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Title: History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4 of 6
Author: Napier, William Francis Patrick
Language: English
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PENINSULA AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR
1814, VOL. 4 OF 6 ***
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Volume 1 of this series can be found at
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Volume 3 of this series can be found at
HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.
BY
W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.
_COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH_
_ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES._
VOL. IV.
LONDON:
THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.
MDCCCXXXIV.
LONDON:
MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK XIII.
CHAP. I.
Lord Wellington’s sieges vindicated—Operations in
Spain—State of Gallicia—Change of commanders—Bonet’s
operations in the Asturias—Activity of the Partidas—Their
system of operations—Mina captures a large convoy at
Arlaban—Bessieres contracts his position—Bonet abandons the
Asturias—Santocildes advances into Leon—French dismantle
Astorga—Skirmish on the Orvigo—General inefficiency of
the Gallicians and Asturians—Operations in the eastern
provinces—State of Aragon—State of Catalonia—State of
Valencia—Suchet marches against Tortoza—Fails to burn the
boat-bridge there—M‘Donald remains at Gerona—The Valencians
and Catalonians combine operations against Suchet—O’Donnel
enters Tortoza—Makes a sally and is repulsed—The
Valencians defeated near Uldecona—Operations of the seventh
corps—M‘Donald reforms the discipline of the troops—Marches
with a convoy to Barcelona—Returns to Gerona and dismantles
the outworks of that place—O’Donnel’s plans—M‘Donald
marches with a second convoy—Reaches Barcelona and returns
to Gerona—Marches with a third convoy—Forces the pass of
Ordal—Enters Reus and opens the communications with Suchet 1
CHAP. II.
O’Donnel withdraws his troops from Falcet and surrounds the
seventh corps—M‘Donald retires to Lerida—Arranges a new
plan with Suchet—Ravages the plains of Urgel and the higher
valleys—The people become desperate—O’Donnel cuts the
French communication with the Ampurdan—Makes a forced march
towards Gerona—Surprises Swartz at Abispal—Takes Filieu
and Palamos—Is wounded and returns to Taragona—Campo Verde
marches to the Cerdaña—M‘Donald enters Solsona—Campo Verde
returns—Combat of Cardona—The French retreat to Guisona,
and the seventh corps returns to Gerona—M‘Donald marches
with a fourth convoy to Barcelona—Makes new roads—Advances
to Reus—The Spaniards harass his flanks—He forages the
Garriga district and joins the third corps—Operations of
Suchet—General Laval dies—Operations of the Partidas—Plan
of the secret junta to starve Aragon—General Chlopiski
defeats Villa Campa—Suchet’s difficulties—He assembles
the notables of Aragon and reorganizes that province—He
defeats and takes general Navarro at Falcet—Bassecour’s
operations—He is defeated at Uldecona 19
CHAP. III.
Tortoza—Its governor feeble—The Spaniards outside
disputing and negligent—Captain Fane lands at Palamos—Is
taken—O’Donnel resigns and is succeeded by Campo
Verde—Description of Tortoza—It is invested—A division of
the seventh corps placed under Suchet’s command—Siege of
Tortoza—The place negotiates—Suchet’s daring conduct—The
governor surrenders—Suchet’s activity—Habert takes the
fort of Balaguer—M‘Donald moves to Reus—Sarsfield defeats
and kills Ugenio—M‘Donald marches to Lerida—Suchet goes to
Zaragoza—The confidence of the Catalans revives—The manner
in which the belligerents obtained provisions explained—The
Catalans attack Perillo, and Campo Verde endeavours to
surprise Monjuic, but is defeated with great loss—Napoleon
changes the organisation of the third and seventh Corps—The
former becomes the army of Aragon—The latter the army of
Catalonia 36
CHAP. IV.
Suchet prepares to besiege Taragona—The power of the
Partidas described—Their actions—They are dispersed on the
frontier of Aragon—The Valencians fortify Saguntum—Are
defeated a second time at Uldecona—Suchet comes to
Lerida—M‘Donald passes with an escort from them to
Barcelona—His troops burn Manresa—Sarsfield harasses his
march—Napoleon divides the invasion of Catalonia into two
parts—Sinking state of the province—Rovira surprises Fort
Fernando de Figueres—Operations which follow that event 52
CHAP. V.
Suchet’s skilful conduct—His error about English
finance—Outline of his arrangements for the siege of
Taragona—He makes French contracts for the supply of
his army—Forages the high valleys and the frontiers of
Castile and Valencia—Marches to Taragona—Description of
that place—Campo Verde enters the place—Suchet invests
it—Convention relative to the sick concluded between St.
Cyr and Reding faithfully observed—Sarsfield comes to
Momblanch—Skirmish with the Valencians at Amposta and
Rapita—Siege of Taragona—Rapita and Momblanch abandoned
by Suchet—Taragona reinforced from Valencia—The Olivo
stormed—Campo Verde quits Taragona, and Senens de Contreras
assumes the chief command—Sarsfield enters the place
and takes charge of the Port or lower town—French break
ground before the lower town—The Francoli stormed—Campo
Verde’s plans to succour the place—General Abbé is called
to the siege—Sarsfield quits the place—The lower town is
stormed—The upper town attacked—Suchet’s difficulties
increase—Campo Verde comes to the succour of the place, but
retires without effecting any thing—Colonel Skerrett arrives
in the harbour with a British force—Does not land—Gallant
conduct of the Italian soldier Bianchini—The upper town is
stormed with dreadful slaughter 70
CHAP. VI.
Suchet marches against Campo Verde—Seizes Villa Nueva de
Sitjes and makes fifteen hundred prisoners—Campo Verde
retires to Igualada—Suchet goes to Barcelona—A council
of war held at Cervera by Campo Verde—It is resolved
to abandon the province as a lost country—Confusion
ensues—Lacy arrives and assumes the command—Eroles
throws himself into Montserrat—Suchet sends detachments
to the valley of Congosta and that of Vich, and opens
the communication with M‘Donald at Figueras—Returns to
Reus—Created a marshal—Destroys the works of the lower
town of Taragona—Takes Montserrat—Negotiates with
Cuesta for an exchange of the French prisoners in the
island of Cabrera—Stopped by the interference of Mr.
Wellesley—Mischief occasioned by the privateers—Lacy
reorganizes the province—Suchet returns to Zaragoza, and
chases the Partidas from the frontier of Aragon—Habert
defeats the Valencians at Amposta—The Somatenes harass
the French forts near Montserrat—Figueras surrenders to
M‘Donald—Napoleon’s clemency—Observations—Operations in
Valencia and Murcia 100
BOOK XIV.
CHAP. I.
State of political affairs—Situation of king Joseph—His
disputes with Napoleon—He resigns his crown and quits
Spain—The emperor grants him new terms and obliges him to
return—Political state of France as regards the war 120
CHAP. II.
Political state of England with reference to the
war—Retrospective view of affairs—Enormous subsidies
granted to Spain—The arrogance and rapacity of the juntas
encouraged by Mr. Canning—His strange proceedings—Mr.
Stuart’s abilities and true judgment of affairs shewn—He
proceeds to Vienna—State of politics in Germany—He is
recalled—The misfortunes of the Spaniards principally
owing to Mr. Canning’s incapacity—The evil genius of the
Peninsula—His conduct at Lisbon—Lord Wellesley’s policy
totally different from Mr. Canning’s—Parties in the
cabinet—Lord Wellesley and Mr. Perceval—Character of the
latter—His narrow policy—Letters describing the imbecility
of the cabinet in 1810 and 1811 131
CHAP. III.
Political state of Spain—Disputes amongst the leaders—Sir
J. Moore’s early and just perception of the state of affairs
confirmed by lord Wellington’s experience—Points of interest
affecting England—The reinforcement of the military
force—The claims of the princess Carlotta—The prevention of
a war with Portugal—The question of the colonies—Cisnero’s
conduct at Buenos Ayres—Duke of Infantada demanded by
Mexico—Proceedings of the English ministers—Governor of
Curaçoa—Lord Wellesley proposes a mediation—Mr. Bardaxi’s
strange assertion—Lord Wellington’s judgment on the
question—His discernment, sagacity, and wisdom shewn 146
CHAP. IV.
Political state of Portugal—Mr. Villiers’ mission expensive
and inefficient—Mr. Stuart succeeds him—Finds every thing
in confusion—His efforts to restore order successful at
first—Cortes proposed by lord Wellesley—Opposed by the
regency, by Mr. Stuart, and by lord Wellington—Observations
thereon—Changes in the regency—Its partial and weak
conduct—Lord Strangford’s proceedings at Rio Janeiro only
productive of mischief—Mr. Stuart’s efforts opposed, and
successfully by the Souza faction—Lord Wellington thinks
of abandoning the contest—Writes to the prince regent of
Portugal—The regency continues to embarrass the English
general—Effect of their conduct upon the army—Miserable
state of the country—The British cabinet grants a fresh
subsidy to Portugal—Lord Wellington complains that he is
supplied with only one-sixth of the money necessary to carry
on the contest—Minor follies of the regency—The cause of
Massena’s harshness to the people of Portugal explained—Case
of Mascarheñas—His execution a foul murder—Lord Wellington
reduced to the greatest difficulties—He and Mr. Stuart
devise a plan to supply the army by trading in grain—Lord
Wellington’s embarrassments increase—Reasons why he does not
abandon Portugal—His plan of campaign 161
CHAP. V.
Second English siege of Badajos—Means of the allies very
scanty—Place invested—San Christoval assaulted—The allies
repulsed—Second assault fails likewise—The siege turned
into a blockade—Observations 182
CHAP. VI.
General Spencer’s operations in Beira—Pack blows up
Almeida—Marmont marches by the passes to the Tagus,
and Spencer marches to the Alemtejo—Soult and Marmont
advance to succour Badajos—The siege is raised, and the
allies pass the Guadiana—Lord Wellington’s position on
the Caya described—Skirmish of cavalry in which the
British are defeated—Critical period of the war—French
marshals censured for not giving battle—Lord Wellington’s
firmness—Inactivity of the Spaniards—Blake moves to the
Condado de Niebla—He attacks the castle of Niebla—The
French armies retire from Badajos, and Soult marches to
Andalusia—Succours the castle of Niebla—Blake flies to
Ayamonte—Sails for Cadiz, leaving Ballesteros in the
Condado—French move against him—He embarks his infantry
and sends his cavalry through Portugal to Estremadura—Blake
lands at Almeria and joins the Murcian army—Goes to
Valencia, and during his absence Soult attacks his army—Rout
of Baza—Soult returns to Andalusia—His actions eulogised 195
CHAP. VII.
State of the war in Spain—Marmont ordered to take a central
position in the valley of the Tagus—Constructs forts at
Almaraz—French affairs assume a favourable aspect—Lord
Wellington’s difficulties augment—Remonstrances sent to the
Brazils—System of intelligence described—Lord Wellington
secretly prepares to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches into
Beira, leaving Hill in the Alemtejo—French cavalry take a
convoy of wine, get drunk and lose it again—General Dorsenne
invades Gallicia—Is stopped by the arrival of the allies
on the Agueda—Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Carlos España
commences the formation of a new Spanish army—Preparations
for the siege—Hill sends a brigade to Castello Branco 215
CHAP. VIII.
The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo make some successful
excursions—Morillo operates against the French in
Estremadura, is defeated and driven to Albuquerque—Civil
affairs of Portugal—Bad conduct of the regency—They
imagine the war to be decided, and endeavour to drive lord
Wellington away from Portugal—Indications that Napoleon
would assume the command in the Peninsula observed by lord
Wellington—He expects a combined attack on Lisbon by sea
and land—Marmont and Dorsenne collect convoys and unite
at Tamames—Advance to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—Combat of
Elbodon—Allies retire to Guinaldo—To Aldea Ponte—Combat
of Aldea Ponte—The allies retire to Soita—The French
retire—Observations 229
BOOK XV.
CHAP. I.
State of the war in Spain—Northern provinces—State of
Gallicia—Attempt to introduce English officers into
the Spanish service—Trafficked for by the Spanish
government—Repelled by the Spanish military—The English
government encourage the Partidas—Lord Wellington sends
the chiefs presents—His after opinion of them—Sir H.
Douglas succeeds general Walker—Miserable state of Gallicia
described—Disputes between the civil and military—Anomalous
proceedings of the English government—Gross abuses in
the Spanish army—Expedition against America fitted out
in Gallicia with the English supplies intended for the
defence of the province—Sir H. Douglas’s policy towards
the Partidas criticized—Events in the Asturias—Santander
surprised by Porlier—Reille and Caffarelli scour Biscay and
the Rioja—Bonet invades the Asturias—Defeats Moscoso, Paul
Lodosa, and Mendizabel, and occupies Oviedo—In Gallicia the
people prefer the French to their own armies—In Estremadura,
Drouet joins Girard and menaces Hill—These movements parts
of a great plan to be conducted by Napoleon in person 254
CHAP. II.
Conquest of Valencia—Suchet’s preparations
described—Napoleon’s system eminently methodical—State of
Valencia—Suchet invades that province—Blake concentrates
his force to fight—His advanced guard put to flight by the
French cavalry—He retires to the city of Valencia—Siege
of Saguntum—The French repulsed in an assault—Palombini
defeats Obispo near Segorbe—Harispe defeats C. O’Donnel
at Beneguazil—Oropesa taken—The French batteries open
against Saguntum—Second assault repulsed—Suchet’s
embarrassments—Operations in his rear in Catalonia—Medas
islands taken—Lacy proposes to form a general depôt at
Palamos—Discouraged by sir E. Pellew—The Spaniards
blow up the works of Berga, and fix their chief depôt
at Busa—Description of that place—Lacy surprises the
French in the town of Igualada—Eroles takes a convoy near
Jorbas—The French quit the castle of Igualada and join the
garrison of Montserrat—That place abandoned—Eroles takes
Cervera and Belpuig—Beats the French national guards in
Cerdaña—Invades and ravages the French frontier—Returns
by Ripol and takes post in the pass of Garriga—Milans
occupies Mataro—Sarsfield embarks and sails to the
coast of the Ampurdan—These measures prevent the march
of the French convoy to Barcelona—State of Aragon—The
Empecinado and Duran invade it on one side—Mina invades
it on the other—Calatayud taken—Severoli’s division
reinforces Musnier, and the Partidas are pursued to Daroca
and Molino—Mina enters the Cinco Villas—Defeats eleven
hundred Italians at Ayerbe—Carries his prisoners to
Motrico in Biscay—Mazzuchelli defeats the Empecinado at
Cubiliejos—Blake calls in all his troops and prepares
for a battle—Suchet’s position described—Blake’s
dispositions—Battle of Saguntum—Observations 266
CHAP. III.
Suchet resolves to invest the city of Valencia—Blake
reverts to his former system of acting on the French
rear—Napoleon orders General Reille to reinforce Suchet with
two divisions—Lacy disarms the Catalan Somatenes—Their
ardour diminishes—The French destroy several bands,
blockade the Medas islands, and occupy Mataro—Several
towns affected to the French interest—Bad conduct of the
privateers—Lacy encourages assassination—Suchet advances to
the Guadalaviar—Spanish defences described—The French force
the passage of the river—Battle of Valencia—Mahi flies
to Alcira—Suchet invests the Spanish camp—Blake attempts
to break out, is repulsed—The camp abandoned—The city is
bombarded—Commotion within the walls—Blake surrenders with
his whole army—Suchet created duke of Albufera—Shameful
conduct of the junta of the province—Montbrun arrives
with three divisions—Summons Alicant, and returns
to Toledo—Villa Campa marches from Carthagena to
Albaracin—Gandia and Denia taken by the French—They besiege
Peniscola—Lacy menaces Taragona—Defeats a French battalion
at Villa Seca—Battle of Altafulla—Siege of Peniscola—The
French army in Valencia weakened by draughts—Suchet’s
conquests cease—Observations 291
CHAP. IV.
Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Description of
Soult’s Position—Events in Estremadura—Ballesteros
arrives at Algesiras—Advances to Alcala de Gazules—Is
driven back—Soult designs to besiege Tarifa—Concludes a
convention with the emperor of Morocco—It is frustrated by
England—Ballesteros cooped up under the guns of Gibraltar by
Sémelé and Godinot—Colonel Skerrett sails for Tarifa—The
French march against Tarifa—Are stopped in the pass of La
Pena by the fire of the British ships—They retire from
San Roque—General Godinot shoots himself—General Hill
surprises general Girard at Aroyo Molino, and returns to the
Alemtejo—French reinforced in Estremadura—Their movements
checked by insubordination amongst the troops—Hill again
advances—Endeavours to surprise the French at Merida—Fine
conduct of captain Neveux—Hill marches to Almendralejos to
fight Drouet—The latter retires—Phillipon sends a party
from Badajos to forage the banks of the Guadiana—Colonel
Abercrombie defeats a squadron of cavalry at Fuente del
Maestro—Hill returns to the Alemtejo 313
CHAP. V.
Soult resolves to besiege Tarifa—Ballesteros is driven
a second time under the guns of Gibraltar—Laval invests
Tarifa—Siege of Tarifa—The assault repulsed—Siege is
raised—The true history of this siege exposed—Colonel
Skerrett not the author of the success 329
BOOK XVI.
CHAP. I.
Political situation of king Joseph—Political state
of Spain—Political state of Portugal—Military
operations—Julian Sanchez captures the governor of Ciudad
Rodrigo—General Thiebault introduces a convoy and a
new governor into that fortress—Difficulty of military
operations on the Agueda—The allied army, being pressed for
provisions, takes wide cantonments, and preparations are
secretly made for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 345
CHAP. II.
Review of the different changes of the war—Enormous efforts
of Napoleon—Lord Wellington’s situation described—His
great plans explained—His firmness and resolution under
difficulties—Distressed state of his army—The prudence and
ability of lord Fitzroy Somerset—Dissemination of the French
army—Lord Wellington seizes the opportunity to besiege
Ciudad Rodrigo 362
CHAP. III.
Means collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Major
Sturgeon throws a bridge over the Agueda—Siege of Ciudad
Rodrigo—Colonel Colborne storms fort Francesco—The scarcity
of transport baulks lord Wellington’s calculations—Marmont
collects troops—Plan of the attack changed—Two breaches are
made and the city is stormed—Observations 375
CHAP. IV.
Execution of the French partizans and English deserters
found in Ciudad Rodrigo—The works are repaired—Marmont
collects his army at Salamanca—Bonet abandons the
Asturias—Souham advances to Matilla—Hill arrives at
Castello Branco—The French army harassed by winter
marches and by the Partidas—Marmont again spreads his
divisions—Agueda overflows, and all communication with
Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off—Lord Wellington prepares to
besiege Badajos—Preliminary measures—Impeded by bad
weather—Difficulties and embarrassments arise—The
allied army marches in an unmilitary manner towards
the Alemtejo—Lord Wellington proposes some financial
measures—Gives up Ciudad to the Spaniards—The fifth
division is left in Beira—Carlos d’Espagna and general
Victor Alten are posted on the Yeltes—The Portuguese militia
march for the Coa—Lord Wellington reaches Elvas—He is beset
with difficulties—Falls sick, but recovers rapidly 390
CHAP. V.
The allies cross the Guadiana—Beresford invests
Badajos—Generals Graham and Hill command the covering
army—Drouet retires to Hornaches in the Llerena—Third
English siege of Badajos—Sally of the garrison
repulsed—Works impeded by the rain—The besieged rake the
trenches from the right bank of the Guadiana—The fifth
division is called up to the siege—The river rises and
carries away the bridge, and the siege is upon the point of
being raised—Two flying bridges are established—The fifth
division invest St. Christoval and the bridge-head—The
Picurina is stormed—The batteries open against the San
Roque and the body of the place—The covering army drive
general Drouet from the Serena into the Morena on the side
of Cordova—Marmont collects his forces in Leon—The Spanish
officers and the Portuguese government neglect the supplies
of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Soult advances from Cordova
towards Llerena—The fifth division is brought over the
Guadiana—The works of the siege are pressed—An attempt to
blow up the dam of the inundation fails—The two breaches
become practicable—Soult effects his junction with Drouet
and advances to the succour of the place—Graham and Hill
fall back—The bridge of Merida is destroyed—The assault is
ordered, but countermanded—A third breach is formed—The
fortress is stormed with a dreadful slaughter, and the city
is sacked by the allies 399
CHAP. VI.
The state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida obliges lord
Wellington to relinquish his design of invading
Andalusia—Soult’s operations described—He reaches Villa
Franca—Hears of the fall of Badajos and retires—Penne
Villemur and Morillo move from the Niebla against
Seville—Ballesteros having defeated Maransin at Cartama,
comes from the Ronda against Seville—A French convoy is
stopped in the Morena, and the whole of Andalusia is in
commotion—Seville is saved by the subtlety of a Spaniard
in the French interest—Ballesteros retires—Assaults
Zahara and is repulsed—Sends a division against Ossuna,
which is also repulsed by the _Escopeteros_—Drives general
Rey from Allora to Malaga—Soult marches from Llerena
towards Seville, and general Conroux brings a brigade up
from the Guadalete to attack Ballesteros—Sir S. Cotton
defeats general Peyreymont’s cavalry near Usagre—Soult
concentrates his army near Seville to light the allies—Lord
Wellington marches to Beira—Marmont’s operations—He marches
against Ciudad Rodrigo—Carlos d’España retires towards
Almeida and Victor Alten towards Penamacor—The French
appear before Almeida—General Trant arrives on the Cabeça
Negro—The French retire and Trant unites with J. Wilson at
Guarda—Marmont advances to Sabugal—Victor Alten abandons
Penamacor and Castello Branco, and crosses the Tagus—The
Portuguese general Lecor opposes the enemy with skill and
courage—Marmont drives Trant from Guarda and defeats his
militia on the Mondego—Lord Wellington crosses the Tagus and
enters Castello Branco—Marmont’s position perilous—Lord
Wellington advances to attack him—He retreats over the
Agueda—The allied army is spread in wide cantonments, and
the fortresses are victualled 434
CHAP. VII.
General observations—The campaign considered—The
justice of Napoleon’s views vindicated, and Marmont’s
operations censured as the cause of the French
misfortunes—The operations of the army of the centre
and of the south examined—Lord Wellington’s operations
eulogized—Extraordinary adventures of captain Colquhon
Grant—The operations of the siege of Badajos examined—Lord
Wellington’s conduct vindicated 450
APPENDIX.
No. I.
Justificatory papers relating to the state of Spain at
different periods 483
No. II.
Siege of Taragona 498
No. III.
Political state of king Joseph 512
No. IV.
Conduct of the English government, and extracts from Mr.
Canning’s and lord Wellesley’s instructions to Mr. Stuart 541
No. V.
Marmont and Dorsenne’s operations 549
No. VI.
Siege of Tarifa, with anonymous extracts from memoirs and
letters of different officers employed in the siege 563
No. VII.
Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, with anonymous
extracts from memoirs and letters of officers engaged in, or
eye-witnesses of the action described 571
No. VIII.
English papers relating to Soult’s and Marmont’s operations,
and French papers relating to the same 578
No. IX.
Summary of the force of the Anglo-Portuguese army at
different periods, exclusive of drummers and fifers, with
summary of the French force at different periods, extracted
from the imperial muster-rolls 584
LIST OF PLATES.
No. 1. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tortoza
_to face page_ 41
2. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Taragona
_to face page_ 75
3. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations and Combat of Elbodon
_to face page_ 240
4. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Saguntum
_to face page_ 283
5. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Valencia
_to face page_ 297
6. Explanatory Sketch of general Hill’s Operations
_to face page_ 324
7. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tarifa
_to face page_ 331
8. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
_to face page_ 386
9. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Badajos, 1812
_to face page_ 419
ERRATA.
Page 3, line 23, _for_ “armies” _read_ “parties.”
35, 9, _for_ “prisoners” _read_ “provisions.”
NOTICE.
In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former
volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed in
the different operations have been consulted for this volume. Amongst
others, the Journal of general Harvey of the Portuguese service, and
some original papers supplied by sir Howard Douglas.
In a recent controversy, I have expressed my belief that the French
army at Albuera, instead of being more, was less numerous, than I had
represented it in my account, of that battle. The following letter,
since procured, decides the question:—
_Extrait d’une lettre écrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. le
m^{al} duc de Dalmatie, général-en-chef de l’armée du midi, à S. A.
S. le prince de Wagram et de Neufchatel, major-général._
Le général Latour Maubourg a été obligé de se replier sur Constantina
et Alamis, Cordove est menacée par un corps Anglais, Portugais, et
Espagnol, beaucoup de troupes se concentrent en Estramadure; Badajoz
est investie. Le général Blake a réuni sur l’Odiel une armée de
quinze à seize mille hommes, et paroit se préparer à marcher sur
Seville. Le restant du quatrième corps est en opérations contre les
troupes qui out débauché de Murcie. Si j’enumere bien, je suis en cet
instant attaqué sur divers points par plus de soixante mille hommes
indépendamment de troupes qui sont restées à Cadiz et à l’isle de
Léon, et de celles qu’il y a à Tarrifa, à Algesiras, et à Gibraltar,
que je dois contenir, le danger est pressant, je dois faire face
de tous côtés assurer de nouveaux triomphes aux armées de S. M.
l’empereur, et éviter les facheux événemens, que l’on prépare contre
l’armée du midi. J’espère réussir, mais le succès sera complet si les
secours que j’attends arrivent apropos; voici mes dispositions. Je
pars dans quatre jours avec _vingt mille hommes, trois mille chevaux,
et trente pièces de canon_, pour rejetter au delà de la Guadiana les
corps ennemis qui se sont répandus en Estremadure, dégager Badajos
et faciliter l’arrivée du général comte d’Erlon. Si les troupes que
ce général amène peuvent se réunir avec celles que je conduirai et
si les troupes qui sont parties des armées du nord et du centre,
dont j’ai en partie disposé, arrivent à tems, j’aurai en Estremadure
trente-cinq mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux, et quarante pièces de
canon de campagne; alors je livre bataille aux ennemis quand bien
même toute l’armée Angloise qui est sur le continent y seroit réunie,
et ils seront vaincus.
Si une partie des renforts que j’attends manquent je ferai avec ce
que j’aurai, tout ce que pourrai vers le but proposé.
Le général-en-chef de l’armée impériale du midi,
(Signée) M^{al} Duc de DALMATIE.
Pour extraits conformes.
_To her grace the duchess of Abrantes._
_September 11, 1833._
MADAM,
In the eighth volume of your “_Mémoires_,” which I have only just
seen, I find the following passages:—
“Toutefois, pourquoi donc m’étonner de la conduite des Portugais?
N’ai je pas vu _ici, en France_, un des frères d’armes de Junot
souffrir qu’on imprimât, dans un ouvrage traduit de l’Anglais, des
choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le maréchal Ney?......
Cet ouvrage, fait par un colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce devant
le ministère de la guerre parce qu’il dit du bien du ministre, m’a
été donné _à moi, à moi la veuve de Junot_, comme renfermant des
documents _authentiques_. J’ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre
la vie privée d’un homme dont on ne pouvait dire aucun mal comme
militaire dans cette admirable affaire de la Convention de Cintra,
puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission militaire ceux
qui l’avaient signée pour l’Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe
Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l’original de
cette convention ne serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que
je le possède, moi, cet original, et même dans les deux langues. Il
n’est pas dans M. Napier;”————
It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the
expressions of a lady; yet when those expressions are dishonouring
to him, and that reputation and talents are joined to beauty to give
them a wide circulation, it would indicate insensibility to leave
them unnoticed.
To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has
always been the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not
therefore enter upon that subject, because I am persuaded that your
grace could not mean to apply the words “_revolting falsehoods_” to
a simple judgement of the military genius of the duke of Abrantes.
Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those directed
against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra.
I think, however, your grace has not perused my work with much
attention, or you would scarcely have failed to perceive that I have
given the Convention of Cintra at length in the Appendix.
But, in truth, I have only alluded to general Junot’s private
qualities when they bore directly upon his government of Portugal,
and, by a fresh reference to my work, you will find that I have
affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The character of the late duke
of Abrantes, as drawn by me, is that ascribed to him by the emperor
Napoleon, (see _Las Cases_,) and the authority of that great man is
expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon therefore, and not against
me, who am but a repeater of his uncontradicted observations, that
your resentment should be directed.
If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me
or my work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese,
and English, and Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of
Portugal; or even a slight examination of only a small part of the
innumerable, and some of them very celebrated periodicals which treat
of that event. You will be then convinced that, so far from having
wantonly assailed the character of general Junot, I have made no
slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been
unjustly overwhelmed; and believe me, madam, that the estimation in
which an eminent man will be held by the world is more surely to
be found in the literature of different countries than in the fond
recollection of his own family. I admired general Junot’s daring
character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave
enemy, I have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed
that feeling towards him and towards other French generals whose
characters and whose acts have been alike maligned by party writers
in this country: such indeed has been my regard for justice on this
point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing with a
French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by
referring to my lord Mahon’s History of the War of the Succession,
in which his lordship has done me the honour to observe that I have
written “_by far the best_ FRENCH _account_ yet published of the
Peninsular War.”
For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar abuse
of a gallant enemy will not be deemed un-English, although lord
Mahon considers it wholly French; but his lordship’s observation
incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue eagerness to
malign any of the French generals; and with respect to the duke
of Abrantes, I could shew that all the offensive passages in my
work rest upon the published authority of his own countrymen, and
especially of his great master the emperor Napoleon, and that
they are of a milder expression than those authorities would have
warranted. It is, however, so natural and so amiable in a lady to
defend the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than
appear to detract in any manner from the grace of such a proceeding,
I choose to be silent under the unmitigated severity of your grace’s
observations.
Not so, however, with respect to that part of your remarks which
relate to marshal Ney. After carefully re-examining every sentence
I have written, I am quite unable to discover the slightest grounds
for your grace’s accusations. In all parts of my work the name of Ney
is mentioned with praise. I have not, indeed, made myself a partizan
of marshal Ney in relating his disputes with marshals Soult and
Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither
have I attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of
war, but this is only matter of opinion which the world is quite
capable of appreciating at its true value; and upon all other points
I have expressed admiration of marshal Ney’s extraordinary qualities,
his matchless valour, his heroic energy!
In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften
the asperity of your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with
more of admiration for your generous warmth in defence of a person so
dear to you, than of any sentiment of resentment for the harsh terms
which you have employed towards myself. And I remain, madam,
Your very obedient servant,
WILLIAM NAPIER, COLONEL.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
BOOK XIII.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: 1810.]
While marshal Beresford followed Soult towards Llerena lord
Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajos, but the relation
of that operation must be delayed until the transactions which
occurred in Spain, during Massena’s invasion of Portugal, have been
noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that a
just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of lord Wellington’s
proceedings might be called rash, and others timid, and slow, if
taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for
delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or
daring, as the circumstances warranted: nor is there any portion of
his campaigns, that requires this wide-based consideration, more than
his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to the rules of
art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with a mournful
slaughter, have given occasion for questioning his great military
qualities, which were however, then most signally displayed.
[Sidenote: See Vol. III p. 404.]
[Sidenote: Official abstract of general Walker’s despatches]
[Sidenote: Official abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.]
In the northern provinces the events were of little interest.
Gallicia after the failure of Renovales’ expedition and the shipwreck
that followed, became torpid; the junta disregarded general Walker’s
exhortations, and, although he furnished vast supplies, the army,
nominally twenty thousand strong, mustered only six thousand in the
field: there was no cavalry, and the infantry kept close in the
mountains about Villa Franca, while a weak French division occupied
the rich plains of Leon. General Mahi having refused to combine his
operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought to
be disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities had
been removed to make way for the duke of Albuquerque: he was however
immediately appointed to the command of Murcia, by Blake, in defiance
of the remonstrances of Mr. Wellesley, for Blake disregarded the
English influence.
[Sidenote: See Vol. III pp. 312, 407, and 475.]
When Albuquerque died, Gallicia fell to Castaños, and while that
officer was co-operating with Beresford in Estremadura, Santocildes
assumed the command. Meanwhile Caffarelli’s reserve having joined the
army of the north, Santona was fortified, and Bessieres, as I have
before observed, assembled seven thousand men at Zamora to invade
Gallicia.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
In the Asturias, Bonet, although harassed, on the side of Potes,
by the Guerillas from the mountains of Liebana; and on the coast
by the English frigates, remained at Oviedo, and maintained his
communications by the left with the troops in Leon. In November
1810 he defeated a considerable body of insurgents, and in February
1811 the Spanish general St. Pol retired before him with the regular
forces, from the Xalon to the Navia; but this retreat caused such
discontent in Gallicia that St. Pol advanced again on the 19th March,
and was again driven back. Bonet then dispersed the Partidas, and
was ready to aid Bessieres’ invasion of Gallicia; and although the
arrival of the allied forces on the Coa in pursuit of Massena stopped
that enterprise, he made an incursion along the coast, seized the
Spanish stores of English arms and clothing, and then returned to
Oviedo. The war was, indeed, so little formidable to the French,
that in May Santander was evacuated, and all the cavalry in Castile
and Leon joined Massena for the battle of Fuentes Onoro, and yet the
Gallician and Asturian regular armies gained no advantage during
their absence.
[Sidenote: Intercepted letter of general Barthelemy to general
Drouet, 1810. MSS.]
The Partidas, who had re-assembled after their defeat by Bonet, were
more active. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino cut off small
French parties in the Montaña, in the Rioja, in Biscay, and in the
Baston de Laredo; they were not, indeed, dangerous in action, nor was
it very difficult to destroy them by combined movements, but these
combinations were hard to effect, from the little accord amongst
the French generals, and thus they easily maintained their posts at
Espinosa de Monteres, Medina, and Villarcayo. Campillo was the most
powerful after Porlier. His principal haunts were in the valleys of
Mena and Caranza; but he was in communication with Barbara, Honejas,
and Curillas, petty chiefs of Biscay, with whom he concerted attacks
upon couriers and weak detachments: and he sometimes divided his
band into small parties, with which he overran the valleys of
Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrando, partly to raise contributions,
partly to gather recruits, whom he forced to join him. His chief
aim was, however, to intercept the despatches going from Bilbao to
Santander, and for this purpose he used to infest Liendo between
Ovira and Laredo, which he was enabled the more safely to do, because
general Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was forced to watch
more earnestly towards the hilly district of Liebana, between Leon
and the Asturias. This district was Porlier’s strong-hold, and that
chief, under whom Campillo himself would at times act, used to cross
the Deba and penetrate into the valleys of Cabuerniego, Rio Nauza,
Cieza, and Buelna, and he obliged the people to fly to the mountains
with their effects whenever the French approached: nevertheless the
mass were tired of this guerilla system and tractable enough, except
in Liebana.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
To beat Campillo once or twice would have been sufficient to ruin
him, but to ruin Porlier required great combinations. It was
necessary to seize Espinosa, not that of Monteres, but a village in
the mountains of Liebana, from whence the valleys all projected as
from a point, and whence the troops could consequently act towards
Potes with success. General Barthelemy proposed this plan to Drouet,
then with the 9th corps on the Upper Douro, whom he desired to
co-operate from the side of Leon, while Bonet did the same from the
side of the Asturias: but though partially adopted, the execution was
not effectually followed up, the districts of Liebana and Santander
continued to be disturbed, and the chain of Partidas was prolonged
through Biscay and the Rioja, to Navarre.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
In this last province Mina had on the 22d of May defeated at
the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, twelve hundred men who
were escorting a convoy of prisoners and treasure to France; his
success was complete, but alloyed by the death of two hundred of
the prisoners, unfortunately killed during the tumult; and it was
stained by the murder of six Spanish ladies, who, for being attached
to French officers, were in cold blood executed after the fight.
Massena, whose baggage was captured, was to have travelled with
this escort, but disliking the manner of the march, he remained in
Vittoria until a better opportunity, and so escaped.
These partizan operations, combined with the descents on the coast,
the aspect of the war in Estremadura, and the unprotected state
of Castile, which was now menaced by Santocildes, were rendered
more important by another event to be noticed hereafter: Bessieres
therefore resolved to contract his position in the north; and first
causing Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay and the Rioja, he
ordered Bonet to abandon the Asturias. On the 14th of June that
general, having dismantled the coast-batteries, sent his sick and
baggage by sea to Santander and marched into Leon, where Santocildes,
who had now increased the Gallician field army to thirteen thousand
men, was menacing Astorga, which place the French evacuated after
blowing up some of the works. Serras and Bonet then united on the
Esla, and being supported by three thousand men from Rio Seco,
skirmished at the Ponte de Orvigo on the 23d, but had the worst, and
general Valletaux was killed on their side: and as lord Wellington’s
operations in Estremadura soon drew the French armies towards
that quarter Santocildes held his ground at Astorga until August.
Meanwhile two thousand French were thrown into Santona, and general
Rognet coming, from the side of Burgos, with a division of the young
guard, made a fruitless incursion against the Partidas of Liebana.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]
This system of warfare was necessarily harassing to the French
divisions actually engaged, but it was evident that neither the
Asturias nor Gallicia could be reckoned as good auxiliaries to lord
Wellington. Gallicia with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified
towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and constant supplies
from England, was of less weight in the contest than five thousand
Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and Wilson. The irregular
warfare was now also beginning to produce its usual effects; the tree
though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit. In Biscay, which had
been longest accustomed to the presence of the invaders, the armed
peasantry were often found fighting in the ranks of the enemy, and
on one occasion did of themselves attack the boats of the Amelia
frigate to save French military stores! Turning now to the other line
of invasion, we shall find the contest fiercer, indeed, and more
honourable to the Spaniards, but the result still more unfavourable
to their cause.
OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.
It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza, was
ordered to besiege Tortoza while Macdonald marched against Taragona.
Massena was then concentrating his army for the invasion of Portugal,
and it was the emperor’s intention that Suchet should, after taking
Tortoza, march with half of the third corps to support the prince
of Esling. But the reduction of Tortoza proved a more tedious task
than Napoleon anticipated, and as the course of events had now given
the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon a common object, it will
be well to compare their situation and resources with those of their
adversary.
Suchet was completely master of Aragon, and not more by the force of
his arms, than by the influence of his administration; the province
was fertile, and so tranquil in the interior, that his magazines
were all filled, and his convoys travelled under the care of Spanish
commissaries and conductors. Mina was however in Navarre on his
rear, and he communicated on the right bank of the Ebro with the
Partidas in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin; and these last
were occasionally backed by the Empecinado, Duran, and others whose
strong-holds were in the Guadalaxara, and who from thence infested
Cuença and the vicinity of Madrid. From Albaracin, Villa Campa
continued the chain of partizan warfare and connected it with the
Valencian army, which had also a line of operation towards Cuença.
Mina, who communicated with the English vessels in the bay of Biscay,
received his supplies from Coruña; and the others, in like manner,
corresponded with Valencia, from whence the English consul Tupper
succoured them with arms, money, and ammunition. Thus a line was
drawn quite across the Peninsula which it was in vain for the enemy
to break, as the retreat was secure at both ends, and the excitement
to renewed efforts constant.
On the other flank of Suchet’s position the high valleys of the
Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, forming a link between
Mina and a division of the Catalonian army stationed about the Seu
d’Urgel, which was a fortified castle, closing the passage leading
from the plain of that name to the Cerdaña: this division in
conjunction with Rovira, and other partizans, extended the irregular
warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfollit to the Ampurdan; and
the whole depended upon Taragona, which itself was supported by
the English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon may therefore be
considered as an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to
reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against
the garrison; but Suchet baffled them; he had made such judicious
arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all
the important points on the frontier circle were fortified, and
connected, with Zaragoza, by chains of minor ports radiating from
that common centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, and the plain of Urgel
in Catalonia, the fort of Morella in Valencia, were his; and by
fortifying Teruel and Alcanitz he had secured the chief passages
leading through the mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus,
at will, invade either Catalonia or Valencia, and from Mequinenza
he could, by water, transport the stores necessary to besiege
Tortoza. Nor were these advantages the result of aught but his
uncommon talents for war, a consideration which rendered them doubly
formidable.
The situation of the French in Catalonia was different. Macdonald,
who had assumed the command at the moment when Napoleon wished
him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the peculiar
warfare of the province, and unprepared to execute any extended plan
of operations. His troops were about Gerona and Hostalrich, which
were in fact the bounds of the French conquest at this period; for
Barcelona was a military point beyond their field system, and only
to be maintained by expeditions; and the country was so exhausted
of provisions in the interior, that the army itself could only be
fed by land-convoys from France, or by such coasters as, eluding the
vigilance of the English cruizers, could reach Rosas, St. Filieu,
and Palamos. Barcelona like the horse-leech continually cried for
more, and as the inhabitants as well as the garrison depended on the
convoys, the latter were enormous, reference being had to the limited
means of the French general, and the difficulty of moving; for,
although the distance between Hostalrich and Barcelona was only forty
miles, the road, as far as Granollers, was a succession of defiles,
and crossed by several rivers, of which the Congosta and the Tordera
were considerable obstacles; and the nature of the soil was clayey
and heavy, especially in the defiles of the Trenta Pasos.
These things rendered it difficult for Macdonald to operate in
regular warfare from his base of Gerona, and as the stores for the
siege of Taragona were to come from France, until they arrived he
could only make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the
resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered
in the mountains by detachments which would have to fight for every
morsel. This then was the condition of the French armies, that
starting from separate bases, they had to operate on lines meeting at
Tortoza. It remains to shew the situation of the Catalan general.
[Sidenote: 1810. July.]
After the battle of Margalef, Henry O’Donnel reunited his scattered
forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, not only
repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but forced the
reluctant Miguelettes to swell his ranks and to submit to discipline.
Being assisted with money and arms by the British agents, and having
free communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Minorca, he
was soon enabled to reorganize his army, to collect vast magazines
at Taragona, and to strengthen that place by new works. In July his
force again amounted to twenty-two thousand men exclusive of the
Partidas, and of the Somatenes, who were useful to aid in a pursuit,
to break up roads, and to cut off straggling soldiers. Of this number
one division under Campo Verde, was, as I have before said, in the
higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and being supported by
the fortified castles of Seu D’Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, and Berga.
A second division was on the Llobregat, watching the garrison of
Barcelona, and having detachments in Montserrat, Igualada, and
Manresa to communicate with Campo Verde. The third division, the
reserve and the cavalry were on the hills about Taragona, and that
place and Tortoza had large garrisons.
[Sidenote: General Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Colonel Green’s do MSS.]
[Sidenote: Official Abstracts of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
By this disposition, O’Donnel occupied Falcet, the Col de Balaguer,
and the Col del Alba, which were the passages leading to Tortoza;
the Col de Ribas and Momblanch, which commanded the roads to Lerida;
San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connection
with Campo Verde was maintained; and thus the two French armies were
separated not only by the great spinal ridges descending from the
Pyrenees, but by the position of the Spaniards, who held all the
passes, and could at will concentrate and attack either Suchet or
Macdonald. But the Catalonian system was now also connected with
Valencia, where, exclusive of irregulars, there were about fifteen
thousand men under General Bassecour. That officer had in June
occupied Cuença, yet having many quarrels with his officers he could
do nothing, and was driven from thence by troops from Madrid: he
returned to Valencia, but the disputes continued and extended to the
junta or congress of Valencia, three members of which were by the
general imprisoned. Nevertheless, as all parties were now sensible
that Valencia should be defended at Tortoza, Bassecour prepared to
march to its succour by the coast-road where he had several fortified
posts. Thus, while Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush
O’Donnel, the latter was combining with Bassecour, to press upon
Suchet; and there was always the English maritime force at hand to
aid the attacks or to facilitate the escape of the Spaniards.
