only when they were brought to me and when I was in the camps. I
always concerned myself personally with individual cases in the camps
whenever I inspected them.
DR. SERVATIUS: You had not only a supervisory capacity, but you also
gave treatment yourself?
JÄGER: Whenever I was in a camp I would be consulted by the camp doctors
and I would advise them.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the job of the camp doctors?
JÄGER: The camp doctors had their daily duty in the infirmary and the
care of the patients in general.
DR. SERVATIUS: So your work was supervisory?
JÄGER: Yes; supervisory.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution has repeatedly interrogated you
outside this courtroom?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have been in Nuremberg before—in this building here?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you make an affidavit about the conditions in the
Krupp camps?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I will put this affidavit to you. This is an affidavit of
15 October 1945. Did you give that affidavit as a witness for the
Prosecution?
JÄGER: As far as I can remember, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Now I ask you to state whether you still stand by the
statements which you made at that time?
JÄGER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall read the statements to you: “My name is Dr.
Wilhelm Jäger. I am a physician in Essen...”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, we cannot have the whole document read to
him. You can put to him anything you want to challenge him upon.
DR. SERVATIUS: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] You say, at about the middle of the first
page:
“I began my work with a thorough inspection of the camps. At
that time, in October 1942, I found the following
conditions...”—and you go on to say—“The Eastern Workers were
housed in the following camps: Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse,
Spendlerstrasse, Hoegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Dechenschule...”
THE PRESIDENT: Are you challenging that?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Where were these camps?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, that is what I want to ask him.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did these camps exist at the time, and were
they occupied?
JÄGER: As far as I can remember. One has to take into consideration that
until I started my work I did not know at all what camps existed. At a
meeting which had been called, where there were doctors of the various
nationalities, I asked first of all what camps there were. They did not
know; and then a list was procured in which the camps were given.
Then...
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have mentioned the camps here by name, and
yet you are not certain that these camps existed at that time, in
October 1942?
JÄGER: I have given the camps which existed at the beginning of my
activities, as far as I could remember. I had to go to each one of these
camps personally, and I had to depend entirely upon myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: Further, concerning the food of the Eastern Workers—if
you will look at the second page of the document—you state the
following:
“The food for the Eastern Workers was completely inadequate.
They received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for
Germans....”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, below the names of the camps he says:
“...all surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.” I
understand you are challenging that?
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the camps surrounded by barbed wire and closely
guarded, as it says here?
JÄGER: In the beginning, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you do not know whether that was the same case in all
camps, do you?
JÄGER: The camps which I visited, where I was as yet unknown, for
instance, Krämerplatz and Dechenschule, were closely guarded, and I had
to show my credentials in order to get in.
DR. SERVATIUS: I repeat the question concerning the food. You said the
Eastern Workers received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum
for Germans. Whereas German workers who did hard work received 5,000
calories per day, the Eastern Workers who performed the same kind of
work received only 2,000 calories per day. Is that true?
JÄGER: That was true at the beginning of my activities. The food for
Eastern Workers—as could be seen from the posted lists—had been
determined as to quantity, and there was a difference between that for
Eastern Workers and that for German workers. The 5,000 calories
mentioned here were given to specific categories of German workers who
did the hardest type of work. That was not given to everybody.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I shall put to you a chart of the calories.
I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this chart. That is an exact table of
the calories to which the individual categories of workers were
entitled. It begins with 9 February 1942 and shows the individual quotas
for the various types of workers; and on the last page there is a
summary of the average quotas of calories which were allotted.
It is shown there in the summary, Group 1. Eastern Workers and Soviet
prisoners of war: Average workers, 2,156 calories; heavy workers, 2,615;
very heavy workers, 2,909; for long hours and night workers, 2,244. Are
you familiar with these figures?
JÄGER: Approximately.
DR. SERVATIUS: Will you compare that with what the German workers
received: The normal consumer, 2,846 calories; heavy workers, 3,159;
very heavy workers, 3,839; for long hours and night workers, 2,846
calories. Is that in accordance with your statement, according to which
you said that German workers doing the heaviest work received 5,000
calories, whereas the Eastern Workers received only 2,000 calories?
THE PRESIDENT: It is very hard to follow these figures unless you give
us the exact page. Are you on the last page?
DR. SERVATIUS: This is a summary.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, on which page are you?
DR. SERVATIUS: On the last page, the last sheet on the right side.
First, there are the food groups 1, 2, 3 on different pages; and then on
the last page, on the right side next to Group 3, which concerns the
Poles, there is a summary of calories for Eastern Workers, for Germans,
and for Poles. If you compare the amounts of calories here in the
columns, that should tally with what the witness has stated. He singled
out the very heavy workers and said that the Germans received 5,000
calories; the table shows that they received only 3,839. He also says
the Eastern Workers received 2,000 calories; whereas, according to the
table, they received 2,900—that is, instead of a proportion of 5,000 to
2,000, it is from 2,900 to 3,800—in round figures about 1,000 calories
and not, as the witness has said here, 3,000 calories. Is that correct?
Do you stand on your statement? A distinction has to be made...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the witness’ answer.
MR. DODD: I think it would be more helpful to the Tribunal, and
certainly to the Prosecution, if it were established who made up this
chart, and whether or not the figures given here cover the camps where
this witness had jurisdiction. From looking it over I cannot tell where
it was made up, except on the front page it says:
“According to the food table by Dr. Hermann Schall, Medical
Superintendent of the ‘Westend’ Sanatorium. Calculations of
controlled foodstuffs for the camps of the firm of Krupp...”
And so on.
But these things can be made up by the bale and presented to witnesses.
Unless there is some foundation laid, I think it is an improper way to
cross-examine.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have an affidavit which can prove where that chart
comes from.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you ever seen this chart before?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is the affidavit of the witness Hahn.
JÄGER: Was a question put to me, please?
DR. SERVATIUS: The witness has the original. It is attached. May I ask
the witness to return the document to me?
JÄGER: I wanted to make a statement on this subject.
At the beginning of my activity the Eastern Workers’ food definitely
differed from that of the German people, and also from that of the
so-called western workers—the French, the Belgians, and so on. It can
be seen from the figures that, even though it may not be stated exactly,
at least there is a difference of 700 to 800 calories. In the beginning
until, I believe, February or March 1943, the Eastern Workers received
no additional rations for long hours, heavy work, or very heavy work.
These additional quotas were given only after Sauckel had ordered it;
and that was, if I remember correctly, at the beginning of 1943. At that
time, as far as I remember, the Eastern Workers were put on an equal
footing with the German workers as far as food was concerned; and they
received additional rations for long hours, heavy work, and very heavy
work, which they had not received at all before.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I understand you correctly, you want to say
that this chart may be right but that in reality the workers did not
receive what is listed on the chart. Did I understand you correctly?
JÄGER: Even from this chart you can see the difference.
DR. SERVATIUS: It was a difference of 3,000 calories which you
mentioned, whereas the table shows a difference of about 1,000 calories.
JÄGER: I said before that there were individual categories of workers
doing the heaviest type of work—such as stokers and miners—and that
they received up to 5,200 calories. That, however, was not the rule.
Only very special workers received up to 5,200 calories.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then what you say here is not correct, because you did
not mention that. You say generally that, whereas the German worker who
did the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories, the Eastern
Workers who did the same type of work received only 2,000 calories per
day. That is, however, a general statement; and it does not show that
you are referring to exceptional cases of individual groups of workers.
Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is the way I saw it, and I believe that you understand it as
it appears here.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, where does this chart come from, and are you putting
it in? Will you put it in?
DR. SERVATIUS: In the affidavit this assertion is made, and the witness
said clearly at that time that the workers doing the heaviest type of
work received 5,000 calories if they were German, and if they were
Eastern Workers, they received only 2,000. That is a very clear
statement in the affidavit, which is not in accordance with the chart.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it in evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What will it be? What number will it be?
DR. SERVATIUS: That will be Exhibit Sauckel-11.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the affidavit refer to the chart?
DR. SERVATIUS: I asked because I questioned the correctness of the
affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I asked whether the affidavit refers to and
identifies the chart, the chart which the witness has just had in his
hand.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you have put in an affidavit by Walter
Hahn. Does that affidavit mention the chart and say where the chart
comes from and by whom it was made up and to what it refers?
DR. SERVATIUS: The affidavit which is here as Document Number D-288 does
not mention the chart, but only the affidavit which I have submitted.
Now I understand it is the affidavit by the witness Hahn, and the chart
is attached; and it is covered by the affidavit made by the witness.
That document I submit in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I said the affidavit by Walter Hahn—does it identify and
is it attached to the chart? What page? There are seven pages, you know.
We cannot find it unless you tell us.
DR. SERVATIUS: In the German text on Page 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean where it says, “The amount of calories
contained in this food can be seen from the calorie table made by me
which covers the whole period of the war”? Is that what you mean? That
is on Page 4 of our copy. It is under the heading “C”: “Food Supply of
French Prisoners of War and Italian Military Internees.”
DR. SERVATIUS: It is there, as I have said before, on Page 4 of the
German text, where it says that the rations were based on calories; and
that the caloric content of the food can be seen from the calculations
made which cover the entire duration of the war. That is the document
attached.
THE PRESIDENT: But it is all right to say that the document is attached,
but it does not refer to it by any name.
DR. SERVATIUS: But the document is attached, so that it is obvious that
it must belong to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I do not want to be contentious about this,
but—maybe I do not understand—I think we ought to know when this
schedule was made; by whom. This affidavit says it is an appendix. Maybe
it was made by the man Hahn, but we do not know it yet; and this witness
has not testified to it, and counsel has not told us.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the position is this, is it not: The man named
Walter Hahn made an affidavit annexed to this chart. That affidavit is
dated, I imagine...
MR. DODD: Yes, 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: ...after the affidavit had been made by this witness, and
replies in detail to the evidence given by this witness.
MR. DODD: Yes. What I wanted to understand fully was that this schedule,
concerning which this witness is being cross-examined, was apparently
not made up at the time when he had responsibility for these camps; and
so far it does not appear from the examination that that is so, and I
think it would have great bearing on the weight of the evidence adduced
through the cross-examination.
I would like to point out that it was the defense of Sauckel that he had
nothing to do with the feeding and care of these workers after they came
into Germany, but that it was the responsibility of the DAF. I think it
might be more helpful if counsel cleared that up, so that we would know
whether he does admit responsibility after they came in and whether that
is the purpose of this cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal does not think that you need
interrupt your cross-examination. You can go on.
DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution has just made that assertion as an
accusation against Sauckel. If the Prosecution today is of the opinion
that Sauckel was not responsible for the happenings in the factories but
rather the works manager was responsible and that he was not responsible
for prisoners of war but that the Armed Forces were responsible for
them, then I do not need this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on with your cross-examination, please.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have made some statements concerning the
clothing of Eastern Workers. You said that they slept in the same
clothes in which they had come from the East and that almost all of them
had no overcoats and were therefore forced to use their blankets—even
in cold and rainy weather—to carry their blankets in the place of
coats.
Was it always like that, or only for a time? Was that a general
occurrence or only an individual case?
JÄGER: In order to avoid another misunderstanding I have to state again:
At the beginning of my activity I depended entirely on myself. There was
no camp command. There was nobody else to work with me. The calorie
tables as were as the clothing charts were not made until later.
The camp management which existed, according to Hahn—if I remember
correctly—was only until February or April 1943. The phase which I
intended to describe, and have described here, refers strictly to the
time when I started my work. At that time the conditions were actually
as I have described them, and I had to go by that. That also included
clothing, as I have confirmed. These people remained in the same
condition as on arrival, as far as clothing was concerned, for quite a
while; and as far as I know they did not receive anything at that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was done about that?
JÄGER: I reported these conditions as soon as possible. I do not
remember when. As far as I could see, the intention was to establish
tailor shops, shoe repair shops, and other work shops in the camps; and
some of them were actually established.
DR. SERVATIUS: One question. Did things generally get much better in the
course of your activities, or did they become worse?
JÄGER: They did not become worse after 1943. After, the first heavy air
raids, of course, the confusion was always very great. A great deal was
destroyed by fire. I recall that during one night 19,000 persons became
homeless; and, of course, clothes and underwear were destroyed also. It
naturally took quite some time to make up these losses.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these conditions caused by the firm of Krupp, or by
lack of supervision on the part of the Labor Front?
JÄGER: As I have said, I saw members of the Labor Front only once in a
camp. Then that commission did actually criticize conditions. It was in
the camp at Krämerplatz, and the firm of Krupp was fined at that time,
because of the conditions. But that was the only time that I got in
touch at all with the Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the firm of Krupp object in any way to the
improvements, so that the Labor Front had to intervene?
JÄGER: That I cannot say. I had no influence in that respect and did not
know anything about it, because I had to deal only with medical affairs,
and did not participate in meetings of the firm of Krupp or the Labor
Front. I could only make reports.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you also made statements concerning the
conditions of health; and you said that the supply of medical
instruments, bandages, medicines, and other medical equipment was
completely inadequate in these camps. Is that true, or were those
exceptional cases; or was it a condition which existed all the time?
JÄGER: That was how I found the camps in October 1942, and slowly I had
to clear up these conditions. Later, of course, there was an
improvement.
DR. SERVATIUS: You say here that the number of Eastern Workers who fell
sick was twice as high as the number of German workers; that
tuberculosis was especially prevalent; and that the percentage was four
times as high among the Eastern Workers as among the Germans. Is that
correct?
JÄGER: That was the case at the beginning when we received workers who
had not had any medical examination at all. When I went through the
camps, I heard from the camp doctors—and saw for myself on the occasion
of inspections—that very many people were sick. The figure was
considerably higher than among the Germans, as far as I could see at
that time.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was done about that by the Krupp firm?
JÄGER: After we had found out that it was tuberculosis we had to deal
with, we made examinations in large numbers, even X-ray examinations.
Then those affected with tuberculosis were separated from the others and
put into the Krupp hospital for medical treatment.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you mentioned typhus, and said that that was also
widespread among the workers.
JÄGER: I busied myself with that in particular, as we had about 150
cases.
DR. SERVATIUS: At what time?
JÄGER: During the entire period from 1942 to 1945.
DR. SERVATIUS: How many workers did you have during that time?
JÄGER: Oh, that varied.
DR. SERVATIUS: Give us some approximate figure.
JÄGER: Well, if I remember correctly, there may have been 23,000 or
24,000; there may have been more. Later, there were about 9,000. But
these figures varied.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you consider it correct, if 150 people out of such a
large number are affected by typhus over such a long period of time, to
say that it was very widespread among the workers?
JÄGER: Yes, for we had no typhus at all among the German population. So
that statement may be justified. If among a population of 400,000 or
500,000—such as there was in Essen at that time—there was no typhus at
all, and if one then takes an average of 20,000, with 150 cases among
the 20,000, then that statement can quite well be made.
DR. SERVATIUS: In other words, you maintain your statement, that it is a
correct statement that typhus was widespread. You say, furthermore, that
carriers of these diseases were fleas, lice, bedbugs, and other vermin
which tortured the inhabitants of those camps. Was that true of all the
camps?
JÄGER: It was the case in almost all the camps when I began my work.
Then a disinfection station was set up by the firm of Krupp, which was
hit in an air attack immediately. It was then rebuilt, and then
destroyed a second time.
DR. SERVATIUS: You say that in cases of illness the workers had to go to
work until a camp doctor certified that they were unfit for work. In the
camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, and
Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse there were no daily consultation hours, and that
at these camps the camp doctors appeared only every second or third day.
Consequently workers were forced to go to work despite illness, until a
doctor appeared. Is that correct?
JÄGER: Naturally a worker had to work unless a camp doctor certified he
was unfit. It was the same with the German population. I am a panel
doctor myself and I know that in many cases a man had to go to work if
he did not report himself sick; there was no difference in that respect.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you say that that was the case in the camps
mentioned; that there was no real consultation hour, which meant that a
man could not possibly report sick?
JÄGER: But he could go to a doctor. Because there were no doctors there,
I purposely arranged that whenever possible people should come to me
during my consultation—to me personally.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said here...
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you just said that the workers could report ill
even when there was no doctor present, that there was some other
provision for them. Here you say that these camps were visited only
every second or third day by the competent camp doctors; that as a
consequence the workers, despite illness, had to report for work until a
doctor was actually there. Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is wrongly expressed. If anyone reported ill he had to be
taken to a doctor, or the doctor was notified.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like to return once more to the subject
of the spreading of typhus. How many deaths resulted?
JÄGER: Only about three or four cases of death resulted, and they
occurred only because the case was diagnosed too late. I always took
personal charge of the typhus cases and had them brought to the hospital
immediately, for I was responsible for this.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say in another place, on Page 2:
“The plan of supplies prescribed a little meat each week. Only
Freibankfleisch could be used for this purpose, which was horse
meat, meat infected with tuberculosis, or meat condemned by the
veterinary.”
Does that mean that the foreign workers received bad meat?
JÄGER: One must define the expression “Freibankfleisch.” That was meat
which was not released for general consumption by the veterinary but
which, after being treated in a certain way, was quite fit for human
food. Even in times of peace and afterwards, the German population
bought this meat. During the war the German population received in
return for their coupons a double quantity of Freibankfleisch.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the veterinary allowed it for consumption?
JÄGER: Meat which had been condemned at first was released for human
consumption after it had been treated in a certain manner and was then
not harmful.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then the expression “condemned by the veterinary” means
that it was first condemned and then allowed?
JÄGER: Yes, then allowed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, regarding the French prisoner-of-war camp in
Nöggerathstrasse you said the following:
“This camp was destroyed in a bombing attack; and the inmates
for almost half a year were housed in dog kennels, latrines, and
old baking ovens.”
Is that correct?
JÄGER: That is how I found this camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you saw that yourself for a half year?
JÄGER: I was there only on three occasions. It was described to me in
that way, and I found the camp in that condition. As far as I could
determine at the time, it had been in that condition for about 4 months;
then it was rebuilt.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I am interested in the dog kennels. How many dog
kennels were there? Were they really dog kennels, or was that only a
derogatory remark about some other kind of billets?
JÄGER: It was an expression of mine, because the inmates built and
hammered these huts together themselves.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is the same true of the latrines, or what does that mean?
JÄGER: That was the place where the doctor had his consultations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a former latrine, or was it a latrine that was
being used as such?
JÄGER: A former latrine.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was a former latrine which had been rebuilt?
JÄGER: It had not been rebuilt; it was just as it had been.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was this latrine then still being used?
JÄGER: It was not being used.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say that there were no tables, chairs, or
cupboards in this camp.
JÄGER: That was also not the case.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you swear to this testimony which you have
seen?
JÄGER: Yes, to the one I saw before.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are you sure it is that testimony which you have just had
in your hands?
JÄGER: In my home in Chemnitz I crossed out various things in the record
of the interrogatory which was submitted to me, and initialed these
corrections...
DR. SERVATIUS: This very sentence, did you not...
THE PRESIDENT: Please do not interrupt him.
DR. SERVATIUS: Please continue.
JÄGER: I must assume that this is that corrected record.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have it before you?
JÄGER: Yes, I have a record before me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you not determine which passages you crossed out?
Were there many passages like that, or was it just single words?
JÄGER: No, sometimes entire sentences.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you swore to that?
JÄGER: Yes. After I had made these changes, I swore to this record.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the
Tribunal to the fact that this statement was in the Krupp files at the
beginning of the proceedings, and that it was considerably shorter, and
that a number of sentences which the witness has sworn to here were
lacking in that statement. I would suggest, therefore, that the
Prosecution should submit the original, which the witness states he has
altered, so that it can be seen just what he did write. As far as I
know, he struck out at the time a few of those very statements which he
has just repeated here.
As an example, I mention that he stated that in this camp there were no
chairs, tables, or cupboards. That is a sentence which was struck out.
The witness thus had doubts at the time, and did not swear to these
facts.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you are talking about. We have before
us what is called a sworn statement, which was put in evidence and which
is signed by the witness. The witness is now saying that that statement
is correct, subject to any alterations which you have extracted from him
in cross-examination.
DR. SERVATIUS: He said it might be entire sentences. I should like to
ask the Prosecution to produce the original document with the passages
crossed out, because I have seen two statements: a brief one in which
these passages are apparently left out, and a complete one, such as we
have before us, and which the witness says had been cut short.
THE PRESIDENT: All that the witness is saying, is it not, is that it was
originally submitted to him in a certain form? He made certain
alterations in it. Then, when those alterations had been made—I do not
know whether it was fair-copied or not—he then signed it and swore to
it, and that is the document that we have.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, my contention is this: The document which
we have before us does not show these crossings out. The words which
were struck out are still contained in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the witness any question you like about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you mark your alterations?
JÄGER: I crossed the passages out with ink and put my name next to the
alterations. It is difficult, of course, and today I am not able to say
what I did strike out at that time, as I did not retain a copy.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, if this document which we have before us
were reproduced correctly these crossed-out passages would have to be
shown, especially as the witness says that he put his initials in the
margin.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied?
Witness, did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? You
know what a fair copy is, do you not?
JÄGER: Yes. I must try to remember exactly.
The document was submitted to me. I made the alterations, and then I
signed three or four of these statements. Then these records were taken
away; and on the same day or the following day, I was in Essen and swore
to this record. Then I received a record which I read before the court.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a fair copy without any alterations?
JÄGER: That was a fair copy. I do not remember exactly; I really cannot.
DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations?
JÄGER: The record came about in this way. Captain Harris came to me and
interrogated me on these matters. Notes were taken; and then Captain
Harris, I think, compiled this record and asked me to sign it.
DR. SERVATIUS: And why did you make these alterations?
JÄGER: Because I could not swear to those things—the things that I
struck out I could not swear to.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it incorrect, or did it go too far?
JÄGER: In part it went too far, I think I can put it that way; and in
part it was incorrect—unintentionally, of course. But I had to make
those changes, and I did make them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I show you a document in which I mark in red
the passages that you struck out, would you recognize those passages?
JÄGER: That is very difficult, for I cannot remember that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: I am not clear on this. I do not know whether counsel is
claiming that we have another document, one which we have not submitted.
I do not know of any such. We submitted the only one that came into our
possession...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got that original, or is it with...
MR. DODD: There were a number of these made up, and they were all signed
as originals. The first was the copy made with the typewriter, the
others carbon copies. It was a joint British-American team that
interrogated the witness, and this one copy was turned over to us, and
we submitted it. That is the only one we have ever seen.
THE PRESIDENT: I see in the certificate of translation it refers to a
certificate dated 14 October 1945, signed by Captain N. Webb...
MR. DODD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You will find that at the end of the document, I think.
DR. BALLAS: As former counsel for Herr Krupp Von Bohlen, I wish to make
a statement about this.
In the Krupp file which the counsel for Krupp...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What have you got to do with it? We are
now considering the suggestion made by Dr. Servatius that this document,
which we are now considering...
DR. BALLAS: I am sorry. I did not quite follow you, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We are now considering the Document Number D-288. You
haven’t anything to do with that document.
DR. BALLAS: Yes, this document does concern me. The Krupp portfolio...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What right have you to speak about it? You
are only a former counsel to Krupp.
DR. BALLAS: I want to help explain the matter. At present I am appearing
for Dr. Siemers, counsel for Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: But how can you help us about the framing of the
affidavit of this witness by the Prosecution? You cannot do anything
about that.
DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to refer to the different versions of the
document.
In the Krupp file there is a Document D-288 which is considerably
shorter than this Document D-288 which has been submitted by the
Prosecution in the case of Sauckel. At the time I called Dr. Servatius’
attention to this difference, and we checked point by point just how far
the deviations went. There are thus two documents—the one original
Document D-288 and the one in the Krupp file which differs from the
document presented in the case of Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: But this document was signed by this witness. There may
have been some other document signed which was put in the Krupp file,
but this witness has said that he signed this document. Therefore, it
does not seem to me that it is material.
DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to call your attention to the fact that there
are two different documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; thank you. Is there any other member of the Defense
that wants to ask questions of this witness?
[_There was no response._]
Then, Mr. Dodd, do you want to re-examine him?
MR. DODD: No, Sir—except that I would like to say, with respect to the
Tribunal’s question concerning this certificate of translation where the
name Captain N. Webb appears, that I am informed that refers to a
certificate which is attached to all British documents and that is a
certificate which goes along for the purpose of the translators.
Undoubtedly, that is what it is. However, I will have a search made in
the document room and clear it up. It is better that way. But my British
friends say that is so—they do send a certificate; and the only
possible explanation is that it is the certificate with a mistake in the
date. But in any event, I will look into it.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness had the original of that affidavit put to
him?
MR. DODD: I believe he has. I understood he had the one which is before
the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he acknowledged the signature?
MR. DODD: Well, I understood so. I can inquire.
[_Turning to the witness._]
Witness, you saw the signature? Is it your signature?
JÄGER: Yes.
MR. DODD: As a matter of fact, I talked to you personally on this
matter; and you told me that this was a statement you gave. Do you
remember that? Do you recall when you and I talked, and you told me this
was your statement? You looked it over and read it.
JÄGER: Yes.
MR. DODD: You read English as well as German, do you not? You have some
knowledge of English.
JÄGER: Some knowledge, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the document is being handed to you. It is in
German, is it not?
JÄGER: It is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: And it is signed by you, is it?
JÄGER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any passage in it which you want to strike out
of it?
JÄGER: May I read the document first?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; you may read it as quickly as you can.
MR. DODD: While the witness is reading the document, I should like to
inform the Tribunal that we made a call to the document room and have
been told by the officer there that there is only one Document D-288,
and this is it; there is no duplicate signed, as counsel for Krupp
stated.
JÄGER: Yes, here there is an alteration which is written in pencil, on
Page 2. I crossed that out, but that was not written by me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I submit the document which I received
from the counsel for Krupp at the beginning? I also have here an English
document, Document Number 288 and the passages which allegedly were
crossed out at the time have been marked by me in red. I should like to
submit this document for the information of the Court; I believe it will
help in clarifying this matter. There are many passages struck out.
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Servatius, that is a different document, as I
understand it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We do not need that. We have this document before us,
signed by the witness; and we have asked him whether he has anything in
it which he thinks did not form part of the original document which he
signed.
JÄGER: On Page 1 it says, “Conditions in all these camps were extremely
bad.” I would have probably limited this statement, because I...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Witness, we do not want to know whether
you think you expressed yourself too strongly. We only want to know
whether the document represents the document which you
signed—accurately represents the document which you signed. If there is
anything which you want to change now, you can say what it is.
JÄGER: The record, as it is before me, I would not change in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one or two questions I want to ask you. Were
prisoners of war employed at Krupp’s during the time you were
supervising these camps?
JÄGER: I did not supervise the prisoner-of-war camps. That is a wrong
expression. I received the permission to visit the prisoner-of-war camps
which were under the sole jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht, and I was told
that these prisoners of war were all working for Krupp.
THE PRESIDENT: Were any of the people who were working at the camps,
which you mentioned in this, prisoners of war?
JÄGER: In Hoegstrasse.
THE PRESIDENT: Prisoners of war were working there, were they?
JÄGER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Krupp’s?
JÄGER: For the Krupp Works, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What sort of work was it?
JÄGER: These things were not under my jurisdiction. It depended on their
trade—locksmiths probably worked in the locksmith shop. But there were
also many unskilled laborers. But I am naturally not able to give you
all the details; these matters were not under my jurisdiction. I was
concerned with these people only in my capacity as a physician.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_The witness left the stand._]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have found that certificate; and it is as I
described it for the Tribunal. It is a certificate by Captain Weber of
the British Army service that he received a copy of this document from
the American team; and it is signed by him, Captain H. Weber, IMT Corps,
British Army, European Sector.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your case then, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. There are two more witnesses, Biedermann and
Mitschke. I can dispense with both of these witnesses.
Then we still do not have the sworn affidavits, the interrogatories from
Dr. Voss, Dr. Scharmann, a witness by the name of Marenbach, and the
witness Letsch, who was an expert in Sauckel’s office. We have received
interrogatories from the witnesses Darré and Seldte, but these have not
been translated as yet. I shall submit them as soon as they have been
translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have concluded my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, counsel for the Defendant Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Your Honors, with your kind permission I shall present my
case in the following manner. First of all, I shall call the Defendant
Jodl to the stand and use all documents, with a single exception, during
his examination, and submit them to the Court.
I do not need to bore the Tribunal with lengthy readings. I have three
document books which are numerically arranged, Jodl 1, Jodl 2, and so
forth—and I shall in each case quote the page which is found in the
upper left-hand corner on every page of the translation. The numbering
is the same as in the original; they correspond. I am sorry to say that
the documents are not exactly in the order in which I shall read them,
and this is due partly to the fact that they were received too late and
partly to other factors. I still do not have several interrogatories,
particularly one which is very important to me. I hope that I shall be
able to submit them later. I was granted five witnesses, but I can
dispense with one of them. The four remaining witnesses will take up
little time.
Now, with the kind permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call the
Defendant Jodl to the witness box.
[_The Defendant Jodl took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ALFRED JODL (Defendant): Alfred Jodl.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst Jodl, in the English-American trial brief it
says that you are 60 years old. That is a mistake. You became 56
recently. You were born when?
JODL: I was born in 1890 on 10 May.
DR. EXNER: You were born in Bavaria, and both of your parents are
descended from old Bavarian families. You chose the military profession;
what was the chief reason for your choice?
JODL: A great-grandfather of mine was an officer; my father was an
officer; an uncle was an officer; my brother became an officer; my
father-in-law was an officer—I can well say that the military
profession was in my blood.
DR. EXNER: And now I should like to hear something about your political
attitude. To which of the political parties which existed in Germany
before 1933 were you closest in spirit?
JODL: As an officer all party politics were entirely remote to me; and
especially the offshoots of the post-war period. If I look at the
background from which I come, the attitude of my parents, I must say
that I would have been closest to the National Liberal Party and its
ideas. In any event, my parents never voted anything but National
Liberal.
DR. EXNER: Tell us in a few words what your attitude was to the Weimar
Republic.
JODL: True to my oath I served the Weimar Republic honestly and without
reserve. If I could not have done that, I would have resigned. Moreover,
a democratic system and a democratic constitution was not at all a
foreign idea to us southern Germans, for our monarchy was also
democratic.
DR. EXNER: And what were your relations to Von Hindenburg?
JODL: I knew Hindenburg. I was assigned to him after his first election
to the Reich Presidency when he spent his first vacation in
Dietramszell. Then I spent a day with the Hindenburg family at their
Neudeck estate together with Field Marshal Von Manstein. I can only say
that I admired him; and when he was elected Reich President for the
first time, I considered that the first symptom of the German people’s
return to self-respect.
DR. EXNER: What was your attitude toward the National Socialist Party?
JODL: The National Socialist Party I hardly knew and hardly noticed
before the Munich Putsch. It was this Putsch which dragged the
Reichswehr into this internal political development. At that time, with
few exceptions, it met this test of obedience. But after this Putsch
there was a certain cleavage in the views of the officers’ corps.
Opinions varied as to Hitler’s worth or worthlessness. I was still
extremely skeptical and unconvinced. I was not impressed until Hitler,
during the Leipzig trial, gave the assurance that he was opposed to any
undermining of the Reichswehr.
DR. EXNER: Did you attend meetings at which Hitler spoke?
JODL: No, never.
DR. EXNER: Tell us which leaders of the Party you knew before 1933.
JODL: I knew only those who had previously been officers: for example,
Epp, Hühnlein, and Röhm. But I no longer had any connection or contact
with them after they had left the Reichswehr.
DR. EXNER: Before the seizure of power had you read the book _Mein
Kampf_?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you read it later?
JODL: I read parts of it later.
DR. EXNER: What was your opinion on the Jewish question?
JODL: I was not anti-Semitic. I am of the opinion that no party, no
state, no people, and no race—not even cannibals—are good or bad in
themselves, but only the single individual. Of course I knew that Jewry,
after the war and in the moral disintegration that appeared after the
first World War, came to the fore in Germany in a most provocative
fashion. That was not anti-Semitic propaganda; those were facts, which
were regretted very much by Jews themselves. Nevertheless, I was most
sharply opposed to any outlawing by the state, any generalization, and
any excesses.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that all the defendants cried,
“Germany awake; death to the Jew.”
JODL: As far as I am concerned, that assertion is wrong. At every period
of my life I associated with individual Jews. I have been a guest of
Jews, and certain Jews have visited my home. But those were Jews who
recognized their fatherland. They were Jews whose human worth was
undisputed.
DR. EXNER: Did you on occasion use your influence on behalf of Jews?
JODL: Yes, that too.
DR. EXNER: Did you know that the Reich Government in the year 1932
counted on the possibility of attempts to overthrow it and sought to
save itself in this direction?
JODL: I certainly knew that, for when I came to Berlin at that time I
did not find in the later operational division any preparations for war;
but I found preparations for the use of the Reichswehr in the interior
of the country, against the extreme leftists as well as the extreme
rightists. There were plans for maneuvers of some sort in that
connection in which I myself participated.
DR. EXNER: What was your attitude to the appointment of Hitler as Reich
Chancellor in the year 1933?
JODL: The appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor was a complete
surprise to me. That evening when I was returning home with a comrade,
through the excited crowds, I said to him, “This is more than a change
of government; it is a revolution. Just how far it will lead us we do
not know.” But the name of Hindenburg, who had legalized this
revolution, and the names of such men as Von Papen, Von Neurath,
Schwerin-Krosigk exerted a reassuring influence on me and gave me a
certain guarantee that there would be no revolutionary excesses.
DR. EXNER: At this point I should like to read a part of General
Vormann’s interrogatory. This is Page 208 of the third volume of my
document book. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
the fact that Page 208 in the upper left hand corner—I submit the
original—refers to the period from 1933 on. Jodl was then at the group
headquarters (Gruppenamt), and Vormann was in his group. I read under
Figure 2:
“Jodl, who at that time was a major on the General Staff, was my
group (Gruppe) leader in 1933. He shared completely the view of
the Chief of the Army Command at that time, General Von
Hammerstein, and was thoroughly opposed to Hitler and the
Party.”
I shall now skip a few lines; they are not so important. Then in the
center of the page, I continue:
“When on 30 January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor,
Jodl was dismayed and astonished. I clearly recall that on 30 or
31 of January, at his request, I had to call together the
officers of his group for a conference. At this conference he
explained that Hitler had been called to be the head of the
Reich according to the existing constitution and the laws in
force. It was not for us to criticize this, particularly the
behavior of Reich President and Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. We
must obey and do our duty as soldiers. The kind of criticisms
made hitherto, of the new measures initiated by the new
chancellor, were not to be made in future for they were
inconsistent with his and our own position.
“His entire speech showed great worry and apprehension with
regard to the coming development of the situation...” and so
forth.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, this would be a convenient time to break off.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Sir David, you were going to show these
applications.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, Number 1, which my friend
General Rudenko will deal with, because he will deal with another one;
and if I might deal with the ones which I have?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant
Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross-examine three witnesses
whose affidavits were used by the Prosecution. The first is
Tiefenbacher, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second,
Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Stroop, dealt with
the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Stroop as SS
and Polizeiführer in Warsaw. The Prosecution submits that in these cases
cross-examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I
do not know if...
THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the
case of—in all three.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will have no objection to
cross-interrogatories as long as they are not brought here as witnesses.
My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath
to use M. François-Poncet as witness. The Prosecution will be grateful
if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my
French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and
they have not got a reply yet. I do not think it will prejudice the
Defendant Von Neurath’s case. It will be time for a reply before there
is any difficulty as to time.
Then, My Lord, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von
Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit
from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Vacano. The affidavit is 12 pages long and is
a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the
Adolf Hitler Schools. The Prosecution feel that the matter has been
thoroughly covered by the Defendant Von Schirach himself and also by his
witnesses Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit
would be cumulative and repetitive. But, of course, it is an affidavit;
it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feel that
they ought to have it, the Prosecution do not wish to press their
objection unreasonably.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English—I have
read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has
been translated into the other languages.
The next, applications from the Defendants Hess and Frank to put an
interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite
shortly, that raises the same point as the application on 2 May 1946 for
Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department. The objection of the
Prosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are
cross-examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer,
and should not, in the opinion of the Prosecution, be allowed to call
evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the
relationship between the witness Gisevius and the United States Office
of Strategic Services.
The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Speer for the
approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The
Prosecution have no objection to the application. They reserve the right
to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the
Trial.
My Lord, the next is a purely formal application on behalf of the
Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an
affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that.
Next is the application on behalf of the Defendant Hess...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We
have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
Then I think that only leaves an application of the Defendant Keitel for
the use of a decree of Hitler of 20 July 1944, and the Prosecution has
no objection to that.
My Lord, I think I have dealt with every one except the first one, which
my friend General Rudenko will deal with—the application of the
Defendant Göring.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of
the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their
view respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses
with regard to the mass shooting of Polish officers by the Fascist
criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal
activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the
evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication
of the special Extraordinary State Commission investigating the
circumstances of the mass shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war by
the German Fascist aggressors in Katyn Forest. This document was
presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Document Number USSR-54 on
14 February 1946, and was admitted by the Tribunal; and, as provided by
Article 21 of the Charter, it is not subject to argument.
Now the Defense once again are putting in an application for the calling
of three supplementary witnesses—a psychiatrist, Stockert; a former
adjutant of the Engineer Corps, Böhmert; and a special expert of the
staff of the Army Group Center, Eichborn.
We object to the calling of these three witnesses for the following
reasons:
The calling of the psychiatrist Stockert as a witness must be considered
completely pointless as the Tribunal cannot be interested in the
question of how the commission drew its conclusion—a conclusion which
was published in a Hitlerite _White Book_. No matter how this conclusion
was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting of Poles by Germans in Katyn
Forest has been unequivocally established by the Soviet Extraordinary
State Commission.
Stockert himself is not a doctor of forensic medicine but a
psychiatrist—at that time a member of the Hitlerite commission, not on
the basis of his competence in the field of forensic medicine, but as a
representative of the German Fascist military command.
The former adjutant, Captain Böhmert, is himself a participant in the
crimes of Katyn Forest, having been a member of the Engineer Corps which
carried out the executions. As he is an interested party, he cannot give
any useful testimony for clarifying the circumstances of this matter.
Third, the expert of the staff of the Army Group Center also cannot be
admitted as a witness because he, in general, knew nothing at all about
the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and could not have known all
that pertained to the matter. The same reasons apply to his potential
testimony to the fact that the Germans never perpetrated any mass
shooting of Poles in the district of Katyn. Moreover, Eichborn cannot be
considered an unprejudiced witness.
Regardless of these objections which express the opinion of all the
prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that
these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the
special authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went with
great precision into all the details. The result of this investigation
has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by
Germans, and are but a link in the chain of many bestial crimes
perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have
previously been submitted to the Tribunal.
For these reasons the Soviet Prosecution categorically insists on the
rejection of the application of the Defense Counsel.
I have finished my statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he
not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories,
which the Prosecution do not object to?
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these
witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on
the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted
to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for
cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not
involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories
will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the
cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further
application, you can always do so.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it,
that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the
Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so
far, been the ruling of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit
is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any
general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought
here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the
matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that
there should be cross-interrogatories.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this
testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the
contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three
interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that
the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I
suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it
says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for
cross-examination?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion
is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would
save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the
questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann,
and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief
statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion?
General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring
to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this
regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government
reports are evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that
that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General
Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave
particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not
witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a
psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any
value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is
made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn
carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned
by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same
staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed
there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a
pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot
eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With
reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not
mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have
now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the
deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a
witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be
proved by hearing him.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German
commission?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained
from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been
carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he
was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military
commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part
in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I
know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a
regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument.
Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should
stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well
then, we will consider that.
Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in
answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent
the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach.
As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to
the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who
made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points
on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a
witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to
determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be
important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then
to decide whether to admit it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want
to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General
Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing
to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application
to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also
withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was
to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been
decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to
Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no
objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear
argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the
Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech
through the earphones.
DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when
Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you
felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.
JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern.
When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the
Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with
Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so
overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will
could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in
taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler.
When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the
command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish
Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with
him.
DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war?
JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war.
DR. EXNER: Did the Führer have confidence in you?
JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust
of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time
he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have
a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial
Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.”
The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the
end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then
his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the
great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and
unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved
and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943
had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp
altercations.
DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his
political intentions?
JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of
course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political
plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for
politics is part of strategy.
DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between
himself and you?
JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for
us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported
to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for
party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such
nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious
that generals do not understand politics.”
It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any
political discussions was slight.
DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly
separate?
JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or
not?
JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the
circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with
doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if
things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous
decision, all discussion came to an end.
DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed
here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?
JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this
Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning
of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war,
and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the
extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the
politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and
to the SS differently again.
The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in
the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a
masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked
photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about
the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and
Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly
humane establishments.
DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Führer’s headquarters from the
outside?
JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a
concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire
surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to
safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1.
Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my
staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each
officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only
very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of
holies.
DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports?
JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated
American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on
new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the
headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of
military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the
present situation were forbidden.
DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Führer take place?
JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on
the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I
took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000
conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the
military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the
basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what
orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an
adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and
orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation
were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval.
Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks?
JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did
not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the
situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a
similar manner.
DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of
the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a
political nature?
JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were
discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military
measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came
together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were
discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct
of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with
foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign
Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the
organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories,
for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to
take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I
really needed the time I then had left for my own work.
DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to
contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?
JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer.
Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were
moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections
I induced the Führer to desist from many things.
DR. EXNER: Can you give an example?
JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not
interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there
was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention.
I prevented that because I objected.
DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler?
JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something
which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was
still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of
passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a
psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again.
This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the
case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch
justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered
that himself.
The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said
that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.”
Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any
other way?
JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for
the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do?
JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In
view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was
particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents.
If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was
not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer
atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by
the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to
know about it?
On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the
Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give
examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He
testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General
Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed
by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten
minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately
ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the
American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American
prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an
investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the
result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi
company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer
immediately.
DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary
Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second
document book:
“The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company
because of atrocities committed against the civilian population
in Eastern Bosnia.”
I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi
company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on
the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police
arrested this Ustashi company.
“The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried
out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it
undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole
Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful
effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the
population caused by the atrocities.”
Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Have you another example?
JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy
violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be
certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases
of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be
quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this
respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back?
JODL: Unfortunately not.
DR. EXNER: I do not understand.
JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through
which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual
and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s
department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at
the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the
Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer
answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is
that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities,
but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to
the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous
attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which
brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A
tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had
been in a position to hold the Führer back.
DR. EXNER: What role did Canaris play in this connection?
JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to
him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far
more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational
conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to
me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of
terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with
Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that
they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators.
DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and
intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything
about such plans?
JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or
about any intentions to carry out a Putsch.
DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have
considered a revolt possible or promising?
JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands.
That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The
results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are
well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July
1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense
of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one
soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All
the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To
overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a
mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had
been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass
of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not
simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke.
But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and
at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything
positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived
in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German
officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers
struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary
deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year
1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power,
who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance
to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded
revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the
man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked.
DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler?
You have already intimated something in that connection.
JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief
answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting
moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a
martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it
was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to
be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing.
Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the
face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their
breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I
myself belonged.
DR. EXNER: Give us an example of such a crisis in your relations with
Hitler.
JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended
Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my
operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court.
Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any
human being. From that day on he never came to dinner.
DR. EXNER: To your mess?
JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The
report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the
Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an
SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and
from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake
hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This
situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field
Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be
replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from
the OKW?
JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to
see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with
the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing
happened.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces
of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of
that is true?
JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual
truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.
DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military
career. How about that?
JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I
was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general
in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was
appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of
lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger
general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the
Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said
to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly
before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to
general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am,
became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my
subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30.
DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of
the Führer, that is with regard to—
Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler?
JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January
1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the
only decoration I received from the Führer.
DR. EXNER: In the entire 5½ years of war?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the
Party?
JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the
fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the
Führer each Christmas.
DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by
us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?
JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to
the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied
territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and
I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer.
DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst.
How did you invest this money?
JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds...
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet
been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and
therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in
detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very
fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly
influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly?
What were the things you disliked?
JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and
his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in
every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent
logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination,
which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often
went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by
his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for
at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the
Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his
mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had
to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not
interested in that.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have
heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of
Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of
any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he
not get on with his own case?
DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Führer personally?
JODL: No; in no way at all.
DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official?
JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and
he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that
therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.
DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle?
JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its
developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries,
his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.
DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove
that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his
enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?
JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered
it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of
lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...
DR. EXNER: When was this speech?
JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was
the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally
necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely
unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same
time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme
leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation
of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could
obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an
officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver
this speech.
DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech?
JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of
the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the
introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay
behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the
strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the
operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify
myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a
General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it
was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The
question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there
were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I
shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover,
it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one
says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I
delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to
the senior officers of the reserve army.
DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of
the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that
in a purely objective military speech?
JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a
critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It
was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party
leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the
speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for
victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which
the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172...
DR. EXNER: Is that the Gauleiter speech?
JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech
which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket”
version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely
revised and altered because it contained many things which were not
important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about
the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means
at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things
contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech
which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these
notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff.
DR. EXNER: Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
JODL: It is in no way the manuscript; that looks entirely different.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the
Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until
the outbreak of the war?
JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was
with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed.
DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before
1939, or before the beginning of the war?
JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal,
Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one
else.
DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the
literature of National Socialism?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in Reich Party rallies?
JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last
3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht
were reviewed.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is,
every year on 9 November?
JODL: No. I really did not belong there.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the
semimilitary units of the Party?
JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after
the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete
power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch.
That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the
Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real
revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in
June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the
Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of
the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an
extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never
reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the
country.
DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your
diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the
document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned
himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19
April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there
is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief
of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning
development of the SS.”
In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of
course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings
concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands
for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this
correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that
I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French
document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this
connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this
large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression,
especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the
chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant
figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must
emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of
documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which
we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found
quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions.
You are making some long statements now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3
February, on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long
statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that
sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it;
but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the
translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations
now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring
to 3 February...
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or
misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if
necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts
from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing
further to say about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It says, on 3 February:
“General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry
of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of
Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all
means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the
wall in its present weak state.”
Then it says under the date of 10 February:
“Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the
Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.”
Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the
document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry
of 25 May 1940:
“The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally
suspicious.”
Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this
dualism that you just mentioned?
JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about
this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite
openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.
DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more
influence in military spheres?
JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the
feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of
the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an
inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he
believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods.
DR. EXNER: And what practical results came about through this?
JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied
tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the
operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police
Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the
SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than
before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and,
in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization.
DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by
the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau.
Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen?
JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and
I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all
the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary,
Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2
February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February
1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy:
“The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the
battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von
Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he
is in favor of Von Brauchitsch.
DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the
generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed?
JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as
Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have
subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau.
DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against
the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There
is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your
participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of
the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and
you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which
the Prosecution has accused you...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number
USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a
set of notes on a report.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all:
What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the
treatment of commissars?
JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned
with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time.
But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field
Marshal Keitel.
DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation
against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action
as retaliation.”
What do you mean by this statement?
JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was
rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place
about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance
ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand
that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they
follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to
Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still
circumvent this order which had been demanded.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this
order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military
authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war.
These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to
brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that?
JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to
Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the
commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and
gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism
for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that
we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of
what had been written in the literature of the entire world about
Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example,
the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that
first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would
actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions
were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I
meant by my notation in the margin.
DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the
war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war;
and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be
considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the
enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to
brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht
auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as...
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in
the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several
minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to
what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission,
that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner,
and I would ask him not to make another one now.
DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of
evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those
words.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when
counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of
the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is
perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by
his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the
question, and not to suggest the answer to him.
DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was
summarizing the main points of what the witness said.
There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to
overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man
zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best
therefore to brand” in English, and in French as _stigmatiser_. It seems
to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should
say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say
_traiter_.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then what happened?
JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.”
The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has
been said that that was a typical military expression used by the
Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the
Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe
we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in
a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to
the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance,
“in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers
“aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to
arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.”
DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning
indicating deception?
JODL: No.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war
crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary
questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the
period of the war?
JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the
strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was
the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with
the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly,
had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the
Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an
extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o’clock in the
morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I
already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with
the press, which had to receive daily information.
DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks
connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations
Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so?
JODL: Yes, of which I was chief.
DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most
important one, was the operations department?
JODL: Yes, operations.
DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department.
The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do
you agree?
JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization
which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel’s case. There is a
great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal
Keitel’s assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however,
only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field
Marshal Keitel.
Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my
operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters
concerned with strategics, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my
quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over
all other tasks.
DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have
authority to issue orders?
JODL: No—or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to
Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but
only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally
decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There
was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the
commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best
possible terms with them.
DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand
that even though you had no authority to issue orders, so many orders
have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed
in different ways—sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a “J,”
the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences.
JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Führer
himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial
at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted
in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came
from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were
signed “by order, Jodl”; but they always had at the beginning the
sentence, “The Führer has decreed,” or that sentence was found somewhere
in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving
reasons for the order, and then, it would read: “The Führer has
therefore decreed.”
DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of
orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Führer, and the other
only by you?
JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of
less importance.
DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with “The
Führer has decreed,” but were signed by you nevertheless. What about
these?
JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: “The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” These were orders which emanated
from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Führer himself and
Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not
in every case.
Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page,
in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other
departments. My initial “J” on the first page was merely an office
notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not
mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that
the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work,
then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of documents, of which
some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are
not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these?
JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff
levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous
files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a
description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other
departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however,
is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it
formed the basis for an order.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can
explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes
concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is
884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152.
Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding
political officials _et cetera_ ... regarding commissars...”
The English translation says: “The Army High Command presents a
statement...”; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French;
it says: _Confirmation des instructions_. It should obviously be
_projet_.
In any case the German original says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding
treatment of political officials _et cetera_, for the uniform
application of the order issued on 31 March 1941.”
And these are the commissars. The whole of this is a condensed draft.
Will you please explain what it means?
JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the
draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but
in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page
153, the views of another department—that of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg’s—are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it contains a
proposal of my own staff.