In the above exposition I have called the native armies by the names
of their provinces, but in December 1810 the whole military force
being reorganized by the regency the armies were designated by
numbers. Thus the Catalonian forces, formerly called _the army of
the right_, was now called the _first army_. The Valencians, together
with Villa Campa’s division, and the partidas of the Empecinado and
Duran, were called the _second army_. The Murcian force was called
the _third army_. The troops at Cadiz, at Algesiras, and in the Conde
Niebla were called the _fourth army_. The remnants of Romana’s old
Gallician division which had escaped the slaughter on the Gebora
formed the _fifth army_. The new-raised troops of Gallicia and those
of the Asturias were called the _sixth army_. And the partidas of the
north, that is to say, Mina’s, Longa’s, Campillo’s, Porlier’s, and
other smaller bands formed the _seventh army_.
Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon’s order to besiege
Tortoza arrived. Suchet was ready to execute it. More than fifty
battering guns selected from those at Lerida were already equipped,
and his depôts were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and Alcanitz.
All the fortified posts were provisioned; twelve thousand men under
general Musnier, intended for the security of Aragon, were disposed
at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of the Ebro, and
at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank; and while these
arrangements were being executed, the troops destined for the siege
had assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under generals Habert and
Laval, their provisions being drawn from the newly conquered district
of Urgel.
[Sidenote: See plans, No. 1 & 3.]
From Mequinenza, which was the principal depôt, there was
water-carriage, but as the Ebro was crossed at several points by
rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the
communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet therefore
set workmen to reopen an old road thirty miles in length, which had
been made by the duke of Orleans during the war of the succession.
This road pierced the mountains on the right bank of the Ebro, passed
through Batea and other places to Mora, and from thence by Pinel to
Tortoza, running through a celebrated defile called indifferently
the _Trincheras_ and the _Passage of Arms_. When these preliminary
arrangements were made general Habert assembled his division at
Belpuig near Lerida, and after making a feint as if to go towards
Barcelona, suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating through the
district of Garriga, reached Garcia on the left bank of the Lower
Ebro the 5th of July. Laval at the same time quitted Alcanitz, made a
feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then turning to his left, came
so unexpectedly upon Tortoza by the right bank of the Ebro, that he
surprised some of the outposts on the 2d, and then encamped before
the bridge-head. The 4th he extended his line to Amposta, seized the
ferry-boat of the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted
Boussard’s cuirassiers, with a battalion of infantry and six guns, at
Uldecona, on the Cenia river, to observe Bassecour’s Valencians.
During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora, and
as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinel, and
the Trincheras, on its intended line; and having placed flying
bridges, with covering works, on the Ebro, at Mora and Xerta, made
those places his depôt of siege. He likewise seized the craft on the
river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and
at Amposta, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat-bridge of
Tortoza, with fire vessels. Following Napoleon’s order, Macdonald
should at this time have been before Taragona; but on the 9th, Suchet
learned, from a spy, that the seventh corps was still at Gerona, and
he thus found himself exposed alone to the combined efforts of the
Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of having moved from
Aragon so soon, yet thinking it would be bad to retire, he resolved
to blockade Tortoza; hoping to resist both O’Donnel and Bassecour
until Macdonald could advance.
The Spaniards who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank the
6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were
driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which, the next day,
fell on his works at Mora, but was repulsed; and the 12th, general
Paris pushed back the Spanish line, while Habert took post in
force at Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora.
O’Donoghue, who commanded Bassecour’s advanced guard, now menaced
Morella, but general Montmarie being detached to its succour, drove
him away.
The 30th, O’Donnel having brought up fresh troops to Falcet, made a
feint with ten thousand men against Tivisa, and then suddenly entered
Tortoza, from whence at mid-day, on the 3d of August, he passed the
bridge and fell with the bayonet on Laval’s entrenchments. The French
gave way at first, but soon rallied, and the Spaniards fearing for
their communications regained the town in disorder, having lost two
hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded.
[Sidenote: 1810. August.]
This operation had been concerted with general Caro, who having
superseded O’Donoghue, was now marching with the Valencians by the
coast-road towards Uldecona: Suchet therefore, judging that the
intention of the Spaniards was to force him away from the Lower Ebro,
before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat, resolved first to strike
a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn upon the Catalans.
In this view he contracted his quarters on the Ebro, and united at
Uldecona, on the 13th, eleven battalions with eight hundred horsemen.
Caro was then in a strong position covering the two great routes to
Valencia, but when the French, after driving in his advanced guard
from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians would not stand a battle,
and being followed beyond Peniscola separated and retreated in
disorder by different roads. Whereupon Suchet returned to Mora, and
there found an officer of Macdonald’s army, who brought information
that the seventh corps was at last in the plains of Reus, and its
communications with the third corps open.
OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.
[Sidenote: 1810. June.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des François.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops in a state of
insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and excited to ferocity by
the cruelty of the Catalans, and by the conduct of his predecessor;
they were without magazines or regular subsistence, and lived by
exactions: hence the people, driven to desperation, were more like
wild beasts than men, and the war was repulsive to him in all its
features. It was one of shifts and devices, and he better understood
methodical movements; it was one of plunder, and he was a severe
disciplinarian; it was full of cruelty on all sides, and he was
of a humane and just disposition. Being resolved to introduce
regular habits, Macdonald severely rebuked the troops for their bad
discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the Catalans,
but neither could be brought to soften in their enmity; the mutual
injuries sustained, were too horrible and too recent to be forgiven.
The soldiers, drawn from different countries, and therefore not bound
by any common national feeling, were irritated against a general, who
made them pay for wanton damages, and punished them for plundering;
and the Catalans attributing his conduct to fear, because he could
not entirely restrain the violence of his men, still fled from
the villages, and still massacred his stragglers with unrelenting
barbarity.
While establishing his system it was impossible for Macdonald to
take the field, because, without magazines, no army can be kept in
due discipline; wherefore he remained about Gerona, drawing with
great labour and pains his provisions from France, and storing up the
overplus for his future operations. On the 10th of June however the
wants of Barcelona became so serious, that leaving his baggage under
a strong guard at Gerona, and his recruits and cavalry at Figueras,
he marched with ten thousand men and a convoy, to its relief, by the
way of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedieu, and Granollers. The road was
heavy, the defiles narrow, the rivers swelled, and the manner of
march rather too pompous for the nature of the war, for Macdonald
took post in order of battle on each side of the defiles, while the
engineers repaired the ways: in every thing adhered to his resolution
of restoring a sound system; but while imitating the Jugurthine
Metellus, he forgot that he had not Romans, but a mixed and
ferocious multitude under his command, and he lost more by wasting of
time, than he gained by enforcing an irksome discipline. Thus when he
had reached Barcelona, his own provisions were expended, his convoy
furnished only a slender supply for the city, and the next day he was
forced to return with the empty carts in all haste to Gerona, where
he resumed his former plan of action, and demolished the forts beyond
that city.
[Sidenote: 1810. July.]
In July he collected another convoy and prepared to march in the
same order as before, for his intent was to form magazines in
Barcelona sufficient for that city and his own supply, during the
siege of Taragona; but meanwhile Suchet was unable to commence the
siege of Tortoza, in default of the co-operation of the seventh
corps; and Henry O’Donnel having gained time to reorganize his army
and to re-establish his authority was now ready to interrupt the
French marshal’s march, proposing, if he failed, to raise a fresh
insurrection in the Ampurdan, and thus give further occupation on
that side. He had transferred a part of his forces to Caldas, Santa
Coloma, and Bruñolas, taking nearly the same positions that Blake had
occupied during the siege of Gerona; but the French detachments soon
obliged him to concentrate again behind the defiles of the Congosta,
where he hoped to stop the passage of the convoy; Macdonald, however,
entered Hostalrich on the 16th, forced the Trenta Pasos on the 17th,
and although his troops had only fifty rounds of ammunition he drove
three thousand men from the pass of Garriga on the 18th, reached
Barcelona that night, delivered his convoy, and returned immediately.
[Sidenote: 1810. August.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
The French soldiers now became sickly from the hardships of a march
rendered oppressive by the severity of their discipline, and many
also deserted; yet others, who had before gone off, returned to their
colours, reinforcements arrived from France, and the emperor’s orders
to take the field were becoming so pressing, that Macdonald, giving
Baraguay d’Hilliers the command of the Ampurdan, marched on the 8th
of August with a third convoy for Barcelona, resolved at last to
co-operate with Suchet. Instructed by experience he however moved
this time with less formality, and having reached Barcelona the 11th,
deposited his convoy, appointed Maurice Mathieu governor of that
city, and on the 15th forced the pass of Ordal, and reached Villa
Franca with about sixteen thousand men under arms. O’Donnel, still
smarting from the affair at Tortoza, retired before him to Taragona
without fighting, but directed Campo Verde to leave a body of troops
under general Martinez in the mountains about Olot, and to move
himself through Montserrat to the district of Garriga, which lies
between Lerida and Tortoza; meanwhile the seventh corps passed by
Braffin and Valls into the plain of Reus, and as we have seen opened
the communication with Suchet, but to how little purpose shall be
shewn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II.
[Sidenote: 1810. August.]
As the Spanish general knew that the French could at Reus find
provisions for only a few days, he withdrew his division from Falcet,
and while Campo Verde, coming into the Garriga, occupied the passes
behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between
Valls and Villafranca, he held the main body of his army concentrated
at Taragona, ready to fall upon Macdonald whenever he should move.
This done, he became extremely elated, for like all Spaniards he
imagined that to surround an enemy was the perfection of military
operations. Macdonald cared little for the vicinity of the Catalan
troops, but he had not yet formed sufficient magazines at Barcelona
to commence the siege of Taragona, nor could he, as O’Donnel had
foreseen, procure more than a few days supply about Reus, he
therefore relinquished all idea of a siege and proposed to aid Suchet
in the operation against Tortoza, if the latter would feed the
seventh corps; and pending Suchet’s decision he resolved to remove to
Lerida.
The 25th of August leaving seven hundred sick men in Reus, he made a
feint against the Col de Balaguer, but soon changing his direction
marched upon Momblanch and the Col de Ribas: his rear-guard, composed
of Italian troops, being overtaken near Alcover, offered battle at
the bridge of Goy, but this the Spaniards declined, and they also
neglected to secure the heights on each side, which the Italians
immediately turned to account and so made their way to Pixamoxons.
They were pursued immediately, and Sarsfield coming from the Lerida
side disputed the passage of Pixamoxons; but Macdonald, keeping the
troops from Taragona in check with a rear-guard, again sent his
Italians up the hills on the flanks while he pushed his French troops
against the front of the enemy, and so succeeded; for the Italians
quickly carried the heights, the rear-guard was very slightly
pressed, the front was unopposed, and in two hours, the army reached
Momblanch, whence after a short halt, it descended into the plains of
Urgel.
[Sidenote: 1810. Sept.]
Suchet being informed of this march came from Mora to confer with
Macdonald, and they agreed that the seventh corps should have for its
subsistence the magazines of Monzon and the plains of Urgel, which
had not yet delivered its contributions. In return Macdonald lent
the Neapolitan division to guard Suchet’s convoys down the Ebro,
and promised that the divisions of Severoli and Souham should cover
the operations of the third corps, during the siege of Tortoza, by
drawing the attention of the Catalan generals to the side of Cardona.
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
The seventh corps was now quartered about Tarega, Cervera, Guisona,
and Agramunt, and Severola was detached with four thousand men over
the Segre to enforce the requisitions about Talarn. He drove four
hundred Swiss from the bridge of Tremp, and executed his mission, but
with such violence that the people, becoming furious, assassinated
the stragglers, and laid so many successful schemes of murder, that
Macdonald was forced reluctantly to renew the executions and burnings
of his predecessors. Indeed, to feed an army forcibly when all
things are paid for, will, in a poor and mountainous country, create
soreness, because the things taken cannot easily be replaced; but
with requisitions severity is absolutely necessary. In rich plains
the inhabitants can afford to supply the troops and will do so, to
avoid being plundered; but mountaineers having scarcely any thing
besides food, and little of that, are immediately rendered desperate
and must be treated as enemies or left in quiet.
While Severoli was ravaging Tremp and Talarn, general Eugenio marched
with another Italian detachment towards Castelfollit, which had a
French garrison, and Macdonald removed his own quarters to Cervera.
Meanwhile O’Donnel, having replaced his division at Falcet to observe
Suchet, distributed his other forces on the line of communication
through San Coloma de Querault, Igualada, Montserrat, and Cardona; he
thus cut off all connection between Macdonald and the Ampurdan, and
enabled Campo Verde closely to follow the operations of the seventh
corps, and that general seeing the French army separated, fell first
upon the head-quarters at Cervera, but being unsuccessful, marched
against Eugenio, and was by him also repulsed near Castelfollit.
Eugenio, distinguished alike by his valour and ferocity, then
returned with his booty to Agramunt, and afterwards invading Pons,
spoiled and ravaged all that district without hindrance. The
provisions obtained, were heaped up in Lerida and Balaguer; but while
Macdonald was thus acting in the plain of Urgel, O’Donnel formed and
executed the most skilful plan which had yet graced the Spanish arms.
We have seen that Baraguay d’Hilliers was left with eighteen
or twenty thousand men in the Ampurdan, but these troops were
necessarily scattered: seven hundred were at Palamos, San Filieu,
and other small ports along the coast; twelve hundred, under general
Swartz, were quartered in Abispal, one short march from Gerona,
and two hundred were at Calonjé, connecting Abispal with Palamos;
the rest were in Figueras, Rosas, Olot, Castelfollit, Gerona, and
Hostalrich, and several thousand were in hospital. O’Donnel having
exact knowledge of all this, left a small garrison in Taragona,
placed the baron d’Errolles at Montserrat, colonel Georget at
Igualada, and Obispo at Martorel, while with six thousand infantry
and four hundred cavalry he marched himself through the mountains,
by San Culgat to Mattaro on the sea-coast: then crossing the Tordera
below Hostalrich, he moved rapidly by Vidreras to Llagostera which he
reached the 12th of September. His arrival was unknown to Macdonald,
or Maurice Mathieu, or Baraguay d’Hilliers, for though many reports
of his intentions were afloat, most of them spread by himself, no
person divined his real object: by some he was said to be gone
against a French corps, which, from the side of Navarre, had entered
the Cerdaña; by others that he was concentrating at Manresa, and many
concluded that he was still in Taragona.
Having thus happily attained his first object, O’Donnel proceeded
in his plan with a vigour of execution equal to the conception.
Leaving Campo Verde with a reserve in the valley of Aro, he sent
detachments to fall on Calonjé and the posts along the coast, the
operations there being seconded by two English frigates; and while
this was in progress, O’Donnel himself on the 14th marched violently
down from Casa de Silva upon Abispal. Swartz, always unfortunate,
had his infantry and some cavalry under arms in an entrenched
camp, and accepted battle; but after losing two hundred men and
seeing no retreat, yielded, and all the French troops along the
coast were likewise forced to surrender. The prisoners and spoil
were immediately embarked on board the English vessels and sent to
Taragona.
[Sidenote: 1810. October.]
Until this moment Baraguay d’Hilliers was quite ignorant of
O’Donnel’s arrival, and the whole Ampurdan was thrown into confusion;
for the Somatenes, rising in all parts, cut off the communications
with Macdonald, whose posts on the side of Calaf and Cervera were at
the same time harassed by Errolles and Obispo: nevertheless, although
a rumour of Swartz’s disaster reached him, Macdonald would not credit
it, and continued in the plain of Urgel. Baraguay d’Hilliers was
therefore unable to do more than protect his own convoys from France,
and would have been in a dangerous position if O’Donnel’s activity
had continued; but that general having been severely wounded, the
Spanish efforts relaxed, and Napoleon, whose eyes were every where,
sent general Conroux, in the latter end of October, with a convoy
and reinforcement of troops from Perpignan to Gerona. O’Donnel,
troubled by his wound, then embarked; and Campo Verde, who succeeded
to the command, immediately sent a part of the army to Taragona, left
Rovira, and Claros, and Manso, to nourish the insurrection in the
Ampurdan, and took post himself at Manresa, from thence he at first
menaced Macdonald’s posts at Calaf; but his real object was to break
up that road, which he effected, and then passed suddenly through
Berga and Cardona to Puigcerda, and drove the French detachment,
which had come from Navarre to ravage the fertile district of
Cerdaña, under the guns of Fort Louis.
This excursion attracted Macdonald’s attention, he was now
fully apprized of Swartz’s misfortune, and he hoped to repair
it by crushing Campo Verde, taking Cardona, and dispersing the
local junta of Upper Catalonia, which had assembled in Solsona;
wherefore, on the 18th, he put his troops in motion, and the 19th,
passing the mountains of Portellas, entered Solsona; but the junta
and the inhabitants escaped to Cardona and Berja, and up the
valleys of Oleana and Urgel. Macdonald immediately sent columns
in all directions to collect provisions and to chase the Spanish
detachments, and this obliged Campo Verde to abandon the Cerdaña,
which was immediately foraged by the troops from Fort Louis. It only
remained to sieze Cardona, and on the 21st the French marched against
that place; but Campo Verde, by a rapid movement, arrived before
them, and was in order of battle with a considerable force when
Macdonald came up.
COMBAT OF CARDONA.
This town stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is joined by
a hog’s-back ridge to the great mountain spine, dividing Eastern
from Western Catalonia. The Cardona river washed the walls, a castle
of strength crowned the height above, and though the works of the
place were weak, the Spanish army, covering all the side of the
hill between the town and the castle, presented such an imposing
spectacle, that the French general resolved to avoid a serious
action. But the French and Italians marched in separate columns, and
the latter under Eugenio, who arrived first, attacked contrary to
orders; yet he soon found his hands too full, and thus, against his
will, Macdonald was obliged also to engage to bring Eugenio off. Yet
neither was he able to resist Campo Verde, who drove all down the
mountain, and followed them briskly as they retreated to Solsona.
Macdonald lost many men in this fight, and on the 26th returned
to Guisona. It was now more than two months since he had left the
Ampurdan, and during that time he had struck no useful blow against
the Spaniards, nor had he, in any serious manner, aided Suchet’s
operations; for the Catalans continually harassed that general’s
convoys, from the left of the Ebro, while the seventh corps, besides
suffering severely from assassinations, had been repulsed at Cardona,
had excited the people of the plain of Urgel to a state of rabid
insurrection, and had lost its own communications with the Ampurdan.
In that district the brigade of Swartz had been destroyed, the ports
of Filieu and Palamos taken, and the Catalans were every where become
more powerful and elated than before: Barcelona also was again in
distress, and a convoy from Perpignan destined for its relief dared
not pass Hostalrich. Macdonald therefore resolved to return to Gerona
by the road of Manreza, Moya, and Granollers, and having communicated
his intention to Suchet, and placed his baggage in Lerida, commenced
his march the 4th of November.
[Sidenote: 1810. Nov.]
Campo Verde getting intelligence of this design, took post to fight
near Calaf, yet when the French approached, his heart failed, and he
permitted them to pass. The French general therefore reached Manreza
the 7th, and immediately despatched parties towards Vich and other
places to mislead the Spaniards, while with his main body he marched
by Moya and the Gariga pass to Granollers, where he expected to
meet Baraguay d’Hilliers with the convoy from Barcelona; but being
disappointed in this, he returned by the Trenta Pasos to Gerona the
10th, and sent his convalescents to Figueras.
[Sidenote: 1810. Dec.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
The vicinity of Gerona was now quite exhausted, and fresh convoys
from France were required to feed the troops, while the posts in
the Ampurdan were re-established and the district reorganized.
Macdonald’s muster-rolls presented a force of fifty-one thousand men,
of which ten thousand were in hospital, six thousand in Barcelona,
and several thousand distributed along the coast and on the lines of
communication, leaving somewhat more than thirty thousand disposable
for field-operations. Of this number, fourteen thousand were placed
under Baraguay d’Hilliers to maintain the Ampurdan, and when the
convoys arrived from France the French marshal marched, with the
remaining sixteen thousand, for the fourth time, to the succour of
Barcelona. His divisions were commanded by Souham and Pino, for
Severoli had been recalled to Italy to organize fresh reinforcements;
but following his former plan, this march also was made in one solid
body, and as the defiles had been cut up by the Spaniards, and the
bridge over the Tordera broken, Macdonald set his troops to labour,
and in six hours opened fresh ways over the hills on the right and
left of the Trenta Pasos, and so, without opposition, reached
the more open country about Granollers and Moncada. The Spaniards
then retired by their own left to Tarasa and Caldas, but Macdonald
continued to move on in a solid body upon Barcelona; for as he was
resolved not to expose himself to a dangerous attack, so he avoided
all enterprise. Thus, on the 23d, he would not permit Pino to improve
a favourable opportunity of crushing the Catalans in his front, and
on the 24th, after delivering his convoy and sending the carts back
to Belgarde, instead of pursuing Campo Verde to Tarasa, as all the
generals advised, he marched towards the Llobregat; and as Souham and
Pino remained discontented at Barcelona, their divisions were given
to Frere and Fontanes.
Macdonald moved, on the 27th, towards Taragona, but without any
design to undertake the siege; for though the road by Ordal and
Villa Franca was broad and good, he carried no artillery or
wheel-carriages: the Spaniards, seeing this, judged he would again go
to Lerida, and posted their main body about Montserrat and Igualada;
but he disregarded them, and after beating Sarsfield from Arbos and
Vendril, turned towards the pass of Massarbones, which leads through
the range of hills separating Villa Franca from the district of
Valls. The Catalans had broken up both that and the pass of Christina
leading to the Gaya, yet the French general again made new ways, and
on the 30th spread his troops over the Paneda or plain of Taragona:
thus shewing of how little use it is to destroy roads as a defence,
unless men are also prepared to fight.
[Sidenote: 1811. Jan.]
Instead of occupying Reus as before, Macdonald now took a position
about Momblanch, having his rear towards Lerida, but leaving all the
passes leading from Taragona to the Ebro open for the Spaniards;
so that Suchet derived no benefit from the presence of the seventh
corps, nor could the latter feed itself, nor yet in any manner hinder
the Catalans from succouring Tortoza. For Campo Verde, coming from
Montserrat and Igualada, was encamped above the defiles between the
French position and Taragona, principally at Lilla, on the road
from Valls; and O’Donnel, who still directed the general movements,
although his wound would not suffer him to appear in the field, sent
parties into the Gariga behind Macdonald’s right flank to interrupt
his foraging parties, and to harass Suchet’s communications by the
Ebro.
From the strong heights at Lilla, the Catalans defied the French
soldiers, calling upon them to come up and fight, and they would
have done so if Macdonald would have suffered them, but after ten
days of inactivity he divided his troops into many columns, and in
concert with Abbé’s brigade of the third corps, which marched from
Xerta, endeavoured to inclose and destroy the detachments in the
Gariga; the Spaniards however disappeared in the mountains and the
French army only gained some mules and four thousand sheep and oxen.
With this spoil they united again on the left bank of the Ebro, and
were immediately disposed on a line extending from Vinebre, which
is opposite to Flix, to Masos, which is opposite to Mora, and from
thence to Garcia and Gniestar. Suchet was thus enabled to concentrate
his troops about Tortoza and the siege of that place was immediately
commenced.
The operations of the third corps during the five months it had been
dependent upon the slow movements of the seventh corps shall now be
related.
[Sidenote: 1810. Sept.]
Suchet, by resigning the plain of Urgel and the magazines at Monzon,
for Macdonald’s subsistence, in September, had deprived himself of
all the resources of the left bank of the Ebro from Mequinenza to
Tortoza, and the country about the latter place was barren; hence he
was obliged to send for his provisions to Zaragoza, Teruel, and other
places more than one hundred miles from his camp; and meanwhile the
difficulty of getting his battering train and ammunition down the
river from Mequinenza was increased because of the numerous bars and
weirs which impeded the navigation when the waters were low: moreover
Macdonald, by going to Cardona, exposed the convoys to attacks
from the left bank, by the Spanish troops which being stationed
between Taragona, Momblanch, and Falcet, were always on the watch.
Considering these things Suchet had, while the seventh corps was yet
at Lerida, and the waters accidentally high, employed the Neapolitan
brigade of the seventh corps to escort twenty-six pieces of artillery
down the river. This convoy reached Xerta the 5th of September, and
the Neapolitans were then sent to Guardia; general Habert was placed
at Tivisa; Mas de Mora was occupied by a reserve, and the Spaniards
again took post at Falcet. At this time general Laval died, and
his division was given to general Harispe, a person distinguished
throughout the war by his ability, courage, and humanity.
Meanwhile the Valencian army had again concentrated to disturb
the blockade of Tortoza, wherefore Suchet strengthened Boussard’s
detachment at Uldecona, and gave the command to general Musnier, who
was replaced at Zaragoza by general Paris. At the same time colonel
Kliski was sent to command the detachments on the side of Montalvan,
Teruel, Daroca, and Calatayud, where a partizan warfare was continued
with undiminished activity by Villa Campa, who had contrived to
open secret communications, and to excite some commotions even in
Zaragoza. On the 7th of August he had beaten a French foraging
detachment near Cuevas, and recaptured six thousand sheep, and at
Andorra had taken both convoy and escort. On the side of Navarre
also, Mina coming down into the Cinco Villas destroyed some
detachments, and impeded the foraging parties. Thus the third corps
also began to suffer privations, and no progress was made towards the
conquest of Catalonia.
In September, however, Villa Campa, having increased his forces,
advanced so near Suchet that general Habert attacked and drove him
over the frontier in dispersion, and recaptured all the sheep before
lost, and Suchet then brought down the remainder of the battering
train, and the stores for the siege; but as the waters of the Ebro
were low, the new road was used for the convoys, which thus came
slowly and with many interruptions and considerable loss; especially
on the 17th of September, when a whole Neapolitan battalion suffered
itself to be taken without firing a shot.
[Sidenote: 1810. Oct.]
In this manner affairs dragged on until the 28th of October; but then
Macdonald (O’Donnel having meantime captured Swartz and raised the
Ampurdan) returned to Gerona, whereby Suchet’s hopes of commencing
the siege were again baffled. And, as it was at this moment that
the assembling of the Cortez gave a new vigour to the resistance in
Spain and the regency’s plan of sending secret juntas, to organize
and regulate the proceedings of the partidas, was put in execution,
the activity of those bands became proportioned to the hopes excited,
and the supplies and promises thus conveyed to them. One of those
secret juntas composed of clergy and military men having property or
influence in Aragon, endeavoured to renew the insurrection formerly
excited by Blake in that province, and for this purpose sent their
emissaries into all quarters, and combined their operations with
Mina. They, also, diligently followed a plan of secretly drawing off
the provisions from Aragon, with a view to starve the French, and
general Carbajal, one of the junta, joining Villa Campa, assumed the
supreme command on that side; while captain Codrington, at the desire
of Bassecour, carried a Valencian detachment by sea to Peniscola to
fall on the left flank of Suchet, if he should attempt to penetrate
by the coast-road to Valencia. Thus, at the moment when Macdonald
returned to the Ampurdan, the Aragonese became unquiet, the partidas
from Navarre and the district of Montalvan and Calatayud, closed
in on Suchet’s communications, the Valencians came up on the one
side, towards Uldecona, and on the other Garcia Navarro moving from
Taragona with a division again assumed the position of Falcet.
[Sidenote: 1810. Nov.]
To check this tide of hostility the French general resolved first to
crush the insurrection project, and for this purpose detached seven
battalions and four hundred cavalry against Carbajal. Chlopiski,
who commanded them, defeated the Spaniards the 31st at Alventoza on
the route to Valencia, taking some guns and ammunition. Nevertheless
Villa Campa rallied his men in a few days on the mountain of Fuente
Santa, where he was joined by Carbajal, and having received fresh
succours renewed the project of raising the Aragonese. But Chlopiski
again defeated him the 12th of November, and the Spaniards fled in
confusion towards the river Libras, where the bridge breaking many
were drowned. The French lost more than a hundred men in this sharp
attack, and Chlopiski then returned to the blockade, leaving Kliski
with twelve hundred men to watch Villa Campa’s further movements.
The Ebro having now risen sufficiently, the remainder of the
battering train and stores were embarked at Mequinenza, and on the
3d dropt down the stream; but the craft outstripped the escort, and
the convoy being assailed from the left bank, lost two boats; the
others grounded on the right bank, and were there defended by the
cannoneers, until the escort came up on the one side, and on the
other, general Abbé, who had been sent from Guardia to their succour.
The waters, however, suddenly subsided, and the convoy was still in
danger until Suchet reinforced Abbé, who was thus enabled to keep
the Spaniards at bay, while Habert, with fifteen hundred men, made
a diversion by attacking the camp at Falcet. On the 7th the waters
again rose and the boats with little loss reached Xerta on the 9th,
and thus all things were ready to commence the siege, but the seventh
corps still kept aloof.
Suchet was now exceedingly perplexed; for the provisions he had with
so much pains collected, from the most distant parts of Aragon,
were rapidly wasting; forage was every day becoming scarcer, and the
plain of Urgel, was by agreement given over to the seventh corps,
which thus became a burthen instead of an aid to the third corps.
The latter had been, since the beginning of the year, ordered to
supply itself entirely from the resources of Aragon without any help
from France; and the difficulty of so doing may be judged of by the
fact, that in six months they had consumed above a hundred and twenty
thousand sheep and twelve hundred bullocks.
To obviate the embarrassments thus accumulating, the French general
called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his
head-quarters, and with their assistance reorganized the whole
system of internal administration, in such a manner, that, giving
his confidence to the natives, removing many absurd restrictions of
their industry and trade, and leaving the municipal power and police
entirely in their hands, he drew forth the resources of the provinces
in greater abundance than before. And yet with less discontent, being
well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police,
by the Aragonese, whose feelings he was careful to soothe, shewing
himself in all things, an able governor, as well as a great commander.
Macdonald was now in march from Barcelona towards Taragona, and
Suchet to aid this operation attacked the Spanish troops at Falcet.
General Habert fell on their camp in front the 19th, and to cut
off the retreat, two detachments were ordered to turn it by the
right and left; but Habert’s assault was so brisk, that before the
flanking corps could take their stations the Catalans fled, leaving
their general Garcia Navarro and three hundred men in the hands of
the victors. But while Suchet obtained this success on the side of
Falcet, the Valencian general Bassecour, thinking that the main body
of the French would be detained by Navarro on the left bank of the
Ebro, formed the design of surprising general Musnier at Uldecona.
To aid this operation, a flotilla from the harbour of Peniscola,
attacked Rapita, and other small posts occupied by the French, on
the coast between the Cenia and the Ebro; and at the same time the
governor of Tortoza menaced Amposta and the stations at the mouth of
the Ebro.
Bassecour moved against Uldecona in three columns, one of which,
following the coast-road towards Alcanar, turned the French left,
while another passing behind the mountains took post at Las
Ventallas, in rear of Musnier’s position, to cut him off from
Tortoza. The main body went straight against his front, and in the
night of the 26th the Spanish cavalry fell upon the French camp
outside the town; but the guards, undismayed, opened a fire which
checked the attack, until the troops came out of the town and formed
in order of battle.
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatch. MSS.]
At daylight the Spanish army was perceived covering the hills in
front; and those in rear also, for the detachment at Ventallas was
in sight; the French were thus surrounded and the action immediately
commenced; but the Valencians were defeated with the loss of sixteen
hundred men, and the detachment in the rear seeing the result made
off to the mountains again. Bassecour then withdrew in some order
behind the Cenia, where in the night Musnier surprised him, and at
the same time sent the cuirassiers by the route of Vinaros to cut
off his retreat, which was made with such haste and disorder that the
French cavalry falling in with the fugitives near Benicarlo, killed
or took nine hundred. Bassecour saved himself in Peniscola, and
thither also the flotilla, having failed at Rapita, returned.
Suchet having thus cleared his rear, sent his prisoners to France
by Jaca, and directed a convoy of provisions, newly collected at
Mequinenza, to fall down the Ebro to the magazines at Mora: fearing
however that the current might again carry the boats faster than the
escort, he directed the latter to proceed first, and sent general
Abbé to Flix to meet the vessels. The Spaniards in the Garriga
observing this disposition, placed an ambuscade near Mequinenza, and
attacked the craft before they could come up with the escort; the
boats were then run ashore on the right side, and seventy men from
Mequinenza came down the left bank to their aid, which saved the
convoy, but the succouring detachment was cut to pieces. Soon after
this the seventh corps having scoured the Garriga took post on the
left bank of the Ebro, and enabled the third corps to commence the
long delayed siege.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: 1810. Dec.]
Tortoza, with a population of ten thousand souls and a garrison of
from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered
the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was
under the command of general Lilli, Conde d’Alacha, a feeble man,
whose only claim was, that he had shewn less incapacity than others
before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the
Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was
considerably advanced ere any interruption was contemplated, and had
any well considered project for its relief been framed, it could
not have been executed, because jealousy and discord raged amongst
the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde was anxious to succeed O’Donnel in
command of the Catalonian army, Bassecourt held unceasing dispute
with his own officers, and with the members of the junta or congress
of Valencia; and Villa Campa repelled the interference both of
Carbajal and Bassecour.
At this critical time therefore every thing was stagnant, except the
English vessels which blockaded Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of
the Ebro, or from certain head-lands observed and pounced upon the
enemy’s convoys creeping along from port to port: they had thrown
provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds into Taragona and
Tortoza, and were generally successful, yet at times met with
disasters. Thus captain Rogers of the Kent, having with him the Ajax,
Cambrian, Sparrow-hawk, and Minstrel, disembarked six hundred men and
two field-pieces under captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed
a convoy intended for Barcelona; but as the seamen were re-embarking
in a disorderly manner, the French fell upon them and took or killed
two hundred, captain Fane being amongst the prisoners.
[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.]
The Catalan army was thirty thousand strong, including garrisons, and
in a better state than it had hitherto been; the Valencians, although
discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and all
things tended to confirm the Spaniards in the confident expectation
that whether succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. But
O’Donnel, who had been created Conde de’ Bispal was so disabled by
wounds, that he resigned the command soon after the siege commenced,
and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead;
for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most
noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as
in most others, they were greatly mistaken.
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
Tortoza, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicated with the
right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on
that river, from Zaragoza to the sea; and below and above the place
there was a plain, but so narrowed by the juttings of the mountains
at the point where the town was built, that while part of the houses
stood close to the water on flat ground, the other part stood on the
bluff rocky points shot from the hills above; and thus appeared to
tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together.
Five of these shoots were taken into the defence, either by the
ramparts or by outworks. That on the south of the town was crowned by
the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort
called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third
shoot, which being prolonged, and rising suddenly again between the
suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel: the
other two, and the deep ravines between them were defended by the
ramparts of the place, which were extremely irregular, and strong
from their situation, rather than their construction.
There were four fronts.
1º. _The northern defending the suburb._ Although this front was
built on the plain, it was so imbedded between the Ebro, the
horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be
approached without first taking the latter fort.
2º. _The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion
of San Pico._ Here the deep ravines and the rocky nature of the
ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the
horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult.
3º. _The south eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion
of Santa Cruz._ This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was
again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a
second ravine.
4º. _The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro._ The ground of
approach here was flat, the soil easy to work in, and the fort of
Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous
effect; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his
attack.
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
[Sidenote: Official extract of Mr. Wellesley’s despatches MSS.]
The Rocquetta, a rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right
bank of the Ebro, was fortified and occupied by three regiments,
but the other troops were collected at Xerta; and the 15th, before
day-break, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at that point,
with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He
marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas,
while general Habert, with two regiments and three hundred hussars,
moved from the side of Perillo, and attacked a detachment of the
garrison which was encamped on the Col d’Alba eastward of the city.
When Suchet’s column arrived in sight of the works, the head took
ground, but the rear, under general Harispe, filed off to the left,
across the rugged shoots from the hills, and swept round the place,
leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the
half circle ended on the Ebro, below Tortoza. The investment was then
perfected on the left bank by the troops from Rocquetta; and during
this movement Habert, having seized the Col d’Alba, entered the
line of investment, driving before him six hundred men, who hardly
escaped being cut off from the place by the march of Harispe. The
communication across the water was then established by three, and
afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a
matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery
and stores had to come from Rocquetta, across the water, which was
there two hundred yards wide, and in certain winds very rough.
The camps of investment were now secured, and meanwhile Macdonald,
sending the greatest part of his cavalry, for which he could find
no forage, back to Lerida by the road of Lardecans, marched, from
Mas de Mora, across the hills to Perillo, to cover the siege. His
patroles discovered a Spanish division in a position resting upon
the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and
thinking he could not remain for want of provisions, returned on
the 19th to Gniestar; but this retrograde movement was like to have
exposed the investing troops to a disaster, for as the seventh corps
retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the
first. However, Macdonald, seeing this, placed Frere’s division of
six thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet’s disposal,
on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well
do. These troops were immediately stationed behind the investing
force, on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Taragona
could most easily approach; and the remainder of the seventh corps
encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the
side of Falcet, only fifteen miles distant from Tortoza. In this
situation it could be more easily fed from Lerida, and could with
greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoy
of the third corps coming from Mequinenza.
[Sidenote: Wimphen’s Memoir.]
The Catalan army was now divided, part being kept on the Llobregat,
under general Caro, part under general Yranzo at Momblanch, and part,
under Campo Verde, on the hills watching Frere’s covering division.
O’Donnel had before directed two convoys upon Tortoza, but the
rapidity with which the investment had been effected prevented them
from entering the place; and while he was endeavouring to arrange
with Bassecour and Campo Verde a general plan of succour, his wounds
forced him to embark for Valencia, when the command, of right,
belonged to Yranzo, but the people, as I have before said, insisted
upon having Campo Verde.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 1._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF THE
SIEGE OF TORTOZA,
1811.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
SIEGE OF TORTOZA.
The half bastion of San Pedro, which was situated in the plain, and
close to the river, was the first object of the French attack, and
to prevent the fire of Fort Orleans from incommoding the trenches,
the line of approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the
right, and pushing forward the left; and to protect its flanks on the
one side, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack, while, on the
other side of the Ebro, trenches were opened against the bridge-head,
and brought down close to the water.
The 19th the posts of the besieged were all driven in, and an
unfinished Spanish work, commenced on the heights in advance of Fort
Orleans, was taken possession of. In the night, a flying sap was
commenced upon an extent of three hundred and sixty yards, and at
a distance of only one hundred and sixty from the fort; but in the
following night, the true attack was undertaken in the plain, during
a storm of wind which, together with the negligence of the Spaniards,
who had placed no guards in front of their covered way, enabled the
besiegers to begin this work at only one hundred and fifty yards from
the half bastion of San Pedro. This parallel was above five hundred
yards long, extending from the false attack against Fort Orleans,
down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun,
and on the left bank ground was broken against the bridge-head.
The 21st, at day-break, the Spaniards, perceiving the works,
commenced a heavy fire, and soon after made a sally; but they were
overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and
from the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro.
In the night of the 21st, the communication in the plain was extended
to fourteen hundred yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of
earth were placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men
shot down the Spanish artillery-men.
On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed;
and on the 24th, the second parallel of the true attack was commenced.
In the night of the 25th, at eleven o’clock and at one o’clock,
separate sallies were again made, but both were repulsed, and the
works were advanced to within twenty-five yards of the pallisades;
a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish
gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen.
In the night of the 26th, the besieged fell upon the head of the
sap, which they overturned, and killed the sappers, but were finally
repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed
forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open
trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way, before a
shot had been fired from either breaching or counter-batteries; a
remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that
the defence was ill-conducted.
The night of the 27th, the works were enlarged as much as the fire of
the place which was untouched would permit; but the Spaniards seeing
the besiegers’ batteries ready to open, made a general sally through
the eastern gates, against the false attack at Fort Orleans; and
through the southern gates against the works in the plain. General
Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point, but at
the latter they beat the French from the covered way, and arriving at
the second parallel, burnt the gabions and did much damage ere the
reserves could repulse them.
The night of the 28th, the batteries were armed with forty-five
pieces, of which seventeen were placed on the right bank, to take the
Spanish works at the main attack in reverse and to break the bridge.
At day-break all these guns opened, and with success, against the
demi-bastion, on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the
castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the
French guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured,
it was not rendered impassable.
On the 30th, the Spanish fire was in turn overpowered by the
besiegers, the bridge was then broken, and in the following night an
attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack; but two guns
which were still untouched and flanked the point of attack, defeated
this effort.
In the morning of the 31st, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head,
and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns
which had defended the half bastion of San Pedro. The besiegers then
effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and attached
the miner to the scarp.
In the night of the 31st, the miner worked into the wall, and
the batteries opened a breach in the curtain, where a lodgement
was established in preparation for an assault. At ten o’clock in
the morning the besieged, alarmed at the progress of the attack,
displayed the white flag. The negotiations for a surrender were,
however, prolonged until evening by the governor, without any result,
and the miner resumed his work in the night.
[Sidenote: 1811. January.]
At seven o’clock on the 1st of January, two practicable breaches
besides that in the curtain were opened by the artillery, and the
mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave
from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of
the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the
immediate possession of one of the forts,—a necessary precaution,
for disputes arose amongst the besieged, and general Lilli intimated
to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognised.
In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that his
talents were not those of a mere soldier, for suddenly riding up
to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a
company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard,
that hostilities had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the
spot, desired to be conducted to the governor who was in the citadel.
Lilli still wavering, was upon the point of renewing the defence,
in compliance with the desires of the officers about him, when the
French general thus came suddenly into his presence, and, although
the appearance of the Spanish guards was threatening, assumed an
imperious tone, spoke largely of the impatience of the French army,
and even menaced the garrison with military execution if any further
delay occurred; during this extraordinary scene general Habert
brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the governor then
signing a short capitulation, gave over the citadel to the French.
When this event was known in the city, the Spanish troops assembled,
and Alacha, in the presence of Suchet ordered them to lay down their
arms. Four hundred French and about fourteen hundred Spaniards had
fallen during the siege; and many thousand prisoners, nine standards,
one hundred pieces of artillery, ten thousand muskets, and immense
magazines, enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was
attributed to general Lilli’s treachery, by others to his imbecility,
and it would seem that there was reason for both charges.
The fall of Tortoza, besides opening the western passage into
Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province
and Valencia, reduced the Spanish army to twenty thousand men,
including the garrisons of the towns which still remained in their
possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falcet to Momblanch,
and Suchet, always prompt to make one success the prelude to another,
endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get
possession of the forts of Peniscola and of Felipe de Balaguer: nor
was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which
were five guns and a hundred men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but
at Peniscola his summons was disregarded and his detachment returned.
Meanwhile Macdonald leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the
Ebro, passed by Falcet to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to
invest Taragona; but without any real intention to do so, for his
cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortoza, and his
actual force did not exceed twelve thousand men. Campo Verde, who had
retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with six thousand men at
Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald’s foragers,
and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a
regiment of Italian dragoons, which would have been destroyed but for
the succour of a neighbouring post.
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes.]
[Sidenote: General Doyle’s despatches MSS.]
On the 14th Macdonald having marched towards Valls, Sarsfield
retired to Pla, and was pursued by general Eugenio with two thousand
Italian infantry. This officer being of a headstrong intractable
disposition, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders,
and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out
of it; and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the
hill in order of battle. Eugenio, instead of retiring, attacked the
first that entered the plain, but he fell mortally wounded, and his
men retreated fighting: meanwhile the firing being heard at Valls
Palombini marched to his assistance, but was himself beaten and
thrown into confusion, and Sarsfield at the head of the Spanish horse
was preparing to complete the victory, when the French colonel Delort
bringing up some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought
off the Italians; yet Delort himself was desperately wounded, and the
whole loss was not less than six hundred men.
Macdonald would not suffer his main body to stir, and Vacani asserts
that it was only by entreaty, that Palombini obtained permission to
succour Eugenio, which was certainly a great error, for so hot and
eager was Sarsfield in the pursuit, that he was come within two miles
of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn.
He, however, returned unmolested to the pass of Cabra, leaving his
cavalry as before in Pla, whence through bye-roads they communicated
with Taragona.
A few days after this fight Sarsfield came out again in order of
battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division
on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but
Palombini’s brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Taragona,
and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had
resolved to go to Lerida, but wished to move without fighting, broke
up from Valls in the night, and, with great order and silence, passed
by the road of Fuencalde, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas, and
though both were occupied by the Spaniards, they did not discover his
movements until the next day. From thence he marched by Momblanch,
upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterwards
spread his troops over the plains of Urgel, to collect provisions,
money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains.
[Sidenote: 1811. February.]
On the other hand the Catalan general, who had received stores and
arms both from England and Cadiz, renewed the equipment of his
troops, and called out all the Miguelettes and Somatenes, of the
hills round the plain of Urgel, to replace the loss sustained by
the fall of Tortoza. These new levies were united at Santa Coloma
de Querault under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at
Igualada and Villafranca, by which the Spaniards holding a close and
concentrated position themselves, cut off Macdonald equally from
Barcelona and the Ampurdan; and this latter district was continually
harassed by Errolles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez, which
still kept the mountains behind Olot, Vich, and the Cerdaña.
Meanwhile Suchet being called by the exigences of his government to
Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under
Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella: he also withdrew
his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of
February, but he left that general, with a division, in command of
Tortoza, having two thousand men at Perillo to connect the city with
San Felipe de Balaguer. Thus all things seemed to favour the Spanish
side, and give importance to their success, against Eugenio; for they
did not fail to attribute both Suchet’s and Macdonald’s retreats, to
fear occasioned by the skirmish with that general; and with some shew
of reason as regarded the latter, seeing that his night march had all
the appearance of a flight.
Macdonald, while gathering provisions at Lerida, and stores and guns
at Tortoza, also repaired the works of Balaguer near Lerida, to serve
as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by
the Noguera, Cinça, and Segre rivers. However Sarsfield and Campo
Verde kept about Cervera and Calaf, watching for an opportunity to
fall on the French detachments, and meanwhile the organization of the
province went on.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 2.]
It may appear extraordinary that the war could have been continued
by either side under such difficulties, but the resources were still
great. A patriotic junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure
provisions, and although the English orders in council interfered
with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could
be bought at the rate of 12 lbs. to the dollar, while with lord
Wellington’s army in Castile it often cost half a dollar a pound.
When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march
could be always traced by the swarms of boats, loaded with people and
provisions, which shooting out from the coast-towns, would hover, for
a while, under the protection of the English vessels, and then return
when the danger was over: and the enemy did never meddle with these
boats lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet
however armed Rapita, and other small places, at the mouth of the
Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to certain craft, which he kept
to watch for provision-vessels, sailing from Valencia for Taragona,
and to aid French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France.
To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the head-lands
from St. Filieu, to Blanes, with troops, and thus small convoys
crept along shore; a fleet loaded with provisions and powder,
escorted by three frigates, entered it in February, and a continual
stream of supply was also kept up by sailing-boats and other small
vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous
craft belonging to the people along the coast. And besides these
channels, as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it
was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision
sometimes to reach Barcelona by land; the Spanish generals winked
at it, and Milans and Lacy, have even been charged with permitting
corn to pass into that city for private profit, as well as from
consideration for the citizens. By these, and like expedients, the
war was sustained.
[Sidenote: 1811. March.]
[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS.]
No important event occurred after the skirmish in which Eugenio
fell, until the 3d of March, when the Spaniards having observed that
the garrison of Tortoza was weakened by the detachment at Perillo,
endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault
Tortoza itself. At the same time they also attacked the fort of San
Filippe, but failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat
although with considerable loss. This attempt was however followed
by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde having
assembled eight thousand men at Molinos del Rey, four thousand at
Guisols, and three thousand at Igualada, prepared to surprise the
city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the
town-major of Monjuic. Trusting to this treason, he first sent eight
hundred chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalette,
to enter that place, and they descended into the ditch in expectation
of having the gate opened; but Maurice Mathieu, apprized of the plan,
had prepared every thing to receive this unfortunate column, which
was in an instant overwhelmed with fire.
Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All that part of
Catalonia west of the Upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Ordal to
the sea, including the district of Tortoza, was placed under Suchet’s
government, and seventeen thousand of Macdonald’s troops were united
to the third corps, which was thus augmented to forty-two thousand
men, and took the title of the “_Army of Aragon_.” It was destined
to besiege Taragona, while Macdonald, whose force was thus reduced
to twenty-seven thousand under arms, including fifteen thousand in
garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of
Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, Seu d’Urgel,
and Montserrat, and to wear down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other
chiefs, who kept in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña: and a
division of five thousand men, chiefly composed of national guards,
was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, for the purpose of acting
in the Cerdaña, and on the rear of the partizans in the high valleys.
By these means the line of operations for the invasion of Catalonia
was altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened,
the seventh corps reduced in numbers, became, instead of the
principal, the secondary army; and Macdonald’s formal method was thus
exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay
already caused in the siege of Tortoza, could never be compensated;
Suchet had been kept on the Ebro, when he should have been on the
Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the fourth corps
in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena.
CHAPTER IV.
[Sidenote: 1811. March.]
When the troops of the seventh corps were incorporated with the army
of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Taragona, were pushed
forward with Suchet’s usual activity; but previous to touching upon
that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare, which
Villa Campa, and others, had carried on against Aragon during the
siege of Tortoza. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment
of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished,
especially along the northern coast, from Coruña to Bilbao, where
experience had also produced a better application of them than
heretofore. The movements of the English squadrons, in that sea,
being from the same cause better combined with the operations of the
Partidas, rendered the latter more formidable, and they became more
harassing to the enemy as they acquired something of the consistency
of regular troops in their organization, although irregular in their
mode of operations: for it must not be supposed, that because the
guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the
country, and was necessarily accompanied with great evils, that as
an auxiliary it was altogether useless. The interruption of the
French correspondence was, as I have already said, tantamount to a
diminution on their side of thirty thousand regular troops, without
reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue
the Partidas; this estimate may even be considered too low, and it is
certain that the moral effect produced over Europe by the struggle
thus maintained, was very considerable.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 2.]
Nevertheless the same number of men under a good discipline would
have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, and
less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed,
all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as
irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization
approaches that of the regular troops: thus militia are better than
armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular
officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. But the
Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; and when
they were dispersed, which happened nearly as often as they took the
field, the war must have ceased in Spain, had it not been kept alive
by the Partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. Again,
when the British armies kept the field, the Partidas harassed the
enemy’s communications, and this constituted their military value;
yet it is certain that they never much exceeded thirty thousand in
number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without
the supplies of England, unless a spirit of order and providence,
very different from any thing witnessed during the war, had arisen
in Spain. How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources
possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the
military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants
first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical
defence.
That many of the Partida chiefs became less active, after they
received regular rank, is undeniable; but this was not so much a
consequence of the change of denomination, as of the inveterate
abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and by which
the Partidas were necessarily affected when they became a constituent
part of those armies; many persons of weight have indeed ascribed
entirely to this cause, the acknowledged diminution of their general
activity at one period. It seems, however, more probable that a life
of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and
the discontent of the people at the exactions of the chiefs, had
in reality abated the desire to continue the struggle; inactivity
was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious
interference by the government. But it is time to support this
reasoning by facts.
During the siege of Tortoza, the concentration of the third and
seventh corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises
at a moment when the Partidas, rendered more numerous and powerful
by the secret juntas, were also more ardent, from the assembly of
the Cortez, by which the people’s importance in the struggle seemed
at last to be acknowledged. Hence no better test of their real
influence on the general operations can be found than their exploits
during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were
to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural
difficulties, the district immediately around Tortoza completely
sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create
a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently
and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret juntas. The
number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they
were sent were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting
them off proportionably augmented. Now the several operations of
Villa Campa during the blockade have been already related, but,
although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to
the Spaniards; and when that chief, after the siege was actually
commenced, came down, on the 19th December 1810, towards the side of
Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by colonel Kliski, who captured or
killed one hundred and fifty in the village of Blancas. The Spanish
chief then retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado
from Cuença, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and
took post between Molina and Albaracin.
At this period Tortoza had surrendered, and Musnier’s division was
spread along the western part of Aragon, wherefore Suchet immediately
detached general Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and general
Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two Partidas. Paris
fell in with the Empecinado near Molina, and the latter then joined
Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain
position near Frias, where he was joined by Abbé; and they continued
the pursuit for several days, but finding that the fugitives took
different routes, again separated; Paris followed Villa Campa, and
Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuença, from whence Carbajal
and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris failing to overtake
Villa Campa, entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three
containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then
returned; and the whole expedition lasted only twelve days, yet the
smaller Partidas, in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a
detachment of fifty men near Fuentes: and this was followed up on
the side of Navarre by Mina, who entered the Cinco Villas in April,
and cut to pieces one hundred and fifty _gens-d’armes_ near Sadava.
However Chlopiski pursued him also so closely, that he obliged his
band to disperse near Coseda in Navarre.
[Sidenote: 1811. April.]
During this time the Valencians had been plunged in disputes,
Bassecour was displaced, and Coupigny appointed in his stead. The
notables, indeed, raised a sum of money for recruits, but Coupigny
would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also
given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very
neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. However, when
Tortoza fell, the Valencians were frightened, and set about their own
defence. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some
smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery-road
to their capital: they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the
rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent fifteen hundred men
into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th
of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having
attempted to surprise Uldecona, which was weakly guarded, were also
defeated and sabred by the French cavalry.
These different events, especially the destruction of the
gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the partizans, and
Suchet was enabled to go to Lerida, in the latter end of March, to
receive the soldiers to be drafted from the seventh corps: Macdonald
himself could not, however, regain Barcelona without an escort,
and hence seven thousand men marched with him on the 29th of the
month, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield,
but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither Macdonald nor
Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined
for the siege. Nevertheless Sarsfield, getting intelligence of the
march, passed by Calaf with his own and Eroles’ troops, and waited
on Macdonald’s flanks and rear near the Cardenera river, while a
detachment, barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front.
This bridge was indeed carried, but the town being abandoned, the
Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night; an act which
was immediately revenged, for the flames being seen to a great
distance, so enraged the Catalans, that in the morning all the armed
men in the district, whether regulars, Miguelettes, or Somatenes,
were assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury
upon Macdonald’s rear, as it passed out from the ruins of the burning
city. The head of the French column was then pushing for the bridge
of Villamara, over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; and
as the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, Sarsfield,
seeing that the French rear stood firm to receive the attack of the
Somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his
division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the
road. Macdonald, however, concentrated his troops, gained the second
bridge, and passed the Llobregat, but with great difficulty and with
the loss of four hundred men, for his march was continually under
Sarsfield’s fire, and some of his troops were even cut off from the
bridge, and obliged to cross by a ford higher up. During the night,
however, he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel,
whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and on the 3d of April,
Harispe, who commanded the escort, recommenced the march, and passing
by Villa Franca, Christina, Cabra, and Momblanch, returned to Lerida
the 10th.
The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each
assigned to a distinct army.
1º. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Taragona and subdue the
lower part of the province.
2º. Macdonald, with that part of the seventh corps called the active
army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line extending from
Taragona, through Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains
about Olot.
3º. Baraguay d’Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to
hold the Ampurdan with the troops before assigned to his charge,
and to co-operate, as occasion might offer, with Macdonald, under
whose orders he still remained; and the division of five thousand
men before mentioned as having been collected near Mount Louis, at
the entrance of the French Cerdaña, was to act on the rear of the
Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front.
Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of
the province were both sinking. The great losses of men sustained
at Tortoza and in the different combats; the reputation of Suchet;
the failure of the attempts to surprise Barcelona, Perillo, and San
Filippe de Balaguer; the incapacity of Campo Verde, which was now
generally felt, and the consequent desertion of the Miguelettes,
would probably have rendered certain the French plans, if at the
very moment of execution they had not been marred by Rovira, who
surprised the great fortress of Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees on
that side of Catalonia. This, the boldest and most important stroke
made by a Partida chief, during the whole war, merits a particular
detail.
SURPRISE OF FERNANDO DE FIGUERAS.
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley’s Despatches. MSS.]
[Sidenote: General Campbell’s MSS.]
[Sidenote: General Doyle’s MSS.]
[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s MSS.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]
The governor of the place, general Guillot, enforced no military
discipline, his guards were weak, he permitted the soldiers to use
the pallisades for fuel, and often detached the greatest part of the
garrison to make incursions to a distance from the place; in all
things disregarding the rules of service. The town, which is situated
below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands, was
momentarily occupied by the Italian general Peyri, with about six
hundred men, who were destined to join Macdonald, and who trusting to
the strength of the fortress above, were in no manner on their guard.
And the garrison above was still more negligent; for Guillot had on
the 9th of April sent out his best men to disperse some Somatenes
assembled in the neighbouring hills, and this detachment having
returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again the next day,
slept while the gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit
for duty: thus the ramparts were entirely unguarded. Now there were
in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called
Juan, employed as under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira
had, such was the negligence of discipline, obtained from the head
of their department the keys of the magazines, and also that of a
postern under one of the gates.
Rovira, having arranged his plan, came down from the mountain of St.
Lorens de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the
covered way with seven hundred chosen men of his own Partida. General
Martinez followed in support with about three thousand Miguelettes,
and the Catalan brothers, having previously arranged the signals,
opened the postern, and admitted Rovira, who immediately disarmed
the guard and set wide the gates for the reserve; and although some
shots were fired, which alarmed the garrison, Martinez came up
so quickly that no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or
forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the
governor and sixteen hundred soldiers and camp-followers were taken
in their quarters, and thus in an hour Rovira mastered one of the
strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired
as a signal to the Somatenes in the surrounding mountains, that
the place was taken, and that they were to bring in provisions as
rapidly as possible. Meanwhile general Peyri alarmed by the noise in
the fortress and guessing at the cause, had collected the troops,
baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to
Gerona, but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight
retired to Bascara. For having mounted the hills during the night,
to observe how matters went, he thought nothing could be done, an
opinion condemned by some as a great error; and indeed it appears
probable that during the confusion of the first surprise, a brisk
attempt by six hundred fresh men might have recovered the fortress.
At Bascara five hundred men detached from Gerona, on the spur of the
occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay
d’Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces without any delay.
Then Peyri, although troubled by the fears of his troops, many of
whom were only national guards, returned to Figueras, and driving
the Spaniards out of the town took post in front of the fort above;
but he could not prevent Martinez from receiving some assistance
in men and provisions from the Somatenes. The news of Rovira’s
exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula,
extending its exhilarating influence, even to the Anglo-Portuguese
army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the
Spaniards, but Baraguay d’Hilliers with great promptness assembled
his dispersed troops, and on the 13th invested the fort with six
thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and this so quickly that
the Spaniard had not time, or, more probably neglected, to remove,
sixteen thousand muskets which were in the place.
Martinez remained governor, but Rovira was again in the mountains,
and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this Partida
chief, seemed to be moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came
up to Vich, intending first to relieve Figueras, and then in concert
with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and
sea. Rovira himself collected a convoy of provisions near Olot.
Captain Bullen with the Cambrian and Volontaire frigates, taking
advantage of the French troops having been withdrawn from Gerona,
drove out the small garrison from San Filieu and Palamos, destroyed
the batteries, and made sail to join captain Codrington at Rosas.
A Spanish frigate, with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with
supplies, anchored at Palamos; and Francisco Milans, after beating
a small French detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich;
Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from
Montserrat reduced Olot and Castelfollit. Sarsfield however remained
in the Seu d’Urgel, and directed the mountaineers to establish
themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away again with great
loss by a detachment from the garrison of Lerida.
On the 3d of May, Rovira having brought his convoy up to Besalu,
Campo Verde, who had arranged that captain Codrington should make a
diversion by an attack on Rosas, drew Milans from Hostalrich, and
having thus united eleven thousand men marched in several columns
from Avionet and Villa Fan against the town, hoping to draw Baraguay
d’Hilliers to that side; and to beat him, while Rovira, forcing a
small camp near Llers, at the opposite quarter, should introduce the
convoy and its escort into the fortress. The circuit of investment
was wide, and very difficult, and therefore slightly furnished of
men; but it was strengthened by some works, and when the Spanish
columns first advanced, the French general reinforced the camp near
Llers, and then hastened with four thousand men against Campo Verde,
who was already in the valley of Figueras, and only opposed by one
battalion. Baraguay d’Hilliers immediately fell on the right flank
of the Spaniards and defeated them; the French cavalry, which had
been before driven in from the front, rallied and completed the
victory, and the Spaniards retreated with a loss of fifteen hundred
including prisoners. This affair was exceedingly ill-managed by
Campo Verde, who was so sure of success that he kept the sheep of
the convoy too far behind, to enter, although the way was open for
some time, hence the succour was confined to a few artillery-men,
some tobacco, and medicines. Meanwhile the English ships landed some
men at Rosas, but neither did this produce any serious effect, and
the attempt to relieve Figueras having thus generally failed, that
place was left to its own resources which were few; for the French
with an unaccountable negligence had always kept a scanty supply
of provisions and stores there. Martinez, who had now above four
thousand men, was therefore obliged to practise the most rigorous
economy in the distribution of food, and in bearing such privations
the peninsular race are unrivalled.
Macdonald was so concerned for the loss of Figueras, that, setting
aside all his own plans, he earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend
the siege of Taragona, and restore him the troops of the seventh
corps: Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain,
thinking that the possession of Upper Catalonia depended upon one
powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had
no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hopes of
obtaining a marshal’s staff rested on the taking of Taragona, and
whose preparations were all made for that siege, Suchet I say, whose
judgement was unclouded, and whose military talent was of a high
order, refused to move a step towards Figueras, or even to delay, for
one moment, his march against Taragona.
He said that “his battalions being scattered, in search of supplies,
he could not reunite them, and reach Figueras under twenty-five days;
during that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d’Hilliers,
could gather in provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the
fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest
troops, and to accumulate great numbers on such a sterile spot would
not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties
with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had already
received information of the disaster, and given orders for the
remedy; and it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on
Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment
of execution, because of the loss of a fort; it was in Taragona,
the greatest part of the forces of Catalonia would be shut up, and
it was only in such a situation that they could be made prisoners;
at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortoza, eighteen thousand men and eight
hundred officers had been captured, and if ten or twelve thousand
more could be taken in Taragona, the strength of Catalonia would be
entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualling Figueras,
that place, by occupying their attention, would become more hurtful
than useful to them; because Campo Verde might, and most probably
would, march to its succour, and thus weaken Taragona, which was a
reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the
latter; wherefore he resolved, notwithstanding the separation of his
battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, to move down
immediately and commence the siege.” A wise determination and alone
sufficient to justify his reputation as a general.
Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely
draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d’Hilliers. In June, when a
detachment from Toulon, and some frontier guards had arrived at
Figueras, the united forces amounting to fifteen thousand men, he
took the command in person and established a rigorous blockade,
working day and night, to construct works of circumvallation and
contravallation; his lines six miles in length, crowning the tops
of the mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, proved what
prodigious labours even small armies are capable of. Thus with
incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place; but this was at
a late period in the year, and when Suchet’s operations had quite
changed the aspect of affairs.
When Tortoza fell, that general’s moveable columns traversing the
borders of Castile, the eastern districts of Valencia, a portion
of Navarre, and all the lower province of Catalonia, protected the
collection of supplies, and suppressed the smaller bands which
swarmed in those parts; hence, when the siege of Taragona was
confided to the third corps, the magazines, at Lerida and Mora,
were already full; and a battering train was formed at Tortoza, to
which place the tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at
Zaragosa were conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, the greatest
part of the artillery-men and engineers, and ten battalions of
infantry were also collected in that town, and from thence shot and
shells were continually forwarded to San Felippe de Balaguer. This
was a fine application of Cæsar’s maxim, that war should maintain
itself, for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials,
collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories;
nothing was derived from France but the men. It is curious, however,
that Suchet so little understood the nature and effects of the
English system of finance, that he observes, in his memoirs, upon the
ability with which the ministers, made Spain pay the expense of this
war by never permitting English gold to go to the Peninsula; he was
ignorant, that the paper money system had left them no English gold
to send.
The want of forage in the district of Tortoza, and the advantage
of the carriage-road by the Col de Balaguer, induced the French
general to direct his artillery that way; but his provisions, and
other stores, passed from Mora by Falcet and Momblanch to Reus, in
which latter town he proposed to establish his stores for the siege,
while Mora, the chief magazine, was supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe,
and Mequinenza. Divers other arrangements, of which I shall now give
the outline, contributed to the security of the communications, and
enabled the army of Aragon to undertake the great enterprize for
which it was destined.
1º. Detachments of gens-d’armes and of the frontier guards of
France, descending the high valleys of Aragon, helped to maintain
tranquillity on the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied the castles
of Venasque and Jaca, which had been taken by Suchet in his previous
campaign.
2º. The line of correspondence from France, instead of running as
before through Guipuscoa and Navarre, by Pampeluna, was now directed
by Pau, Oleron, and Jaca to Zaragoza; and in the latter city, and in
the towns around it, four or five battalions, and a proportion of
horsemen and artillery, were disposed, to watch the Partidas from
Navarre and the Moncayo mountains.
3º. Four battalions with cavalry and guns, were posted at Daroca
under general Paris, whose command extended from thence to the fort
of Molina, which was armed and garrisoned.
4º. General Abbé was placed at Teruel with five battalions, three
hundred cuirassiers, and two pieces of artillery, to watch Villa
Campa, and the Valencian army which was again in the field.
5º. Alcanitz and Morella were occupied by fourteen hundred men,
whereby that short passage through the mountains from Aragon to
Valencia was secured; and from thence the line to Caspe, and down the
Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortoza, was protected by twelve hundred men;
Tortoza itself was garrisoned by two battalions, the forts at the
mouth of the Ebro were occupied, and four hundred men were placed in
Rapita.
This line of defence from right to left was fourteen days march, but
the number of fortified posts enabled the troops to move from point
to point, without much danger; and thus the army of the great and
rich province of Valencia, the division of Villa Campa, the Partidas
of New Castile and Navarre, including Mina and the Empecinado, the
most powerful of those independent chiefs, were all set at nought
by twelve thousand French, although the latter had to defend a line
of one hundred and fifty miles. Under cover of this feeble chain
of defence, Suchet besieged a strong city which had a powerful
garrison, an open harbour, a commanding squadron of ships, and a
free communication, by sea, with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the
Balearic islands. It is true that detachments from the army of the
centre, acting on a large circuit round Madrid, sometimes dispersed,
and chased the Partidas that threatened Suchet’s line of defence, but
at this period, from circumstances to be hereafter mentioned, that
army was in a manner paralysed.
While the French general’s posts were being established, he turned
his attention to the arrangements for a permanent supply of food.
The difficulty of procuring meat was become great, because he wisely
refrained from using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, lest the
future supply of his army should be anticipated, and the minds of
the people of that province alienated by the destruction of their
breeding flocks; to avoid this, he engaged contractors to furnish him
from France, and so completely had he pacified the Aragonese, through
whose territories the flocks were brought, and with whose money
they were paid for, that none of his contracts failed. But as these
resources were not immediately available, the troops on the right
bank of the Ebro made incursions after cattle beyond the frontiers of
Aragon; and when Harispe returned from Barcelona, eight battalions
marched upon a like service up the higher valleys of the Pyrenees.
It was in this state of affairs that Suchet received intelligence of
the surprise of Figueras, which induced him to hasten the investment
of Taragona. Meanwhile, fearing that Mina might penetrate to the
higher valleys of Aragon, and in conjunction with the partidas of
Upper Catalonia cut off all correspondence with France, he detached
Chlopiski with four battalions and two hundred hussars to watch the
movements of that chief only, and demanded of the emperor, that some
troops from Pampeluna should occupy Sanguessa, while others, from
the army of the north, should relieve the detachments of the army of
Aragon, at Soria and Calatayud.
The battalions sent up the high valleys of Catalonia returned in
the latter end of April. Suchet then reviewed his troops, issued a
month’s pay, and six day’s provisions to each soldier, loaded many
carriages and mules with flour, and, having first spread a report,
that he was going to relieve Figueras, commenced his march to
Taragona by the way of Momblanch. Some Miguelettes entrenched in the
pass of Ribas, were dispersed by Harispe’s division on the 1st of
May, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but four hundred
men were left in Momblanch, where a post was fortified, to protect
the line of communication with Lerida, and to prevent the Spanish
partizans on that flank, from troubling the communication between
Mora and Reus. The 2d the head-quarters were fixed at Reus, and the
3d the Spanish outposts were driven over the Francoli; meanwhile
Habert, sending the artillery from Tortoza by the Col de Balaguer,
moved himself with a large convoy from Mora by Falcet to Reus.
CHAPTER V.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
In Taragona, although a siege had been so long expected, there was
a great scarcity of money and ammunition, and so many men had,
as Suchet foresaw, been drawn off to succour Figueras, that the
garrison, commanded by colonel Gonzalez, was not more than six
thousand, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants and the seamen
of the port. The town was encumbered with defensive works of all
kinds, but most of them were ill-constructed, irregular, and without
convenient places for making sallies.
Taragona itself was built upon rocks, steep on the north-east and
south, but sinking gently on the south-west and west into low ground.
A mole formed a harbour capable of receiving ships of the line, and
beyond the mole there was a roadstead. The upper town was surrounded
by ancient walls, crowning the rocks, and these walls were inclosed
by a second rampart with irregular bastions which ran round the whole
city. On the east, across the road to Barcelona, there was a chain
of redoubts connected by curtains, with a ditch and covered way; and
behind this line there was a rocky space called the Milagro, opening
between the body of the place and the sea. The lower town, or suburb,
was separated from the upper, by the inner ramparts of the latter,
and was protected by three regular and some irregular bastions
with a ditch; a square work, called Fort Royal, formed a species
of citadel within, and the double town presented the figure of an
irregular oblong, whose length lying parallel to the sea, was about
twelve hundred yards.
On the east beyond the walls, a newly constructed line of defence was
carried along the coast to the mouth of the Francoli, where it ended
in a large redoubt, built to secure access to that river when the
ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut
by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called
the Prince, half-way between that near the Francoli and the town; and
it was supported by the mole which being armed with batteries, and
nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea-line.
The approach on the side of the Francoli river was of a level
character, and exposed to the fire of the Olivo, a large outwork
on the north, crowning a rocky table-land of an equal height with
the upper town, but divided from it by a ravine nearly half-a-mile
wide, across which the aqueducts of the place were carried. This
Olivo was an irregular horn-work, four hundred yards long, with a
ditch twenty-four feet deep and forty wide, but the covered way
was not completed, and the gorge was only closed by a loop-holed
wall; neither was this defence quite finished, as the steepness of
the rock, and the fire of the city appeared to render it secure.
The bastion on the left of the Olivo, was cut off by a ditch and a
rampart from the body of the work, and on the right also within the
rampart there was a small redoubt of refuge, with a high cavalier
or bank, on which three guns were placed that overlooked all the
country round. The ordinary garrison of the Olivo was from twelve
to fifteen hundred men, and it contained fifty out of three hundred
pieces of artillery which served the defence of Taragona.
The nature of the soil combined with the peculiarities of the works,
determined Suchet’s line of attack. On the north and east side
the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches
unfavourable for breaching batteries; and as all the guns and stores
would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless
the Olivo was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided in an
attack. Wherefore, on the side of the lower town the French resolved
to approach, although the artificial defences were there accumulated,
and the ground between the town and the Francoli river taken in
reverse by the Olivo, which rendered it necessary first to reduce
that outwork. But this part was chosen by the French, because the
soil was deep and easily moved, their depôts and parks close at hand,
the ground-plot of the works so salient that they could be easily
embraced with fire, and because the attack would, it was supposed,
cut off the garrison from fresh water, yet this last advantage was
not realized.
On the 4th of May the French, passing the Francoli, drove in the
outposts, took possession of two small detached redoubts, situated
on the northern side, called the forts of Loretto, and invested the
place. However the Spanish troops supported by the fire of the Olivo
killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day a fruitless
attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the
fleet under captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of
the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of
war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys, then
coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balaguer. The investing
troops whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly
incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was
maintained and perfected.
Habert’s division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea
to the bridge of the Francoli; general Frere’s division connected
Habert with Harispe’s, whose troops occupied the ground before
the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe’s left to the
road of Barcelona which runs close to the sea on the east side of
Taragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the
Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the park, which was
established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja,
contained sixty-six battering guns and mortars, each furnished with
seven hundred rounds. There were also thirty-six field-pieces, two
thousand artillery-men to serve the guns, seven hundred sappers
and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and nearly fifteen thousand
infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a
strong covering position, the depôt at Reus was secured by fortified
convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions.
Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which
were farther secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and
the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo,
but this water, whose source was ten or twelve miles off, was also
necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut
off by the Somatenes, which obliged the French to guard its whole
course during the siege.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]
Meanwhile Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras had sent Sarsfield
and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada,
and embarking at Mattaro himself, with four thousand men, came on
the 10th to Taragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had
produced great consternation. Yet when Campo Verde arrived with
this reinforcement, and when colonel Green, the English military
agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz, in the Merope, bringing with
him fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and
stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of
defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at
Momblanch was attacked by two thousand Miguelettes, and the Somatenes
assembled in the vicinity of Reus.
Suchet detached general Frere with four battalions to relieve the
former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus
also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his
patroles over the Gaya as far as Torre de Barra, where he found
some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a
convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of
both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different
towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and
it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both
sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total
disregard of civilized usages prevailed.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 2._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF THE
SIEGE OF TARAGONA.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
Sarsfield’s arrival near Momblanch threatened the communications
between Reus and Mora, and at the same time a Valencian column,
acting in concert with captain Adam of the Invincible, attacked
the posts of Rapita and Amposta: the former was abandoned by the
garrison, and the latter was surrounded by the Valencians, but a
regiment sent from Tortoza, after disengaging Amposta, defeated the
Valencians near Rapita; nevertheless Suchet, unwilling to lessen his
already too small force, did not restore the latter post.
SIEGE OF TARAGONA.
The French general having resolved to attack the lower town,
commenced his operations by constructing a fort and batteries, on
the right of the Francoli, near the sea-shore, with a view to keep
the English ships of war and the gun-boats at a distance from his
projected trenches. These works commenced in the night of the 7th,
were successfully continued towards the mouth of the river under
the fire of the vessels; a trench, lined with musqueteers, was also
carried from the left along the bank of the river to the bridge, but
the Spaniards continually harassed the investing troops both from
within and from without, and made some attempts against the camp;
wherefore the brigade of general Salme, which was close to the Olivo,
was obliged to entrench, and yet lost fifty or sixty men daily by the
enemy’s skirmishers.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Sect. 1.]
On the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French stormed two
external entrenchments near the Olivo, and then turned them against
the besieged; the next morning a vigorous attempt to retake them
was repulsed with a loss of one hundred men, and on the Francoli
side, a sally supported by the shipping failed in consequence of the
cowardice of some Spanish officers. On the same day, besides this
attack on the side of the Francoli, the garrison came out from the
Barcelona gate, and six hundred Somatenes from the Upper Gaya fell on
the patroles of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini scoured the
country on the 15th as far as Arbos.
The 18th a powerful sortie from the lower town was made by Gonzalez,
who passed the bridge, and, aided by a fire from the place, from the
Olivo, and from the fleet, pressed Habert’s division hard; Suchet
however came down with his reserve, pushed between the river and
the Olivo, and menaced the Spanish line of retreat, which obliged
Gonzalez to retire with loss. On the 20th three other sallies were
made from the Olivo, and from the upper town, on the Barcelona side,
but they were all in like manner repulsed; and that day Sarsfield
took post with twelve hundred men on a high and rugged place near
Alcover, thus menacing the depôt at Reus. The French general
therefore detached two battalions of infantry and some cavalry, under
general Broussard, to dislodge him, which was effected with the
loss of a hundred French; but three days later he appeared before
Momblanch, and was only driven away by the united brigades of Frere
and Palombini, who marched against him. Divers attempts were also
made upon the line of Falcet, especially at Grattallopes, where the
Spanish colonel, Villamil, having attacked Morozinski, a Pole, the
latter defended himself successfully, and with a bravery that has
always distinguished the people of that heroic nation; a nation whose
glory springs like an _ignis fatuus_ from the corruption of European
honour!
These repeated attacks having warned Suchet how difficult it would be
to maintain, with his weak army, so great an extent of communication,
he abandoned his post at Momblanch, and contented himself with
preserving the lines of Falcet and of Felippe de Balaguer; a measure
the more necessary, that the garrison of Taragona was now greatly
augmented; for on the 16th, the Blake had sailed for Valencia to seek
reinforcements, and Carlos O’Donnel, who had succeeded Bassecour,
gave him above two thousand infantry and two hundred cannoneers, who
were safely landed at Taragona on the 22d, two thousand stand of
arms being, in return, delivered by captain Codrington to O’Donnel,
to equip fresh levies. Above twelve thousand men were thus collected
in the fortress, but all the richest citizens had removed with their
families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were
dispirited.
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, and
carried on his approaches from both ends of the Spanish entrenchments
which he had seized on the night of the 13th. His engineers wished
to reach a round hill, close to the works, on which they proposed to
plant their first breaching battery, and they crowned it on the 22d,
but with much loss, being obliged to carry the earth for the work,
up the hill in baskets, and they were continually interrupted by
sallies. Three counter-batteries were, however, completed and armed
on the 27th with thirteen pieces, of which six threw shells; but to
effect this, the soldiers dragged the artillery over the rocks, under
a heavy fire of grape, and the garrison making a vigorous sally,
killed general Salme, when he opposed them with the reserves. The
moment was dangerous to the French, but they were finally victorious,
and the fire of the batteries having opened the same morning, was
sustained until the evening of the 29th, when a breach being formed,
the assault was ordered.
STORMING OF THE OLIVO.
Upon the success of this attack, Suchet thought, and with reason,
that his chance of taking the town would depend, seeing that his army
was too feeble to bear any serious check. Wherefore, having formed
his columns of assault, he personally encouraged them, and at the
same time directed the troops along the whole line of investment to
advance simultaneously, and menace every part of the town. The night
was dark, and the Spaniards were unexpectant of an attack, because
none of their guns had yet been silenced; but the French, full of
hope and resolution, were watching for the signal. When that was
given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side,
made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat all their drums, and with
loud shouts approached the town at those opposite quarters; the
rampart of the place was instantly covered with fire from within and
from without; the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst
the noise of four hundred guns the storming columns rushed upon the
Olivo.
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
The principal force made for the breach; but a second column,
turning the fort, got between it and the town, at the moment when
fifteen hundred men, sent to relieve the old garrison, were entering
the gates. Some of the French instantly fell on their rear, which
hurrying forward, gave an opportunity to the assailants to penetrate
with them before the gates could be closed, and thirty sappers with
hatchets having followed closely, endeavoured to break the door,
while Papignay, their officer, attempted to climb over the wall; the
Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers, but the other troops,
planted their ladders to the right and left, and cutting through the
pointed stakes above, entered the place and opened the gate.
At the main attack the French boldly assailed the narrow breach, but
the ditch was fifteen feet deep, the Spaniards firm, and the fire
heavy, and they were giving way, when the historian, Vacani, followed
by some of his countrymen, (it is a strange error to think the
Italians have not a brave spirit!) cut down the paling which blocked
the subterranean passage of the aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch
and afterwards into the fort. Then the Spaniards were driven from the
ramparts on all sides, back to the little works of refuge, before
noticed, as being at each end of the Olivo, from whence they fired
both musketry and guns; but the French and Italian reserves, followed
by Harispe with a third column now entered the place, and with a
terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished,
some escaped, a thousand were taken, and amongst them their commander
who had received ten wounds.
In the morning three thousand Spaniards came out of Taragona, yet
retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms
to dispose of the dead; this was however treated with scorn and the
heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury
them. Campo Verde now gave general Senens de Contreras the command
of Taragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was about
ten thousand strong, including some new levies made by the junta of
Catalonia.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
Suchet’s investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras
his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when
trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town including
the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along
the sea-shore, that is to say, 1º. The Nun’s bastion and a half-moon
called the King’s, which formed, on the Spanish right, a sort of
horn-work to the royal fort or citadel. 2º. The bastion of San Carlos
and a half-moon called the Prince’s, which stood on the left, in
the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place,
and served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3º. The
sea-line itself and the Francoli fort.
The 2d of June the besieged made a fruitless sally, and in the night
of the 3d some advanced Spanish entrenchments were destroyed by the
French. Sarsfield then entered Taragona with a detachment, and took
the command of what was called the Port, which included the Mole,
the works leading to the Francoli, and the suburb or lower town,
Contreras still remaining governor of all, although reluctantly, for
he expected no success.
In the night of the 4th the approaches were carried forward by the
sap, the second parallel was commenced, and on the 6th the besiegers
were within twenty yards of the Francoli fort, which had a wet
ditch and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries which
had been armed as the trenches proceeded, opened their fire against
it on the 7th. The fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten
o’clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, three hundred
chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river,
attacked the ruins, and the defenders retired fighting, towards
the half-moon of the Prince. The assailants then made a disorderly
attempt to enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss
of fifty men, yet the lodgement was under a heavy fire secured; and
the next night a battery of six pieces was constructed there, with a
view to silence the guns of the Mole, which together with that of the
place, endeavoured to overwhelm the small space thus occupied, with
shot.
In the nights of the 8th and 9th under terrible discharges from both
the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to fort
Francoli on the right, and on the left, carried to within seventy
yards of the Nun’s bastion.
The 11th Sarsfield making a sally, killed some men, and retarded
the works; but before the 15th, three approaches by the sap were
conducted against the Nun’s bastion, where the besiegers crowned
the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh
batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front
from the Prince to the Nun’s bastion.
On the morning of the 16th fifty-four guns opened from the French
batteries, and the Spaniards placing sand-bags along the parapets
endeavoured by musketry to kill the gunners, who were much exposed,
while all the cannon of the place which could be directed upon the
trenches were employed to crush the batteries. Towards evening this
fire had in a great degree mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed
the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their
right; but the loss and damage was great on both sides, for two
consumption magazines exploded in the town and the Nun’s bastion was
breached. The engineers also observed that the ditch of the Prince
was not carried round to the sea, and hence Suchet who feared a
continuation of this murderous artillery battle, resolved to storm
that point at once, hoping to enter by the defect in the ditch.
At nine o’clock two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the
trenches, and after a short resistance entered the work both by the
gap of the ditch, and by escalade; the garrison fought well, and
were put to the sword, a few only escaping along the quay, these
were pursued by a party of the French, who passing a ditch, and
draw-bridge which cut off the road from the bastion of San Carlos,
endeavoured to maintain themselves there, but being unsupported were
mostly destroyed. The lodgement thus made was immediately secured and
included in the trenches.
During the night of the 17th the old batteries were repaired and the
construction of a new one, to breach the bastion of San Carlos, was
begun upon the half-moon of the Prince; the saps and other approaches
were also pushed forward, a lodgement was effected in the covered way
of the Nun’s bastion, and the third parallel was commenced; but on
the right of the trenches, in advance of the Prince, the workmen came
upon water which obliged them to desist at that point.
The 18th the third parallel was completed and the descent of the
ditch at the Nun’s bastion was commenced by an under-ground gallery;
yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and
thirty-seven shells thrown very exactly into the lodgement on the
counterscarp, obliged the besiegers to relinquish their operations
there during the day. At this time also the gun-boats which hitherto
had been of little service in the defence, were put under the
direction of the British navy, and worked with more effect; yet it
does not appear that the enemy ever suffered much injury from the
vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their
convoys on the Col de Balaguer road.
During the nights of the 19th and 20th all the French works were
advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery, in the Prince,
being ready, opened its fire against San Carlos, and was followed
by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine
silenced the Prince’s battery after a few rounds, the damage was
however repaired, and at four o’clock in the evening nearly all
the Spanish guns being overcome and the breaches enlarged, Suchet
resolved to storm the lower town. But previous to describing this
terrible event, it is necessary to notice the proceedings within and
without the place, that a just idea of the actual state of affairs on
both sides may be formed.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 4.]
Macdonald had continued the blockade of Figueras with unceasing
vigilance; and as the best of the Miguelettes were shut up there,
and as the defeat of Campo Verde, on the 3d of May, had spread
consternation throughout the province, the operations to relieve it
were confined to such exertions as Rovira, Manso, and other chiefs
could call forth. In like manner Francisco Milans was left in the
Hostalrich district, and by his local popularity amongst the people
of the coast between Palamos and Barcelona, was enabled to keep up
an irregular force; but his object was to be made captain-general of
the province, and his desire of popularity, or some other motive,
led him to favour the towns of his district at the expense of the
general cause. Mattaro and Villa Nueva de Sitjes trafficked in corn
with Barcelona, and one of their secret convoys was detected at a
later period passing the outposts with Milans’ written authority. He
put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but he did
not succeed in removing the suspicion of corruption from himself.
This traffic was very advantageous for the French, and Maurice
Mathieu being either unwilling to disturb it, or that having recently
suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro, he feared to risk his troops, made
no movement to aid the siege of Taragona, which it would appear, he
might have done by taking possession of Villa Nueva de Sitjes.