The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become
one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I
might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further
treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore
one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the
well-considered words contained in an actual order.
DR. EXNER: All right. So much for the summarized draft and your notes.
Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This
matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it
goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we
know from the newspapers.
I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to
this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do
not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to
have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I
hope this has been done.
Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both
are signed by the Führer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-542.
MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book,
Number 7, Page 64.
DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an
explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order
threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like
warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection.
Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the
Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October ’42?
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into
greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own
person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers
and German officers whom I represent here is in question.
The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it?
JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942—it was really a
supplement to the communiqué—emanated in the main from me. It deals
with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter
which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The
Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up.
DR. EXNER: But this supplement...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know—at least I have not seen the
document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to
any answer to any English documents as far as we know.
DR. EXNER: I wished to submit this document but objections were raised.
THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the
Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?
DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to
present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it
briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he
means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the
subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when
he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does
not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement
to make.
DR. EXNER: Yes, I understand.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the
contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you
have it in your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What
the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to
deal with this subject.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an
improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the
Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it
forward in the evidence in this case.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you understand? You must
not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you
will give us an explanation of what you meant?
JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order.
Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It
was written by the Führer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already
stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is
the sentence which reads:
“...in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and
their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits
will be treated as such by the German troops and will be
ruthlessly eliminated in battle wherever they appear.”
This sentence was written, word for word, by the Führer himself.
DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to
that effect...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute.
Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the
Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of
October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report
refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the
Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?
JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the
entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence.
But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this
document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never
objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the
Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it
at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when
this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but
I have no objection to it at all.
DR. EXNER: May I say something?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all
the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either
this afternoon or tomorrow.
I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr.
President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht
communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Führer wrote
the supplementary sentence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have
said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You
are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the
witness.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, state once more which part of the
Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Führer.
JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing
whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the
well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the
beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it
emanated from you?
JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was
formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of
the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio.
This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I
established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records,
photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. Initially this affair
had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced
into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Führer,
which begins with the sentence: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht is
therefore compelled to decree the following.”
DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement
known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Führer
demand from you drafts for an executive order?
JODL: When the Führer had written this last supplementary sentence, he
turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order
to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he
added: “But I do not want any military courts.”
DR. EXNER: Did you make a draft?
JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of
warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared
such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked
for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document
1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?
DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS,
RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204?
DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.
JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to
avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the
announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was
certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the
entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again,
either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous
occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be
shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not
happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.
In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17
October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me
and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him
the following answer, word for word:
“Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order
like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him
that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that
I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under
international law.”
And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the
Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to
speak to him personally.
DR. EXNER: And this coincided with the Vinnitza crisis?
JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings
or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have
helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me
on the telephone and informed me that the Führer was going to draw up
the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and
brought with him these two orders of the Führer—the order to the
troops, and an explanation for the commanders.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to two documents which are before us?
JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers
submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the
Führer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The
documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the
originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned
that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to
1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal—Page 104 of Volume
II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark
on that page is “No.” In the French translation this non is missing, and
should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your
own handwriting, “That will not do either,” and your initial “J” for
Jodl.
Can you explain in general what this means?
JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff—as may be seen
under the first figure on Page 104—on their own initiative asked for
proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris,
because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly,
from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned
with a legal problem.
On Page 106, under paragraph “a,” there is the proposal which the
foreign division of the intelligence department made:
“Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found ...
without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as
bandits ... or if they fall into German hands outside battle
operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for
interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary
court martial.”
That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian
clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might
be a spy or an escaped prisoner-of-war or an enemy airman who had saved
his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian
clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating
officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant,
two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph “b”...
DR. EXNER: And for that reason you wrote “No”?
JODL: For that reason I wrote “No.”
In paragraph “b” it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were
captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in
that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the
function of a military court, and that it could never be.
I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I
saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates.
DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had
grave misgivings about the Führer Order. Will you tell the Court now
what misgivings you had?
JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality.
Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently
clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered
military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may
on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment
not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some
safeguard against a miscarriage of justice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install
some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous?
JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by their actions put themselves
outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with
the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in
international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a
_franc-tireur_.
The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were
using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Führer went further
and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the
point on which I had grave misgivings.
DR. EXNER: What legal doubts did you have?
JODL: Just this doubt—that on the basis of this order, soldiers also
would be massacred...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you
can speak a little bit more fast.
JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Führer’s
expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers,
would be wiped out. In addition—and this was especially repugnant to
me—at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were
to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What
was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely,
whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy
the legal status of a prisoner-of-war, or whether on account of his
earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal
status.
DR. EXNER: By that you mean the Geneva Convention?
JODL: Yes, I mean the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had
acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers?
JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the
Führer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders
of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders
were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever
possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after
some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and
testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me
that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families,
unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika—that
was their badge—had been shackled with a loop around their necks and
the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way
that they had strangled themselves.
I may add that I kept these photographs from the Führer, and I did not
tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I
concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry.
Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German
soldier had been shackled at Dieppe.
Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of
Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had
been shackled.
Finally we captured the so-called British order for close combat. That
was the last straw for the Führer; I also studied it very carefully.
These close-combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be
shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the
shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498
were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler
referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been
killed, and that criminals, as Commandos...
THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is
inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these
things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That
is not what the witness said.
DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order
is based were reported to you.
JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Führer first
makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their
conduct of the war have been using methods which violate the
international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true
on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since
the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was
an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There
was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be
given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of
such reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult
to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order
was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in
respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other
things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that
it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which
happened long before.
JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only
want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the
reasons given by the Führer for this order did not spring from a
diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our
possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own
mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or
whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital
point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact
that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in
the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the
testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was
obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more
than once—that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled
and that you had the Canadian orders before you.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of
killing prisoners.
JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any
captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though
this was also contained as a reason in the Führer Order. But I must
explain that the British Ministry of War advised us—I cannot recall
exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio—that situations
might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be
killed—no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled
because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if at the
end here the Führer says orders have been found according to which the
Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is
referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a
method of shackling which would cause death.
DR. EXNER: And that was your own part in this Commando Order?
JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it
distributed, in accordance with express instructions.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this
order—one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not
correct?
JODL: No, I signed only a general decree to have one of the orders kept
secret.
DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have
refused to transmit this order?
JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Führer, I would
have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But
as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its
entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know
that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference
of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a
different opinion on the subject.
DR. EXNER: General, you can speak a little faster.
Could you have made counterproposals?
JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however—a time of
conflict with the Führer—it was not possible for me to speak to him
personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference
on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in
the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I
was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same.
DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have
been interpreted in different ways?
JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of
really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly
encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was
the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our
troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of
the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a
reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the
sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a
Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a
sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had
to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under
their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which
go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender;
or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The
commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of
such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite
possible—and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the
bulk of cases—that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.
DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices
followed by the troops?
JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was
reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured—which according
to the Führer decree was not allowed—then I raised no questions or
objections. I made no report at all to the Führer on Commando operations
which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him
from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field
Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in
convincing the Führer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.
DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out?
JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the
public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not
more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all.
For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly
large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht
communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who
were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the
Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is
given—it is USA-551, on Page 117.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7.
JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered...
DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another
document, Document 532-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention
Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2,
Page 113.
This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it
because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out.
Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained
in this document?
JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander,
West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should
be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted
to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to
the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little
further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking
place daily at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not
rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am
asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they
maintain it, or did they deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was
struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now?
DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I
merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that
the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly
bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in
evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it
has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been
given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was
then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference
being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the
Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl’s writing upon it; and,
therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its
admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My
Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to
cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my
friend Dr. Exner putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368.
DR. EXNER: Will you continue?
JODL: At that time it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order
entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4:
“That is just what they should not”—the entire first page. That was of
no use, however, because on that very day the Führer made a different
decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his
decision is contained in Document 551-PS.
DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the
second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men
belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten
remark of yours: “Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater
of war.” This is on Page 117.
Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for
your remark.
JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits
were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was
to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not
to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations
which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted
this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there
existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice
in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a
landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because
all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command
posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions
applied to the whole Italian theater of war.
DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the
second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: “...the
order remains in force....” But the second paragraph reads:
“Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle
area of the beachhead—that is in the area of the divisions
fighting in the front line—as well as reserve troops up to and
including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the
basic order....”
The word “Generalkommando” means “corps command,” and it has not been
quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of
the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodi’s comment, also to
apply to the Italian theater.
Now finally—but before that I have another important question...
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: Yes; the word “Generalkommando” has been translated into the
French, _Région Militaire_. _Région Militaire_ is not quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, “corps command.” That is correct.
The English is correct: “corps command.” That is the same as
“Generalkommando.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw
the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a
mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call
it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is
not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our
attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now,
will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it
appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in
your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the
Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court
should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists
of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the
second is a draft initialed “W”—that is Warlimont, with Jodi’s penciled
note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order
in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to
Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the
last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of
Keitel. That appears from the original draft.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution has been
emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept
secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of
commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs.
You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order,
503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?
JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document
503-PS.
DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book,
on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue?
JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of
all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order
contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which
the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando
operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain
circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would
certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type
of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be
considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a
sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition—as the
order seems to end before it—that sentence, I must say, made me
indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly
strict secrecy for this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says:
“If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men
temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately
after interrogation.”
I cannot prove it...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not in 503, is it?
DR. EXNER: 503-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document
book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy
order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be
submitted to the Tribunal.
JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble. The
troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not
kill Commandos but took them prisoner.
DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also
convinced that it was against international law?
JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it
distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I
think it is base to extort all information out of him first.
DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned
before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the
Führer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite
clear. But you said you also did not report information which you
obtained from the enemy—killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?
JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the
violations of international law which we considered had been committed
there—the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one
thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men
belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled
themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or
Wehrmacht communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you
should ask him again I don’t know.
DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now pass to another subject, the order
regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler’s order about the fate of
Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-123, second volume, Page
145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114.
This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did
this order come into being?
JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence:
“The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world.”
I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field
Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He
reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out
toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be
absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people
fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply
situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the
first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the
Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous
explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city
was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers
were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because
further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first
the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of
the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60
objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some
time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by
engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be
blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the
explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this
demolition chart in my hands. That proved...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the details of Kiev. This
deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance
what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was
feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans
of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he
could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go
into the details about Kiev.
DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15
(Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on
these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more
now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.
JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Führer always
expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would
happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive
reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was
given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was
given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had
been undermined and would be defended to the last man.
The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German
troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire
staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason
the Führer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request,
put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, “The Führer
has again decided”—that means “once more,” “for the second time.”
DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the
east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?
JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our
experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the
transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train “Bavaria,”
which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population
from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible,
because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the rails
had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was
very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of
people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the
idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea,
incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made
here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.
DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has
accused you of ordering in Document UK-56—which is Exhibit RF-335 in my
document book, the second volume, Page 153—of ordering the deportation
of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political
order.
Will you explain how this order came into being?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You
said—at least, I took it down—Page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second
volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please reply.
JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the
deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at
which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Führer; and the
Führer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through
General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel.
Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the
military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or
rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed
to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the
German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which
it was destined. The Reichsführer SS received the letter only for
information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our office
practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him,
but it was merely for information. He already knew the Führer’s
decision.
I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote,
“The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsführer SS...”
DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2?
JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be
addressed to the Reichsführer SS; and it would have had to be worded
like this: “Reichsführer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark.” But it is
exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hannecken
in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is
being handled by the Reichsführer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to
be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency
existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that
had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected
to it and forbidden it.
The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I
informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone,
quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution
mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark
into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that
possible.
Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the
deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in
question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as
I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to
Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross;
and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their
treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider
is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on
Page 156 of the second volume the word “volunteers” does not appear in
the translation. It says here, “The Reichsführer SS has permission to
recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are
to be released...” The word “volunteers” is missing in the English
translation; the French, merely says _hommes_—“men.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] You actually had no dealings with matters
in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then
did you come to sign this order?
JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order
because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.
DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court
what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are
under oath.
JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very
often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say,
fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint
or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single
occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt
in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but
Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts
which had been built there, and he said, “Not only the Jews but also
Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter
resistance.” And with that he removed my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I
heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in
the presence of soldiers at the Führer’s headquarters. Himmler spoke
only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of
the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen
and Einsatzkommandos—a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard
here in detail—there was never any explanation through the Führer
himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell
uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a
menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police,
and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the
Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of
the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all
these things for the first time after the end of the war.
DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to point out to you that
you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Führer;
you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself.
The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had
been no explanation to the Führer.
THE INTERPRETER: From the Führer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Führer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord.
JODL: I said that the Führer had never given us any other reason for the
presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were
necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did
you know about them? Please be brief.
JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at
Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg
once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the
name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the
name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I
made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual
criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like
Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable
detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons,
or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of
the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I
had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had
seen them with my own eyes.
DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police
General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with
Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and
reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do
you say to that?
JODL: I think it was on 30 December 1943.
DR. EXNER: Was it?
JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is
incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present,
the word “murder” was never mentioned. The Führer said:
“I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now
beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to
say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which
has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will
be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by
terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be
hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want
courts martial, which only create martyrs.”
He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be
murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the
presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again,
it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international
law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its
opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such _franc-tireur_
warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point.
DR. EXNER: You just said, “as long as I was present.” Were you not
present during the entire conference? Can you remember?
JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were
made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away
for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and
partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what
these partisans were?
JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types
of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five
characteristics:
1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one’s own front; 2)
it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of
the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders from them; 4) it
must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to...
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t require a lecture about this matter.
DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now
want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all
I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180,
USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book,
Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action
against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122
is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure
5, I quote:
“In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works,
so-called _istrebitelni_ battalions (i. e. destruction
battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the
German troops....”
Then, under Roman Numeral III:
“...the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan
groups have become known ... partly from the captured combat
directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a
captured partisan ... is significant: ‘A partisan must destroy
everything that he can reach...’”
And then, in one of the “Combat Directives for Partisan Groups” received
by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated:
“Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his
allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the
enemy are to be opposed.”
And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads,
_et cetera_. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I
have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise
themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will
work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The
witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against
partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it
was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that.
Is that correct?
JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting
obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in
Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive
for partisan warfare. It is called “Instructions for Partisan Warfare,”
and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see
that in the second sentence it says that...
DR. EXNER: Page 126.
JODL: ...the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, “Instructions for
Partisan Warfare in the East,” issued by the OKW, Armed Forces
Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that
at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession
instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the
battle against partisans should be conducted.
DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is
an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor
Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare
against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well
directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from
1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler’s
permission; is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: What made you do that? Was it not an unusual step?
JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to
Field Marshal Keitel or to the Führer, because it was a contradiction of
all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives
instructions for all so-called partisans in France and
Yugoslavia—partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines—to
be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners
of war.
I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting
of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Führer no longer
concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after
1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law,
as the “Canaris” department had been dissolved on that day and the
foreign section, together with the international law department, had
come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to
participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and
I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war.
In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and
even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners
of war, long before Eisenhower—on 7 July 1944 only—demanded that
terrorists in France should be given that status.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was
only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true?
JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943,
to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway sabotage occurred in
Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by
Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000
Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed
off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a
peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated
that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror
became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being
killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in
the East.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal’s
attention to an entry in Jodl’s Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page
119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says,
“Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Führer to increasing
partisan activity...”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in
this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that
guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to
the passage?
DR. EXNER: Will you name the passage, Defendant?
JODL: It is under Figure 163, on Page 131.
DR. EXNER: Page 131 of the second volume.
JODL: May I read it?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
JODL: “All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian
clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in
principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons
encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered
as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be
proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the
uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful
interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how
they are dressed”—and, may I add, even if dressed in German
uniform—“are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans
must hear of this.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps—it is 1 o’clock—we might
break off now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan
regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number
161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document
we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the
destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of
villages in France. Will you please comment on this?
JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the
collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had
decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the
Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is
prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror
activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order
the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the
contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very
exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional
commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial
investigation.
I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine,
which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of
the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life,
_et cetera_. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves
as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of
international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the
French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to
develop into a regular war.
Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of
things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the
behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its
commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to
the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am
grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the
beginning was nothing else than _franc-tireur_ warfare, the heroism of
which I do not dispute.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level
fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and
Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can
be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the
treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell
us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward
these proposals?
JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that
numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by
individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer
demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum
731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an
order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that
connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I
concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in
the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had
rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international
law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I
objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered
entirely admissible according to international law. This was later
crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered
murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote
this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching...
DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal,
where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is
found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in
this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is
a notation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please comment on this.
JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number
3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot
down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist
act.
DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top.
JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by
Goebbels, published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. The more I concerned
myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all
could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never
capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he
would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a
general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete
agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire
action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which
was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein
nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy
report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all
over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be
treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or
not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you
consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than
to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I
succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did
not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had
were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved
further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest
charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having
torpedoed his order.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief
of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his
representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143.
How did that work out in practice?
JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an
appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s
Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly
was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it
compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with
the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?
JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers
wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a
deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a
deputy.
DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the
rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my
document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a
compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance
in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column
there are examples; in the third and fourth...
MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book.
DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side
a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this
incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for
propaganda, and so forth.
Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange
document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set
down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.
JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was
compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich
Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we
would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the
stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by
taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international
law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every
officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we
tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific
instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned
ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no
doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought
out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to
these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international
law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only
say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of
Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy
attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At
any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual
practice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions
of international law?
JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I
knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which
infractions of international law did not occur.
If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the
paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I
should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification
according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of
international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply,
himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only
after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the
whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and
the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on
the subject.
DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question,
but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall
therefore forego the calling of this witness.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I want to ask you the following question
in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the
limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?
JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well
acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war.
Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were
always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the
Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate
the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and
all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved
that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international
law.
Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent
documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer
only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in
which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...
DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document
book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the
occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were
issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very
characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I
should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place
for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries.
The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.”
Then on Page 99, at the top it says:
“Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the
Norwegian population.
“Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not
entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into
Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of
its inhabitants.
“Therefore, the following is to be observed:
“I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national
consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves
closely related to other Nordic peoples.
“Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.”
Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4:
“The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old
Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property
is inviolable. The house remains...”
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is
enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it?
DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document
which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice
of this document.
Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to
have been signed by the defendant, does it?
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] What had you to do with this
document? Did you...
JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the
Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von
Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I
participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to
the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that
effect in my diary.
DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith.
“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the
occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161,
Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order
to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law
must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of the other regulations.
In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit
GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding
the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the
tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph:
“Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are
not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither
in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed
Keitel.”
Did you also draft that?
JODL: I drafted that order.
DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting
partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.
JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated
already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy
incident.
DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international
law where your orders were concerned?
JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law
very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the
Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is
only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to
the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare,
deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion
and legal war force; between _franc-tireur_, bandit, and scout; between
spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of
aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal
war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the
effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have
had on international law.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of
Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not
been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the
Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit.
I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr.
Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can
perhaps merely refer to it...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as
we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the
affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of
Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I
think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I
beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to
me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the
German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving
information here.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had
occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward
legal questions.
And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war
there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous
entries in the war diary, orders, _et cetera_, are the subject of
serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you
were captured, of destroying all this material?
JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every
piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a
single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete
files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original
Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was
captured.
DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace.
First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this
critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.
JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the
Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October
1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the
Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.
DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?
JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish
campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia;
and from 27 October 1939...
DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?
JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and
the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with
war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called
Truppenamt?
JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations
Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz
Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and
preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of
enemy occupation. That was all.
DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general
conscription?
JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the
day before.
DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National
Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?
JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic
directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and
Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of
the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht
maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to
work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription
order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian
sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the
Reich Defense Committee came under me.
DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your
military rank?
JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in
1936—I believe—I became a colonel.
DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?
JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the
Wehrmachtsamt.
DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on
the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS,
Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this
document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes
a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense
Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us
about that?
JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit
a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.
DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law
itself?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?
JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction
of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting
of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his
deputy.
DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been
discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.
JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of
the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to
military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the
mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.
DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?
JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The
French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages
according to the degree of tension existing.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to
say it was copied from France?
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant;
why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?
JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was
customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an
intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization
was issued.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?
JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political
plans or intentions?
JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.
DR. EXNER: But how about war?
JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.
DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war...
JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.
DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization
books. Is that correct?
JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the
details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed
according to degrees of tension.
DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?
JODL: I mean all the ministries.
DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?
JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had
to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.
DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely
with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine
in case of a French occupation.
DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in
this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit
GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth
session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost
secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your
description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?
JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over
the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years
the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern
themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular
importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise
by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very
characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in
connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine.
DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries
would not be disquieted?
JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we
had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been
broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very
greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to
avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.
DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?
JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the
Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in
East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden
attack by Poland.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?
JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth
session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my
document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting
Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way?
JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.
DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:
“The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted
in a completely changed military and political situation in the
case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in
one’s own country.”
He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and
this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness
can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, were you concerned with armament in
the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?
JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real
sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by
their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these
matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my
work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the
German Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament,
and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with
this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of
armament? Were you in favor of it?
JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was
characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36
divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to
the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a
thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a
foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.
DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me:
What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?
JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was
1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s
plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.
DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the
armament?
JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the
objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the
neighboring countries.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which
has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George
Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of
it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3,
(Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some
sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.
In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we
see:
“The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak.
Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly
to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.”
Then on the next page there is another sentence:
“Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding
that a security policy is a war policy...”
Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that
of foreign countries was at that time?
JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190
divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank
construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and
offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It
would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should
like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her
geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament
conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper
definition for this conception could not be formed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again,
on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and
again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only
effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...”
Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that
such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only
for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?
JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military
ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to
destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939,
actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these
states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939
that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the
approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held
completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.
DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?
JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started.
We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of
our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime
army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914.
Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already
testified, were ridiculously low.
DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of
yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS,
USA-72. On 13 December you said:
“After completion of project for L”—that is the
Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on
state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck
is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of
combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.”
JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the
Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the
Rhineland?
JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the
actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because
before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself.
DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that
occupation?
JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose
entire fortune is at stake.
DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?
JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician.
Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between
Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which
I accepted as a fact at the time.
DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the
occupation?
JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but
only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine;
one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken.
DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation,
is it not?
JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of
that occupation?
JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés
in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by
them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he
ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on
condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men
from their borders.
DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?
JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected
very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we
would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of
General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly.
DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with
any aggressive intention?
JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.
DR. EXNER: Why not?
JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the
French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.
DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions
then?
JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible
that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the
occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East.
That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the
Führer’s brain.
DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?
JODL: No, none whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5
November 1937 which has been presented here?
JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me
that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the
minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary,
Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all
sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in
general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that
Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself
because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?
JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most
emphatically.
DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the
Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following
pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces
for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from
this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the
whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what
this directive means.
JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for
every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year
in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general
conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction
between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature
were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were
improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations
was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter
appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal
would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the
page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are
to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by
regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the
special “Case Otto.”
DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July
1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a
year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is
referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same
problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian
case?
JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.
DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you
had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry
in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account
which you received through Keitel; is that right?
JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General
Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.
DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel
with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and
G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military
pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that
Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and
military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German
original.
Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being
held against you.
JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered
them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that
in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards
have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in
the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to
Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were
taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.
DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...
JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of
pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to
the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of
such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it
for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who
was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were
suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention
for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved
was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a
General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the
directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist,
but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only
been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian
restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment,
the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself
would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?
JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and
acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I
belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer
contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that
country there had been a government against the will of the people for a
long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.
DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the
suggestion, C-175?
JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the
corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and
lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna,
because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be
given this task.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer
told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you?
JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General
Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me,
and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?
JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.
DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the
frontier districts, into Austrian territory?
JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended
for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have
been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or
Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?
JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the
last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich
Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police
would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening,
however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me,
which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to
find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by
my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that
he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all
drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded
by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding
the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number
C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of
something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already
being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too
late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit
USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian
troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army.
They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how
the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the
telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his
decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?
JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a
triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though
no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us
during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the
German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.
DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you
participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which
the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences?
JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.
DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for
“Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?
JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the
first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the
unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were
to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened
hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against
Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way,
even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a
war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be
conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the
weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be
drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new
assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case
Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack
Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without
provocation...”
DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS,
Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend
to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without
provocation...” Now, please continue.
JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident
occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our
borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to
Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in
Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a
single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had
happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of
the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is
a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the
German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that
time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there
is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian
mobilization in May 1938?”
And he answered:
“It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government
wished to force her political allies to take up a definite
position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff,
informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had
exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled
in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the
responsibility of not taking countermeasures.”
On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be
mentioned:
“The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is
altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place
without any German threat and without even any apparent cause.
Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for
the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence
the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first
volume. Now continue, please.
JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General
Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the
impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed
my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:
“It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be
destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action.
To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment
is a matter for the political leadership.”
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have
already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May
1939.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us briefly what the contents
of these directives were.
JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the
Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without
particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2)
after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the
lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an
incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which
would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.
Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should
break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free
operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4
days such a situation would be created that the military position of
Czechoslovakia would become untenable.
DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This
was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because
this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30
September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1
October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which
had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the
Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely,
that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October
1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was
to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if
France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.
I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of
a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was
left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated
only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I
have decided, from 1 October...”
JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to
be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military
forces were concerned, nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page
32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the
entry under 14 September 1938:
“At noon it was announced that the general order for
mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This,
however, did not take place, although approximately eight age
groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans
are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730
hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling
up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech
border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The
Führer gives his authorization from Munich.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page
32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an
entry made in the midst of that critical period.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Just what were these military measures
which were being introduced?
JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in
Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many
escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.
On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the
previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had
been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the
Reserve Army.
Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the
Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in
Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the
political discussions, did the military deployment against
Czechoslovakia commence.
I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of
Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the
Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would
negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or
militarily.
DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26
September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made
by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page
34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:
“Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that
according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation
between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the
German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately
having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague
through Colonel Juppe.
“1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been
confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy.
“1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint.
To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies,
‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces,
who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion
that he should think over what measures would have to be taken
if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of
Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may
have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.”
Then, on 26 September, it says:
“It is important that false reports do not induce us to military
actions before Prague replies.”
The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided
on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that
date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?
JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new
mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date
for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.
DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine
that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with
France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.
DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern
about incidents?
JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a
conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was
at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his
oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military
action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention.
According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment
I shared his worries to some extent.
DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of
the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from
Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You have already said, have you not, what
your worries were? Our weakness?
JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven
reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but
a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions.
That was militarily impossible.
DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred
to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this
case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me
what the significance of that statement is.
Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It
is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made
at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you state what you intended
in this work of the General Staff?
JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained,
assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to
attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the
result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out
of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had
passed.
The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the
Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing
happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer
be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore,
nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in
Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military
action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an
incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for
deployment.
The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from
the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was
meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.
At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since
the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans
liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order.
They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian
border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany.
All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in
that manner.
From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean
and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful
Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly
interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express
that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course,
purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a _casus
belli_.
DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the
intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any
case”?
That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract
from 388-PS.
JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to
know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not
the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on
each side.
The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the
enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European
nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of
Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need
not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves
who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able
to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of
the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that
mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a
situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of
these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to
the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an
incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and
England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might
find a really obvious reason for taking action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish
to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in
translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36.
It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on
Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of
an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation
(Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these
last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not
absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to
it. “Anlass” means “_prétexte_” in French—which as far as we know is
“pretext.”
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of
the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.”
DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I
just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and
not “provocation.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now the Prosecution calls these
considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and
connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German
Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to
have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say
to that?
JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer
allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the
German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not
even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it
here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as
we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to
protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the
people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously
threatened.
DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third
volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory
of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time.
The third question is as follows:
“Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the
order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the
lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?”
And his answer is:
“Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by
telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so
forth.
Then in Question 4...
“It is true that the German Embassy...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall only refer to the
testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident
had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the
incident really happen?
JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it
necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution
was a political one and entirely different.
DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely
theoretical, did it?
JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really
necessary at all.
But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political
discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the
provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading
to any military measures on our part.
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September
know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know
that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had
become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938
at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the
calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The
whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political
correspondent of _The Times_ wrote an article on 28 September against
this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately
after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of
which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous
one?
JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact,
I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the
protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the
borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be
kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was
available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in
Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.
DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an
extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:
“...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to
put a provisional deployment into action soon.”
And then:
“...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the
German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands,
while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at
our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment
should be executed separately on the various fronts.”
Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the
cause of it?
JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against
Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved
in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And
as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own
initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for
any eventuality.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer,
after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and
Moravia?
JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September
where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.”
I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during
those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field
Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British
Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in
Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened
by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion
which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer
nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.
DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21
October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what
was the position?
JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here
in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.
DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to...
JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th
Division stationed there.
DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not?
JODL: The end of October.
DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be?
But, of course, you have already answered that.
JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a
period of peace. I can certainly say that.
DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then?
JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna
taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that
if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that
in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General
Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division
in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would
never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going
to come.
DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact
with the OKW?
JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received
no military documents from the OKW during all that period.
DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that
time?
JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or
what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.
DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel?
JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the
end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite
probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in
Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on
1 October.
DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the
remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?
JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the
time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps
at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia
together with the entire 44th Division.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing?
JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of
that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.
DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case
Green which you had originally drafted?
JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were
completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops
provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into
Czechoslovakia in 1939.
DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a
conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been
mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, _et cetera_.
It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your
representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?
JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that
General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of
Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question
of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it
is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my
successor.
DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not?
JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite
accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever
to do with the events of May 1939.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May
1939?
JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946.
DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or
with Austrian National Socialists?
JODL: No, not at all; with nobody.
DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here?
JODL: No, not with them either.
DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel.
I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on
that occasion?
JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and
on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not
talk to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be?
JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer?
JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern
Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.
DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage...
JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the
tickets.
DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember?
JODL: I bought them about the second half of July.
DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin?
JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine
that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me
unexpectedly in Brünn.
DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have
had to go to Berlin?
JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin
anyway.
DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Führer in Berlin?
JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course,
to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and
the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I
thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?
DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of
tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr.
President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of
my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2
days, to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that
Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr.
President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit
a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a
certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have
numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my
friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time
be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages
from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the
memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution
agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may
now be permitted to submit it.
Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I
have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages,
and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually
made, the documents will not become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others
are not yet ready. May I submit them later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the
record.
DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main
task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is
correct, is it not?
JODL: That is correct.
DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you
had to make?
JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The
Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data
for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and
enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own
decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving
these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of
the Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to
work on operations which were never actually carried out?
JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total
number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there
was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the
operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational
plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not
remained undecided for a long time.
As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every
detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of
England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of
Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter
attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.
DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the
war?
JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not
apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only
to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the
Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances
developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff
was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed
completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed
supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about
this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer,
as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through
Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently
a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff
of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces
Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all
the other theaters of war.
DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the
Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad;
and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly
accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is
that true?
JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest
sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion
possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are
as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad
must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with
Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler
told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage,
when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the
question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed
again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present
on this occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant,
although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean,
he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he
undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us,
or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was
necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already
settled the matter.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the time when you were
recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you
find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in
Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was
really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our
hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely
increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack
ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a
war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared
except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The
forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the
pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however,
efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of
Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they
were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in
conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and
France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought
in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General
Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich
Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized?
JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived
in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very
first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment
was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.
DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against
you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.”
Had you prepared a plan against Poland?
JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the
preparations for the Polish war.
DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left
Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready?
JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out.
DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has
been so often quoted here?
JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech?
JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg.
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on
9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember
that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting
while you were on the Führer’s train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom,
where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris
made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and
expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was
imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that
nothing else was discussed.
DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only
present during that particular part of the discussion?
JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise
against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct.
DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the
artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the
giving of the orders for this?
JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard
Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed.
The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the
Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did
personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of
Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless
resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned
artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I
emphasize the word “fortress.”
DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the
co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?
JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was
informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the
Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that
Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might
speak a little faster.
JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line
would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When
we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me
on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew,
Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and
informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this
demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards
I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not
yet ready.
When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to
cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from
Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up
their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was
punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops
that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in
agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened?
JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I
would say it was about 14 or 15 September.
DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral
countries...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been
telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely
no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not
know.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence
and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of
neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?
JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a
sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate,
something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not
in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in
view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality
of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.
DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation
of Norway?
JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November
1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had
first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took
place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer
give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me
about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at
which I was present.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document
C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to
read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.
What was the Führer’s point of view?
JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also
established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the
theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England
really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite
different.”
DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time?
JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to
think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been
proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.
DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87.
Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler
in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be
respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the
purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged
by the Prosecution?
JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few
dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political
assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do
not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer
read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not
know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal
memorandum by the Führer.
DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page
48, Volume I, of my document book.
In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared?
JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out
to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself
and was completed in 2 nights.
DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document
book:
“The Nordic States.
“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen
circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The
continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible, even if the war is of long duration.”
JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely
secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at
that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible
since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral
Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the
leadership?
JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant
gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had
to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that
nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore,
depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by
actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for
this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date
suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became
necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate
from each other.
DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared
in every detail?
JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of
1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...
DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89.
JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what?
DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a
document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit
GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document
said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: Document C-174.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for
a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you
yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it
yourself. What does it mean?
JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary,
but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a
decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which
I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it
was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr
Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in
particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise
information for the Führer about these many reports which we received...
DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which
England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or
is the question settled?
JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the
information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is
also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite
openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances
Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the
mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the _Altmark_
case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant
breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states
in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has
mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is,
his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is
an entry on 10 March:
“The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very
gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is
furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut
Germany off from Swedish ore.”
And then the entry of 25 March:
“The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen
in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.”
Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack?
JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on
the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy
regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and
Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British
troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern
part of the English east coast.
DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had
got there first?
JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can
only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been
half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the
northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have
been incapable of ever rectifying this again.
DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan
really existed?
JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed
in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war
correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than
the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To
the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik
he could not give us any information at all.
Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part
of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel.
Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries
carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers
whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that
all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again
the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary,
Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the
entry of 26 April. There it says:
“Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen
and submits additional important documents, among them the
secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin.
They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and
confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is
being handed over to the Foreign Office.”
In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s
interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now
present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw
your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5.
Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English
representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable
the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and
excuses. What do you say about this?
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on
the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the
custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians,
nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to
contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely
necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the
English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of
my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the
honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason
be changed in any way.
DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of
the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks
in the West?
JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but,
on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread
opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in
the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and
took away all their mobile equipment from them.
DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the
Führer’s intentions were concerning the West?
JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He
too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of
the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a
sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single
shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember
rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she
fights it out to the bitter end.
DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to
answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from
a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as
far as the West was concerned?
JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly
connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the
greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we
possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion
to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually
bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from
their colonial empire.
I believe I need say no more about that.
DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106,
Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it
aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the
basic ideas which we have already heard expressed.
JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Führer took such a
serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority
in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter,
although all soldiers without exception advised him against it.
DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I,
Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Führer on the conduct of the
war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52,
Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my
document book.
Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of
Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?
JODL: It was no trifle for the Führer to create new enemies possessing a
strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented.
It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually
inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of
the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency.
DR. EXNER: Now, what were the reasons?
JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its
strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured—namely,
between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where
the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through
this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose
heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in
fact, rather an unmoral one.
The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the
fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined
English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland;
and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one
might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to
the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the
soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of
Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.
DR. EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?
JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was,
however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were
supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what
was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for
myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the
Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian
territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even
if the two countries wished to—and perhaps in the beginning they did so
wish—they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.
DR. EXNER: What danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by
the English and French have meant to us?
JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Führer, first,
in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted.
There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the
page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr—of which,
incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today.
In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief—Document
789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23—he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I
of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr
district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise
in that region. He referred to it there as the “Achilles’ heel,” and
that is just what it was for German war strategy.
DR. EXNER: And he said there, on Page 59 of our document book:
“We have an Achilles’ heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of
the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If
England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the
Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger.”
JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the
absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material
we captured afterwards—and in this connection I would draw your
attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17
November 1939—confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence
reports.
DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris’
honesty, had you?
JODL: No. At that time there was not the slightest reason for doubt.
DR. EXNER: Yes. But now some doubt has arisen as to his honesty.
Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did
the Führer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less
than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again.
JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Führer had ordered the
attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a
time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear,
frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At
times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and
then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would
cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for
attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared
for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out.
On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that
one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian
frontier. I do not know if that is true.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving
these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to
say on that subject.
JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a
politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.
I was under the impression—and, indeed, an impression which could be
proved—that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no
longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must
say that it was obedience—for obedience is really the ethical basis of
the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of
obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I
consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous
testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially
in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other
course for the soldier but obedience.
And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers
here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of
its own brave soldiers.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS,
on 19 March you made the following entry: “The Balkans should and must
remain quiet.” That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88,
Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first:
“The Führer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied
from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement. ... The
Balkans should and must remain quiet.”
What does that mean?
JODL: Herr Professor, I must correct you. This is not my diary.
DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your
diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what
this is—what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the
other not?
JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is
from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every
evening.
DR. EXNER: And now this diary, Document 1809-PS, what was that?
JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up
dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked
important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them
out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war
and for the official diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. An
example would be Document 1809-PS.
DR. EXNER: Did you check what your secretary had compiled?
JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into
the hands of the Prosecution.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here
as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do
you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the
Prosecution?
JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook
had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder
are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff? Not you?
JODL: No. It was always kept by a highly qualified expert of my own
selection.
DR. EXNER: Did you check it?
JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the
Göttingen University.
DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness.
Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not?
JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read
through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my
attention to it.
DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up.
We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called
diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by
that?
JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that
he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept
quiet.
DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as
quiet as possible?
JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward
Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna.
Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the
Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the
Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through
Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international
law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she
should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above
all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian
campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between
Germany and Greece could be avoided.
DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of
Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document
444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the
paragraph before the last:
“The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of
the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the
following guiding principles...”
And it is then stated in the last but one paragraph of that page:
“The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be
counted on for the deployment of these forces...”
Well, what forced us to give up this program?
JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy’s arbitrary act,
about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made
statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as
usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme
Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Führer
did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German
soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He
ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be
prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose
of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the
Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English
divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy’s madness.
In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an
operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force
base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this
contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted
to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of
the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief
passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says:
“‘Operation Marita.’ My plan therefore is”—I am quoting—“...
to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the
occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the
entire mainland of Greece.”
I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a:
“The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the
Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the
attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove
necessary.”
It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of
the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take
this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was
not yet the case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this
plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event
alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?
JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in
politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact
had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge
of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the
meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could
only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the
defendants—Defendants Göring and Keitel—have dealt with the political
aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is
anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be
entirely cumulative.
DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to
add—some documents, _et cetera_.
JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through—the English was not coming
through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.
JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with
regard to the Yugoslav problem...
THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then,
Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.
JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.
DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.
JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the
immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or
at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we
ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by
an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any
use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the
evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel
said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on
Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this
sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the
document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order
signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall
quote:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political
situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of
loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore
beaten as quickly as possible.”
This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that
whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the
sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the
28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following _aide-mémoire_, this
operational _aide-mémoire_, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our
liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I
quote:
“Should political developments call for armed intervention
against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” _et cetera_.
I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the
political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not
clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do
it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this
decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the
order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these
directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That
is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have
already stated, and it says there:
“As a result of the change in the political situation...” _et
cetera_—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the
last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code
name ‘Project 25.’”
I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?
JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: ...30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3
days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937
as was once stated here.
DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was
Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave
permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this
connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24
March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete
and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March
1941?
JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed
at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at
Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The
order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of
international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav problem I may add that
the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack
Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl’s office, is a statement which has not
been and cannot be substantiated by anything.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to?
24-March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.
DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?
DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the question of the Soviet
Union. How many troops did we have in the East during the Western
campaign?
JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western
campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.
DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western
campaign?
JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such
weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation
line.
DR. EXNER: In your diary—the so-called diary—Document 1809-PS, Volume
I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: “Situation in the
East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia.”
That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did
you come to this conclusion?
JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration
of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing
anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Führer’s
which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.
DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that
the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive
preparation. How should that be understood?
JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to
conceal the impending attack on Russia.
DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the
Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It
is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and
it says there:
“The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the
coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the
enclosed map ought to have been reached.”
And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the
English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this
is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says,
namely, “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for
answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service...”
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph
are you reading?
DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.
DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will
dictate it now, or read it slowly.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is
nothing here.
DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are
very important.
THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the
passage.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book
7, Page 102.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.
DR. EXNER: “For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as
well as for answering questions asked by the Russian
Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply...”
And now explain the subject further.
JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris’ office were issued by me
every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage
work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what
matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this
time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can
be clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:
“In statements on the equipment situation of the forces,
especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to
exaggerate if necessary.”
I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses
should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety
had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania
might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that,
and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had
already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have
said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I
would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his
friends—namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were
beginning to deploy our troops.
DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Führer’s fears that
Russia might prove hostile to us?
JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near
Berchtesgaden.
DR. EXNER: In what connection?
JODL: The Führer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation
and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might
occupy still more territory in Romania before the winter and that the
Romanian oil region, which was the _conditio sine qua non_ for our war
strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not
deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to
oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost
the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.
DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler’s concern about the seizure of
the Romanian oil fields. Did the Führer do anything on account of this
apprehension?
JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation—when I
protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment
at that time for it would take 4 months—that the Führer ordered that
these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then
issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called
“Reconstruction East” and included all measures to improve the
deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued
on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the
War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is
an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval
Operations Staff:
“Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the
Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove
necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields.”
That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?
DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version.
Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the
numbering of the English version. It is the entry: “Transfer of 10
divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
JODL: This entry is a proof of the Führer’s intentions at that time with
regard to this reinforcement in the East.
DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Führer’s order issued to prepare for
attack?
JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the
discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by
the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Führer on 12
November. It is Document 444-PS...
DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.
JODL: ...and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order,
which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the
Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from
Page 67 which reads:
“Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all
preparations for the East which have already been verbally
ordered are to be carried out.”
This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.
JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral
instructions had been given to the Army.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was
there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the
“Lebensraum,” and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest,
and so on?
JODL: In my presence the Führer never even hinted at any other reason
than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one
might say, he incessantly repeated:
“No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final
sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have
stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have
certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is
unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of
cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked.”
But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word
was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this
kind.
DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military
situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?
JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign,
relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any
information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly
unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at
fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead;
and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually
strong forces employed, by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic
states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.
DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of
military reinforcements for the Red Army?
JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on
intelligence reports and information from the radio interception
section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there
were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941,
there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number,
consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this
strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating
from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100
divisions.
DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by
diplomatic means?
JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov;
and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the
military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely
neutral Russia in our rear—a Russia which in addition sent us
supplies—we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on
6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had
at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense
struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind
that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly
let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for
months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by
the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the
further military situation on both sides look like?
JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The
divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew
rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army
informed the Führer of the operations which he himself intended to carry
out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop
deployment. This map indicated—and this has been proved by
documents—that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry
divisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of
plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?
DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture
facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration
of Russian troops had not...
THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us
about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment
of German troops.
DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as
to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us on general lines
how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941
reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?
JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed
against us in February.
THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.
DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?
JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our
deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And
furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39,
Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a
study of this document book—it is the timetable for the
deployment—that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack
formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry
divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until
10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German
intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not
the case.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for
the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you
perhaps say anything more about that?
JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000
trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would
have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure. So for purely
technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.
DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Führer’s
decision?
JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Führer still
had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1
April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The
order for the attack itself—that is, the real opening of the
campaign—was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by
documents.
DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Führer waged a preventive war. Did
later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?
JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later
on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite
our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that
although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour,
it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.
DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number
of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?
JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in
eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to
more than a hundred.
DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been
the result of Russia’s having forestalled us?
JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the
operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never
strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the
events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this
front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we
never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian
attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly
would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct,
namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military
point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political
situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we
based our military work accordingly.
DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did
Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has
already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page
94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit
USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said
something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?
JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession.
So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But
it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in
the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody
else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.
DR. EXNER: What does that mean?
JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into
contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of
German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and
precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.
DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read:
“It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to
crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United
States out of the war.”
JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements
on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the
Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason
the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution
list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the
case of an operational order. Also that is why the Führer did not sign
it.
DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top
of Page 96. They read as follows:
“Moreover, attacks on other British bases—on American naval
forces only if the entry of the United States into the war
cannot be prevented—are capable of shattering enemy forces in
those places.”
And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United
States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove
possible.
JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to
exert influence on Japan, as that would have been a political action; it
was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such
a case.
DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders
he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you
anything to add to that?
JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes
from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of
Document Book Number 1.
DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There
we find: “Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of
Denmark and Norway.” And then...
JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.
DR. EXNER: Please read it.
JODL: “All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag,
as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail
or take off.”
DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The
paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft,
_et cetera_, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.
JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff,
America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.
DR. EXNER: Before Japan’s attack on America, did you have any official
dealings with Japanese officers?
JODL: No, not before.
DR. EXNER: None at all?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?
JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise
to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Führer; for
he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the
news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous
interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein’s. It is Page 81, Volume I,
of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be
found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?
JODL: No, no.
DR. EXNER: No?
JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: It states:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is
considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic
islands.”
That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America:
“With a view to a future war against America, the Führer is
considering...” What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?
JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually
being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the
Führer had always wanted to do.
DR. EXNER: For what purpose?
JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American
intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration.
Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we
had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he
tells General Von Waldau in this letter.
Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an
order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.
DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?
JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the
North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great
for my liking.
DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?
JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a
new and powerful enemy.
DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?
JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of
France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we
tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in
delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Führer could not refuse
altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us,
rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories
of the war.
DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I
should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted
by Göring, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Dönitz. I do not know whether such a
reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.
Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole
series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of
conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out.
What have you to say to this?
JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted
picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my
having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War
contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised
for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against
Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that
time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland,
Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been
reached with Italy or with Japan.
I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff,
General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff
officer of the German Armed Forces?
JODL: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for
a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?
JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses
which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the
individual district headquarters.
DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the
professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us
briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please
confine yourself exclusively to the following points:
How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack;
then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward
international law and politics?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely
irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant,
I will dispense with the answers to these questions.
Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the
military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of
unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars,
committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please
explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as
to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a
group.
JODL: I never understood the idea of such a group, and I never shall
understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were
to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit—or be obliged to form a
unit—under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of
high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as
an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the
National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all
spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The
goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary
obedience.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]_
_Afternoon Session_
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia
there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and
the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that
conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what
was the subject of that conference.
JODL: During that conference, the Führer spoke to General Staff officers
only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on
the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with
the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no
matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in
particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without
interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?
JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of
the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?
JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt,
informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the
Führer’s intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff
officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their
too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or
criticize.
DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless,
considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?
JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals
believed that he could or should draw the Führer’s attention to the
possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did
something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.
DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of
excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?
JODL: The Führer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on
principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead
at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were
taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the
company commanders, to come to the Führer’s headquarters. For days he
personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors
being present. He did the same thing very, very often with Air Force
officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force present.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler
conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at
the Führer’s headquarters at the time take part in such conferences
without difficulties?
JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation
only things which had already happened were discussed, the Führer was
very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was
discussed which dealt with future operations—for instance, the attack
on Russia in 1942—commanding generals of an army group from the Western
Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so
that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate
such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.
DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called “smallest circle” was
summoned to a situation conference?
JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would
announce, on behalf of the Führer, that a discussion among the smallest
circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could
take part.
DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear
energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an
army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please
limit yourself to the most important instances.
JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question;
otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that
not a single conference took place without the old traditional
conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into
conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Führer. Therefore,
apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I
can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general
of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the
names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a
post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army
groups, did you not?
JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding
generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups.
During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of
army groups in the East whom I did not know. For the most part they did
not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did
not know some of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general
of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without
difficulties?
JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The
commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding
generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant’s office,
or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for
permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do
themselves.
DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group
intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider
right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group,
who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular
branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only
channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal
official way?
JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and
it had been done for a number of years.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler’s attempt to set Hitler
against the generals? When I say “generals” I mean the ones who are of
the “group.”
JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained
that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of
irresponsible sources from reaching the Führer. It was a standing rule
that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity
through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or—as they called it—the
reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military
leaders, so that the severe orders of the Führer for brutal action—as
he called it—might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All
of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all
the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my
question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler’s attempt
to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.
JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler
went to the Führer and reported to him, privately of course. He
complained about certain commanding generals, all of them of the Army;
and we knew about it, because the following day the Führer suddenly
began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our
knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.
DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?
JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the
relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High
Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The
reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in
the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff
group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the
Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say,
even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This
constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by
the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal
Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely
overcoming this tension as the war went on.
DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that
point.
The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless
war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal
Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?
JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when
the Führer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north
of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an
unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France,
characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air
Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite
clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Führer at the end, “My
Führer, what do you really think about the further development of the
war?” The Führer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered
curtly, “That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have
to leave that to me.”
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge
wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?
JODL: I stood next to the Führer when he received this letter. He opened
the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said
exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge
began his letter with fulsome praise for the Führer’s personality and
steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more
in sympathy with his ideals than the Führer assumed. He had begun his
task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our
own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation
was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly,
was what the letter contained.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding
the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?
JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question,
because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision.
But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a
responsible position who did not tell the Führer soberly, honestly, and
openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless—as
indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this
view in writing in a memorandum to the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns.