Such was the state of Eastern Catalonia, and in the western parts,
the infantry of Sarsfield, and of Eroles, who had come down to the
vicinity of Valls, and the cavalry under Caro, which was a thousand
strong, formed, with the new levies ordered by the junta, an army
of seven or eight thousand men. This force might have done much,
if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, and led by others, had
not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege,
Sarsfield had acted, as we have seen, with some success on the side
of Momblanch and Reus; but when he was sent into the lower town, the
active army being reduced to Eroles’ division, the cavalry could
do no more than supply small detachments, to watch the different
French convoys and posts. Campo Verde, however, fixed his quarters at
Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding
Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet,
demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, and formed a general
plan for the succour of the place. But in Taragona his proceedings
were viewed with dislike, and discord and negligence were rendering
the courage of the garrison of no avail.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]
We have seen that captain Codrington landed two thousand five hundred
Valencians on the 22d of May; besides that reinforcement, vessels
loaded with powder and other stores, and additional mortars for the
batteries, came from Carthagena and from Cadiz in the beginning
of June. From Murcia also came reinforcements; but such was the
perversity of some authorities and the want of arrangement in all,
that the arms of these men were taken away from them before they
sailed; and yet in Taragona there were already two thousand men
without arms, a folly attributed by some to the Spanish authorities
of Murcia, by others to colonel Roche, the English military agent.
Nor did the confusion end here; for captain Codrington, when he
sailed from Taragona to Peniscola in the latter end of May, supplied
O’Donnel with arms for two thousand recruits, who were to replace
the Valencians then embarked; and a few days afterwards he delivered
so many more at the city of Valencia, that Villa Campa and the
Empecinado, whose troops, after their dispersion in April by Abbé
and Paris, had remained inactive, were enabled again to take the
field. Thus it appears that, while men were sent without arms from
Valencia to Taragona, arms were being conveyed from the latter place
to Valencia.
[Sidenote: Report of Contreras.]
The troops in Taragona had, by these different reinforcements, been
augmented to near seventeen thousand men; however that number was
never available at one time, for the Murcians were sent to Montserrat
to be armed, and the losses during the operations, including those
caused by sickness, had reduced the garrison at this period to less
than twelve thousand. Several colonels of regiments, and many other
officers, feigning sickness, or with open cowardice running away,
had quitted the town, leaving their battalions to be commanded by
captains; the general of artillery was incapable, and Contreras
himself, unknown to the inhabitants, unacquainted with the place
or its resources, was vacillating and deceitful to those serving
under him. He was very unwilling to undertake the defence, and he
was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield
inside. In the fleet also some disagreement occurred between captain
Codrington and captain Bullen, and the commanders of the Diana and
Prueba, Spanish ships of war, were accused of gross misconduct.
Carlos O’Donnel and his brother the Conde de Abispal, at the desire
of captain Codrington, had permitted Miranda to embark with four
thousand of the best Valencian troops for Taragona, there to join in
a grand sally; but they exacted from Codrington a pledge to bring
those who survived back, for they would not suffer this their
second aid in men to be shut up in the place when the object was
effected. These troops landed the 12th at Taragona, yet the next day,
at Campo Verde’s order, Miranda, instead of making a sally as had
been projected, carried them off by sea to Villa Nueva de Sitjes,
and from thence marched to meet a detachment of horse coming from
Villa Franca; and on the 15th two squadrons of cavalry issuing from
Taragona by the Barcelona gate, passed the French line of investment,
without difficulty, and also joined Miranda who then marched to unite
with Campo Verde at Igualada.
This movement was in pursuance of a grand plan to succour the place;
for the junta of Catalonia, having quitted Taragona after the fall
of the Olivo, repaired with the archives to Montserrat, and as usual
made their clamours for succour ring throughout the peninsula:
they had received promises of co-operation from O’Donnel, from
Villa Campa, and from the partizans, and Campo Verde proposed, that
the English ships of war should keep between the Col de Balaguer
and Taragona, to cannonade the French convoys on that route; that
a detachment should take post at Ordal to watch the garrison of
Barcelona, and that he with the remainder of his forces, which
including Miranda’s division amounted to ten thousand infantry and a
thousand cavalry, should take some commanding position near Reus. In
this situation he designed to send a detachment towards San Filippe
de Balaguer to communicate with the fleet, and, avoiding any serious
action, to operate by small corps against the French line of supply,
and thus oblige them to raise the siege, or if they came out of
their lines to fight them in strong positions.
Contreras treated this plan with contempt. He said it would cause
the loss both of the place and the army; that the French would not
raise the siege except for a general battle, and that within their
lines the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the
garrison; wherefore he desired the general-in-chief to attack them in
conjunction with himself, and the junta, who were at variance with
Campo Verde, backed this proposal.
Neither of these plans, however, appear sound; for though it is
certain, if the generals could have depended upon their troops,
such was the reduced state of Suchet’s force, and so extensive
was his line of investment, that it would have been easy to break
through; yet, unless the French were put entirely to the route,
which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because
the communication was already open by sea. On the other hand Campo
Verde’s plan was only proposed on the 13th, and would have been too
slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in
accord with that great maxim of war, which prescribes the _attack of
an enemy’s weakest point with the greatest possible numbers_, to have
marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus, to beat the
troops there, and destroy the depôts; and then seizing some strong
posts on the hills close to the besieger’s lines to have entrenched
it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If Campo Verde
had destroyed either of these depôts the siege must have been raised;
and if he was unable to beat two or three thousand infantry at those
places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison,
to destroy sixteen thousand of all arms in the entrenchments before
Taragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francoli river; but so
tender was he of the depôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to
raise the Somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with three thousand
infantry from Teruel, and that general who was active and experienced
in the guerilla warfare, soon dispersed the Spanish levies, and took
their chief with many others prisoners, after which he joined the
besieging army.
Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, two
hundred inferior officers, and above two thousand five hundred men
during the siege, and had not more than twelve thousand infantry fit
for duty; but colonel Villamil, a partizan of Campo Verde’s, taking
advantage of Abbé’s absence, marched with a thousand men to attack
Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came
with his whole division to Falcet on the 20th, and captured a convoy
of loaded mules, driving back the escort with some loss to Mora. The
design was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit
of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin
Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet
thus weakened. However the French general would not turn from his
principal object, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that
the loss of the convoy did not seriously affect him.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]
Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order
to assault the lower town was given to an army, small in number,
but full of vigour, and confident of success; while, in the place
there was confusion, folly, and cowardice. Contreras indeed acted a
shameful part; for during captain Codrington’s absence, Sarsfield had
concerted with the navy, that in the case of the lower town being
stormed, the ships should come to the mole and the garrison would
retire there, rather than to the upper town; meanwhile Campo Verde
recalled him to the active army, intending that general Velasco
should replace him; but at three o’clock on the 21st, the breaches
being then open, and the assault momentarily expected, Contreras
commanded Sarsfield instantly to embark, falsely averring that such
was the peremptory order of Campo Verde. Sarsfield remonstrated
in vain, and a boat from the Cambrian frigate carried him and his
personal staff and his effects on board that vessel; thus the command
of the troops was left to an inefficient subordinate officer, the
assault took place at that moment, and when Velasco arrived, he found
only the dead bodies of those he was to have commanded. Contreras
then assured captain Codrington and the junta, that Sarsfield had
acted without his consent, and had in fact betrayed his post!
STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN.
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
[Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s Papers, MSS.]
This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two
breaches had been made in the bastions, and one in the fort Royal;
they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the French
fire; nevertheless the assault was ordered, and as some suppose,
because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield’s removal, and
the consequent confusion in the garrison.
Fifteen hundred grenadiers, destined for the attack, were assembled
under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was formed to
support the storming troops, and to repel any sally from the upper
town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French guns
thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient
for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the
shattered walls gave way. At last Harispe’s division began to menace
the ramparts on the side of Barcelona, to distract the attention
of the Spaniards, and then Suchet exhorting the soldiers to act
vigorously, gave the signal and let them loose while it was still
day. In an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants
swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the fort Royal; the
Spaniards, without a leader, were thrown into confusion, and falling
in heaps broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and
towards the upper town, and a reserve stationed under the walls of
the latter was overthrown with the same shock. Then some of the
fugitives, running towards the mole, were saved by the English
launches, others escaped into the upper town, a few were made
prisoners, and the rest were slaughtered.
At eight o’clock the lower town was in the possession of the enemy.
Fifteen hundred bodies, many of whom were inhabitants, lay stretched
upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on
fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage
ceased, the troops were rallied, working parties were set to labour;
and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers
were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing forward to the
walls of the upper town.
The front before them consisted of four bastions with curtains, but
without a ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left,
that of St. John opposite their centre, that of Jesus opposite their
right; but the bastion of Cervantes, which covered the principal
landing place of the Milagro, although on the same front of defence,
was somewhat retired and not included within the attack. A hollow
piece of ground, serving as a trench, had enabled the French to
establish their left in a side bastion of the wall, connecting the
upper with the lower town; and their right was strongly protected by
some houses lining the road, for between the two parts of the city
there were four hundred yards of open garden-ground interspersed with
single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing
places of the Milagro, two mortars which were on the hill of the fort
Loretto, concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed
close up to the wall; but at daylight the ships of war passed the
port delivering their broadsides in succession, Contreras then showed
the heads of columns as if for a sally, and the French skirmishers
retired; whereupon the Spanish general, contented with having thus
cleared his front, re-entered the place.
The men saved from the mole, by the ships, were now relanded in
the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived,
but being like the first detachment without arms only added to the
confusion and difficulties of the governor. Nevertheless as the loss
of the French in the storming was about six hundred, and that of the
Spaniards not more than two thousand, the besieged had still nine
thousand fighting men; a number nearly equal to the whole infantry
of Suchet’s army; and hence Contreras, far from quailing beneath the
blow, would not even receive a flag of truce by which the French
general offered honourable conditions.
Suchet’s position was becoming more embarrassing every moment; he
had now delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly
one-fifth of its original number, and the men’s strength was spent
with labouring on his prodigious works: his line of communication
with Lerida was quite intercepted and that with Mora interrupted,
and he had lost a large convoy of provisions together with the mules
that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner
abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially
under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered
with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any
moment, and Campo Verde with ten thousand men was daily menacing his
rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who
had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who
had just then taken the convoy with Massena’s baggage at the Puerto
de Arlaban, in fine all the Partidas of the mountains of Albaracin,
Moncayo, and Navarre, were in motion, and menacing his position in
Aragon. This rendered it dangerous for him to call to his aid any
more troops from the right of the Ebro, and yet a single check might
introduce despondency amongst the soldiers of the siege, composed
as they were of different nations, and some but lately come under
his command; indeed their labours and dangers were so incessant and
wearing, that it is no small proof of the French general’s talent,
and the men’s spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken.
On the 24th the crisis seemed at hand, intelligence arrived in the
French camp, that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river
to fight, at the same time the garrison got under arms, and an
active interchange of signals took place between the town and the
fleet. Suchet immediately placed a reserve to sustain the guards
of his trenches, and marched with a part of his army to meet Campo
Verde. That general, pressed by the remonstrances of Contreras and
the junta, had at last relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles,
and united his army at Momblanch on the 22nd, and then moving
by Villardoña, had descended the hills between the Gaya and the
Francoli; he was now marching in two columns to deliver battle,
having directed Contreras to make a sally at the same moment. But
Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found, or pretended to
find, some obstacles and halted, whereupon Campo Verde instantly
relinquished the attack, and marched to Vendril before the French
general could reach him.
The 25th he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and
for that purpose desired that three thousand men of the garrison
should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder be held ready to cut
their way through the enemy’s lines during the action. He likewise
assured him that four thousand English were coming by sea to aid
in this project, and it is probable some great effort was really
intended, for the breaching batteries had not yet opened their fire,
and the wall of the place was consequently untouched; ten thousand
infantry and a thousand cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few
miles of the French camp on the Barcelona side; eight thousand men
accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on
the 26th colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with four
thousand, but with twelve hundred British soldiers, sent from Cadiz
and from Gibraltar to succour Taragona.
[Sidenote: Contreras’ Report]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 1.]
The arrival of this force, the increase of shipping in the roadstead,
and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the garrison
from the depression occasioned by the disappointment of the 27th;
and they were still more elated when in the evening colonel Skerrett
and his staff, accompanied by general Doyle, captain Codrington, and
other officers of the navy, disembarked, and proceeded to examine
the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when
they heard that the British commander, because his engineers affirmed
that the wall would give way after a few salvos from the breaching
batteries, had resolved to keep his troops on board the transports,
idle spectators of the garrison’s efforts, to defend the important
place which he had been sent to succour.
Contreras, thus disappointed on all sides, and without dependence
on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the
29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so join the
army in the field; meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so
willed it. And he had good reason for his resolution, for the ground
in front of the walls was high and narrow; and although there was
neither ditch nor covered way, a thick hedge of aloe trees, no small
obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart, which was also
cut off from the town, and from the side works, by an internal ditch
and retrenchment. Behind the rampart the houses of the great street
called the Rambla, were prepared for defence, furnishing a second
line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the
making of sallies in force, which at such a period was a good mode of
defence, the reduced state of the French army gave reason to believe
that eight thousand brave men could resist it effectually.
The 28th a general plan for breaking out on the Barcelona side, the
co-operation of the fleet, and a combined attack of the Spanish army,
was arranged; and Eroles embarked for the purpose of re-landing at
Taragona, to take the leading of the troops destined to sally forth
on the 29th. The French general had however completed his batteries
on the night of the 27th, and in the morning of the 28th they opened
with a crashing effect. One magazine blew up in the bastion of
Cervantes; all the guns in that of San Paulo were dismounted; the
wall fell away in huge fragments before the stroke of the batteries,
and from the Olivo, and from all the old French trenches, the guns
and mortars showered bullets and shells into the place. This fire
was returned from many Spanish pieces, still in good condition, and
the shoulders of the French batteries were beaten down; yet their
gunners, eager for the last act of the siege, stood to their work
uncovered, the musketry rattled round the ramparts, the men on both
sides crowded to the front, and while opprobrious words and mutual
defiance passed between them, the generals, almost within hearing of
each other, exhorted the soldiers to fight with the vigour that the
crisis demanded.
STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN.
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
[Sidenote: Rogniat.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
[Sidenote: Codrington’s papers. MSS.]
At five o’clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased,
and fifteen hundred men led by general Habert passing out from the
parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred
under general Ficatier followed in support, general Montmarie led a
brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to
break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating, to
turn the interior defence of the Rambla. Harispe took post on the
Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison.
The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than a
hundred yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and
when within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to
turn to the right, and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and
of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the breach with
apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction
was great, the head of the French column got into confusion, gave
back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and a
great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At
that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier, who had obtained leave
to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst
the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance,
went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up
the breach, notwithstanding many wounds reached the top, and there
fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the
first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by
the following masses of the French.
Meanwhile Montmarie’s sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario,
and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted
by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the
Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a
devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made,
but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted,
and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and
soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona
gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for
the landing-places within the Milagro; but that way also had been
intercepted by general Rogniat with his sappers, and then numbers
throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces,
while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of
the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by
Harispe’s men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand in
number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror;
fire had been set to many houses, Gonzales, fighting manfully, was
killed, Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only
saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected
by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When
the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into
the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns
swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed
together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing
through the flaming streets at a trot, rode upon the fugitives,
sabring those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter
there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women
and children had, during the siege, been removed from Taragona by
the English shipping, and that the richest citizens had all gone to
Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only seven or
eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on
board the vessels; nine thousand, including the sick and wounded,
were made prisoners; more than five thousand persons were slain, and
a great part of the city was reduced to ashes.
CHAPTER VI.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
Suchet had lost in killed and wounded during the siege between four
and five thousand men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to
efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the
ruined city been given, than the French general was again in movement
to disperse Campo Verde’s force. In the night of the 29th Frere’s
division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe’s upon Villa Nueva,
being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé’s brigade and the heavy
cavalry. Campo Verde then abandoned Vendril, and Harispe’s column,
although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva,
where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark
in the vessels off the port. The light cavalry sabred some and made
fifteen hundred prisoners, including the wounded men who had been
carried there from Taragona during the siege; and Frere’s column in
a like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa
Franca. Campo Verde then fled with the main body to Igualada, and
Suchet pushed on with the reserve to Barcelona, where he arranged
with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from
re-embarking, or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras.
[Sidenote: 1811. July.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 5.]
Distrust, confusion, and discord now prevailed amongst the Catalans.
The people were enraged against Campo Verde, and the junta sent to
Cadiz to demand the duke of Infantado as a chief. Milans, who had
assembled some Miguelettes and Somatenes about Arens de Mar, openly
proposed himself, and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in
any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to
have the latter made captain-general, and a junta of general officers
actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde
remained, and that general had already reached Agramunt, whence,
overwhelmed with his misfortunes, he meant to fly towards Aragon. He
was, however, persuaded to return to Cervera, and call a council of
war, and then it was proposed to abandon Catalonia as a lost country,
and embark the army; and this disgraceful resolution, although
opposed by Sarsfield, Santa Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was
adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The junta
remonstrated loudly, all the troops who were not Catalans deserted,
making principally for the Segre and Cinça rivers, in hope to pass
through Aragon into New Castile, and so regain their own provinces;
every place was filled with grief and despair.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 2.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.]
In this conjuncture captain Codrington refused to embark any
Catalans, but he had promised to take back the Valencians, and
although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated
by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract: yet even
this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle, on
the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other. Meanwhile colonel
Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned
to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his controul; and the
captain of the Prueba frigate, having under his command, several
Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of
the municipality, ammunition, stores, and money, all belonging to
Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances,
that captain Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch
him back by force.
In the midst of these afflicting scenes Suchet brought up his troops
to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu with a part of his garrison
marching upon Mataro, dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had
collected there; but the Valencian infantry to the number of two
thousand four hundred escaped to Arens de Mar, and being received on
board the English vessels were sent back to their own country. The
cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses, would not embark, and
menaced their general Caro, who fled from their fury; nevertheless
Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money
from the smaller depôts, marched inland. Campo Verde then embarked
privately in the Diana to avoid the vengeance of the people, and
general Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command; yet he
would have been disregarded, if Eroles had not set the example of
obedience. Suchet however moved against him, and first scouring the
valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all
directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras.
Lacy, thus pressed, collected the cavalry and a few scattered
Catalonian battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, and Seu
d’Urgel, and took refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself
into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed.
Suchet unable to find subsistence in the valleys, resolved to
attack this celebrated place, and for this purpose leaving Frere
and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time
upon Montserrat, returned himself with the reserve to Reus. Here he
received despatches from Napoleon, who had created him a marshal,
and had sent him orders to take Montserrat, to destroy the works
of Taragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march
against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town of Taragona,
ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortoza, and
marched against Montserrat on the 22d of July by the way of Momblanch
and San Coloma to Igualada. At the same time Harispe and Frere moved
by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of
the garrison of Barcelona.
TAKING OF MONTSERRAT.
This strong-hold was occupied by fourteen or fifteen hundred
Miguelettes and Somatenes, inadequate as it proved to defend it
against a great body of men such as Suchet was bringing up. But
Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to the natural
strength, and it would soon have been impregnable; for on all sides
the approaches were through the midst of steeps and precipices, and
high upon a natural platform, opening to the east, and overlooking
the Llobregat, stood the convent of “_Nuestra Señora de Montserrat_,”
a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had
removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well
stored and armed, and above it huge peaks of stone shot up into
the clouds so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet’s
expressive simile, “It was like the skeleton of a mountain.”
There were three ways of ascending to this convent; one from
Igualada which winded up on the north, from Casa Mansana, between a
perpendicular rock and a precipice; this road which was the only one
supposed practicable for an attack, was defended by two successive
batteries, and by a retrenchment immediately in front of the convent
itself. The other two ways were, a foot-path on the south leading
to Colbato, and a narrow road crossing the Llobregat and running by
Monistrol on the east, but both so crossed and barred by precipices
as to be nearly inaccessible to troops.
Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front, and to
intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; he then occupied the roads
of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe’s and Frere’s divisions, and
directed Abbé’s brigade to attack from the convent by the northern
line. The 24th Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the
25th advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and
supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops, but exposed
to the fire of the Somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above.
In a short time the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of
the column as it turned an angle, but more light troops being sent
out, they climbed the rough rocks, and getting above the battery shot
down upon the gunners, while the leading companies of the column
rushed forward, in front, and before a second discharge could be
made, reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire.
The Spaniards then threw down large stones upon the French until
the fire of the light troops above, became so galling that the work
was abandoned, the French however followed close, and the men above
continued clambering along with that energy which the near prospect
of success inspires; thus the Spaniards, unable to rally in time,
were overtaken and bayoneted in the second battery, and the road was
opened.
Abbé now re-formed his troops and marched on to assail the
entrenchments of the convent, but as he advanced a sharp musketry
was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison
came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were
supposed to be the brigade from Colbato; they however proved to be
the light troops first sent out, to keep off the Somatenes from the
right flank; for when the column advanced up the mountain, these
men, about three hundred in number, had wandered too far to the
right, and insensibly gaining ground up hill, had seized one or two
of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished; then growing
more daring, they pressed on unopposed, until they gained the rock
immediately overhanging the convent itself, and perceiving their
advantage, with that intelligence which belongs only to veterans,
immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their commanding position,
the steep rocks, and narrow staircases, compensated for their
inferiority of numbers, and in a little time they gained one of the
doors, entered, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and
galleries, with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from
the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived, and then the whole garrison
gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat,
where from their knowledge of the country they easily avoided
Harispe’s men.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
The loss of this place, which by Eroles and others was attributed
to colonel Green’s having carried off the money destined for
strengthening it, was deeply felt from its military importance, and
from the superstitious veneration in which it was held: several towns
then offered their submission, many villages gave up their arms, and
a general fear of Suchet’s prowess began to spread all over Spain;
but the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered.
The anarchy attendant upon the fall of Taragona and the after
movements of Suchet had indeed been great; and as we have seen, most
of the persons who might have aided to restore order, acted so as to
increase the general confusion, and their bad example was followed
by the authorities in other provinces who were most immediately
connected with Catalonia: thus Cuesta, at this time governor of the
Balearic isles, Bassecour who was at Cuença, and Palacios, who had
just been made captain-general of Valencia, did in no manner comport
themselves as the occasion required. Cuesta who had neglected to
send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now entered into
a negotiation to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against those
of Taragona, a praiseworthy thing, if, as Suchet asserts, it arose
from humanity; and not an ill-judged measure in itself, because the
Catalonian soldiers to be exchanged were the best in Spain, and the
French prisoners were ruined in constitution by their hard captivity.
But at this period of distress it was impolitic, and viewed with
suspicion by the Catalonians, as tending to increase the French
force. At the desire of Mr. Wellesley this exchange was, however,
peremptorily forbidden by the regency, and Cuesta refused to receive
any more prisoners at Cabrera, which while those already there were
so tormented, was, from whatever motive arising, a meritorious act,
and the last important one of his life, for he soon after died. The
prisoners remained, therefore, a disgrace to Spain and to England;
for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound
to insist, that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the
result of her interference, should not be exposed upon a barren rock,
naked as they were born, and fighting for each other’s miserable
rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the
English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking advantage of
the times, plundered the people along the coast in concert; and
they were all engaged in the smuggling of tobacco, the monopoly of
which here as in other parts of Spain formed the principal resource
of the revenue. Yet there were many considerable resources left
to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous
districts were not subdued and scarcely crossed by the French lines
of invasion. The Somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and still
ready to come forward, under a good general, if arms were provided
for them, and the English squadron was always at hand to aid them:
Admiral Keats brought three thousand muskets from Gibraltar, Sir E.
Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet,
was anxious to succour the province to the full extent of his means,
and Minorca was a great depôt of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy,
Eroles, Rovira, and others, therefore, raised fresh levies; and while
the blockade of Figueras continued to keep all Macdonald’s army
employed, the Spaniards seized the opportunity to operate partially
on the side of Besalu and Bispal, and even in the French Cerdaña,
which being unprotected, was invaded by Lacy.
Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one
side, and on the other from Taragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that
a new and troublesome Catalonian war was preparing; but he was
obliged to return to Saragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of
Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been
disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde’s army. The
Valencian cavalry also, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat,
had under the conduct of general Gasca endeavoured to push through
Aragon towards Navarre; and although they were intercepted by general
Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they finally reached
Valencia without much loss, and the rest of the fugitives gained the
Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was then
in a very low state; he had been defeated on the 14th at Sanguessa,
by Chlopiski, and Reille, who using the reinforcements then pouring
into Spain, had pursued and defeated him again at Estella on the
23d of July, at Sorlada on the 24th, and at Val de Baygory on the
25th; yet he finally escaped to Motrico on the Biscay coast, where
he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels; but he
was again defeated by Caffarelli, and finally driven for refuge to
the district of Leibana; here the soldiers flying from Taragona and
Figueras joined him, and he soon reappeared more fierce and powerful
than before.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.]
Meanwhile Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped from the
supplies given by captain Codrington, concerted his operations with
the partida chiefs Duran and Campillo; and their combined forces
being eight thousand strong, having advanced from different quarters
on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to
carry off grain, which was now very scarce. This delayed the invasion
of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again
secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were
then escorting the prisoners to France. But when they returned, he
directed numerous columns against the partidas, and at the same time
troops belonging to the army of the centre came down by the way of
Medina Celi; whereupon the Spaniards retired to their fastnesses in
the mountains of Soria on one side, and in those of Albaracin on the
other.
Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against
Rapita and Amposta, for the former post was re-established after the
fall of Taragona, but although Habert, marching out of Tortoza with
seven or eight hundred men, defeated them with a considerable loss,
the embarrassments of the third corps were not removed; for while
these successes were obtained on the right of the Ebro the Catalans
began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat. On the 9th
of August the Somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol,
and were with difficulty repulsed; and a few days after, a convoy
coming from Igualada to Montserrat, was attacked by fifteen hundred
insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a
battalion and dislodged the Catalans, but he lost more than a hundred
of his own men in the action. Suchet finding from these events that
he could not safely withdraw his main body from Catalonia until the
fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province,
sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to move with
his garrison to aid Macdonald in the blockade; that place had,
however, surrendered before Palombini had passed Barcelona.
General Martinez, after making many vain efforts to break the line of
blockade, and having used every edible substance, prepared, on the
16th of August, to make a final effort, in concert with Rovira who
came down to Llers. An officer deserting from the garrison betrayed
the project; and Rovira was beaten in the morning before the garrison
sallied, nevertheless, in the night Martinez endeavoured to cut his
way through the lines on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with
a loss of four hundred men. Three days after, the place was given up
and three thousand famished men were made prisoners. Thus ended the
fourth great effort of the Catalonians. The success of the French
was not without alloy, more than a fourth part of the blockading
troops had died of a pestilent distemper; Macdonald himself was too
ill to continue in the command, and the remainder of his army was
so weakened, that no further active operations could be undertaken;
Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and
means to reorganize troops for a fifth effort.
The persons who had betrayed the place to Rovira were shot by
Macdonald, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned this
misfortune was condemned to death; but Napoleon, who has been so
foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon, who had
commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned general Guillot; a
clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by
one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly
and powerfully to the destruction of the emperor’s projects, but were
in themselves great crimes; and it is to be doubted if any other
sovereign in Europe would have displayed such a merciful greatness of
mind.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The emperor was discontented with Macdonald’s operations, and
that general seems to have mistaken both the nature of mountain
warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first
requires a persevering activity in seizing such commanding posts on
the flanks or rear of an adversary as will oblige him to fight on
disadvantageous terms; and as the success greatly depends upon the
rapidity and vigour of the troops, their spirit should be excited
by continual enterprize, and nourished by commendation and rewards.
Now Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither
gain the confidence of his soldiers, nor cherish their ardour; and
while he exacted a more rigid discipline, than the composition of
his troops and the nature of the war would bear, he let pass many
important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His
intent was to reduce the ferocious and insubordinate disposition of
his men, but the peculiar state of feeling with respect to the war
on both sides, did not permit this, and hence his marches appeared
rather as processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He
won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to
the public feeling, and lost a most important fortress, which, with
infinite pains and trouble, he could scarcely regain.
The plans of all the French generals had been different. St. Cyr used
to remain quiet, until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he
could crush them in general battles; but then he lost all the fruit
of his success by his inactivity afterwards. Augereau neither fought
battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political
hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, but
he avoided battles; although in every previous important attack the
Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions.
Suchet alone combined skill, activity, and resolution, and the
success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon
the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that this last
marshal was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that
the emperor required of the seventh corps exertions which the extreme
want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been
deceived as to the resources at first, and have thus put it upon
enterprises beyond its means; but after two years’ experience, after
receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having
the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to
imagine that so consummate a captain would have urged Macdonald to
undertake impracticable operations; and the latter gave no convincing
proof that his own views were sound. Notwithstanding the continual
complaints of St. Cyr, and other French writers, who have endeavoured
to show that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand
the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were
continually overmatched, it is certain that, after Baylen, the latter
never lost a great battle except to the English; that they took every
town they besieged, and never suffered any reverse from the Spaniards
which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. It would
be silly to doubt the general merit of a man who in so many wars,
and for many years, has maintained the noblest reputation, midst
innumerable dangers, and many great political changes in his own
country, but Macdonald’s military talents do not seem to have been
calculated for the irregular warfare of Catalonia.
2º. The surprise of Figueras has been designated as a misfortune
to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of their best
Miguelettes, who fell with the place; and because it drew off Campo
Verde from Taragona at a critical period. Let us, however, contrast
the advantages, and, apart from the vigour and enterprise displayed
in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will
be seen that the taking of that fortress was a great gain to the
Catalans; for, first, it carried away Macdonald from Barcelona,
and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of
failure incurred by Suchet at Taragona; a failure infallible, if his
adversaries had behaved with either skill or courage. Secondly, it
employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia, the national guards
of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon, in a blockade, during
which the sword and sickness destroyed more than four thousand
men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field
service for a long time; meanwhile Lacy reorganized fresh forces, and
revived the war, which he could never have done if the seventh corps
had been disposable. Thirdly, seeing that Campo Verde was incapable
of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or
retarded for any time the investment of Taragona; but it is certain
that the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity to Catalonia, to
recover the loss of Taragona; and it obliged Suchet, instead of
Macdonald, to take Montserrat, which disseminated the former force,
and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira’s daring,
in the surprise, and Martinez’ resolution in the maintaining of
Figueras, were as useful as they were glorious.
3º. The usual negligence, and slowness of the Spaniards, was apparent
during this campaign; although resolution, perseverance, and talent
were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, the success was in a
great measure due to the faults of his opponents, and amongst those
faults colonel Skerrett’s conduct was prominent. It is true that
captain Codrington and others agreed in the resolution not to land;
that there was a heavy surf, and that the engineers predicted on the
27th that the wall would soon be beaten down; but the question should
have been viewed in another light by colonel Skerrett. Taragona
was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the war.
It was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and
before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of
Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely fourteen thousand
infantry were under arms, and those were exhausted with toil. The
upper town, which was the body of the place, was still unbreached,
it was only attacked upon one narrow front, and behind it the Rambla
offered a second and a more powerful defence. There were, to use the
governor’s expression, within the walls “_eight thousand of the most
warlike troops in Spain_,” and there was a succouring army without,
equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers. Under these
circumstances the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a
severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations.
Captain Codrington asserts that in the skirmishes beyond the walls,
the valour of the garrison was eminent; and he saw a poor ragged
fellow endeavouring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to
stifle the burning fuze of a shell with sand, that some women and
children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs
of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the
people was diminished, and the spirit of the soldiery overlaid, by
the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to
Villa Nueva, and they were followed by many superior officers of
regiments; Contreras jealous of Sarsfield had obliged him, as we have
seen, to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented
it to the garrison as a desertion; the Valencians were carried off
after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms;
and all this confusion and mischief were so palpable, that the poor
Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to
themselves, and it was precisely for this reason that the British
should have been landed to restore confidence. And is there nothing
to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking
out of the place at the moment of attack? Let it be remembered also,
that in consequence of the arrival of a seventy-four, convoying the
transports, such was the number of ships of war, that a thousand
seamen and marines might have been added to the troops; and who can
believe that three or four thousand French and Italians, the utmost
that could be brought to bear in mass on one point, and that not
an easy point, for the breach was narrow and scarcely practicable,
would have carried the place against eight thousand Spaniards and
two thousand British. But then the surf and the enemy’s shot at
the landing-place, and the opinion of general Doyle and of captain
Codrington and of the engineers! The enemy’s shot might have
inflicted loss, but could not, especially at night, have stopped
the disembarkation; and the opinion of the engineers, was a just
report of the state of the walls, but in no manner touched the moral
considerations.
When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea
during a violent storm he replied, “_it is necessary to sail—it is
not necessary to live_.” It was also necessary to save Taragona!
Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain
danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British
intrepidity to be set at nought? Were British soldiers to be quiet
spectators, while Spaniards stood up in a fight too dangerous for
them to meddle with? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading
to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the
garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed?
What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most
painful! Taragona strongly fortified, having at different periods
above fifteen thousand men thrown into it, with an open harbour and
free communication by sea, was taken by less than twenty thousand
French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succouring army, a
British brigade, and a British fleet!
4º. The cruelty of the French general and the ferocity of his
soldiers, have been dwelt upon by several writers, but Suchet has
vindicated his own conduct, and it is therefore unnecessary here to
enter into a close investigation of facts which have been distorted,
or of reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity,
commonly attendant upon the storming of towns, was practised may be
supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing
calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look
upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and
it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an
army composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the
obstinacy of the defence, and by a cruel warfare; in Spanish towns
also the people generally formed a part of the garrison.
OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.
[Sidenote: See Vol. III.]
The transactions in the first of these provinces during the siege
of Taragona have been already sufficiently noticed; and those in
Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Cullar in
November 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together
with the frequent change of commanders, and the neglect of the
government had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of
men was indeed considerable, and the fourth French corps, weakened
by drafts for the expedition to Estremadura, and menaced by the
Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than five or six thousand
men; yet the province had never been touched by an enemy, and the
circumstances were all favorable for the organization and frequent
trial of new troops.
In February 1811 colonel Roche, the military agent, described the
whole army as “ready to disperse on the first appearance of an
enemy,” and in the following June he says that “after being left to
themselves for three years, the Murcian troops were absolutely in a
worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution,
that general Freire, although at the head of sixteen thousand
infantry and three thousand cavalry, dared not attack the six
thousand French before him, lest his men should disperse, and they
thought as little of the general as he did of them; that indolence,
lassitude, and egotism prevailed in all parts; that the establishment
of the Cortes had proved but a slight stimulus to the enthusiasm,
which was fast dying away, and that the most agreeable thing in the
world at the moment to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter,
while England and France fought the battle and paid all the expense.”
The Murcian force was increased after Mahi’s arrival to twenty-two
thousand men, but remained inactive until August, when Blake assumed
the command, and the events which followed will be treated of
hereafter.
The petty warfare in the south of Grenada and Andalusia, deserves
little notice, for during Blake’s absence in Estremadura with the
fourth army, it was principally confined to the Ronda, where the
Serranos aided at times by the troops from Algesiras, and by succours
from Gibraltar, were always in arms; yet even there, the extreme
arrogance and folly of the Spanish generals, so vexed the Serranos,
that they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with
the French, and while Soult continued at Llerena after the battle
of Albuera. The Escopeteros and civic guards sufficed to keep the
Partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed
from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat of all intrigues and
follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops.
The narrative of the circle of secondary operations being now
completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British
general alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view
of political affairs shewing how strongly they bore upon lord
Wellington’s decisions; and if such an interruption of the military
story should be distasteful to any reader I would have him reflect,
that war is not so much a series of battles, as a series of
difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success.
BOOK XIV.
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH.
[Sidenote: 1810.]
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
After the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued
his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He
published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers,
took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the
people generally with mildness. But he was guided principally
by his Spanish ministers, who being tainted with the national
weaknesses of character were, especially Orquijo, continually making
exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and
striving, sometimes with, sometimes without justice, to incense the
king against them. This course, which was almost the inevitable
consequence of his situation, excited angry feelings in the military,
which, joined to the natural haughtiness of soldiers in command,
produced constant disputes. In the conquered provinces, Joseph’s
civil agents endeavoured to obtain more of the spoil than comported
with the wants of the armies, and hence bickerings between the French
officers and the Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were
violent. The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not
act under military orders, with respect to the supplies, nor would
they furnish sums for the military chests. On the other hand the
generals often seized the king’s revenue, raised extraordinary and
forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and even threatened
to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their
wishes. Neither was Joseph’s own conduct always free from violence,
for in the latter part of 1811 he obliged the merchants of Madrid, to
draw bills, for two millions of dollars, on their correspondents in
London, to supply him with a forced loan.
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
He was always complaining to the emperor that the niggardly
allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery
of the country left him no means of existence as a monarch; and
during the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa
Fé, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors
at Paris, were in angry negotiations, with Napoleon’s ministers,
relating to this subject, and to a project for ceding the provinces
of the Ebro in exchange for Portugal. Against this project Joseph
protested, on the grounds that it was contrary to the constitution
of Bayonne, that it would alienate the Spaniards, was degrading to
himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal, was neither
so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as
the provinces to be taken away, and the well-known hatred between the
Spaniards and Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet
subjects.
[Sidenote: 1811. January.]
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
To these complaints, Napoleon answered with his usual force and
clearness of judgment. He insisted that the cost of the war had
drained the French exchequer; that he had employed nearly four
hundred thousand men for the king’s interest, and that rather than
increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He
reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste
and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his
extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party,
and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish
army which would desert on the first reverse. The constitution of
Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war, nevertheless he had
not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize
the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest obliged
him to do so. He required indeed a guarantee for the repayment of the
money France had expended for the Spanish crown, yet the real wishes
of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory
could take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered
was folly. As this last observation was Joseph’s own argument, an
explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the
seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord,
asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact that marks the
character of the Spanish cabinet.
Napoleon also assured the king that there must be a great deal of
money in Spain, for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of
the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards
from America, there were the subsidies from England, and the enormous
expenditure of her troops. Then, the seizure and sale of national
domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into
calculation, and if the king wanted more, he must extract it from the
country, or go without. France would only continue her subsidy of two
millions of franks monthly. The emperor had always supported his wars
by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the
king might do the same.
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.]
Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent;
that he recompensed services, by giving bills on the contingent sales
of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the
soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive,
and that his own expenses were not greater than the splendour of
the crown required. That many of the best generals approved of his
raising a Spanish army, desertions from it were less frequent than
was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops
served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He
wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from
the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of
the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should
be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could
not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his
subjects should not be like those of a foreign general. Lenity was
necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to
those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people’s
affections. The plate of the suppressed convents was not so valuable
as it appeared at a distance, the greater part of it was already
plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French
marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted
his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a
monarch and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the
throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never
oppose his brother’s will, he would not live a degraded king, and was
therefore ready to resign, unless the emperor would come in person
and remedy the present evils.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
[Sidenote: February.]
[Sidenote: April.]
Napoleon, while he admitted the reasonableness of some of the king’s
statements, still insisted, and with propriety of argument, that it
was necessary to subdue the people before they could be conciliated.
Yet to prevent wanton abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum
which each person, from the general governors down to the lowest
subaltern was to receive, and he ordered every person violating
this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the
circumstance sent to Paris within twenty hours after. Before this,
Bessieres, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been
sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellerman, and
others in the northern provinces. And in respect of conciliation,
the emperor remarked that he had himself, at first, intended to open
secret negotiations with the Cortes, but on finding what an obscure
rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph
to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of men of influence
and reputation, wherein (adverting to the insane insolence of the
Spaniards towards their colonies) he might by the discussion of
really liberal institutions, and by exposing the bad faith with which
the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and
conciliate the Spaniards with hopes of preserving the integrity of
the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III.]
[Sidenote: May.]
An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the emperor
finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of franks
monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of
notice, as illustrating the character of Napoleon, that in the course
of these disputes, Joseph’s friends at Paris, repeatedly advised him,
that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the
emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and
disposed him to concede what was demanded. Joseph, however, could not
endure the decree for establishing the military governments, by which
the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals,
and their reports upon the civil and judicial administration referred
entirely to the emperor. It was a measure assailing at once his
pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily
more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by
his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshal’s
orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his
Spanish servants, were untrue and others distorted. We have seen how
the habitual exaggerations, and even downright falsehoods of the
juntas and the regency, thwarted the English general’s operations,
and the king, as well as the French generals, must have encountered a
like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature
of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint
should exist.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 2.]
Joseph’s personal sentiments, abstractedly viewed, were high-minded
and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an
usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and
at last such was his irritation, that having drawn up a private but
formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of five thousand
men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed
out of Spain and reached Paris: there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr,
Kellerman, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani, were also assembled, and
all discontented with the war, and with each other.
[Sidenote: See Chap. I.]
By this rash and ill-timed proceeding, the intrusive government was
left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly
useless at the critical moment, when Soult, engaged in the Albuera
operations, had a right to expect support from Madrid. The northern
army also was in a great measure paralysed, and the army of Portugal,
besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization
attendant upon the retreat from Santarem, and upon a change of
commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessieres abandoned
the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castile on the
communications with France; for it behoved the French generals,
everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive,
until the emperor’s resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture
should be known.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
Napoleon astounded at this precipitate action of the king,
complained, with reason, that having promised not to quit the
country without due notice, Joseph had failed to him, both as a
monarch and as a general, and that he should at least have better
chosen his time; for if he had retired in January, when the armies
were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the emperor
might then have abandoned Andalusia, and concentrated Soult’s and
Massena’s troops on the Tagus; which would have been in accord with
the policy fitting for the occasion. But now when the armies had
suffered reverses, when they were widely separated, and in pursuit of
different objects, the mischief was great, and the king’s conduct not
to be justified!
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 2.]
Joseph replied that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion
during his absence, and then reiterating his complaints and declaring
his resolution to retire into obscurity, he finished by observing,
with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for
the emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a
good subject, but in Spain a bad king.
The emperor had however too powerful an intellect for his brother
to contend with. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by
concession, he obliged him to return again in July, furnished with
a species of private treaty, by which the army of the centre was
placed entirely at his disposal. He was also empowered to punish
delinquents, to change the organization, and to remove officers who
were offensive to him, even the chief of the staff, general Belliard,
who had been represented by Orquijo as inimical to his system. And if
any of the other armies should, by the chances of war, arrive within
the district of the centre army, they also, while there, were to be
under the king; and at all times, even in their own districts, when
he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain
with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had
liberty to change Bessieres for Jourdan.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 3.]
To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the
north, Napoleon required the French military authorities, to send
daily reports, to the king, of all requisitions and contributions
exacted. And he advised his brother to keep a Spanish commissary at
the head-quarters of each army, to watch over Spanish interests;
promising that whenever a province should have the means, and the
will, to resist the incursions of the guerillas, it should revert
entirely to the government of the king, and be subjected to no
charges, save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general
purposes. The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like
situation on the same terms, and meanwhile Joseph was to receive a
quarter of the contributions from each, for the support of his court
and of the central army.
The entire command of the forces in Spain the emperor would not
grant, observing that the marshal directing from Madrid, as
major-general, would naturally claim the glory, as well as the
responsibility of arranging the operations; and hence the other
marshals, finding themselves, in reality, under his, instead of the
king’s command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports
and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were
therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier, for the emperor’s
information. Finally the half million of francs hitherto given
monthly to the king was to be increased to a million for the year
1811; and it was expected that Joseph would immediately reorganize
the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it
had not yet been, of weight in the contest.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
The king afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most
important of which related to the employment and assembling of
Spaniards according to his own directions and plans. This final
arrangement and the importance given to Joseph’s return, for by the
emperor’s orders, he was received as if he had only been to Paris
to concert a great plan, produced a good effect for a short time;
but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon fearing to trust Spanish
civilians, extended the plan, hitherto confined to Catalonia, of
employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of
the Ebro. Then the king’s jealousy was again excited, and the old
bickerings between him and the marshals were revived.
POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.
In 1811 the emperor’s power over the continent, as far as the
frontier of Russia, was in fact, absolute; and in France internal
prosperity was enjoyed with external glory. But the emperor
of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy, and by a personal
discontent; in dread also of his nobles, who were impatient under the
losses which the continental system inflicted upon them, was plainly
in opposition to the ascendancy of France, and Napoleon, although
wishing to avoid a rupture, was too long-sighted, not to perceive,
that it was time to prepare for a more gigantic contest than any
he had hitherto engaged in. He therefore husbanded his money and
soldiers, and would no longer lavish them upon the Spanish war. He
had poured men indeed continually into that country, but these were
generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a
reserve of two hundred thousand old soldiers; but with that art that
it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for
ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances.
Such an uncertain state of affairs, prevented him from taking more
decided steps, in person, with relation to Spain, which he would
undoubtedly have done if the war there, had been the only great
matter on his hands, and therefore the aspect of French politics,
both in Spain and other places, was favourable to lord Wellington’s
views. A Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal
chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success; yet his
anticipations were dashed with fear, for the situation of the Spanish
and Portuguese governments, and of their armies, and the condition of
the English government, were by no means so favourable to his plans,
as shall be shewn in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II.
POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous
loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that
to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more
reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national
character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether
military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen,
rendered a very difficult task.
Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its
influence as weak to sway, the councils of Spain, could only hope
by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal,
to acquire that personal ascendancy, which would enable him to
direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner,
and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that
ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse
between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the
first bursting out of the insurrection, to the period now treated of;
a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to
conduct great affairs. Heaping treasure, stores, arms, and flattery,
upon those who were unable to bear the latter, or use the former
beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of
forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor
in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of
events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his
misconduct, at the moment, by his glittering oratory.
[Sidenote: 1808.]
Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance
of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist
sent to Spain, carried, to Coruña, such a sum, as, with previous
subsidies made up one million of dollars for Gallicia alone. The
deputies from Asturias had at the same time demanded five millions of
dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was
known, two millions more were demanded for Gallicia, which were not
refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr.
Stuart, was, _to enter into “no political engagements.”_
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Mr. Duff, the consul for Cadiz, carried out a million of dollars
for Andalusia, the junta asked for three or four millions more,
and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very
great. Thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more
than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent;
the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms, and other
stores given, may be estimated by the fact, that eighty-two pieces
of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand
flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand
five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts
had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was
in proportion. But Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr. Duff and to the
other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, “_His Majesty had
no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which
he furnished to Spain_.”
Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as
nothing! but acknowledged that _specie_ was at this time so scarce
that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the
former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that
any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England.
And “each province of Spain,” he said, “had made its own particular
application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as
had never before been made upon England at any period of its
existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference
to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution
necessary.” And the more so, that “the deputies were incompetent
to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs
in Spain;” yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these
astounding things to the junta of Seville, “_to avoid any appearance
of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then
making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay
the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any
other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the
actual means of the country_.” In proof of Mr. Canning’s sincerity
upon this head, he afterwards sent two millions of dollars by Mr.
Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all!
Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted
through subordinates and irresponsible persons were absurdly and
unequally distributed.
This obsequious extravagance, produced the utmost arrogance on the
part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister’s
humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached
Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body,
raising its demands upon England, in proportion to its superior
importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional
succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the
English government.
Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of
cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals,
three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots,
twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve
thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand
arobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their
demands! and when Mr. Stuart’s remonstrance obliged them to alter the
insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously
upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only
done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might _naturally
expect demands like the present to follow the first_. They desired
also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the
British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of
Godoy’s property in the English funds!
Such was Mr. Canning’s opening policy, and the sequel was worthy
of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth
proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving
of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most
critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs
in Portugal and at Cadiz, during sir John Cradock’s command, have
been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious
accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early
and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart.
That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important
points, his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of
sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning
neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all
the idle, vaunting, accounts of the subordinate civil and military
agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus
encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the
arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far
as he was able misleading the English general.
Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July 1808, and on the 22d of that month
informed Mr. Canning that the reports of successes in the south
were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased exactly
in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged
scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence
of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the
numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means
so great as they were represented.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician
insurrection, by which he plainly shewed that every species of
violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from
the leading people; that the junta’s object was to separate Gallicia
from Spain; and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of
abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succours; that the
junta of Gallicia was only kept in power, by the countenance of
England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and the residence of her
envoy at Coruña. The interference of the British naval officers
to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been
successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been intreated to meddle in
the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests
for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end
of August the system of folly, peculation, waste, and improvidence
which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by
Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest
degree altering the latter’s egregious system, or even attracting his
notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville,
that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the
consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a
premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have
been his first object to suppress.
Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the peninsula, whence he could not
communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence
materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Gallicia;
and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a
British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all
capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so
little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy’s reports, that
the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon
to receive the consul’s letters, which caused the delay of a week
when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be
remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been
officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person!
[Sidenote: See Vol. I.]
When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs,
on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally
to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning’s
inconsiderate conduct every where prominent. In the capital the
supreme junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the
influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the
following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject
of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz.
“When the junta refused to admit general Mackenzie’s detachment, you
tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the
inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings
which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever
the navy or the English travellers, may assert to the contrary, I am
perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them,
and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board.”
Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr. Frere, apparently tired
of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued
reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart,
either to join Cuesta’s army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose
the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent
there, although this was the critical period, which preceded the
Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without
formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain,
and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading
statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact
information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions
of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war.
That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been
brought to maturity by count Stadion, was on the point of being
abandoned because of Mr. Canning’s conduct. He had sent no minister
to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards,
without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive
terms, the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without
which, she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart
suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions
of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected
because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid
of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a
manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-elected juntas in
the peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and
misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon
France; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had
only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions three hundred
had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection.
In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business,
and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of
Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at
the moment; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to
the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable
of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered,
he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna
without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much
higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable
of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been
slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren
expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great
northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France.
The Prussian cabinet in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen,
whose fears influenced the king’s resolutions, only waited for these
troops, to declare war; and there was every reason to believe that
Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of
Moore’s campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss
of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting
of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both;
finally the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France,
may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning’s incapacity as a
statesman.
But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil
genius of the Peninsula; for passing over the misplaced military
powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers’ legation in Portugal, while he
neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent
lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed.
And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning
insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence, received from
different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home;
an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of
the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted
rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the
enemy’s emissaries at Lisbon. In after times when by a notorious
abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he
complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and
he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several
hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the
previous war; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon;
and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year
1826! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe
in general were neglected, and the particular welfare of Portugal
seriously injured by another display of official importance still
more culpable.
It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have
joined the duke of Wellington’s army, previous to the battle of
Waterloo; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business
of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his
embassy. Marshal Beresford well acquainted with the characters,
of the members of the Portuguese regency, had assembled fifteen
thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped,
with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field;
the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal
informed the English ambassador, that he had only to give the order,
and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the
same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as
this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to
record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be
done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity
of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert,
beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and as Beresford had foreseen
no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived
of important reinforcements; the Portuguese were deprived of the
advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the
resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from
that country; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war,
the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they
all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don
Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed by an eloquence, always used in
defence of public corruption, and a wit, that made human sufferings
its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has
little to do with the affairs of nations.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.]
When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of
ministry, lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry
Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart
received orders to make conditions and to demand guarantees for the
due application of the British succours; those succours were more
sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with
advice and remonstrances, in all the proceedings of the respective
governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even
desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese
nation,—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from
being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was
in every thing a contrast to that of Mr. Canning.
But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have
proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were
two parties in the cabinet. The one headed by lord Wellesley, who
was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without
much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own
country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to
maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal,
in every thing relating to public matters, this man’s career was
one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but
his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the
introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived
by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness
to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked,
contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to
sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility
of failure.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV.]
With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited
the result of lord Wellington’s operations in 1810. They affected to
dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their
alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public
instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They
deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops, at
Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the
Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way
of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of
the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior
officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those
officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was,
from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which
the safety of the army depended in the event of failure.
Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and lord
Wellington’s successes in the field, only furthered the views of
Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due
support had been given to him. Indeed such a result is to be always
apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war
requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which
the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician,
believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the
supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds
with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr.
Canning and Mr. Perceval may however be judged of by the following
extracts, the writers of which as it is easy to perceive were in
official situations.
[Sidenote: A. April. 1810.]
“I hope by next mail will be sent, something more satisfactory and
useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am
afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our
great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget
more distant but not less interesting concerns.”
[Sidenote: A. April. 1811.]
“With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the
inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no
means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who
are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results, the details we
read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the next day; and
in the mean time be the tools you have to work with good or bad, so
it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine
expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal
within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which
prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there
seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have
stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets,
and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable
necessity of a change of measures, and principles, in the government.”
[Sidenote: B. Sept. 1811.]
“I have done every thing in my power to get people here to attend to
their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money!
money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all
my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the
same answer, ‘_that the thing is impossible_.’ The prince himself
certainly appears to be _à la hauteur des circonstances_, and has
expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote
the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect
comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully
aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could
adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the
present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided
and adequate effect, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present
feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all
that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous
Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves
by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us
as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and
christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more
vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the
resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents
and embarkations.”
A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely
be exhibited, and it was not wonderful, that lord Wellington,
oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have
often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant
risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from
England. In the next chapter shall be shewn the ultimate effects of
Canning’s policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.
CHAPTER III.
POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
As the military operations were, by the defeat of the regular armies,
broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the
political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed,
rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the
restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained
very powerful; and while nominally responsible, to the Cortes and the
regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views
urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between
them and the generals, who were, for the most part, the creatures of
the regency, or of the Cortes, were constant. In Gallicia, in the
Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were
increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield,
Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were
always in controversy with each other or with the juntas. Palacios
dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was
made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the
church party against the cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the junta
of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballesteros of his own
motion placed the county under martial law. The junta, strangely
enough, then appealed to colonel Austin the British governor of the
Algarves, but he refused to interfere.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: Letter to General Dumouriez 1811. MSS.]
The cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter,
of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the cortes, were
only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected
the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean,
violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them.
Thus confusion was every where perpetuated, and it is proved by the
intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the
British officers, and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only
moral resource left for keeping up the war, was their personal hatred
of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression.
Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgement which marked all
his views, had early described Spain as being “_without armies,
generals, or government_.” And in 1811, after three years of war,
lord Wellington complained that “_there was no head in Spain, neither
generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry;
that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or
military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource,
and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their
resources were small_.” But the miserable state of the armies and the
unquenchable vanity of the officers, have been too frequently exposed
to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry,
while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them
odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested
the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all
spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct.
The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution
of the contest were, therefore, 1º. the improvement and the better
guidance of the military power; 2º. the preventing a war between
Portugal and Spain; 3º. the pretensions of the princess Carlotta of
Portugal; 4º. the dispute with the American colonies.
With respect to the first, lord Wellington had made strenuous
efforts, and his advice, and remonstrances, had at times saved the
armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also
made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service,
but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the
leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr.
Canning’s impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by
no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an
arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican
party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds
with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly
desired to have an English general, and in 1812 colonel Green did
organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in
the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox had before proposed
a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington,
and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by
those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however
quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British
commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers,
taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and
equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of
such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer
to exclaim on seeing them that “he blushed for the folly of his
government.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the
Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars.
But the increase of this force, which however never exceeded thirty
thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and
amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and
quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all
confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire
with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every
action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure
to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering
starved naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from
new levies in a month.
The chances of a war with Portugal were by no means slight, the
early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in
Lisbon, the violence of Romana’s soldiers, and the burning of the
village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the
people of Algarves and the Andalusians had revived all the national
hatred on both sides. The two governments indeed entered into a
treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was
with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart
and lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first,
and afterwards the court of the Brazils, from provoking a war by
re-annexing Olivença to Portugal, when it was taken from the French
by marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people
subordinate to their policy that this design was formed at the very
moment when the princess Carlotta, was, strenuously, and with good
prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
The intrigues of this princess were constant sources of evil; she
laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent
Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate
consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In
August 1810 a paper signed by only one member, but with an intimation
that it contained the sentiments of the whole cortes, was secretly
given to Mr. Wellesley, as a guide for his conduct. It purported
that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from
their captivity being apparent, the princess Carlotta should be
called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son,
Pedro, to the princess of Wales, or some other princess of the House
of Brunswick, that a “sudden and mortal blow might be given to the
French empire.” Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note, of the same
tendency, would in the first session of the cortes be transmitted
to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly
because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against
the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later
procured a decree, rendering such persons ineligible, to pass in
the cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta’s intrigue, nevertheless
her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English
influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of
being publicly admitted.
The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand’s release was
founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had
acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity,
which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there
were at Lisbon one Francisco Sagas, and his brother, daring men, who
were only deterred from undertaking the enterprize by a previous
experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored
Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because
Escoiquez who ruled the prince, and was as timid as himself opposed
it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness, the cortes
passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in
captivity.
[Sidenote: See Vols. I. & III.]
These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence
compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of
the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of
their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and
injustice of the juntas, the regency, and the cortes, with relation
to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be
repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the
leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the peninsula
in November 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the duke of
Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but
his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just
then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart foreseeing
great advantage from this appointment laboured to persuade Mr.
Frere to support it; but the latter, always narrow in his views,
refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England! and
this, joined to the duke’s own reluctance, seemed to end the matter.
Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of
Portugal, urged her claim to be regent, and ultimately, queen of
that country, as well as of Spain; and her interests were strongly
supported there, until May 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy,
arrived at Monte Video, and spoiled her schemes.
[Sidenote: Sept.]
The cry for a free trade with England, was then raised by the
colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions, presenting
a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and
affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper
of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of
his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and
the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the
disturbances which had already taken place, Cisneros observed that
the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with
England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to
this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws
relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves,
should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a
nature, that at first sight, they appear to be directed against some
common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels
of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops
and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be
suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel,
or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property
already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by
which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not
to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own
sailors!
In April 1810 the disposition to revolt spread; the Caraccas and
Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of
Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally
gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon
it as a secret continuation of Miranda’s affair. Lord Liverpool,
indeed, immediately disavowed the governor’s manifesto, but being
very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and
to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France,
three things incompatible, his policy produced no good result.
Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the
desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans
even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon’s success
should separate the two countries; but the Spanish regency, with
characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was
the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt
was forced on in that country also.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]
This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many
ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence,
sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed
the succours received from England, in fitting out large expeditions
of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely,
pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British
on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy;
and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and
to the cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as “a people
capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned.”
Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of
connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which
greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s despatch to Mr. H. Wellesley, May, 1811.
MSS.]
By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula
was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all
things therefore conduced to make lord Wellesley desire his brother,
Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the
Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans,
like lord Liverpool’s, were based upon the desire to preserve the
trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated
his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to
enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded
on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavour to convince the
regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the
best for all parties. For the primary object being to keep France
from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by
England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not
inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists
would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was
considered by them as a safe and honourable channel of reconciliation
with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal
recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken
place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection
and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand
had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only
injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the
latter.—The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had already
diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to
seek for French officers to assist them. The trade was essential to
enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although
this had been frequently represented to the regency, the latter had
sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at
the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade
the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done
also at a moment, when the regency was unable to transport Blake’s
army from Cadiz to the Condado di Niebla without the assistance of
British vessels. “It was difficult,” Lord Wellesley said, “to state
an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had
occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good
policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of
two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults
of a foreign foe”:—“Spain could not expect England to concur in a
continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was
injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French
but against the main sources of her own strength.”
[Sidenote: June.]
After these instructions, which were given before the constitution
of Spain was arranged by the cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the
mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept
it upon condition, that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form
of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately
break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation
failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice
and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi
maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret
article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr.
Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse
of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but as
Bardaxi asserted, that lord Wellington had before agreed to the
propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley
referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually
engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus
called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was
on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his
manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even
in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions,
immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider
that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all
points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with
admiration of his foresight and judgment.
“He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi’s observation.
His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as
he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside,
at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of
merchants’ profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally
suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add
greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an
open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit
was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would
be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches
of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at
which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded
by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might
be the final particular relations established between Spain and her
colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the
annihilation, of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain
was then sure to be the greatest gainer.
“In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have
been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have
been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships
to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England
should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have
considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could
assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and
its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the
weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross
folly and misapplication of means. Nay England could not, in justice
to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual
assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies could
always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and
certainly it would be the highest madness, in Spain, to attempt at
that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England, to
assist, or even encourage her in such an attempt.
“The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence
and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity,
and _now_ should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having
recourse to violence. But the reception of the deputies from America
which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter.
It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had
gone, the fact, that colonies have the power to separate if they have
the will, would have been at once verified.
“Great Britain, although late, had at last _offered_ that mediation
which he wished had been _asked_ for, and it remained to consider
on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better
if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her
intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and
commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible
to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the
submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in
that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to
submission! and he, lord Wellington, was said to have approved of
this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has
never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to
the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by
England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered
these facts as little as he appears to have done! Great Britain
cannot agree to that condition!
[Sidenote: See Vol. III. p. 419.]
“In respect to constitution” (alluding to the acknowledgement of the
civil rights of the Americans by the cortes) “the Spaniards had gone
a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require,
they would probably ask her to have separate local representative
bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial
assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in
the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish
government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her
prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence
of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of
mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly
on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not
done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and
interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to
those of the mother country.
“It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably
not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such
a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances
of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in
the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object
the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have
confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what
system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion
she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials
England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining
the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or
at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the
difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case
have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow
view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and _if
she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would
be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which
would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the
resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war
with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies
from Spain._”
The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted
by the cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission
of mediation, of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed
in September 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded
beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr.
Wellesley’s remonstrances were unheeded, and although the regency
afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return
for a subsidy, nothing was concluded.
CHAPTER IV.
POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Vol. III.]
The power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over
their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the duke of Brunswick
at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the
patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord
Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the
difficulties engendered by those things, cannot be understood without
a more detailed exposition.
[Sidenote: Feb. 1810.]
Mr. Villiers’s mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning,
had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in
business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he
found every thing, except the army under Beresford, in a state of
disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because
of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government.
As early as 1808 lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only
to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to
assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw
forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any
deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected,
and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was
also feeble and uncertain.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from
the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded
the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in
practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that
it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the
subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men
to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in
all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered
sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and
no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience.
The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes,
partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments
from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all
things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was
kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with
Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge,
for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already
too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding
of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the
whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months’ consumption.
In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed;
the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of
smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own
resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies.
Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was
so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been
assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to
meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils,
all representations, to the regency, were met by references to that
nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus
paralysed.
In March 1809 the British government had taken ten thousand
Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to twenty
thousand, and in June to thirty thousand. The cost of these forces,
and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy,
amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy partly from
negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of
Mr. Canning’s prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However,
as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own
method, the regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to
obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have
been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason lord Wellington
strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the regency, by a wilful
misunderstanding of the debates of parliament, and by the distortion
of facts, endeavoured to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England,
and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents
by the Whigs, whose clamour, just, as applied to the ministers, was
unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of
the times.
In this state of affairs Mr. Canning being happily removed from
office, lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions
of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to
make conditions with respect to the succours, and in Portugal they
were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of
revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports
of the condition of the army, and the expenditure of the subsidy.
Lord Wellesley also, thinking that the example of a cortes in Spain,
might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal,
was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were
preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the prince regent,
whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he
said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and
hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving however no
more than was absolutely necessary.
The regency were strongly opposed to this notion of a cortes, and Mr.
Stuart and lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of
the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful
enough, without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the
project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient
to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves
certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shewn, was not
a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what
would conduce to the success of the war, was therefore consistent
upon this occasion, but it is curious to observe the course of
the English cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military
conscription, authorized by the laws, was an unheard-of oppression
on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal a conscription, enforced
by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and lord Wellesley
admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and
oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold
a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their
country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted
it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism.
Mr. Stuart in concert with lord Wellington diligently endeavoured
to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever he complained of any
particular disorder, he was, by the regency, offered arbitrary power
to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious
to the people, he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became
apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. The marquis
of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill health, but
really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a
Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority
of marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of
finance, and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas secretary-at-war,
with a vote in the regency on matters of war. But the former soon
after Mr. Stuart’s arrival resigned his situation in consequence of
some disgust, and the Conde Redondo, having undertaken the office,
commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the
taxes, especially the “_decima_” or income tax, which was neither
impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the
powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the
imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously
from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only
from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but
from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their
servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other
classes in the community were liable to.
The working of the Souzas, in the Brazils, where the minister of
finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury
under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire’s
resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the
government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the
government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members
then proposed to fill up Das Minas’ vacancy themselves, but this
was resisted by lord Wellington, on the ground, that, without the
prince’s order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the
regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for
removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in concert
with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a
change, which would have impeded the ameliorations begun. Such,
however, was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed,
as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole
direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of
the country; lord Wellington thought this could not be done, without
assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country,
which he had previously proposed to the British cabinet, but which
it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart’s project fell to the
ground.
Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up, lord Strangford, whose
diplomatic dexterity evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been
rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there
bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the
English general, to keep the regency permanent, and to support the
secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and
the Conde de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience,
to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities
than any other persons, and hence lord Wellington had resisted the
prince’s orders for Cypriano Freire’s resumption of office, and
had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own
remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs lord
Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the prince
to accede to the following propositions. 1º. That the British
plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the count Redondo, doctor Nogueras, and
the principal Souza, should be added to the old regency. 2º. That
admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3º. That all
traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures
should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates.
This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to
establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful
part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the regency, but this was
arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and
consequently had the same object of favouring the Souzas in view.
Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington strongly objected to this change,
although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless
of the prince regent’s rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that
a government composed of men having different views and feelings,
and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on
usefully, was at first averse to join the regency, but was finally
persuaded to do so by lord Wellington, who justly considered that his
presence there would give the only chance of success.
Doctor Nogueras’ appointment was described, by lord Strangford, as
a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of
those very secretariats which lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were
labouring to preserve. But lord Strangford prided himself chiefly
upon the appointment of the principal Souza, who, he said, had been
recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as
shewing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza
had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding
of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford,
the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in
Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that
intimations to that effect had been formally given to him, by lord
Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however,
armed with additional power, to thwart the English authorities in
Portugal, and thus lord Strangford’s diplomacy tended, in effect, to
ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support.
[Sidenote: See Vol. II. Appendix.]
In relating these proceedings I have, following his own letter,
announcing the change, described lord Strangford as acting
voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed, that it
was under Mr. Canning’s instructions, he had pressed for this
incorporating of the British minister in the regency, and that
Nogueras’ appointment sprang entirely from the prince regent’s own
will, which he did not choose to oppose. In like manner, when lord
Wellesley was intent upon assembling a cortes, lord Strangford called
it “_a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the
government_,” and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to
press it, because he thought it “_useless and even hurtful_,” which
inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs
rested. As affecting Mr. Canning’s policy, however, it is to be
observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was
to put Mr. Villiers in the regency, not with any view to the more
complete controul of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the
instructions to sir John Cradock prove, to ensure a preponderance to
the diplomatic department over the military in that country.
The principal reforms, in the administration, which had been
sought for by lord Wellington, were a better arrangement of the
financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the
fidalgos—the suppression of the “_junta di viveres_,” a negligent
and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese
commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the
national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal
department under one head—the formation of a military chest,
distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds to
other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of
transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of
the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival
of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war.
These things he had hoped to accomplish; but from the moment the
change effected by lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious
disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese
government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even
personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters,
were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they
had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force
the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less
vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control
by lord Wellington. This plot however required that the patriarch
should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always
dexterously prevented.
[Sidenote: May.]
The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a
demand for the removal of the principal Souza, reached the Brazils
in February 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but so
strongly was the faction supported at Rio de Janeiro, that in May,
the prince regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas’
proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His
minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote, that the capture of Massena
with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not
make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of
the allies; and in an official note to lord Strangford, he declared,
that the prince regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters
concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was
influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which
expression lord Strangford said referred solely to Forjas.
[Sidenote: June.]
The prince himself also wrote to lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart
of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the
cause of all the factions which had sprung up, and he declared
that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled.
He desired that Forjas, who he affirmed to be the real author of
the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the
Brazils, to answer for his conduct; and finally he announced his
intention to write in a like strain to the king of England. To this
lord Wellington answered that finding his conduct disapproved and
Souza’s applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately
sent in his resignation, admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same,
and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his
own cabinet should be made known: the war was then on the point of
finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because
the resolution of the English general was kept secret, to avoid
disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the
part of the prince.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
Meanwhile other embarrassments were super-added, of a nature to
leave the English general little hope of being able to continue
the contest, should he even defeat the intrigues at Rio Janeiro;
for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and
Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Nogueira, and Redondo, against their
enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that
could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly
by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences,
continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging
to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever
stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared
for, disorders were unrepressed, the troops were starved, and the
favouring of the fidalgos constant. The “_junta de viveres_” was
supported, the formation of a military chest, and commissariat,
delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the
natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased,
because the prince regent had early in 1811 intimated an intention of
immediately returning to Europe.
I have said that it was a favourite maxim with the regency that a
paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public
service, and they added to this another still more absurd, namely,
that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food,
which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they
excused neglect, whenever the repetition, that there had been no
neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between
the British commissariat and the “_junta de viveres_” were frequent
and very hurtful, because the former able to outbid, and more in fear
of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too
small sphere of their activity, and lord Wellington was prevented
feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His
principal dependance for the support of his own troops was upon the
Spanish muleteers attached to the army, they were the very life and
sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity
to the British were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese
people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and
lord Wellington only obtained their services, for those brigades
which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think
the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even
in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. And yet it is not
uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of
public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the
rugged experience of Wellington’s camp as nothing in the formation of
a statesman.
The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt.
Abrantes had like to have been abandoned, from want, at the time
Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during
that general’s retreat; Beresford’s operations in the Alemtejo were
impeded, and his hospitals were left without succour; at Fuentes
Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery were forced to
supply themselves by picking up the enemy’s bullets; the cavalry of
that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than forty thousand
regular troops, formed by Beresford, only nineteen thousand were
to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera, the rest had
deserted or died from extreme want.
When Massena retreated the provincial organization of the country was
restored, and to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts
before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn on the
credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also
published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs
were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding
these efforts, such was the distress, that at Caldas eighty persons
died daily, and at Figueras where twelve thousand people, chiefly
from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were
above a hundred, and the whole would have perished but for the active
benevolence of major Von Linstow, an officer of general Trant’s
staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers that the
detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of
the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his
troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon,
and even assassinated while on duty with impunity; the whole army was
disgusted, the letters to England were engendering in that country
a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not
with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of
operations.
As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest
which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn
was to be got from the Baltic because there was no specie to pay for
it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible
manner until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American
vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided
partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a
parliamentary grant which passed when Massena retreated.
In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy
to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of
it was paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was
scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place
of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus
Mr. Canning’s prodigality, Mr. Vansittart’s paper system, and Mr.
Perceval’s economy, all combined to press upon the British general,
and to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part
of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which
had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval however, in answer to his
remonstrances, employed a secretary of the Treasury to prove in a
laboured paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had
been over-supplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister,
whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France,
designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal
alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.]
Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution
to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of
themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to
the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their
system. To the English general’s remonstrances on this head, Forjas
replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French, was the
national custom, and could not be dispensed with! a circumstance
which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the
accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and
men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to
consider. And here it is right to observe, that so many complaints
were made of the cruelty committed by Massena’s army while at
Santarem, that lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but
having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that
in most cases, the _ordenança_, after having submitted to the French,
and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the
stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was
only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct: the
projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the
_ordenanças_ to cease from such a warfare.
The character of the regency was, however, most openly shewn in
their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the
advantages which that treaty ensured to Portugal, they complacently
reaped, but overlooked or annulled those points in which the
character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention,
and in despite of the remonstrances of lord Wellington and Mr.
Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into loathsome
dungeons, without any cause of complaint; and in the affair of
Mascarheñas their conduct was distinguished alike by wanton cruelty
and useless treachery. This youth, when only fifteen, had with
many others entered the French service in Junot’s time, under the
permission of his own prince; and he and the Conde de Sabugal, were
taken by the peasantry in 1810 endeavouring to pass from Massena’s
army into Spain, Sabugal in uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. They
were both tried as traitors. The first, a general officer, and with
powerful friends amongst the Fidalgos, was acquitted, as indeed
was only just; but he was then appointed to a situation under the
regency, which was disgraceful, as arising from faction: Mascarheñas
was a boy, and had no powerful friends, and he was condemned to
death. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart represented the injustice of
this sentence, and they desired that if humanity was unheeded the
government would put him to death as a spy, for being in disguise,
and so prevent the danger of reprisals, already threatened by
Massena. The young man’s mother and sisters, grovelling in the dust,
implored the regency to spare him, but to shew their hatred of lord
Wellington and Mr. Stuart, for the disputes with the regency were
then highest, the government told the miserable women, that it was
the British general and minister who demanded his death, and they
were sent, with this brutal falsehood, to weep and to ask grace
from persons who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly
executed as a traitor, for entering the French service under the
authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted, and even
rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances, when the
excuse of the disguise had been rejected.
In 1810 one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was
likewise seized in disguise within the British lines, and, having
given useful information, was by lord Wellington confined in St.
Julians, to protect him from the Portuguese government. After a time
he became deranged, and was released, whereupon the regency, rather
than keep him, desired that he might be sent as a prisoner of war to
England; thus for convenience admitting the very principle which they
had rejected when only honour and humanity were concerned. A process
against the marquis d’Alorna had also been commenced, but his family
being powerful it was soon dropped, and yet the government refused
madame d’Alorna leave to join her husband, thus shewing themselves
spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the
court of Brazil was shocked. The prince rebuked the regency severely
for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others,
and banished Sabugal to Terceira.
This was the political state of Portugal.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
Lord Liverpool’s intimation, that neither corn nor specie could be
had from England, threw lord Wellington on his own resources for
feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of
commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods,
passed current with the people when the national bonds called
“Apolocies” were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr.
Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having
ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially
in South America, could be bought by bills, cheaper than it sold for
hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought
with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile
agents to purchase it for the army account, and after filling the
magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was,
however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which
were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which
frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from
bringing back merchandize, were forced to demand coin, which helped
to drain the country of specie.
As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English
merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with
their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the
Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English
minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills;
to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new
bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as
the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this
complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military
chest; and this commerce, which lord Wellington truly observed, was
not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the
army, and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have
destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the
ministers, on the representations of the merchants who found their
exorbitant gains interrupted by it.
Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in
England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated
his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought
of executing it. Yet when he considered, that the cause was one
even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the
embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and
that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were
likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the
Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered
also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the
chances of war are many, even in the worst of times, and above all,
when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he
quelled his rising indignation, and re-tempered his mighty energies
to bear the buffet of the tempest.
But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could
he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he
moved in the north, Marmont’s army and the army under Bessieres were
ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade
it before he could even advance against them. To take that place
required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous
country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the
army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his
forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing
effectual; meanwhile Soult would have again advanced from Llerena,
and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests.
To act on the defensive in Beira, and follow up the blow against
Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and
the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph’s absence
paralysed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was
being reorganized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with
Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to lord Wellington’s
fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must
have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the
army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government
had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left
a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of
Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of
Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained the enemy’s
bridge equipage and battering train; but which, on common military
calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and
Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town
that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon,
and a base for further operations obtained.
According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven
over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time
to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side;
wherefore lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch
away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real
situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor
a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made
or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and
the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived,
because it was the attempt, rather than the success, which was
necessary to keep the war alive; moreover the French did not push
their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen
circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by
private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English
general to support the crisis.
CHAPTER V.
SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
There is no operation in war so certain as a modern siege, provided
the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient
sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no
operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of
the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger.
Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required
longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he
was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of
strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The
time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest
point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a
force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the
movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to
Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could
not be stopped by general Spencer, because the mouths of those
defiles were commanded by Marmont’s positions. It was possible
also at that season, for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near
Alcantara, and hence more than twenty days of free action against the
place were not to be calculated upon.
Now the carriages of the battering guns used in Beresford’s siege
were so much damaged, that the artillery officers asked eleven days
to repair them; and the scanty means of transport for stores was much
diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera to the different
hospitals. Thus more than fifteen days of open trenches, and nine
days of fire could not be expected. With good guns, plentiful stores,
and a corps of regular sappers and miners, this time would probably
have sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was
a keen jest of Picton to say, that “lord Wellington sued Badajos in
forma pauperis.”
The guns, some of them cast in Philip the Second’s reign, were of
soft brass, and false in their bore; the shot were of different
sizes, and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were
inexperienced, there were but few British artillery-men, few
engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops
of the line how to make fascines and gabions. Regular and sure
approaches against the body of the place, by the Pardaleras and
the Picurina outworks, could not be attempted; but it was judged
that Beresford’s lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval,
might be successfully renewed, avoiding the errors of that general;
that is to say, by pushing the double attacks simultaneously, and
with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and
batteries from thence could sweep the interior of the castle, which
was meanwhile to be breached. Something also was hoped from the
inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult’s retreat after
Albuera.
This determination once taken, every thing was put in motion with the
greatest energy. Major Dickson, an artillery officer whose talents
were very conspicuous during the whole war, had, with unexpected
rapidity, prepared a battering train of thirty twenty-four-pounders,
four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers
made to serve as mortars by taking off the wheels and placing
them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from
Salvatierra, making altogether fifty-two pieces, a considerable
convoy of engineer’s stores had already arrived from Alcacer do
Sal, and a company of British artillery marched from Lisbon to be
mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners.
The regular engineer-officers present, were only twenty-one
in number; but eleven volunteers from the line were joined as
assistant-engineers, and a draft of three hundred intelligent men
from the line, including twenty-five artificers of the staff corps,
strengthened the force immediately under their command.
Hamilton’s Portuguese division was already before the town, and on
the 24th of May, at the close of evening, general Houston’s division,
increased to five thousand men, by the addition of the seventeenth
Portuguese regiment, and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San
Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and
on the 27th Picton’s division, arriving from Campo Mayor, crossed
the river, by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their
united force being about ten thousand men. General Hill commanded the
covering army which, including the Spaniards, was spread from Merida
to Albuera. The cavalry was pushed forward in observation of Soult,
and a few days after, intelligence having arrived that Drouet’s
division was on the point of effecting a junction with that marshal,
two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, which had
been quartered at Coria, as posts of communication with Spencer, were
called up to reinforce the covering army.
While the allies were engaged at Albuera, Phillipon, the governor
of Badajos, had levelled their trenches, repaired his own damages,
and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables from the people
of Estremadura, who were still awed by the presence of Soult’s army;
and within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now
exceed five thousand souls. He had also mounted more guns, and when
the place was invested, parties of the townsmen mixed with soldiers,
were observed working to improve the defences; wherefore, as any
retrenchments made in the castle, behind the intended points of
attack, would have frustrated the besiegers’ object by prolonging the
siege, lord Wellington had a large telescope placed in the tower of
La Lyppe, near Elvas, by which the interior of the castle could be
plainly looked into, and all preparations discovered.
In the night of the 29th, ground was broken for a false attack
against the Pardaleras, and the following night sixteen hundred
workmen, with a covering party of twelve hundred, sank a parallel
against the castle, on an extent of eleven hundred yards, without
being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight.
The same night twelve hundred workmen, covered by eight hundred men
under arms, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty yards from San
Christoval, and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this
line one breaching, and two counter-batteries, were raised against
the fort and against the bridge-head, to prevent a sally from that
point; and a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences
of the castle, but the workmen were discovered, and a heavy fire
struck down many of them.
On the 31st the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft,
was pushed forward without much interruption, and rapidly; but the
Christoval attack, being carried on in a rocky soil, and the earth
brought up from the rear, proceeded slowly, and with considerable
loss. This day the British artillery company came up on mules from
Estremos, and the engineer hastened the works. The direction of
the parallel against the castle was such, that the right gradually
approached the point of attack by which the heaviest fire of the
place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save time, that
before the suitable point of distance was attained, a battery of
fourteen twenty-four-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
[Sidenote: French Register of the Siege, MSS.]
On the Christoval side, the batteries were not finished before the
night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky, that the miner
was employed to level the ground for the platforms; and the garrison
having mortars of sixteen and eighteen inches’ diameter mounted
on the castle, sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge
missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether,
if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge, from whence most
of the shells rolled off before bursting, yet so difficult is it to
judge rightly in war, that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it
was thrown away! The progress of the works was also delayed by the
bringing of earth from a distance, and woolpacks purchased at Elvas,
were found to be an excellent substitute.
In the night of the 2d, the batteries on both sides were completed,
and armed with forty-three pieces of different sizes, of which
twenty were pointed against the castle; the next day the fire of the
besiegers opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the
shot, rendered it very ineffectual at first, and five pieces became
unserviceable. However, before evening the practice was steadier, the
fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry
fell from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of clay.
In the night of the 3d the parallel against the castle was prolonged,
and a fresh battery for seven guns traced out at six hundred and
fifty yards from the breach. On the 4th the garrison’s fire was
increased by several additional guns, and six more pieces of the
besiegers were disabled, principally by their own fire. Meanwhile the
batteries told but slightly against the bank of clay.
At Christoval, the fort was much injured, and some damage was done
to the castle, from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns
were so soft and bad that the rate of firing was of necessity greatly
reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed,
all the damaged works were repaired, and the next day the enemy
having brought a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on
the castle side, the parallel there was deepened and traverses were
constructed to protect the troops.
Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, but the bank of
clay, although falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular.
One damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had
become unserviceable.
In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended,
a fresh battery was traced out, at only five hundred and twenty
yards from the breach, to receive the Portuguese iron guns, which
had arrived at Elvas; and on the Christoval side some new batteries
were opened and some old ones were abandoned. During this night the
garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach,
before morning their labourers were well covered, and two additional
pieces, from Christoval, were made to plunge into the trenches
with great effect. On the other hand the fire of the besiegers had
broken the clay bank, which took such a slope as to appear nearly
practicable, and the stray shells and shots set fire to the houses
nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled.
On the 6th there were two breaches in Christoval, and the principal
one being found practicable, a company of grenadiers with twelve
ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned
the fort by the east to divert the enemy’s attention. Three hundred
men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by
the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the
bridge-head; and a detachment, with a six-pounder, moved into the
valley of the Gebora, to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by
boats.
FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.
The storming party, commanded by major M‘Intosh, of the 85th
regiment, was preceded by a forlorn hope under Mr. Dyas, of the
51st, and this gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a
young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis about midnight,
and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had,
however, cleared all the rubbish away, the breach had still seven
feet of perpendicular wall, many obstacles, such as carts chained
together and pointed beams of wood, were placed above it, and
large shells were ranged along the ramparts to roll down upon the
assailants. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable, was
retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed
to a flank fire, from the town as well as a direct fire from the
fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders, and another effort
was made to escalade at different points; the ladders were too short,
and the garrison, consisting of only seventy-five men, besides
the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and
mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that
the assailants again retired with the loss of more than one hundred
men.
[Sidenote: Lamarre’s Sieges.]
Bad success always produces disputes, and the causes of this failure
were attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the
first; by others to the confusion which arose after the main body
had entered. French writers affirm that the breach was certainly
practicable on the night of the 5th, but repaired on the 6th; that
as the besiegers did not attack until midnight, the workmen had
time to clear the ruins away and to raise fresh obstacles, and the
bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three muskets each,
did the rest. But it is also evident, that whether from inexperience,
accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not
very well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders
few and short, and the breach not sufficiently scoured by the fire of
the batteries. The attack itself was also irregular and ill-combined,
for the leading troops were certainly repulsed before the main body
had descended the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was
admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that
the supports should form almost one body with the leaders, because
the sense of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to
valour, and obstacles which would be insurmountable to a few, seem to
vanish before a multitude. It is also to be recollected that this was
a case where not loss of men, but time was to be considered.
During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the
castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and
the following day three others were disabled. However, the bank of
clay at the castle at last offered a practicable slope, and during
the night captain Patton of the engineers examined it closely; he
was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived to make his report that
it was practicable. Nevertheless the garrison continued, as they
had done every night at both breaches, to clear away the ruins, and
with bales of wool and other materials to form defences behind the
opening. They ranged also a number of huge shells and barrels of
powder, with matches fastened to them, along the ramparts, and placed
chosen men to defend the breach, each man being supplied with four
muskets.
In this order they fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon
made. For intelligence now arrived that Drouet’s corps was close
to Llerena, and that Marmont was on the move from Salamanca, and
hence lord Wellington, seeing that his prey was likely to escape, as
a last effort resolved to assault Christoval again. But this time
four hundred British, Portuguese, and French men of the Chasseurs
Britanniques, carrying sixteen long ladders, were destined for the
attack; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was
nine instead of twelve, and a greater number of detachments than
before were distributed to the right and left to distract the enemy’s
attention, to cut off his communication with the town, and to be
ready to improve any success which might be obtained. On the other
side Phillipon increased the garrison of the fort to two hundred men.
SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.
The storming party was commanded by major M‘Geechy; the forlorn
hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by Mr. Hunt, an
engineer officer, and a little after nine o’clock the leading troops
bounding forward, were immediately followed by the support, amidst a
shattering fire of musketry which killed major M‘Geechy, Mr. Hunt,
and many men upon the glacis. The troops with loud shouts jumped
into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called to them to come on,
and at the same time rolled the barrels of powder and shells down,
while the musketry made fearful and rapid havoc. In a little time
the two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also
came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could
be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts, bayonetted the
foremost of the assailants, overturned the ladders, and again poured
their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When a hundred and forty
men had fallen the order to retire was given.
An assault on the castle breach might still have been tried, but the
troops could not have formed between the top, and the retrenchments
behind the breach, until Christoval was taken, and the guns from
thence used to clear the interior of the castle; hence the siege was
of necessity raised, because to take Christoval, required several
days more, and Soult was now ready to advance. The stores were
removed on the 10th, and the attack was turned into a blockade.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The allies lost, during this unfortunate siege, nearly four
hundred men and officers, and the whole of their proceedings were
against rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores
too few, and the points of attack, chosen, not the best; the defences
were untouched by counter-batteries, and the breaching batteries were
at too great a distance for the bad guns employed; howitzers mounted
on trucks were but a poor substitute for mortars, and the sap was not
practised; lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been
crowned, and a musketry fire established against the breach.