What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly
Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?
JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o’clock in
the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a
dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced
that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict
either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political
point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of
the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he
was most dejected.
DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed
between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other
after the Polish campaign?
JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the
view I described this morning—namely, that we should remain quiet in
the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which
they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a
military argument to the Führer at that time. This argument was that
considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would
not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the
British Army, in an offensive. That made the Führer extremely bitter,
and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the
commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire
memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the
light of that conflict.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the
group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you
to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document
3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There
on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special
task groups were entirely under the command of the armies—that is to
say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop
service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?
JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer
by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and
Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite
openly, even at the risk of being called a “Parsifal,” but it is a fact.
I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was
divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone,
and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could
fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all
respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no
Police—except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely
under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the
division, were they not?
JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work
among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under
the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of
communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and
services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main
sector—which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent
of the entire operational area—the entire Police and everything which
did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the
Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the
Reichsführer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the
troops—that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during
advance or retreat—did the Army, of course, have the right to give
orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas
and in the rear areas of the Army these special task groups came under
the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders
and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that
correct?
JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they
were to do from Himmler only.
DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number
12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as
regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is
that true?
JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member
of the Police or the SS.
DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special
task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists.
Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced
that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been
clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since
Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to
give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with
the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.
JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals
actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can
say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which
revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone
for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the
police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I
have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than
that.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding
generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those
conditions without protest?
JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of
much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protests. Hundreds
of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how
the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered
inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order
in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz’
memorandum, which was one of the first.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum?
JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit
Number 13 from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS,
Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page
2: “It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were
conducted with cruelty on both sides.”
I skip a sentence. He goes on to say:
“There is no question but that these facts must have been known
to the leading officers in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and
in the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was
Hitler’s view that in the fight against partisans only the use
of cruel, intimidating punishment could be successful.”
Is Rittmeister Scheidt’s statement correct, namely, that the leading
officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of
the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan
fighting?
JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already
been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I
signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit
RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans
conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was
extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing
the methods employed by the enemy, would on their part not be exactly
mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we
issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be
taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that
the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That
it was the Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the
troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the
many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had
with the Führer on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about
cruelties committed by their own soldiers?
JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in
the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Führer, which
begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that individual
soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial
because of their behavior when fighting partisans.”
DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could
do in a case like that?
JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always
acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from
doing that?
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15,
by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559.
In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle of Page 1:
“Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I
realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest
measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly
have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of
partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination of
Jewry and other undesirable elements.”
Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point of
view, and was that their final aim?
JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned
many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge
does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the
partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian
fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a
question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit
that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.
As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who
were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than
one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal,
large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in
dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight
at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.
DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General
Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Röttiger states the
following, and I quote:
“Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks of
the SD units were, and although this apparently happened with
the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces, we
opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant
endangering our own troops.”
In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the
special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the
knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then,
you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions
you have already...
JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single
officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them.
DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW,
the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states,
at the top of Page 2:
“As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which stated that
all members of partisan groups who had been captured, such as
Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed over
by the troops to the SD for ‘special treatment’ without delay.
Apart from that, this order contained instructions that in
guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned,
were to be taken.”
Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no
prisoners were to be taken?
JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It
was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting.
Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue.
There never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came
from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt
with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by
itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were
never handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed
over at all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one.
They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words,
every word is untrue.
DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same SS Leader
Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document 3716-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit:
“As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached
to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the
latter in every way—that is to say, tactically, as well as in
every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of these
units were fully known to the commanding generals. They approved
of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they never raised
any decisive objections to them.”
Do you know SS Leader Rode?
JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much
about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such
a special task group himself, and who really must know, has stated quite
clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from
whom he received his orders.
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was
Ohlendorf.
JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order.
Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order
orally to the commanding generals?
JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a
few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I
recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when
addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that
second conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my
generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.”
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that
order?
JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true—that
Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...
DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando
Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...
JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the
Commissar Order, are you not?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.
JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High
Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order,
and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me
confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I
know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order
officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.
DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?
JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the
General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?
JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application...
JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of
that order?
JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the
order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly,
that it was wrong from the practical point of view.
DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally—and
you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to have mentioned
additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they
were so that we may get this matter quite clear.
JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he felt it
necessary to convince somebody.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he state...
THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they have not yet
all been given.
[_Turning to the defendant._] During that conference did Hitler state...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the reasons which,
you say, Hitler gave for this order?
JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Führer
also pointed out. They were...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many
occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have
spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who
comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think
that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this
witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument
about it. He can give his explanation now.
JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If you
do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from
Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the
Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a
picture of what can be expected from these commissars.”
He also stated that.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report
in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.
DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian
Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the second document
book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there
is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in
Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further. The next is a
suggestion.
I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out
in this report.
JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no
doubt...
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only
guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that
the witness would have personal knowledge about that.
Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942
had been changed—that is, partially revoked by application of the
Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that
change?
JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the
entire order withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the
Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is
dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued?
JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th
Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I
already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of
September, and that was the reason for this order.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their
jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly?
JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...
THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High
Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged
courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on
this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of
discipline or atrocities...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in
the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any member of the High
Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection
with a court martial?
DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the
High Command.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What do you know about the reasons for the
mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the
winter of 1941?
JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the
Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in my
presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last
great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was
described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished
encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last
8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots
because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they
fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly
move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards
supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so
that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no
accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could
have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and
then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of
those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died.
That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there to
investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the
Army.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by
German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on
that point?
JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer himself had
with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery
before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed
a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants
in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the
power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which
were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery,
only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was
so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were
mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as
we had captured.
DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his
opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad.
You have seen the target chart for this artillery?
JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for
many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have
been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman
knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH
to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of
1941? What was the reason for that order?
JODL: The reasons are that...
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not
been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order.
I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.
JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48
degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in
his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm
shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that
is to say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and
would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was
really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to
retreat, the Führer then ordered that those fireplaces must be
destroyed—not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown
up—because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the
Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations
for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is
absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for
this type of winter warfare—and it happened only during the
winter—that order can be justified.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?
JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first
report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its
propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that the Reich
Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the
whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department
to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I
received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is
contained in the _White Book_ issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I
have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were
presented.
DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution
have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in
the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which
you perhaps still recollect?
JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was,
perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it
has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear
from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not
photographed in an army dog training center.
THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be
able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one photograph of a
police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can you say...
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that
they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t take
them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he can say
upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.
Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the
witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was
taken without fighting.
JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think,
18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy fighting.” But
I do not believe...
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured:
whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or
whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there
was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly
despicable act.
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who
should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any
one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must
strike out the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the
Indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the
evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of
Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there
was no reason to fire on the town.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on.
JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained
the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even though the
German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly
never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.
DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I
merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this
event when it was reported to him.
JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been
started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was
correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel,
the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?
JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in
connection with this event.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?
JODL: I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were
there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944?
JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?
JODL: I took part in all of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order
ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this
offensive?
JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those
conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely
operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct
of the troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had
been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?
JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have
been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued
only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS.
PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of
the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army?
JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the
Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of
the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der
Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the
prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the
result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that
question.
Do you know the case—the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that
was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in
about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that
Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the
officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an
examination is not an excessive amount of time.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know the Commando case in which the
son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?
JODL: Yes, I know the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.
JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite
remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel,
and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court
proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German
cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress
against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these
proceedings be discontinued.
DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?
JODL: Yes, they were.
DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more
questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff?
JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I would
say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff,
from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was
in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security
Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general
staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary,
he acted, of course, as my deputy.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is
that correct?
JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the
other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a
commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff
chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask any
questions.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of
March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference,
that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag
III, at Sagan?
JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the
big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a
very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going
on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English
airmen from the Sagan Camp.
DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this situation
conference?
JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I
am absolutely certain about that.
DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out
what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?
JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I
learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I
knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in
him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One
must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between
him and the Führer, which I witnessed personally.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I
will ask the witness a few questions.
Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the
units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that
you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of
aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit
(Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit
is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.
JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for
the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger
battalions. We never used this term.
HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a
Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in
the occupation of the Sudetenland?
JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the
occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein Free
Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German
refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA
leaders who had formerly been officers.
HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a
Wehrmacht regiment in the war?
JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I
should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was
recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with
the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of
the word.
HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools,
and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and
assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these
22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the
Wehrmacht?
JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the
Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else
than by its own personnel.
HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were
drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from
the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?
JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other
German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service
in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as
noncommissioned officers.
HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA
trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but
that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by
the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much
greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the
military schools of the Army and nowhere else.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether you know
anything about this—that in the course of extending the war effort, 86
percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.
JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.
HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70
percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be
that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to
ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or
whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the
able-bodied male population?
JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were
drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who
was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the
SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Stürme),
engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in
action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action
outside Germany during the war.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a
liaison man with the SA?
JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA
Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the
Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was
composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer
formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of
the SA.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that
on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal
Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close
connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you
explain this photograph?
JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von
Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter
inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm Putsch
we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of
war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at
the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.
HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he
inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field
Marshal?
JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.
HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is
charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task
of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and
especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling,
increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially
among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal
observations?
JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the
Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks,
to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing
for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.
HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of
the opinion that it is not true?
JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.
HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst,
the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is
it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the
urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication
which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty
of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told
the Führer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war
with Great Britain?
JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know
something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received
the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I
telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not
there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before
the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had
concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that
reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For
this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what
I learned at that time.
DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Führer
held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the
Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this
conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop
represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an
attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by
diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?
JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before
I had said the same thing to the Führer, that we should clear up the
situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this,
the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared
considerably worse than I did. The Führer said:
“Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would
swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike
intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in
the back.”
I recall that statement very exactly.
DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the
very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern
questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison
man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions
to the Führer?
JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often,
repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of
its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must
assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also
the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign
Minister.
DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the
Wehrmacht was against Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva
Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed
Hitler’s intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had
been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing
Hitler to give up his intention?
JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for
certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable
attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me that was
conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of
view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign
Office—together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and
Luftwaffe—in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To
what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the
Führer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of
English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German
prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to
discontinue this measure?
JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office,
repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order concerning
the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these
many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded
in having the order withdrawn.
HERR BÖHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question
of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries
and observations you wanted to prevent the ‘cause’ for the decision
regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution
submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an
alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler at Klessheim, the
other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I
would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about
Ribbentrop’s attitude toward the handling of the question of
terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this
question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether
he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if
decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by
expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it
intended to depart from the Geneva Convention?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can’t you put that question more shortly; what
does he know about it?
DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of
terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht,
was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view
to Hitler?
JODL: To this I can say—again from talks with Ambassador Ritter—that I
knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that
is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of
terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of
view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Führer
would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral
instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich
Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I
never saw it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on
behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in
1943?
JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman—I
believe it was an English captain—established contact with us. This
captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern
area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the
Führer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be
tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Führer
agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently
nothing came of it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of
Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and
1943?
JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western
campaign. At that time the Führer spoke quite openly and frankly with
everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the
Führer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only
if part of our former colonies were given back to us.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to
Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be
permitted to emigrate?
JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our
troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference at
the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Führer wanted to
hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or
whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion,
which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said
to the Führer, “Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some
neutral country?” The Führer answered, “That is easier said than done.
Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is
technically impossible.” That is my recollection of this talk.
DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and
you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler’s orders. An
affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is
asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich
Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?
JODL: Before this Himmler-Führer conference, which caused me to send my
teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a
word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that
the Foreign Office had any part in it.
DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?
JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not
recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present,
in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you
testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
JODL: That is true, yes.
DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1
April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the
financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many
divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?
JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually
ready—that is, as regards personnel and materiel.
DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up?
JODL: I cannot say with certainty.
DR. KRAUS: Approximately?
JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time,
one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were probably
infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped,
and they existed only as skeleton formations.
DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was
increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September
1939—that is, increased from 27 divisions?
JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable
because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing
results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions;
also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning
to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position
to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve divisions—even
though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939—as I
said before, according to my recollection—there were between 73 and 75
divisions.
DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or
April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by
200 percent in 15 or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set
up 27 divisions?
JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75,
were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number
in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact
that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I have
said—to the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence
Service during Kaltenbrunner’s time was better organized than before.
Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in
the OKW?
JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general
question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner’s positions given to us more
than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite
generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with
the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this
connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other
intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and
its influence on policy as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t understand you to ask him anything about the
Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what
relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was
connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have
involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come
through properly?
Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner’s time the whole
Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time—that
is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have
within the Intelligence Service?
JODL: Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The
Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this
nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about,
you can ask it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation
discussions which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any
more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What
was his activity over a number of years?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that
is, the daily military conferences—how did Kaltenbrunner conduct
himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his
reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief
of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the
only time which is in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences,
certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if
you know any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention.
Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell
me?
JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters
were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did
not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing
him at a discussion in the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?
JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945—that is, from the end of January, I
frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before that time
he came to the Führer’s headquarters, from time to time, and talked to
me there—especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence
Service—but he was not present at the situation conferences of the
Führer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports?
JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris—he took
it over on 1 May 1944—before he took over the Intelligence Service, he
sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area,
and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the
Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and
although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to
him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his
business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from
Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only
did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he
sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the
individual agent’s reports. These comprehensive situation reports about
the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention
because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness,
soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in
Canaris’ reports.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the
daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around
him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was
Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?
JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the
Führer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official
attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz):
Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Dönitz is accused of calling on the Navy to
continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a
responsible military adviser, advise the Führer at that time to
capitulate?
JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was
completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It
would have been of no use.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes
Offensive in February 1945?
JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Führer
realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much
sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in
this connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this?
JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this,
apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing
resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it
were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional
surrender, for the other countries left us in no doubt on that score;
and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely
removed by the fact that we captured the English “Eclipse”—the
gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact
instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after
the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops
would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured
by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the
winter of 1941 at Vyazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to
camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an
enormous toll.
Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 3½
million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It
was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into
the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts
closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held
in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there
will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the
organizational department of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna,
you always worked with him?
JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War
Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost
sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.
DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have
personal relations with him?
JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through
together, these relations became very personal.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as
one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They charge him with
using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here
called Keitel, weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his
purpose in his position.
I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and
answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in
various ways—as you have heard—and only a person like you can answer
them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for more than a decade.
Therefore, please tell me briefly—making your sentences short—what the
official relations were between Keitel and Hitler.
JODL: The official relations between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel
were exactly the same as between the Führer and me, but on a somewhat
different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning.
They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher
officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian
officer bound by tradition.
DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a
daily occurrence?
JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely
unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer,
to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The
entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field
Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That
is a fact.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the evidence
which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don’t you ask him whether he
confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not
submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning became
necessary because between the questioning of the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations
with the Führer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you
certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered
it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness
appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel,
if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you
wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and—if
you did—why you didn’t ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of
Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the
question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius
said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the
main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other
witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius
did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information
from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question
now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field
Marshal Keitel said under oath—and which was confirmed by others, with
the exception of Gisevius—or is it true what Gisevius said?
JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced
it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this
connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was
no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that
Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since
you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document
presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS.
This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files,
as you see. It is about the _White Book_ which was prepared on the
alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this
connection, the witness Gisevius said:
“I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider
especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to
incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and
Holland, and to tell him—that is, Hitler—that the information
which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged
violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong.
Counterintelligence”—that is Canaris—“was to produce these
reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral
Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told
Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly
produced by the OKW, were wrong.
“That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler
that which he should have.”
Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this
document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were
expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris
report—contained in Part A—the OKW refused to cover this _White Book_.
Is that true?
[_There was no response._]
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the
facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without
being choked with disgust.
I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this
report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the
_White Book_ of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked
through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which
Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the
intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm
that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely
necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation
of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word,
Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, “I will not
stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political
decision? In this _White Book_ are, word for word, the reports which you
yourself—Canaris—gave me.”
Whereupon Canaris said, “I am of exactly the same opinion. In my
opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by
the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite
sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken
place in Holland and in Belgium.” And he advised Field Marshal Keitel
against signing it.
That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I
do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the
imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All
these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people
who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most
despicable incidents of world history.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case.
Gisevius said, “It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an
urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative.” He asserts that Canaris
gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you,
is that true?
JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field
Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was
considered necessary for the Führer to know about. I have already said
that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have
gone to the Führer directly. He had only to go into the next office and
inform the Führer’s chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don’t know, why don’t you say so? If you don’t
know whether he gave it to the Führer or not, say so.
DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral
Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
JODL: In fact, he went to the Führer dozens of times.
DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?
JODL: Absolutely, at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes
this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session
of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed
together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to
the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of
the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13,
Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military
competencies.
You remember that you signed these affidavits?
JODL: I did so, yes.
DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents?
JODL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
JODL: I confirm this statement.
DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the
subject of rearmament—that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also
given here as a source of information—I should like to ask you a few
questions.
You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document
2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General
Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as
a source of information, I must question you about Thomas. In his
affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1
February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is
true or not?
JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers
for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was
therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made
available for special employment?
JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943,
General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that
of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true?
JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called
the “History of Rearmament.”
DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked
together—that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the
war, and the relations were good.
DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning
rearmament?
JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own
rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our
enemies. I remember those.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is
10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had
better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH DAY
Thursday, 6 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question about
General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the war
potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were these
important reports always submitted to Hitler?
JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches, and
drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often occasioned
violent disputes, because the Führer considered this representation of
the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.
DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of view that
the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?
JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that, after a
very careful study of enemy achievements in armament production, these
statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate.
DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was supposed
to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the course of
years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he
objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer habitually
indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a pessimistic
rather than an optimistic nature.
DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as head of the
Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s efforts?
JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General Thomas was
under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to work with
him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the armament
office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was done by the
Field Marshal on the order of the Führer.
DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas
relevant to the case of Keitel—how is the question of whether General
Thomas was acting against the supposed interests of Germany or not
relevant to the cases of either Keitel or Jodl? The evidence of Gisevius
was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me—and I
think, to the Tribunal—to be entirely irrelevant to the case of either
the defendant whom you represent or the case of the Defendant Jodl. What
does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try
and overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The question which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether
Field Marshal Keitel submitted and supported the reports handed in by
Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source
of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler.
Therefore this evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl
has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Führer. But
what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was
making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely
irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of Gisevius’ sources of
information, in my opinion; but I will withdraw this question. However,
in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other
source of information, Canaris.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Canaris was a regular and frequent guest
in the Führer’s headquarters and a guest of yours. What were the
relations of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief?
JODL: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris from the
first day to the last were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of
too much blind confidence.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the relations were after the 20th of July?
JODL: I know that even after the 20th of July Field Marshal Keitel did
not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of
Canaris he supported his family with money.
DR. NELTE: How were the relations between Canaris and Heydrich?
JODL: I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to maintain
especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich so that they would
not distrust him.
DR. NELTE: What can you say about the attitude of Field Marshal Keitel
to Hitler’s plan in October 1939, the plan to attack in the West?
JODL: I know that Field Marshal Keitel was apparently strongly impressed
by the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the General
Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in
the West. I know it, although I did not experience it personally; but
Schmundt told me about it later—I know that during this time he also
had a controversy with the Führer which led to the first request to
resign. This is what I can report according to what Schmundt told me; I
did not witness it myself, nor did Field Marshal Keitel tell me about it
personally then.
DR. NELTE: In Document 447-PS, which the Prosecution submitted—these
are the guiding principles for special tasks issued with Directive
Number 21—under I, 2b, is the now famous paragraph according to which,
in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsführer SS is given
special tasks on behalf of the Führer in connection with the preparation
of a political administration, resulting from the inevitable conflict
between two opposing political systems. So much for the brief citation.
I will not hand the document to you since you are certainly well
acquainted with it, and to make the matter brief I will only ask you to
tell the Court how Field Marshal Keitel reacted to the issuing of this
order.
JODL: The claim of the Führer to infringe upon the sovereignty of the
Army in its operational area with Himmler and the Police led to days of
bitter disputes with the Führer. The same disputes had already taken
place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my
entries in my diary, 1780-PS. Of course I know today why the Führer
insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced
the Police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all
our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the Police and
with Himmler, but in the end the Führer put this measure through in
spite of resistance all along the line.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution asserted here that in 1940 Field Marshal
Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, at that time Chief of the
General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based essentially on
testimony of the witness General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions
to put to you on this matter. Was Field Marshal Keitel competent to
order the killing of a general?
JODL: No. Any death sentence at all had to be confirmed by the Führer.
DR. NELTE: Well, I naturally do not mean a death sentence—in this
connection.
JODL: Well. No one at all has the authority to order murder to be
committed.
DR. NELTE: I ask this because Lahousen’s testimony made it appear as if
this order had been given by Field Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If
we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been
a politically highly important act considering the importance of
Weygand.
JODL: Undoubtedly.
DR. NELTE: Would it not also have been a foolish act in terms of policy?
JODL: It would first of all have been a crime...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your
questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that
it is argumentative. Go on.
DR. NELTE: If such an order had been given, could it have remained
unknown to you?
JODL: I cannot imagine that Field Marshal Keitel, charged with the
ordering of the murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
DR. NELTE: What exactly did you hear about the Weygand case?
JODL: I never heard a single word about the Weygand case. I heard only
one thing when Himmler reported to the Führer in my presence: “I have
given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He is completely provided for
there in such a way that he can be satisfied.” That is the only thing I
ever heard in which the name of Weygand figured.
DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen was also heard in the case of General
Giraud. Did you also know anything of this case of Giraud which
attracted much attention?
JODL: I heard a little more about the Giraud case. Shortly after the
successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a
conversation that he was having Giraud watched by Canaris so that he
would not, as the Führer always feared, go to North Africa and there
direct the formation of the Colonial Army against us or, so that he
could be arrested in the event that he should rejoin his family in the
territory actually occupied. That is what he told me. Several months
later he said to me again, “I have now withdrawn this assignment to
Canaris because the Führer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are
concerned with it there will only be difficulties and differences.” The
third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel
told me that a deputy of Giraud—I believe it was about the end of 1943
or in the spring of 1944—approached the counterintelligence service and
said that Giraud, who could not agree with De Gaulle in North Africa,
asked whether he might not return to France. I told Field Marshal Keitel
then that we absolutely must agree to that immediately because that was
extremely favorable for us politically. That is the only thing I ever
heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else.
DR. NELTE: The day before yesterday you spoke about the talks in the
Führer’s train in September 1939, at which General Lahousen was also
present. In this connection you said, “I have no objections to
Lahousen’s statement.” But to avoid misunderstandings, I should like you
to say whether you mean by that that all the testimony of Lahousen,
which also referred to Giraud and Weygand, is credible and correct, or
only the part regarding your presence in the Führer’s train?
JODL: Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen which he made
about me. As for the other statements which were made here, I have my
own opinion, but perhaps that is not appropriate here.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, in answer to a question by Dr. Stahmer, you spoke
about the dispute on the occasion of the 80 RAF officers who escaped. In
order to clarify this question, which weighs heavily against Field
Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that
Keitel objected violently because the recaptured RAF officers were
turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo?
JODL: When I stood at the curtain for those 1 or 2 minutes, I heard the
Führer say first of all:
“That is unheard of. That is the tenth time that dozens of
officer prisoners have escaped. These officers are an enormous
danger. You don’t realize”—meaning Keitel—“that in view of the
6 million foreign people who are prisoners and workers in
Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising.
That is the result of this careless attitude of the commandants.
These escaped Air Force officers are to be turned over to
Himmler immediately.”
And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer:
“My Führer, some of them have already been put back into the
camp. They are prisoners of war again. I cannot turn them over.”
And the Führer said, “Very well, then they can stay there.” That is what
I heard with my own ears at that moment, until a telephone conversation
called me away again.
DR. NELTE: Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel
about this incident?
JODL: We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field
Marshal Keitel was beside himself, for on the way up he had told me that
he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Führer. He hoped
that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious with
Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Führer. I told him that
if the Führer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a
great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be
notified so that the order might be rescinded—all officers who were
prisoners had to make an attempt to escape.
I must say openly that at this moment neither of us had any thought that
these recaptured fliers might be shot. For they had done nothing except
escape from a camp, which German officers had also done dozens of times.
I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of
the Army, which certainly, in his opinion, would be far too lenient, and
wanted to have them work as punishment for some time in a concentration
camp under Himmler. That is what I imagined.
DR. NELTE: In any case, in your presence and in your hearing, Hitler’s
orders to Himmler to shoot these officers were not issued?
JODL: I know that with absolute certainty for I know how I felt when I
suddenly received the news that they had been shot.
DR. NELTE: Now I should like to ask you a few brief concluding
questions.
The Tribunal asked the Defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he
had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were
present. What can you tell the Court about Keitel’s efforts to resign
from his position?
JODL: The first case that I mentioned a while ago must have been in the
spring of 1940, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about
it, but I did not see it myself. The second case about which I know
exactly, was in 1941, November, when there was an enormous controversy
between the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, and the Führer chose to use
the expression, “I am only dealing with blockheads.”
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us
when Keitel attempted to resign...
JODL: This second case was in the fall of 1941. After the controversy,
Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I
entered the room his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally
took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not
want the details, and now we are being told about details about the
resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious
the matter was to the Defendant Keitel that he even wanted to use his
pistol?
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about the particular desk on
which the document was put, or something of that sort. He made his
efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance.
DR. NELTE: You can testify about this case when Field Marshal Keitel
handed in his resignation in writing?
JODL: I myself saw him writing it, and I read the introduction.
DR. NELTE: If things like this occurred frequently, as you have stated
in the course of your testimony, and went as far as the pistol incident
indicates, how did it happen that Keitel always remained?
JODL: Because the Führer would not separate from him under any
circumstances. He absolutely refused to let him go. I believe that
various attempts were made in this direction from other sources, too;
but the Führer did not let him go. In the second place, of course our
mutual attitude was that we were, after all, engaged in a war for
existence in which an officer, in the long run, could not stay at home
and knit stockings. Over and over again it was the sense of duty that
won the upper hand and caused us to bear all the difficulties.
DR. NELTE: You will understand that one must hold up to the generals
“loyalty unto loyalty” and that duty can only go to the point where it
does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
JODL: I have thought a lot about it.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for counsel to put. It is
an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not a proper
question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
DR. THOMA: Witness, is it true that Rosenberg, in the middle of January
1943, gave you and General Zeitzler the draft of a proclamation to the
peoples of eastern Europe?
JODL: That is true. It was after the discussion on the situation.
Rosenberg was present in headquarters. He asked me and Zeitzler to step
into the next room for a moment and said that he wanted to report to the
Führer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples and that he would like to
submit it to us first. I recall that.
DR. THOMA: Do you still recall the contents?
JODL: It was a very extensive concession in regard to the sovereignty of
these individual eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt, through a
policy of reconciliation, to combat unrest and antagonism to the German
system.
DR. THOMA: Did you express to Rosenberg your pleasure at this
proclamation?
JODL: We said then that this had always been our idea, but that we had
doubts whether it was not already too late.
DR. THOMA: What was the success of this memorandum?
JODL: As Rosenberg told me after the conference, the Führer, as he often
did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said,
“Put it aside.”
DR. THOMA: Did you have the impression that Rosenberg’s suggestions
arose from concern about the dangers caused by Koch’s methods?
JODL: Undoubtedly it was an attempt to counteract these methods which
were gradually used by Himmler and particularly by Koch.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, I have no more questions.
DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for SS): Was the strategic assignment of the
divisions of the Waffen-SS under you?
JODL: The divisions of the Waffen-SS, in regard to assignment, were
generally treated like the divisions of the Army.
DR. HAENSEL: How many Waffen-SS divisions were there, according to your
recollection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions also so
that we have a means of comparison.
JODL: At the beginning of the war, I believe, we began with three SS
divisions. The number increased until the end of the war to an estimated
35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of Army divisions which varied,
but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
DR. HAENSEL: What was the procedure in setting up new divisions? Who
decided whether such a new division would be a Waffen-SS division or a
Wehrmacht division?
JODL: As soon as the Führer had ordered the establishment of a new
series of divisions he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so
many divisions were to be set up and so-and-so many Waffen-SS divisions.
He determined the number.
DR. HAENSEL: Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily?
JODL: I had the impression that in setting up the SS divisions, the
Führer wanted to go as far as he absolutely could.
DR. HAENSEL: And what do you consider—when you say “could,” what do you
consider the limit?
JODL: The limit was in the fact that the soldiers of these Waffen-SS
divisions were to be volunteers; and the time came very soon when
Himmler had to report, “I do not get any more replacements for the
divisions;” and from that time on the situation arose that, when the men
came for military duty, the cream of the crop was taken by the SS, and
these people, even if they were strict Catholic peasants’ sons, were
drafted into the SS divisions. I myself received bitter letters from
peasants’ wives about this.
DR. HAENSEL: In connection with this drafting into the Waffen-SS that
you have just described, were political viewpoints taken into account?
Was a recruit first questioned politically in some way before he was
turned over to the Waffen-SS, or was no consideration taken of this?
JODL: No, the decisive thing was that the fellow was big, looked
healthy, and promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive
thing.
DR. HAENSEL: You said yesterday that in the drafting of recruits no
consideration was given to whether a man belonged to the SA or not. Is
the same thing true of membership in the General SS? I mean in this
sense, was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the
General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
JODL: Not to such a pronounced extent as in the case of the SA. I
believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the
Waffen-SS and volunteered. But I also know that very many did not do
that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were
treated in the Army just like any other German.
DR. HAENSEL: If I understand you correctly then, there were many members
of the General SS on the one hand who served in the Army; and on the
other hand, there were many who belonged neither to the Party nor to the
SS but served in the Waffen-SS?
JODL: That is true; it does not apply to the very beginning of the war,
but it is absolutely true for the second half of the war.
DR. HAENSEL: And this second half of the war contained the greater
number?
JODL: Undoubtedly, that—the second half—I always call that part after
the big losses in the first Russian campaign of 1941.
DR. HAENSEL: How strong was the total Waffen-SS at the end of the war,
approximately?
JODL: About 480,000 men.
DR. HAENSEL: And the losses, that is the dead and captured, would be
added to this number?
JODL: Yes, they would be added.
DR. HAENSEL: And do you have any figures in mind about that?
JODL: It is hard to give an estimate in regard to the SS.
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, you told the Tribunal 2 days ago that you had
soldiering in the blood, is that right?
JODL: Yes, this is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. And you said yesterday that you were here to
represent the honor of the German soldier, is that right?
JODL: Yes, I do that to a high degree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, yes. And you put yourself forward as an
honorable soldier.
JODL: With full consciousness, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you put yourself forward as a truthful man.
JODL: I represented myself as such a man, and I am.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Because of the things you say you have been made
to do in the last 6 or 7 years, do you think your honor has become at
all soiled?
JODL: My honor was certainly not soiled, for I guarded it personally.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, you say your honor is not soiled.
Have you—during the last 6 or 7 years, when causing to be said the
things which you say you had to circulate—has your truthfulness
remained at the same high standard?
[_There was no response._]
Can’t you answer that question?
JODL: I believe I am too dull for that question.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, then if you are too dull, I won’t persist in it;
I will go on. I will leave the question and I will go on.
In 1935 you were lieutenant colonel at the head of the Home Defense
Department of the Wehrmacht, is that right?
JODL: Absolutely right.
MR. ROBERTS: That is Department L, Landesverteidigung, is that right?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And was Field Marshal Von Blomberg your superior?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg was not my direct superior, but one of
my superiors.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you work a good deal with Field Marshal Von Blomberg?
JODL: On various occasions I reported to him personally, of course not
nearly so much as the Chief of the Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you attend staff talks with him?
JODL: I did not attend large conferences with Blomberg. I believe that
there were seldom more persons than General Keitel and I and perhaps one
other chief of a department.
MR. ROBERTS: And would they be called staff talks?
JODL: No, those conferences took place in the Office of the Chief of the
Armed Forces Department.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you go to staff talks?
JODL: Of course, since I belonged to the staff.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I thought that.
Now, will you please look at the Document C-139, Exhibit USA-53. First
look at the signature, will you. That is signed by Blomberg, is it not?
JODL: That is signed by Blomberg, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is dealing with “Operation Schulung.” Do you
remember what Operation Schulung was?
[_There was no response._]
That is the reoccupation of the Rhineland, isn’t it?
[_There was no response._]
Can’t you answer me?
JODL: I can answer you as soon as I have read that.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the question was whether you remember what
Operation Schulung was. It isn’t necessary to read the document in order
to answer that question.
JODL: According to my recollection—I do not know whether it comes from
studying the documents here in Nuremberg—the term Schulung meant
preparations for the occupation of the Rhineland after evacuation of the
West Rhine territories in the case of French sanctions...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, I agree.
JODL: But—there is more to be said in that connection.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, wait a moment. That is then dealing with the
reoccupation of the Rhineland; do you agree with that?
JODL: No, that does not deal with the reoccupation of the Rhineland.
That is absolutely false, but it...
MR. ROBERTS: Now, just let us look at this document together and see
what it says. Now, first of all, it is dated the 2d of May 1935.
“For the operation...” I am reading it to you if you will follow it, and
might I make this point first: It is apparently so secret that it
couldn’t be entrusted to a stenographer, isn’t it? The whole document is
written in manuscript, handwriting, isn’t it?
[_There was no response._]
MR. ROBERTS: You can answer that question surely. Can’t you see whether
it is in handwriting or not?
JODL: It is in handwriting, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, why not say so?
Now then, let’s just look at the document. It is from the Reich Minister
of Defense; that is Von Blomberg, isn’t it? It is the second copy, “By
hand only.” It is, to the Chief of the High Command, Chief of the Naval
High Command, and the Reich Minister for Air.
“For the operation suggested in the last staff talks”—that is
why I asked you whether you went to staff talks, you see—“of
the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name, ‘Schulung.’”
Then, may I just refer briefly to the contents:
“This is a joint undertaking of the three branches of the
Wehrmacht... The operation must be executed”—and this is a
phrase we have become familiar with later—“by a surprise blow
at lightning speed.
“Strictest secrecy is necessary ... only peacetime strength....”
And Number 3:
“Every improvement of our armaments will make possible a greater
measure of preparedness....”
And then:
“The High Command of the Army is asked: How many divisions ready
for action?”
Not one token battalion as you said yesterday.
“Reinforcement of the necessarily inadequate forces there”—that
is in the West—“by the East Prussian divisions which will be
brought here at once by rail or sea transport... High Command of
the Navy to look after the safe transport of the East Prussian
troops by sea, in case the overland route is closed.”
What could that refer to, that secret instruction—so secret it had to
be in manuscript—if it wasn’t the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: If you will permit me to make quite a brief explanation, then the
Tribunal will be saved a tremendous lot of time.
MR. ROBERTS: Please, Witness, answer my question first and then make an
explanation after, if it is brief. The question is, what could it refer
to except the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
JODL: I am not here as a clairvoyant; I do not know the document; I have
never read it; at this time I was not in the Armed Forces
Department—that has entirely different signatures—I was in the
operations section of the Army. I neither saw nor ever heard of this
paper. If you look at the date, 2 May 1935, it is proven there in
writing, for I entered the Armed Forces Department only in the middle of
June 1935. Thus, only on the basis of my general staff training can I
give you some assumptions; but the Court do not want assumptions.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, if that is your answer. And are you saying that
you, who heard General Field Marshal Von Blomberg’s staff talk, cannot
help the Court at all as to what that secret operation order is about?
JODL: It was before my time. I was not with Von Blomberg then.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look, please at EC-405. Now—let
him see the German book, Page 277.
My Lord, that is Page 26. Hasn’t he a German book?
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you did say, did you not, that you remember
that the Operation Schulung was the preparation for the occupation of
the Rhineland?
JODL: No, I said the contrary. I said that I heard the word, Schulung,
for the first time here in the Court; and then I wondered what that
could have been.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will be able to judge as to what you said
by the shorthand notes. You say, do you, that you did not say Schulung
meant the preparation for the occupation of the Rhineland? Is that
right?
JODL: I mean, that as General Staff officer of the operations section at
that time I had to know what military preparations were made.
THE PRESIDENT: But, that is not what I asked you. What I want to know is
what you said just now when you were asked if you remembered what
Operation Schulung meant. What did you say? It is suggested that it may
have come through wrongly to us in the translation. What did you say?
JODL: I said, “I believe I recall, but I am not certain whether
this recollection did not result from studying the documents
here or earlier, that the word, Schulung, meant the preparations
for the evacuation of the western Rhine territory and occupation
of the Rhine boundary in case of French sanctions, for that was
the only thing with which we were concerned at that time.”
All the evacuation measures which I later mentioned anyway in Document
EC-405 were part of that.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you remember the date of that first document, 2d of
May 1935. Now I refer to EC-405 which is in the big Document Book 7,
Page 261, and it is on Page 277 of the German book, 277. Now this,
Witness, is a meeting—I want you to look, please, at Pages 43 and 44 of
the original which you have. Have you got 43 and 44?
JODL: 43 and 44, yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, now, you see there—it is a meeting of the
working committee of the Reich Defense Council. It is dated the 26th of
June 1935 and at letter “F:” “Lieutenant Colonel Jodl ... about
‘participation in Mobilization Preparations,’” and the first three
paragraphs deal with general mobilization; and I do not want to read
them, but the fourth paragraph reads:
“Demilitarized zone requires special treatment. In his speech of
21 May 1935 and other utterances the Führer has stated that the
stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact
regarding the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the
_aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires of 17 June 1935
on ‘Recruiting Offices in the Demilitarized Zone,’ the German
Reich Government has replied that neither civilian recruiting
authorities nor other offices in the demilitarized zone have
been entrusted with mobilization tasks such as the raising,
equipping, and arming of any kind of formations for the event of
war or in preparation thereof.”
Now, if Von Blomberg’s handwritten letter of the 2d of May 1935 did
refer to preparations for reoccupying the Rhineland by surprise, it was
highly dishonest of the Führer, 19 days later on the 21st of May, to say
that the Locarno and Versailles treaties were being observed, wasn’t it?
JODL: No, it wasn’t dishonest, for if it is true at all that the term,
Schulung...
THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter of comment, if you please.
MR. ROBERTS: I shall, of course, My Lord, have to make certain comments
on the witness as I proceed. No doubt Your Lordship will realize that I
am not endeavoring to depart from this particular ruling which is only
for this particular question, presumably.
THE PRESIDENT: I think—the Tribunal think that you ought not to make
comments but you ought to confine yourself as far as possible to
cross-examination about the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, My Lord I—about your Lordship’s ruling—I have had,
of course, a very extensive experience in cross-examination in many
courts, and I bow entirely to Your Lordship’s ruling; but it is very
difficult for a cross-examiner to confine himself entirely to the facts.
But I shall do the very best I can.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall read on:
“Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at present
under all circumstances, only those preparatory measures that
are urgently necessary may be carried out in the demilitarized
zone. The existence of such preparations or the intention of
making them must be kept strictly secret in the zone itself as
well as in the rest of the Reich....
“Weapons, equipment, insignia, field-gray uniforms, and other
items stored for mobilization purposes must be kept from sight.”
And now I want to refer to the last paragraph:
“Commitment to writing of directives for mobilization purposes
is permissible only insofar as it is absolutely necessary to the
smooth execution of the measures provided for the demilitarized
zone. Without exception such material must be kept in safes.”
You were collecting weapons and uniforms in the demilitarized zone, were
you?
JODL: They were weapons and items of equipment of the Landespolizei, the
Order Police, and the Gendarmerie. There were no troops there.
Consequently, there were no weapons there for them.
MR. ROBERTS: Did the Police wear field-gray uniforms?
JODL: To my knowledge the Police wore a gray-green uniform or a green
uniform.
MR. ROBERTS: Then what was the need of this great secrecy if this was
only police equipment?
JODL: It was the equipment in addition for the reinforced border
guards—the customs inspectors—about which I have already said that it
was intended...
MR. ROBERTS: My question, Witness, was what was the need for secrecy?
What was the need for secrecy if you were not breaking the Treaty of
Versailles? Can’t you answer that?
JODL: I have already testified to the reasons for keeping all these
measures secret in detail during my direct examination, and I confirm
that in all these preparations it was a question—in case of an
occupation of the western Rhenish territory by France—of setting up a
blockade along the line with the aid of the Police, the Gendarmerie, and
the reinforced border guards. That was the intention at that time, only
for this eventuality. I have already testified under oath that I learned
about the occupation of the Rhineland only 6 or 8 days beforehand.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you have, you see, and I am suggesting to you that
your evidence was quite untrue on that point; and I am going to suggest
it is quite untrue on many points. Now then, will you please go back to
the first paragraph that I read. You say:
“To the _aide-mémoire_ of the French Chargé d’Affaires ... the
German Reich Government has replied that neither civilian
recruiting authorities nor other offices ... have been entrusted
with mobilization tasks such as the raising, equipping, and
arming of any kind of formations for the event of war....”
Doesn’t that subsequent paragraph about the weapons, equipment,
insignia, and field-gray uniforms show that the truth was not told to
the French Chargé d’Affaires?
JODL: I only repeat the answer that was given to the French Chargé
d’Affaires. I believe that that was essentially true: No mobilization
tasks, such as disposition, equipment, and arming of formations for the
event of war. There was no thought of war, no one mentioned it with even
one word.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not repeat the point, I submitted—may I just remind
you—and I think there are copies for the Tribunal too—of Article 43 of
the Versailles Treaty.
Article 42 defines the area, the left bank of the Rhine and the right
bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east. Article 43:
“In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of
armed forces, either permanently of temporarily, and military
maneuvers of any kind; as well as the upkeep of all permanent
works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”
I suggest to you the step you were taking—mentioning at that
meeting—was a clear breach of Versailles. Do you agree, or don’t you?
JODL: No, I do not agree to that. They were taken in the event that the
enemy should not abide by the treaty and should attack us again, as that
time in the Ruhr district.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I propose to refer to you a document which
has been described as your speech, L-172, from time to time—and I want
to make it quite clear first as to what you say the document is, because
you wouldn’t say one thing one day and the opposite the next, would you,
Witness? That document has your writing in places, has it not? I can
refer you to the pages if you like. If you look at page...
JODL: That is unnecessary. It contains many handwritten corrections and
notations by me. But I have...
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Witness, for saving me that trouble then. And is
that a speech—the notes of a speech—which you delivered at Munich to
the Gauleiter in 1943?
JODL: I have already clearly said that this was the rough draft, not the
speech that I made but parts of the first draft and most of the contents
consist of notes by my staff, which they sent me for the preparation of
this speech. I crossed out whole pages and sent the whole rough draft
back again and only then did I make my speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to examine that, because you said quite
differently, did you not, when you were interrogated by one American
officer on two separate occasions? You said quite differently, did you
not?
[_There was no response._]
Were you interrogated on this matter on the 8th of October last year by
Colonel Thomas Hinkel? Do you remember that? Perhaps you would not
remember the date.
JODL: No. Oh, we spoke about this matter a few times.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and you were sworn when you gave your answers to the
interrogators?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, may I read, to refresh your memory, a copy from
the shorthand notes of the interrogation?
“I show you a photostatic reproduction of a number of pages of a
lecture, which was purported to have been given by you on the
7th of November 1943, and ask you if those pages represent the
lecture that was delivered. For the record, that is identified
as L-172.”
Then you answer:
“Yes. A number of things are not contained therein, which I
explained with the map.
“Question: ‘You interpolated the remarks that do not appear in
the written part; is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘Yes, many particulars I set forth just with the map at
hand.’
“Question: ‘Is that your handwriting appearing on the cover
page?’
“Answer: ‘No, it is not mine.’
“But the remaining sheets you identify as the written version of
a lecture at Munich?
“Answer: ‘I cannot say whether it was actually my lecture as it
was, because I see the signature of Buttlar. It isn’t the
lecture itself. That is the materials of the brochures which had
been furnished to me.’”
Then:
“Do you identify...”
Just follow this, will you, Witness?
“Do you identify the first 29 pages as constituting the lecture
that you delivered?
“Answer (after examining the document): ‘Yes, that is my
lecture.’”
Do you want to alter that sworn answer now? Do you?
JODL: I have not read the transcript of the notes which were taken here.
I do not know the translation. I made several other statements in that
regard. I observed in the second interrogation that that was not
actually my speech, and that...
MR. ROBERTS: I will read the second one, Witness. I have that for you.
This was on the 16th...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, had you finished what you wanted to say?
JODL: No, I had not finished. I was interrupted.
THE PRESIDENT: Then finish what you want to say.
JODL: I wanted to say that before I had looked over the whole document,
at the first moment, of course, I had the impression that that was the
copy from which I delivered my speech. However, when I looked at it more
carefully in the course of the interrogations, I noticed that it was
only the material collected for this speech, and I said clearly and
distinctly:
“It contains the first draft, the outline and the conclusion by
me. The whole middle part is only material furnished by my
staff, and the whole thing is not at all the speech which I
gave.”
That is word for word what I told Colonel Hinkel.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Let me read now what I was going to read, the second
interrogation. This is the 16th of November 1945, 4 days before the
Trial:
“This document is identified for the record as L-172. I show you
the photostatic reproduction in order to refresh your
recollection concerning it.
“As I remember your previous testimony, it was to the effect
that the first part of the document is the speech that you wrote
for delivery to that meeting. The second part consists of
various thoughts on the basis of which this speech was prepared;
is that right?
“Answer: ‘One moment, please. This is not my real lecture. This
is a conglomeration of the pieces of writings which are partly
drafts of my own, that is, the introduction; but all the
appendices are the basis of my lecture furnished me by my staff.
“‘The photostats appended to the original lecture—it was a
photographed copy—and also a number of maps which were drawn up
were included.
“‘This is not my lecture as such; and the annotations made here,
in this calligraphic manner, were not mine. I made them in my
own handwriting.
“‘I do not know the origin of this copy. Most likely it was
furnished me by the OKW for the purpose of my giving this
lecture. It is altogether a conglomeration of various pieces of
writing, and it is usable only with limitations. However...’”
And just listen to this, will you?
“‘...as to the broad lines of it, this is what I have used as a
lecture.’”
Then the next question was:
“I believe you stated before that the written speech that you
had was not given as set forth in the text because you
interpolated various remarks in the course of the speech,
particularly whenever you referred to one of the maps that you
placed before the audience, in order to follow the campaigns
which you discussed. Isn’t that correct?”
Now listen to this:
“What I have written down I have actually spoken and I followed
this text written down by myself. But in regard to the momentary
situation on the various fronts”—and that is Part 3 and 4,
where you will find a note “delivered extemporaneously”—“I had
that so clearly in mind that I did not need to base my speech on
any written statements. Also, I referred to the maps freely.”
Then the last question on this point:
“Is it not true, however, that the document before you
represents, in general, the speech that you gave at Munich in
November 1943 to this meeting?”
The answer is:
“Yes; much, without doubt, is the same. All the appendices with
regard to these various theaters of war and other appendices I
had not used during my speech. I had returned them.”
Do you agree with your answer to that interrogation?
JODL: On the whole, you have confirmed just what I said. However, I do
not know why we have to talk so long about it. The case is completely
clear. It is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, please do not worry yourself. I know I am stopping
you; but I apprehend that I am stopping you from saying something quite
irrelevant, and in the interest of time I regard it as my duty to stop
you. Please do not worry about why I should do something.
I want to know whether that document roughly represents what you said in
the speech. It is quite a different thing to being in a wastepaper
basket.
JODL: The introduction and the conclusion, as contained here in the
first draft were, of course, basically retained in the speech in this
form. However, the whole speech was only finally worked out on the basis
of this first draft; it was shortened, changed, parts were crossed out,
and mistakes were eliminated. And only then came the main part of the
speech for which only the material is here. There is no proof, and I am
not in a position to say whether I actually spoke even one sentence of
those which are here in the form in which it is found in the first
draft.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; I will accept that.
JODL: If you give me a copy of my actual speech I will recognize it.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all we can give you, Witness, because that is all
we found.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might as well adjourn now.
MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship please.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I should like to call attention to the
following: When my client was interrogated here, he was heard through an
interpreter, since he does not understand the English language. On the
basis of this testimony the minutes were, as I have just heard, set down
in the English language. These minutes he never saw and he did not sign
them. And now these minutes, which were compiled in English, are
submitted to him in a German translation. In my opinion it is quite
impossible under such circumstances to tie the defendant down to
specific words which are contained in the minutes. He abides by what he
said, but he cannot recognize everything that is in those minutes
when...
THE PRESIDENT: That is true. We will keep these facts in mind. The
Tribunal will keep these facts in mind, if you will draw them to their
attention.
MR. ROBERTS: If it please the Tribunal, I am passing from that point.
The witness, I think, said the document was the basis of his speech; and
I accept that answer and I pass to another point.
Would you please give the witness his diary, 1780-PS, German C-113. And
it is Page 133 in the large document book, Page 133.
Witness, I think you have seen this entry. My Lord, it is the 5th of
November 1937 I am dealing with:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy....”
Page 133 of the large book.
THE PRESIDENT: When you say, large book, you mean Number 7?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Number 7; I am sorry. I should have given it a number.
[_Turning to the defendant._] 5th of November 1937:
“Führer develops his ideas about intentions for future course
and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces...”—_et cetera_.
There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the chief
of Armed Forces and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
“...the intention of L...”—does that mean your department,
Landesverteidigung—its intention to have these thoughts put on paper?
[_There was no response._]
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, Witness.
JODL: “Intention of L,” that means the intention of the Department of
National Defense (Landesverteidigung) to have these thoughts put down on
paper and transmitted to the branches of the Wehrmacht.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, the meeting that you were talking about was
what we have called the Hossbach Conference, was it not, which is
386-PS? The Tribunal is very familiar with it. You remember the
conference, do you not? You have read it many times here?
JODL: Yes, but I was not present at this conference. I do recall the
things that were read here.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you were not present. But presumably you, as head of
the Home Defense Department, were told of what was said at the
conference?