2º. That a siege so conducted should fail against such a brave and
intelligent garrison is not strange; but it is most strange and
culpable that a government, which had been so long engaged in war as
the British, should have left the engineer department, with respect
to organization and equipment, in such a state as to make it, in
despite of the officers’ experience, bravery, and zeal, a very
inefficient arm of war. The skill displayed belonged to particular
persons, rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with
which they worked, especially those sent from the storekeeper’s
department, were so shamefully bad that the work required could
scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting-tools were eagerly
sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the
British; when the soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms,
were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French.
3º. The neglect of rules, above noticed, was for the most part
a matter of absolute necessity; yet censure might attach to the
general, inasmuch as he could have previously sent to England for a
battering train. But then the conduct of the Portuguese and British
governments when lord Wellington was in the lines, left him so little
hope of besieging any place on the frontier, that he was hourly
in fear of being obliged to embark: moreover, the badness of the
Portuguese guns was not known, and the space of time that elapsed
between the fall of Badajos and this siege, was insufficient to
procure artillery from England; neither would the Portuguese have
furnished the means of carriage. It may however at all times be taken
as a maxim, that the difficulties of war are so innumerable that no
head was ever yet strong enough to fore-calculate them all.
CHAPTER VI.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
It will be remembered, that Soult instead of retiring into Andalusia,
took a flank position at Llerena, and awaited the arrival of Drouet’s
division, which had been detached from Massena’s army. At Llerena,
although closely watched by general Hill, the French marshal, with an
army, oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained
an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet’s approach, when he
again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry
skirmish took place to the disadvantage of the French.
[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch from Soult to Marmont.]
On the 14th, Drouet, whose march had been very rapid, arrived,
and then Soult, who knew that lord Wellington expected large
reinforcements, and was desirous to forestal them, advanced to
Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill took measures to concentrate the
covering army on the position of Albuera. Meanwhile Marmont, who had
reorganized the army of Portugal, in six divisions of infantry and
five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon’s orders to co-operate
with Soult; and in this view had sent Reynier with two divisions
by the pass of Baños, while himself with a considerable force of
infantry and cavalry and ten guns escorted a convoy to Ciudad
Rodrigo. General Spencer, with the first, fifth, sixth, and light
divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, was then behind the Agueda;
and Pack’s Portuguese brigade was above Almeida, which had been
again placed in a condition to resist an irregular assault. Spencer’s
orders were to make his marches correspond with those of the enemy,
if the latter should point towards the Tagus; but if the French
attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa, and to blow up Almeida
if the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the
6th, Marmont, having introduced his convoy, marched out of Rodrigo
in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos, the other upon Espeja.
The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade’s cavalry
before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave
its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy’s advance, which soon
closed upon, and cannonaded it, with eight pieces of artillery.
Unfortunately the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French
and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must
have been destroyed, if captain Purvis, with a squadron of the fourth
dragoons, had not charged the enemy while the other troopers, with
strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the
marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not
follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only twenty men.
After the action an officer calling himself Montbrun’s aide-de-camp
deserted to the allies.
General Spencer, more distinguished for great personal intrepidity
than for quickness of military conception, was now undecided as to
his measures; and the army was by no means in a safe situation, for
the country was covered with baggage, the movements of the divisions
were wide, and without concert, and general Pack who had the
charge of Almeida too hastily blew it up. In this uncertainty the
adjutant-general Pakenham pointed out that the French did not advance
as if to give battle, that their numbers were evidently small, their
movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably intended
to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus: he
therefore urged Spencer either to take up a position of battle which
would make the enemy discover his real numbers and intentions,
or retire at once behind the Coa, with a view to march to lord
Wellington’s assistance. These arguments were supported by colonel
Waters, who, having closely watched the infantry coming out of Ciudad
Rodrigo, observed that they were too clean and well dressed to have
come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison.
He had also ascertained that a large body was actually in movement
towards the passes.
Spencer yielding to these representations marched in the evening by
Alfayates to Soito, and the next day behind the Coa. Here certain
intelligence, that Marmont was in the passes, reached him, and he
continued his march to the Alemtejo by Penamacor, but detached one
division and his cavalry to Coria, as flankers, while he passed with
the main body by Castello Branco, Vilha Velha, Niza, and Portalegre.
The season was burning and the marches long, yet so hardened by
constant service were the light division, and so well organized
by general Craufurd, that, although covering from eighteen to
eight-and-twenty miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler
behind. The flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily
exposed at Coria, then followed, and Marmont having imposed upon
Spencer and Pack by his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo,
filed off by the pass of Perales, while Reynier moved by the passes
of Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united
at the bridge of Almaraz. Here a pontoon bridge expected from Madrid
had not arrived, and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one
ferry-boat which caused a delay of four days, which would have proved
fatal to Badajos, if the battering guns employed in that siege had
been really effective.
When the river was crossed, the French army marched in two columns
with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they
arrived the 18th, and opened their communications with Soult.
On the other side, lord Wellington had been attentively watching
these movements; he had never intended to press Badajos beyond the
10th, because he knew that when reinforced with Drouet’s division,
Soult alone would be strong enough to raise the siege, and hence the
hurried assaults; but he was resolved to fight Soult, and although
he raised the siege on the 10th, yet, by a deciphered intercepted
letter, that Phillipon’s provisions would be exhausted on the 20th,
he continued the blockade of the place, in hopes that some such
accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. It may
be here asked, why, as he knew a few days would suffice to reduce
Badajos, he did not retrench his whole army and persist in the siege?
The answer is that Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted both of
provisions and ammunition, by the siege of Badajos, the enemy would
immediately have taken that fortress.
When Soult’s advanced guard had reached Los Santos, the covering
army, consisting of the second and fourth divisions and Blake’s
Spaniards was concentrated at Albuera, Hamilton’s Portuguese were
also directed there from Badajos; meanwhile the third and seventh
divisions maintained the blockade, and Wellington expecting a battle
repaired in person to Albuera, but, unlike Beresford, he had that
position entrenched, and did not forget to occupy the hill on the
right.
On the 14th, it was known that Marmont was at Truxillo, and that
in four days he could unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was
also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana, yet Wellington
still lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but
the cautious manner in which the latter moved, continually refusing
his left and edging with his right, towards Almendralejos, soon
extinguished this chance; on the 17th, the blockade having been
raised the day before, the allies repassed the Guadiana in two
columns. The British and Portuguese moved by the pontoon bridge near
Badajos, the Spaniards crossed at Jerumenha;—this movement, not an
easy one, was executed without any loss of men or stores, and without
accident, save that general William Stewart by some error, took the
same line as Blake, and at night fell in with the Spaniards, who
thought his division French and were like to have fired.
The 19th the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus
succoured after two most honourable defences, and at a moment when
Phillipon, despairing of aid and without provisions, was preparing
his means of breaking out and escaping.
The 21st Godinot’s division which had marched by Valverde took
possession of Olivenza; the 22d he pushed a detachment under the
guns of Jerumenha, and the same day the whole of the French cavalry
crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa
and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other.
Lord Wellington being now joined by the head of Spencer’s corps,
had placed his army on both sides of the Caya, with cavalry posts
towards the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of
Elvas. His right wing was extended behind the Caya to the lower
bridge on that river, and his left wing had a field of battle on
some high ground resting on the Gebora, a little beyond Campo Mayor,
which fortress was occupied, and the open space between it and the
high ground strongly entrenched. On this side also cavalry were
posted in observation beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, the
whole position forming an irregular arch embracing the bridge of
Badajos. The wood and town of Aronches were behind the centre of
the position and the little fortified place of Ouguella was behind
the left; but the right wing was much more numerous than the left,
and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the
Caya, was occupied by the light division, whose position could not be
recognized by the enemy.
If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would
have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the
menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not
exceed ten or twelve miles: the communications also were good, and
from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French
movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo
Mayor, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers on that frontier.
The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it
from the enemy’s side, and to protect the rear, the first division
was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy
at Marvão or Castello de Vide if he should attempt to turn the allies
by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move
between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too
long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near
Elvas or Campo Mayor.
The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st,
both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of
Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The
right column after driving back the outposts of the allies, was
opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden’s Portuguese, and
retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but
the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa
Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons,
and the second German hussars which were on the Guadiana escaped
to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune in
which nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or taken is not
very clear, for the French aver that colonel Lallemand, by a feigned
retreat drew the cavalry into an ambuscade, and the rumours in the
English camp were various and discordant.
After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana
above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and
proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress,
hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off
the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther
operations took place.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and,
although the crisis glided away without any event of importance, this
was one of the most critical periods of the war. For Marmont brought
down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, thirty-one
thousand infantry, four thousand five hundred cavalry, and fifty-four
guns; Soult about twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand
cavalry, and thirty-six guns;—to effect this, Andalusia and Castile
had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the
Asturias, Bonnet united with general Mayer, who had succeeded Serras
in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians
in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsular were in
presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and
it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos,
and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya had made ample amends
for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was
succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal,
Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura
campaign had been favourable to them, and the political state of
their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon
the peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially
strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there
could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would,
if successful, have revenged Massena’s disasters, and sent lord
Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if
unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because
from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos,
a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was
thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops,
than it really was; the position very difficult to be examined was
confidently held by lord Wellington, and no battle took place.
Napoleon’s estimation of the weight of moral over physical force
in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were
conscious of recent defeats, Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the
horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce
blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils, and if Cæsar
after a partial check at Dyrracchiaum held it unsafe to fight a
pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced
or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were
divisions on the Caya, as good in all points, and more experienced,
than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The
stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved
by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of
the general. Lord Wellington’s resolution to accept battle on the
banks of the Caya, was nevertheless, one of as unmixed greatness,
as the crisis was one of unmixed danger to the cause he supported.
For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have
already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of
misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the
enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay,
but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering
of those brave men that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to
assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the
sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at
last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the
English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped
that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved
it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of
necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which
were thus exhausted; and what with desertion, famine, and sickness,
that flourishing army which had mustered more than forty thousand
good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena’s invasion, could
now scarcely produce fourteen thousand for a battle on which the
fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large
reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many
sick and wounded, that scarcely twenty-eight thousand sabres and
bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of
one-fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry
was double that of the British.
To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations
only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but
the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the
troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha,
Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olaya, which were the
fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any
means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been
entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of
burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British
detachments could go; and all the commissariat means to boot, were
scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the
subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp;
there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from
the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon.
When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only ten
thousand rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight’s provisions in
store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many
places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her
glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire at
Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed
of untried soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked
to; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls.
It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state
of affairs, he might under cover of the Guadiana, have collected
his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the
pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did
pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies,
and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines,
which would have ensured the fall of that place; unless the English
general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior
numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a
perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army,
would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of
Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications
of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat
and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the
Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of
political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it
did so; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen.
While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared
of all the hospitals and heavy baggage; workmen were day and night
employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and
guns, ammunition, and provisions were brought up from Abrantes,
by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of
Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of
perdition, but the true peninsular character was now displayed, and
in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by
the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated
in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of
the Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened
at the consequences of their own conduct; but when they found
their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of lord
Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had
exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they
had replenished it!
His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the
more admirable, because Mr. Perceval’s policy, prevailing in the
cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest,
and almost without a hope of support in his own country: yet his
daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune; it was supported
by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no
advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula,
knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push
their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in
Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from
them; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the
north and the army of the centre were paralysed by the flight of the
king, and this was the moment, when Figueras having been surprised
by Rovira, and Taragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of
Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus,
nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprizes of the
Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians
only, above forty thousand regulars, besides partizans, with which
they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated
in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprizes of the
northern partidas.
[Sidenote: See Book XIII. Chap. I.]
This favourable occasion was not seized. Julian Sanchez, indeed,
cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo;
Santocildes came down to Astorga, and as I have before observed,
Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications;
some stir also was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was
harassed, but the commotion soon subsided; and a detachment from
Madrid having surprised a congregation of partidas at Peneranda,
killed many and recovered a large convoy which they had taken; and
in this complicated war, which being spread like a spider’s web over
the whole Peninsula, any drag upon one part would have made the whole
quiver to the most distant extremities, the regular armies effected
nothing. Nor did any general insurrection of the people take place in
the rear of the French, who retained all their fortified posts, while
their civil administrations continued to rule in the great towns as
tranquilly as if there was no war!
Lord Wellington’s principal measure for dissipating the storm in his
front had rested upon Blake. That general had wished him to fight
beyond the Guadiana, and was not well pleased at being refused;
wherefore the English general, instead of taking ten or twelve
thousand Spaniards, and an uneasy colleague, into the line of battle
at Campo Mayor, where he knew by experience that they would quarrel
with the Portuguese, and by their slowness, insubordination, and
folly, would rather weaken than strengthen himself, delivered to
Blake the pontoons used at Badajos, and concerted with him a movement
down the right bank of the Guadiana. He was to recross that river at
Mertola, and to fall upon Seville, which was but slightly guarded by
a mixed force of French and Spaniards in Joseph’s service; and this
blow, apparently easy of execution, would have destroyed all the
arsenals and magazines, which supported the blockade of Cadiz. Lord
Wellington had therefore good reason to expect the raising of that
siege, as well as the dispersion of the French army in its front. He
likewise urged the regency at Cadiz to push forward general Beguines
from San Roque, against Seville, while the insurgents in the Ronda
pressed the few troops, left in Grenada, on one side, and Freire,
with the Murcian army, pressed them on the other.
Blake marched the 18th, recrossed the river at Mertola the 22d,
remained inactive at Castillegos until the 30th, and sent his heavy
artillery to Ayamonte by water; then, instead of moving direct with
his whole force upon Seville, he detached only a small body, and with
a kind of infatuation wasted two successive days in assaulting the
castle of Niebla; a contemptible work garrisoned by three hundred
Swiss, who had in the early part of the war abandoned the Spanish
service. Being without artillery he could not succeed, and meanwhile
Soult, hearing of his march, ordered Olivenza to be blown up, and
taking some cavalry, and Godinot’s division which formed the left of
his army, passed the Morena by Santa Ollalla and moved rapidly upon
Seville. From Monasterio he sent a detachment to relieve the castle
of Niebla; and at the same time, general Conroux, whose division was
at Xeres de los Cavalheiro, crossed the mountain by the Aracena road,
and endeavoured to cut off Blake from Ayamonte.
Thus far, notwithstanding the failure at Niebla, the English
general’s project was crowned with success. The great army in his
front was broken up, Soult was gone, Marmont was preparing to retire,
and Portugal was safe. Blake’s cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some
infantry under Ballesteros, had also, during the attack on Niebla,
appeared in front of Seville on the right of the Guadalquivir, and
a slight insurrection took place at Carmona on the left bank. The
Serranos, always in arms, were assisted by Beguines with three
thousand men, and blockaded the town of Ronda; and Freire advancing
with his Murcians beyond Lorca, menaced general Laval, who had
succeeded Sebastiani in command of the fourth corps. In this crisis,
general Daricau, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great
convent, which Soult had, in anticipation of such a crisis, fortified
in the Triana suburb, before his first invasion of Estremadura. But
the Spanish troops of Joseph, shewed no disposition to quit him, the
people of Seville remained tranquil, and Blake’s incapacity ruined
the whole combination.
[Sidenote: 1811. July.]
Soult approached on the 6th of July, Ballesteros and Villemur
immediately retired, and the insurrection at Carmona ceased. Blake,
hearing of Conroux’s march, precipitately fled from Niebla, and only
escaped into Portugal by the assistance of a bridge laid for him at
San Lucar de Guadiana by colonel Austin. He then resolved to embark
some of his forces and sail to attack San Lucar de Barameda; but
scarcely had a few men got on board, when the French advanced guard
appeared, and he again fled in disorder to Ayamonte, and got into
the island of Canelas, where fortunately a Spanish frigate and three
hundred transports had unexpectedly arrived. While Ballesteros, with
the cavalry and three thousand infantry, protected the embarkation,
by taking a position on the Rio Piedra, Blake got on board with great
confusion, and sailed to Cadiz, for the French had reinforced San
Lucar de Barameda, and entered Ayamonte. The Portuguese militia, of
the Algarves, were then called out; and Ballesteros after losing some
men on the Piedra, took post in the mountains of Aroches on his
left, until the French retired, when he came back with his infantry
and entrenched himself in Canelas. On this island he remained until
August, and then embarked under the protection of the Portuguese
militia at Villa Real, while his cavalry marched up the Guadiana to
rejoin Castaños, who with a few troops still remained in Estremadura.
A small battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after
unsuccessfully attacked by the French, and this finished the long
partizan warfare of the Condado de Niebla.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
There was now nothing to prevent the French from again pressing
the allies on the Caya, except the timid operations of Freire on
the side of Grenada, and these Soult was in march to repress. With
indefatigable activity he had recalled the troops of the fourth
corps, from Estremadura, to supply the place of the detachments which
he had already sent, from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, and Malaga, to
quell the insurrection in the Ronda; and while he thus prepared the
means of attacking Freire, Beguines was driven back to San Roque,
and the Serranos as I have before observed, disgusted with the
Spanish general’s ill conduct, were upon the point of capitulating
with the French. During these events in the Ronda, Godinot returned,
from the pursuit of Blake, to Jaen, whence on the 7th of August, he
was directed to march against Pozalçon and Baza, where the Murcian
army was posted. Meanwhile Blake, re-landing his troops at Almeria,
joined Freire; his intention was to have commenced active operations
against Grenada, but thinking it necessary to go first to Valencia
where Palacio was making mischief, he left the army, which was above
twenty-seven thousand strong, under Freire, and before he could
return it was utterly dispersed.
ROUT OF BAZA.
General Quadra, who commanded the right wing of the Murcians, was at
Pozalçon, and it is said, had orders to rejoin Freire, but disobeyed.
The centre and left under Freire himself, were at Venta de Bahul in
front of Baza. The 8th, Soult, at the head of a mixed force of French
and Spanish troops in Joseph’s service, drove back the advanced
guards from Guadix. The 9th he appeared in front of Bahul, where
he discerned the Spanish army on strong ground, their front being
covered by a deep ravine. As his object was to cut off the retreat
upon Lorca, and the city of Murcia, he only shewed a few troops at
first, and skirmished slightly, to draw Freire’s attention, while
Godinot attacked his right at Pozalçon and got in his rear. Godinot
wasted time. His advanced guard, alone, had defeated Quadra with
great loss, but instead of entering Baza, he halted for the night
near it; and during the darkness, the Spaniards, who had no other
line of retreat, and were now falling back in confusion before Soult,
passed through that place, and made for Lorca and Caravalha. Soult’s
cavalry, however, soon cut this line, and the fugitives took to the
by-roads, followed and severely harassed by the French horse.
At this time the whole province was in a defenceless state, but the
people generally took arms to protect the city of Murcia. That
place was entrenched, and the French marshal, whose troops were few,
and fatigued by constant marching, not thinking fit to persevere,
especially as the yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, returned
to Grenada, whence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents
who had gathered under the Conde de Montijo in the Alpuxaras. Thus
Grenada was entirely quieted.
Here it is impossible to refrain from admiring Soult’s vigour and
ability. We see him in the latter end of 1810, with a small force
and in the depth of winter, taking Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque,
Valencia d’Alcantara, and Campo Mayor; defeating a great army,
and capturing above twenty thousand men. Again when unexpectedly
assailed by Beresford in the north, by the Murcians in the east, by
Ballesteros in the west, and by Lapeña and Graham in the south, he
found means to repel three of them, to persevere in the blockade
of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against
the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon
human record, and that at a moment when the king by abandoning his
throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast
to Estremadura, he still maintained the struggle, and again taking
the offensive obliged the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did
not then push his fortune to the utmost, it must be considered that
his command was divided, that his troops were still impressed with
the recollection of Albuera, and that the genius of his adversary
had worked out new troubles for him in Andalusia. With how much
resolution and activity he repressed those troubles I have just
shewn; but above all things he is to be commended for the prudent
vigour of his administration, which, in despite of the opposition
of Joseph’s Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with
such a notion of his power and resources, that no revolt of any real
consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or “Escopeteros”
failed him in the hour of need.
Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain;
the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior
suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the
French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national
government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable
English and Spanish agents prodigal of money, and of arms,
continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast
covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies
on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a
fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost,
few reinforcements, and all the material means to be created in the
country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced
that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such
difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated
the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an
adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was
not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny
him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and
admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that
forms a great captain.
CHAPTER VII.
[Sidenote: 1811. July.]
While Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of Andalusia, Marmont
retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the
valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left,
at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and
thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the
French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their
efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier,
his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of
the Guadiana, this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the
siege of Badajos, if Marmont’s position had not forbid that measure,
he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to
judge of the motives which influenced his conduct we must again cast
a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was
hourly changing.
In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat, and
dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had
chased the Partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuença, and re-established
the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and
confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters
on each side of their frontier, at Baza and Taragona
The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the
northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down
the Guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly forty thousand
fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were
come, or coming into the north of Spain. The young guard which was at
Burgos, under general Dorsenne, was increased to seventeen thousand
men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by
the Spaniards, to shake the French hold of the country while Soult
and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to
plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily,
because the king was now on his return from Paris, in apparent
harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties
were defined.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
Suchet urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion
of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the
middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic
enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In
the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed
Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; thirteen thousand men
of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th,
and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a
large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between
Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France, and general Dorsenne
taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade
Gallicia.
Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and
Leon, to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw
all his posts and depôts with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line
of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his
chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the
Tagus, and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and
to secure the communication across the river.
Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually
arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion
of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was,
he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could
always be frustrated by Marmont’s moving against their flank; and
with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side,
would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in
time be overmatched, as the French fell back upon their resources.
Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do
against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while
stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the
king’s administration.
In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in
Estremadura, to cover Soult’s operations against Blake and the
Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the
valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle
of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another
division occupied Placentia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and
Baños; Girard’s division of the fifth corps, remained at Zafra, to
serve as a point of connexion between Marmont and Soult, and to
support Badajos, which, by a wise provision of Napoleon’s, was now
garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of
Portugal and of the south. This gave each general a direct interest
in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was
to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might
have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence
of succouring Ciudad.
To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond the means of the duke of
Ragusa; he therefore repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed
two strong forts, one at each side, to protect it, and to serve as an
intermediate field depôt; a third and more considerable fort was also
built on the high ridge of Mirabete, to insure a passage over the
hills from Almaraz to Truxillo. A free intercourse with the army of
the south was thus secured on one side, and on the other, the passes
of Baños and Bejar, and the Roman road of Puerto Pico, which had been
restored in 1810, served for communication with the army of the north.
The French affairs had now assumed a very favourable aspect. There
was indeed a want of money, but the generals were obeyed with
scrupulous attention by the people of Spain, not only within the
districts occupied by them, but even in those villages where the
guerillas were posted. This obedience lord Wellington attributed
entirely to fear, and hoped as the exactions were heavy, that the
people would at last fight or fly from their habitations on the
approach of a French soldier; but this did not happen generally,
and to me it appears, that the obedience was rather a symptom of
the subjection of the nation, and that with a judicious mixture of
mildness and severity perfect submission would have followed if
England had not kept the war alive.
On the other hand the weakness and anarchy of the Spaniards were
daily increasing, and the disputes, between the British general and
the Portuguese government, had arrived to such a height, that lord
Wellington, having drawn up powerful and clear statements of his
grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils and the other to his own
government, with a positive intimation that if an entirely new system
was not immediately adopted he would no longer attempt to carry on
the contest. Lord Wellesley, taking his stand upon this ground,
made strenuous exertions in both countries to prevent the ruin of
the cause; but lord Wellington, while expecting the benefit of his
brother’s interference, had to contend with the most surprising
difficulties, and to seek in his own personal resources for the means
of even defending Portugal. He had sent marshal Beresford to Lisbon,
immediately after Albuera, to superintend the reorganization and
restoration of the Portuguese forces, and Beresford had sent Mr. De
Lemos, an officer of his own staff, to the Brazils, to represent the
inconveniences arising from the interference of the regency in the
military affairs. On the other hand the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos,
who had been about the British head-quarters as their spy, to Rio
Janeiro, and thus the political intrigues became more complicated
than ever.
But with respect to the war Wellington had penetrated Napoleon’s
object, when he saw Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus;
he felt the full force of the emperor’s military reasoning, yet he
did not despair, if he could overcome the political obstacles, to
gain some advantage. He had now a powerful and experienced British
force under his command, the different departments and the staff of
the army were every day becoming more skilful and ready, and he had
also seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers. The
king he knew to be no general, and discontented with the marshals;
Soult he had found able and vast in his plans, but too cautious in
their execution; Marmont, with considerable vigour, had already shown
some rashness in the manner he had pushed Reynier’s division forward,
after passing the Tagus, and it was, therefore, easy to conceive
that no very strict concert would be maintained in their combined
operations.
Lord Wellington had also established some good channels of
information. He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who
were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise,
constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish
state-counsellor, living at the head-quarters of the first corps,
gave intelligence from that side, and a guitar-player of celebrity,
named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice
from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch
corn for France, kept _chasse marées_ constantly plying along the
Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but
facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies,
amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little
hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man while plying his
trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every
French soldier, that passed in or out of Spain by that passage, and
transmitted their numbers by the _chasse marées_ to Lisbon.
With the exception of the state spy at Victor’s head-quarters, who
being a double traitor was infamous, all the persons thus employed
were very meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also,
were Spanish gentlemen, alcaldes, or poor men, who disdaining rewards
and disregarding danger, acted from a pure spirit of patriotism, and
are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their
virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river, on
one of his expeditions; and the alcalde of Caceres, a man, of the
clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the
cause, and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand’s restoration
cast into a dungeon, where he perished; a victim to the unbounded
ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well!
With such means lord Wellington did not despair of baffling the deep
policy of the emperor in the field. He thought that the saying of
Henry the Fourth of France, that “_large armies would starve and
small ones be beaten in Spain_,” was still applicable. He felt that
a solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his
brother’s aid, he hoped to have, would enable him either to strike
partial blows against the French, or oblige them to concentrate in
large masses, which, confident in his own martial genius he felt he
could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts,
and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto,
indeed, the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the
partidas, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances,
and the palpable advantages of the system, he trusted would yet
teach them what to do.
Having deeply meditated upon these matters and received his
reinforcements from England, he resolved to leave Hill with ten
thousand infantry, a division of cavalry, and four brigades of
artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremos. From these
rich towns which were beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, the
troops could rapidly concentrate either for an advance or retreat;
and the latter was secured upon Abrantes, or upon the communications
with Beira, by Niza, and Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge
had now been established. The front was protected by Elvas,
Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella; and Castaños also remained in
Estremadura with the fifth army, which by the return of the cavalry
from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie’s legion now amounted to
about a thousand infantry and nine hundred horse. This force placed
on the side of Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara
as posts of support, and a retreat either by the fords of the Tagus
near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello
de Vide. Hill’s position was thus so well covered, that he could
not be surprised, nor even pressed except by a very strong army;
and he was always on the watch as we shall hereafter find, to make
incursions against the division of the fifth corps, which remained
in Estremadura. The rest of the army was then placed in quarters of
refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão and other places near the
Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to meet Marmont’s
movement to that river.
When this disposition was made, the English general arranged his
other measures of offence. The conduct of the Portuguese government
and the new positions of the French armies had, as Napoleon had
foreseen, left him no means of undertaking any sustained operation;
but, as he was ignorant of the great strength of the army of the
north, he hoped to find an opportunity of taking Ciudad Rodrigo
before Marmont could come to its assistance. For this purpose he had
caused a fine train of iron battering guns, and mortars, together
with a reinforcement of British artillery-men, which had arrived at
Lisbon from England, to be shipped in large vessels, and then with
some ostentation made them sail as it were for Cadiz; at sea they
were however shifted on board small craft, and while the original
vessels actually arrived at Cadiz and Gibraltar, the guns were
secretly brought first to Oporto and then in boats to Lamego. During
this process, several engineer, artillery, and commissariat officers,
were sent to meet and transport these guns, and the necessary stores
for a siege, to Villaponte near Celerico; and as one of the principal
magazines of the army was at Lamego, and a constant intercourse was
kept up between it and Celerico, another great depôt, the arrival,
and passage of the guns and stores to their destination was not
likely to attract the attention of the French spies.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
Other combinations were also employed, both to deceive the enemy and
to prepare the means for a sudden attack, before the troops commenced
their march for Beira; but the hiding of such extensive preparations
from the French would have been scarcely possible, if the personal
hatred borne to the invaders by the peninsulars, combined with the
latter’s peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any
information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had
arrived at Oporto. The operation of bringing sixty-eight huge guns,
with proportionate stores, across nearly fifty miles of mountain, was
however one of no mean magnitude; five thousand draft bullocks were
required for the train alone, and above a thousand militia were for
several weeks employed merely to repair the road.
[Sidenote: General Harvey’s Journal.]
The allies broke up from the Caya the 21st of July, and they had
received considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, but
they were sickly and required a change of cantonments; hence when
an intercepted despatch gave reason to believe that Ciudad Rodrigo
was in want of provisions, Wellington suddenly crossed the Tagus
at Vilha Velha, and marched in the beginning of August by Castello
Branco and Penamacor towards Rodrigo, hoping to surprise it in a
starving state, but giving out that his movement was for the sake of
healthy quarters. His movement was unmolested save by some French
dragoons, from the side of Placentia, who captured a convoy of
seventy mules loaded with wine near Pedrogoa, and getting drunk with
their booty attacked some Portuguese infantry, who repulsed them
and recovered the mules; but there were other ostensible objects
besides the obvious one of removing from the well-known pestilence
of the Guadiana, which contributed to blind the French as to the
secret motives of the English general. We have seen that Dorsenne was
menacing Gallicia, and that Soult was in full operation against the
Murcians; it was supposed that he intended to invade Murcia itself,
and therefore the march of the allies had the double object, of
saving Gallicia, by menacing the rear of the invading army; and of
relieving Murcia by forcing Marmont to look after Ciudad Rodrigo,
and thus draw him away from the support of Soult, who would not, it
was supposed, then quit Andalusia.
[Sidenote: General Walker’s Correspondence, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Abadia’s ditto, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
Gallicia was meanwhile in great danger, for the Partidas of the north
had been vigorously repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, which enabled
Dorsenne to collect about twenty thousand men on the Esla. Abadia,
who had succeeded Santocildes, was posted with about seven thousand
disciplined men behind this river, and he had a reserve of fifteen
hundred at Foncebadon; but he could make no head, for to this number
the Gallician army had again dwindled, and these were starving. The
25th the French, having passed the river in four columns, made a
concentric march upon Astorga. Abadia, whose rear-guard sustained a
sharp conflict near La Baneza, retreated, precisely by the same line
as sir John Moore had done in 1809, and with about the same relative
proportion of force; but as he only took the Foncebadon road and
did not use the same diligence and skill as that general, the enemy
forestalling him by Manzanal and Bembibre, cut him off from Villa
Franca del Bierzo and from the road to Lugo, and on the 27th drove
him into the Val des Orres. During this operation the division of the
army of the north, which Bessieres had sent with the convoy to Ciudad
Rodrigo, entered that place and returned to Salamanca.
[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The Spanish general having thus lost his line of communication with
Lugo, and the few stores he possessed at Villa Franca, took post
at Domingo Flores in the Val des Orres, where he entered a strong
country, and, under the worst circumstances, could retire upon
Portugal and save his troops if not his province. But his army which
was in the utmost distress before, for shoes and clothing, was now
ready to disband from misery, and the consternation in Gallicia was
excessive. That province torn by faction, stood helpless before the
invader, who could, and would, have taken both Coruña and Ferrol, but
for the sudden arrival of the allies on the Coa, which obliged him,
for his own safety, to return to the plains. Souham, also, who was
coming from Burgos, by forced marches, to support Dorsenne, halted at
Rio Seco, and Abadia did not fail to ascribe all this to the loss he
had inflicted, but his vanity was laughed at.
To have thus saved Gallicia was a great thing. That kingdom was
the base of all the operations against the line of communication
with France; from thence went forth, those British squadrons which
nourished the guerilla warfare in Biscay, in the Montaña, in Navarre,
in the Rioja, and the Asturias; it was the chief resource for the
supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal,
and honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important
than Catalonia. But like the rest of Spain it was always weak from
disorders, and, if the allies had remained in Alemtejo, there was
nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it; for though he should
not have taken Ferrol and Coruña, the points of St. Jago, Lugo, Villa
Franca, and Orense would have given him an entire command of the
interior, and the Spaniards holding the ports only would not have
been able to dislodge him.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
Lord Wellington arrived upon the Coa about the 8th of August,
intending, as I have said, first a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo,
and finally a siege; it was however soon known that the French had
on the 6th supplied the place for two months, and the first part
of the design was therefore relinquished. The troops were then
quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line
of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where
there was still some corn. If the enemy advanced in superior numbers,
the army could retire through a strong country to a position of
battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct.
Nor was the rest of Beira left unprotected, because the French would
have exposed their left flank, by any advance in the direction of
Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the
valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celerico.
The line of supply from Lamego along which the battering-train was
now moving, was however rather exposed.
While the army was in this position, the preparations for the siege
went on briskly, until Wellington learned, contrary to his former
belief, that the disposable force of the army of the north, was above
twenty thousand good troops; and consequently, that Ciudad Rodrigo
could not be attacked in face of that corps, and of Marmont’s army.
Then changing his plan, he resolved to blockade the place, and wait
for some opportunity to strike a sudden blow, either against the
fortress, or against the enemy’s troops; for it was the foundation
of his hopes, that as the French could not long remain in masses,
for want of provisions, and that he could check those masses on the
frontier of Portugal, so he could always force them to concentrate,
or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of
observation, that his plans were based on calculations which did not
comprise the Gallician army. He had no expectation that it would
act at all, or if it did, that it would act effectually. It had no
cavalry, and the infantry being undisciplined dared not enter the
plains in face of the enemy’s horsemen; yet this was in August 1811,
and Gallicia had not seen the face of an enemy since June 1809!
Early in September, Marmont, pushing a detachment from Placencia
through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet, at St. Martin
de Trebejo, and opened his communications with Dorsenne. Nevertheless
lord Wellington formed the blockade. His head-quarters were fixed at
Guinaldo, the fifth division was placed at Perales, in observation
of Marmont, and the first division, now commanded by general Graham,
occupied Penamacor. A battery of artillery, was withdrawn from
Hill, and three brigades of that general’s corps, reinforced by a
Portuguese regiment, passed the Tagus, and were placed on the Ponçul,
in advance of Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that
line of communication. Meanwhile the battering-train was collected
at Villa de Ponte, the troops were employed to prepare gabions and
fascines, and the engineers instructed two hundred men of the line,
in the duties of sappers. The bridge over the Coa at Almeida which
had been broken by Massena, was permanently repaired, and the works
of Almeida itself, were ordered to be once more restored to form a
place of arms for the battering-train and stores; Carlos d’España
came also to Leon to form a new army under the protection of the
allies, but he was without officers, arms, money, or stores, and his
force was a mere name.
CHAPTER VIII.
[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]
During the first arrangements, for the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo,
the garrison made some excursions, to beat up the quarters of the
British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers
from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in
Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing
to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by general
Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving
from Zafra, again defeated him and drove him to Albuquerque. Other
military operations, worth relating, there were none, but the civil
transactions in Portugal were very important.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]
Mr. Stuart’s exertions had produced some improvement in the
Portuguese revenue; the ranks of the infantry were again filling
by the return of deserters, and by fresh recruits, which, with the
reinforcements from England had raised the actual number of the
allied army to upwards of eighty thousand men, fifty-six thousand
of which were British; the number under arms did not however exceed
twenty-four thousand Portuguese and thirty-three thousand British,
of whom five thousand were cavalry, with about ninety pieces of
artillery. The previous operations in Alemtejo had produced sickness,
which was increasing, and twenty-two thousand men were in hospital;
and hence, Hill’s corps being deducted, lord Wellington could not
bring to the blockade of Ciudad above forty-four thousand of all
arms, including Sanchez’s Partida. But Marmont, alone, could in
a few days bring as many to its succour, and Dorsenne always had
from twenty to twenty-five thousand men in hand; because the French
reinforcements had relieved the old garrisons in the north and the
latter had joined the army in the field.
At this time the British military chest was quite bankrupt, even the
muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely
depended, were six months in arrears for wages; and the disputes
with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious than ever. The
regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated
to throw the burthen of feeding the native troops entirely upon
the British commissariat, without any reform of abuses, and lord
Wellington had rejected it, hence renewed violence; and as Beresford
had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart deprived of his support on
military questions, and himself no longer a member of the regency,
was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The
prince regent’s return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in
the Brazils, and the regency expecting a long hold of power, and
foolishly imagining that the war was no longer doubtful, were, after
the custom of all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising
how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to
or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands,
such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the
Portuguese post office; and at the same time they preferred various
vexatious, and unfounded charges against British officers, while
gross corruption, and oppression of the poorer people, marked the
conduct of their own magistrates.
But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed,
was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever.
Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe that the emperor was
coming to Spain. And this notion was confirmed by the assembling
of an army of reserve in France, and by the formation of great
magazines at Burgos, and other places, to supply which, and to obtain
money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest,
and selling the overplus of corn again even by retail. Minute
reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon;
reinforcements, especially of the imperial guards, were pouring into
Spain, and Wellington judging that the emperor must either drive the
British from the Peninsula, or lower his tone with the world, thought
that he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, the valley of
the Tagus, and Alemtejo at the same time; and that he would risk his
fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land.
Whether Napoleon really meant this; or whether he only spread the
report, with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive
operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet
as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if
the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the
Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that every
thing in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington’s
opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or
lose his influence in the world does not however seem quite just;
because the mighty expedition to Moscow, proved, that Napoleon did
not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have
enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the
English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy,
that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions
unfavourable to his influence.
[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s History of the Peninsular War.]
Under the notion that Napoleon’s coming was probable, the English
general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to
the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore
urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order,
repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena’s
invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines,
for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern
bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of
Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal
there was planned to float ships of three hundred tons, and to serve
as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of
the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducing to objects of general
utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that
lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political,
and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the
commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at
the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they
were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and captain Holloway
of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at
St. Julian’s, in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the
most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in
any season. Finally the militia were again called out, a measure of
greater import, in the actual state of affairs, than would at first
appear; for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and
the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious
evil.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s correspondence with Lord Liverpool, MSS.]
Had all these preparations been duly executed, lord Wellington
would not have feared even Napoleon; but all that depended upon
the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which
was but a faction, was, as usual, entirely neglected. The regency
refused to publish any proclamation to display the danger, or to
call upon the people to prepare for future efforts; and although the
ancient laws of Portugal provided the most ample means for meeting
such emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira, the Alva and other
rivers, on the line of retreat, were left unrepaired. The roads were
therefore impassable, and as the rainy season was coming on, the
safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had
been obliged to retire before the emperor. The regency pleaded want
of money, but this also could be traced to their own negligence in
the collection of the taxes, for which there was no solid reason;
because, with the exception of the devastated districts, the
people were actually richer than they had ever been, not indeed in
goods, but in hard cash, derived from the enormous sums expended
by the British army. To add to these embarrassments the secret
correspondents of the army on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased
their communications, and it was at first feared they had paid
with their lives for the culpable indiscretion of the Portuguese
government; for the latter had published, in the Lisbon Gazette, all
the secret information sent to Silveira, which being copied into
the English newspapers, drew the enemy’s attention. Fortunately this
alarm proved false, but a sense of the other difficulties was greatly
aggravated to the English general, by comparison of his situation
with that of the enemy; neither necessity nor remuneration, could
procure for him due assistance from the Portuguese people, while the
French generals had merely to issue their orders to the Spaniards
through the prefects of the provinces, and all means of transport or
other succour, possible to be obtained, were sure to be provided on
the day and at the place indicated.
In the midst of these cares lord Wellington was suddenly called
into military action by the approach of the enemy. Ciudad Rodrigo
having been blockaded for six weeks wanted food, and Marmont, who had
received a reinforcement of eleven thousand men from France, and had
now fifty thousand, present under arms, in the valley of the Tagus,
being in pain for the garrison, had concerted with Dorsenne a great
combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been
occupied by a part of the fifth corps, and Girard with the remainder
had advanced to Merida, while Foy, reinforced by a strong division of
the army of the centre, occupied Placentia. Marmont himself quitting
Talavera, had passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at
Bejar; at the same time Dorsenne reinforced by eight thousand men
under Souham, had collected another convoy at Salamanca, and leaving
Bonnet’s division, which now included Mayer’s troops, at Astorga, to
watch the Gallicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st,
their united armies presenting a mass of sixty thousand men, of
which six thousand were cavalry; and they had above a hundred pieces
of artillery.
The English general, who had expected this movement, immediately
concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the
Agueda, but he did not think fit to retreat until he had seen their
whole army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his
dishonour. Hence to make the enemy display his force, he established
himself in the following positions near the fortress.
The third division, reinforced by three squadrons of German and
British cavalry, formed his centre. It was posted on the heights of
Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, and within three
miles of Ciudad, commanding a complete prospect of the plains round
that place.
The right wing, composed of the light division, some squadrons of
cavalry, and six guns, was posted beyond the Agueda, and behind the
Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia, and flowing in a
rugged channel to the Agueda, which it joins about three miles above
Rodrigo; from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of
the hills could be discerned.
The left wing, composed of the sixth division and Anson’s brigade of
cavalry, the whole under general Graham, was placed at Espeja, on
the lower Azava, with advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva. From
thence to Ciudad Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain, and
on Graham’s left, Julian Sanchez’s Partida, nominally commanded by
Carlos d’España, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation.
The heads of the columns were therefore presented on three points to
the fortress; namely, at the ford of the Vadillo; and the heights of
Pastores and Espeja. The communication between the left and centre
was kept up by two brigades of heavy cavalry, posted on the Upper
Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack’s Portuguese brigade. But
the left of the army was very distant from Guinaldo, which was the
pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger of making a flank
march in retreat, should the enemy advance, the seventh division
was placed in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava
d’Aver. Thus the allied army was spread out on the different roads
which led, like the sticks of a fan, to one point on the Coa.
The fifth division remained at St. Payo, watching the passes from
Estremadura, lest Foy should from that direction fall on the rear
of the right wing; and as Marmont’s movement affected the line of
communication along the eastern frontier, general Hill first sent
Hamilton’s Portuguese towards Alburquerque, to support the Spanish
cavalry, which was menaced by the fifth corps, and then brought the
remainder of his troops nearer to the Tagus, in readiness to take
the place of his third brigade, which now marched from the Ponçul to
Penamacor.