JODL: I have already stated with regard to that that the report which I
received was in no way sensational. The directives for the preparations
after this time are available to the Court in writing; what we prepared
and worked out at the time is proved thereby. We have the orders of 20
May and of 14 June; they are available.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were only asked whether you were told what
happened at the conference. It was not necessary to make a long
statement about that.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, I try to put simple questions, and I am asking for
simple answers. The last thing I want is to interrupt you.
Were you told that at that conference Hitler said that Germany’s problem
was a question of space?
JODL: No, not one word.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you told that Hitler said that the German question
could only be solved by force?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And were you told that Hitler said that German rearmament
was practically complete?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: And the last question I will ask you: Were you told that
Hitler said that the first aim in the event of war would be Austria and
Czechoslovakia?
JODL: The report about the more active preparations for the march
against Czechoslovakia was, I believe, contained in these statements.
But I can only say that the details which I received from Field Marshal
Keitel are not in my recollection at present. I recall only one thing,
that it was no surprise or sensation for me, and only small corrections
of the directives which had been given out up to that point were
necessary.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Thank you. Now then, you were not present at
Obersalzberg when Keitel was there with Schuschnigg the following
February, were you?
JODL: No, I was not present.
MR. ROBERTS: But Keitel later told you what had happened?
JODL: He made a few brief remarks about that in narrative form, for
after all, I had no further concern in this matter.
MR. ROBERTS: Did you make that entry in your diary; that is, the next
entry to the one I was referring to, Page 133, Book 7, the same page,
under 11th of February 1938:
“Evening 12 February General Keitel, with General Reichenau, and
Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and Schmidt were again put
under severest political and military pressure.”
Did Keitel tell you that?
JODL: Yes. You have only inserted the word “again.” That is not in my
diary. This entry I made personally, because Keitel told me that during
lunch Reichenau and Sperrle had carried on warlike conversations, that
they had talked about the new rearmament of Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, in March—I think this is common
ground—you signed or initialed one or two orders for the “Operation
Otto.”
JODL: Yes; but at that time it was not called Otto but “For the March
into Austria.”
MR. ROBERTS: Hitler, when he heard that Schuschnigg was going to obtain
the opinion of the people by plebiscite, decided to invade at once, did
he not?
JODL: Yes, I was told, when he heard that there was to be a grotesque
violation of public opinion through the trick of a plebiscite, he said
that he would certainly not tolerate this under any circumstances. This
is what I was told.
MR. ROBERTS: He would not tolerate public opinion being ascertained?
JODL: No; he would not tolerate public opinion being abused through this
trick. That is how it was told to me.
MR. ROBERTS: So the Armed Forces of Germany then marched into Austria?
That is right?
JODL: That is right; the Wehrmacht marched in.
MR. ROBERTS: And Austria, from that day, received all the benefits of
National Socialism, is that right?
JODL: That is a political question. At any rate it could perhaps have
become the happiest country on earth.
MR. ROBERTS: I wasn’t asking what it could have become, but what it
received. It received the SS, the Gestapo, the concentration camps, the
suppression of opponents, and the persecution of Jews, didn’t it?
JODL: Those are questions with which I did not concern myself. Those
questions you have to put to the competent authorities. In addition it
received me as artillery commander; and they loved me; I only want to
confirm that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You say the people appeared pleased to see you?
JODL: The people who were under my jurisdiction were very happy about
this officer; I can say that.
MR. ROBERTS: They had to appear to be, whether they were or not, didn’t
they?
JODL: No, they did not have to be. At any rate, after I had been away
for a long time, they certainly did not have to write enthusiastic
letters to me, letters which I received throughout the war from these
Austrians to whom my heart belonged.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one man who was not pleased to see you, wasn’t
there?
JODL: I know no such person.
MR. ROBERTS: Don’t you?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: What about Schuschnigg?
JODL: I never saw Schuschnigg. He doesn’t know me and I do not know him.
I don’t know...
MR. ROBERTS: He wasn’t pleased to see you come in, was he?
JODL: I cannot say that.
MR. ROBERTS: What happened to him?
THE PRESIDENT: We know that, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: I quite realize that. I can’t imagine my question is not
admissible, but if you don’t want me to put it—it is one of a series of
questions—I won’t.
Schuschnigg was put in a concentration camp, wasn’t he?
JODL: I was told that the Führer had decided: “I do not want a martyr,
under any circumstances, but I cannot liberate him; I must put him in
honorary custody.” That was the impression I had during the entire war.
MR. ROBERTS: Honorary custody?
JODL: It was called honorary custody.
MR. ROBERTS: What? Was he an honorary member of Dachau?
JODL: That I do not know. Those are not questions that you can put to
me, for I was a soldier and not the commandant of a concentration camp.
MR. ROBERTS: That is an honor that one would be glad to dispense with,
isn’t it?
JODL: I would gladly dispense with much that took place during these
years.
DR. EXNER: Please, I must protest against questions like that, purely
political and based purely on legal questions and on matters which the
defendant cannot at all answer through his own knowledge. It is not a
fact whether Schuschnigg was happy.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, in my respectful submission, these questions are
perfectly proper; they are questions the like of which have been put by
every counsel who has cross-examined both for the Prosecution and the
Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, the Tribunal thinks that the
cross-examination is proper.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I am passing from that point. I am grateful to
you.
[_Turning to the defendant._] The only question I ask in conclusion is
that Schuschnigg was kept in prison or kept in confinement for several
years without any charge and any trial. That is right, isn’t it?
JODL: It may be, I do not know.
MR. ROBERTS: You knew, did you not, when you signed those orders for the
march into Austria, that Germany had given an assurance in May 1935 to
respect the territorial integrity of the state of Austria and that on
the 11th of July 1936 there had been entered into by your Government and
the Austrian Government an agreement by Germany to recognize the full
sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria? Did you know of these
things?
JODL: At that moment I did not know that; in my position as a colonel in
the General Staff that did not concern me in the least. What would that
have led to?
MR. ROBERTS: I am passing from Austria with this one last question: Is
there an entry in your diary—it is a passage in L-172, the basis for
the draft of your speech—that after the Anschluss Czechoslovakia was
enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall a victim? My Lord, that is
Page 290 of Book 7. Do you remember that passage?
JODL: In the first draft which I made for my Gauleiter speech it was put
down exactly what strategic improvements had taken place through the
various actions of the Führer, in retrospect, but only these strategic
results....
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but—again I do not want to stop you, but did you say
that—something to this effect—and I will give you the document if you
like—that Czechoslovakia was enclosed by pincers and was bound to fall
a victim?
JODL: In the first draft I set down that through the taking
over—through the Anschluss of Austria—the strategic situation of
Czechoslovakia had become so hopeless that at any time it must fall a
victim to a pincers attack; a strategic retrospect about facts,
indisputable facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I accept that, Witness. Now I go very shortly to the case
of Czechoslovakia. I only want to deal really with a couple of
documents. I want to deal with item 17, which the Tribunal will find on
Page 29 of Book 7. And it is marked—if you’ll hand it up—and I have
flagged that for you, Witness, item 17.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You are familiar with that?
JODL: Yes, I know that.
MR. ROBERTS: And I do not propose to read it again, because it was read
very recently; but you agree, do you not, you said yesterday, the
problem was this: First of all, you must have a surprise attack; if you
were going to attack at all, you must have a surprise attack.
JODL: On the basis of the stipulations made by the Führer; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: You must have a surprise attack first, and your troops
would take 4 days to get into their battle position.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And therefore you must know the time, the incident which is
going to be the cause of the attack; you must know the time when the
incident is going to take place.
JODL: Yes, I said that one would either have to predetermine the time or
one must know it in advance; otherwise the demands could not be carried
out.
MR. ROBERTS: And, therefore, you must create the incident yourself.
JODL: I testified to that at length yesterday. Either one of the many
had to be exploited or perhaps one would have to help the situation
along a bit; but, as I said, those are General Staff considerations
which, when we capture them from the French, you consider entirely
irrelevant.
MR. ROBERTS: It is set down at the end of the document on Page 30 that
either the Wehrmacht or the counterintelligence section would be charged
with the manufacture of the incident in the last paragraph.
JODL: Yes, I therefore wrote: “In case the counterintelligence service
is not charged with the organization of an incident _aside from
that_”—“in case.” These are all theoretical deliberations of the
General Staff in a situation, which I depicted quite accurately
yesterday, where such incidents already occurred every day.
MR. ROBERTS: I know. Then, if this had taken place, the world would have
been told that because of that incident Germany had been compelled to go
to war?
JODL: I do not believe that this would have been reported to the world.
Rather, I believe the true reason would have been told the world, which,
furthermore, was made known constantly through the press, that 3½
million Germans cannot be used as slaves by another people permanently.
That was the issue.
MR. ROBERTS: If the world is going to be told the truth, what is the
earthly good of manufacturing an incident?
JODL: I testified as to that yesterday—I can only repeat what I said
yesterday at length: I knew the history of war too well not to know that
in every war things like that happen—the question as to who fired the
first shot. And Czechoslovakia at that time had already fired thousands
of shots which had fallen on this territory.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I say, Witness, subject to correction, that you are
not answering the question at all. The question was a very short one and
you make a long speech about something quite different. The question is,
if the truth was sufficient to justify your going to war, why should you
want to manufacture an incident? If you can’t answer it, say so.
JODL: Well, it isn’t at all confirmed that I wanted to bring about an
incident. I wrote, “in case ... not.” We never prepared one and that is
surely the essential thing.
MR. ROBERTS: I won’t argue any further with you. I have put my point and
will leave it. But now I want, on quite another point, to refer to the
last paragraph on Page 29, the same document:
“Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the consequence
could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of
such an attack.”
Perhaps you would read this paragraph, known already to the Tribunal.
“...death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral
powers.”
That means an air raid before there has been any declaration of war or
any warning to the civilian population, doesn’t it?
JODL: That meant that I called the attention of the Führer, through this
document, to the fact that on the basis of his decree that result could
or would come about.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you call that a terror attack? A terror attack?
JODL: It cannot be said under what conditions such an action would be
launched. These are all theoretical tasks for our General Staff. How and
if that was translated into practice, that no one can say, whether with
justice or injustice; that depended on the political decision.
MR. ROBERTS: I will show you later how those thoughts were carried into
practice in the case of other countries. So we will leave that document
altogether now and I will leave the case of Czechoslovakia. Now you were
recalled to the OKW on the 23d of August 1939, from your artillery
employment. We know that, don’t we?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That was a great compliment to the opinion that the Führer
had of you, wasn’t it?
JODL: The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not
know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. On a very small point, Witness, you told the
Court yesterday or the day before that you never had a conference with
the Führer, I think, until September 1939; but your diary, on the 10th
of August 1938—it is Page 136 of Book 7—your diary said you attended a
conference at the Berghof with the Army chiefs and the Air Force groups.
Didn’t you meet the Führer then?
JODL: That which you asserted in your first sentence, I did not say.
What I said was, word for word:
“On 3 September I was introduced to the Führer by Field Marshal
Keitel, and on this occasion, at any rate, I spoke with him for
the first time.”
That is what I testified to, word for word, yesterday. I had seen the
Führer a dozen times before then and I had heard him when he delivered
his big speeches, after he was Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I accept that. It is quite likely that I was wrong.
Now, with regard to the Polish campaign, did I hear you right when you
said that Warsaw was only bombed after leaflets had been dropped?
JODL: That applies to the period of the siege of Warsaw. The terror
attack, I might say, which was to hit the entire city through artillery
bombardment, that took place after two previous warnings.
MR. ROBERTS: It is a matter of history, is it not, that Warsaw was
bombed, with many other Polish towns, in the early hours of the 1st of
September 1939 before any declaration of war? Isn’t that a matter of
history?
JODL: As far as this historical fact is concerned, Field Marshal
Kesselring, who is very well informed about this, testified to that here
in detail. He said—and also Reich Marshal Göring—that on this date the
militarily important objectives throughout Poland were attacked but not
the population of Warsaw.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. You are quite right, now Kesselring—If the
Tribunal wants the reference, he gave evidence as to the bombing of
Warsaw, the English transcript, Page 5731 (Volume IX, Page 175).
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I suppose the result of the Polish
campaign was naturally a source of satisfaction to all of you?
JODL: The military development of the Polish campaign, from the military
point of view, was extremely satisfactory to us. Of course things happen
in life that would give more satisfaction than a military action.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want you to look at a letter. This is—My
Lord, this is a new exhibit, D-885, and it is GB-484.
That letter is in your writing, is it not? Is it in your writing?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, it is written to Police President Dr. Karl
Schwabe, Brünn, Moravia, Police Presidency, dated October 28, 1939:
“My dear Police President: For your enthusiastic letter of 22
September, I thank you heartily. I was quite particularly
pleased about it. This wonderful campaign in Poland was a grand
opening for this hard and decisive struggle and has brought
about for us an unusually favorable point of departure
politically as well as militarily. The difficult part for the
people as well as the Armed Forces is still ahead.”—I propose
to read it without comments and comment afterward.
“But the Führer and his associates are full of the greatest
confidence; for the sanctimonious British will not succeed in
throttling our economy, and militarily we are without worry.
Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this the
many strong-willed and devoted men who are today at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.
This time we will show that we have better nerves and greater
unity. That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty
share to keeping the Czechs at it and not let them perk up, of
this I am convinced.”
Then he is very pleased about the high recognition granted to the
troops:
“Thanking you heartily once more for your words of appreciation
which exceed my modest contribution in the shadow of the
powerful personality of our Führer. I am with a Heil Hitler.”
Why did you call the British sanctimonious? Because they keep treaties
and don’t have concentration camps and don’t persecute Jews? Is that why
you thought we were sanctimonious, because we don’t break treaties?
JODL: No, that was not the reason. The reason was that the political
situation generally was represented that way, and that I was actually of
that opinion at the time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now you deal with:
“Decisive is the will of the people to stick it out, and this
the many strong-willed and devoted men who are at the head of
the districts and in other responsible posts will take care of.”
Who were these strong-willed and devoted men? Is that the SS and the
Gestapo?
JODL: No, these are the Gauleiter.
MR. ROBERTS: The Gauleiter?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but I mean we have one or two Gauleiter here,
Gauleiter Sauckel, for instance; in a large area like Thuringia, he
couldn’t do much by himself, could he? He would have to have some SS or
Gestapo, wouldn’t he?
JODL: We are not at all concerned with that here. The fact is that these
Gauleiter actually directed the organization of the State and the
administration in this war in a noteworthy way. Despite the catastrophe
the people were much better taken care of than in the years 1914-18.
That is uncontested and it is to the credit of these people.
MR. ROBERTS: They were better taken care of?
JODL: Even in the most terrible conditions at the end every man in
Berlin received his normal rations. It was a model of organization, I
can only say that.
MR. ROBERTS: And a model of organization because no opposition to the
government or the Party was allowed, was it?
JODL: Certainly, it made it easier on one hand, and on the other hand,
led to terrible catastrophes about which, of course, I only heard here
for the first time.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Well, the letter speaks for itself, and I will
go along. May I just ask you about this last sentence:
“That you, Police President, will contribute your weighty share
to keeping the Czechs at it and to not let them perk up...”
What did you mean by that?
JODL: Since he was Police President in Brünn, it was his task to see
that quiet and order were maintained in Brünn and not to tolerate a
Czech uprising at our backs while we were at war. That is a matter of
course. I did not say that he was to murder or germanize the Czechs at
all, but he had to keep them in order.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I pass from that now and I want to go to the
various campaigns in the West. Now, with regard to Norway, of course you
knew that your country had given its solemn word repeatedly to respect
the integrity of Norway and Denmark, did you not?
JODL: I said yesterday, with reference to the two declarations of...
MR. ROBERTS: Please answer my question, it is such a simple one.
JODL: Yes, I believe, I recalled that at the time. I am quite sure.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good; and we know there was an assurance at the
beginning of the war to reassure all these western neutrals, and there
was another assurance on the 6th of October; and you say that in
November Hitler decided to invade Denmark and Norway?
JODL: Yes. I testified as to that at length yesterday.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you did. Please don’t always say that. I have got to
ask you to go over the same ground from the other angle, you see.
“Norway,” as your speech said—and I am quoting from Page 291 of Book
7—perhaps you had better give it to him—Page 11 of your notes...
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is in the middle, My Lord, under
Paragraph 8:
“In the meantime we were confronted by a new and urgent problem:
The occupation of Norway and Denmark....
“In the first place there was danger that England would seize
Scandinavia and thereby, besides effecting a strategic
encirclement from the north, would stop the import of iron and
nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes.
Secondly, it was with the realization of our own maritime
necessities”—“Notwendigkeiten”—that is the word, isn’t
it—“Notwendigkeiten”...
My Lord, that ought to be “necessary” and not
“imperative”—“erforderten.”
“...which made it necessary for us to secure free access to the
Atlantic by a number of air and naval bases.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] You wanted air bases and U-boat bases,
didn’t you?
JODL: Militarily they were tremendously important to us, there is no
doubt about that; but the prerequisites to taking them, those were the
reports which we had, the threat to Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: What I suggest to you, you see, is this: In this, like the
case of the other three Low Countries—in this case, you simply made an
excuse. You thought England might do something, although she had not
done it for months, and you breached Norway’s neutrality at your own
chosen time. Is that right?
JODL: In order to answer that question “yes” or “no,” one would have to
undertake a very thorough study of all the historical documents on both
our own and the other side. Then one can say if it is correct or not.
Before that has been decided, only a subjective opinion exists. I have
mine, and you have another.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And I point out to you that it was Germany on every
occasion who violated the neutrality. The other countries, the Allies,
did not.
JODL: In the case of Norway, the English did that first in the case of
the _Altmark_ by laying mines and by firing upon German ships in
Norwegian territorial waters. That has been proved indisputably. There
is no doubt about that.
MR. ROBERTS: The _Altmark_, as you very well know, Witness, was not an
occupation at all; it was merely the act of the British Navy in taking
British prisoners from a German prison ship, and I imagine your Navy
would have done the same if they had had the chance. What is the good of
talking about the _Altmark_? It was not an occupation at all.
JODL: But it was a violation of international law as far as Norwegian
sovereignty was concerned. You could only request that Norway do that,
but you yourselves could not carry out a combative action in Norwegian
waters. I know the regulations in this connection exactly.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should you break your word to Norway and cause untold
suffering and misery to the inhabitants of that country because the
British went into the territorial waters and took out a few hundred
prisoners? What is the logic of it? Why should the Norwegians suffer for
it?
JODL: You are just quoting one small example from the tremendously real
picture of England’s occupation, but there are hundreds of them.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the example you quoted, Witness, not I. I did not
quote it.
JODL: I can only say that we were under the definite subjective
impression that we carried through an enterprise, in the last second,
for which British troops were already embarked. If you can prove to me
that is not true, I shall be extremely grateful to you.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now I am going to call your attention to the only
outside evidence that you have produced about that, because it was read
rather hurriedly—quite rightly, yesterday.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, it is in Jodl’s Document Book 2,
and it is Page 174. Well, My Lord, it begins at Page 174. My Lord, that
is on the left-hand top corner. Page 174 says that Albrecht Soltmann was
an expert specialist, that he evaluated files from the British landing
brigade, and that he examined diaries. That is on the second page, and
the bottom of Page 175:
“The documents and statements by prisoners showed that a short
time before our landing in Norway the British invasion troops
had been embarked on destroyers. On the following day they were
again disembarked and remained in the vicinity of the port of
embarkation. They were then reembarked after the German invasion
of Norway for the second time and transported to Norway. What
intention the English pursued in the embarkation of their troops
before our landings could not be determined from the documents
and from the statements of prisoners. Whether they intended to
occupy Norway before our invasion could at that time only be
conjectured, because the prisoners did not make any exact
statements in this respect. The conjectures are based on the
special equipment of these British troops. Insofar as I could
evaluate the documents and statements furnished by prisoners
they did not contain proof of the English plans with regard to
Norway.”
And this is the next question:
“Have not the results of all documents and statements furnished
by prisoners been to the effect that in the invasion of Norway
we arrived only just ahead of the English?
“Answer: ‘Yes, the information in the documents and the
statements furnished by prisoners could be interpreted to mean
that in our invasion we were just ahead of the English. However,
whether this was considered unmistakable evidence I cannot
judge.’”
And then they deal with French documents captured in a railway train.
The witness does not know anything about them.
[_Turning to the defendant._] That is pretty poor evidence, isn’t it, on
which Norway was to be invaded, contrary to all the treaties and all the
assurances?
JODL: I quite agree with you on that; you are quite correct. But that is
only because Soltmann was unfortunately not the expert in this field. He
was not even an officer of the General Staff. I had forgotten that. We
had further and quite different evidence which lay before me on my desk;
namely, all the commands carried by the English landing brigade. They
confirmed our assumptions absolutely and definitely.
MR. ROBERTS: An invasion without any warning or any declaration of war?
JODL: That is a political question.
MR. ROBERTS: You have told the Court yesterday what a stickler you were
about international law, how keen you were to see that international law
was observed. You knew that was against international law, didn’t you?
JODL: These matters were not in our regulations, but only the provisions
which applied to the Wehrmacht. The concept of an aggressive war was not
found in any regulation. We went only by the Geneva Convention and the
Hague Land Warfare Regulations.
MR. ROBERTS: I mean if an honorable German gives his word he keeps it,
does he not? He does not break his word without saying that he is going
to depart from it, does he, an honorable German?
JODL: That seems to be a practice which is generally observed all over
the world when human beings work together, but not in the sphere of
politics.
MR. ROBERTS: If that is your code of honor, why is it not grossly
dishonorable for Germany to break her word over and over and ever again?
Or would you rather not answer that question?
JODL: No, you would do better to put that question to the people who
were responsible for German politics.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, I will leave that. Now I want to come to the
invasion of Holland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. I beg your pardon,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
You have no doubt at all, have you, on the documents that in the event
of war in the West, it was always Hitler’s intention to violate the
neutrality of those three small countries?
JODL: From the beginning, in his orders for the attacks in the West, he
had the intention to go through Belgium; but he had reservations with
regard to Holland for a long time, which were only rescinded later—I
believe in the middle of November. Regarding Holland his intentions were
not specific. Regarding Belgium his intentions in that direction were
known comparatively early, that is, about the middle or the early part
of October.
MR. ROBERTS: You could not, of course—I mean Germany naturally wanted
to wage an offensive war and an offensive war in somebody else’s
country. That is the ambition, naturally, isn’t it?
JODL: The German objective in this war was to win, at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. You couldn’t attack in the West unless you attacked
through Belgium, could you?
JODL: In any event, any other attack was tremendously difficult and was
highly doubtful. I have already said that.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is why, of course, France built the Maginot Line,
so that you couldn’t attack her frontally.
Well, now, if you secured the coast of Belgium and Holland, you secured
air bases from which you could annihilate England or Great Britain. That
is what you hoped, wasn’t it?
JODL: No doubt the strategic position of Germany in the battle against
England improved through our having the coast; that is true.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. May I just remind you of a few documents which the
Tribunal know already. I do not intend to read them, but the first
document in order of date is 375-PS, USA-84, dated 25 August 1938. It is
during the Fall Grün time. That was the Air Force appreciation which, in
the last paragraph of the document, Page 11, I think, it says:
“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands would represent an
extraordinary advantage in the air war against Great
Britain....”
And the Army is asked to say how long it would take.
That was at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, wasn’t it?
JODL: Yes, but this document, I believe, has already been characterized
as a ridiculous piece of paper, being the work of an insignificant
captain.
MR. ROBERTS: He seems to have been a very good judge, at any rate,
judging what happened afterwards.
Well now, the next document—I know you were in Austria, but no doubt
you heard about it from Keitel—was the Chancellery meeting the 23d of
May 1939. That is L-79, it is Book Number 7, Page 275. Do you remember
there that the Führer said:
“The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be militarily occupied.
Declarations of neutrality must be ignored....
“In this matter, considerations of right and wrong or treaties
have no significance....
“The Army will have to take positions essential to the Navy and
the Air Force. If Belgium and the Netherlands are successfully
occupied and held, if France is also defeated, then fundamental
conditions for a successful war against England will have been
secured....
“Daily attacks by the German Air Force and Navy will cut her
life lines.”
There wasn’t any doubt as to the policy of the Führer in May 1939, was
there?
JODL: It was in Court here that I first heard about this conference and
about the things which were purportedly discussed at that time; and I am
not able to judge whether it is correct, for I did not hear it, not even
from Keitel, not even later.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Did you hear about the speech made by the Führer
on the 22d of August 1939?
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] I do not know if the Court has got this. It
is not in the Document Book; 798-PS, in Document Book Number 4. There
are some loose copies, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
“Those countries”—Holland, Belgium—“and Scandinavia will
defend their neutrality by all available means. England and
France will not violate their neutrality.”
You always thought Hitler was a good prophet, didn’t you? You thought
Hitler was a good judge.
JODL: Very often, yes, very often.
MR. ROBERTS: And he was a good judge that England and France would keep
their word, whereas Germany would break hers.
Now, then, that is August. Now then I want to...
JODL: But that I don’t know.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, I want to come to the document which you
put in yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, wait a minute. Defendant, what do you mean by
saying you don’t know that? Do you mean that you did not know the
document? You said, “I don’t know that.”
JODL: I do not know what the Führer actually said in his conference on
the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken
place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents
which have been submitted here.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to put the whole Document L-52. Dr. Exner, quite
properly of course, read some extracts; but I want to read some more.
Have you got copies for the Tribunal?
Now, L-52 was Hitler’s memorandum on the 9th of October 1939. May I
point out that the 9th of October 1939 was 3 days after his renewed
assurances to the western neutrals.
I want to refer—certain passages you have read; I want to refer to
others.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, what I am now reading from,
starting with the outside page, is the 5th page. It is Page 27 of the
original, which appears in the bottom right-hand corner.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I read the paragraph on Page 25 of your
original, Witness.
“Germany’s military means of waging a lengthy war are, as far as
our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the U-boat arm.
“The U-boat can even today, if ruthlessly employed, become an
extraordinary threat to England. The weaknesses of German U-boat
warfare lie in the great distance of approach to the scene of
their activity, in the extraordinary danger attached to these
approaches, and in the continual threat to their home bases.
That England has not, for the moment, laid the great mine fields
as in World War I, between Norway and the Shetland Islands, is
possibly connected—provided the will to wage war exists at
all—with a shortage of necessary blockade materials. But if the
War lasts long an increasing difficulty to our U-boats must be
reckoned with in the use of these only remaining inward and
outward routes. Every creation of U-boat bases outside these
constricted home bases would lead to an enormous increase in the
striking power of this arm.”
Is that a covert reference to the Norwegian bases, do you think, giving
access to the Atlantic?
JODL: I do not believe so. I believe it is a general correct naval
strategic consideration and can apply just as well to a base at Murmansk
which, for instance, we already had at that time, or in Spain, or in
some other state that was neutral at the time; but it is not a reference
to Norway, for I have declared under oath that at the time, the Führer
never gave a thought to Norway, not the slightest thought, before he
received the report from Quisling.
MR. ROBERTS: I have your answer. Now, may I go on reading?
“The German Air Force: It can only succeed in effective
operations against the industrial center of England and her
south and southwest ports, which are gaining in importance
during the war, when it is no longer compelled to operate
offensively from our present small North Sea coast by
tremendously devious routes involving long flights. If the
Dutch-Belgian area were to fall into the hands of the English
and French, then the enemy air forces, in order to strike at the
industrial heart of Germany, would need to cover barely a sixth
of the distance required by the German bomber to reach really
important targets. If we were in possession of Holland, Belgium,
or even the Straits of Dover as jumping-off bases for German air
attacks, then, without a doubt, Great Britain could be struck a
mortal blow, even if the strongest reprisals were attempted.
“Such a shortening of the air approaches would be all the more
important to Germany because of our greater difficulties in fuel
supply. Every 1000 kilograms of fuel saved is not only an asset
to our national economy, but means that 1000 kilograms more of
explosive can be carried in the aircraft; that is, 1000
kilograms of fuel would become 1000 kilograms of bombs. This
also leads to economy in aircraft, in mechanical wear and tear,
and above all, in the precious blood of soldiers.”
Then I ask you to turn to your Page 41.
My Lord, it is two pages on, and Your Lordship will see “41” nearly at
the top of the page, with an asterisk, and the heading, “The German
Attack.” Has Your Lordship got it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The German Attack. The German attack is to be
launched with the fundamental object of destroying the French
Army, but in any case it must create a favorable initial
situation which is a prerequisite for a successful continuation
of the war. Under these circumstances the only possible area of
attack is the sector between Luxembourg in the south and
Nijmegen in the north, excluding the fortress of Liège. The
object ... is to attempt to penetrate the area
Luxembourg-Belgium, and Holland in the shortest possible time
and to engage and defeat the opposing Belgian-French-English
forces.”
I suppose I can’t ask you to say what is your opinion of the honesty of
giving those western neutrals a guarantee on the 6th of October and
saying that is the only possible means of attack in that memorandum of
the 9th. I suppose that is a question of politics, is it?
JODL: That is a political question, but the declarations were always
made only on the condition of the strictest neutrality of these
countries. But this neutrality was not kept, for British fliers flew
over this area by day and by night.
MR. ROBERTS: Why should the wretched people of the Netherlands and
Belgium be destroyed and mutilated because British airmen fly over their
territory—destroyed and mutilated by the German Army? What is the logic
of your remark at all?
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] My Lord, there was one more passage from
that document I should like to read. If Your Lordship is thinking of
adjourning, perhaps I might read it, and then I will have finished with
the document. My Lord, it is the next page, and it is toward the end of
the page. It is against the lettering—the number L-52. It is just
above, “Time of Attack.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is on your Page 52, Witness, at the
very beginning, or just at the end of Page 51:
“All the leaders must keep firmly fixed in their minds the fact
that the destruction of the Anglo-French Army is the main
objective, the attainment of which will make possible the
prerequisite conditions for later and successful employment of
the German Air Force against other objectives. The brutal
employment of the German Air Force against the heart of the
British will to resist can and will follow at the given moment.”
Did that mean terror attacks against the civilian population?
JODL: You are asking me continually about a document which from the
first to the last word was written by the Führer, as I have already told
you. You are producing a rather interesting picture of the Führer as a
strategist and as a military leader, and it is of interest to the world;
but I cannot see how this concerns me. These are the thoughts which the
Führer put down as military commander and are of great interest for all
soldiers in the world. But what does it have to do with me? That I do
not understand.
MR. ROBERTS: But may I point out, Witness, that your own counsel
produced it and you relied on certain parts of it. That is how it
concerns you; you relied on it.
JODL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MR. ROBERTS: Witness, I only have two other questions on the alleged
aggression against the Low Countries. Will you look at your diary,
1809-PS, for the 8th of May 1940. It is Page 141 in Document Book 7, and
it is Page 115 in the German book. The actual quotation is Page 143 in
the Document Book 7; at the top of the page: “8 May. Alarming news from
Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road blocks, other
mobilization measures.”
Were you afraid that the Dutch might actually take some steps to defend
themselves against your invasion?
JODL: I was sure that the Dutch would defend themselves against Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Was it alarming you because you thought the Dutch might
have suspected you were going to break your treaties and assurances?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
MR. ROBERTS: I will go on:
“According to the intelligence reports the British are said to
have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch refused.
According to reports, measures of the Dutch partly directed
against the coast and partly against us. Not possible to obtain
a clear picture whether the Dutch do not work hand in hand with
the English or whether they really want to defend their
neutrality against the first attacker.”
It is clear from that, is it not, that you had no information at all
that Dutch neutrality was going to be broken?
JODL: That is not clear from the entry; it is only a brief argument on
the basis of masses of reports which we received from Canaris on that
day or on the previous day. If they were to be followed up accurately,
the reports immediately preceding this entry would have to be at hand;
the entry refers to the latest reports, and not to the many thousands
which had come in before.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, on the 10th of May without any declaration of war
these three countries, small countries, were invaded with all of the
armed might of Germany, were they not?
JODL: The attack began on the 10th of May along the whole front.
MR. ROBERTS: What had those countries done at all to deserve the horrors
of invasion and the misery of German occupation?
JODL: That, again, is a historical question. I have already said that
according to my personal point of view England and France in fact forced
them to give up their strictly neutral attitude. That was my impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Their only fault, was it not, was that they stood in the
way of your air bases and U-boat bases?
JODL: They were not only in the way, but by tolerating actions
incompatible with neutrality, they helped England in the war against us.
That was my subjective impression.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I have only got—with the permission of the Tribunal,
there was one question I should have asked on Norway; only one; and if I
might go back to that, I want to ask you about your diary entry,
1809-PS, Page 143 in Document Book 7. I have not got a reference to the
German but it is about at that place. I will read it slowly: “13 March:
Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’”—Weser—“He is still looking for
an excuse”—or “justification”—to use your word. And the next day: “14
March: Führer has not yet decided what reason to give for Weser
Exercise.”
If you had a good reason for breaking Norwegian neutrality, why should
the Führer be unable to find one?
JODL: Because for this operation the Führer considered it absolutely
necessary to have some documentary proof. So far, there had only been
very strong indications which came near to a proof, but we had as yet no
documentary evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I leave that part of the case, and I now go to
Yugoslavia, and I have only two or three questions on Yugoslavia.
I want you to look at Document 1746-PS, Page 127 in Document Book 7;
German book, 112.
Before we deal with the document, Witness, Yugoslavia had also received
assurances from Hitler. That is so, is it not, or do you not know?
JODL: Yes. Not only did Yugoslavia receive assurances from Hitler, but
we also received them from the Yugoslav Government, which had concluded
a treaty with us on the previous day.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, you will find the document I am going to refer to—it
has got a piece of paper headed with the German word for “discussion,”
“Besprechung.” Have you found it? It should be a piece of paper with the
word “Besprechung.”
JODL: “Discussion on the Situation in Yugoslavia”; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that is right.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dated 27 March 1941?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Now if you turn to—I think it is Page 2:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for declarations of
good faith from the new government, to make all preparations to
destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic inquiries will be made; no ultimatum presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted
for the future, will be taken note of. The attack will start as
soon as the means and the troops suitable are ready. It is
important that action be taken as fast as possible.”
Now I go to Page 3, Witness:
“Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and military
destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking.”
Now I go to Page 5, Witness:
“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible
with the destruction of the Yugoslav Air Force ground
installation, and to destroy its capital, Belgrade, in waves of
attacks.”
The Führer was not going to give the civilian population even half an
hour’s warning, was he?
JODL: I do not know what preparations for warning the Yugoslav
Government had been made, but at the moment of the Putsch it immediately
made military preparations and deployed its forces along our border.
MR. ROBERTS: May I ask you this? Do you approve, as an honorable
soldier, of attacking a city crowded with civilians without a
declaration of war or even half an hour’s warning?
JODL: I do not hold that view. I have already said that I, personally,
and half an hour or an hour later the Reich Foreign Minister, suggested
an ultimatum.
MR. ROBERTS: When you lost air superiority and people were able to hit
back, you Germans made a great deal of fuss then about terror attacks,
did you not?
JODL: This city was at the same time the center of a Putsch government
which had annulled a treaty concluded with Germany, and which from that
moment on had made preparations along the whole front for war with
Germany.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am going to leave the incident. Do you remember how
you referred to it in the notes for your lecture? It appears on Page
127—no, My Lord, it does—I beg your pardon, it appears on 292 of Book
7 and at 304 of the German. You refer to it as “an interlude.” Do you
remember? The German word is “Zwischenspiel,” “interlude.” Is that your
idea of an interlude?
JODL: To be juridically exact, you mean the first draft of my lecture
and not my lecture which you do not know. However, even in this first
draft I cannot recall mentioning an interlude.
MR. ROBERTS: How many civilians, how many thousands, do you think were
killed in the first movement of that “interlude”—in the bombing of
Belgrade without warning?
JODL: I cannot say, but surely only a tenth of the number killed in
Dresden, for example, when you had already won the war.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to the alleged aggression against the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Republic
in July of 1940, did he not?
JODL: In July of 1940 he had not yet reached that decision.
MR. ROBERTS: But at any rate—I do not want to waste time—we know that
on the 22d of June 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union contrary to her
nonaggression pact. That is history, is it not?
JODL: Yes. The surprise attack on 22 June 1941 is a historical fact
which took place because the politicians were of the opinion that the
Soviet Union had not kept the pact.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, Witness, I am going to pass from this part of the case
altogether. I want to put one last question: Do you not think that this
record of broken pledges will dishonor the name of Germany for centuries
to come?
JODL: It might, if historical research after exact investigation of
Russian documents delivers clear proof that Russia had no intention of
strangling us politically or of attacking us. In that case, yes;
otherwise, no.
MR. ROBERTS: I now want to ask—to come to quite a different part of the
case under Count Three and Count Four. The documents have been put to
you so often. I do not want to put them again.
But, you remember the “Barbarossa” order. That is C-50, in Document Book
7, Page 187; and German book, 146. That was circulated by your office,
was it not, Wehrmachtführungsstab, L?
JODL: It was dealt with in the Quartermaster Section of the
Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, would you agree that that was a shameful order to
have to issue?
JODL: I agree. I have already said that there was no soldier who was not
opposed to this order; they all did so.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now we know that on the 17th of July—and this
is Document C-51, which is in Document Book 7, at Page 190, German Page
150—we know that from the same office, the WFSt, L, there was issued an
order that the previous order was to be destroyed, but its validity was
not to be affected, destroyed below corps level. What was the object of
the destruction of that order?
JODL: Unfortunately I cannot tell you; I do not recall this order. I do
not believe I ever saw it, at least not before this Trial.
MR. ROBERTS: Perhaps you would look at it, Witness, C-51, Page 190, Book
7; 150, German book. Now, that comes from WFSt—that is,
Wehrmachtführungsstab—Department “L”; and then “Q” for “Quartermaster,”
in brackets. That is your office, is it not?
JODL: That is a part of the Wehrmachtführungsstab.
MR. ROBERTS: It is signed Keitel.
JODL: Yes. But I do not know this order; it was shown to me for the
first time here in Nuremberg; I had never seen it before. I do not know
what it is about or what order is being rescinded. I have already said
that these questions of military legal jurisdiction were dealt with by
Field Marshal Keitel, and that he used my Quartermaster Section as a
working staff without my having any part in these matters. I do not know
this order.
MR. ROBERTS: And you cannot suggest any reason why it had to be
destroyed?
JODL: No; I cannot give you any information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now then, I want C-52, which has not yet been put in. Your
Lordships will find it on Page 191 of Book 7. I offer it as GB-485, and
it is in the German book on Page 153.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, this is another Keitel order. It
comes from Wehrmachtführungsstab, L; then, in brackets, “I Op.” Is that
your department?
JODL: That is the section which worked with me on all operational
questions.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you remember that order?
JODL: Yes, I remember the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Now—I think you took part in drafting it; did you not?
JODL: Certainly, because it is an operational order which supplements a
directive.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, well, will you look at Paragraphs 6 and 7? Paragraph
6:
“In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East,
forces available for establishing security will be sufficient
only if all resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of
the guilty, but by the occupation forces spreading such terror
as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclination to
resist.
“The respective commanders, together with the troops at their
disposal, are to be held responsible for maintaining peace in
their respective areas. The commanders must find the means of
keeping order within the regions where security is their
responsibility, not by demanding more forces, but by applying
suitable Draconian measures.”
That is a terrible order, is it not?
JODL: No, it is not at all terrible for it is established by
international law that the inhabitants of an occupied territory must
follow the orders and instructions of the occupying power, and any
uprising, any resistance against the army occupying the country is
forbidden; it is, in fact, partisan warfare, and international law does
not lay down means of combating partisans. The principle of such warfare
is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and this is not even a
German principle.
MR. ROBERTS: Is it not the tooth and the eye of the innocent?
JODL: It is not a question of the innocent. It expressly states, “to
eradicate every inclination to resist.” It is a question of those who
resist, that is, by partisan warfare.
MR. ROBERTS: I will not argue about it, Witness. I gather you approve of
the order.
JODL: I approve it as a justified measure conforming to international
law and directed against a widespread resistance movement which employed
unscrupulous methods. Of that we had evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now I want to come to something quite different.
I want to come to the Commando Order, and I desire to put in two
documents which have not yet been put in, to trace the history of the
making of this order, because I suggest it was drawn up in your office
under your jurisdiction.
Will you give the witness, please, 1266-PS, which I offer, My Lord, as
GB-486.
Now, this is the first document, dated the 8th of October. That is a
memorandum from the “Q” branch of the Wehrmachtführungsstab; that is
right, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was—that is the wireless order that you mentioned?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: First it deals with the “tying up,” My Lord, which is not
important. Secondly, the wireless announcement of the 7th of October
1942, which reads as follows:
“All terror and sabotage detachments of the British and their
accomplices who do not behave like soldiers but like bandits
will in future be treated as such by German troops and will be
ruthlessly slain in battle wherever they make their appearance.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, of course, that order does not mean
very much, does it? It assumes that the enemy are not behaving like
soldiers, but like bandits, and says they may be slain in battle.
But then the second paragraph:
“The Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff...”
That was Warlimont, was it not, Witness?
JODL: Yes, that was Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
“...has given the following urgent task to ‘Q’:
“1) Drafting of the order.”
Look at Number 2:
“Like the Barbarossa order issued at the time this order must
also be drawn up—in conjunction with the Armed Forces Legal
Department and Counterintelligence—with great thought and care.
Distribution down to armies only, from there forward only
orally. To be destroyed after having been taken cognizance of.”
What was the nature of that order that was drawn up with so much care by
your staff and the Legal Department and Counterintelligence?
JODL: I believe that was Document C-50, which you mentioned earlier. The
Barbarossa order is not a clear term.
MR. ROBERTS: “The following must be borne in mind regarding the
contents of the order:
“In cases where captives are temporarily taken into custody for
our own purposes, the persons concerned are to be handed over to
the SD by Counterintelligence after a thorough examination in
which the SD is also to take part.
“Not to be lodged in prisoner-of-war camps under any
circumstances.
“This order is to take effect subsequently with regard to the
people from Norway.”
The people from Norway were some English Commandos who had blown up a
power station in Norway; is not that so?
JODL: That is possible, but I do not know. I have never seen this.
MR. ROBERTS: I think I will be able to remind you later about it.
The next document I do not read. It is from somebody called “Dr. Hülle,”
whom I do not know, and I do not think it adds anything to it.
Then the next document—the third in Your Lordship’s bundle—is dated 9
October and is signed “Warlimont.” Is it dated 9 October, Witness?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Signed Warlimont?
JODL: Signed by Warlimont.
MR. ROBERTS: It sets out the first facts in the first two paragraphs
that we know:
“The Führer wishes an order to be issued laying down the proper
behavior of the Armed Forces.
“At the instance of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Armed
Forces Legal Department has drawn up the draft attached hereto.
“You are requested to co-operate in a thorough examination, if
necessary, calling in the Reichsführer SS.
“We refer to the discussion between Chief of Counterintelligence
and the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.”
Then the next document is the draft order prepared by the Legal
Department:
“Members of terror and sabotage detachments of the British Armed
Forces who demonstrably break the rules of an honorable way of
fighting will be treated as bandits: To be exterminated
mercilessly in battle or in flight. If in case of military
necessity they should be temporarily arrested, or if they fall
into German hands outside combat actions, they are to be brought
before an officer immediately for interrogation and are then to
be handed over to the SD.
“Holding them in a prisoner-of-war camp is forbidden.
“This order may be distributed only down to armies. From there
to the front it must be transmitted only verbally.”
And did you—do you remember having a conversation on the telephone with
the head of the Legal Department about this order?
JODL: No, I do not remember.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, will you look at the next document; it is dated 14
October. It is in the same bundle, the next page of it—I beg your
pardon, it is a memorandum. Now you notice the heading, the original
heading was: “Reprisal Actions—Prisoners of War.” Somebody struck that
out and put instead: “Combating of Enemy Sabotage Detachments.”
“Memorandum. (Telephone discussion with the Chief of the Armed
Forces Legal Department).
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department has spoken with
the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff by telephone.”
That is you, is it not?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: “The latter”—that is you—“said that the Führer’s
aim in this action was to prevent this manner of waging war
(dropping small detachments who do great damage by demolitions
and then surrender).”
That was the object of the order, was it not?
JODL: Yes, but by using methods contrary to international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is a matter perhaps neither for you nor me to
discuss. But if I might be allowed to ask you this question: Do you draw
any distinction between a British airman who bombs a power station from
the air and a British parachutist in uniform who is landed and blows it
up with an explosive? Do you draw any distinction in international law?
JODL: No. As such, the destruction of an objective by a demolition troop
I consider completely admissible under international law; but I do not
consider it admissible during such an operation for civilian clothes to
be worn under the uniform and armpit pistols to be carried which start
firing as soon as the arms are raised in the act of surrender.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, there are two things there, you see, and one answer
and I am not going to argue at all with you; but when you consider the
case you will find many, many cases where these persons were executed
and there is no suggestion they had anything but a uniform at all.
JODL: I believe that these cases were quite rare, that at least these
people were mixed with those who wore civilian clothes.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I am not going to argue with you because there are
other documents and they will have to be, perhaps, summarized sometime.
But would you agree that a parachutist in uniform, with no civilian
clothes, acting like that, if he is killed, shot by the SD, would you
agree that that would be murder? Or would you rather not answer that?
JODL: I have already said that if a soldier in full uniform only blows
up or destroys an objective, I do not consider it an action contrary to
international law; and for that reason I opposed the Commando Order in
this form almost to the last moment...
MR. ROBERTS: I hear your answer and I will not pursue that matter. Then
the document goes on—I do not want to read it all:
“The Chief of the Armed Forces Legal Department spoke to the
effect that under these circumstances one should consider
issuing an order fit for publication. Article 23c of the Hague
Land Warfare Regulations, which forbids the killing or wounding
of an enemy who lays down his arms or is unarmed, if he
surrenders unconditionally, had to be explained; when the Land
Warfare Regulations were concluded this manner of waging war was
not yet known and the regulation therefore could not apply to
this.”
Well now, that was the first bundle. Now I want to put you a...
JODL: I should like to make a brief comment on this document. I have not
seen any of these papers before; I am now seeing them for the first
time; but they prove, word for word, what I said here the day before
yesterday under oath, that on their own initiative, the members of my
staff, as they heard that the Führer had demanded an executive order,
began preparatory work for the draft of such an order with the Legal
Department and with the Foreign Department, but that I did not accept
and did not submit any order to the Führer.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, I want to put to you another document, 1265-PS.
My Lord, I offer it as GB-487.
Now the first document in the bundle is a teletype dated 13 October and
it is signed by Canaris. Is that right, Witness?
JODL: Yes, a teletype message from Canaris.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, and it is a teletype to the OPS Staff. The subject is
“Treatment of Prisoners of War.”
“Regarding discussions and measures in pursuance of OKW’s
announcement of 17 October 1942 the following general attitude
is taken:”
Number 1 does not matter; it is about chaining. Number 2 is the
important one:
“Treatment of Sabotage Units: Sabotage units in uniform are
soldiers and have the right to be treated as prisoners of war.
Sabotage units in civilian clothes or German uniform have no
claim to treatment as prisoners of war (_francs-tireurs_).”
You agree, of course, with the correctness of that, do you not? The rest
of that document does not matter. You agree, do you not, with that
opinion in Paragraph 2, as a man who knows international law?
JODL: Yes, I agree with Paragraph 2; it corresponds entirely with my
opinion; it agrees completely with my point of view.
MR. ROBERTS: And now the next document.
If you go to the—if the Tribunal would kindly go to the last document
of the three; and would you go to the document which is headed,
“Telephone call; Reference: Letter Ausland Abwehr of 13. 10. 42.” My
Lord, that is the one I have just read.
“Opinion of the Armed Forces Legal Department”—Paragraph 2,
that is referring to Canaris’ opinion—“Fundamentally in
agreement.
“It may, however, be possible to support the following train of
thought with regard to special cases:
“Fighting methods such as exist now and such as it is intended
to prevent came about long after the creation of the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare, in particular as a result of war
in the air. Special attention is drawn to the mass use of
parachutists for purposes of sabotage. Anyone who commits acts
of sabotage as a soldier with the intention of surrendering
after the act of sabotage without fighting does not act like an
honest fighter. He misuses Article 23c of the Hague Regulations
for Land Warfare during the formulation of which no such methods
were contemplated. The misuse lies in the speculation on
surrender without fighting after successful completion of the
act of sabotage.
“This view regarding the inadmissibility of sabotage Commandos
can be backed up without reservation provided we also apply it
to ourselves.”
That document has your initial on the top, Witness? Is that right?
JODL: I have read this document. It contains a statement on
international law by the Armed Forces Legal Department, which on this
point agrees with the Führer’s opinion. It actually confirms the
possibility that a misuse of international law may be committed by
surrendering immediately after an action and thus securing for oneself
complete absence of danger in the conduct of a war operation. That
interpretation is disputable; I do not fully approve of it, but it was
the view of the highest legal authority at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Many, many brave soldiers, when they are outnumbered,
surrender, do they not? Many Germans surrendered at Bizerte and Tunis,
thousands of them. How did that put them outside the pale of
international law or the protection of it?
JODL: But they were soldiers captured in the normal manner of war, which
the Führer always recognized. This is a disputable case and very
doubtful under international law, but, as I said, it is not an idea of
mine and has nothing to do with me; I only took note of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. My Lord, the intermediate document is a letter
signed “Lehmann,” who was head of the Legal Department. It merely
confirms the telephone conversation which I have read, and I do not
think it is necessary to read it again. It is before the defendant.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well now, the last of these documents
before the order was finally drawn up and issued, the Court has already
seen, because it was put in.
It is 1263-PS, RF-365, My Lord, it was in Jodl’s Document Book Number 2,
Page 104.
Will you look at the original, please.
There is an unfortunate omission from Page 110 in Dr. Exner’s book,
which I am perfectly certain is quite inadvertent. Will you look at the
document dated 15 October 1942?
My Lord, I think that is the first in your bundle. It is Page 110. It is
first in the single documents. It is Page 110 of Dr. Exner’s book, and I
apologize to him because I have just seen the marginal writing. It was
covered over before, and I had not seen it. I apologize.
My Lord, the...
It is a note, is it not, Witness, signed Warlimont, your deputy, 15
October. I think you will find it the second document in your file. I do
not want to read it all again because it has been read, but you see:
“The Proposal of the Amt Ausland Abwehr will be submitted as Appendix
1.”
The Tribunal will find Appendix 1, in which he says—in which it is
suggested, under letter “A,” that sabotage troops who do not wear
uniforms should be court-martialed. You have said “no.” You have given
your reasons. I will not worry you about that any more. And then “B”;
members of sabotage units, who are in uniform but are guilty of
dishonorable activities are after capture to be put into special
confinement. Do you say that that does not go either?
And then, if you will go back to 15 October, just the second paragraph
down:
“The Chief of WR”—that is the Legal Department—“has made a
statement to the effect that the order was to be drawn up in
such a way that it will take into account our own interests...”
Is it “our own interests,” Witness? “Take into account our own
interests”?
JODL: Yes, “our own interests.”
MR. ROBERTS: “...our own interests while considering the future
conduct of the war. In this way he wanted to avoid repercussions
which would run counter to our further intentions. Sabotage is
an essential part of conducting war in time of total warfare; we
ourselves have strongly developed this method of fighting.”
And you write against that, do you, “But the English make much more use
of it”?
JODL: Yes, it is an undeniable fact that at that time of the war the
English made much more use of it than we.
MR. ROBERTS: Is that a reason for making a law, an order of this kind,
to try and discourage the English from using sabotage detachments?
JODL: No, that is certainly not a reason. It is only a denial of the
statement that we had strongly developed this method of fighting; hence
my remark, “Yes, but the English to a much greater extent than we.”
That, of course, has nothing at all to do with the reason for the order.
MR. ROBERTS: Then I am not going to take more time on that particular
document, except—have you got a document dated 14 October with 1, 2, 3,
4 at the end? I think it is on a separate page, the 1, 2, 3, 4.
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: It says:
“With the view in mind—to prevent the enemy’s fighting the war
by using sabotage troops—following questions have to be
clarified before formulating an order:
“1) Have we ourselves the intention of dropping sabotage Units
in the zone of rear echelons of the enemy, or also far back in
the interior?
“2) Who will drop more sabotage troops, the enemy or we?
“3) Can we establish the principle: Sabotage troops do not
conduct legal war; they are to be exterminated in the fighting
without mercy?
“4) Do we attach importance to first arresting the single
members of this group for interrogation by Counterintelligence
and not killing them immediately?”
These were the considerations which were discussed in your office before
the orders were drawn up.
JODL: These were questions—not points of view—questions which were
raised in the Armed Forces Operations Staff as a result of the Armed
Forces communiqué. Fortunately, the submission of all these documents
proves the complete correctness of everything I said here 2 days ago.
The staff, the Legal Department, and the Ausland department racked their
brains and pondered how they could draw up the executive order
implementing the Führer’s additions to the Wehrmacht communiqué. Neither
they nor I came to any conclusion, and no proposal was made to the
Führer; nothing was done. That is what I stated here the day before
yesterday, and that is what, fortunately, you yourself have proved by
submitting these documents.
MR. ROBERTS: You have said, I think, that part of the Führer’s order
disgusted you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you have said in your interrogation that circulating
this order was one of the things which went against your inner
conscience—one of the few things. “Your inner convictions”—to use your
actual words.
JODL: In the preliminary interrogation I said that it was one of the
few—or the only—order I received from the Führer which I, in my own
mind, completely rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: You rejected it, but these young men went on being shot,
did they not?
JODL: I have already described exactly how the commanding generals at
the front, vigorously supported by me, interpreted this order in the
mildest imaginable way in practice; actually, only very few such
incidents occurred, and I believe that most—at any rate, nearly all
that came to my knowledge—were highly justified, because the fighting
methods of those people were not methods of honest soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, you talk about your “inner convictions.” I think
Keitel spoke about his “inner conscience.” But should we have heard
anything about these convictions and this conscience if Germany had not
lost the war?
JODL: No, but then we might have heard of the strangled at Dieppe in a
similar trial.
MR. ROBERTS: It is very late and—now, I just want to deal with a few
examples, very very quickly, of the order being carried out, as you said
it was only carried out a few times. I just, first of all, want to refer
to UK-57, which is Page 309 of Document Book 7, the German copy Page
33—German copy Page 344. I am sorry, I had given you the wrong number.
I can read this out. It is a report which is initialed by Keitel.
“On 16 September 1942”—mark the date, that is more than a month
before the Commando Order came into force—“10 Englishmen and 2
Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coast, dressed in the uniform
of the British Mountain Rifle Regiment, heavily armed and
equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating
difficult mountain country, they blew up important installations
in the power station Glomfjord on 21 September. A German sentry
was shot during the incident. Norwegian workmen were threatened
that they would be chloroformed if they resisted. For this
purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphium syringes.
Seven of the participants have been arrested. The others escaped
into Sweden.”
Then follow seven names, which I read out to this Court, I think, in
January. They were shot on 30 October 1942. That would be, shot as a
result of the order which you circulated, although it was not in
existence when those men blew up that power station. You told me some
little time ago that that power station was a proper military target.
These men were in uniform. Can you begin to justify that?
JODL: No, I cannot justify that, and I will not justify it. I consider
it completely illegal, because this order could certainly not have been
retroactive; but I did not learn of this affair at the time. Of UK-57 I
read the first and second parts here for the first time; the third part
I read in April 1944.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, there are other exhibits dealing with this
matter which I am not going to put to you. They have been referred to
before, and I do not want to be cumulative. I would like you—or perhaps
I will ask you one question first.
I think it was laid down, was it not, that every action taken under this
Führer Order was to be reported in the Wehrmacht report?
JODL: Yes, that was ordered.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I just want to give you an example of the Wehrmacht
report.
526-PS, USA-502, My Lord, it is 7a, Page 15. It is dated 10 May 1943,
German Page 21 of the small book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It is a notice from the “Q” branch of your
staff.
“On 30 March 1943 in Toftefjord an enemy cutter was sighted.
Cutter was blown up by enemy. Crew: 2 dead men, 10 prisoners.
“Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetlands) by the Norwegian
Navy.
“Arms: Two Colt machine guns, two mounted machine guns, a small
transmitter ... 1,000 kilograms of explosives....
“Purpose: Forming an organization for sabotaging strong-points,
battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges....
“Führer order executed by the SD.
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was engaged and
destroyed on approaching the coast.”
That was false, was it not?
JODL: I confirmed this communiqué of 6 April which included the
contribution from the commander in Norway as I received it on 6 April;
this brief formulation always originated with the commander at the
front. But what actually happened is set down in this note of 10 May
which, most unfortunately, I never saw, because on 10 May 1943 I
traveled by train to Bad Gastein to begin a cure for a severe case of
lumbago; and so, unfortunately, I saw this document for the first time
here in Nuremberg. I am sorry, because this would have been one of the
few cases in which I might have been able to intervene.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, but, Witness—keep it in front of you—because you see
the action was not taken on 10 May; it was taken before, or on 6 April.
Look at the last paragraph:
“Wehrmacht report of 6 April announces the following:
“...enemy sabotage unit engaged and destroyed on approaching the
coast.”
Whereas, in fact, they had been taken prisoner and then shot like dogs
by the SD.
JODL: Yes, I have just said that. Before this contribution of 6 April, I
heard nothing about the whole matter, but only on the 10th of May did it
come to our knowledge, and then the Armed Forces Operations Staff drew
up this note. The whole investigation into these events was made by the
Intelligence Service, the office of Canaris, together with its Security
Police; it was not the SD; that is wrong; it was the Security Police.
Unfortunately I did not know of these details; the Intelligence Service
knew them. I was concerned with the whole question only because I had to
edit the Armed Forces communiqué; otherwise I would never have dealt
with the Commando Order; I was quite innocent of it.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I just want to show you one more instance. It is
2610-PS.
It is, My Lord, in small Document Book 7a, Page 23, the German small
book Page 41.
Now, I want you to notice, Witness, this is the only document which I
rely on, which is not one of your own captured contemporaneous German
documents. This is a report from the Judge Advocate General’s
Department, United States Army. It concerns 15 United States personnel
who were shot under this order. If you look at the second page:
“On the night of 22 March 1944, 2 officers and 13 enlisted men
of the Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the Army of the
United States disembarked from some United States Navy boats and
landed on the Italian coast near Stazione di Framura. All 15 men
were members of the United States Army and were in the military
service of the United States. When they landed they were all
properly dressed in the field uniform of the United States Army
and they had no civilian clothes. Their mission was to demolish
a railroad tunnel on the main line between La Spezia and Genoa.
That rail line was being used by the German Forces to supply
their fighting forces on the Cassino and Anzio Beachhead
fronts.”
That was a good military target, that tunnel, was it not?
JODL: Yes, a military target, absolutely.
MR. ROBERTS: And all 15 men were shot because of the order that you
circulated...
JODL: I did not understand. The order which—which I circulated; yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Which you circulated on the 19th of October. You circulated
a supplementary order to the Führer Order, the last paragraph of which,
I think, disgusted you. That is 503-PS.
JODL: It would be more correct to say “which you had to circulate.”
MR. ROBERTS: I will take that question up in a moment. I do not agree. I
must not argue with you, but I must put some questions.
General Dostler, who ordered the shooting of those men, he himself, you
see, was also shot by sentence of this court martial.
I am going to turn now from the Commando Order and...
JODL: May I say something else about this document?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, anything you like.
JODL: This incident never came to my knowledge; at least, I have no
recollection of it. As far as I know, it never appeared in the Armed
Forces communiqué, because General Dostler did not report the incident
to his commanding officer, Kesselring, who might have been able to take,
and might have taken, a different course in this affair.
MR. ROBERTS: Why do you say that you had to circulate this order? No man
can compel another to circulate an order for murder, unless he does it.
JODL: I have explained at length that this order could not simply be
interpreted as an order to murder, but that very serious and justified
doubts and considerations could arise with regard to international law
and with regard to the justness of this order. In any case, you should
have complete appreciation of such a delicate situation, because even
now, in my position here, I cannot say or do as I like, and that exactly
is what I experienced during these last 5½ years.
MR. ROBERTS: You could have refused. You could have said, and the other
generals could have said, could you not: “We are all honorable soldiers.
We will not publish and issue those orders”?
JODL: Certainly under other circumstances it might have been possible,
first, if at the time I had not had that conflict with the Führer, and
secondly, if the British Ministry of War had made my task a little
easier. However, these events and the statement made by the British on
the 2d of September put the Führer into a rage against which I was
powerless. How much I tried to resist, for that the document itself is
the best proof, because the threat of punishment and detailed
justification for it were directed against me personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, would that be a convenient time to break
off?
[_A recess was taken._]
MR. ROBERTS: I want to ask you a few questions about the deportation of
the Jews from Denmark. Will you look, please, at a new exhibit, D-547,
which I offer as GB-488. Now, that is the OKW Operational Staff from the
commander, Denmark, dated 20 September 1943. That is before the teletype
which has been put in, 2 days before:
“The Führer has agreed in principle with Dr. Best’s telegram
that the Jewish question in Denmark be solved very soon by
deportation.
“Execution of this measure should take place while the state of
military emergency still exists. It is not certain if sufficient
police forces can be provided for the arrest of the Jews and
their families, about 6,000 persons, most of whom live in
Copenhagen. The Army would be heavily burdened....
“I believe that the results of the deportation will be
serious....
“The armament industry deliveries will be prejudiced.
Considerable disturbances will have to be reckoned with.”
And you made a note on the back of it:
“I know nothing of this. If a political measure is to be carried
out by the commander of Denmark the OKW must be notified by the
Foreign Office.”
Is that right?
JODL: Yes. I would not have recalled this document, but I certainly
wrote the note. It proves that I did not remember until now that
obviously this question had been discussed in Denmark some days before
and that the commander in Denmark had been making objections.
Consequently I wrote, I know nothing of this. This is a political
measure, and if a political measure is to be carried out in Denmark,
then the Foreign Office should kindly notify us.
MR. ROBERTS: I omit one or two unimportant documents. Will you go to
document dated 1 October 1943—the fifth or sixth document of Your
Lordship’s file, Number D-547, dated 1 October 1943. It is to the OKW
from Denmark, and quotes as follows:
“The Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark has given the following
report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“1) The arrest of the Jews will take place on the night of 1-2
October. Transportation from Zealand will be carried out by
ship....
“2) Should I receive no contrary instruction, I do not intend
allowing the Jewish action to be mentioned, either on the radio
or in the press”—and then
“3) ...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews
undisturbed in order that the seizure of these possessions
cannot be imputed to be the reason or one of the reasons for the
action.”
Then you deal with the disadvantages—the writer does—and there is a
question: “Does the Reichsführer SS know?” The answer:
“The Reichsführer SS knows, is in agreement,” and then a pencil note in
Jodl’s handwriting, “The Führer agrees.” Is that in your writing?
JODL: Yes, that is my handwriting, but that refers only to the
announcement of the release of the interned Danish soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: I see.
JODL: Then it is important to note in this document that the commander
in Denmark said that he did not intend having the property of the
evacuated Jews disturbed. He said:
“...I intend leaving the possessions of the evacuated Jews
undisturbed....”
He had the executive power at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: Have you got the next document in the same bundle, 2d of
October 1943, to OKW Operations Staff, from Denmark? I quote:
“Jewish action carried out in the night of the 1-2 October by
the German Police without incidents.”
And then the last document, dated 3 October 1943, to the OKW Operations
Staff:
“According to the statement of the Reich Plenipotentiary, the
Reichsführer SS has ordered that the Reichsführer SS alone as
the person ordering the Jewish action is to receive the exact
figures on arrests.
“The Plenipotentiary has, therefore, given no figures to the
commander of the German troops in Denmark. 232 Jews have been
handed in by the Police via the collecting points set up by the
Watch Battalion, Copenhagen.”
What was the Watch Battalion?
JODL: I cannot say that at the moment; I do not know how it was
composed. It might have been a unit of the Police; it might have been
part of the Army; I cannot say with certainty. At any rate it was a unit
which was used only for guard duties. But it is interesting that I wrote
the remark: “Is a matter of complete indifference to us,” which proves
that I was not interested in the affair, and refused to have any part in
it.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, I wonder. First of all, you said that the Watch
Battalion might have been a part of the Wehrmacht. Were you...
JODL: That is not certain. I do not wish to dispute it definitely. There
were also watch battalions of the Army, but it might equally well have
been a watch unit of the Police. I cannot say it with certainty, but
General Von Hannecken should have information about it.
MR. ROBERTS: But were your “decent German soldiers,” whom you mentioned
yesterday, were they called upon to round up Jews who managed to get
through the SS net?
JODL: No, it says here, “...it was carried through by the Police,” and I
do not believe that any unit of the Wehrmacht concerned itself with
deportation of Jews. I do not believe it; the Wehrmacht rejected that.
MR. ROBERTS: Dirty work, was it not?
JODL: I do not believe that it happened; I do not believe it.
MR. ROBERTS: Then your note: “...is a matter of complete indifference to
us”—it was a matter of complete indifference to you how many Jews were
deported, you did not care?
JODL: The note does not imply that, but it does prove that the matter
was a political one, and with political matters I was not concerned. My
attitude to the Jewish question has, I believe, been made clear already.
MR. ROBERTS: Where did the Jews go to, Auschwitz?
JODL: No. The French Prosecution read it here; these Jews of whom we are
speaking now were taken to Theresienstadt; a few of the older people
died there, but all of them were treated well, and received clothing and
food. I had the same information, and this document of the Danish
Government confirms it.
MR. ROBERTS: You believe that, do you?
JODL: Yes, I believe that, because the Danish Government confirms it
here; it was confirmed in this court by the Prosecution itself.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I want to deal with one other topic, the topic of
forced labor. Did you say in your speech—will you look at your notes of
your speech, Pages 38 and 39, and it is Page 298 of Document Book 7, the
big one, the paragraph, which begins on Page 38 in the witness’ copy. It
has got a frame; I think it is a piece of paper headed “38.” I wonder if
you can find it for him.
“This dilemma of manpower shortage has led to the idea of making
more thorough use of the manpower reserves in the territories
dominated by us. Right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up
together. I believe that insofar as concerns labor, everything
has been done that could be done. Where this has not yet been
achieved, it appeared to be more favorable politically to
refrain from measures of compulsion, and secure in turn order
and economic aid. In my opinion, however, the time has now come
to take steps with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmark,
Holland, France, and Belgium to compel thousands of idlers to
carry out the fortification work which is more important than
any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been
given.” (Document Number L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34.)
Do you remember them?
JODL: There is no doubt that I drafted this once.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes?
JODL: But that does not prove that I said it.
MR. ROBERTS: But had the necessary orders been given for the civilians
in the occupied territories to work on the German fortification?
JODL: A compulsory labor order was issued in most countries, but I—you
may not know it—I state under my oath that in Denmark and Holland, and
also in Belgium, local firms, which recruited their own labor under the
labor order, worked on these fortifications and that the populations of
these areas were particularly glad about this, because the stronger
their coast was fortified, the more certain were they that the invasion
would not take place in their neighborhood. And, of course, they were
greatly interested in preventing an invasion, which they knew would
destroy everything. Though it sounds incredible, the local inhabitants
did work on these fortifications, some of them with the greatest
enthusiasm. That is a fact.
MR. ROBERTS: No, I did not stop you. But had the necessary orders been
given—that is in the last sentence—to compel these people who did not
want to, to compel them to work on fortification? I am not talking about
the people who did want it, but the people who did not.
JODL: I understand. I did not know details of the procedure, as I did
not concern myself with it, but I did know that compulsory labor orders
had been issued in the occupied countries.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I will leave that, if you have said all you want
to say. Will you look now, please, at a new document, Number 1383-PS,
which I offer as GB-489. This is a report of a discussion of the current
military situation, 12 December 1942, Pages 65 and 66, Jodl speaking:
“The military commander of France reports: The number of French
workers deported into the Reich since 1 June has now passed
220,000. There are in round figures 100,000 skilled laborers in
Berlin.”
How many of these 220,000 were volunteers, did you find out?
JODL: I cannot say that; I only quoted from a report which was appended
to the situation report from France. That a large-scale exchange between
prisoners of war and workers had been in progress has already been
stated in detail by Sauckel.
MR. ROBERTS: I will leave that. I ask only two questions now on Sagan,
Stalag Luft III.
You said yesterday that after the incident of the Sagan shooting, you
thought Hitler was no longer “humane.” Did you say that?
JODL: I said yesterday, I had the impression then that he was disavowing
all humane conceptions of right.
MR. ROBERTS: Had you thought that he was humane up to March of 1944?
JODL: Before this time, I personally knew of no action of his which
could not be justified legally, at least under international law. All
his previous orders, so far as I knew, could still be justified in some
way. They were reprisals. But this act was not a reprisal.
MR. ROBERTS: This was—would you agree with me—the word is not too
strong—that this was sheer murder of these 50 airmen?
JODL: I completely agree with you: I consider it sheer murder.
MR. ROBERTS: How could you honorable generals go on serving a murderer
with unabated loyalty?
JODL: I did not serve with unabated loyalty after this event, but I did
everything in my power to avoid further injustice.
MR. ROBERTS: Now I come to something else, the question of destruction
in Norway. The document is 754-PS. It has not yet been exhibited. I
offer it as GB-490. This document is signed by you, is it not?
JODL: I have known this document for a long time; it is signed by me.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. Perhaps I might just read parts of it to the Tribunal.
Dated 28 October 1944. It is from your staff, and the distribution is to
the Army supreme command; commander-in-chief, Norway; to the Reich
Commissioner, Norway; and the Navy.
“Because of the unwillingness of the northern Norwegian
population to evacuate voluntarily the Führer has agreed to the
proposals of the Reich Commissioner and has ordered that the
entire Norwegian population east of the Fjord of Lyngen be
evacuated by force in the interest of their own security, and
that all homes are to be burned to the ground or destroyed.
“The commander, Northern Finland, is responsible that the
Führer’s orders be carried out without consideration. Only by
this method can the Russians with strong forces, aided by these
homesteads and the population familiar with the terrain, be
prevented from following our withdrawal operations during the
winter and shortly appearing in front of our position in Lyngen.
This is not the place for sympathy for the civilian population.”
Lyngen is in the very north of Norway, is it not, on the west coast?
JODL: No, on the northern coast, where Finland is closest to the coast
of the polar region and very near Norway.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that order was carried out, according to the Norwegian
report, UK-79, which the Tribunal will find as the last document in the
small book, 7A, Page 26 of the Norwegian report, at the bottom of the
page, Page 26:
“As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the
retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944,
the Germans practiced the ‘scorched earth’ policy for the first
time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population
was to evacuate, and that all houses, transport, and stores were
to be destroyed. As a result of this, about 30,000 houses were
damaged apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels amounting
to 176 million kroner.”
And then, for photographs will the Tribunal turn to Pages 62 and 63; 62
is a copy of the German order, and 63 is a photograph of the ruins of a
fishing village.
That was a cruel order, was it not, Witness?
JODL: No, not exactly. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks
about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon
the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers but
much against their will.
Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities
of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these
cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice this order was
moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had
with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region—and whom
I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be
produced—it was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what
was necessary from a military point of view and could be justified under
Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare was destroyed.
Otherwise no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and
if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still
standing, not destroyed.
The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this
attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer in
similarly strong terms, but nevertheless he demanded that this order be
issued. We who retained our humanitarian sentiments carried out the
order only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons.
These are the facts.
MR. ROBERTS: I think you said, when you were interrogated, that your
brother complained of this order, did he not?
JODL: Yes, quite, he was enraged by this decree.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well. I am now going to turn to two documents with
regard to the treatment of the Norwegian civilian population.
They are in your Document Book 1, Pages 99 and 100—well, it begins at
Page 98. These are regulations on the conduct during the occupation of
Denmark and Norway. And there are instructions to the troops to treat
the inhabitants politely and well and to behave themselves with due
decorum. That is right, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is correct.
MR. ROBERTS: And they must be told that they are entering Norway for the
protection of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. That
appears on Page 99. That is rather a euphemistic description of a sudden
invasion with no declaration of war, is it not?
JODL: Yes, but at first it was carried out in a fairly peaceful manner
on the whole.
MR. ROBERTS: From your point of view?
JODL: No, from the point of view of the Norwegians as well. The most
extraordinary things...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, you know, we have seen—we can see in the Norwegian
Government’s report photograph after photograph of these towns and
villages bombed to ruins. Is that your idea of an orderly occupation?
JODL: What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth
mentioning; just a few coastal batteries and a few fortifications, but
no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the
English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer, but nothing was destroyed
when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at
the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest.
MR. ROBERTS: And naturally, Witness, if you could have landed without
opposition and occupied the country without opposition, so much the
better for you? That is obvious, is it not?
JODL: Yes, undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the
Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation if
Terboven had not come.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want you to look at a part of that document which,
quite properly, of course, was not read.
It is Appendix 5 which will be part, My Lord, I assume, of Exhibit
AJ-14, the number which this document was given when it was put in in
the examination-in-chief. But I am handing the Tribunal copies of
Appendix 5, because it does not appear in the Jodl document book.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, Appendix 5, I can describe as
the sting in the tail of this document:
“Guiding Principles for the Attitude of Troops in Occupied
Areas.
“Only”—I do not read the first few paragraphs—“Only in the
event of the civil population’s putting up a resistance or
behaving rebelliously can the following decisions be carried
out:
“1) If the civilian population offers resistance or if attacks
are to be feared, the arrest of hostages should, on principle,
be resorted to. Hostages should only be arrested on orders of
the commander of a regiment or a commander of equivalent rank.
“When accommodating and feeding hostages it should be borne in
mind that they are not imprisoned because of crimes. Hostages
and population are to be informed that the hostages will be shot
at any sign of hostile action. Previous sanction of the shooting
by the divisional commander must be obtained....”
Then:
“Armed resistance by the civilian population is to be crushed by
force of arms.”
The last sentence on that page:
“The death penalty will be imposed for violence of any kind
against the German Armed Forces. Immediate trials will be held
by a field court martial. The regimental commander can appoint
the summary court, composed of one captain, one sergeant, one
corporal, hear witnesses, draw up the sentence in writing. The
verdict will be the death penalty if guilty, otherwise
acquittal. The sentence will be executed immediately after
confirmation by the regimental commander.
“The following are to be considered as acts of violence:
Sabotage, destruction of our lines of communications, cutting of
telephone wires, demolitions, _et cetera_.” (Document Number
Jodl-37, Exhibit Number AJ-14.)
A little drastic, that, was it not? Only the death penalty?
JODL: These instructions are, word for word, in complete accord with our
directives which, in times of peace, were laid down by the group of
experts on international law in co-operation with the Foreign Office and
with German professors of international law. It would have been well, if
only these, our military precepts, our military court procedure laid
down before we went to war, had been followed consistently everywhere.
Our official directives laid down the question of hostages from the
point of view of international law, and there is no doubt that under
international law as applicable in the year 1939, the taking of hostages
was admissible.
MR. ROBERTS: I suggest to you, as you raise that point, that nowhere in
international law will you find the shooting of hostages legalized at
all.
JODL: Then it is not with certainty prohibited anywhere in international
law. I believe it is an open question. In our directives, even in the
_Handbook on Tactics_, the concept of taking hostages had been laid down
for years.
MR. ROBERTS: That may be so, and I do not want to argue with you about
it. I suggest to you that the Hague Regulations protect the lives of
civilians in occupied countries, unless they commit crimes, of course,
and also prohibit collective punishment of the innocent.
If you do not want to say any more on that—I do not want to stop you if
you do.
JODL: I can only summarize and say that every word here is in accord
with the directives applicable in the German Army, and these directives
were not illegal. But one would have to argue this problem with experts
on international law.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Now, will you look at one other document dealing
with Norway? It is D-582.
My Lord, it is a new document, and I offer it as GB-491.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Is that a document which comes from your
office?
JODL: Yes. It originated with the Armed Forces Operations Staff,
Quartermaster Section.
MR. ROBERTS: Do you know of it or not?
JODL: I cannot recall it, but there are some notes of mine on it, and so
I undoubtedly saw the document.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, yes. Where are the notes, Witness?
JODL: They are on the back page of the last teleprint message.
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, I see what you mean, yes. Well, will you take first of
all—I had forgotten that you were getting more than one document. Will
you take first of all the document dated the 2d of February 1945? I
think it is the top one.
JODL: There are no remarks of mine on that document, so I cannot say
with certainty whether I have seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Just have a look at it and tell me whether you have seen
it.
JODL: I do not think I have seen this. I do not—I have no recollection
of having ever read it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, then, I do not think it would be right to
cross-examine you on that document.
My Lord, in that case, I would ask to withdraw it, and I will not put it
in as an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the defendant said that it was from his office.
MR. ROBERTS: Very well, then. I will—he did that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You see what the document says, Defendant.
It is dated 2 April 1945; it deals with...
JODL: The 2d of February.
MR. ROBERTS: It is the 2d of February. It deals with Reich Commissioner
Terboven’s report to the Führer. It says:
“Those responsible for attempts to murder and to carry out
sabotage are the illegal elements within Norway with a
bourgeois-national majority and a communist minority, as well as
individual groups which came direct from England or Sweden....
“The bourgeois-national majority was opposed to the communist
minority in conception of sabotage and murder, and in particular
with regard to their extent and nature. This resistance has ...
become progressively weaker during the course of the past year.
“Official departments of the exile government, as for instance
the Crown Prince Olaf, as so-called Commander-in-Chief of the
Norwegian Armed Forces, and various others, have called upon the
population in speeches and orders to carry out sabotage. As a
result, there is a particularly good possibility here of
stamping every supporter of the exile government as an
intellectual instigator or accomplice.
“The aim of the coming measures must therefore be: a) to
strengthen the power and will to turn once more against sabotage
by threatening the very influential class of leaders in the
bourgeois camp; b) thereby to exacerbate more and more
antagonism between the bourgeois and Communists....”
And then, “Suggestions.” These are suggestions from your office,
apparently:
“1. Particularly influential representatives of the explicitly
anti-German and anti-National Socialist class of industrialists
to be shot without trial on the accusation that they are
intellectual instigators or accomplices and stating that they
were convicted within the framework of police investigations.
“2. Similar men from the same circle to be sent to Germany to
work on fortifications.
“3. In cases where the circumstances are particularly suitable,
proceedings to be taken before the SS and Police Court, with the
execution of the sentence of death and suitable publicity.”
There are other suggestions which I need not read. And then the last
paragraph but one:
“The Führer has agreed to these proposals only in part.
Especially in connection with efforts at protection against acts
of sabotage he has rejected taking hostages. He has rejected the
shooting of influential Norwegian representatives without
trial”—which is underlined in blue pencil.
Is that your blue pencil?
JODL: No, it is not mine.
MR. ROBERTS: You see, it is a remarkable document, Witness, because that
is one instance where your department is suggesting a course of what I
submit is brutal action, which for once the Führer rejects.
JODL: I believe, Mr. Roberts, you are somewhat mistaken. No proposal at
all is being made here, but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is
advising the military commander in Norway of what Reich Commissioner
Terboven has told the Führer. He reported to the Führer first about the
general situation and then be made the proposals mentioned here; and the
Armed Forces Operations Staff which obviously had a representative at
this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military
commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven.
That is what happened and these proposals went beyond—they were too
much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good, Witness, I hear your answer, and the Court will
consider it. It may be accepted. The document speaks for itself.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you read the first—the subject description
“Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s Report to the Führer”?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. That is the first—that is the subject, is it not,
beginning, Witness, “Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven’s
Report”? Whose orientation? Your department’s?
JODL: Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Böhm.
General Böhm as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command
20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner
Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing.
It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I
cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did
not originate with me; I have never seen it.
MR. ROBERTS: Well now, the second document, this is from Terboven to
Bormann on the 28th of October 1944. That is with regard to the
evacuation east of Lyngen. I do not think I need read that. Then, the
next document, maybe the second document, it is a teleprint of the 6th
of April 1945, from Oberführer Fehlis, SS Oberführer to the Operations
Staff, and it says:
“In accordance with the instructions of the OKW (WFSt) ... dated
29 March 1945, members of the Norwegian resistance movement who
appear in organized units and who are easily recognizable as
combatants by arm bands or other insignia are to be treated as
prisoners of war.”
And then the SS Oberführer says:
“I consider this order completely intolerable. I explained this
clearly to Lieutenant Colonel Hass and Major Benze from the
Armed Forces Operations Staff, who stayed here. There have been
isolated appearances of uniformed groups in Norway, but there
has been no fighting as yet. Inquiries were made at the defense
headquarters in London as to whether armed resistance should be
offered in case of German or Norwegian police action. As yet no
partisan or other fighting in Norway. On one occasion, captured
members of the military organization in uniform claimed the
right to be treated as prisoners of war. If this demand were met
at the present moment, the result would be that active fighting
on the part of the military organization would be set going.
Please obtain cancellation of the order of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff.”
And you, you voted for the exemption being removed, did you not?
“The objection is justified. Norway has a government in its own
country. Whoever fights against it in the country is a rebel. It
is another question in the case of Norwegian troops who were
taken to England and from there brought into the struggle under
England’s order.”
That is your note?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And you stick to that, do you? I mean you—that is your
opinion today?
JODL: Yes, indeed. I am of the opinion, from the point of view of
international law, that members of a resistance movement against their
own Norwegian government are certainly not to be considered as normal
troops but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But if Norwegian
troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And
that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.
MR. ROBERTS: What do you call their own Norwegian government, the puppet
government which was set up by the Germans?
JODL: In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time;
and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international
law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to
international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them.
That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has
been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us
in Germany today.
MR. ROBERTS: Now, I want to deal quite shortly with three other matters,
and then I have finished. I want to deal first of all with what you have
said with regard to Hitler’s suggestion to revoke the Geneva Convention.
You say you were instrumental in preventing him from renouncing that
Convention?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Would you look at a document which has already been put in,
C-158, which is GB-209. I think you have loose copies for it; it is not
in a document book. This was put in with regard to the case against
Dönitz. It is headed, “Extracts from Minutes of the Hitler Conference on
the 19th of February 1945...”:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was present on 19 February
1945.
“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention. As not only the Russians but
also the Western Powers are violating international law by their
actions against the defenseless population and the residential
districts, it appears expedient to adopt the same course in
order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with
every means for our existence, and also to urge our people to
resist to the utmost. The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy to consider the pros and cons and to state his own
opinion.”
Then, further down, My Lord—Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on the
Hitler conference of the 20th of February:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy informed Generaloberst Jodl,
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the
representative of the Foreign Office at the Führer’s
headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to
Germany’s possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a
military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as
the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the
disadvantages outweigh the advantages; even from a general
standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that
this measure would bring no advantages. It would be better to
carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and
at all costs to save face with the world. The Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff and Ambassador Hewel are in full
agreement.”
You were saying there, were you not, that you agreed with Raeder when he
said, “Break the Geneva Convention, but do not tell the world that we
are doing so.”
JODL: Grossadmiral Dönitz.
MR. ROBERTS: Dönitz, right. I beg your pardon. That is what you were
saying, is it not?
JODL: No. The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner
on a conference from which one can gather only that Grossadmiral Dönitz
disapproved, and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the
end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason
given to us by the Führer at that time was that the tremendous number of
German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting as a
consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain
this remark, and in my written draft which I submitted to the Führer and
which contains the attitude of the Navy that sentence was not included,
but only advantages and disadvantages were compared. The disadvantages
were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and
impossible, and so it was not carried out. More I cannot say. Witnesses
will confirm my statement.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now going to put to you your own Document D-606.
My Lord, that has not yet been exhibited. I offer it as 492-GB. GB-492.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now that is signed by you, is it not? It
deals with the subject of the breach of the Geneva Convention. If you
would say first if it is signed by you? Is it signed by you? Please
answer my question: Is it signed by you?
JODL: Yes; my signature is at the end.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that is where one usually finds the signature. Now,
it is dated 21 February 1945, and it is written on your letterhead
notepaper. And then, “Notes on report submitted to the Führer on 23
February through the Chief of the Operations Staff. The following
questions were to be examined.”
My Lord, I do not propose to read it all, or anything like that. If the
witness would follow me, I will read anything he wants. But it is a
discussion as to the various advantages and disadvantages of repudiating
the various international agreements, and I think I am not doing the
witness an injustice if I say from a utilitarian rather than a moral
point of view.
JODL: Yes, quite correct. For my only aim was to succeed with the
Führer, and this document was worded accordingly.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I want to read the last paragraph.
My Lord, it is the last page but one of Your Lordship’s document, right
at the bottom:
“C. Proposal of the OKW:
“At the present moment the disadvantages of repudiating the
agreements which have been kept up to now in any case outweigh
the advantages by far.
“Just as it was a mistake in 1914 that we ourselves solemnly
declared war on all the states which had for a long time wanted
to wage war on us, and through this took the whole guilt of the
war on our shoulders before the outside world, and just as it
was a mistake to admit that the necessary”—note the word
“necessary”—“passage through Belgium in 1914 was our own fault,
so it would be a mistake now to repudiate openly the obligations
of international law which we accepted and thereby to stand
again as the guilty party before the outside world.
“Adherence to the accepted obligations does not demand in any
way that we should have to impose on ourselves any limitations
which will interfere with the conduct of the war. For instance,
if the British sink a hospital ship, this must be used for
propaganda purposes, as has been done to date. That, of course,
in no way prevents our sinking an English hospital ship at once
as a reprisal and then expressing our regret that it was a
mistake in the same manner as the British do.”
That is not very honorable, is it?
JODL: I can only say in reply that this was the sole method which
achieved success with the Führer, and by its use success was, in fact,
achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he
would have said, “Leave me alone with this foolish talk,” and he would
have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things
compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not
carry it through.
You must after all grant me that at the end of 5½ years I knew best how
to achieve good results with him and avoid bad ones. My aim was to
achieve success, and I achieved it.
MR. ROBERTS: But, you see, you were deploring it there, the fact that
you told the world the truth in 1914. In 1914 you said that you regarded
treaties only as a scrap of paper. You are saying now, “What a pity we
told the world the truth in 1914. We ought to have told them something
untrue, and then we should have, possibly, had a better world
reputation.”
JODL: That was an argument which the Führer used frequently. If one
repeated his arguments in that form again and again he was more inclined
to read and accept one’s suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging
our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage and immediately decreeing
renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do
good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way than not at all.
MR. ROBERTS: I am now coming to quite another point: Were you an admirer
of the principles of the Nazi Party?
JODL: No.
MR. ROBERTS: Were you of the opinion that there was a successful fusion
between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht, which brought about the
rejuvenation, the resurrection of Germany after 1933?
JODL: It would have happened, and I hoped for a long time that it would
happen; indeed, on the whole the relationship improved somewhat in the
course of the years and especially during the war. At first, it was
poor, very poor.
MR. ROBERTS: You wrote—please, I am reading now from your speech,
L-172. It is Page 290 of Document Book 7, and it is Page 6 of your
lecture notes, Page 290 of Document Book 7 and 203 of the German:
“The fact that the National Socialist movement in its struggle
for internal power was the preparatory stage to the outer
liberation from the shackles of the dictate of Versailles I need
not enlarge upon in this circle. I should like, however, to
mention how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what
an important part has been played by the National Socialist
movement in reawakening the will to fight, in nurturing fighting
strength, and in rearming the German people. Despite all its
inherent virtues this small Reichswehr could never have been
able to cope with this task, if only because of its restricted
radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at and has
luckily been successful in bringing about was a fusion of these
two forces.”
Did that represent your honest opinion or not?
JODL: Yes, that is historical truth, indisputable historical truth. The
Movement did bring that about; that is certain.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. Then, I now want to put to you the last document
but one that I put in.
My Lord, it has not been exhibited. It is 1808-PS. I offer it as GB-493.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You made a speech, did you not, after the
attempt on Hitler’s life, to your staff? And are these the notes of your
speech on 24 July?
JODL: I have never seen this document before; I am seeing it for the
first time now. I did not know that any notes were made about the
speech.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, let us go by stages. Did you make a speech to your
staff shortly after the attempt on Hitler’s life—on 24 July 1944?
JODL: Yes, even while my head was still bandaged.
MR. ROBERTS: Secondly, is that document which you have in front of you,
is that a document which comes from your files? Look at the cover, if
necessary.
JODL: I assume so. It is headed: “Armed Forces Operations Staff War
Diary.” Most likely these are notes of Major Schramm.
MR. ROBERTS: Let me begin at the beginning of those notes. Just see if
you can remember what you said. Did you begin by saying: “The 20th of
July was the blackest day which German history has seen as yet, and will
probably remain so for all times”?
JODL: Yes, that is quite possible.
MR. ROBERTS: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because somebody
tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer?
JODL: Should I—at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly,
insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents
of the regime—should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the
worst thing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot
the Führer and had then given himself up, it would have been entirely
different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer.
I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among
the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then.
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want to argue with you, but do you think it is any
more dastardly than shooting those 50 American soldiers who landed in
the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like
dogs?
JODL: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a
soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the
Almighty do that.
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. I have only about three more questions to ask
you.
My Lord, I am going to read from Page 2 of that document, about 10 lines
from the top. It begins, “The Führer...”
[_Turning to the defendant._] If I read this slowly, perhaps see if you
can recognize it.
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be
assassins wished to do away with him, as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember saying that or something like that? Can you find the
place?
“The Führer ignored this and other things, and now the would-be
assassins wished to eliminate him as a ‘despot’.”
Do you remember that?
“And yet, they themselves experienced how the Führer did not
come to power by force, but borne up by the love of the German
people.”
Do you remember saying that?
JODL: Yes, and that is true. He came to power, borne up by the love of
the German people. I had tremendous experiences in that respect. He was
almost overwhelmed by this love of the people and of the soldiers.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by—I beg your pardon, have you finished? I did
not mean to interrupt you.
JODL: Yes, I have dealt with that point.
MR. ROBERTS: Borne up by the love of the German people. You have
forgotten the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps for political
opponents, have you not?
JODL: I have told you how unfortunately little I knew of all these
things, almost nothing. Of course, with a knowledge of these things, all
this takes a different aspect.
MR. ROBERTS: I take your answer, and I put my last document to you.
My Lord, this is a new document, 1776-PS; I offer it as GB-494.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Just have a look; see if it is signed by
you, will you?
JODL: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: So it is signed by you. Now, you have told this Court that
you were opposed to terror attacks. Just see what this document says.
Now, note the date first, the 30th of June 1940. That is just after the
temporary fall of France?
“Chief WFA.
“The Continuation of the War against England.
“If political means are without results, England’s will to
resist must be broken by force:
“a) by making war against the English mother country.
“b) by extending the war on the periphery.
“Regarding Point a) there are three possibilities:
“1) Siege....
“2) Terror attacks against English centers of population.
“3) Landing of troops....”
And now I read this as an example of historical prophesy:
“Germany’s final victory also over England is only a question of
time.”
Then I go down several paragraphs:
“Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks—declared
to be reprisal actions—this increasing weakening of English
food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and
finally break and thus force its government to
capitulate....”—Signed—“Jodl.”
“Terror attacks against English centers of population”—would you like
to say anything to justify that sentence?
JODL: Yes, a few remarks. This proposal, which actually is only a
compilation of notes, proves three things:
First of all, that on 30 June 1940 I did not know of any intention or of
the possibility of entering into a war with Russia, otherwise I would
not have written: “Germany’s final victory over England is only a
question of time.”
Secondly, I admit having voiced a thought which was later carried into
practice with such perfection by the Anglo-American Air Force.
Thirdly, this thought came to me only after the attack on the civilian
population had been started and continued by the English Air Force,
despite months of efforts and repeated warnings on the part of the
Führer.
It is a historical fact, confirmed by many documents, that the Führer
tried to the utmost to avoid this form of aerial war against the
population. But it was already clear at that time, that he would not be
able to succeed.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, now, I have finished, Witness. You will notice that
of all the documents I have put, except for that one American report,
they were all German documents, originating at the time of these events
about which I have been cross-examining.
In the face of those documents, do you still say that you are an
honorable soldier and a truthful man?
JODL: Not only do I still affirm that, but I also think that the
submission of these documents has actually and quite specifically proved
it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 7 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH DAY
Friday, 7 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock to
sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session
from 1000 to 1300.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You
have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not?
JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief
department of the OKW?
JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say
that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important
departments of the OKW.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his
absence?
JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational
matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a
rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel’s deputy?
JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course,
whenever the Führer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with
me, as I was the next officer by seniority.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to
the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all
important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also
present? Do you remember that testimony?
JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation
difficulties.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is possible. I shall repeat it. On the 13th of May,
appeared the witness Wagner here before the Tribunal. Do you remember,
or not?
JODL: I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal
Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and I do not
dispute it.
COL. POKROVSKY: He said either Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst
Jodl was present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in the
way this question is phrased?
JODL: In 99 percent of all cases, both of us were present at the
situation conferences.
COL. POKROVSKY: So that if we forget for one minute such formal
considerations, such formal circumstances, would it be right to conclude
that it was precisely you, Jodl, who actually was Keitel’s acting deputy
in the eyes of Hitler, of the whole cadre of officers, and of the entire
military machinery of the German Reich? Would that be correct, or not?
JODL: In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in
unimportant things, yes; but when it came to important things I could
reach him by telephone, at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that
I deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was
away he was in Berlin at headquarters.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case I would like to remind you of one such
fact, which you yourself confirmed here on the 6th of June, while
testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which caused you to sign
Document UK-56, Exhibit RF-1438. You said that the document had had no
connection with your sphere of activity. It concerned the deportation of
Jews from Denmark and, you signed the document even though it actually
had no connection with the operations staff work. You signed it because
Keitel was away at the time. Was it not so? Is it true?
JODL: That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter and had to be
signed immediately.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We can find a great many documents of that type;
but I do not consider it necessary to waste any more time on the further
elucidation of this point. Tell me, would it be correct to say that you
were well aware of the entire work carried out by the OKW—that you well
knew what important problems were occupying the OKW at that time?
JODL: Only to a limited extent—in individual matters. I was not at all
aware of everything that took place in the numerous offices in Berlin.
That was quite impossible. It did not concern me. I have testified
already that my time was so fully taken up that I had much more to do
than I had time for.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, you force me to revert to a question which I
really wanted to have done with. Will you please now look at our new
Document USSR-476. This document consists of excerpts from Keitel’s
testimony of 9 November 1945. It is stated there:
“Question: ‘Would it have been possible for General Jodl,
without your knowledge to call such a meeting?’”
We are talking, My Lord, of the conference in Reichenhall.
Reply of Field Marshal Keitel:
“Yes, it was quite possible, as I was frequently on official
journeys; and General Jodl had authority to call a meeting
because he represented me in my absence.”
Have you found the passage? Have you read it?
JODL: Colonel Pokrovsky, of course, it is very difficult for you to
follow these military matters. It is ridiculous. Surely I may question
my staff officers. I do not need to call a meeting for that. These were
my General Staff officers with whom I worked in Reichenhall. Surely I
could go to them. That was my office and my duty.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for you to raise your
voice in that way.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you have still not answered two of
my questions. First, have you read this document?
Please tell me: Have you, or have you not, read the passage which I have
just read into the record on Page 1?
JODL: Yes. Here, Field Marshal Keitel says, “...since I was very often
away on official journeys...”
COL. POKROVSKY: You do not have to read it a second time. I have read it
already. I merely want you to tell me whether you have read that
passage?
JODL: Yes, I read that, and it says here, “...to ask Generaloberst
Jodl.”
COL. POKROVSKY: No, you are reading beyond the passage which interests
me at this moment. As for the words “...to ask Generaloberst
Jodl.”—rest assured, we shall get to that passage. But is it true that
Keitel was often away, and that you deputized for him? I do not hear any
answer.
[_There was no response._]
I still hear no answer.
JODL: I have already said that, now and then, he went to the front for a
day or so and that he was several times in Berlin for a few days; but he
was at those offices which were subordinate to him. I was alone with my
operations staff, and I could do whatever I pleased with my staff.
During the entire war I never called a conference of other offices as a
deputy of Field Marshal Keitel. I did not understand anything about
those matters.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have uttered a great many words, but have not given
me a clear answer to my very short and simple question—namely, do you
confirm, or do you not confirm, the truth of Keitel’s statement? “Yes”
or “no.” That is very easy to answer, is it not?
JODL: That is what it amounts to, but the thing as written down is
ridiculous.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall gauge the truth of your statement later. It is
important to me to establish the fact.
I am submitting our Document USSR-263 to the Tribunal. You will now have
the pleasure of reading it yourself. It is an excerpt from the evidence
of another officer who worked with you, General Warlimont. Please
acquaint yourself with that passage which is marked on your copy while I
read it aloud. That will be quicker.
The question put to Warlimont:
“When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the
attack on the Soviet Union?”
Have you found this passage?
JODL: That which I have before me—the passage which is marked in
red—contains a statement by Warlimont as to the organization of the
offices of the OKW. On the next page something follows about the
preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.
COL. POKROVSKY: “When did the OKW first receive the order for
preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?”
Warlimont replies:
“I personally first heard about the plan on 29 July 1940... On
that day Generaloberst Jodl arrived by special train in Bad
Reichenhall, where also Section ‘L’ of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff was quartered.”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, I do not consider it necessary to read a
greater part of Warlimont’s testimony, because we are dealing with a
well-known fact, that is, the convocation of the conference during which
Jodl gave his colleagues the order to prepare the plan for the attack on
the Soviet Union. This document has already been accepted in evidence by
the Tribunal.
Warlimont then states, “Jodl stunned us by his announcement of the
coming attack, for which we were not at all prepared.” Have you found
the passage? Please look at the document.
[_There was no response._]
Jodl, will you please take the document in your hand and see whether it
has been read into the record correctly.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it not coming through properly? Wait a minute.
DR. EXNER: I just wanted to call the attention of the Tribunal to the
fact that the translation and the transmission is coming through to us
so very badly that I have scarcely understood anything. I hear only half
a question at a time, and I am surprised that the defendant could answer
at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through better now? Is the translation
coming through better now?
DR. EXNER: I am of the opinion that the translation itself is poor, not
only the technical transmission. It is often very difficult to
understand the question—it makes no sense at all. And my colleague, Dr.
Stahmer, confirms this. Therefore it is difficult for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better go on and see, perhaps, if it will
improve.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to read one other sentence to yourself.
It is the passage in which Warlimont states to whom the responsibility
for elaborating the plans was entrusted and how the officers present had
reacted. He testifies, “Jodl stunned us by this announcement...” It is
on the first page at about the middle of the page. Have you found it?
JODL: I could not find the sentence which you have just read, “Jodl
stunned us.” I cannot find that sentence.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case, I shall begin with the preceding sentence.
Perhaps it will be easier for you.
“Besides myself, he also ordered three other senior officers ...
Colonel Von Lossberg, Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von
Falkenstein of the Luftwaffe, and Captain Junge of the Navy to
attend.”
Have you found it?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
“Jodl stunned us by this announcement ... for which we were not
at all prepared.”
And then a little further down:
“Jodl announced that the Führer had decided to prepare for war
against Russia. The Führer based his decision on the fact that
war with Russia must come sooner or later and that it would be
better to carry this campaign through in the course of this
war...”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now, I would like you to read one more
paragraph from Document USSR-476, which has just been handed to you, on
Page 1. It is, Jodl, the one which you began to read the first time, and
I told you then that we should get back to it eventually. Keitel is
asked whether he knows anything about that conference, and he answers:
“I know nothing whatever about a conference with regard to an
attack on the Soviet Union. I heard about it for the first time
after I was imprisoned here.”
Have you found the place?
JODL: No. I have not found it, but I do recall it. I read it just a
short while ago.
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like you to have it. We do not want any
misunderstandings. A little lower down Keitel states that you did not
inform him of this conference even later. Is that so? Do you confirm
this statement, or do you not? Would you say that Keitel had testified
correctly?
JODL: Actually there is no such thing as a conference in these military
matters. You have conferences in civil and parliamentary life, but we do
not have conferences. I talked to my General Staff officers as often as
I pleased. Therefore, it is...
COL. POKROVSKY: Excuse me, I am going to interrupt you here. Later on
you may add all you wish to say, but I merely want a direct answer to
the question: Is Keitel’s testimony correct, that you never reported
this conference to him? Is that true or not?
JODL: I certainly did not report to him on this very discussion; but
that is not in the least important. I am certain that I reported to him
what the Führer told me, because that was an important matter; and
later, because of this, he wrote a memorandum. Therefore, he must have
heard about it—but that is only a supposition, a very likely
supposition, which I am voicing here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I am perfectly satisfied with your reply. And
to conclude my first group of questions, I want to ask just one more on
this particular matter: Do you not agree with me that only the Deputy
Chief of the OKW, and not just any other responsible official, could
quite independently—without Keitel’s knowledge, without any
instructions, and without even a _post factum_ report to him—decide
questions, such as the preparation of a plan for attacking another
country? Have you understood my question?