Wellington’s position before Rodrigo was very extensive, and
therefore very weak. The Agueda, although fordable in many places
during fine weather, was liable to sudden freshes, and was on both
sides lined with high ridges. The heights, occupied by the troops, on
the left bank, were about three miles wide, ending rather abruptly
above Pastores and Elbodon, and they were flanked by the great
plains and woods, which extend from Ciudad to the bed of the Coa.
The position of Elbodon itself, which was held by the centre of
the army, was, therefore, not tenable against an enemy commanding
these plains; and as the wings were distant their lines of retreat
were liable to be cut, if the centre should be briskly pushed back
beyond Guinaldo. But, at the latter place, three field redoubts had
been constructed, on the high land, with a view to impose upon the
enemy, and so gain time to assemble and feel Marmont’s disposition
for a battle, because a retreat behind the Coa was to be avoided if
possible.
On the 23d the French advanced from Tamames, and encamped behind the
hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo. Then a strong detachment
entered the plain, and having communicated with the garrison, and
examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo returned.
The 24th, six thousand cavalry, with four divisions of infantry,
crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in
observation on the Vadillo, introduced the convoy. On this day the
fourth division of the allies, was brought up to the position of
Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed, yet no other change was
made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But
the 25th, soon after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial
guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the
Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit, they
were however flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and
beaten by two squadrons of the fourteenth, and sixteenth, dragoons,
who reoccupied the post at Carpio.
During this skirmish, fourteen battalions of infantry, thirty
squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, the whole under Montbrun,
passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it,
and marched towards Guinaldo. The road soon divided, one branch
turning the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading
nearer to the Agueda, and passing through the villages of Pastores,
La Encina, and Elbodon; and as the point of divarication was covered
by a gentle ridge, it was for some time doubtful which branch
the French would follow. In a short time this doubt was decided.
Their cavalry poured along the right-hand road leading directly to
Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on
the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy’s horsemen without
waiting for their infantry commenced the
COMBAT OF ELBODON.
The position of the third division was completely turned by this
movement, and the action began very disadvantageously, for the
seventy-fourth and sixtieth regiments, being at Pastores, on the
right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton being with three
other regiments, at Elbodon, could not take any immediate part in
the fight. Hence, as the French force was considerable, Wellington
sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and meanwhile
directed general Colville to draw up the seventy-seventh and fifth
British regiments, the twenty-first Portuguese, and two brigades
of artillery of the same nation, on the hill over which the road
to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten’s three
squadrons. The height, thus occupied by the allies, was convex
towards the enemy, and covered in front and on both flanks, by deep
ravines, but it was too extensive for their numbers; and before
Picton could bring in the troops from the village of Elbodon, the
crisis of the combat passed. The Portuguese guns had sent their shot
amongst the thickest of Montbrun’s horsemen in the plain, but the
latter passed the front ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing
vigour riding up the rough height, on three sides, fell vehemently
upon the allies. Neither the loose fire of the infantry, nor of
the artillery, could stop them, but they were checked by the fine
fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending
masses, not once but twenty times, and always with a good will, thus
maintaining the upper ground for above an hour.
It was astonishing to see so few troopers bearing up against that
surging multitude, even favoured as the former were by the steep
rocky nature of the ground; but Montbrun obstinate to win soon
brought up his artillery, and his horsemen gaining ground in the
centre, cut down some of the gunners and captured the guns; and
one of the British squadrons by charging too far got entangled
in the intricacy of the ravines. The danger was then imminent,
when suddenly the fifth regiment, led by major Ridge, a daring
spirit, darted into the midst of the French cavalry, and retook
the artillery, which again opened its fire; and nearly at the same
time the seventy-seventh, supported by the twenty-first Portuguese,
repulsed the enemy on the left. However, this charging of a weak line
of infantry against a powerful cavalry, could only check the foe at
that particular point. Montbrun still pressed onwards with fresh
masses, against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons
penetrated between the right flank and the village of Elbodon. From
the enclosures and vineyards of that village, Picton was at this time
with difficulty and some confusion extricating his regiments; the
expected brigade of the fourth division was not yet in sight, and the
French infantry was rapidly approaching: the position was no longer
tenable, and lord Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to
fall back and unite in the plain behind.
Colville forming his battalions in two squares immediately descended
from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, and
at this moment, the allied squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by
the French, who had completely turned their right, galloped away,
and took refuge with the Portuguese regiment, which was farthest in
retreat. Then the fifth and seventy-seventh, two weak battalions
formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the
whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how
vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket! To send the
charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous
squadrons, rending the skies with their shouts, and closing upon the
glowing squares, like the falling edges of a burning crater, were as
instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad; and the rolling
peal of musketry had scarcely ceased to echo in the hills, when
bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even
step, the British regiments came forth like the holy men from the
Assyrian’s furnace.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 3._
EXPLANATORY SKETCH
of the
_OPERATIONS AND COMBAT_
of
EL BODON.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired over
the plain to the position at Guinaldo, which was about six miles
distant. The French, although fearing to renew the close attack,
followed, and plied the troops with shot and shell, until about four
o’clock in the evening, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here
the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack’s brigade came up
from Campillo, and the heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava, being also
brought into line, the action ceased. By this retrograde movement of
the left and centre of the third division, the seventy-fourth and the
sixtieth regiments, posted at Pastores, were cut off; they however
crossed the Agueda by a ford, and moving up the right bank happily
reached Guinaldo in the night, after a march of fifteen hours, in the
course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol.
During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was
ordered to fall back on the first division, at Nava d’Aver, but to
keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d’España retired with
Sanchez’s infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself
passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division
was withdrawn from Allemadilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters
baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have
marched to Guinaldo; general Craufurd received the order at two
o’clock, he plainly heard the cannonade, and might easily have
reached Guinaldo before midnight, but he only marched to Cespedosa,
one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed
by fifteen hundred French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore
occupied by only fourteen thousand men, of which about two thousand
six hundred were cavalry. The left of the army, concentrated at Nava
d’Aver, under Graham, was ten miles distant; the light division being
at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was
sixteen miles distant, and the fifth division, posted at Payo in the
mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile Marmont brought up
a second division of infantry, and in the course of the night, and
the following day, united sixty thousand men in front of Guinaldo.
The situation of the English general was become most critical, yet
he would not abandon the light division, which did not arrive until
after three o’clock in the evening. Marmont’s fortune was fixed in
that hour! He knew nothing of the allies’ true situation, and having
detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace their
left, contented himself with making an ostentatious display of the
imperial guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who
was too weak to fight, and laughing to see him so employed, soon
changed the state of affairs.
In the night, Wellington by a skilful concentric movement from
Guinaldo, Nava d’Aver, Perales, and Payo, united the whole army on
new ground, between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, twelve
miles behind Guinaldo; and it is a curious fact that Marmont had so
little knowledge of his own advantages, that instead of harassing the
allies in this difficult movement, he also retired during the night,
and was actually in march to the rear, when the scouts of the column,
which had marched by the valley of Azava, brought word that the
allies were in retreat, and their divisions still widely separated.
Dorsenne then insisted that Marmont should wheel round and pursue,
but lord Wellington was already in a strong position behind the
stream of the Villa Maior.
The fifth division, coming up from Payo, was now on the right at
Aldea Velha, the fourth and light divisions, with Victor Alten’s
cavalry, and the heavy dragoons, under sir Stapleton Cotton, were
in the centre in front of Alfayates; the convent of Sacaparte was
on their left, and the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack’s and
M‘Mahon’s Portuguese brigades; the sixth division with Anson’s
cavalry closed the line at Bismula. The cavalry picquets were pushed
beyond the Villa Maior in front of Aldea de Ponte, in the centre, and
towards Furcalhos on the right; and the third and seventh divisions
were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but
the days were short, serious dispositions were required for a general
attack, and the allies could not be turned, because they covered all
the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa.
COMBAT OF ALDEA DE PONTE.
The French, moving by the roads of Furcalhos and of Aldea de Ponte,
were checked by the picquets of the light division on the former; but
on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts from the hills,
and across the stream of the Villa Maior, and about ten o’clock took
possession of Aldea de Ponte.
At twelve o’clock the head of the infantry came up and immediately
attacked general Pakenham, then commanding a brigade of the fourth
division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Lord Wellington
arrived at the same moment, and directed the seventh fuzileers to
charge in line, and he supported them on each flank with a Portuguese
regiment in column. The French, who had advanced well up the hill,
were driven back, and though they afterwards attempted to turn the
brigade by a wood, which was distant about musket-shot from the
right, while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, the
artillery sufficed to baffle the effort. Then the English general
taking the offensive, directed the twenty-third fuzileers and
Portuguese caçadores to turn the French left, and seize the opposite
hills, which finished the action, and Aldea de Ponte was again
occupied by the allies. Wellington, who had been much exposed to
the fire, rode to another part of the position, but scarcely had he
departed when the French from the Forcalhos road joined those near
Aldea de Ponte, and at five o’clock renewing the attack retook the
village. Pakenham, with his fuzileers, immediately recovered it, but
the French were very numerous, the country rugged, and so wooded,
that he could not tell what was passing on the flanks, wherefore,
knowing that the chosen ground of battle was behind the Coa, he
abandoned Aldea de Ponte and regained his original post.
In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th
occupied a new and very strong position in front of the Coa, the
right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the
village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the Coa. The whole army thus
enclosed, as it were in a deep loop of the Coa river could only be
attacked on a narrow front, and Marmont, who had brought up but a
few days’ provisions and could gather none in that country, retired
the same day. This terminated the operations. The French placed a
fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca; a
strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with
Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the
Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions
as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned
to Placentia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton’s Portuguese
division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand
men of the fifth corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra; and when
these movements were known, the light division reinforced by some
cavalry resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert
with Julian Sanchez. The rest of the army was cantoned on both sides
of the Coa, and head-quarters were fixed at Frenada.
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des François.]
Nearly a month had been employed by the French in the preparation
and execution of this great operation, which terminated so feebly
and so abruptly, because the generals were as usual at variance.
They had victualled Ciudad Rodrigo, but they had lost the favourable
opportunity of invading Gallicia. Nothing had been gained in the
field, time was lost, and the English general’s plans were forwarded.
OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: Londonderry’s Narrative.]
[Sidenote: Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns]
1º. Lord Wellington’s position behind Soita has been noticed by two
recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle
on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it
was assumed in contempt of the adversary’s prowess. This last appears
a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if lord Wellington
had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But
sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised, neither
was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from any overweening
confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was
chosen well, without imprudence, and without presumption.
The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six
miles, and the part open to attack was very much reduced by the
rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men
were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than
one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country
hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the
enemy’s horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington
had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him
at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front.
It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by
Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it
was equally certain that he could only have a few days’ provisions
with his army, and that the neighbourhood could not supply him. It
was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than
fight, and he did so.
Let us however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was
prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind
Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong
to be fought with on a plain, yet not strong enough to warrant a
retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly for
three days, each day engaged, and the enemy’s powerful horse and
artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa,
which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for crossing,
of which the principal were, the ford of Serraleira behind the right
of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa behind their left; and the
bridge of Sabugal behind their centre. The ways to those points were
narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not
have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and
perhaps dishonour: and had lord Wellington been unable to hold his
position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not
have been very much increased, because his incumbrances would all
have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights
half-a-mile in front of Sabugal favourable for a rear-guard. The
position of Soita appears therefore to have been chosen with good
judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy; but
it is certain that the battering train, then between Pinhel and Villa
Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not
sufficiently considered his enterprize, and knew not where or how to
strike.
2º. The position of Aldea Ponte, was equally well chosen. Had the
allies retreated at once from Guinaldo, to Soita, baggage and
stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had
the appearance of a flight; the road from Payo would have been
uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But
in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads
were occupied, and as each point was strong in itself, it was not
difficult for a quick-sighted general, perfectly acquainted with
the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the
enemy’s columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing,
and the fifth division had taken its place in line.
3º. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The
previous entrenching of it proved lord Wellington’s foresight, and
he remained there thirty-six hours, that is, from mid-day of the
25th until midnight of the 26th, which proved his firmness. It is
said that sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night
of the 25th, and that arrangements were actually made in that view,
yet anxious for the safety of the light division he would not stir.
The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify
the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring
strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to
controul. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength
in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments constructed were
only a few breast-works and two weak field redoubts, open in rear,
and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and
Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans
with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont
heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit,
he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon’s fortune, “_And
Wellington’s star, it also is bright!_”
4º. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that
at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding
operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad
Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade; and
the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the
communications with the left bank precarious. Nor though bridges had
been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the
place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both
sides of the river; because Marmont’s army would then have advanced
from Placencia to Castello Branco, have seized the passage over the
Tagus at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the fifth corps endangered
the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the allies to quit their
entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have re-victualled the
place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position
with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while
separate, and to oppose them when united. This position was on the
Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys
could be collected for Ciudad Rodrigo, were from fifty to sixty miles
distant, lord Wellington’s object, namely the forcing the French to
assemble in large bodies without any adequate result, could be, and
was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment.
So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived
with sixty thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs
entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the
entrance of the convoy, he should have concentrated his army at
once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this he kept it extended on
a line of many miles and the right wing separated from the centre
by a difficult river. In his despatch, he says, that, from some
uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy’s numbers, it was necessary
to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is
rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which
could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole
army, and violated two vital rules of war which forbid—
1º. The parcelling of an army before a concentrated enemy.
2º. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy’s
reach.
Now lord Wellington’s position on the 24th and 25th extended from
the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda, to Marialva
on the Azava; the distance either from the Vadillo, or Marialva,
to Guinaldo, was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by
worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing,
compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore
when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the allies’ wings were cut off,
and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops
at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of
generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for
it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were
conducted with consummate skill.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into
a series of ill-combined, and partial attacks, had previously made
dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the
garrison, the real situation of the allies, and he also knew of
the camp at Guinaldo, which being on their line of retreat was the
important point. If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak
on the 25th with the whole or even half of his forces, he could
have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another
fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division,
thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken
and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have
been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division
had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with
it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could
not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown
across the ford of Caros near Robleda would have sufficed to keep the
light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent,
over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine.
The centre being broken the French could, at choice, have either
surrounded the light division, or directed the mass of their forces
against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have
had to retreat from the Azava over the plains towards Almeida.
It may be said that all the French were not up on the 25th, but
they might have been so, and as lord Wellington was resolved to see
their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is
however sufficient to remark that the allies exclusive of the fifth
division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men
of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty
miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the
troops more than eight, and at the principal point, namely Pastores,
only three, miles, from a fortress from whence sixty thousand
infantry and six thousand cavalry, with one hundred and twenty guns
were ready to issue. Finally the point of concentration at Guinaldo
was only twelve miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because
their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington’s conduct at Guinaldo was
above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the
difference between genius and error.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
4º. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was
rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he
commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of
the Alemtejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and
even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to
operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill’s corps
had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for
him, the allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the
letter containing this false information.
5º. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he
had no intention of fighting, but tempted by the false position of
the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the Lower
Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet
he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six
hours at Guinaldo; and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste
of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not
intend a great battle.
6º. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About
three hundred men and officers fell on the part of the allies, and on
that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares
and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days
were full of interest, and instruction, and diversified also by
brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge’s daring charge has been already
noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry encounters, that a French
officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey of the
fourteenth dragoons, perceived that he had only one arm, and with a
rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute and passed on!
Such was the state of the war on the frontier of Portugal; in the
next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain.
BOOK XV.
CHAPTER I.
STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
_Northern Provinces._ The invasion of Gallicia, which had been
arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a
most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed
for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his
staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The
great road to Coruña was open, and although general Walker, seeing
the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be
dismantled, and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the
timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña,
neither that nor any other useful measure was executed.
Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government,
to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the
Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning
demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without
which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To
introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was
not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what
they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction
finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington,
on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention
to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and
affording an example to the continental nations of popular and
protracted resistance to France.
[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military agent,
(these officers must not be confounded with the military agents
originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had
occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those bodies by
increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each
other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord
Wellington at the desire of government, sent to the guerilla chiefs,
military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of
their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed
derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had
derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When
he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he was forced
to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and
although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance
to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing
against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in
numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they
only barricadoed the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were
so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in
security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his
generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any head, observed, that
when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a
nullity!
[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]
Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne’s retreat enabled Abadia to resume
his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable
state; the wet season was setting in upon men, destitute of even
the necessaries of life, although the province abounded in cattle
and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although
plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore
cheap, and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price.
An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of
Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also
offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial
goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and
baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy’s
ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the
return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal
traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have
been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every
where prevailed, the exigences of the war were always the last things
cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses
with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no
discipline.
The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet
the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco
the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling
arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge
on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less
than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency
by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of
day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty millions of
reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax
tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and
the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded,
in six months, less than a seventh part.
From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1º.
That England and not Gallicia had hitherto supported the war here, as
in other parts of the Peninsula. 2º. That as England had in 1808-9
paid to Gallicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other
succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the
deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes
of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities,
and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive
juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in
the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable,
to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of
this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it
was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias,
jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these
last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their
own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get
the controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and
as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they
strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest
the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican,
and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also
reached this quarter.
The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great
influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than
principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at
head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original,
or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were
called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly
avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the
guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked,
and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil
press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders
rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had
legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every
change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused
to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of
Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their
interference; and when they proposed to establish a general depôt at
Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it.
But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in
the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national
independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression,
with an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the
people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy and
church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas,
because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the
church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while
the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes,
disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies.
The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy
of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not
for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough
to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to
put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of the bigoted
part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always have more
charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the
exigences of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go
to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if the very advocates
of liberty in Spain had not in their madness, resolved to oppress
the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a rabid love of power in
practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost
partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the
greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and
just.
[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]
In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir Howard Douglas’s
arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money
from England; but he advised, instead, a better management of their
own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to
render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line
of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he
endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa,
on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat; he
also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great-coats, the hospitals
with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the army to twenty-five
thousand. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and
which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot,
than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable
baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants
and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above five thousand!
a sixth part of the whole force! When the sick men were deducted,
scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry
remained for service. Then there was so little organization or
arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the
greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one
quarter to another, as a military body; and the generals, unable to
feed them on the frontier, more than once, menaced, and in December
did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.
Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter
loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the
troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the
province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for
each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve,
and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier.
But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into various
intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English,
and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the
army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had
ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the
very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing
to invade Gallicia, and sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the
disloyal proceeding; the junta also were really averse to it, and
Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a personal interest in the
colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to
evade Mr. Wellesley’s reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation
of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the
organization of another, three times its strength, including all
the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and
also sailed a few months later. This then was the state of Gallicia
in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or
system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction, her people
were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad: she had no
cavalry, and the infantry were starving, although the province easily
supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence,
those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the
plains of Leon, and were consequently of little weight in the general
contest.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]
Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas had nothing to work
upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably
increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to
keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command,
they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as
indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when
they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage
of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the
north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina,
Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces
did not exceed ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes,
customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his
from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were
bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the
formation of the seventh army.
It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.
In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal’s arrival, and when Bonet had
marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered
some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a very active
officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The British
cruizers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several
coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board, came to
the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with
the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille
and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and
Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the mountains of Leon,
and thus marred the object of the Iris. Nevertheless, when Mina was
reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he
returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits,
which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be
hereafter noticed.
While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication,
Dorsenne having the invasion of Gallicia in view, relieved Bonet
on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand
men to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The
Gallicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand
five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below
the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal
uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five
thousand men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were
therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual
improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to
the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet,
an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena
with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him
also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.
[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]
All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish
magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having
resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified
several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions,
and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias.
The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed,
and in Gallicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso’s
division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged
Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier,
had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the
imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly
exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear
them say, “the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison
to the depredations of the Spanish troops.”
During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at
Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw
Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and
the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his
own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly
part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have
arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more
against Lisbon, by Massena’s route, was not promising, unless the
northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required
the preliminary occupation of Gallicia, at least of the interior. In
the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously
with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary
to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast,
dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set
in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion
of Gallicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne’s army, Caffarelli
was to join in the expedition, and Monthion’s reserve, which was to
replace Caffarelli’s on the line of communication, was already six
thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole,
and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of
the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon’s
arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and
Wellington’s operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to
relinquish the invasion of Gallicia, and caused Bonet once more to
abandon the Asturias.
Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the
northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms,
because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults
of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion.
There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him,
had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the
Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these
things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat
of the conquest of Valencia.
CHAPTER II.
CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
In August, and the beginning of September, Suchet, while preparing
for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa
and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon.
He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in
their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large
magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men had been left
in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed
under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and twenty-four thousand
of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force
Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army
of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever
has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused.
He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few
men, than to make an overwhelming attack, if he thereby weakened his
communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the
attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to
aid Suchet’s operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be
struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march,
but combined movements, of detachments from nearly all the armies in
the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington,
by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Gallicia, the French army of the
north, in return, by menacing Gallicia, fixed the allies on the
Agueda, and so protected Suchet’s invasion of Valencia.
[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]
Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortoza by the
sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San
Mateo. That from Tortoza, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads,
but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked,
partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort
of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could move
on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at
Tortoza, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the
French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved
to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by
Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to
Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum,
trusting for subsistence to the “_huerta_” or garden of Valencia,
until the arrival of his convoys.
He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From
Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in
the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep
and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in
advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in
his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that
the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite
for the subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized
regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their
different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries, of different
branches of the service, would then be unknown; and the character
of all subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the
battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy,
which cannot now be said.
[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.]
While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey
to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios,
notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to
be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general
of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong
party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When
after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied
the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the
chief command at Valencia, Palacios’ faction opposed him, and
endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to their side,
by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the
strong country in advance. Blake, however, resolved to act on the
flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C.
O’Donnel, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin,
supporting them with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He
charged Mahy, who commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred
cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the
army of the centre, posted at Cuença. He detached Bassecour with two
thousand men to Requeña, and the same time, directed Duran and the
Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in this
expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.
[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Wellesley, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Doyle, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.]
Blake had, exclusive of Mahy’s and Bassecour’s divisions, about
twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand
five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for
three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred in
Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole country
seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people being very
uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent partizan
force, of more than eight thousand. The Valencian army contained the
Albuera divisions, St. Juan’s, Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s veterans;
it was therefore, not only numerous, but the best Spain had yet
produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in all things
necessary for its supply: but there was no real power, the building,
though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had
many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were
not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than
organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them. He was
unpopular, both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency of which he
formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had quashed Mahy’s command
of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order,
which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not
obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have
formed a reserve, after Mahy’s division had marched for Cuença, fell
into the greatest disorder: above eight thousand men deserted in a
few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus
all interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was
in fact the key of all the eastern coast because Carthagena required
an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and
Alicant was then quite defenceless.
[Sidenote: Suchet.]
[Sidenote: Vacani.]
It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion.
His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of
September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo,
and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established;
but this latter column instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe,
turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to
Castellon de la Plana, where the whole three were united on the 20th.
The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola
on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th; but as
the road run directly under the fire of the last place, the main body
moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the
battering-train still at Tortoza.
[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.]
During these operations Blake appeared inclined to fight, for he
brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo; Mahy,
who had done nothing on the side of Cuença, was also in march to join
him; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion; and
a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French
dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake
doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O’Donnel with
four thousand men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself
with fifteen thousand behind the Guadalaviar. Valencia was thus
thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour’s division was at hand,
and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp
(which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication
with Tortoza was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants
which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro.
SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.
This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia, was
a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and
the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by
modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit
of the rock: but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination
the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only
seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The
modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was
covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some
Spanish picquets; but the 23d Habert, having passed the water,
invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the
west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from
Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the
army was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north-west, and
patroles were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum
was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the
west, where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and
difficult. It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had
mounted their large guns; for the French were obliged to bring earth
from a distance, to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the
miner to level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to
withstand heavy shot.
The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San Pedro,
and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando, which could
not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height, then
only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock, there
were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still engaged
repairing, and had only stopped with timber; a large tank offered
cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches, and
Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns
were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong
reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against
the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged: but in
the previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied were
repulsed, and the action having excited both sides, a French soldier
fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns
rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and the garrison
would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison thrust the
ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with the loss
of three hundred men. After this check, as the artillery was still
at Tortoza, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa,
employed another part in making a road, for the guns, to reach the
battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his
own attention to the movements of Blake.
That general following his first plan of action against the French
flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O’Donnel
with Villa Campa’s division and St. Juan’s cavalry, to Betera, and
Beneguazil, and Obispo’s division to Segorbe; thus forming a half
circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with
Teruel, near which place Mahy had by this time arrived. Suchet
however caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division
dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians
then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against
O’Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having
his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the
Spaniards were beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in
disorder over the Guadalaviar. During these events Blake remained an
idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large
body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of
battle.
[Sidenote: 1811. October.]
The French train now advanced from Tortoza, and four pieces were
placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th Suchet took the
direction of the attack in person, and the fort situated upon an
isolated rock, was breached in a few hours; but the garrison of the
King’s Tower (a separate work placed on a small promontory, and
commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and was carried off,
on the 11th, under the French fire, by the Magnificent. The French
general having thus with a loss of only thirty men opened the road
for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege of
that place; but the difficulties were very great, the formation of
the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain, and although
his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery on the
12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right
and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the
besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men.
On the 17th the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire
against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet
the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th the fire
recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns, and
the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which
overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were
early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired
it with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud
cries provoked the attack. At five o’clock, four hundred men rushed
forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit. Soon,
however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began to fire,
the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen without
making the slightest impression on the defenders, the attempt was
abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a second
battery of six pieces, one hundred and forty yards from the tower,
and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the breach,
yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them; meanwhile
Andriani the governor, having communication by signal with the ships
in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant defence, and was
informed that he was already promoted for what he had done. But to
understand Suchet’s embarrassments, from the protracted resistance of
Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy’s contemporary operations in
Catalonia, and the proceedings of the Partidas against the French
communications and posts in Aragon.
CATALONIA.
[Sidenote: August.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 2.]
It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueiras produced
sickness in M‘Donald’s army, and that the return of Suchet to
Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from Lerida
to Montserrat, Tortoza, and Taragona, had completely extinguished
the French power in the field; because the divisions of the army of
Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being destined for
the enterprize against Valencia, could not be employed in harassing
expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled, notwithstanding the troubles
which followed the fall of Taragona, to reorganize about eight
thousand men in two divisions, the one under Eroles, the other under
Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios of reserve, and arms
and ammunition being supplied by the English navy, Lacy was soon in a
condition to act offensively. Thus the taking of Montserrat was very
injurious to the French, for it is generally supposed that Friere’s
division, if held together in the field, would have prevented this
reaction in the principality. Lacy at first suggested to the British
navy the recapture of the Medas Islands, and it was effected in the
latter end of August, by the Undaunted, Lavinia, and Blossom, aided
by a small party of Spaniards, the whole under the command of captain
Thomas. The enterprise itself was one of more labour than danger,
and the Spanish allies were of little use, but the naval officers
to whose exertions the success was entirely due, were indignant at
finding that colonel Green, who served as a volunteer, endeavoured to
raise his own reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character
of those under whom he served.
[Sidenote: Memoir upon Busa, by Capt. Zeupfinning, MSS.]
Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had
proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine
depôt and strong-hold, in common with the British navy, but with a
strange folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would
defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding this
scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their attention
inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the position
of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable rock
which is situated between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers and about
twenty miles from Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that
a very rugged one. The rock itself fourteen miles in circumference,
healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance
of forage, and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by
frightful precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into
a surrender. Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d’Urgel were therefore
guarded by the tercios of reserve and Lacy soon commenced offensive
excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the
French communication.
[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]
In September while the Somatenes interrupted the passage of the
convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful attack on the fort
of Moncada near Barcelona; Lacy who had returned from an incursion
in the French Cerdaña where he had gathered some booty, then united
Eroles and Sarsfield’s troops, and surprised the town of Igualada,
where he killed two hundred French, but not daring to attack the
castle retired to Calaf, and from thence again detached Eroles to
Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming to Igualada. Eroles beat
the escort, and captured the convoy, and then the French quitted the
fortified convent of Igualada, and joined the garrison of Montserrat,
when the whole, fearful of being invested and so starved, abandoned
that important point, and marched through Barcelona to Taragona; the
Spaniards immediately occupied Montserrat, and recovered a large
store of clothing and cavalry equipments, which had been hidden
in a vault and were undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing
his success, forced the garrisons of Belpuig, and Cervera, about
five hundred in all, to surrender, and thus the whole line of
communication, between Lerida and Barcelona, fell into the power of
the Catalonians. The confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield
occupied Granollers, and the passes leading into the valley of Vich;
Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampurdan; and Eroles suddenly passing by
Seu d’Urgel into the Cerdaña, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national
guards commanded by general Gareau, who had been sent there after
Lacy’s invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the
frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the
way of Ribas, and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while
Milans occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which
M‘Donald was preparing for Barcelona.
Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the
coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather would not permit him to land.
Nevertheless the attention of the French general was distracted, and
the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield, and projected
the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting his troops in
march, feared the execution and relinquished the attempt. Meanwhile
one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced the French communication
between Mequinenza and Tortoza, and another swarm settled on the
plains about Lerida.
The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the Empecinado
had received Blake’s orders to unite near Cuença, for the purpose of
invading Aragon; but the secret junta of the district were averse to
the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to move, and
even came to blows with the junta’s people. In this confusion general
d’Armanac, who had retired from Cuença, returned, and dispersed
the whole. The Empecinado however collected them again, and having
joined Duran, their united powers being about six thousand infantry
and two thousand five hundred horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina
also acting in concert with them, quitted the mountains of Leon
and entered Navarre with about five thousand men, and some minor
partisans were already acting against different parts of Aragon.
The whole were in want of clothing and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper,
the consul at Valencia, having safe means of communication with the
interior supplied them.
General Musnier’s force was so scattered that he could not fight
either of the large Partidas, without exposing some important
point to the other, and the 29th of September the Empecinado took
possession of the pass of Frasno, while Duran invested the fortified
convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French and
Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the explosion
of two mines had killed a number of them they surrendered. Musnier
collected some men to succour the place, but unable to force the
pass of Frasno, retired; yet being reinforced on the 5th, he again
advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by general Reille also came
up; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared until the French retired, and
then reoccupied Calatayud. They were now in full communication with
Mina and a general plan of invasion was discussed, but as Duran and
Mina could not accord each acted separately.
[Sidenote: 1811. October.]
Severoli’s division eight thousand strong and just arrived from
Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Spaniards
from Calatayud pursued them on the roads to Molino, Daroca, and
Medinaceli. On the other side of the Ebro however Mina fell on the
post of Exca in the Cinco Villas; the garrison broke through his
investment in the night, but he pursued them almost to the gates of
Zaragosa, and then turning off towards Ayerbe, attacked that post and
menaced the communication by Jaca. The commandant of Zaragosa had
sent an Italian battalion to look after the flying garrison of Exca,
which was found at Zuera, and the united forces amounting to eleven
hundred infantry and sixty cavalry followed Mina and came up with
him at Ayerbe; the guerilla chief instantly turned with a part of
his troops, and the Italians retreated towards Huesca, but having to
cross a plain were all killed or taken.
Reille and Musnier hearing of this misfortune spread their columns
in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and
although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico
on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The Iris frigate which was
then harassing the enemy’s coast line took some of them off his
hands, and the remainder, three hundred in number, were sent to
Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only thirty-six arrived, the
rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise
near a French post!
While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro,
Mazzuchelli’s brigade followed the Empecinado, and having defeated
him in a sharp action, at Cubiliejos de la Sierra, brought off the
garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort; but the smaller Partidas
infested the road between Tortoza and Oropesa, and in this disturbed
state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was to
disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo’s division against
Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahy was still in
those parts. Thus the partizan warfare seemed interminable, and
Suchet’s situation would really have been very dangerous, if he had
been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force and was
cooped up between the enemy’s fortresses; his communications were all
interrupted; he had just met with two signal failures at Saguntum,
and he was menaced by a formidable army which was entirely master of
its operations. Blake however soon relieved him of his difficulties.
Palacios with the junta had retired to Alcira, and in concert with
the friars of his faction had issued a manifesto, intended to raise
a popular commotion to favour his own restoration to the command,
but Blake was now become popular; the Valencians elated by the
successful resistance of Saguntum, called for a battle, and the
Spanish general urged partly by his courage, the only military
qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on
the French rear had not disturbed the siege, acceded to their desire.
Mahy and Bassecour’s divisions had arrived at Valencia, Obispo was
called in to Betera, eight thousand irregulars were thrown upon
the French communications, and the whole Spanish army amounting to
about twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand good cavalry, and
thirty-six guns made ready for battle.
Previous to this, Suchet, although expecting such an event, had
detached several parties to scour the road of Tortoza, and had
directed Palombini’s division to attack Obispo and relieve Teruel.
Obispo skirmished at Xerica on the 21st, and then rapidly marched
upon Liria with a view to assist in the approaching battle; but
Blake, who might have attacked while Palombini was absent, took
little heed of the opportunity, and Suchet, now aware of his
adversary’s object, instantly recalled the Italians who arrived the
very morning of the action.
The ground between Murviedro and Valencia was a low flat,
interspersed here and there with rugged isolated hills; it was
also intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts, and thickly
studded with olive-trees; but near Saguntum it became straitened by
the mountain and the sea, so as to leave an opening of not more than
three miles, behind which it again spread out. In this narrow part
Suchet resolved to receive the attack, without relinquishing the
siege of Saguntum; and he left a strong detachment in the trenches
with orders to open the fire of a new battery, the moment the
Spanish army appeared.
His left, consisting of Habert’s division, and some squadrons of
dragoons, was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and
gun-boats which flanked Blake’s march. The centre under Harispe, was
extended to the foot of the mountains, so that he offered an oblique
front, crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini’s
division and the dragoons, were placed in second line behind the
centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve.
This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain, but the
right flank of the French, and the troops left to carry on the siege,
were liable to be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which, the
roads from Betera led to Gilet, directly upon the line of retreat.
To prevent such an attempt Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong
detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and
placed the Neapolitan brigade of reserve at Gilet: in this situation,
although his fighting troops did not exceed seventeen thousand men,
and those cooped up between two fortresses, hemmed in by the mountain
on one side, the sea on the other, and with only one narrow line
of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very
numerous army. He trusted to his superiority in moral resources, and
what would have been madness in other circumstances, was here a proof
of skilful daring.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 4._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF THE SIEGE & BATTLE OF
_SAGUNTUM_,
1811.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
Blake having issued a fine address to his soldiers on the 25th of
October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zayas, composed
of the Albuera divisions, marched by a road leading upon the
village of Puzzol; and Blake followed in person, with a weak reserve,
commanded by general Velasco.
The centre under Lardizabal supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro,
moved by the main road.
The left consisting of Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s infantry, and of
St. Juan’s cavalry, and supported by Mahy’s division which came from
the side of Betera moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo,
also coming from Betera, acted as a flanking corps, and entering the
mountains by Naquera, menaced the right of Chlopiski, but he was met
by a brigade under general Robert.
The Spaniards moved on rapidly and in good order, driving the French
outposts over a ravine called the Piccador, which covered Suchet’s
front. Zayas and Lardizabal immediately passed this obstacle as did
also Caro and Loy, and the first took possession of Puzzol while
the flotilla ranged along the coast and protected his right flank.
Blake with Velasco’s reserve halted at El Puig, an isolated hill on
the sea-coast behind the Piccador, but Lardizabal and the cavalry
forming an oblique line, in order to face the French front, occupied
the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order
of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for on the hither side of
it St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa were drawn up, and Mahy took
possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the
mouth of St. Espiritus.
By this disposition the Spanish line, extending from Puzzol to the
Germanels, was not less than six miles, and the division of Obispo
was separated from the left by about the same distance. Blake’s order
of battle was therefore feeble, and he was without any efficient
reserve, for Velasco was distant and weak and Mahy’s was actually in
the line. The French order of battle covering less than three miles
was compressed and strong, the reserves were well placed and close
at hand; and Chlopiski’s division, although a league distant from
the main body, was firmly posted, and able to take a direct part in
the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by
impassable heights.
BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.
The fight was commenced by Villa Campa, who was advancing against the
pass of Espiritus, when the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew
his advanced guard, and put his division into confusion. Chlopiski
seeing this, moved down with the infantry, drove Mahy from the
Germanels, and then detached a regiment to the succour of the centre,
where a brisk battle was going on, to the disadvantage of Suchet.
That general had not judged his ground well at first, and when the
Spaniards had crossed the Piccador, he too late perceived that an
isolated height in advance of Harispe’s division, could command
all that part of the field. Prompt however to remedy his error, he
ordered the infantry to advance, and galloped forward himself with
an escort of hussars to seize the hill; the enemy was already in
possession, and their guns opened from the summit, but the head of
Harispe’s infantry then attacked, and after a sharp fight, in which
general Paris and several superior officers were wounded, gained the
height.
At this time Obispo’s guns were heard on the hills far to the right,
and Zayas passing through Puzzol endeavoured to turn the French left,
and as the day was fine, and the field of battle distinctly seen by
the soldiers in Saguntum, they crowded on the ramparts, regardless of
the besiegers’ fire, and uttering loud cries of Victory! Victory! by
their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward.
The critical moment of the battle was evidently approaching. Suchet
ordered Palombini’s Italians, and the dragoons, to support Harispe,
and although wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought
them into action. Meanwhile the French hussars had pursued the
Spaniards from the height to the Piccador, where however the latter
rallied upon their second line and again advanced; and it was in
vain that the French artillery poured grape-shot into their ranks,
their march was not checked. Loy and Caro’s horsemen overthrew the
French hussars in a moment, and in the same charge sabred the French
gunners and captured their battery. The crisis would have been fatal,
if Harispe’s infantry had not stood firm while Palombini’s division
marching on the left under cover of a small rise of ground, suddenly
opened a fire upon the flank of the Spanish cavalry, which was still
in pursuit of the hussars. These last immediately turned, and the
Spaniards thus placed between two fires, and thinking the flight
of the hussars had been feigned, to draw them into an ambuscade,
hesitated; the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers put
every thing into confusion. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with
the remainder of the cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were
recovered, the Spanish artillery was taken, and Lardizabal’s infantry
being quite broken, laid down their arms, or throwing them away,
saved themselves as they could. Harispe’s division immediately joined
Chlopiski’s, and both together pursued the beaten troops.
This great, and nearly simultaneous success in the centre, and on the
right, having cut the Spanish line in two, Zaya’s position became
exceedingly dangerous. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advancing
against his front, and Blake had no reserve in hand to restore the
battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco, remained inactive
at El Puig. However such had been the vigour of the action in the
centre, and so inferior were Suchet’s numbers, that it required two
hours to secure his prisoners and to rally Palombini’s division for
another effort. Meanwhile Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some
measure by the water-cuts, fought stoutly, maintained the village
of Puzzol for a long time, and when finally driven out, although he
was charged several times, by some squadrons attached to Habert’s
division, effected his retreat across the Piccador, and gained El
Puig. Suchet had however re-formed his troops, and Zayas now attacked
in front and flank, fled along the sea-coast to the Grao of Valencia,
leaving his artillery and eight hundred prisoners.
During this time, Chlopiski and Harispe, had pursued Mahy, Miranda,
Villa Campa, and Lardizabal, as far as the torrent of Caraixet,
where many prisoners were made; but the rest being joined by Obispo,
rallied behind the torrent, and the French cavalry having outstripped
their infantry, were unable to prevent the Spaniards from reaching
the line of the Guadalaviar. The victors had about a thousand killed
and wounded, and the Spaniards had not more, but two generals, five
thousand prisoners, and twelve guns were taken; and Blake’s inability
to oppose Suchet in the field, being made manifest by this battle,
the troops engaged were totally dispirited, and the effect reached
even to Saguntum, for the garrison surrendered that night.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. In this campaign the main object on both sides was Valencia.
That city could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the
Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering
his army, was the problem for Blake to solve, and it was not very
difficult. He had at least twenty-five thousand troops, besides
the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Segorbe, and he could
either command or influence the movements of nearly twenty thousand
irregulars; his line of operations was direct, and secure, and he
had a fleet to assist him, and several secure harbours. On the other
hand the French general could not bring twenty thousand men into
action, and his line of operation, which was long, and difficult, was
intercepted by the Spanish fortresses. It was for Blake therefore
to choose the nature of his defence: he could fight, or he could
protract the war.
2º. If he had resolved to fight, he should have taken post at
Castellon de la Plana, keeping a corps of observation at Segorbe, and
strong detachments towards Villa Franca, and Cabanes, holding his
army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet’s columns, as they
came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have, taught
Blake, that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish
troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain; and
this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked.
He should therefore have resolved upon protracting the war, and have
merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns,
without engaging in a pitched battle.
3º. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe, the army might have
been withdrawn, and concentrated at Murviedro, in one march, and
Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to
Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that
fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and
the numerous water-cuts and the power of forming inundations in the
place, were so favourable for defence, that it would have been nearly
impossible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have
invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp.
4º. In such a strong position, with his retreat secure upon the
Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile
plains from the French foragers, and would have held their army at
bay while the irregulars operated upon their communication. He might
then have safely detached a division to his left, to assist the
Partidas, or to his right, by sea, to land at Peniscola. His forces
would soon have been increased and the invasion would have been
frustrated.
5º. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare
consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and
from behind the Guadalaviar, sent unconnected detachments on a half
circle round the French army, which being concentrated, and nearer
to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia,
could and did, as we have seen, defeat them all in detail.
6º. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military
conceptions far beyond his means, and, from want of knowledge,
generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project
of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and
connecting Mina’s operations between Zaragoza and the Pyrenees, with
Lacy’s in Catalonia, was gigantic in design, but without any chance
of success. The division of Severoli being added to Musnier’s, had
secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the reinforcements then
marching through Navarre, to different parts of Spain, rendered the
time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. But the
chief objection was, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion
of protracting the war about Saguntum; and the operations against
Valencia, were sure to be brought to a crisis, before the affair
of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing, to recal the
French general. The true way of using the large guerilla forces, was
to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet’s army, especially
on the side of Teruel, where he had magazines; which could have
been done safely, because these Partidas had an open retreat, and
if followed would have effected their object, of weakening and
distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a
different operation from that which Blake adopted, when he posted
Obispo and O’Donnel at Benaguazil and Segorbe; because those
generals’ lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were
within the power of the French; and this error alone proves that
Blake was entirely ignorant of the principles of strategy.
7º. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish
general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great
error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had
so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched
battles, was still so ignorant of his art, that with twice as many
men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he
made three simultaneous attacks, on an extended front, without any
connection or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or
to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regard to the
strength or fierceness of his prey, was Blake’s only notion, and the
result was his own destruction.