JODL: I understood your words, but not their meaning. First of all, you
put a wrong assertion in your question. You asserted that I did not
report the preparation for an attack on a neutral country to Field
Marshal Keitel. That is an assertion on your part which I refuted
yesterday under oath. We were not concerned with an attack on the Soviet
Union at this meeting. We were concerned with the defense against a
Soviet attack on the Romanian oil fields. That is established in
Document C-170, the War Diary of the Navy.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wanted to say on that question?
JODL: I believe that suffices.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend to argue with you. I merely wish to say
that we have two proofs of this conference. First, your testimony, in
which you deny the fact of the preparation of a plan for attacking the
Soviet Union; and second, the testimony of another participant at this
conference, Warlimont, who says straight out that the meeting was
specifically concerned with elaborating the plan of attack on the Soviet
Union and that this directive greatly astonished all of them. I do not
intend to deal with this question any further, but I should like to
ask...
JODL: If you are interested, I could explain that divergence to you.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, at the present moment it does not interest me.
Would it be correct to state that you were either the leading, or one of
the leading, staff officers in Hitlerite Germany who were engaged in
preparing measures for attacking the Soviet Union, as far back as the
summer of 1940? It is precisely on this matter that I want to hear your
reply. Is the question clear to you?
JODL: The question is clear, and my answer to it is that I was probably
the first who learned of the Führer’s concern about Russia’s political
attitude. However, I was not the first who made preparations for an
attack on the Soviet Union. To my surprise I discovered here, through
the witness Paulus, that long before we concerned ourselves with any
orders of this kind, plans of attack were already worked out in the
General Staff of the Army. I cannot tell you with absolute certainty why
it was done. Perhaps Generaloberst Halder can tell us about that. I can
only express that as a supposition on my part.
COL. POKROVSKY: Suppositions are of no interest to us; we are only
concerned with facts here. On the day before yesterday, the 5th of June,
you stated that the attack on the Soviet Union, whereby Germany broke
her nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, was in the nature of a
preventive war. That is what you then stated, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is what I said, it was a preventive war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. That is your opinion. Do you remember that
from the testimonies of Milch and Raeder, from the testimony of Göring,
from the testimonies of Paulus and Keitel, it seems that they were all
opposed to the attack on the Soviet Union? I shall read into the record
one sentence from Keitel’s testimony here in court just to help you to
remember.
While General Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. was
cross-examining Keitel, he put this question:
“You stated that you especially went to Hitler with the request
that he, Hitler, change his intentions with regard to the Soviet
Union?”
Answer (Keitel): “Yes, I asked him not only to change this plan,
but to do away with these plans altogether, that is, not to wage
war against the Soviet Union.”
Do you remember that testimony of Keitel?
JODL: Yes, I remember, and I know the memorandum as well.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Do you not find it rather strange that a
man—in this case yourself—who has in every way endeavored to disclaim
the fact that he was Keitel’s deputy, should emphasize before Hitler and
here before the Tribunal, that he was better informed on current events
than Keitel and could, therefore, find the courage to make a statement
in direct opposition to the attitude of Keitel, Paulus, Raeder, Göring,
and Milch?
JODL: I did not understand that.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall be very pleased to make my meaning more
explicit. Keitel did not appear to see any necessity for what you call a
“preventive” war, and all the persons whose testimony I have just
mentioned also saw no reason for waging a so-called “preventive” war.
They did not believe that the Soviet Union intended to attack Germany,
whereas you declared that the war was of a “preventive” nature. Now, do
you understand my question?
JODL: Yes, now I understand you.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, would you like to answer the question?
JODL: Yes, I can give an explanation. First of all, it is not certain
what stand Field Marshal Keitel took in the spring of 1941 with regard
to this question. Secondly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force—with due respect to both of these
gentlemen—saw the problem as a whole only from the point of view of
naval or air strategy, and they saw no danger whatsoever in the Russian
Navy or the Russian Air Force. What was taking place on land, of course,
was of less interest to them. That explains why the strongest opposition
came from the Luftwaffe and the Navy; and only the Army, in this case,
was much more inclined to see the tremendous danger with which it was
confronted. But in spite of this, every one of us, I myself included,
warned the Führer most urgently against this experiment, which should
have been undertaken only if there really was no other way out. I will
not take it upon myself to judge whether there might perhaps have been a
political possibility which was not exhausted; I cannot judge that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I am satisfied with your reply, and
particularly with the fact that you have condescended to define the
breaking of this treaty and the attack on the Soviet Union by the word
“experiment.” I want you to look at the document...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should not make comments of that sort. You
must ask questions and not make comments.
COL. POKROVSKY: My remark, My Lord, is connected with my next question.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, please look at Document 865-PS.
Have you got this document?
JODL: Yes, I have the document before me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In reply to the questions of your counsel,
you stated that Lammers had, quite by accident, designated you as a
collaborator of Rosenberg. There in your hands is a very brief document,
which I shall now read aloud—a document signed by Keitel. It is a
top-secret letter of 25 April 1941, addressed to Rosenberg personally.
This letter states:
“The Chief of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
Führer’s directive appointing you his plenipotentiary for
dealing with questions relating to eastern European territories.
I, on the part of the High Command of the Armed Forces, entrust
the handling of these questions to the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, General of Artillery Jodl, with Major General
Warlimont as his deputy. I request that your department contact
these two persons only.
“Heil Hitler! Yours truly”—signed—“Keitel.”
With this document in mind what do you say now in reply to the question
as to whether or not you remember, that you, with Warlimont as your
deputy, were charged by the High Command of the Armed Forces, as far
back as April 1941, to deal with the practical problems of the Hitlerite
expansion to the east in accordance with the directives of the Staff
Rosenberg.
Do you understand my question?
JODL: I already told the Court yesterday everything that can be said in
connection with this formality. Minister Lammers sent the very same
letter to all Reich Ministries. He asked every Ministry to designate a
plenipotentiary and a deputy; and accordingly, Field Marshal Keitel
naturally designated the two officers who were at headquarters. I never
worked with Rosenberg, and it was not necessary to do so—except for one
single talk with him, which I mentioned yesterday. Only my propaganda
section conferred with the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories
about leaflets—quite simple matters which every soldier can understand.
COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, concerning the question of soldiers. You
stubbornly affirm that you were only concerned with military questions
of an operational nature and had nothing to do at all with political
questions. Have I understood you correctly?
JODL: I gave that explanation yesterday as well, insofar as politics
were not an integral part of the strategy. To a certain extent politics
did come into it, for without politics there could be no strategy. It is
an essential part of strategy. But since I was not a strategist, but
only dealt with this matter as a General Staff officer, I was not
concerned with this subject directly.
COL. POKROVSKY: You were not concerned with these matters? You will now
look at Document C-26, Exhibit USSR-477, and I must ask you if you have
found your own signature on the last page.
JODL: Yes, I see my signature.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have found it? It is a directive on the organization
of propaganda in connection with “Case Barbarossa.” Is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you going to deny that in that directive, issued by
you, the question is clearly put that the U.S.S.R., as a sovereign
state, should be destroyed and that you consider that a purely military
problem—you, an officer of the General Staff, did not deal with
politics?
JODL: I cannot find the place where it says that Russia is to be
destroyed.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right if you want to draw attention to the
wording. It is not stated there in just these words. I am thinking of
the general sense of the directive, particularly of Subparagraph “d.”
JODL: Yes, but—I know the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: I want to read out one sentence:
“Propaganda aiming at the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into
separate states shall not be used for the time being.”
Further on there are a couple of technical remarks, and then it says in
the same paragraph:
“Nevertheless, we should avoid such terms as ‘Russia,’
‘Russians,’ ‘Russian Armed Forces,’ _et cetera_, and substitute
‘Soviet Union,’ ‘Peoples of the Soviet Union,’ ‘Red Army,’ _et
cetera_.”
Have you found the place, Jodl?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. What would you like to say if you want to say
anything at all on the subject?
JODL: Why, certainly. I wish to answer the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you please.
JODL: As may be seen from the heading of this directive, it deals with
the handling of propaganda. Compared with the British and the Soviet
Union, we were mere schoolboys in propaganda. You are perhaps aware that
propaganda is something quite justifiable and is not limited by any
regulations of international law. At one time, in Geneva, there was a
long debate about this; and the idea that propaganda should be
restricted by international law was rejected. I have already stated that
in my preliminary interrogation. In the field of propaganda, I can do
whatever I wish. There is no law, either criminal or international, in
regard to that. But perhaps you do not know that this propaganda had to
be in line with the political directives of the Führer, and this was
being done here. I am very well acquainted with propaganda, for I
studied it for 5 years—yours, too. That is still quite another type of
propaganda.
COL. POKROVSKY: You preferred not to give a direct answer to the
question you were asked. I am perfectly satisfied with that, too, since
I have understood your attitude toward this subject.
Now, I should be interested in receiving a reply to the following
question: What connection did the Ministry of Propaganda have with the
issue of this directive? Did this Ministry participate in the drafting
of the directive, or were you and the OKW solely responsible? Did you
understand me?
JODL: Yes, I understood you. My propaganda division worked in Berlin. I
cannot tell you in detail how it worked with Minister Rosenberg or with
the Ministry of Propaganda on such a document. But General Von Wedel,
the chief of this division, could tell you. I only knew it was drawn up
in agreement with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, for
I was always eager that we should not take separate lines but rather
work in line with the competent civilian authorities. But it is only
propaganda; it is not a directive to destroy Russia. Propaganda is a
spiritual weapon.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not propose to enter into a discussion with you on
what constitutes propaganda and whether you were only responsible for
propaganda. We shall have quite a number of other questions to ask.
Do you suggest that this directive was issued after a certain pattern
decided upon with other departments? That is how I understood you. Is
this correct? Partly by agreement with “Stab Rosenberg”?
JODL: Yes, I believe that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now let us pass on to a second complex of
questions. Do you dispute the fact that the document regarding the
conference at Hitler’s headquarters on 27 March 1941 dealt with the
subject of Yugoslavia? You, of course, remember that conference?
JODL: Yes, I remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you argue the fact that the documents describing
this conference and the directive for operations against
Yugoslavia—both documents are dated 28 March 1941, in other words, they
were issued on the following day—would you still argue that these
documents did not emanate from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, that
is, from you personally? You can, if you like, take a look at Document
1746-PS. It might help you to remember events.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you are not losing sight of the fact
that this subject was fully gone into by Mr. Roberts in
cross-examination of the defendant?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, if you consider that the question has already
been completely clarified, I shall refrain from asking it. But it seems
to me that insofar as I understood him, he analyzed this question in
another sense. But if you think the matter is clear, I shall withdraw
it.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know yet. But I was only pointing out to you
that it had been fully gone into by Mr. Roberts. I do not know what this
document you are suggesting is.
COL. POKROVSKY: I offered for the attention of the defendant two
documents, My Lord: the directive for operations against Yugoslavia,
dated 28 March, and the minutes of the conference. Both documents were
submitted to the Tribunal. If you think that the matter has been fully
covered already, I will not ask the questions. However, it appears to me
that there is some reason for asking the question.
THE PRESIDENT: All the Tribunal want to know is whether there is some
really fresh point which is being brought out. You must have heard Mr.
Roberts’ cross-examination of the defendant upon the Yugoslavian attack.
And I do not know what these documents of the 22d of March and the 28th
of March are, or what you are asking to get out of them. If there is
anything that is really fresh or new, of course, you may put it; but if
it is not, then it is covered by what the Tribunal have already said,
that cross-examination ought not to go over the same ground again.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you will permit me to say so, My Lord, I understood
Jodl to mean that for him...
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you, too.
COL. POKROVSKY: I understood in Jodl’s testimony, in reply to Mr.
Roberts’ question, that it is still not quite clear as to who was in
charge of the operations against Yugoslavia; and I only want to have
this point elucidated. Now, if the Tribunal consider that this question
has already been replied to, I shall, of course, withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are not able to see
what there is fresh in this method of questioning that you are now
raising; and unless you insist upon it yourself because you think it is
of great importance, I think you should pass on to the next matter in
your cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I shall continue, My Lord.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Your counsel has submitted Document L-172,
containing the following sentence made by you in your speech to the
Gauleiter of 7 November 1943. I shall read out this sentence: “This
dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing
more fully the reserves of manpower in the occupied territories.”
Do you remember this document?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Your counsel submitted to the Tribunal
Document L-172, which is a speech made by you before the Gauleiter.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter now? You cannot hear without your
earphones on.
[_Turning to Dr. Exner._] Do you wish to say something?
DR. EXNER: If you please, Mr. President, the translation is such that we
simply cannot understand anything. We receive half a sentence which
makes no sense at all—at least, that is our opinion—and I believe the
other gentlemen, including the defendant, have the same difficulty...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has not shown any sign that he was unable
to understand the translation; he has never protested, and he has
answered the questions.
DR. EXNER: Do you understand, Defendant?
JODL: I would say that I can guess what most of the questions mean.
Since I am fully acquainted with the problem, it is easy for me; but I
am not sure...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, will you go a little slower. You
heard, did you not, what Dr. Exner said?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, I heard him. I fear, however, My Lord, that the
tempo of my speech may impede the interrogation, but I shall try to
speak more slowly.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In the speech with which you addressed the
Gauleiter on the 7th of November 1943, you expressed, _inter alia_, the
following idea: “The dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to
the idea of utilizing more fully...”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, can you possibly indicate to us what
page this is on. In our book we have not any single document in English,
as yet. This document we have not had in English.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document L-172, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, this very passage that you have just
read, or part of which you just read, was put by Mr. Roberts yesterday
to the defendant. Surely that is contrary to our rules; we cannot have
the same subject gone over twice. We already have it marked.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am quoting this sentence, My Lord, not as a question
to the witness, but only as an introductory remark to the question which
is to follow this sentence. I am reminding him of this sentence in order
to receive an answer. The sentence as such is not to be considered as a
question.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat what you said?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, he will now receive the document in order to
save time, and I shall then ask him the question. I want...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we want to know what the question is,
so we may see if it is not a question which has been gone into by Mr.
Roberts. Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal have indicated to you that they
do not want you to go over the same ground which was gone over
yesterday. If you have some new question, by all means put it.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend, Mr. President, to repeat in my
questions any question previously asked by Mr. Roberts. Therefore, with
your permission, I shall now continue, and I should like you, Witness,
to look at Document J-6, Exhibit Number USSR-130. It is stated in these
documents that they were issued with the consent of the OKW. They deal
with the introduction of general conscription in the occupied
territories of Carinthia and Krain. Have you found it? Have you found
the passage that I have just read, that is, the decree dealing with the
introduction of conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia
and Krain?
JODL: Yes, that document begins with the following sentence...
COL. POKROVSKY: It begins with the following sentence, “In agreement
with the OKW...” Is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: As Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you could
not but know of such facts as the conscription for service in the German
Army of the population of the occupied Yugoslav territories. What do you
have to say about this decree, which is a gross violation of
international law? Do you understand my question?
JODL: Yes. I can only say that I see it here for the first time. This is
the first I have heard of it. After all, I am not the OKW. I am Chief of
the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I never read this document during the
war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will you read it, then, immediately. Do you not consider
it a gross violation of international law?
JODL: In order to give my opinion, I would have to go into it more fully
from a legal point of view, and I am not in a position to do that, and I
believe it is not of interest to the Tribunal.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, on 4 June you testified before the Tribunal that
the decisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions were your reference
book. You will now be shown Document 638-PS, submitted to the Tribunal
on 20 March as Exhibit USA-788. The authenticity of this document...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, 638 is the document which has been handed up.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document 638-PS, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, is the document that you just handed
up to us J-6? Are you offering that in evidence? Are you offering that?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not submitting a new document. It was already
submitted as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Are you referring to the Document 638-PS,
or are you referring to Document J-6?
COL. POKROVSKY: I am referring to Document 638-PS, accepted by the
Tribunal as U.S.A. evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I was not. I was referring to the Document J-6. The
document which is here before me, which is 638, is the Yugoslav
document.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document to which you refer, My Lord, bears a double
number, USSR-130 and J-6; and the second document also bears a double
number, USSR-447.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to know about the second document. I only
want to know whether you are offering the first document in evidence, or
has it already been offered in evidence?
COL. POKROVSKY: It has already been submitted, My Lord, by the
Delegation of the Soviet Union.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You, Jodl, have probably had sufficient
time to read the document. Is that right? Have you read it?
JODL: I know about this document from these proceedings.
COL. POKROVSKY: Quite correct. I only wish to remind you that Göring has
twice confirmed the authenticity of this document and merely questioned
the accuracy of certain entries in individual sentences. I should now
like to ask you how you reconcile your concepts of international law
with the formation of bands under German command, attired in German
military uniforms, bands recruited from the dregs of the criminal
classes, who were officially authorized to plunder, murder, burn, and
violate—they could also do all this during military operations. Have
you understood my question?
You, of course, well remember that these bands were actually created and
entered the ranks of the Armed Forces of the German Reich. You remember
the testimony of the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 7 January 1946,
concerning the special commands acting on these principles?
JODL: I do not know just how you come to know that the High Command gave
its approval and that this actually took place; I do not know. These are
merely the notes of alleged statements by the Reich Marshal, but I do
not know how they concern me.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall try to help you to understand this fact. Do you
remember that at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 a special
command was formed to operate against the partisans? The first
commanding officer of that unit was Dirlewanger, and Von dem
Bach-Zelewski testified about him here on 7 January 1946. Do you
remember that?
JODL: No, I do not remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot remember? Very well. Then we shall prove it
without your testimony. Do you remember the fact that units of the
Yugoslav Army wore regulation uniforms, complete with insignia, numbers
of regiments and divisions? Do you remember that? Do you understand my
question, or do you not?
JODL: I understood. Do you mean the Brandenburg Regiment? I have some
idea of that.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I have something else in mind. I wish to remind you
that despite the fact that parts of the Yugoslav Army did not come under
these descriptions which you have enumerated here before the Tribunal in
speaking of bands—that these parts of the Yugoslav Army were referred
to in every official document of the German High Command as bands, in
order to justify any atrocity perpetrated against them, and only in the
top-secret correspondence between German officers and staffs was the
correct, factual nomenclature of these divisions, regiments, and
brigades indicated. Perhaps this fact, in your opinion, also testifies
to the adherence of the German High Command to the standards of
international law? Have you understood me?
JODL: I understand you very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you wish to say anything on the matter?
JODL: Yes. I can only say this assertion of yours is untrue. We...
COL. POKROVSKY: I would ask you to reply as briefly as possible.
JODL: Yes, I was going to answer very briefly. We always called these
Yugoslav bandits “bands” for propaganda reasons, but in practice
uniformed fighters always were treated as prisoners of war; and there is
no order which would have prevented them from receiving such treatment
as prisoners of war. Otherwise, we would not have had so many prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am very much obliged to you for having raised the
question of the prisoners of war. You have testified on oath before the
Tribunal that there was no decree which forbade taking prisoners of war.
You have not yet forgotten that testimony of yours?
JODL: No, there are no international law regulations which apply to a
rebellion. There is no such thing.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I asked you to confirm only if I have rendered your
testimony correctly to the Tribunal. You stated, before the Tribunal,
that there was no decree against taking prisoners of war. Did you give
such testimony before the Tribunal, or did you not?
JODL: What you have stated here is not my verbatim testimony.
COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, just a minute. We shall discuss in detail
the matter I have mentioned. First, I want you to tell me the following:
You stated, before the Tribunal, on oath, that there was no decree in
the German Armed Forces to the effect that prisoners of war were not to
be taken. Did you give this testimony or not? Have you understood me?
JODL: I think I remember. I do not know of any such order that no
prisoners of war were to be taken.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. One moment more. I now want you to help me to
elucidate another matter. A sentence of yours appears in this typed
script to the effect that you considered it improper to question a
prisoner-of-war if a decision had already been made that the
prisoner-of-war was to be shot. Is that so? Is it correct?
JODL: Yes, I testified to the effect that I rejected that sentence from
the moral and from the humane point of view.
COL. POKROVSKY: Excellent. Now I want you to tell me the following: Do
you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division in the German Army?
It seems that you, at one time, were directly connected with it? Was
there such a division or not?
JODL: That there were four mountain divisions, that I do not remember,
there were many more.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not talking about four divisions. You have been
given an inaccurate translation. I am asking you whether you remember
that there was a 4th Mountain Division?
JODL: I certainly knew about that. I wanted to be the commander of that
division.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In that case, you may also remember another
responsible officer of the German Army, whose name was Kübler? He
operated in Yugoslavia.
JODL: There were two men of the name of Kübler, an older man and a
younger man.
COL. POKROVSKY: Major General Kübler is the one who interests me. I am
not asking you who Keitel was. You know that better than I do.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for a few minutes?
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, you and I, Defendant Jodl, will attend to these two
documents. Please take Document J-67, Exhibit Number USSR-132. It is a
directive to the 118th Infantry Division.
JODL: 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: I will read to you the “Instructions for Conduct of
Troops during Operations,” Paragraph 2. “Prisoners: Any man who has
obviously fought against the German Armed Forces, and has been captured,
is to be shot after interrogation.” Is that correct? It says so
precisely in those words? Do you hear me?
JODL: That is approximately what it says in that one sentence, but I
should like to have the whole document. Nothing can be gathered from one
sentence. What is decisive is what comes before it, and that is not
stated in the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is written above: “Instructions for the Conduct of
Troops during Operations.”
Now for the second document. It bears the stamp of the IV Mountain
Regiment. It was issued on 6 October 1943 and contains Keitel’s personal
instructions, written in his own hand, on how to deal with prisoners of
war. I will ask you to revert to Subparagraph 3. It says, in the second
part of this subparagraph, “...commanders having at least the rank of
divisional commanders are authorized to issue orders to take no
prisoners, and the civilian population in the combat area may be shot.”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Apparently the translation was not coming
through correctly. Perhaps you are going too fast. It was coming through
correctly to me, but it apparently was not coming through correctly to
the defendants. Would you put your question again?
COL. POKROVSKY: In Subparagraph 3 of the document issued by the IV
Mountain Regiment it says...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number of it?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, My Lord. It is Exhibit USSR-470; and it bears a
double number, Document J-127.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you found Subparagraph 3, Defendant
Jodl?
JODL: Yes, but this cannot possibly be described as a document. That is
not a document.
COL. POKROVSKY: This document says how prisoners of war are to be
treated.
I do not know how you feel about it, but it is quite clear to me.
JODL: But it is not an original. It is a fantastic translation. Any
soldier would have thrown it straight into the wastepaper basket. It is
a falsification. But I admit that it may be due to the foolish
translation. In my opinion, all it contains is nonsense. The heading
says “IV Mountain Regiment,” and it is a Roman four. It should be an
Arabic number. It is never called Mountain Regiment. It then goes on to
say, the commander of the IV Mountain Division, Section Ic, delivers
under number such and such the following—all that is nonsense, pure,
unadulterated nonsense! This is not a document. It is a scrap of paper.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not responsible for the translation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original of these
documents. They were put in, apparently, as USSR-132 and USSR-470. Is
USSR-470 a new document?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, My Lord, this document has already been submitted,
and the original is in the records of the Tribunal. Now I am only
submitting a copy of this document which is at our disposal. Both
documents were previously submitted in the original. If it is necessary,
we can obtain these original documents and submit them a second time.
THE PRESIDENT: One of the secretaries of the Tribunal says that it was
not submitted before—not offered in evidence before—USSR-470. Are you
sure?
COL. POKROVSKY: There may have been some technical error. I was informed
that it had already been submitted. We shall now go into this matter
thoroughly. I believe, My Lord, that the original of the second document
is in your possession.
JODL: I can say something to clarify this.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are uncertain about the
admission of this Document 470. Could you tell us exactly what the
document is, and in what circumstances it is now being offered in
evidence? What the document is, and where it came from?
COL. POKROVSKY: I can give quite a definite answer to the last question,
My Lord, but perhaps I shall have to answer the first part of your
question a few minutes later. The matter is being investigated.
On the second page of Exhibit USSR-470, at the bottom of the page, there
is an affidavit:
“This is to certify that this is a correct and certified copy of
the original document which was captured during military
operations in June 1944, at Pakracu, by the Yugoslav National
Army of Liberation. The original document is kept in the
archives of the State Commission for the Investigation of
Atrocities perpetrated by the occupants and their collaborators
in Belgrade, dated 4 January 1946, Belgrade,”
signed by the President of the State Commission, University Professor
Dr. D. Nedelkovitsch.
I am just having investigations made as to whether this document has
already been submitted, by what member of the Soviet Delegation it was
submitted, and on what date. If the document has not yet been submitted,
then we can demand the original from the Belgrade archives—the German,
the captured copy—or else a certified photostat, whichever is most
acceptable to the Tribunal and have it presented in evidence.
My Lord, I have just been informed that this document was not presented.
Therefore, it will be submitted for the first time, and we shall
immediately ask for the original as additional evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, with reference, for the moment, to
Document USSR-132, which I understand has already been put in
evidence—offered in evidence—the Tribunal would like to see the
original of that document because there are only two paragraphs put out
in the copy that we have before us, and that was the point that was
taken by the Defendant Jodl, that he wanted to see the whole document.
Colonel Pokrovsky, first of all, with reference to Document 132, which
the Tribunal understand has already been offered in evidence, the
Tribunal think that that document in full should be put before the
defendant for him to make any comments. With reference to Document 470,
which you are now offering in evidence, the Tribunal are of the opinion
that you should go on cross-examining with reference to that document,
subject to the production, as soon as possible, of the original or a
photostatic copy of the original, and subject to the right of the
defendant’s counsel to apply to have that cross-examination struck out
if there is any substantial difference between the translation in the
Yugoslav language—which is now being put to the defendant, or used for
the purpose of cross-examination of the defendant—and the original
document.
Is that clear to you and to Dr. Exner?
COL. POKROVSKY: It shall be done, My Lord.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I think that a discussion of this document
ought not to be permitted at the moment. There are too many
discrepancies in it. As it stands, it cannot be correct. Roman numeral
IV, for instance, “the IV Mountain Regiment,” is referred to. That Roman
numeral IV is quite wrong. Then it says “the commander delivers...”
which is not German. Then, on Line 4 there is mention...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal want to know what you are talking
about. Are you talking about 470?
DR. EXNER: Yes. I am merely trying to show that this cannot be a genuine
document because it is not proper German at all.
For instance, in Line 4 it says, “Armed Forces Operations Staff, Ob.H.”
The Armed Forces Operations Staff is attached to the OKW, not to the
Ob.H.
Then, there is no signature. It is signed “Keitel” on the first page;
but he signs as a Generaloberst, whereas I am told he was already a
Field Marshal at that time.
Furthermore, this signature is part of the quotation and it says, “The
OKW supplies the following...” Then there is the quotation—and Keitel’s
signature is a part of that—whereas the document itself is supposed to
originate from the 4th Mountain Regiment, and there is no signature of
the 4th Mountain Regiment. I really do not think there would be any
sense in talking about the document until the original has been
supplied. For instance, on Page 2 of the document there is the statement
that this goes to the commanders of 6, 7, _et cetera_. They are not
commanders, these company commanders. No German military person could
have written this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal adhere to the decision that this
document may be used now. All the points which you are now raising and
any other points which you may wish to raise upon the document will be
open to you if you wish to move to have the cross-examination struck out
at a later stage when the original had been produced.
DR. EXNER: I understand.
THE PRESIDENT: For the purposes of not wasting time, it is, the Tribunal
think, more convenient to have the cross-examination now upon this
document. We will leave it to you to move hereafter to strike the whole
cross-examination out.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky, here is the original Document
USSR-132 which the defendant ought to have for the purpose of making any
comments that he wishes to make.
COL. POKROVSKY: The instructions of the Tribunal will be carried out, My
Lord. We shall submit the original document.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you acquainted yourself with the
contents of the document?
JODL: It is an order of the 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have no doubts at all about the authenticity of the
document?
JODL: No, there is no doubt that it is an order of the 118th Infantry
Division, but the connection between the 118th Infantry Division and
myself is puzzling. But the order is genuine.
COL POKROVSKY: Perhaps you would like to admit now that this is not a
question of stupidity but of villainy. Perhaps you would like to amplify
your testimony in this sense?
JODL: I did not understand you.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, when you were asked about Paragraph 2 of
Document USSR-132, you said that the whole document was not before you.
Now you have the whole document.
JODL: I have it, yes. I have the entire document. The entire order from
Kübler is perfectly in order in my opinion. Apparently the doubts which
the Prosecutor has refer to Point 2, where it says, “Any man who has
obviously fought against the German Armed Forces and has been captured
is to be shot after interrogation.”
That, of course, does not refer to normal troops. That refers to the
population. At least, that is how I see it. Paragraph 8 says, “Attitude
towards the Population.”
That is also in order from the point of view of international law. It
draws a distinction between the attitude towards a hostile population
and the attitude towards a peaceful population.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wish to say?
JODL: Yes, but as I said, I do not understand the connection between
Major General Kübler’s order and myself. I do not understand it.
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm that the question of the treatment of the
civilian population has been isolated to form an independent paragraph,
Number 8? Is that correct? You have just referred to that.
JODL: Yes, Paragraph 8 mentions the treatment to be meted out to the
civilian population.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer. Let us pass on to
another group of questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
JODL: But I wished, with the permission of the Tribunal, to object...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Defendant, are you suggesting that there is
anything in the order itself which indicated that the prisoners dealt
with in Paragraph 2 are not, as you have put it, normal troops?
JODL: In that respect, the paragraph is not very clear; but the next
document which the Prosecutor has submitted might give the proof
regarding what other orders have been issued. However, I consider that
it is out of the question that Kübler gave an order saying that Yugoslav
troops captured in battle should be shot. That is quite impossible. And
had he done so, then he would have done so against the orders of the
High Command of the German Armed Forces. But how can I give my views on
an order from Major General Kübler? It would be best to ask him, he is
alive.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, your answer to my question, then, is in the
negative, that there is nothing in the order itself which shows or
indicates that the prisoners referred to in Paragraph 2 are not normal
troops.
JODL: That cannot be concluded from the wording of that order.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I ought to draw your attention to the words under
“General Directives for the Conduct of Troops in Action.”
At any rate, that is your answer upon the whole document.
JODL: May I please have permission to look at the original again? I have
only a copy here before me.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: You now have the original document before you. Do you
want to add anything to what you have said?
JODL: I just wanted to add—if you are dealing with this order of Major
General Kübler—that it is not certain whether this order refers to any
particular action, for example, the mopping up of guerrillas in a given
territory who were not regarded as regular troops at that particular
moment, but were regarded as a revolt of the population. That is
feasible.
At any rate, I cannot answer these questions because I am not Major
General Kübler.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can pass on to 470.
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal for permission to make a correction in my
objection to this document?
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you speaking of?
JODL: Document USSR-470.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to say about it?
JODL: I previously described that document as nonsensical because, at
the first moment, I regarded it as a German order. In the meantime I
have ascertained that it is obviously a Croatian order, because it is
addressed to three Ustashi battalions. In this Croatian order the
Croatian commander of this mountain regiment tells his troops something
which he had apparently received in the way of orders from the 4th
German Mountain Division, regarding the treatment of prisoners. He, in
turn, traces it back to an order from Keitel which, however, is
misrepresented and which, if it were correct, would best be handed in to
the counsel for Field Marshal Keitel, because it is the best example of
the attitude toward the guerrillas in Yugoslavia in keeping with
international law—that is, if it is correct. Therefore, it is not a
German order; it is apparently a draft or a translation of a Croatian
order of the 4th Mountain Regiment. But what the 4th Croatian Regiment
has to do with the General or the Defendant Jodl is a puzzle to me. I do
not understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask you, Defendant Jodl, whether you knew of such a
directive by Keitel to the effect that division commanders or officers
of higher rank were entitled to issue orders that no prisoners should be
taken. Do you know of such a directive?
JODL: No, it is not known to me; and it is not certain that the order
was issued in that way. However, in certain cases it is permissible
under international law.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to ask in connection with
this document. The defense counsel will obviously ask some questions
when the original document is submitted to the Tribunal.
I shall now proceed to another group of questions. If I am not mistaken,
you confirmed the authenticity of your so-called notes for “Plan Grün”
where it dealt with the creation of an incident on the borders of
Czechoslovakia. It is stated quite clearly there that the organization
of this incident was to be entrusted to the counterintelligence. Have I
interpreted the idea of your notes correctly?
JODL: No. The translation as it came over to me is completely distorted.
But there has been a full discussion about that, too.
COL. POKROVSKY: To facilitate the task of the interpreters, I shall
simplify the question. You, I believe, confirmed the authenticity of
this document dealing with the incident and the organization of the
incident. This is Defense Document Jodl-14.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it has come through properly.
JODL: No. It did not make any sense to me at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right. I shall repeat it. Do I clearly understand
that you do not contest the authenticity of Document Jodl-14?
JODL: If that is the letter from me to Major Schmundt, then that is an
absolutely genuine document, which I wrote myself.
COL. POKROVSKY: In this connection I should like to ask you one precise
question: Do you confirm that the provocation which you call the
“organization of an incident” had two objectives: First, to give a
pretext for an attack against Czechoslovakia; and secondly—to use your
own terminology, which we heard here on 4 June—to shift the blame for
the war on to somebody else’s shoulders? Had you these two objectives
when you proposed to organize an incident? Do you understand my
question?
JODL: I understood roughly what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give an answer?
JODL: Yes, I can repeat the answer I gave yesterday. I have...
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm this?
JODL: My testimony of yesterday? Yes, of course. I still maintain today
something which I said yesterday.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I would like you to tell the Tribunal
everything you know about the supplying of weapons to the Sudeten
Germans organized into the Henlein Corps, which you mentioned to the
Tribunal in passing. You stated that this corps contained a certain
number of officers. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, I remember.
COL. POKROVSKY: In order to help you, I will show you a document.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
It is the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank. He declares in this testimony
that the Henlein Corps received a certain quantity of weapons. Do you
know anything about this?
JODL: I only know of weapons supplied to the Henlein Free Corps at the
time when it was being formed on German territory. Whether arms had been
previously smuggled into Czechoslovakia for that Sudeten-German group,
or how they were brought in, is something which I know nothing about.
The Armed Forces were never in any way concerned with that, just as
later on they were not concerned with the Henlein Free Corps.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know what kind of weapons were sent there? Were
they of German origin or not?
JODL: The fact that arms were taken into Czechoslovakia is something I
know absolutely nothing about. I was not a smuggler of arms; I was a
General Staff officer.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is why I am asking you, since you have said that
you received reports on the arming of the Henlein Free Corps when it
arrived on German territory. That is why I asked you, an officer of the
General Staff, were these weapons of German origin or not? You must know
that.
JODL: Henlein’s Free Corps—which was formed near Hof, and in the
district to the North, on 17 September—received, in my opinion, former
Austrian, or even German, arms. I think they were Austrian weapons, but
I do not know that for certain.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then it is not necessary. We only need definite
information and definite facts. You will now be handed a photostatic
copy of the Case Green folder.
[_The folder was submitted to the defendant._]
You will look at the passage which has been marked. The marked passage
says, “For the success of the operation, the penetration into Sudeten
Germany with parachute troops will be of great value.” The Defendant
Keitel, on 6 April 1946, when questioned regarding this part of the
document, said that it is precisely you who could give the requisite
explanations with regard to this document.
JODL: With reference to this paragraph I have to say that, in the
preparation for a possible war, the Army had a notation inserted to the
effect that fortifications would have to be penetrated quickly or would
have to be opened up from the rear and that for the success of this
joint action the co-operation of airborne troops, together with the
border population and the Sudeten Germans who deserted to us, might be
of value. For, of course, it was a fact that among the Germans who had
been drawn into the ranks and who numbered about 100,000, not one would
have turned his weapon upon us but would have deserted on the spot. They
wrote that to me personally while in Czech uniform. These Germans would
have deserted on the spot. That, of course, we expected and had taken
into account in our military calculations.
COL. POKROVSKY: I fear that you have not understood me quite correctly
or that you did not wish to understand the question which I put to you.
Defendant Jodl, I am interested in something else. Do you confirm the
fact that prior to the attack on Czechoslovakia you had planned
diversionary activity on the territory of Czechoslovakia proper. That is
what I am interested in. Yes or no?
JODL: First, there was no attack upon Czechoslovakia at all; that is a
historical untruth. Second, this was General Staff work, which was
prepared for a possible war; and there is nothing else to be said about
that.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was
whether you planned before the war—or the possible war—diversionary
activity in Czechoslovakia. Did you plan that? Can you answer that?
JODL: No, I did not. You will have to ask Admiral Canaris about that.
Such matters were not in my jurisdiction.
COL. POKROVSKY: Keitel advised us to ask you, and you advise us to
question Canaris. Very well; I have another question to ask you. Was the
unification of all pro-Fascist forces and armed Fascist bands in
Yugoslavia, which fought against the Allies, carried out with your
knowledge? Or do you know nothing about that?
JODL: You mean the military organization under Marshal Tito. That is
known to me, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am referring to the organization under the
direction of the German High Command, of a united front of all
pro-Fascist bands—of Nedish, Michailovič, and others—financed by
Germany, helped by Germany, and under the leadership of the German High
Command. Do you know anything about that, or do you not?
JODL: I do not know whether you have in mind the Chetniks. They were
under Italian command. Because of this there was always a big row
between us and the Italians. Then there was the Ustashi, they were
Croatians. But the other pro-Fascist organizations are not known to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will look at Document J-95, Exhibit
USSR-288. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It is the
testimony of Nedish. Two or three sentences from this document have a
direct bearing on the questions that I have asked you. Nedish testified
under oath, naming those who had helped him to form and to finance his
bands. He named the representatives of the German High Command and the
Gestapo who helped him to create his armed forces.
Have you found that?
JODL: That is right. Nedish formed a Serbian unit. I forgot that before.
Nedish had a—what shall I say—a Serbian...
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember it?
JODL: Yes. Nedish had a small unit. That is right. There were perhaps
5,000 to 6,000 men. They were Serbs.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you give financial support to this organization?
JODL: No. I had no money. I did not back these things.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not speaking of your personal means, but the
means of the German Reich.
JODL: I cannot tell you that. I did not concern myself with money in
this war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the German High Command at the head of the work of
controlling the organization of these bands, or was it not?
JODL: No. I did not organize it. The Commander, Southeast, probably
discussed that with Nedish. But it was Nedish’s own private affair if he
wished to call on the Serbs to fight.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not know whether it was his private business or
not. But it is most important to me that you confirm the fact that these
bands actually existed. How Nedish organized them does not interest me.
JODL: I can confirm that. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 men of the
Serbian auxiliary police.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will be shown another report from this
group of questions. It is an official report of the Polish Government
sent to the Military Tribunal. You will find that it contains some very
valuable information about the activities of the Fifth Column. Please
turn to the sentence which is marked “B.” It is said there:
“In addition to the agents selected from among the young people
and appointed to co-operate with the German civilian population,
there also existed a group of leaders and instructors made up of
officers who had come to Poland, supplied with valid passports,
weeks before the outbreak of hostilities.”
Do you, as the direct leader of the counterintelligence—this section
was subordinate to you—know anything about this Fifth Column
organization in Poland?
JODL: There are two small errors you have made, Colonel Pokrovsky: first
of all, counterintelligence was not under me but under the Chief of the
High Command of the Armed Forces; and secondly, I stated at length
yesterday that I know nothing about any of the preparations for the
Polish campaign, either from the point of view of operations or
otherwise, because I was Artillery Commander in Vienna and Brünn. What
Canaris did at that time with respect to Poland is something I know
absolutely nothing about. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot be of
any help.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, let us proceed to the next group of questions. You
were examined on 8 November by the Soviet Prosecution, and you were
asked whether Germany was pursuing a predatory policy when attacking the
Soviet Union? Do you remember being asked this question?
JODL: I remember very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed a copy of your answer. You
replied:
“I admit that the question of the expansion of Germany’s
‘Lebensraum’ and the utilization of Russian economy for
Germany’s needs did play a certain part, but it was not the
basic reason for the attack on the Soviet Union.”
Do you remember answering in this sense?
JODL: It is possible. I did not sign it. At any rate, I said it was not
the chief cause.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also said in the same answer:
“It was never our intention to keep enlarging our ‘Lebensraum’
and thereby create new enemies.”
It appears that you do remember that?
JODL: Yes, I do.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will now recall that the witness
Ohlendorf testified before the Tribunal that prior to the outbreak of
hostilities against the Soviet Union, Himmler, in his speech, had
outlined a program for the annihilation, in the East, of 10,000,000
Slavs and Jews? Do you remember this statement?
JODL: I recollect having heard that testimony in this courtroom, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this—in the light of Ohlendorf’s
testimony—would you not like to answer more precisely the question as
to whether the war against the Soviet Union was waged with a predatory
purpose, with the purpose of seizing territory, annihilating the
population, and then of transforming the occupied territories, to quote
Hitler’s own words, “into a paradise for the Germans”? Do you not think
that is exactly what did happen?
JODL: What the Führer might have wanted to create later on I do not
know; but the military and strategic reasons, which he gave us and which
were definitely confirmed by the many reports received, I explained
yesterday in great detail. The main reason was the feeling that we were
under a dire threat of being attacked by Russia. That was the decisive
point.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will now be handed Document C-57. It has
already been submitted to the Tribunal, My Lord. On the evening of 5
April 1946 this document was put to Defendant Keitel as Exhibit
USSR-336. I must ask you to turn to Subparagraph 4 of this document and
to Subparagraph 7, for Defendant Keitel stated that you could give far
more detailed explanations about these documents. Point 4 referred to
the active participation of Spain in the seizure of Gibraltar as far
back as 1941. Tell us, how was this active participation of Spain to be
expressed? Have you found this passage in the document?
JODL: Yes, I already know the document. But nobody signed it. First of
all, I have to give an explanation of what this document is, so that it
is not mistaken for an order.
COL. POKROVSKY: But I do not believe I ever said that it was an order.
JODL: That is all right, because it is not an order. I cannot say what
the people who drew up this document had in mind at the time. It was
obviously a draft which the General Staff officers, presumably from my
department, together with the operations expert of the Navy, prepared in
my office and which they submitted to the Naval Operations Staff for
their perusal, according to the principle that General Staff officers
must think and plan a long time ahead. They had these personal ideas and
put them down on paper without my ever having seen them.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, Colonel Pokrovsky? It was whether
the draft did not...
COL. POKROVSKY: I asked a question to which I received no answer. My
Lord, I asked him what he could say about the actual part which Spain
was to play in the seizure of Gibraltar in 1941.
JODL: I cannot make a statement on what other people thought. I can only
talk about serious intentions in connection with Spain in 1940. That I
can talk about. But as far as this paper is concerned, I can say nothing
about it. For at the time I had long ago dismissed the thing as
impossible. I know of it only since I have been in Nuremberg; I never
saw it before.
COL. POKROVSKY: Whether that plan could not be fulfilled is quite
another question. Defendant Keitel said that you could give an
explanation. You declare that you cannot say anything.
JODL: As I have just said, it is some preliminary work carried out by
the younger General Staff officers, which I saw here in the document
room for the first time with great interest and some amusement. It was
not shown to me at the time, because it could already be seen that in a
week’s time the situation would change.
COL. POKROVSKY: You know nothing about the proposed dispatch of an
expeditionary corps to Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, through Trans-Caucasia in
the direction of the Persian Gulf, if the Soviet Union had fallen, as is
stated here; you did not know anything about that either?
JODL: It was never a really serious proposition. On the contrary, I had
the biggest row of my life with the Führer because I refused to attack
beyond the Caucasus in the direction of Baku. But the General Staff
officers did entertain such ideas in the first flush of optimism because
of the big victories in the summer. That is what they are there for—to
have ideas. But the decisions are made by the older and more
level-headed men.
COL. POKROVSKY: So you confirm that the success of the Red Army upset
what you call “the bold and far-reaching plans” of Hitler to send an
expeditionary corps to Syria and Egypt? Is that right?
JODL: If the Soviet Union had collapsed, then one might have entertained
such ideas for continuing the war. But never the idea, for instance, of
attacking Turkey. She would have come over to our side anyway
voluntarily. That was the opinion of the Führer.
COL. POKROVSKY: How do you know that?
JODL: How do I know it? Even the document says so. And there are the
entries in the Diaries of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which are
here in Court. It says:
“After big German victories, Turkey will come over to our side,
anyway. I order that she be given preferential treatment in the
supply of munitions and arms and tanks.”
In fact, Turkey had expressed such a wish, and she was very grateful to
receive from us tanks equipped with arms. The Führer would never have
done that if he had expected Turkey to join our opponents.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall proceed to another group of questions. On the
eve of the campaign against Russia, a conference was held between the
representatives of the OKW, the OKH, and the so-called RSHA. The
participation of the subdepartment SIPO was being considered. Do you
know anything about this conference, at which the witness Ohlendorf was
present?
JODL: I know nothing about that. I was working on quite different
matters, and I have never had any conferences or connections with the
Reich Security Main Office at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with Wilhelm Scheidt, a colleague in
the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW?
JODL: Yes, I know him. He was an assistant to General Scherff.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with his testimony which was given
before the Tribunal? It is, My Lord, on Page 2207 of the English
transcript (Volume IV, Page 467). He testifies that the criminal
practice of inflicting punitive measures on the peaceful civilian
population was known to the leading officers of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff and of the General Staff of the Army. Do you remember
that?
JODL: I do not know the words that he used. Criminal actions were
neither known to the Armed Forces Operations Staff nor to me. I rejected
criminal actions and fought against them, and I made that abundantly
clear here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that you deny all knowledge of the
criminal punitive measures taken against the civilian population? Do you
mean to say you knew nothing about them?
JODL: Of course, I know of the fight against your partisans. That is
quite clear. I have shown two instructions which were issued by the
Armed Forces Operations Staff in this connection.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 7 January 1946, the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski
testified that the real aim of this struggle against the partisans was
the extermination of the Slavs and the Jews, and that the methods used
in this struggle were known to the High Command. Do you wish to deny
this, too?
JODL: It might have been the intention of Bach-Zelewski; it was not
mine. My instructions were different. I already described the intention
yesterday as completely senseless. The numbers of guerrillas made no
difference at all in the gigantic struggle between the German and the
Soviet Armies. It was a minute percentage.
COL. POKROVSKY: Could you perhaps recollect, Defendant Jodl, when and in
what circumstances you yourself said, at one of Hitler’s conferences,
that the German troops were entitled to treat the partisans as they
wished and to subject them to any kind of death by torture, by
quartering, hanging them head downward, _et cetera_. Do you remember
having said something of the kind at that time?
JODL: About this matter—which is more comical than serious—we talked
for quite some time during the preliminary interrogation.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you can tell us about this matter at less length
but with greater precision. Will you answer my question whether you
spoke these words or anything like these words, and in what
circumstances did you say them?
JODL: I want to explain it briefly. It was on 1 December 1942. As the
Tribunal will remember, a directive in regard to combating the
guerrillas was issued on 11 November by the Armed Forces Operations
Staff, which we declared to be outdated by the new issue on 6 May 1944.
In that directive, which was issued on 11 November, I had written the
sentence: “The burning down of villages as a reprisal is forbidden,
because it necessarily only creates new partisans.”
The draft of that instruction remained in the Führer’s hands for weeks.
He always objected that this instruction would hamper the troops in
ruthlessly combating the guerrillas. As at that time I had already
issued that instruction and he still had not given his approval, I
became rather rude; and when he once more came with lengthy explanations
of his fighting experience, his experience of fighting the Communists in
Chemnitz, I said, in order to break the ice at last, “My Führer, what
people do in battle does not come into this instruction at all. As far
as I am concerned, they can quarter them or they can hang them upside
down.”
If I had known that the Russian gentlemen have so little sense of irony,
I would have added, “and roast them on the spit.” That is what I said
and I added, “But in this instruction we are concerned with reprisals
after the battle, and they must be prohibited.”
Then there were roars of laughter from all the officers present, and
also from the Führer; and he gave me permission to issue that directive;
and the testimony of a witness, General Buhle, who was present, will
confirm that to you. That quartering people has not been the custom in
Germany since the sixteenth century, any more than hanging people upside
down, everybody in the world certainly knows. Therefore that remark
could only be an ironical one.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask the Tribunal to grant me one minute for one last
question, literally one minute only.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you know that the German troops,
evidently understanding irony better than we do—and in the literal
sense of the word—quartered, hanged upside down, and roasted Soviet
captives over the fire? Did you know of that?
JODL: Not only I did not know it, but I do not even believe it.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall proceed to
the last group of questions left to me after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will that take, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have only a very few questions to put, and I believe
it will not take very long.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
COL. POKROVSKY: You have given very important testimony before the
Tribunal. You have admitted that in 1941 the warriors of the Red Army at
Vyazma were fanatically resisting the Fascist invaders. Many of them
were taken prisoner only because they were too exhausted to move. You
thereby explained the abnormally high mortality among the Soviet
prisoners of war. Is that correct?
JODL: That is true with regard to the prisoners, particularly in the
Vyazma pocket.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you think of any other reasons you know which would
account for this high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war?
JODL: I did not hear of any other reasons.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then I will refresh your memory a little and draw your
attention to a short excerpt from our Exhibit Number USSR-353. It is a
letter from Rosenberg to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
that is, it was sent directly to the OKW. The letter is dated 28
February 1942. I would draw your attention to a few short extracts from
this document. On Page 1, I believe, the following sentences are
underlined:
“The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a
large-scale tragedy.... A great part of them have died of hunger
or from the inclement weather. Thousands have also died of
typhus.”
I will leave out a few sentences and proceed to the next page:
“Several intelligent camp commanders have taken this line with
some success.”
Before it had been a question of the population being willing to supply
the prisoners of war with food of their own accord.
“In the majority of cases, however, the camp commanders have
forbidden the civilian population to give any food to the
prisoners of war and have preferred to let them die of
starvation.... Moreover, in many cases, when prisoners of war on
the march could no longer keep up from sheer hunger and
exhaustion, they were shot in full view of the horrified
civilian population; and the corpses were left by the roadside.”
And further on:
“Remarks have been heard like these: ‘The more of these
prisoners that die, the better it will be for us.’”
And again on Page 3:
“It would be too naive to imagine that what went on in the
prisoner-of-war camps could be concealed from the Soviet
Government. It is obvious from Molotov’s circular note that the
Soviets are perfectly well aware of the conditions described
above....”
Have you found the passages in question?
JODL: Yes, I have found them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, did you really know nothing of the reasons for this
high mortality?
JODL: No. I heard of the letter here in court for the first time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Defendant Jodl, I am not asking you about the letter. I
am asking you about the reasons for these mass deaths among the Soviet
prisoners. So you did not know of the reasons which led to these mass
deaths?
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document signed?
COL. POKROVSKY: The document bears no signature. It is a captured
document, Number 081-PS. It belongs to the documents captured by the
United States and was handed to us so that we could submit it to the
Tribunal.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I did not hear your reply, Defendant.
JODL: I knew nothing about these reasons for the mass deaths. In any
case they are completely wrong; that I do know, because I can give rough
figures from memory as regards the number of Soviet prisoners of war and
their whereabouts.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We will now deal with this question from a
different angle. Are you familiar with the name of Von Graevenitz?
JODL: Von Graevenitz? Yes, the name is familiar to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did he not work in the OKW?
JODL: He was, if I am not mistaken, in the Armed Forces Department as a
subordinate of General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: This time you are quite accurate; you are right. Do you
know General Österreich?
JODL: No, I do not know that general.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have never even heard the name?
JODL: I do not recall it.
COL. POKROVSKY: This general was chief of the department in charge of
prisoners of war in one of your military districts. Do you perhaps
remember this general’s testimony about the directive he had received
from Von Graevenitz in the OKW with respect to the Soviet prisoners of
war? You will now be shown Document Number USSR-151, Page 5 of the
German text. You will find there the passage to which I should like to
draw your attention.
“At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 I was repeatedly
called to Berlin to attend conferences held by the commanders in
charge of prisoners of war in the military districts.
“The newly appointed commander of the Prisoners of War
Organization in the headquarters of the OKW, Major General Von
Graevenitz, presided over the conference.
“During the conference there was a discussion about the
treatment of prisoners of war who, because of their wounds or
from exhaustion and disease, were unfit to live and unfit to
work. At the suggestion of General Von Graevenitz several of the
officers present, among them several doctors, gave their
opinions on it and declared that such prisoners of war should be
concentrated in a camp or in a hospital and be poisoned.
Following this discussion, Major General Von Graevenitz issued
an order to the effect that all prisoners of war who were unfit
to live and to work should be killed and that medical personnel
should be employed for this purpose.”
Did you know anything at all about that?
JODL: I knew nothing about that at all, and I cannot comment on this
document. It has nothing to do with me and I do not know whether what
has been said here is true, but General Von Graevenitz must certainly
know about it. I had no connection whatsoever with prisoners of war.
That was another office, General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: Von Graevenitz himself defends his statement. He was an
executive; he put the directives of the OKW into effect and also issued
the relevant instructions and yet you tell me you knew nothing about
them?
JODL: I did not say that. General Von Graevenitz is no subordinate of
mine. I had no interviews of any kind with him. I have seen him perhaps
twice in all my life. I was not responsible for prisoners of war, and I
was not competent to deal with them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. We will now pass on to my last group of
questions. There are very few of them.
When Defendant Keitel was cross-examined here before the Tribunal, as
well as in the preliminary interrogations preceding the Trial—I believe
these particular subjects arose during the preliminary interrogation—he
said that you would give us more detailed information about directives
for the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. You stated here before the
Tribunal that the directives were issued for two reasons: First, because
General Von Leeb had reported on the gradual seeping through of the
Leningrad populations to the west and south to the front lines; and
secondly, they were issued as a reprisal for Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Not reprisals, but the justifiable fear that whatever could happen
to us in Kiev could also happen to us in Leningrad; and the third reason
was the announcement by the Soviet Russian radio that this would
actually take place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. The only important thing for me is to establish
the fact that you connected the issuing of this directive with the
report from the Leningrad front and with the affair in Kiev; is that
correct?
JODL: I did not connect them; but events, as they actually happened,
necessarily influenced the decision of the Führer in this direction.
These were the reasons which he gave himself.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will remember when the High
Command received this information from Leeb—in what month?
JODL: It was in the first days—as far as I remember in the first days
of September.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you can also remember the date on
which the Germans captured Kiev. Was it not towards the end of September
1941?
JODL: As far as I remember, Kiev was occupied at the end of August. I
believe it was on 25 August or about that date. But I cannot...
COL. POKROVSKY: Was that not on 22 September?
JODL: That is entirely out of the question. We have a document here, a
report about the incidents in Kiev; I do not know the date of it from
memory, but it is Document 053-PS. We must be able to see the date from
that document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is precisely in that document that 23 and 24
September are mentioned. Well, let us, however, suppose that it really
did happen in August. Would you not remember the date when Hitler first
declared that Leningrad should be razed to the ground?
JODL: I beg your pardon. I have made a mistake all the time about the
date. This document is—Document C-323, the Führer decree, is dated 7
October. So, your statement may be correct. I was a month off in my
calculations, and the taking of Kiev was actually at the end of
September. The reports which we received from Leeb came in the first
days of October. I made a mistake. I am sorry.
COL. POKROVSKY: Please, do not mention it; it is of no importance. I
only want you to remember when Hitler first stated categorically that he
would raze Leningrad to the ground. That is important for me.
JODL: You are referring to the naval document, I assume, the document of
the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed Document L-221 and will be shown
the passage where it is written that, on 16 July 1941, during a
conference in the Führer’s headquarters, the following statement was
made:
“The Finns are claiming the district of Leningrad. The Führer
wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to
the Finns.”
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: This took place on 16 July 1941, did it not?
JODL: The document was written on 16 July 1941, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: That was considerably earlier than the date you received
the report from the Leningrad front?
JODL: Yes, it was 3 months before then.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was also long before the day when explosions and
fires first occurred in Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Quite correct.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was clearly not by accident that in the directive you
drew up yourself and in the statements you made before the Tribunal, you
declared that the Führer had again decided to raze Leningrad to the
ground. It was not the first time he had made this decision.
JODL: No, this decision, if it actually was a decision—and the
statements made at this conference—I learned for the first time here in
Court. I personally did not take part in the discussion, nor do I know
whether the words were said in that way. My remark that the Führer had
again taken a decision refers to the verbal order he had given to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army shortly before, perhaps 1 or 2 days
earlier. It is quite clear that there was already talk of this and that
in the order I am referring to—a letter of the High Command of the Army
of 18 September—and in that way the word “again” is to be explained. I
was quite unaware of the fact, and I heard of it for the first time here
in Court. It was only here in Court that I heard of the conference
taking place at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. The Tribunal will probably be able to judge
precisely when Hitler made this statement for the first time.
You have declared that you knew nothing about reprisals against the
Jews?
JODL: No.
COL. POKROVSKY: And yet you have just referred to Document Number
053-PS.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
It is a report from Koch, personally signed by him. Maybe you will
confirm that it states quite clearly that Koch held the civilian
population of the city responsible for the Kiev fires and exterminated
the entire Jewish population of Kiev, numbering some 35,000 souls, over
half of whom were women. That is what the report says. Is it correct?
JODL: I know that very well indeed, but I only found this document here
in the document room; and I used it as a good piece of evidence for the
incidents in Kiev. The existence of the document was unknown to me until
I came to Nuremberg and it never went to the OKW either. At all events,
it never came into my hands. I do not know whether it was ever sent.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also did not know whether the Jews were exterminated
or not? Is that true?
JODL: I certainly believe it today. There can be no more doubt about
that; it has been proved.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In the document submitted by your defense
counsel as Exhibit Number Jodl-3, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6 of
your document book, in the last entry made on that page, you will read
the following: “A large proportion of senior generals will leave the
Army.”
This refers to the entry in your diary of 3 February 1938. Do you
remember?
JODL: Yes, that is from my diary.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are we to understand that resignations from the Army
could take place at any time, in other words, that any general could
retire or resign from the Army whenever he wanted to? That is what you
say here.
JODL: At that time, I believe it was quite possible. In the year 1938 I
knew of no decree which prohibited it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In Document Number Jodl-64, Exhibit Number
AJ-11, which was submitted by your defense counsel, we find a passage
which, for some reason or other, was not read into the record; and I
would like to quote it now. It is the testimony of General Von Vormann,
who states under oath that you, together with General Von Hammerstein,
often used such expressions as “criminal” and “charlatan,” when
referring to Hitler?
Do you confirm the accuracy of that testimony, or has Vormann expressed
himself incorrectly?
JODL: To the best of my knowledge, and in all good conscience, I believe
that he is confusing two things. In talking about the Führer, I very
often said that I looked on him as a charlatan; but I had no cause or
reason to consider him a criminal. I often used the expression
“criminal”; but not in connection with Hitler, whom I did not even know
at the time. I applied it to Röhm. I repeatedly spoke of him as a
criminal, in my opinion; and I believe that Vormann is confusing these
statements just a little. I often used the expression “charlatan”; that
was my opinion at the time.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is to say, you considered Röhm a criminal and the
Führer a charlatan? Is that correct?
JODL: Yes, that is right, because at that time it was my opinion. I knew
Röhm, but I did not know Adolf Hitler.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then how are we to explain that you accepted leading
posts in the military machine of the German Reich, after the man whom
you yourself described as a charlatan had come to power?
JODL: Because in the course of the years I became convinced—at least
during the years from 1933 to 1938—that he was not a charlatan but a
man of gigantic personality who, however, in the end assumed infernal
power. But at that time he definitely was an outstanding personality.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you receive the Golden Party Badge of the Hitler
Party?
JODL: Yes, I have already testified to that and confirmed it.
COL. POKROVSKY: In what year did you receive the badge?
JODL: On 30 January 1943.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was it after that when you came to the conclusion that
Hitler was not a “charlatan”? Did you hear my question?
JODL: Yes. It became clear to me then that he was, as I said before, a
gigantic personality, even if with certain reservations.
COL. POKROVSKY: And after you had reached that conclusion you promptly
received the Golden Party Badge? I thank you.
I have no more questions, Your Honor.
DR. NELTE: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the
Document Number USSR-151, which was submitted by Colonel Pokrovsky. I
should like to ask for this document to be admitted only if General
Österreich can be produced as a witness for cross-examination. My
reasons for this are the following:
1. The document as submitted contains the heading “Aussagen” or
“statements,” but we cannot make out before whom these statements were
made.
2. The document contains no mention of the place where it was drawn up.
3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last
paragraph General Österreich set it down in his own handwriting; and,
therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath.
Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings
forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is
necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should
just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive.
At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on
behalf of Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence
as long ago as February or March?
DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor—and I know this for certain—was
it issued to us through the Document Division. I am seeing this document
for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some
information about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request.
DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed
that General Österreich can also be produced by the people who took his
testimony at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some
information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet
Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into
German then or was it read in Court?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document
room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was
presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners
of war. It is all I have on the matter.
I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a
matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However,
we can easily make sure.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to re-examine the
defendant?
DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up
again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point
which seems to me in need of clarification.
One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were
shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you
said that the pictures were genuine.
What do you mean by that?
JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the
Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I
meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say
that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of
atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that
they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to
assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by
the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one
does not take a picture of one’s own acts of cruelty if any were ever
committed.
DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new
document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in
Norway. Why in this purely military Führer Decree did you write: “The
Führer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the
occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders
accordingly....” and so on? Why did you deliberately put in “to the
proposals,” and so forth?
JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the
commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between
the OKW and the Führer, then I started with the words “The Führer has
decreed....”
If a decree originated from the Führer himself, I started the decree
with a preamble which gave the Führer’s reasons and the arguments in
favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote “The Führer, therefore, has
decreed....”
If the Führer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to
issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, “The
Führer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has
decided....” In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all
about.
DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree—Document Number 754-PS—without
objection or resistance?
JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando
Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven
wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in
Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from
northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first
before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon
I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in
Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the
Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not
consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven
had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told
him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were
not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no
necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better
to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what
he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however,
incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the
grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly
not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the
Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions
between me and my brother.
DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and
proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and
presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to
international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the
grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced
objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity.
Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?
JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation
of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Namely?
JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the
Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday...
MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of
time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday;
and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.
DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please
tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in
Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided
upon in Reichenhall?
JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has
given evidence about this already.
DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did
not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at
Reichenhall.
DR. EXNER: Please be brief.
JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the
orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description
is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events
with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until
the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of
the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he
was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may
be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations
Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to
the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.
DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was
presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and
Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war.
On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring,
too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed
in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different
period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the
same opinion.
Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS.
I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this
document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a
matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at
all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention
to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.
Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about
partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you
are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by
evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this
document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is
somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness?
I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s
document.
DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember
having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in
this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one
question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging
of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of
whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the
prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of
guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.
There it says:
“Question: Is it true or not...?”
Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number
AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory
of General Buhle, which was made in America.
Then it says:
“Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also
took part in a report on the military situation on the evening
of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion
between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the
East. Is that correct?’
“Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer
remember the exact date.’”
THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the
third document in the third book.
DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to
Question 5:
“Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion
Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been
drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’
“Answer: ‘That is correct.’
“Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the
burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’
“Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted
to have this prohibition rescinded?’
“Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my
hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was
expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I
remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions
of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’
“Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also
had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any
restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged
in combating the partisans?’”
According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:
“This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can
do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down
or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation
applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which
the partisans were active....
“Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental
misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as
far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his
exact words.’
“Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this
remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you
yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer
abandoned his standpoint?’
“Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of
Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned
his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems
probable to me.’
“Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside
down, quartered,” interpreted?’
“Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,”
“quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an
ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance
with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on
the soldiers in combat.’
“Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s
fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to
observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know
that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior,
always endeavored to observe the provisions of international
law...’
“Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that
Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated
international law?’
“Answer: ‘No.’”
THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the
cross-examination.
DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?
JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the
general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.
DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.
It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it
was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between
political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and
that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else
about that before we finish?
JODL: There was no conspiracy...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really
arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said
that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his
evidence.
DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close
connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course,
that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought
the question permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the
conspiracy.
DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection
which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant
General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That
is all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the
day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the
war. Do you remember that?
JODL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of
the war. Is that right, 35 about?
JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is
this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only
the Waffen-SS?
JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the
Army and under the command of the Army?
JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders,
but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior
was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought
them under Himmler’s jurisdiction?
JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical
purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the
divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost
exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the
Army? When? What year?
JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the
war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I
want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an
invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?
JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the
strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you
did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?
JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?
JODL: It began through...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear
that attack?
JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it
arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from
that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?
JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had
only been a conjecture.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the
political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?
JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with,
until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense.
It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an
attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not
at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that
Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack?
What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?
JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a
written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to
the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course
how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it
would end...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go
into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia
was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to
attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you
advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into
Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if
there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too,
could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[_The defendant left the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?
DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I
should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame
leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four
witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel
to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only
one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on
behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that
case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first
witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr
von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
during the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army,
and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations
Department of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number
823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second
volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?
DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the
document?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.
DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.
DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with
the Defendant Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the
Defendant Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper
right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be
read as a “J.”
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly
the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written
note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster
Department, Colonel Polleck.
DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two
signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot
recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior
Administrative Counsellor Niehments.
DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4
or 9 for the date?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.
DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the
signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been
submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I
initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster
Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again
initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative
Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I
should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and
that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In
the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came
from his staff...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a
lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the
margin of this document, do you see them?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field
Marshal Keitel.
DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments
made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you
correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons
of competency?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on
the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of
the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with.
DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came
under Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU”
Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of
work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with
either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy
chief, with the Chief of the OKW.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is
that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of
prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department,
“QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also
supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came
directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with
military administration, and the third department dealt with general
questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions
concerning international law and so on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these
organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department,
an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but
in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of
Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the
Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of
cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the
beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second
General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of
the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your
duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of
positions in the higher command offices for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1
October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold
this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1
October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of
the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new
mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in
this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers
that are submitted have no relevancy at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the
evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the
Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world
conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators
obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it
must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed
periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the
Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any
cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at
another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The
Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1
October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to
leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to
the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along
if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think...
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You
show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something
else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere
conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important
position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was
the only thing to be shown.
May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the
Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of
activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have
particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially
connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating
guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer
of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with
by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of
partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous
regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and
incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating
guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and
since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first
had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the
guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which
the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it
correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several
times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and
danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard
to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting
went beyond the general conception of the _franc-tireur_ system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area
affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with
regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual
both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in
it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in
these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of
reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of
Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very
limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla
warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is
that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of
such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to
the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite
interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind
every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed
by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla
fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht
command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case,
because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in
the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with
our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the
country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were
undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain
cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and,
although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were
most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of
the 1st Cossack Division.
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st
Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW
about the difficulties he was having in his division?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine
from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that
occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me
in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the
difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit,
particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that
time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s
policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other
complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his
division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of
our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence
in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some
general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties
with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now
coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of
competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the
decisive question.
[_Turning to the witness._] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do
with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have
anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then
I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my
question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you
won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are
leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too
much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the
witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with
his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness
has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it
a little further but...
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the
witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably
because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May
1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the
Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained
the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now
ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946,
are correct.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit
which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff
submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following
statement. I quote:
“It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the
civilian population in operational areas and the methods of
guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome
opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to
carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the
systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.”
I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have
arrived at that view?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and
very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla
warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might
express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it
is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in
regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over
anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the
end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the
Führer’s order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that
anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that
police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly
over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these
tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in
this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to
the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this
connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was
no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of
guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In
the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether
disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the
Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves,
which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces
released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest
made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from
transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General
Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible
that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander,
Southwest?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the
war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army;
and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled
there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their
selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to
ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the
framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried
out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the
strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom
I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in
responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to
cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von
Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already
retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over
higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these
positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with
the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding
international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of
the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection
that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff
officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as
personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to
us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and
army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential
and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders.
These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the
first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only
that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every
positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety
about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the
forces, which made careful work difficult.
After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it
was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue
to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards
Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my
talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction
among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to
preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the
Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant
Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these
officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that
to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to
keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe
should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is
concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at
what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of
war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask
the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this
offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there
was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is
the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive
begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first
preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these
intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the
offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The
first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do
know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had
already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the
Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore
made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these
movements.
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the
offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer
of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very
territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY
Saturday, 8 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand._]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the
Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and
documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the
order in which they were dealt with in Court.
The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three
witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and
Strupp.
The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan
are rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the
application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted
yesterday.
The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and
Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may
be called upon the subject concerned.
With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal
order as follows:
The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is
rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission
given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the
substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form
embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a
person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the
originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal
have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues
before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents,
and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the
testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add
nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the
proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as
to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The
motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former
decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a
witness are accordingly denied.
There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and
it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the
Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not
be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the
defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine
those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are
now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the
organizations are concerned.
That is all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of
Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was
discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed
me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.
Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers,
however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is
therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach,
who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought
here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the
Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory.
My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is
living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of
Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this
letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the
Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the
attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by
the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in
the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance
to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.
I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same
time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the
Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses
here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take
care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the
particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince
Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this
interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had
desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the
use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the
Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles
as follows:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is,
the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by
the use of force.”
This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover,
this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or
contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force”
contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to
these principles. These questions...
THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is:
“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing
relations through peaceful means rather than force.”
There is nothing contradictory in that, in English.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The
word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the
same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a
peaceful manner only and not by force.
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to
establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful
means. “Not by force” he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the
Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want
to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all
means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced
them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the
interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no
further reason to supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know
what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer
peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means
might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on
the German translation.
We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful
methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the
Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which
Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that
Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal
have accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you
would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have
the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here
to depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter
which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an
affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David.
Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to
draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a
letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted
the affidavit in the proper form.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution
were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove
nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My
Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David.
Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in
the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl
von Pfeil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to
mention one point that arose on Tuesday.
Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not
been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a
misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at
an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to
general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had
not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their
case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued.
I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later
stages, adopted the same line.
Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the
Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted
to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I
think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish
to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was
part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the
time.
I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection
on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case,
or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I
thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain
that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we
have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with
reference to the admission or introduction of this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to
it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to
make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how
the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor
Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in
so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness.
Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal
Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers
and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them
over to the Gestapo.”
Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not
the case?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as
superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and
Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military
capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of
father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the
Eastern Front.
I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel,
the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the
staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field
Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and
Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw
myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he
would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate
officers.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of
course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of
this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East
has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I
think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the
interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated
the 20th of May 1946.
My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any
effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this
affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and
as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should
be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit
number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct.
That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get
copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen
this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy,
and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a
witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be
supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it,
and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course
would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they
may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.
Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon
and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit
over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application
on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can
retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of
the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major
Büchs.
[_The witness Büchs took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HERBERT BÜCHS (Witness): Herbert Büchs.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold nothing and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of
the war?
BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force
serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that
capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war?
BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23
May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the
Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these
headquarters?
BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition
to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in
Berchtesgaden.
DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the
Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that?
BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name
Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.
DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?
BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and
official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship
between themselves or with others?
BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I
also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on
Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three
again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
[_Turning to the witness._] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the
names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?
BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler;
then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative
of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of
the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the
Armed Forces with the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of
these three gentlemen?
BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to
Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he
turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the
Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation
discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation.
In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were
frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection
between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.
DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?
BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl
always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always
rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks
against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was
fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter
who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw
that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply
returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views.
If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the
Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the
dispute in question.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?
BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official
contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed
the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher
officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General
Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so
that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what
personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these
three gentlemen.
BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the
defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on
several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.
As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at
all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations
between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his
relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also
disliked personally.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know
anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the
possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to
the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?
BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the
Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency
landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against
the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a
Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected
an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very
sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the
appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?
BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these
gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any
direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not
directly connected with military matters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?
BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand
and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer
from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude,
which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of
violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.
DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have
documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree
with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a
delaying action?
BÜCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Führer in the heat of his
rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the
demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to
carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl
used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments
pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices
concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment
approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his
extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy
correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved
were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to
the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as
far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in
this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was
repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements
and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?
BÜCHS: I know of no such order.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such
decree was issued?
BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account
by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had
described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the
incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two
Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were
captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft
artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and
had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied,
“because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my
own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached
me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed
Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again
demanded that the order be carried out.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?
BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the
campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the
foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment
of terror-fliers was again put aside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I
believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the
Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of
his demand this decree had not been issued?
BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself
very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of
the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the
beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the
Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude
taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been
impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over
Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror...
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been
present at the entire discussion.
Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the
Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the
testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under
Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the
details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in
Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room.
Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with
Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by
telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I
should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole,
even though the witness heard only a part.
With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr.
President, we can save time if I may present it now.
First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller,
which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:
“How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air
Force?” The answer is on the next page and is:
“From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the
Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force.”
Question 5—and that is the question which concerns us—is on Page 179:
“Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich
Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because
such an order was not given?”
Answer, Page 180:
“Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press
reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March
1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation
discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:
“‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short
time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops.
They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members
of the population, threatened with death, and probably would
have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and
taken them under their protection.’
“Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that
this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the
population.
“b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:
“‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail
out are not to be protected against the population. These people
only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that
German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our
own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate.
Why are my orders not carried out?’
“Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:
“‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case
be a practical impossibility.’
“Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:
“‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the
cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air
Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to
them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact
between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’
“Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be
present in the background, and went on, addressing him but
sometimes not looking at him:
“‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the
last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in
future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to
the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to
carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is
liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’
“Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation
and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the
impression of general surprise and disapproval.
“c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested
an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway.
Essential points:
“Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air
Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in
any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal.
It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree
to this in any way, shape, or form.’
“Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The
duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things
are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what
the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He
does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers
of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The
Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our
soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter
either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take
care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first
to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at
once for a fairly long time anyway.’
“Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving
Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as
the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again
refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we
will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what
is going to happen to us?’
“The following was decided at my suggestion:
“No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued
by the Air Force or the SD.
“Surrenders to the SD—none.
“In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first
of all, prevent further action through explanations of the
following kind: All members of air crews previously captured,
not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the
control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture
not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult
process to determine the number of air personnel captured during
the last few months.
“Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out
without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go
automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of
transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.
“Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In
order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer
of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a
delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be
appointed.
“d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to
Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter,
and said:
“‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly
is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order
cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is
entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and
verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must
sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not
be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either;
I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and
everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But
I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’
“Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any
circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’
“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must
think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’
“The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to
the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the
Führer’s order.
“e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I
had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to
reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the
room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was
passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and
Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:
“‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me,
for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or
at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do
against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German
women and children?’
“Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and
what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the
enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be
eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get
stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our
favor.’
“Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible
to the German people for the continuation of this situation in
the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as
terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’
“Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the
air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’
“Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’
“Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it
had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more
approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to
him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a
good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:
“‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not
do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the
education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that
they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the
regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order
actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my
Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their
duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced
landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would
the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do
would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is
something for which we cannot answer to our men and their
relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline
would collapse at one blow.’
“Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his
first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in
thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he
interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:
“‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well.
But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and
have no other means except this.’
“Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.
“f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I
told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him
to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself
could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our
conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the
Führer’s order.
“g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began
with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’
“It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the
principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to
the Reich Marshal again, and added:
“‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it.
I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now,
in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any
of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last
conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he
does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you
will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has
ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’
“The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s
attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act
as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary,
and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane
and cannot be done.’
“h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the
above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air
Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my
opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices,
as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s
meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces
High Command (OKW).
“Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the
Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to
Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again
about this matter.
“I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop
or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.
“i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive
was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention
was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It
disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure
that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.
“No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I
remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must
be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer
was concerned.
“In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair
at all.”
Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture
presented by General Koller correct?
BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by
the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is
based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt
you.’” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which
emphasizes what was said...
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions
on this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the
offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished.
BÜCHS: Yes, I can still remember.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal,
the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the
Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of
Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?
BÜCHS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration
camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?
BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich
Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever
seen such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station
broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the
Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location
of concentration camps. Is that possible?
BÜCHS: That is quite out of the question.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about...?
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich.
We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him
whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come
to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further
questions.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred
to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was
a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding
officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at
the daily discussions of the situation?
BÜCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.
DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation
discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force
officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?
BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the
question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops.
These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the
camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to
be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I
remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to
say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be
decided was how their transport was to be arranged.
DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made
regarding that transport, and who made them?
BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general
terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment
than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of
Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even
our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the
population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I
remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to
be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the
German civilian population.”
DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement,
refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the
Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was
presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how
they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said,
“They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual
text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That
is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in
the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different
and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer
said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march
in a column, on foot.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal
with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General
Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact.
[_Turning to the witness._] A remark is supposed to have been made in
the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take
off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do
you remember who made that remark?
BÜCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.
DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was
made?
BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in
some connection or other; I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed
to have made such a remark.
BÜCHS: I think that is quite out of the question.
In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to
take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at
once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The
stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither
look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at
such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often
some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the
stenographers.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged
to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important
questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision
announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the
questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement.
I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am
not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that
decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to
put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the
witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put
your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to
put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an
impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of
the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence
directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was
announced without the Defense having first been notified.
DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in
connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must
emphasize them because...
THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Löffler?
DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be
questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the
custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense
because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read
Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in
what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with
reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble,
have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set
up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they
are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future
date in this Court.
The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t
desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the
counsel for the organizations.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we
feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that
these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss
of that witness.
I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so
that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr.
President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this
Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission
because the number...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have
already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it
further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It
is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very
great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in
respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: May I give one explanation...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not
hear you further at this stage.
DR. LÖFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem
to be entirely clear.
BÜCHS: May I ask which conference?
MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the
evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.
BÜCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being
made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their
boots on.
BÜCHS: Yes, that is what I said.
MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I
had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that
that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not?
BÜCHS: So it was said.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer
could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know
who said it?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the
status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of
his new-found brother-in-law?
BÜCHS: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the
witness Professor Dr. Schramm.
[_The witness Schramm took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations
Staff during the war?
SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces
Operations Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?
SCHRAMM: Until the end—that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces
Operations Staff?
SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I
kept the War Diary of that staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?
SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to
the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the
University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name
would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me
to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian
would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events
connected with that staff, would you not?
SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the
internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation
discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important
document passed through my office during those two years.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight
into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone
else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of
General Jodl’s activities.
SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s
activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to
information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint
messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which,
of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence
between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared
on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another
angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North
Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest,
in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.
SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date
information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational
adviser to the Führer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four
theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of
war?
SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army,
and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always
lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with
those of the Eastern Front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000
teleprint messages in a year?
SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it
exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed
through the War Diary office, and that they were so [_demonstrating_]
thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through
my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.
DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which
has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer
has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler
saying that generals must not resign?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared
in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already
issued before my time—that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That
order was about 1½ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully
worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it
afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every
commanding officer—and the departments under him correspondingly—was
entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the
Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the
order once it was given him by higher quarters—that is to say, he would
have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It
added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of
this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not
tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were
not in agreement with his orders.
I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great
deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading
an order from the Supreme Command.
DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little
more slowly?
This order—the contents of which you have just described to us, and by
means of which you have established the date of the final and most
stringent formulation—did this order also apply to a man like General
Jodl?
SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the
more to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question.
General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a
civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the
detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and
to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its
decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis
for judgment for or against?
SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General
was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly
immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party
members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally
could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was
completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise
political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous
amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time
for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do
not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn.
What the General committed to paper—and these papers, as I have seen
myself, run into thousands—was always strictly confined to military
matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be
more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having
seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had
great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...
SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite “no,” because I know
from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all
diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it
because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any
ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen
the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed
himself to criticism from those below him—from people who did not know
the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal,
and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved.
I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at
the time of Adolf Hitler’s, death, had scarcely more German war
decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not
see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a
foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of
political aspirations.
DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a
speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the
Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?
SCHRAMM: First of all, let me tell you that the reason why I remember it
exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was
based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War
Diary. It was like this:
That was a speech for which material was collected in the various
departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was
difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we
were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8
or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech
outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy’s dropping
out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern
Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We
had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness
was felt by all those who understood the situation.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the
speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the
reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.
SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts’
objection as to what the witness must say. That’s a mistranslation.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly
translated.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, I want to show you a document which
was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document
1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document
first.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in
the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me
during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It
is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed
up loose towards the end of the cross-examination, Document 1808-PS.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the
second last page, on the right?
SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20
July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in
the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that
the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that
conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The
signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my
clerk.
DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of
documents.
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I drew it up myself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of
yours was?
SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short
notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As
not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes,
so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had
said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still
standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand.
There was no time to find a stenographer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes?
SCHRAMM: Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed
the General’s speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain,
of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes
which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of
course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual
words spoken. I now see that there are 4½ pages. The speech was, of
course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed
account.
DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only...
SCHRAMM: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances
in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do
not possess. That was...
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission—again in the
interests of saving time—to mention that these matters are all very
irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler’s life, and that
Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are
not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you’ll do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, will you please be very brief and
quote the personal circumstances?
SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around
his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so
quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right
next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply
impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his
staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[_There was no response._]
Does the Prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next
witness, General Winter?
[_The witness Winter took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the
Russian campaign?
WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt’s army group.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow
a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than
you have just been doing.
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me—since you had a very responsible
position—what was officially said to be Hitler’s reason, at that time,
for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and
my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected
shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the
frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount
of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the
official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army
group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department
under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true
one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active
preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this
impression?
WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression,
according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there
was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot
give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our
marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops,
so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large
proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected,
and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the
Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive
force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the
first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps
which covered a large area of German or ex-Austrian territory which,
again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In
addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in
themselves.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your
opinion, was particularly significant—namely, the finding of these maps
which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly
significant—more significant than the other things you have mentioned?
WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian
Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which
would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area—even
allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such
reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy’s frontier.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that
after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with
exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities.
Have you any idea of what I mean?
WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these
difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are
referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or
delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a
very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area.
They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt
extensive countermeasures at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give
you details.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?
WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there
which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along
the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a
divisional staff with all its main material—I cannot remember its
number—was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This
caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security
searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of
staffs and other authorities from that time on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see
one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?
WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that
right?
WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and
permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH,
Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to
which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary
confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Führer to
nominate a new commander for that army group. I have a painfully
accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the
telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand.
The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler’s answer,
relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.
DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?
WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that
there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler
himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual
situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal
Von Rundstedt’s Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In
the course of this discussion, Hitler—I cannot tell you for certain
whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant
Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards—I repeat, there
was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached
the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to
him:
“In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications
to resign. When I have once made a decision the responsibility
is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my
superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, ‘I am
not going on with it, because I don’t want to take the
responsibility.’”
We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and
I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our
impression was correct.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date,
altered his decision not to allow that in the future?
WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know,
there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were
issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an
officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume
responsibility.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed,
you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of
the war, were you not?
WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General
Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15
November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation
discussions with the Führer?
WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the
week.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these
situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took
place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no
real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation
discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a
situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of
people present?
WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon’s
program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while
there was a second situation discussion at 2 o’clock in the morning, of
no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior
General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the
Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of
time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no
one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was
not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure
repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or
detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in
particular that you want to prove about them.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at
this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this
case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon in
cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have
made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is
based on the supposition that something has been heard...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need lay down any hard and fast rules,
but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these
“situation conferences,” and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn’t
seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences
with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, it is possible in military life for
an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?
WINTER: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent
opinion on record?
WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility
existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in
1938—I think, in winter 1938-39—removed such a possibility once and
for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of
general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent
opinions on record.
DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the
interpretation, will you please explain the word “Aktenkundig”?
WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official
files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any
comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the
decision or order of his superior.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?
WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no
longer existed as they were done away with.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document
shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also
submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know
the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that’s the Number 3606. It’s Exhibit GB-292, My Lord.
I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?
WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference
number on it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?
WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank
space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The
document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here;
but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the
file copy from my quartermaster’s department. The third copy must have
been sealed and attached to the same records.
Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the
question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was
drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl,
and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would
prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving
the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the
point of view of international law and from the point of view of the
psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home.
I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me.
He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and
he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative
treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more
detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy
and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its
success with Hitler under all circumstances—for his idea must not be
allowed to be put into practice.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition
regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out
that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff
and of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not
matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission.
I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this
question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who
is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of
having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question.
[_Turning to the witness._] You have told us that Germany attacked the
Soviet Union in breach of their Nonaggression Pact, because Germany
feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff
officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the
Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether
politically...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that
Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18
December 1940—446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7—that on 18 December
Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet
Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the
attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of
Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say
the Soviet Union, breaking the Nonaggression Pact.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures
in the Ukraine, did you not?
WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals—as far as the troops were
concerned—in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no
recollection now of any such instances.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What measures did you take against the
resistance of the population?
WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was
involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational
zone in the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time,
with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the
population did not occur—as far as I know—until later when the
operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there
was resistance against political Reich commissioners.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?
WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at
the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area
lines were at the Dnieper at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories
to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of
them—something which was forgotten.
To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an
interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. And then there is
Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermüller, with
reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last
to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg’s
statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question
of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not,
after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position
against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211.
The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an
immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time.
“Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the
_coup d’état_ of the army, started to deploy her armies on all
her borders?
“Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German
Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the
Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
“Question: Is it a fact that the Army ‘List,’ of which you were
the commander at the time, had the order, before the _coup
d’état_ in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of
Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not
even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian
territory?
“Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given
to respect Yugoslavia’s neutrality.
“Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?
“Answer: No.”
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come
in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate,
I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart
from that, I have completed my case.
THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST DAY
Monday, 10 June 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case
with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the
Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: “God protect Austria.”
It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the
Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of
Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace
treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the
Tribunal’s attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be
permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had
originally intended?
Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the
examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense.
[_The defendant took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where were you born?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to
now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a
crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the
German-speaking enclave Olmütz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age
of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I
completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the
University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and saw
fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war
I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor’s
degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for
bravery in the face of the enemy.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did
you retain from the time of your youth?
SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of
the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans
and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified
Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic
policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language
compromise was agreed upon in Moravia.
DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your
service in the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I
remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the
Fourteen Points of President Wilson.
DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people’s right of
self-determination?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen
Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We
Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this
right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy
Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had
been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had
been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of
the 1,000 years of their existence.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war?
SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up
my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one.
DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of
any political party?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did
not want to tie myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all
parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties;
but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed
for individual groups of the community.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance,
the Austro-German Volksbund?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German
Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918
was Austria’s Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November
1918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the
right of self-determination, decided that “Austria is a part of the
German Republic.” Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly
repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain
forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold
plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to
the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these
events in his book, _Three Times Austria_.
The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German
neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the
Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The
first document, to which I have given the Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the
proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence
reads:
“The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction
over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially
in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any
annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited
by German farmers, workers, and citizens.”
Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit—it is
on Page 4 of the document book—the resolution which the witness has
already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly
on 12 November 1918, which says:
“German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities
are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the
German Republic.”
The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner,
explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the
following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3:
“Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose
pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and
thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which
loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in
this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and
perhaps also tempting to settle one’s account separately and
perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy’s ruse, in this hour
our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family
and one people living under a common fate.”
Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18...
THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not?
DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8.
That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when
145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921,
there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg,
and 877 votes against it.
Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there
were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the
economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire
history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic
parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the
world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country.
Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now
with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my
next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian
Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of
my document book. As President of the Parliament he suggested the
acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following
reason:
“The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need
lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally
and economically and which can once again procure work for the
masses of our people at home and abroad....”
Then in the second paragraph he says:
“It also has no other choice because our country depends on the
big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw
materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and
its currency.”
The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and
Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the
greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time:
“But we will never believe that the Central European question is
solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up
Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the
solution.”
I shall now continue with the examination of the witness.
I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the
conditions after 1927?
SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just
described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make
so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had
repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918
had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government,
turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character.
DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire,
an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of
the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms
were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy
between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The
only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian
Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which
still held all parties together. Around the year 1930—at least then it
was first noticeable—the National Socialist German Workers Party made
its appearance.
DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly
with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian
conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course,
already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the
Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political
leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind
of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with
our customary political thinking.
DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any
value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any
other.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party
had gained in the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in
Austria—undoubtedly very great as time went on—was due to its
unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion
that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation
of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic
party leaders.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which
brought success to the NSDAP?
SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from
the Reich...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by
Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause,
which gives the interpreter no chance.
SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the
discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the
elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10
percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the
Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an
end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested
in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the
Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do
not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here
again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join
the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May
1938, and my membership number is above 7 million.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew
that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before
25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal
Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another
discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming
of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already
at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only
National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only
on Hitler’s orders.
DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution
have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being
extolled.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so-called Annual Commemoration in the year
1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a
Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been
hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us
referred to that death as murder.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal
Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the
NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather?
SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and
disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also
found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from
the events of 25 July:
First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting
of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even
though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to
realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead
to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to
avoid war.
DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year...
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic
policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have
happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be
done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease
its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence
of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National
Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active,
and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional
strength of the parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had
any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in
1936?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you...
SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when
I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading
German politician.
DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at
that time, when you were State Councillor?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without
my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg, through Minister Klees
asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly
close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland
Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an
Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in
writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition
could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that
task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because
the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain
Leopold was the head.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he
did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the
agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its
earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three
times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him;
that I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following
documents without reading from them?
Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an
excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583,
already submitted to the Court.
Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-581.
And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zernatto
expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold’s aims
and efforts.
My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double
game. As counterevidence, I applied for permission to hear the former
Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want
to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on
Page 140:
“Question: ‘Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time
when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was
declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact
with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?’
“Answer: ‘No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his
visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party
member. I think—I do not know with certainty—that he joined
the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he
personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi
circles.’”
On Page 6 of the same document it says:
“Question: ‘Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double
game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet
and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal
Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain
extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in
February 1938?’
“Answer: ‘I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the
illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it,
because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact
with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty. Schuschnigg
himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at
that time—before Klausner it was Leopold.’”
[_Turning to the defendant._] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning
of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What
did you think of the political situation at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of
all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with
the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the
Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any
interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian
National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National
Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not
mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely
convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National
Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the
support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation—I mean of the
Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority
would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations.
One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by
enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria
for the Führer’s policy and the demand for equal rights of the German
people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field
Marshal Göring and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these
conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the
formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist
ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer
adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the
two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian
National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police
intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set
up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today’s
denazification system.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about.
First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of
1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws
regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the
State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became
untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler
who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the
political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it
was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from
the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr
Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to
the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the
Austrian Government—that is, Dr. Schuschnigg—should be made aware of
the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was
necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the
government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior
was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not
mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the
discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed
Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time
met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the
expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were
concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also
placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I
heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr.
Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr.
Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at
the Obersalzberg?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by
Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for
Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We
agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National
Socialists—for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischböck—to certain
public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the
subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler
reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February
Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and
contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, “I had the
definite impression that he”—Seyss-Inquart—“did not until then know
anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the
agreement”—of 12 February.
Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the
Interior and Police, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing
connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them.
Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February
contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison
man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists
on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the
protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no
doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and
Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian
National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their
political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess
their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised
hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that
means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of
getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This
agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure
thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to
make sure whether my plan had his approval. I went with Dr.
Schuschnigg’s assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16
February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I
talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours.
It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler
with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement.
But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my
interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once
that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I
made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter,
and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want
to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those
notes. My statements...
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can
you do it in headings, perhaps?
SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my
whole responsibility.
“A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I
adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support
the Constitution, that is, further development, including the
Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public
opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance
with present constitutional possibilities; I must be an active
guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the
meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party
and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against
prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of
the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to
be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in
Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such
is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of
individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the
State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing
to do this, to be locked up.”
In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me:
“It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a
dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national
German conception to a National Socialist one.”
That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February,
from 12 to 2:10 o’clock.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you...
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understood the witness to say that he made
his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his
secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those
notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should
be made clear on the record.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes?
DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got
the notes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna.
I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found,
searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution
during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the
Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original.
THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.
DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over?
[_The document was submitted to the Tribunal._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused
with the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not
understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never
received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made
soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no
such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself
whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the
Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which
you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you
say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the
shorthand notes you made at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon
of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made
in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had
several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one
of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my
defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few
weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret flies in
Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this
defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some
search made for them, and some effort made to find them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself.
MR. DODD: We do not have it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide
with the voluntary statement, which the defendant...
MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President,
to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this
defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he
clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in
a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if
I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we
never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the
interrogation.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case
was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted
the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations.
[_There was a short pause._]
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number Seyss-Inquart-49, Page
113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant, the present
witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is
evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65,
on Page 158.
Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your
proposals?
SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said “yes” to a number of things, but on other
points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would
agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed
feasible.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as
Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under
the control of the Nazis.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to leave the main explanation of this
matter to my witness, Dr. Skubl. After Dollfuss’ death Dr. Skubl was a
special confidant of the Austrian Government and was placed at my side
as State Secretary and Inspector General for Security Matters—clearly
also to act as a kind of check. I had no objection at all to that and
was very pleased to have such an expert at my disposal.
I should just like to mention briefly that all orders of the entire
executive came from Skubl. I myself never gave a direct order to the
Austrian police. Skubl was given instructions by Dr. Schuschnigg,
particularly on 10 and 11 March. I myself did not bring a single
National Socialist into the Austrian police.
DR. STEINBAUER: All right, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: Perhaps I might refer briefly to the public appeal...
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I want to refer to two documents,
Numbers Seyss-Inquart-51 and 52, on Pages 117 and 119 respectively. We
have now reached Document Book Number 2. The first is a speech by the
defendant as Minister, addressed to his police officials, and the second
speech is a radio talk which he gave at Linz.
We now come to the critical days in March. Were you informed of the
plebiscite plan of Schuschnigg, and by whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: The day before Dr. Schuschnigg announced in Innsbruck the
plan for the plebiscite he called me in and informed me of his plan. I
asked him at that time whether the decision was unalterable, and he
affirmed that. I expressed my concern that this might lead to
difficulties; but I promised him that I would help him wherever I could,
either to make the best of this plebiscite or to bring about a suitable
outcome—suitable, that is to say, even for the National Socialists. Of
course, I had continual contact with the Austrian National Socialists,
since I was the liaison man. I spoke at several meetings—Zernatto and
Dr. Schuschnigg were informed of that—and recounted what I had
discussed with Adolf Hitler or what I had proposed to him. I avoided all
possibilities of demonstrations, and as Minister of the Interior also
banned such demonstrations. In that connection may I refer to the
general ban on public meetings, imposed by me among others, and to the
specific prohibition of a demonstration at Graz, evident from the
interrogatory of the witness Uiberreither.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Schuschnigg give you any promises?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. I want to say that on the same evening I was also
approached by Dr. Jury who in some way had already heard of the plan for
the plebiscite. I did not tell him that I had given my assent to Dr.
Schuschnigg, though on account of my function as liaison man as laid
down in the agreement of 12 February, I should not have allowed silence
to be imposed on me; yet, I did keep silent.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think, Mr. President, this might be a suitable moment
for the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: We got as far as the plebiscite which Schuschnigg had
planned and which then became known. We come now to 11 March. What did
you do in the forenoon on that day?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must say first that a day or two before, after
consultation with Austrian National Socialists, I wrote a letter to Dr.
Schuschnigg in which I commented on the plebiscite in an unfavorable
way. The reasons were primarily that a real plebiscite result was not
guaranteed, because it was not a proper plebiscite within the meaning of
the national laws. For example, the plebiscite was not decided on by the
Council of Ministers but by the Fatherland Front, that is, by the party;
and it was to have been carried out by that party.
It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed and a proper election
with all its legal requisites be held. On the evening of 10 March, in
the presence of Foreign Minister Schmidt, I had another detailed
conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg; and we agreed that the Government—as
well as the provincial governments, and so forth—should include
National Socialists, that, in effect, a coalition government should be
formed; and in that case the National Socialists would also vote “yes.”
Only with reference to the license of the Party, the activities of the
Party, were there still differences of opinion. I reported this to the
Austrian National Socialists but they were not much interested, because
news had come from Berlin that Hitler had rejected the plebiscite. I was
told that on the next day I would receive a letter from Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive a letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I received a letter from Hitler by courier. I am
almost certain that the letter also contained the draft of a telegram
for a march into Austria, but I cannot recall whether the draft of a
radio speech was also included in it.
DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do in the morning, after receiving this
letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: After receiving this letter I went with Minister Glaise
to Dr. Schuschnigg. We were at the Federal Chancellor’s office at 10
o’clock, and I informed Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg of the entire
contents of this letter without reservation. In particular, I pointed
out that in case of a refusal Adolf Hitler expected unrest among the
Austrian National Socialists and that he was ready, if disturbances
occurred, to answer an appeal for help by marching in. In other words, I
expressly called Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg’s attention to the
possibility of this development.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ask for an answer from him?
SEYSS-INQUART: The letter set a deadline, 12 o’clock. As our talk lasted
until about 11:30, I asked Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg to give me an
answer by 2 o’clock. I know that in the meantime, and also on the
previous day, he had taken security measures through Dr. Skubl, of which
I had approved. A number of age groups of the Austrian Federal Army were
called up, the police everywhere received instructions, and a curfew was
imposed in the evening.
DR. STEINBAUER: What happened in the afternoon of 11 March?
SEYSS-INQUART: At 2 o’clock I went to the Federal Chancellor’s office
with Minister Glaise. We had a talk with Dr. Schuschnigg; he rejected a
postponement. At that moment I was called to the telephone; Field
Marshal Göring was on the phone, and the conversation between us is
reproduced here under the Exhibit Number USA-76, Document Number
2949-PS.
And then followed demands and concessions. When I told Field Marshal
Göring that Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg rejected the postponement, he
declared, in the name of the Reich, that he had to ask for Schuschnigg’s
resignation, because he had broken the agreement of 12 February and the
Reich had no confidence in him. Dr. Schuschnigg was then ready to
adjourn, but not to resign. Thereupon Field Marshal Göring demanded not
only Schuschnigg’s resignation, but my appointment as Federal
Chancellor. During a conference with Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at
3:30 in the afternoon, the Chancellor said that he would hand to the
Federal President the resignation of the whole Cabinet. When I was
informed of this, I left the Federal Chancellor’s office, because I
considered my function as a middleman concluded in the meaning of the
agreement of 12 February; and I did not want in any way to advocate or
promote my own appointment as Federal Chancellor.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection may I refer to my Exhibit Number
Seyss-Inquart-58, Page 134 (Document Number 2949-PS). This is an excerpt
from the telephone conversations of Göring; Göring is listening to
reports, and Seyss-Inquart is speaking of the relationship between
Germany and Austria. It says here: “Yes, he means that Austrian
independence will be preserved....”
Now, that was on 11 March, in the late afternoon?
SEYSS-INQUART: In these telephone conversations it was also suggested
that the Party formation, the emigrant Legion, should come to Austria.
From the same telephone conversation it is obvious that I opposed this
and wanted rather an election or a plebiscite held before the entry of
any formation into Austria.
In the course of that afternoon State Secretary Keppler came to Vienna
and requested information from me. And so I again went to the Federal
Chancellor’s office. Berlin repeatedly asked me to intervene with the
Federal President in order to effect my own appointment as Federal
Chancellor. I always refused to do that.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did the Austrian NSDAP do at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria began demonstrations. Party members
left their houses, filled the streets, and as Party members or
sympathizers took part in a demonstration against the system and for the
National Socialists, a demonstration which assumed enormous proportions.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the feeling in the Federal provinces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had no contact with the Federal provinces but learned
quite late during that night or on the next day that there, even on a
larger scale than in Vienna, big demonstrations of very large crowds had
taken place against the Fatherland Front and for the National
Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: What attempts did Federal President Miklas make to solve
this situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot say anything about that from my own observation,
for until 8 o’clock in the evening no one at all approached me on these
matters. No one spoke to me about the Federal Chancellorship; no other
possibility of a solution was discussed with me. I heard that the
Federal President wanted to make Dr. Ender, of Vorarlberg, Chancellor
and me Vice Chancellor. I believe that suggestion would have been
completely practicable. But I could not discuss it—least of all with
Berlin—because no one had said anything to me about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: And when events reached a climax and Schuschnigg offered
his resignation, did you compile a Cabinet list?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the evening it became clear that Federal
Chancellor Schuschnigg would resign and that the Reich would not
tolerate any other than a National Socialist Government. Therefore, in
order to avoid being taken by surprise, I considered it my task to study
whom I should take into a Cabinet. The suggestions mentioned in the
telephone conversations were not transmitted by me at all. I chose my
colleagues quite independently—naturally after consultations with
Austrian National Socialists—and they included also people with strong
Catholic ties, such as Professor Mengin, Dr. Wolf, and others.
I asked Foreign Minister Schmidt to enter the Cabinet. He asked me for a
reason, and I told him: I want to keep Austria autonomous and
independent, and I need a foreign minister who has connections with the
Western Powers. Schmidt refused, remarking that Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg had introduced him into polities and that he would remain
loyal to him.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit some documents now: Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-50, Page 115, from Zernatto’s book on
Seyss-Inquart’s position; then, on Page 125, Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-54, also from Zernatto’s book, where it says:
“...he”—Seyss-Inquart—“no longer has developments in his hands.”
Then Document Number Seyss-Inquart-62, Page 149, in which Zernatto
quotes from a conversation with Dr. Seyss-Inquart:
“He says that there are two main points on which he will not
compromise. The first is Austria’s independence and the second,
the possibility for the conservative Catholic element to develop
its own life.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now we come to a very important question.
You then made a radio speech in which you called yourself a Minister,
although Schuschnigg had already resigned.
SEYSS-INQUART: The situation was as follows: The resignation of the
whole Cabinet was not accepted by the Federal President; and we,
including myself, remained Ministers. When Dr. Schuschnigg made his
farewell speech, he did not speak of the resignation of the whole
Cabinet. He only said, “We yield to force.” Dr. Schuschnigg and Federal
President Miklas had agreed at that time that I would not actually be
appointed Federal Chancellor, but that with the entry of German troops
executive power should be passed to me. Therefore, in my opinion, I was
_de facto_ Minister of the Interior and Foreign Minister.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution assert that you yourself exerted
pressure on Federal President Miklas to appoint you Chancellor.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not see Federal President Miklas at all until 9 or
10 o’clock in the evening, after Schuschnigg’s speech “We yield to
force.”
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to submit to the Court this speech of
Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg of 11 March under Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-53, Page 122; in it he says:
“The Federal President has commissioned me to inform the
Austrian people that we are yielding to force. Since we are at
all costs determined not to spill German blood, even in this
grave hour, we have given orders to our Armed Forces to withdraw
without resistance, if the invasion of Austria is carried out,
and to await the decision within the next hours.”
The Prosecution, Witness, sees evidence of this pressure also in the
fact that SS units were called to the Federal Chancellor’s office at
that time. What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe it was after Schuschnigg’s farewell speech,
when I saw in the anterooms 10 or 15 young men in black trousers and
white shirts, that was the SS. I had the impression that they were doing
messenger and orderly duty for State Secretary Keppler and the others.
As they approached the rooms in which Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg and
President Miklas were, I ordered guards of the Austrian Guard Battalion
to be placed at their doors. I may mention that these were selected men
of the Austrian Army who according to Austrian standards were very well
armed, while these SS men—40 at most—possibly carried pistols.
Moreover, 50 steps from the Federal Chancellor’s office were the
barracks of the Guard Battalion, with a few hundred picked and
well-armed men. If Federal President Miklas and Federal Chancellor
Schuschnigg had not been concerned with things other than those which
happened in the Federal Chancellor’s office and on the street outside
it, they could easily have put an end to this situation by calling out
the Guard Battalion.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit of the
Gauleiter of Upper Austria, Eigruber, which states that even before you
became a Federal Chancellor, you ordered the seizure of power in the
various Austrian Federal provinces.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely incorrect, and the Gauleiter of Upper
Austria also does not claim to have talked to me. I believe he says that
he had received a telegram signed by me. I did not send a telegram, and
I did not give oral instructions to any Gauleiter or to anyone else for
the seizure of power.
Later I heard from Globocznik that he had carried out the seizure of
power. He told me of that in these words: “You know, I seized power for
you and acted as the government; but I did not tell you anything about
it, because you would have been against it.”
DR. STEINBAUER: You say you would have been against it. Was the
population against it, too, against the marching in, which had meanwhile
taken place, that is, the invasion as described by the Defendant Göring?
SEYSS-INQUART: One cannot call it an invasion; it was a stormy, loudly
cheered entry of German troops. There were no villages—even those with
an orthodox Catholic population—and no workers’ districts which did not
burst out in stormy jubilation. Moreover, both Dr. Schuschnigg and I
were completely clear about this; once in 1937 he had agreed with me
when I said that the entry of German troops into Austria could not be
impeded by anything but the ovations of the population.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to a Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-37, Page 86. This is a quotation from the book by
Sumner Welles, _The Time for Decision_, describing a conversation
between him and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and it says:
“Before the occupation of Austria, Dr. Schuschnigg came to Rome.
He admitted to me frankly that, if Germany occupied Austria, the
majority of Austrians would support the occupation and, if Italy
sent troops into Austria to prevent the occupation, the
Austrians as one man would join with the Germans to fight
Italy.”
Now, Witness, we come to the next day, to 12 March. Did you not at that
time have a telephone conversation with Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; I called the Führer in connection with the entry of
troops. I should like to repeat and explain that on the day before, at
about 7 o’clock, the negotiations suddenly came to a stop. Everybody
waited. At half past 7 State Secretary Skubl came with the news that the
entry of German troops had actually begun, according to a report from
one of the frontier posts; indeed Field Marshal Göring had repeatedly
said that it would take place. Thinking that the entry was actually in
progress, Schuschnigg then made his farewell speech. And with that the
government of the Fatherland Front had resigned from office. And I state
expressly, up to this moment I did nothing which in any way furthered
the taking over of control in Austria or to express it more correctly,
which intentionally furthered the establishment of the National
Socialists and the seizure of power. I only acted as an intermediary
within the meaning of the Treaty of 12 February. But from the moment
when the system of the Fatherland Front came to an end, I considered it
my responsibility to take action. First I made a radio speech, but not
the one which had been prescribed for me in the morning. For I did not
speak of a provisional government, but referred to myself as Minister of
the Interior. Only then did I call on the SA and the SS to act as
auxiliary police; and like Schuschnigg, I gave the order to offer no
resistance to the entry of German troops. Subsequently I was appointed
Federal Chancellor, and my Cabinet was approved. On the same night I
drove Dr. Schuschnigg home in my car, because I was afraid something
might happen to him at the hands of provocateurs; and I asked Dr.
Keppler to call up the Führer and ask him not to give the order for the
entry of troops. Reich Marshal Göring spoke about that here. In the
morning I called up again; then I met the Führer at the airport in Linz,
and, as the entry of the troops was in full progress, I asked him
whether it would not be possible to have Austrian troops march into the
German Reich, so that, symbolically at least, equal rights would be
maintained. The Führer agreed; and Austrian troops actually marched into
Munich, Berlin, and other cities, in Austrian uniform.
DR. STEINBAUER: How, in your capacity as newly appointed Federal
Chancellor, did you envisage the further development of the situation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Since the system of the Fatherland Front had broken down,
I could no longer entertain my idea of a coalition government. It was
clear to me that a National Socialist government with a very strong
Catholic tendency would control developments not in the form of an
immediate Anschluss but rather—by carrying out appropriate elections
and a plebiscite—in the form of an economic and possibly a military
union with the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to
submit an extremely important document, which shows in an entirely new
way how the Anschluss Law came about. It is a sworn statement of the
former State Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Stuckart, who is imprisoned
here. I submit it to the Court and should like to establish the
following from this testimony...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is not in the document book because I received it
later. The translation of it has not yet been completed. I will read
from the witness’ testimony only briefly to establish the connection—I
have submitted the original to the Court...
THE PRESIDENT: You are giving it a number, are you?
DR. STEINBAUER: Document Number Seyss-Inquart-92. The witness says in it
that Hitler would probably have incorporated the presidency of Austria
in his own person, that he, the witness, was told by Frick to draft a
law to that effect, but that he was then suddenly ordered to Linz...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute, Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. STEINBAUER: In the Dutch matter also, there are a few affidavits
which have not yet arrived or which have just come in. Perhaps it would
be more expedient to submit these documents when they have been
translated.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will have the affidavit, I suppose?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the Prosecution already have the affidavits.
If I may continue, he says that to his surprise he was told by Hitler in
Linz to draft a law providing for the direct, total Anschluss, that is,
providing for Austria’s status as a province, a Land, of the German
Reich, like Bavaria and the other German Länder. He worked out this law,
as he had been instructed to do, flew to Vienna, and submitted it for
approval to the ministers who were assembled there.
I should like to establish in three documents the impression which the
Anschluss made on the population. First, Document Number
Seyss-Inquart-30. This is the celebration at which the Viennese welcomed
the Führer in the biggest square in Vienna, the Heldenplatz. On that
occasion, on 15 March, the witness welcomed the Führer and said:
“The goal for which centuries of German history have battled,
for which untold millions of the best Germans have bled and
died, which has been the final aim of fierce struggle, the last
consolation in the bitterest hours—has today been reached.
Austria has come home.”
Hitler now ordered that this Anschluss Law subsequently be sanctioned by
a plebiscite of the Austrian population. Documents showing the results
of this plebiscite have already been submitted to the Court. I should
just like to point out, in addition, the attitude of the Catholic
bishops toward the plebiscite—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-32,
Page 73—and the attitude at that time of the present Federal President,
Dr. Karl Renner—that is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-33, Page 76. On
the attitude of the other powers to the Anschluss question I shall quote
from testimony of the witness Schmidt, who as the then Foreign Minister
was the qualified man; but I should like to submit one document on it,
namely Document Number Seyss-Inquart-38, Page 89. That is the House of
Commons speech of Chamberlain, who was Prime Minister at the time. In
reply to a question regarding the Anschluss he said: “...nothing could
have stopped this action by Germany unless we and others had been ready
to use force to prevent it.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now Austria has been incorporated, it is a
part of the Greater German Reich, with Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. Did
you remain Federal Chancellor or did you receive another state function
after the seizure of power?
SEYSS-INQUART: On the 13th during the night, I reported on the Anschluss
Law to the Führer; and I took the opportunity of discussing three
questions with him immediately. That was, however, not at all easy, for
the Führer was deeply moved and wept.
First, I asked that the Austrian Party might retain relative
independence and be headed by an Austrian as the provincial leader;
second, that Austria as a state might also enjoy a certain degree of
independence. To the first request the Führer said, “Possibly”; to the
second he said, “Yes”; Austria would receive her own governor, a
Reichsstatthalter. I then rose and asked the Führer that I be allowed to
return to my private practice as a lawyer. As a third request, I asked
that the unjust exchange rate of 2 schillings to 1 mark be altered to
1.50. The Führer agreed to that also.
On 15 March, on the occasion of the celebration which has already been
mentioned here, the Führer told the radio announcer, “Announce that
Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart will now speak.” That to me was actually
the first news of my appointment as Reichsstatthalter. I held that post
until the end of April 1939.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who really directed policy in Austria after the
Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: Bürckel was sent to Austria immediately with the task of
reorganizing the Party and preparing the plebiscite. The interference of
Bürckel and his collaborators, and various plans somewhat strange and
adverse to Austrian conceptions, caused me, on 8 April, in Bürckel’s
presence, to call the Führer’s attention to this sort of co-ordination
and in my hearing the Führer said to Bürckel: “Bürckel, you must not do
that, otherwise the enthusiasm of the Austrians for the Anschluss will
change to dissatisfaction with the Reich.”
Nevertheless, a few weeks later he made Bürckel Reich Commissioner for
the Reunion. He controlled the Party and politics and propaganda,
including church policy, and he had the right to give me instructions in
state matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: You know that the Prosecution make charges against you
in connection with the policy in Austria shortly after the Anschluss.
The first charge is with regard to the Jewish question, namely, that you
participated in this grievous treatment of the Jewish population, or
that you were responsible for it.
What can you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot at all deny it; for certainly, as chief of the
civil administration, I issued orders along that line in my field of
authority, though Bürckel claimed that the Jewish question, as such was
part of his field; and in a document which has been submitted here, he
called the Jewish question a matter arising as a consequence of the
Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: May I, in this connection, refer to two documents. One
is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-64, a decree on Page 154. It is the
decree of the Führer on the appointment of Bürckel as Reich Commissioner
for the Reunion of Austria with the Reich. I emphasize here especially
Article 4, which gives Bürckel the detailed authority to issue orders to
the witness. The second document is Exhibit Number Seyss-lnquart-67,
Page 163; the Court already has it; it is Document Number 2237-PS. With
this long document, I only want to demonstrate that the entire solution
of the Jewish problem, particularly in November 1938, was a matter with
which the defendant had nothing to do.
The defendant’s own attitude I should like to show by submitting an
affidavit which came to me unsolicited from Australia. This is Document
Number Seyss-Inquart-70, Page 175. I am fully aware of the Tribunal’s
view that it is not very weighty evidence that some defendants have
submitted letters from Jews; “One swallow does not make a summer,” as
the proverb says. The reason for my submitting this document is
Paragraph 12 on Page 4, in which the witness, Dr. Walter Stricker, who
comes from a highly respected Jewish family in Linz, says the following:
“After my departure from Austria, I heard of other cases in
which Dr. Seyss gave similar help to Jews and that in May 1938,
when persecutions of Jews became particularly severe, he
protested to the Gauleiter Bürckel.”
It is therefore quite clear that the defendant did not participate but
rejected this radical policy.
Witness, you know from the trial brief that you are charged with having
played a double game. What was the attitude of the Party toward you
after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know that this charge is made against me and has been
made against me before. Radical circles of the Party made the same
accusation against me, and I will admit openly that I can understand why
it was made. I attempted to bring together two groups which, as history
has shown, simply could not be brought together; and since this could
not be anticipated at the time, the radical elements of both groups must
have come to the conclusion that the man who attempted it was not honest
in his attempt. But more important is something else. The final solution
of the Austrian question was not my solution at all, but the solution of
the radical elements in the Party. I myself, however, from 11 March at 8
o’clock in the evening, participated in that solution. As a result, it
is easy for people to say that I participated in it beforehand and
prepared for it; but that is not true. Only at 8 o’clock in the evening,
after Schuschnigg and the Fatherland Government had resigned, did I too
adopt this point of view, because under the given political conditions
there was no other possibility. For there was no political power in
Austria other than that of the National Socialists; the alternative was
civil war.
I myself welcomed the Anschluss Law, and my decision also determined
that of my colleagues. On 13 March, of course, I welcomed the opportune
moment. At most, there might have been some sort of hesitation as to
whether the Anschluss should actually then be carried through. I
considered that, but as I saw it, there was no need for misgivings from
the foreign political point of view, because, according to all reports,
everything would pass quietly. Domestically, there had never been so
much enthusiasm in Austria. I felt that no Austrian statesman, no man in
a position of responsibility, ever had the whole population behind him
as much as I. But the Anschluss Law was valuable and useful, insofar as
in any case the Reich would in reality have had the authority, and thus
it was certainly better it had full responsibility outwardly too.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Defendant Kaltenbrunner told me that he and you were
at this time very closely shadowed by Heydrich. Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich in particular was among those who distrusted us,
and “us” includes Kaltenbrunner. At the end of 1937 Heydrich wrote a
secret report, which I later received. In this report he said that the
solution of the Austrian question in favor of the Party was inescapable,
that the policy of State Councillor Seyss-Inquart might, however, prove
to be the only obstacle, for he would be in a position to produce
something like Austrian National Socialism. After the Anschluss a
so-called “escort” detail was attached to me with the sole task of
sending to Heydrich constant reports on what I was doing. I had as
little objection to this as to the fact that, as Austrian Minister of
Security, my telephone conversations were intercepted.
DR. STEINBAUER: After you had allegedly played the main role in this
affair, what reward did you receive for your activity? Were you given an
estate or a gratuity of several hundred thousand marks? Did you ever
receive anything like that?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, and there was no question of anything like that. My
reward was the knowledge of having worked for the formation of Greater
Germany.
DR. STEINBAUER: I would still like to ask you: Did you ever receive
anything?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. On my fiftieth birthday...
DR. STEINBAUER: But you received a title, did you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean the title of Gruppenführer of the SS? On 15
March I was named Gruppenführer of the SS, as an honorary rank. I must
add that I did not try to obtain it and that I went through no
examinations or other such things. As a rule an honorary rank in the SS
does not entail membership in the general SS; it does not bestow on the
holder either command or disciplinary powers. I myself learned that when
I complained to Himmler about Bürckel and demanded proceedings—that
letter has been submitted here. Himmler told me then that he had no
disciplinary powers over Bürckel, who held only an honorary rank. I
myself, as regards the SS...
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, as I understood it, the defendant said
that he received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich. What
was that secondary post? Is that what you said?
SEYSS-INQUART: Heydrich wrote a secret report against me. No, I am
sorry, Heydrich sent an “escort” detail...
THE PRESIDENT: You said in 1937 Heydrich issued a secret report about
Austria, and then said that the solution was unavoidable except for the
policy of Seyss-Inquart. That was the substance of it, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not quite understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that, I understood you to say you received a
secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to accompany me
as a kind of guard escort, and these men had orders to report my
movements to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; I must have misunderstood the translation.
DR. STEINBAUER: To sum up, I can say that apart from your appointment as
SS Gruppenführer you received no awards, with the exception of a promise
that you would become Reich Minister within a year? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: This promise was given at the end of April 1938. I refer
to a question in the cross-examination of the Reich Marshal. Before 13
March 1938 I did not receive the slightest promise from the Reich on
anything and was not in any way under obligation to anyone or bound to
obey anyone in the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: And with that I can close the chapter on Austria and
briefly discuss the Czechoslovakian question.
You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter sent to the
Führer by Henlein, of having taken an active part in the annexation of
Czechoslovakia.
SEYSS-INQUART: In the affairs of September 1938 I had no other part at
all than that of receiving, as Reichsstatthalter in Austria, the
refugees from the border areas, lodging, and caring for them in Austria.
Henlein, and a few other leaders, I knew personally but did not
interfere in their politics and was not well acquainted with their
relations to the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you say about Slovakia?
SEYSS-INQUART: The relations between Vienna and Bratislava were very
good even at the time of the old Austrian Monarchy. I myself had
relatives in Bratislava. Hence the Slovaks and the Germans knew each
other well. We knew in particular the complaint of the Slovaks that the
promise of Pittsburgh had not been kept, that they had not received full
autonomy of Slovakia. Father Hlinka was in favor of complete autonomy;
he was venerated in Slovakia as a saint, and at least three-quarters of
the Slovakian people were behind him; he advocated independence from the
Parliament in Prague and the adoption of Slovakian as the official
language. After March 1938—to be exact, after September 1938—I met a
few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr. Tiso, Dr. Churchansky, and perhaps
one or two others. The Führer himself once asked me to inform him and to
send him a report on Slovakian conditions; and I commissioned two of my
colleagues, who had very good personal connections in Slovakia, to
obtain the desired information. In March 1939 I talked to Sidor and Dr.
Tiso, because they wanted to confer with me on possible Berlin-Prague
developments and their consequences for Slovakia; at least, so I was
told by my colleagues who had invited me. Mention was made in these
discussions of the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash and of the
concern for the integrity of Slovakia, because there was the danger that
the Hungarians, and the Poles too, might take advantage of the occasion
by occupying Slovakian territory. The Slovakian gentlemen wanted
assurances on what Berlin intended to do and what they could do to
preserve the integrity of their country. I spoke very openly with these
gentlemen; but I did not ask them to declare their independence, for
they themselves had to make that decision. We discussed rather the
question of whether differences between Slovakian and German interests
existed, and we established that they did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to two
documents. One is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-71, Page 181. This is
the reference to the Pittsburgh Treaty. The second document is Exhibit
Number Seyss-Inquart-72 (Document Number D-751), Page 183, submitted by
the Prosecution as Exhibit Number USA-112, as proof that the defendant
was in unlawful contact with the Slovakians.
You are, of course, acquainted with this document, Witness. It is a
report of Viscount Halifax, of 21 March 1939. Who was in Bratislava with
you at that time? Or were you there at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: State Secretary Keppler was at that time sent from Berlin
to Vienna with the task of putting certain questions to the Slovakian
Government. Both Bürckel and I had refused to take over such an
assignment; that was one of the few instances in which I agreed with
Bürckel. As chief of territorial administration it fell to me to make
preparations for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State
Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Bürckel and I
accompanied Keppler. No generals or other representatives of the
Wehrmacht were present. The record of the conversations may be
considered accurate.
DR. STEINBAUER: It says in the document “and five German generals.”
SEYSS-INQUART: That is wrong.
I should like to call the Court’s attention to the fact that both the
Slovakian Minister Sidor and Monsignor Tiso, who later became President,
declare in this document that they negotiated only with Bürckel; the
name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then, to sum up, can I say that you did not engage in
the activity with which the Prosecution charge you in connection with
Czechoslovakia or Slovakia? Is that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I do not think that, in pursuing the
interests of the Reich, I overstepped those limits which in such
negotiations must be conceded to someone charged with representing
legitimate interests. I did not participate when on 12 March Dr. Tiso
through Bürckel—I did not overstep the limits justified in representing
legitimate interests of the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
Then in 1939, on 1 May 1939, you became Minister without Portfolio. Is
that correct?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you ever take part in a Cabinet session, or a
session of the Secret Defense Council?
SEYSS-INQUART: It no longer existed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have influence in any way on the decision to
make war on Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way whatever.
DR. STEINBAUER: When the war with Poland had actually begun, did you
express your opinion on it to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the second week of September I wrote a letter to
Hitler. I hope that this letter too is among my Vienna files. I read a
copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents
well. I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that among the German
people there was no enthusiasm at all; but, on the contrary, the gravest
concern that it would be a life-and-death struggle. I expressed my
opinion that the war would not end by a military solution but would have
to be solved politically and that the basis for such a political
solution would be the alliance with the Soviets, which should perhaps be
extended to a military alliance. Consideration should be given to the
fact that the Soviets, like Czarist Russia, would never abandon their
interests in the Balkans and that Pan-Slavism would also play a role;
consequently, Russia would have to be reckoned with in the
Czechoslovakian and Polish questions. I said that it was necessary at
all costs to maintain the belt of neutral states. Then the war on the
narrow Western Front would run its course. The Italian policy, however,
should not become a burden for Germany; but an agreement should be
reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated through
the air or by U-boats; one had to attack her position in the
Mediterranean to force her to make peace.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive an answer to this letter from the
Führer?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received no direct answer, but once in a conversation
he made a remark which showed clearly that he had read the letter. He
said to me, “I do not want to destroy the British Empire at all,”
whereby, however, he implied that he had misunderstood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, if the Tribunal agree, I think this would
be a suitable time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. STEINBAUER: We last spoke about your attitude with regard to the
question of Czechoslovakia. You talked about your position as Reich
Governor in Vienna, and described your intolerable relations with
Bürckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to
Poland. What were your functions in Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I was appointed administrative chief for
Southern Poland, which position actually came within the organization of
the Armed Forces. This administrative post, however, was never set up,
since the Government General was created forthwith and I became the
Deputy of the Governor General. My sphere of influence was legally
defined but depended, of course, upon the different cases in which the
Governor General needed me as his deputy. On 19 January 1940, he
determined this at a conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document
Seyss-Inquart-73, on Page 185, which is an extract from Dr. Frank’s
diary. On Page 14 of this diary he describes the functions of
Seyss-Inquart, and then on Page 30 he says something which he repeated
to me in person, namely, that he bore the responsibility for what
happened there.
Now, you became the deputy of the Governor General—although by rank as
a Reich Minister you were actually placed higher—and you exercised
certain functions there which, as we have heard, consisted primarily of
making out reports. Under Document Number 2278-PS is a report which you
yourself wrote, in which there are certain things for which you are
accused. Will you please tell us what you have to say about this report
on your official travels.
SEYSS-INQUART: My secretary wrote that report. I have read it, of
course.
DR. STEINBAUER: It is Exhibit USA-706.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is brought against me, among other things, that the
Governor of Lublin had suggested that the Jews be transferred from
Lublin to the district of Cycow and then decimated. The Prosecution
itself has stated that this is an insertion made by the writer. In any
case this was not an official report at a meeting.
Cycow itself was a settlement occupied by a group of Germans, and by
employing Jews in that area I could hardly be suspected of wanting to
exterminate the Jews in that district because of the climatic
conditions. I knew, however, that it was the Governor’s wish to have the
very large Jewish population of Lublin removed from the town. I remember
nothing of any specific intention expressed by the word “decimating”—in
the sense of annihilating. The Governor of Radom reported to me that
desperate criminals there had been shot. It is true, he did tell me
that. I was under the impression that this had been done by the summary
courts martial, which still functioned at the time. But there are
several passages in this same report where I always point out that
German courts must be introduced, and that no sentence must be carried
out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I said
the same thing at the time I was at Radom—only this is not mentioned in
the report.
I have been accused of wanting to monopolize certain vital products,
such as salt, _et cetera_. That was quite natural, considering the
economic chaos in which we found Poland. We had to arrive at a “natural”
economic system, and supply the agricultural population with certain
products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town
populations. In this connection I wish to point out that I urged the
re-establishment of the Polish National Relief Organization under the
former Polish management, and that I asked for 9 million zloty to be
placed at its disposal also for motor vehicles, _et cetera_. In addition
to this I said that compulsory work must be replaced by normal
employment as soon as possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the so-called “AB Action” plays a considerable
part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for “extraordinary
pacification action.” Since that might still have happened in your time,
I should like to ask if you know anything about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: This affair took place during the very last period of my
stay in Poland. With the beginning of the Norwegian campaign the
resistance movement in Poland became extremely active, and grew as a
result of the campaign in the West. The Security Police demanded the
severest countermeasures. Bühler really made the objection which he
stated here on this witness stand. I always understood the Governor
General’s words just as Bühler wanted them to be understood. But Bühler
was quite right in making the objection, because the Police might have
interpreted these words as giving them much greater powers than the
Governor General intended to give them.
Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these summary courts
martial, and he set up his own investigation commission. I was the
chairman of this commission as long as I was in Poland, and sometimes we
canceled as many as 50 percent of the sentences imposed.
DR. STEINBAUER: How long were you actually Deputy during your period of
office, when Dr. Frank was prevented from carrying out his duties?
SEYSS-INQUART: Ten days, I believe.
DR. STEINBAUER: Ten days. Well, then, I think I can rapidly wind up the
Polish question by asking: Did you introduce any measures which could
really be said to be in the interests of the Polish population?
SEYSS-INQUART: During the winter of 1939-40 there was a famine in Polish
towns. I myself intervened with State Secretary Backe, and on one
occasion, for instance, I obtained 6,000 tons of grain for the large
cities. I approached Reich Marshal Göring and the Führer too, and asked
for the town of Lodz to be left under the administration of the
Government General. I did the same for the coal district west of Kraków.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the main part of the accusation held
against you, and that is the question of your activities in the
Netherlands.
My first question is this: How did you become Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Führer appointed me.
DR. STEINBAUER: And where were you at the time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was on a service mission in the Government General, and
Dr. Lammers called me to headquarters.
DR. STEINBAUER: So you did not apply for this job?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that did not even enter my mind. At that time I had
just asked the Führer for permission to join the Armed Forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: But did not your war injury prevent your joining the
Armed Forces?
SEYSS-INQUART: I had hoped that I might be useful somehow or other.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what were the instructions the Führer gave you with
regard to your new position?
SEYSS-INQUART: The instructions are described in Document 997-PS, which
was submitted by the Prosecution. That gives a fair picture of them.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is Exhibit RF-122.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was responsible for the civil administration, and,
within this administrative task, I had to look after the interests of
the Reich. Apart from this I had a political task. I was to see to it
that while Dutch independence was maintained, the Netherlands should be
persuaded to change their pro-British attitude for a pro-German one and
enter into a close economic collaboration.
I wish to draw your attention to Paragraph 3 of this document, in which
I pointed out the difficulties connected with these two tasks, and the
difficulties in co-ordinating them. I showed that one cannot co-ordinate
the two so easily. An occupational power, I said, demands the
suppression of all official activities and an awakening of a common
political will, but grants such freedom which in the end may lead the
Dutch to feel dependent on their own decisions. It was not my intention,
therefore, to force upon the Dutch people any definite political will.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was this order of the Führer ever altered later on?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, this order was never altered.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you carry out this task from the political point
of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to co-operate?
SEYSS-INQUART: With the exception of the Marxists I allowed all parties
to remain, and I gave them as much freedom to continue their activities
as was compatible with the interests of the occupying forces. I
particularly helped the National Socialist parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: The Prosecution make the accusation against you that in
your speeches you often describe things quite differently from the way
in which you carry them out. In this regard I refer to Document 3430-PS,
Exhibit USA-708.
It is asserted there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the
Dutch. That is Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-76, on Page 197 of my document
book.
SEYSS-INQUART: It is certainly correct that the goal which I had set for
myself, and which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not reached in
practice, nor could it have been. However, it may be possible that it
gave the Dutch the impression that I was trying to force National
Socialism upon them because, after all, later on I could admit only
National Socialist parties, whereas I had to dissolve the others. I
never used state methods of coercion to force any Dutchman to become a
National Socialist, nor did I make membership in the National Socialist
Party a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges to
which every Dutchman was entitled.
Incidentally, I referred to this quite clearly in my speech. I said:
“I shall always act as a National Socialist.... But that does
not mean that I shall force National Socialism on one single
person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction.
“There are two groups of organizations. There is the political,
in the case of which I attach importance to the demand that each
and every member be led to National Socialism—but these are
absolutely voluntary organizations.... Then there is the
vocational.... in which it is immaterial what political views
the individual has, as long as he fulfills his duties in his
particular profession.”
DR. STEINBAUER: Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in
Holland?
SEYSS-INQUART: That happened during the second half of 1941. With the
beginning of the Eastern campaign all the political parties, with the
exception of the National Socialists, adopted an actively hostile
attitude toward the occupational forces. In the interests of the
occupational forces that could no longer be tolerated.
I think it remarkable, to say the least, that for 1½ years I allowed
those parties to continue their work since, after all, they were no less
hostile to National Socialism than National Socialism is today with
regard to the democratic parties.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, is it true or not that you showed partiality,
and gave preference to the NSB Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true as far as the field of political
propaganda was concerned; it is untrue as far as state matters were
concerned.
The creation of a so-called National Political Secretariat has been held
up as an accusation against me. That was a National Socialist advisory
body for my administration, and it was not allowed to exercise any
influence on the Dutch administration. Any such attempts were strictly
prohibited by me.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not, nevertheless, put individual members of the
NSB into state positions?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, and it seemed a matter of course to me,
because I had to find colleagues on whom I could rely. They were not
under Party orders, however; on the contrary, in most cases certain
differences developed between these people and the heads of the Party.
In the face of urgent remonstrances I did not create a National
Socialist government in the Netherlands—as was the case in Norway—and
chiefly because Certain Dutch gentlemen like General Secretary Van Damm,
President Van Lohn of the Supreme Court, and Professor Schneider who was
President of the Cultural Committee, urged me to realize how wrong it
would be to do so.
DR. STEINBAUER: President Vorrink, a witness who has been examined here,
talked about a policy of exploitation which you carried on. Is that
true?
SEYSS-INQUART: The use of the National Socialist parties for the benefit
of German policy did actually occur. I observed it, and I stated the
fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The
German occupational forces had to introduce a number of measures which
were oppressive for the Dutch people, and which discredited our Dutch
friends.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you have to say to the accusation brought
against you that you had co-ordinated all the cultural institutions?
SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in
part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the
organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right
down to the chessplayers’ club everything in the Netherlands was
organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational
forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack
of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very
similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations
only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate
politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a
profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon
compulsory collection of membership fees.
I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of
all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as
occupational authorities was necessarily the right one—at least the
better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent
political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed.
DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up?
SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a
medical association (Ärztekammer), a chemists’ association
(Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there
was a workers’ front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members
could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they
wished.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of
“Germanization.” What do you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In
English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean
German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not
mean “making them into Germans”; We meant a political and cultural union
of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we
did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-103:
“Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?”
Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments
of tension...
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been
translated. But the entire book has been presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit
USA-708. It is a book entitled _Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden_, and it
contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which
have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to
them.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any
dividing line between what is important to the military war effort and
something which is private and a matter for civilians.
I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used
for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to
exercise control over them.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the
Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an
alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the
Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no
particular influence of its own.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the
administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the
Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner;
on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces,
and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had
special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive
powers was transferred to him.
The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher
SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the
Führer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the
right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would
investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions
which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and
the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year
Plan.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was
Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab too—and Speer, to complete the picture?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there
were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive
organ for the superior Reich offices?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the
responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the
first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored
me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own
hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not
previously given my consent. The Führer acknowledged this quite plainly
on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any
conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am
completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the
Government General the same centralization did not exist.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an
administration?
SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made
by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the
Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation
with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed
to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more,
then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943
all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave
my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period.
Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch
authorities to supply them.
DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment,
which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler...
SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the
Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a
new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of
the country myself. I decided on the second solution.
DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force?
SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent
on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of
course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the
Higher SS and Police Leader as well—that is, in the capacity as my
Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into
three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were
acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated
them as regards organization.
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the
Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror
attacks on National Socialists—some very cruel murders. There was the
danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in
fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this
Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined
auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and
guard railways, _et cetera_. The result was that these acts of terror
ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further
difficulties arose.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important
chapter.
SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the
Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is
quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are
actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not
quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So
they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by
tomorrow morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t it got a PS number, or any other designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only
quoted individual passages from it.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167.
On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would
bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution
believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it.
That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned
only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their
own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not
get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it
really was a restriction for the Dutch.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and
possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts
entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a
commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it.
The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation.
For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had
killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market,
were fined 200 guilders; so I installed special economic judges,
Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But
the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced
our German courts, as every occupational power does.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans
staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of
the German occupational forces.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these
courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the
death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the
German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add
to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the
executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and
Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases
in 4 years—that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on
the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards.
DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you
had a special reprieve department?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document
Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit
of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and
reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two
paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on
Page 3:
“In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner
proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most
sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially
calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between
the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he
himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of
case reports which were submitted to him together with a
suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After
about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to
reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the
Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the
following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision
in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental
questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent...
“No sentence of death was carried out without there being an
official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a
formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted.”
Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph:
“Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved
that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually
delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch
Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in
... I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo
whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I
would collect material and use it to take action in order to
bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment.
And I was actually successful with such action. This was proof
to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police
methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal
procedure.”
I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come
to the question of finance.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Führer’s order excluding courts is also very
important.
DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive.
After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary court-martial
procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court
procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the
legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to
special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be
there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch;
thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the
question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be
transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure
was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May
1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these
summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special
emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war.
In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Führer which had
already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed
Forces. I refer to 1155-PS—no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong—it is
Document 835-PS.
On 30 July 1944 the Führer ordered that all non-German civilians in
occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were
to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I
both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging
effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an
order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations.
During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never
carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from
Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who
had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge
them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary.
One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I
do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I
urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order,
but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the
impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police
affair, which was directly...
SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or
influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to
check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize
that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such
a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself
being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from
safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the
Führer decree had been issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has
been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation.
Who was this gentleman?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the
Netherlands—that is to say, the bank of issue—and he was also the
General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one
of the world’s leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality
and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot.
DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for
Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I
would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to
his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could
not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that
all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he
remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he
resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did
this without the slightest disadvantage to himself.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor?
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until
March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he
most certainly would not have done it.
His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a
League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks
similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr.
Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million guilders a month. Then there
was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3
years I saved 60 million guilders, which remained in the Netherlands as
a special bequest.
As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no
authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the
Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at
their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation
costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were
incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the
cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million
marks per month were demanded—partly in gold. Later this contribution
was designated as voluntary assistance for the East...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders?
SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was
called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of
course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be
increased to 100 millions, but I refused.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance
because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time
between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my
administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges
between the Reich and the Netherlands—to lift the foreign currency
embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issue, guilders
could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental
possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr.
Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to
say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I
passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried
out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President
of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree.
I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was
against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time
the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they
did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and
the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected
that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that
thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In
February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands
were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich
Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that
in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted
to some 4½ billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General
Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischböck, who suggested this matter contrary
to the wishes of Trip.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischböck
alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but
it was he who put the matter to me.
DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective
penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law.
SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law
only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18
million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in
Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took
part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered
that definite individuals were responsible for the offense.
DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that.
It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened.
DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of
responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel.
What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what
happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage
camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only
when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The
camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of
the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent
family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever
shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St.
Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder
them from continuing their anti-German activities.
DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the
reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and
Lutheran ministers in concentration camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which
may happen in times of occupation—because it publicly opposed the
measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience.
That was an isolated case, and it never happened again—for the good
reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the
pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the
prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a
criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and
there was no incitement to resistance.
I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at
the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I
finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the
priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of
them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the
concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought
out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second
third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was
only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for
me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the
Reich.
Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the
Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were
put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest
of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to
Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality was high, I made such urgent
appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then
accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison.
They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I
had less than 100.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in
church, and especially prayers for the Queen.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were
obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made—as was quite natural—for the
Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the
fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the
Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for
tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these
prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a
subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always
suppressed.
DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you
were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without
legal proceedings. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of
hostages being shot—that is, people were shot without there being any
causal connection with a crime. This occurred in August 1942, and the
case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according
to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in
connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages
were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who
made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High
Command of the Army.
My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking
over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and
which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something
peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly
emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the
directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist
circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers
could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the
Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers
with several children.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people
who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated?
SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through
Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order
in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at
Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader
informed me generally that the most seriously charged political
prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that
the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and
that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch
police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I
heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is
that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported
into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe
there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said
there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after
the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter?
SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from
the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons.
DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement.
DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact...
SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be
shot. Rauter’s deputy Dr. Schöngarth refused, and informed me that there
were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in
accordance with the Führer’s order, because they had been convicted of
other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was
somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not
give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion,
prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the
resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and
supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a
serious danger to the German occupational forces.
Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot—amongst them
80 in Apeldoorn alone—and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schöngarth
told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal
resistance movement.
DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about
the Putten case?
SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three
were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the
SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I
myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses.
The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the
order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population
to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure
to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high
mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to
the military commander to have these men returned. The military
commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not
know.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a
short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the
question of the embargo on foreign currencies.
The Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has just informed me, during the
recess, that in this conflict, Fischböck, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one
hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Göring,
as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on
foreign currencies. And he writes me here, “I bear the responsibility.”
So it was a decision which was taken by Göring.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in
which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of
the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.
DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn’t make it any better. You may ask
the witness any question about it.
DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court
sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit
Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by
Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3:
“In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen
demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed.
Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter,
who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part
applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr.
Schöngarth)...”
He reports further on Page 5:
“It was often a question of prisoners who had already been
sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
“Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police.
After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the
Führer’s, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a
way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and
attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely
different reasons.”
SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly?
DR. STEINBAUER: Please do.
SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement
were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it
was decided that they should be shot according to the Führer’s orders.
The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for
this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made,
instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the
exact opposite of the shooting of hostages—or at least, it was supposed
to be.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, “Concentration Camps and
Prisons.” My first question: Who was competent in these matters?
SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons,
the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court
authorities, I myself was competent—that is, the court prisons were
under my charge.
DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near
Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a
Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St.
Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might
be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a
concentration camp, but abuses occurred there.
DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly
camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands.
But Reichsführer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a
concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this
idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen
from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in
concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to
exert a certain influence.
DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these
concentration camps, too—for example, especially in the Vught Camp,
which you mentioned.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as
well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost
unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it
cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I
took steps—the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the
president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been
brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case
investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and
was sent back to the Reich.
In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a
high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using
the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every
week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to
what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether
the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or
whether he included the cases of shooting—I could not say.
In this camp there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling;
brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was
removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police
Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was
not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl.
There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is
described under the title, “Women in Cell.” The head of the camp,
allegedly for disciplinary reasons, had a large number of women crowded
into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to
death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central
Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS
Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and
received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is
indicated, moreover, in the French report.
DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp—that is, for police
prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be
sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being
sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or
8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp—not Dutch Police, but a
voluntary SS guard company, I believe.
Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention
to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death
there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to
light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to
me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one
was killed, and the persons responsible were punished.
I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to
the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually
favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a
severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called
his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not
occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth.
In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the
concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were
satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and
prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in
the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much
importance to this fact, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp.
SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a
completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was
enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were
Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the
outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision
in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the
camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one
clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians.
They, too, never reported anything.
DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on.
Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who
voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern
Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and
their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a
neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that
these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to
me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally
inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to
Document F-224(d), on 5 March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote
a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained
about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about
the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich
for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that
the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal
institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to
Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily
took due steps to settle the matter.
DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and
confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed
judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden.
SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was
incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a
verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration
camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was
false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam
judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked
them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them
as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried
by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about
conditions in the camps?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a
representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all
concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying
whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem
nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me.
I should like to say that this circumstance was especially gratifying
for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a
change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me.
I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to
the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in
concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in all of
Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my
setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the
prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners
could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there
were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle
with the Police on this question?
SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite
facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and—we have
heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems
to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every
excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do
not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There
is only a single report here—that is Document F-677, the report of the
tax collector Bruder—which attains the level of the usual atrocity
reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its
face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the
information itself is not credible. He asserts, for example, that the
prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS
guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted
that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work.
It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the
Netherlands were quite as bad as all that.
DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to
Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor
commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field
of labor commitment?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish
between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the
Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed,
those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and
naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent
problem—not only a social one—for me to reduce the number of
unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is
without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the
second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the
material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse.
At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges,
call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of
1942—that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the
German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to
work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I
believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was
carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the
Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German
inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring
agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the
whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the
period which I call “voluntary,” 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to
the Reich and about 40,000 to France.
By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich
demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor
service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from
Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Führer order. Now, labor
commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following
way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to
the labor office, where they received certificates of conscription for
work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused.
Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and
taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that
this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts,
and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent,
or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory
measures in the Reich was no lower—or higher.
At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of
workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the
Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received
free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I
decided to draft three young age groups—I believe 21 to 23 years of
age—in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the
first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it
was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by
sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to
Minister Speer’s understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken
to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders
arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling
these orders were declared “blocked” industries. Among them was the
Organization Todt.
Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a
million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities.
It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take
steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the
Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has
confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Führer
order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He
also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to
me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my
arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the
forced recruitment. By “forced recruitment,” I mean blocking off whole
districts and seizing the men.
In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely.
Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But
something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From
experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army
decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland—that
is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government
in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter
in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War
Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If
an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal
forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland.
Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full
shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am
convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated.
The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered
the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely
carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very
purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his
own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local
authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the
last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the
measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of
protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to
protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital
industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the
Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had
sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption
certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler?
SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort.
I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for
the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and
transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not
live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the
Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be
willing to agree to this labor commitment—by no means in order to aid
the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions—if
they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The
Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation
which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the
labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and
ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor
officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal
conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact.
It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized
for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons
which I have given.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my
Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200,
excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement
of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is
important. Page 2:
“...workers who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the
Security Service.”
Then, Page 3:
“...apart from that, the measure was not very successful.
Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution,
because many former members of the armed forces received
exemption; others went underground....
“The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the
greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported....”
And then, Page 6:
“...until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for
deportees was bearable....
“Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January
1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities—that is,
almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight
cars....”
SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time.
I should like to refer to the fact that I also drafted Dutch workers in
order to carry out the construction work entrusted to me by the Führer
on the resistance lines east of the Ijssel. I used part of the
transports which came from Rotterdam, _et cetera_, for this purpose, and
thus I prevented these people from being sent to the Reich. I had no
influence on the treatment in the Reich; I only forbade further
transports into the Gau Essen, because it was reported to me that in the
Rees Camp the treatment was very poor, and that some Dutch people had
died.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next count of the Indictment—that is,
to the Jewish question. The Netherlands Government report, Exhibit
USA-195, sums up all ordinances submitted by the Prosecution. I should
like to submit this Document 1726-PS to my client, so that it may remind
him of the laws. The Court already has it.
[_Turning to the defendant._] What did you, as Reich Commissioner, do
about the Jewish question?
SEYSS-INQUART: When I took over the functions of the Reich Commissioner,
I of course realized that I had to take a definite attitude, and would
have to take some steps with regard to the Jews in the Netherlands.
Amsterdam, in western Europe, is perhaps one of the best known and one
of the oldest seats of Jewish communities in western Europe. Moreover,
in the Netherlands there were a great many German Jewish emigrants.
I will say quite openly that since the first World War and the postwar
period, I was an anti-Semite and went to Holland as such. I need not go
into detail about that here. I have said all that in my speeches, and
would refer you to them. I had the impression, which will be confirmed
everywhere, that the Jews, of course, had to be against National
Socialist Germany. There was no discussion of the question of guilt as
far as I was concerned. As head of an occupied territory I had only to
deal with the facts. I had to realize that, particularly from the Jewish
circles, I had to reckon with resistance, defeatism, and so on.
I told Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
that in the Netherlands I would remove Jews from leading posts in the
economy, the press, and the administration. The measures taken by me
from May 1940 to March 1941 were limited to that. The Jewish officials
were dismissed, but were given pensions. The Jewish firms were
registered, and the heads of the firms were dismissed. In the spring of
1941 Heydrich came to me in the Netherlands. He told me that we would
have to expect that the greatest resistance would come from Jewish
circles. He told me that the Jews would at least have to be treated like
other enemy aliens. The English, for instance, in the Netherlands, were
interned and their property confiscated. In view of the large number of
Jews—about 140,000—this was not so simple. I admit frankly that I did
not object to this argument of Heydrich’s. I also felt that this was
necessary in a war which I absolutely considered a life and death
struggle for the German people. For that reason, in March 1941 I ordered
that the Jews in the Netherlands be registered. And then things went on
step by step.
I will not say that the final results—as far as the Netherlands are
concerned—were intended thus from the beginning; but we decided on this
method. The regulations cited here, if they appeared in the Dutch Legal
Gazette, were mostly signed by me personally. At least, they were
published with my express assent. Individual measures mentioned here,
however, were not by me. For example, in February 1,000 Jews were
supposed to have been arrested and sent to Buchenwald and Mauthausen.
That much I know. In the Amsterdam ghetto...
THE PRESIDENT: February of what year?
SEYSS-INQUART: February 1941. In the Amsterdam ghetto, a National
Socialist was killed by Jews. Reichsführer Himmler thereupon ordered 400
young Jews sent to Mauthausen. I was not in the Netherlands at that
time. That was, by the way, the reason for the general strike in
Amsterdam in March 1941. After my return to the Netherlands, I protested
against this measure, and to my knowledge such a mass transfer to
Mauthausen did not occur again. Synagogues were also burned. Apparently
someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8 November 1938. I immediately
intervened. Further incidents did not occur. On the other hand, the
Police wanted to tear down the old temple in Amsterdam. General
Secretary Van Damm called this to my attention, and I prevented it.
I indicated earlier that the motive for the measures is to be found in
the consideration to treat Jews like enemy aliens. Later, with other
measures, the original intention was certainly abandoned; they became
the same as those taken against the Jews in the Reich. Perhaps, in one
case or another, this was even exceeded, for I know that, for example,
in the Netherlands there was a drive to get the Jews sterilized.
Our goal was to keep the Jews in the Netherlands—namely, in two
districts of Amsterdam and then in the Westerborg Camp and in the Vught
Camp. We had also prepared to create the necessary opportunities for
work. I instructed the General Secretary for Education to withdraw as
much money from the Dutch budget for the education of the Jews as they
should have according to their proportion of the population. It is
certain that with this measure of concentrating the Jews in two
districts and two camps, harshness occurred which was perhaps
unavoidable, and which might even in some cases be considered as
excessive.
Finally, the Security Police demanded the introduction of the so-called
Jewish Star. A not inconsiderable number of Jews were not in the
confined areas, and the Security Police demanded that they be marked in
order that it might be ascertained whether the Jews adhered to the other
restrictions. In the eyes of Germans, this star was certainly considered
a stigma. The Dutch did not consider it as such. There was many a
Dutchman who, out of protest, wore such a star himself.
About 1942, I believe, Heydrich came along with further demands—this
time that the Jews be evacuated. He explained this by saying that
Holland would sooner or later be a theater of war, in which one could
not allow such a hostile population to remain. He pointed out that he
was responsible for the police security of the Reich, and that he could
not bear this responsibility if the Jews remained in Holland. I believe
that we in the Netherlands opposed this evacuation project for 3 or 4
months while attempting to find other ways out.
Finally, Heydrich had a Führer decree sent to me, according to which he
had unlimited powers to carry out all measures in the occupied
territories as well. I inquired of Bormann what this meant, and this
order was confirmed, whereupon the evacuation of the Jews was begun. At
that time I tried to ascertain the fate of the Jews, and it is rather
difficult for me to speak about it now because it sounds like mockery. I
was told that the Jews were to be sent to Auschwitz. I had people sent
from the Netherlands to Auschwitz. They came back with the report that
that was a camp for 80,000 people with sufficient space. The people were
comparatively well off there. For example, they had an orchestra of 100
men. A witness here, confirming that this orchestra played when victims
arrived at Auschwitz, made me think of that report.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, you probably won’t finish today.
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are likely to be?
DR. STEINBAUER: I hope to be finished, at the latest, by noon tomorrow,
but perhaps it will take only an hour. I still have questions on
plundering, economic measures, and destruction. Then I will be finished.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in
the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 15_, by Various.]
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