8º. Suchet’s operations, especially his advance against Saguntum,
leaving Oropesa behind him, were able and rapid. He saw the errors
of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum
was no fault; the French general acted with a just confidence in his
own genius, and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by
the battle, but he acknowledged that such were the difficulties of
the siege, the place could only have been taken by a blockade, which
would have required two months.
CHAPTER III.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
Saguntum having fallen, Suchet conceived the plan of enclosing and
capturing the whole of Blake’s force, together with the city of
Valencia, round which it was encamped; and he was not deterred from
this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon,
nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake however, reverting to his
former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts
of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled
by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to
move upon Cuença, with the Murcian army, to support Montijo, Duran,
and the Partida chiefs, who remained near Aragon after the defeat
of the Empecinado. But the innumerable small bands, or rather armed
peasants, immediately about Valencia, he made no use of, neither
harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to
action.
In Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazuchelli entirely defeated
Duran in a hard fight, near Almunia, on the 7th of November; on the
23d Campillo was defeated at Añadon, and a Partida having appeared at
Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally Napoleon,
seeing that the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered
general Reille to reinforce Suchet not only with Severoli’s Italians,
but with his own French division, in all fifteen thousand good
troops.
Meanwhile in Catalonia Lacy’s activity had greatly diminished. He
had, including the Tercios, above sixteen thousand troops, of which
about twelve thousand were armed, and in conjunction with the junta
he had classed the whole population in reserves; but he was jealous
of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had
before done in the Ronda, deprived them of their arms, although they
had purchased them, in obedience to his own proclamation. He also
discountenanced as much as possible the popular insurrection, and he
was not without plausible reasons for this, although he could not
justify the faithless and oppressive mode of execution.
He complained that the Somatenes always lost their arms and
ammunition, that they were turbulent, expensive, and bad soldiers,
and that his object was to incorporate them by just degrees with the
regular army, where they could be of service; but then he made no
good use of the latter himself, and hence he impeded the irregulars
without helping the regular warfare. His conduct disgusted the
Catalonians. That people had always possessed a certain freedom and
loved it; but they had been treated despotically and unjustly, by all
the different commanders who had been placed at their head, since the
commencement of the war; and now finding, that Lacy was even worse
than his predecessors, their ardour sensibly diminished; many went
over to the French, and this feeling of discouragement was increased
by some unfortunate events.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.]
Henriod governor of Lerida had on the 25th of October surprised and
destroyed, in Balaguer, a swarm of Partidas which had settled on
the plain of Urgel, and the Partizans on the left bank of the Ebro
had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys. The French
also entrenched a post before the Medas Islands, in November, which
prevented all communication by land, and in the same month Maurice
Mathieu surprised Mattaro. The war had also now fatigued so many
persons, that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as
friends. Villa Nueva de Sitjes and other places were in constant
communication with Barcelona; and the people of Cadaques openly
refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, declaring that they had
already paid the French and meant to side with the strongest. One
Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the
enemy; counter guerillas, or rather free-booting bands, made their
appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast,
and these pirates of the ocean, the disgrace of civilized warfare,
generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless
flags without distinction. Then the continued bickerings between
Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with Lacy, who was,
besides, on bad terms with captain Codrington, greatly affected the
patriotic ardour of the people, and relieved the French armies from
the alarm which the first operations had created.
In Catalonia the generals in chief were never natives, nor identified
in feeling with the natives. Lacy was unfitted for open warfare, and
had recourse to the infamous methods of assassination. Campo Verde
had given some countenance to this horrible system, but Lacy and his
coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French
officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of
wines and flour, and the firing of powder-magazines, regardless of
the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the
explosion; and if any man shall doubt the truth of this allegation,
let him read “_The History of the Conspiracies against the French
Armies in Catalonia_.” That work, printed in 1813 at Barcelona,
contains the official reports of the military police, upon the
different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops;
and when due allowance for an enemy’s tale and for the habitual
falsifications of police agents is made, ample proof will remain that
Lacy’s warfare was one of assassination.
The facility which the great size of Barcelona afforded for these
attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison,
induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city,
preserving only the forts. This simple military precaution has been
noted by some writers as an indication that he even then secretly
despaired of final success in the Peninsula; but the weakness of
this remark will appear evident, if we consider, that he had just
augmented his immense army, that his generals were invading Valencia,
and menacing Gallicia, after having relieved Badajos and Ciudad
Rodrigo; and that he was himself preparing to lead four hundred
thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe. However the
place was not dismantled, and Maurice Mathieu contrived both to
maintain the city in obedience and to take an important part in the
field operations.
It was under these circumstances that Suchet advanced to the
Guadalaviar, although his losses and the escorts for his numerous
prisoners had diminished his force to eighteen thousand men while
Blake’s army including Freire’s division was above twenty-five
thousand, of which near three thousand were cavalry. He first
summoned the city, to ascertain the public spirit; he was answered
in lofty terms, yet he knew by his secret communications, that the
enthusiasm of the people was not very strong; and on the 3d of
November he seized the Grao, and the suburb of Serranos on the left
of the Guadalaviar. Blake had broken two, out of five, stone bridges
on the river, had occupied some houses and convents which covered
them on the left bank, and protected those bridges, which remained
whole, with regular works. Suchet immediately carried the convents
which covered the broken bridges in the Serranos, and fortified his
position there and at the Grao, and thus blocked the Spaniards on
that side with a small force, while he prepared to pass the river
higher up with the remainder of his army.
The Spanish defences on the right bank consisted of three posts.
1º. The city itself which was surrounded by a circular wall thirty
feet in height, and ten in thickness with a road along the summit,
the platforms of the bastions being supported from within by timber
scaffolding. There was also a wet ditch and a covered way with
earthen works in front of the gates.
2º. An intrenched camp of an irregular form five miles in extent. It
enclosed the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and
Ruzafa. The slope of this work was so steep as to require scaling
ladders, and there was a ditch in front twelve feet deep.
3º. The lines, which extended along the banks of the river to the sea
at one side, and to the villages of Quarte and Manisses on the other.
The whole line, including the city and camp, was about eight miles;
the ground was broken with deep and wide canals of irrigation, which
branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte, and the
Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya behind the left wing to observe
the open country. Suchet could not venture to force the passage
of the river until Reille had joined him, and therefore contented
himself with sending parties over to skirmish, while he increased his
secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour
the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed;
the French waited for reinforcements, and Blake hoped that while he
thus occupied his enemy a general insurrection would save Valencia.
But in December, Reille, having given over the charge of Navarre and
Aragon to general Caffarelli, marched to Teruel where Severoli with
his Italians had already arrived.
The vicinity of Freire, and Montijo, who now appeared near Cuença,
obliged Reille to halt at Teruel until general D’Armanac with a
detachment of the army of the centre, had driven those Spanish
generals away, but then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not
rejoin Blake, and as the latter was ignorant of Reille’s arrival,
Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly.
[Illustration: _Vol 4. Plate 5._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF
The Siege & Battle of
VALENCIA,
1812.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
On the 25th, the Neapolitan division being placed in the camp at the
Serranos, to hold the Spaniards in check, Habert took post at the
Grao, and Palombini’s division was placed opposite the village of
Mislata, which was about half-way between Valencia and the village
of Quarte. Reille at the same time made a forced march by Liria
and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night, above
the sources of the canals, opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army
crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th and formed
in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o’clock and
Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, whose plan was to drive all
Blake’s army within the entrenched camp, fearing that the Spanish
general, would evade the danger, if he saw the French divisions in
march, resolved to push at once with Harispe’s infantry and the
cavalry to the Albufera or salt-lake, beyond Valencia, and so cut off
Blake’s retreat to the Xucar river. Robert’s brigade therefore halted
to secure the bridges, until Reille should come up, and while the
troops, left on the other bank of the Guadalaviar, attacked all the
Spanish river line of entrenchments, Suchet marched towards the lake
as rapidly as the thick woods would permit.
[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]
The French hussars soon fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya
and were defeated, but this charge was stopped by the fire of
the infantry, and the remainder of the French horsemen coming up
overthrew the Spaniards. During this time Blake instead of falling on
Suchet with his reserve, was occupied with the defence of the river,
especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack, to cover
the passage at Ribaroya, had first given him the alarm. Palombini,
who was at this point, had passed over some skirmishers and then
throwing two bridges, attacked the entrenchments; but his troops were
repulsed by Zayas, and driven back on the river in disorder; they
rallied and had effected the passage of the canals, when a Spanish
reserve coming up restored the fight, and the French were finally
driven quite over the river. At that moment Reille’s division, save
one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and
in concert with Robert, attacked Mahy in the villages of Manisses and
Quarte, which had been fortified carefully in front, but were quite
neglected on the rear, and on the side of Aldaya. Suchet who had
been somewhat delayed at Aldaya by the aspect of affairs at Mislata,
then continued his march to the lake, while Reille meeting with a
feeble resistance at Manisses and Quarte, carried both at one sweep,
and turned Mislata where he united with Palombini. Blake and Zayas
retired towards the city but Mahy driven from Quarte took the road to
Alcira, on the Xucar, and thus passing behind Suchet’s division, was
entirely cut off from Valencia.
All the Spanish army, on the upper Guadalaviar, was now entirely
beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the
city, Habert was likewise victorious. He had first opened a cannonade
against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao, and this flotilla
although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate, and
closely supported by the Papillon sloop, fled without returning a
shot; the French then passed the water, and carried the entrenchment,
which consisted of a feeble breast-work, defended by the irregulars
who had only two guns. When the passage was effected Habert fixed
his right, as a pivot, on the river, and sweeping round with his
left, drove the Spaniards towards the camp; but before he could
connect his flank with Harispe’s troops, who were on the lake,
Obispo’s division, flying from Suchet’s cavalry, passed over the rice
grounds between the lake and the sea, and so escaped to Cullera.
The remainder of Blake’s army about eighteen thousand of all kinds
retired to the camp and were closely invested during the night.
Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry
soldier behind him, were then sent by different roads of Alcira,
Cullera, and Cuença, the two first in pursuit of Mahy and Obispo, the
latter to observe Freire. Mahy was found in a position at Alcira,
and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the
Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened,
and at the first shot he fled although the ground was strong and he
had three thousand men while the French were not above a thousand.
Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahy,
when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow not only prevented their
junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British
consul thinking the Xucar would be defended, had landed large stores
of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to
re-embark them, when the storm drove the ships of war off the coast,
and for three days fifty cavalry could have captured Denia and all
the stores.
In this battle which cost the French less than five hundred men,
Zayas alone displayed his usual vigour and spirit, and while retiring
upon the city, he repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road
Mahy had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other
was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With
twenty-three thousand infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river
in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could
have operated on either side; with strong entrenchments, a secure
camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could
have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation, in
less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted
Suchet whose force, seeing that one of Reille’s brigades had not
arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the
river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him, by a march,
which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than fifteen
miles or five hours march; and he now rejected the only means of
saving his army. But Suchet’s operations which indeed were of the
nature of a surprise, proves that he must have had a supreme contempt
for his adversary’s talents, and the country people partook of the
sentiment; the French parties which spread over the country for
provisions, as far as Xativa, were every where well received, and
Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people.
The 2d of December, the Spanish general, finding his error, attempted
at the head of ten thousand men to break out by the left bank of
the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his
advanced guard of five thousand men had made way, it was abandoned,
and the main column returned to the city. The next day many deserters
went over to the French, and Reille’s absent brigade, now arrived and
reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified
his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th
repulsed two thousand Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular
approaches against the camp and city.
SIEGE OF VALENCIA.
[Sidenote: 1812. January.]
It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city
contained one hundred and fifty thousand souls besides the troops,
and there was no means of provisioning them, because Suchet’s
investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their parcs of
ammunition which had reached Saguntum, were transported across
the river Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of
San Vincente, and the Olivet offered two projecting points of the
entrenched camp, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the
trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January.
The fire killed colonel Henri, the chief engineer, but in the night
of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the
city; the French, perceiving the movement, escaladed the works, and
seized two of the suburbs so suddenly, that they captured eighty
pieces of artillery and established themselves within twenty yards
of the town wall, when their mortar-batteries opened upon the place.
In the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that
he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but that the
bombardment had convinced him, that he might now depend upon both the
citizens and the troops.
This answer satisfied Suchet. He was convinced the place would
not make any defence, and he continued to throw shells until the
8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte,
but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However,
the bombardment killed many persons, and set fire to the houses
in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at
Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While he
was debating with them, a friar bearing a flag, which he called the
Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob, and insisted upon fighting
to the last, and when a picquet of soldiers was sent against him,
he routed it and shot the officer; nevertheless his party was soon
dispersed. Finally, when a convent of Dominicans close to the walls
was taken, and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to
retire to Alicant with arms, baggage, and four guns.
These terms were refused, but a capitulation guaranteeing property
and oblivion of the past, and providing that the unfortunate
prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an
equal number of Blake’s army, was negotiated and ratified on the
9th. Then Blake complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the
city. Above eighteen thousand regular troops, with eighty stand of
colours, two thousand horses, three hundred and ninety guns, forty
thousand muskets, and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is
not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war,
that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach
Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after!
On the 14th of January Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia,
having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of
his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own
activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created
him duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in
unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say vigorous and
prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars,
and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of
their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their
real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not
to offend the citizens by violating their customs, or shocking their
religious prejudices, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to govern
through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy
aided him, and the submission of the people was secured.
The errors of the Spaniards contributed as much to this object, as
the prudent vigilance of Suchet; for although the city was lost, the
kingdom of Valencia might have recovered from the blow, under the
guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches,
the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar
was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours
remained unsubdued; the Partidas in the hills were still numerous,
the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the
British fleets were ready to aid, and to supply arms and stores.
The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their
posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul,
Tupper, proposed to establish a commission of government, having
at its head the padre Rico, the author of Valencia’s first defence
against Moncey, and the most able and energetic man in those parts,
Mahy evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power, and
shewed every disposition to impede useful exertion. Then the leading
people either openly submitted or secretly entered into connection
with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the
resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the
stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to
France, and the horrors of the Cabrera were prolonged.
During the siege of Valencia, Freire, with his Murcians, including a
body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district
and retired across the Xucar to Almanza; Mahy occupied Alcoy, and
Villa Campa had marched to Carthagena. Suchet wished to leave them
undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicant itself. But to
ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold
ten thousand men in the Despeñas Peros, ready to march if necessary
to Suchet’s assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to
detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry,
from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon.
These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and
Alicant before the battle of the 26th, but they were delayed, and
only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered.
Freire retreated before them, and Mahy, who was preparing to advance
again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicant. Montbrun knew that Valencia
had fallen, and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but
ambitious to share in the glory of the hour he marched against
Alicant, and throwing a few shells summoned it to surrender. The
municipal authorities, the governor and many of the leading people,
were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when
he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state
of defence. The consul, Tupper, and Roche, the military agent, by
distributing clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers,
restored their courage, drew many more to Alicant, and stopped the
desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire’s division
alone had lost two thousand men. Montbrun’s attempt therefore, hurt
the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted
and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful
manner.
Villa Campa now abandoned Carthagena and returned to the mountains
of Albarazin; and Suchet, embarrassed by the failure at Alicant,
and dreading the fever at Carthagena, posted Harispe’s division on
the Xucar, to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the
enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely
neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after
the stores were removed; for the castle had sixty guns mounted, and
many vessels were in the port; and as a post it was important, and
might easily have been secured until a Spanish garrison could be
thrown in. When these points were secured Suchet detached a brigade
on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuença,
and then directed Musnier’s division to form the siege of Peniscola;
but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that
Taragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed
the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy; wherefore Severoli’s
division moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter
marched to Tortoza in aid of Taragona. Previous to Musnier’s arrival,
Lafosse, governor of Tortoza, had advanced with some cavalry and
a battalion of infantry to the fort of Balaguer, to observe Lacy,
and being falsely told that the Spaniards were in retreat, entered
Cambril the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to
Taragona. Lacy was nearer than he imagined.
It will be remembered that the Catalan army was posted in the valley
of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to
Barcelona. In December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Dacaen,
who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long expected
convoy, and the Spaniards being thus placed between two fires, after
a slight action, opened the road. When Dacaen returned to Gerona
they resumed their position, but Lacy after proposing several new
projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution,
at last decided to fall on Taragona, and afterwards to invade Aragon.
With this view, he drew off Eroles’ division and some cavalry, in
all about six thousand men, from the Congosta, and took post about
the 18th of January, at Reus. Stores from Cadiz were landed from the
English vessels at Cape Salou; captain Codrington repaired to the
Spanish quarters on the 19th to concert a combined operation with the
fleet, and it was at this moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse
had entered Taragona with the cavalry, and that the French infantry,
about eight hundred in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the
vicinity of the Spanish army.
Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and captain Codrington
would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons
chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two
captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners, and brought them
to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French
infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks, and closing
upon their rear, killed or wounded two hundred when the remainder
surrendered.
The naval officers, thus freed, immediately regained their ships,
and the squadron was that night before Taragona; but a gale of wind
off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the
land-side, and the next day the increasing gale obliged the ships
to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had meanwhile abandoned the project
against Taragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off
himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles’ division, reinforced by
a considerable body of armed peasantry, in a position at Altafulla,
behind the Gaya. Here the bridge in front being broken, and the
position strong, Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of
Sarsfield’s division, awaited the attack of three thousand men who
were coming from Barcelona. He was however ignorant that Dacaen,
finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the
side of Vich, had sent general Lamarque with five thousand men to
Barcelona, and that Maurice Mathieu was thus in march not with three
but eight thousand good troops.
BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA.
The French generals, anxious to surprise Eroles, took pains to
conceal their numbers, and while Maurice Mathieu appeared in front,
Lamarque was turning the left flank. They marched all night, and at
day-break on the 24th, having forded the river, made a well combined
and vigorous attack, by which the Spaniards were defeated with a loss
of more than one thousand killed and wounded. The total dispersion
of the beaten troops baffled pursuit, and the French in returning to
Barcelona suffered from the fire of the British squadron, but Eroles
complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a settled design to
sacrifice him.
While this was passing in Lower Catalonia, Dacaen scoured the higher
country about Olot, and then descending into the valley of Vich
defeated Sarsfield at Centellas, and that general himself was taken,
but rescued by one of his soldiers. From Centellas, Dacaen marched
by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 27th
January, meanwhile Musnier re-victualled Taragona. Thus the Catalans
were again reduced to great straits, for the French knowing that they
were soon to be reinforced, occupied all the sea-coast, made new
roads out of reach of fire from the ships, established fresh posts
at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques, placed detachments in
the higher valleys, and obliged their enemies to resort once more
to an irregular warfare; which was however but a feeble resource,
because from Lacy’s policy the people were now generally disarmed and
discontented.
Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield, and Rovira, indeed, although
continually quarrelling, kept the field; and being still supplied
with arms and stores which the British navy contrived to land, and
send into the interior, sustained the war as partizans until new
combinations were produced by the efforts of England; but Lacy’s
intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and
the foundations of strength in the principality were shaken. The
patriots indeed still possessed the mountains, but the French held
all the towns, all the ports, and most of the lines of communication;
and their moveable columns without difficulty gathered the harvests
of the valleys, and chased the most daring of the partizans.
Meanwhile Suchet, seeing that Taragona was secure, renewed his
operations.
SIEGE OF PENISCOLA.
This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was
nearly impregnable; and the only communication with the shore, was by
a neck of land sixty yards wide and two hundred and fifty long. In
the middle of the town there was a strong castle, well furnished with
guns and provisions, and some British ships of war were at hand to
aid the defence; the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep
marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered
by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by
batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been
taken during the siege of Tortoza, but had escaped from France, was
now governor of Peniscola, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous.
On the 20th ground was broken, and mortar-batteries being established
twelve hundred yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th.
In the night of the 31st a parallel five hundred yards long was
built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either
flank.
[Sidenote: 1812. February.]
In the night of the 2d of February the approaches were pushed beyond
the first parallel, and the breaching batteries being finished and
armed were going to open when a privateer captured a despatch from
the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take
the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to
surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened
negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress,
the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found
sixty guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place,
which secured their line of communication, produced a general
disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet’s
account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary
to give to a transaction, full of shame and dishonour, to Navarro,
can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The
true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison
were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the
British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do
their duty to their country.
After this capture, six thousand Poles quitted Suchet, for Napoleon
required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition.
These veterans marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of
Blake’s army, at the same time Reille’s two French divisions were
ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the Lower Ebro,
and Palombini’s Italian division was sent towards Soria and Calatayud
to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa, and Bassecour, who were still
in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards
Aragon, and Severoli’s division took his place on the Lower Ebro;
for the Partidas of Duran, Empecinado, and those numerous bands from
the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed
Navarre and Aragon and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina’s also
re-entered Aragon in January, surprised Huesca, and being attacked
during his retreat at Lumbiar repulsed the enemy and carried off his
prisoners.
Suchet’s field force in Valencia was thus reduced by twenty thousand
men, he had only fifteen thousand left, and consequently could not
push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure
of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French
armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor’s
lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet’s army to
Cuença, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid; thus
Valencia was made, as it were, a mere head of cantonments, in front
of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicant then
became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who
had neglected the wound he received at the battle of Saguntum, now
fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which
seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power, was
suddenly extinguished.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia, were but
a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish
cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely, the neglect of all good
military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad
troops.
2º. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part
of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous
battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar;
he might have defended that river without risking his whole army,
and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut
up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have
capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always
have broken through the thin circle of investment, drawn by Suchet,
especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks
of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was
pithily summed up in one sentence by the duke of Wellington. Being
accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe,
by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send
reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—“The misfortunes of
Valencia are to be attributed to Blake’s ignorance of his profession,
and to Mahi’s cowardice and treachery!”
CHAPTER IV.
OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
The affairs of these provinces were so intimately connected, that
they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult’s position
at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from
thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a
consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried.
Seville the base of his movements, and the storehouse of his army,
was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being
generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From
this point he maintained his line of communication, with the army of
Portugal, through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha;
and from this point he sustained the most diversified operations on
all parts of a circle, which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Cadiz,
Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura.
The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable
point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation
of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and
the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until
the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth
of the Guadiana were as we have seen frequent. Nevertheless, when
Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte, in July and
August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception
of the castle of Paymago, wherefore Soult, dreading the autumnal
pestilence, did not keep more than twelve hundred men on that side.
The blockade of the Isla was always maintained by Victor, whose
position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de
Barameda on the right, to Conil on the left, and running through
Xeres, Arcos, Medina, Sidonia, and Chiclana. But that marshal
while thus posted was in a manner blockaded himself. In the Isla,
including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less
than sixteen thousand troops, who, having the command of the sea,
could at any moment land on the flanks of the French. The Partidas,
although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse
with Seville; the Serranos of the Ronda and the regular forces at
Algeziras issuing, as it were, from the fortress of Gibraltar,
cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held
by the allies, for general Campbell would never relinquish that
important point, the fresh supplies of cattle, drawn from the great
plain called the Campiña de Tarifa, were straitened. Meanwhile the
expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and
Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part
of the army of the south; hence Victor’s corps, scarcely strong
enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress
in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army being
well known in Cadiz, the safety of that city was no longer doubtful,
a part of the British garrison therefore joined lord Wellington’s
army, and Blake as we have seen carried his Albuera soldiers to
Valencia.
In Grenada the fourth corps, which, after the departure of
Sebastiani, was commanded by general Laval, had two distinct tasks to
fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army;
the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpuxaras, against
the efforts of the Partidas of those mountains, against the Serranos
of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and
from Algeziras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of
Mahi, Freire, and Montijo to aid the Valencian operations, secured
the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a
small force, having pushed his partizan excursions rashly, was killed
in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered.
Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand
men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that
of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the Partidas, who were more numerous
there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La
Mancha.
Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos,
an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most
formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with
Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the
way of Truxillo; and there the fifth French corps, commanded by
Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to
preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to
protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps
of general Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo’s Spanish
army, which was becoming numerous and bold.
Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from
sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the
Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging
parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his
retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about
Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French
general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana,
but this exposed his troops to Hill’s enterprises; and that bold and
vigilant commander having ten thousand excellent troops, and being
well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour.
Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus; the construction of
the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division
at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended
indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position
in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra
with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make
his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as
occasion required.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 3.]
Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the
circle round Seville, at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and
Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; and to support his extensive
operations, the duke of Dalmatia, if his share of the reinforcements
which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would have
had about a hundred thousand troops, of which ninety thousand men
and fourteen thousand horses were French. But the reinforcements
were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of
French present with the eagles was not more than sixty-seven thousand.
The first corps contained twenty thousand; the fourth and fifth about
eleven thousand each; the garrison of Badajos was five thousand;
twenty thousand formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the
force consisted of “_Escopeteros_” and civic guards, who were chiefly
employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions, Soult
could therefore take the field, at any point, with twenty-four or
twenty-five thousand men, and in Estremadura, on very pressing
occasions, with even a greater number of excellent troops well
and powerfully organized. The manner in which this great army was
paralysed in the latter part of 1811, shall now be shown.
[Sidenote: 1811. October.]
In October, Drouet was in the Morena, and Girard at Merida, watching
Morillo, who was in Caceres, when Soult, who had just returned to
Seville after his Murcian expedition, sent three thousand men to
Fregenal, seemingly to menace the Alemtejo. General Hill therefore
recalled his brigades from the right bank of the Tagus, and
concentrated his whole corps behind the Campo Maior on the 9th.
The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired
from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to Caza de Cantellaña, and
every thing indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult’s
attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballesteros in the
Ronda, and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had
reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a
division and some cavalry near Caceres.
Ballesteros had disembarked at Algeziras on the 11th of September,
and immediately marched with his own and Beguine’s troops, in all
four thousand men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the
Serranos of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th he had endeavoured
to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, where Beguines had a
garrison, but a French detachment from Chiclana had already reduced
that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one
to Chiclana, the other to Ximena.
At this time six thousand French were collected at Ubrique, intending
to occupy the sea-coast, from Algeziras to Conil, in furtherance of
a great project which Soult was then meditating, and by which he
hoped to effect, not only the entire subjection of Andalusia, but the
destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design,
which shall be hereafter explained more fully, required several
preliminary operations, amongst the most important of which was the
capture of Tarifa; for that place, situated in the narrowest part
of the straits, furnished either a protection, or a dangerous point
of offence, to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations
of its possessor with England. It affected, as we have seen, the
supplies of the French before the Isla; it was from its nearness,
and from the run of the current, the most convenient and customary
point for trading with Morocco; it menaced the security of Ceuta,
and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal
superiority over the smaller towns, and ports along the coast, which
would have given the French, if they had taken it, a moral influence
of some consequence.
Soult had in August despatched a confidential officer from Conil to
the African coast to negotiate with the Barbaric emperor, and the
latter had agreed to a convention, by which he engaged to exclude
British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations
to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes, while carrying to
the French those supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided
Soult would occupy Tarifa as a depôt. This important convention was
on the point of being ratified, when the opportune arrival of some
unusually magnificent presents from England, turned the scale against
the French: their agent was then dismissed, the English supplies were
increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of
horses to remount the allied cavalry.
Although foiled in this attempt, Soult, calculating on the capricious
nature of barbarians, resolved to fulfil his part by the capture
of Tarifa; hence it was, that when Ballesteros appeared at Ximena,
he arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent
troops from Seville by Ubrique against the Spanish general, whose
position besides being extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth
corps, was likely to affect the taking of Tarifa. Ballesteros, if
reinforced, might also have become very dangerous to the blockade of
Cadiz, by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and
still more by menacing Victor’s communications with Seville, along
the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon
arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the
14th eight thousand men under generals Godinot and Semélé advanced
upon St. Roque and Algeziras. The inhabitants of those places
immediately fled to the green island, and Ballesteros took refuge
under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of
the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and
thus cooped up, he lived upon the resources of the place, while
efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their
flanks. The naval means were not sufficient to remove his whole army
to another quarter, but seven hundred were transported to Manilba,
where the Serranos and some Partidas had assembled on the left of
the French, and at the same time twelve hundred British troops with
four guns, under colonel Skerrett, and two thousand Spaniards, under
Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right.
Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, but Skerrett arrived the
17th. The next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the
sea-road by which it marched was so swept with the guns of the Tuscan
frigate, aided by the boats of the Stately, that the French after
losing some men returned. Then Godinot and Semélé being in dispute,
and without provisions, retreated; they were followed by Ballesteros’
cavalry as far as Ximena, where the two generals separated in great
anger, and Godinot having reached Seville shot himself. This failure
in the south unsettled Soult’s plans, and was followed by a heavier
disaster in Estremadura.
SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO.
When Drouet had retired to Zafra, Hill received orders from
Wellington to drive Girard away from Caceres, that Morillo might
forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his corps at
Albuquerque on the 23d, and Morillo brought the fifth Spanish army
to Aliseda on the Salor. Girard was then at Caceres with an advanced
guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill occupied Aliseda and
Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from
Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th at day-break Hill entered Malpartida de
Caceres, and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy. Girard then
abandoned Caceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill,
having no certain knowledge of the enemy’s movements, halted for the
night at Malpartida.
On the morning of the 27th the Spaniards entered Caceres; the enemy
was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida; and the British
general, hoping to intercept their line of march, pursued by a cross
road, through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this
movement intelligence was received that the French general had halted
at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, on the main road
to Caceres, which proved that he was ignorant of the new direction
taken by the allies, and only looked to a pursuit from Caceres. Hill
immediately seized the advantage, and by a forced march reached
Alcuesca in the night, being then within a league of Aroyo de Molinos.
This village was situated in a plain, and behind it a sierra or
ridge of rocks, rose in the form of a crescent, about two miles wide
on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another
entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right. The
most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the
extremity of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between
them was that of Medellin.
During the night, though the weather was dreadful, no fires were
permitted in the allied camp; and at two o’clock in the morning of
the 28th, the troops moved to a low ridge, half-a-mile from Aroyo,
under cover of which they formed three bodies; the infantry on the
wings and the cavalry in the centre. The left column then marched
straight upon the village, the right marched towards the extreme
point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of
the crescent; the cavalry kept its due place between both.
One brigade of Girard’s division, having marched at four o’clock by
the road of Medellin, was already safe, but Dombrouski’s brigade
and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place; the horses of
the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to the olive-trees, and the
infantry were only gathering to form on the Medellin road outside
the village. Girard himself was in his quarters, waiting for his
horse, when two British officers galloped down the street, and in an
instant all was confusion; the cavalry bridled their horses, and the
infantry run to their alarming posts. But a thick mist rolled down
the craggy mountain, a terrifying shout, drowning even the clatter of
the elements arose on the blast, and with the driving storm came the
seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, charging down the street.
Then the French rear-guard of cavalry, fighting and struggling hard,
were driven to the end of the village, and the infantry, hastily
forming their squares, covered the main body of the horsemen which
gathered on their left.
The seventy-first immediately lined the garden walls, and opened a
galling fire on the nearest square, while the ninety-second filing
out of the streets formed upon the French right; the fiftieth
regiment closely following, secured the prisoners in the village,
and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted
the outside of the houses, and endeavoured to intercept the line of
retreat. The guns soon opened on the French squares, the thirteenth
dragoons captured their artillery, the ninth dragoons and German
hussars, charged their cavalry and entirely dispersed it with
great loss; but Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded,
still kept his infantry together, and continued his retreat by the
Truxillo road. The right column of the allies was however already
in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close
upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed,
was again coming up fast; Girard’s men were falling by fifties,
and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but
giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the
almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less
obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills
at an easier part beyond his left, the thirty-ninth regiment and
Ashworth’s Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the
twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth, led by general Howard, followed him
step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment,
until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial
of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard,
Dombrouski, and Briche, escaped at first to San Hernando, and Zorita,
in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at
Orellano on the 9th of November, they rejoined Drouet with about six
hundred men, the remains of three thousand. They were said to be
the finest troops then in Spain, and indeed their resolution not to
surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their
excellence.
The trophies of this action were the capture of twelve or thirteen
hundred prisoners, including general Bron, and the prince of
Aremberg; all the French artillery, baggage, and commissariat,
together with a contribution just raised; and during the fight, a
Portuguese brigade, being united to Penne Villamur’s cavalry was sent
to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was
not more than seventy killed and wounded, but one officer, lieutenant
Strenowitz, was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and
successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian, who having abandoned
the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez’ Partida, was liable
to death by the laws of war; having been however originally forced
into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter. General
Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to general Drouet, and
such was the latter’s good temper, that while smarting under this
disaster he released his prisoner.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 6._
_Explanatory Sketch of_
GEN^L. HILL’S OPERATIONS,
1811.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to
general Barois, yet in a military point of view his offence was
unpardonable. He knew two or three days before, that general Hill
was near him; he knew that there was a good road from Malpartida
to Alcuesca, because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres;
and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without
sending out even a patrole upon his flank, thus sacrificing two
thousand brave men. Napoleon’s clemency was therefore great, and yet
not misplaced, for Girard, afterwards, repaid it by his devotion at
the battle of Lutzen when the emperor’s star was on the wane. On the
other hand general Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage
escape; and to good arrangements added celerity of movement, with the
utmost firmness and vigour of execution. His troops seconded him as
he merited; and here was made manifest the advantage of possessing
the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instincts of
revenge as the Peninsulars; for, during the night of the 27th, every
Spaniard in Aroyo, as well as in Alcuesca, knew that the allies were
at hand, and not one was found so base or so indiscreet as to betray
the fact.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.]
This blow being struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, and the
Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, but the report of Girard’s
disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet reoccupied
Caceres with a thousand men; Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the
15th of November, and moved to Truxillo; a convoy entered Badajos
from Zafra on the 12th, a second on the 20th, and Soult, while
collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the
ground under the guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Every thing
seemed to indicate a powerful attack upon Hill, when a serious
disturbance amongst the Polish troops, at Ronquillo, obliged Soult
to detach men from Seville to quell it. When that was effected, a
division of four thousand entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose
corps was thus raised to fourteen thousand infantry and three
thousand cavalry, on the 5th of December advanced to Almendralejos,
and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Merida. At the same time
Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence
Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia,
and Soult with the same view sent ten thousand men to the Despeños
Peros.
[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]
Drouet’s movements were, however, again stopped by some
insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now known that
Soult’s principal object was to destroy Ballesteros, and take Tarifa,
Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly
to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in
favour of Ballesteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia.
With this view he entered Estremadura by Albuquerque on the 27th of
December, and having received information that the French, untaught
by their former misfortunes were not vigilant, he made a forced march
in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th he passed Villar del Rey and
San Vincente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with
three hundred French infantry, and a few hussars, part of a foraging
party, the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant.
A patrole gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Merida, and
were closely followed by four hundred of the allied cavalry, who
had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the
words of general Hill, “the intrepid and admirable manner in which
the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as
he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the
fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting any
thing against him.” Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded
on this occasion, reached Merida with a loss of only forty men, all
killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at
Merida immediately abandoned their unfinished works, and evacuated
that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of
wheat.
[Sidenote: 1812. January]
From Merida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st of
January to Almendralejos, where he captured another field store; but
the French general, whose troops were scattered, fell back towards
Zafra; the weather was so bad, and the roads so deep, that general
Hill with the main body halted while colonel Abercrombie with a
detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry followed the enemy’s
rear-guard. Meanwhile Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent,
either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajos, or
some Polish troops with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese
frontier on the right of the Guadiana, by Moura, Mourao, and Serpe,
with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the
sierra Morena.
Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro, on the evening of the 3d,
where, meeting with a stout squadron of the enemy, a stiff charge
took place, and the French out-numbered and flanked on both sides
were overthrown with a loss of thirty men. But Drouet was now in full
retreat for Monasterio, and Morillo moving upon Medellin, took post
at San Benito. Thus the allies remained masters of Estremadura until
the 13th of January, when Marmont’s divisions moved by the valley
of the Tagus towards the eastern frontier of Portugal; Hill then
returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello
Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena and his cavalry
supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo, but
that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, had made a
sudden incursion to La Mancha, and was then attacking the castle of
Almagro. There, however, he was so completely defeated by general
Treillard that, flying to Horcajo in the Guadaloupe mountains,
although he reached it on the 18th, his fugitives were still coming
in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest
disorder.
CHAPTER V.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
While the events, recorded in the foregoing chapter, were passing in
Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important
operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given
orders to assemble a battering train, and directed general Laval
with a strong division of the 4th corps to move from Antequera upon
San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of general
Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballesteros had obtained
some success against that general at Bornos on the 5th of November;
but Skerrett finding that Copons instead of four thousand had only
brought seven hundred men, returned to Tarifa on the approach of some
French from Conil.
Semélé, being thus reinforced, obliged Ballesteros, on the 27th,
again to take refuge under the walls of Gibraltar, which he reached
just in time, to avoid a collision with Laval’s column from
Antequera. Semélé’s troops did not follow very close, and a combined
attack upon Laval by the divisions of Ballesteros, Skerrett, and
Copons, was projected. The two latter with a part of the troops under
Ballesteros, were actually embarked on the 29th of November for the
purpose of landing at Manilba, in pursuance of this scheme, when
Semélé’s column came in sight, and Skerrett and Copons instantly
returned to Tarifa.
[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]
Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burthen upon that
fortress, and his own troops without shelter from the winter rain,
wherefore general Campbell proposed to send them, in British vessels,
to renew the attempt against Malaga, which had formerly failed
under Lord Blayney. On the 12th of January, at the very moment of
embarking, the French retired from before Gibraltar, by the Puerto de
Ojen, a grand pass connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the vallies
of the Guadaranque, with the great and rich plain called the Campiña
de Tarifa; and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern
entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement
was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering train
was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to
seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and
Los Barios, where Ballesteros had now taken post. This combination
was however on too wide a scale to be adopted in all its parts;
Ballesteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen,
and Skerrett and Copons received orders from general Campbell to take
advantage of this diversion; but the former, seeing that his own plan
was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards
after a skirmish of six hours retired. Laval then left fifteen
hundred men to observe Ballesteros, and placing a detachment at
Vejes to cover his right flank, threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced
against Tarifa.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 7._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF THE
SIEGE OF TARIFA.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
This town was scarcely expected by the French to make any resistance.
It was encircled with towers, which were connected by an ancient
archery wall, irregular in form without a ditch, and so thin as to
offer no resistance even to field artillery. To the north and east,
some high ridges flanked, and seemed entirely to command the weak
rampart; but the English engineer had observed that the nearest
ridges formed, at half pistol-shot, a natural glacis, the plane of
which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with
great nicety; and to this advantage was added a greater number of
towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior
defence. He judged therefore that the seemingly favourable nature of
the ridges combined with other circumstances, would scarcely fail to
tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side. With a view
to render the delusion unavoidable, he strengthened the western front
of the place, rendered the access to it uneasy, by demolishing the
main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the
north-west; and an outwork, of a convent which was situated about a
hundred yards from the place, and to the east of the suburb. This
done, he prepared an internal defence, which rendered the storming
of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered; but to
appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described.
Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent which
entering at the east, passed out at the opposite point. This stream
was barred, at its entrance, by a tower with a portcullis, in front
of which pallisades were planted across the bed of the water. The
houses within the walls were strongly built and occupied inclined
planes rising from each side of the torrent, and at the exit of the
latter there were two massive structures, forming part of the walls
called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked
up the hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the
stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land, and then
a causeway, the whole being about six hundred yards long, joined the
town to an island, or rather promontory, about two thousand yards in
circumference, with perpendicular sides, which forbade any entrance
save by the causeway; and at the island end of the latter there was
an unfinished entrenchment and battery.
On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest of
which, called the Catalina, was scarped and crowned with a slight
field work, containing a twelve-pounder. This hill covered the
causeway, and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which
was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the western front,
and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The
gun in the tower of the Gusmans also shot clear over the town on to
the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised; and
in addition to these posts, the stately ship of the line, the Druid
frigate, and several gun and mortar-boats were anchored in the most
favourable situation for flanking the enemy’s approaches.
Reverting then to the head of the defence, it will be seen, that
while the ridges on the eastern fronts, and the hollow bed of the
torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault,
deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side; the flanking fire of the
convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the
appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the
western side, and as it were, forcibly urged them towards the eastern
ridge where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had
even marked their ground, and indicated the situation of the breach;
that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the
hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the
walls far greater than the outer depth; where he had loop-holed the
houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets,
and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would
thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes,
exposed on each side to the musketry from the loop-holes and windows,
and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which looked
up the bed of the torrent. Thus disputing every inch of ground, the
garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the
Gusmans, which being high and massive were fitted for rear-guards to
cover the evacuation of the place, and were provided with ladders for
the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the
Catalina.
The artillery available for the defence appeared very powerful,
for besides that of the shipping, and the guns in the Catalina,
there were in the island twelve pieces, comprising four
twenty-four-pounders, and two ten-inch mortars; and in the town
there were six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front. An
eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis
tower, and two field-pieces were kept behind the town in reserve for
sallies; but most of the artillery in the island was mounted after
the investment, so that two twenty-four-pounders and two mortars
only, could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls
and towers of the latter were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy
guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to
the enemy’s fire.
SIEGE OF TARIFA.
The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred
horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand five hundred men, and
was posted in the following manner. Seven hundred were in the island,
one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the convent, and fifteen
hundred in the town.
On the 19th of December the enemy having driven in the advanced
posts, were encountered with a sharp skirmish, and designedly led
towards the eastern front.
The 20th the place was invested, but on the 21st a picquet of French
troops having incautiously advanced towards the western front,
captain Wren of the eleventh suddenly descended from the Catalina
and carried them off. In the night the enemy approached close to the
walls, but the next morning captain Wren again came down from the
Catalina, and, at the same time, the troops sallied from the convent,
with a view to discover the position of the French advanced posts. So
daring was this sally that Mr. Welstead of the eighty-second actually
pushed into one of their camps and captured a field-piece there;
and although he was unable to bring it off, in face of the French
reserves, the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the
ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely
and could with difficulty recover the captured piece of artillery
from under the guns of the north-east tower.
In the night of the 22d the anticipations of the British engineer
were realized. The enemy broke ground in two places, five hundred
yards from the eastern front, and assiduously pushed forward their
approaches until the 26th; but always under a destructive fire, to
which they replied with musketry, and with their wall-pieces, which
killed several men, and would have been very dangerous, but for the
sand-bags which captain Nicholas, the chief engineer at Cadiz, had
copiously supplied. This advantage was however counterbalanced by the
absence of the ships which were all driven away in a gale on the 23rd.
On the 27th the French battering-train arrived, and on the 29th
the sixteen-pounders opened against the town, and the howitzers
against the island. These last did little damage beyond dismounting
the gun in the tower of the Gusmans, which was however quickly
re-established; but the sixteen-pounders brought the old wall down in
such flakes, that in a few hours a wide breach was effected, a little
to the left of the portcullis tower, looking from the camp.
The place was now exposed both to assault and escalade, but behind
the breach the depth to the street was above fourteen feet, the space
below was covered with iron window-gratings, having every second
bar turned up, the houses there, and behind all points liable to
escalade, were completely prepared and garrisoned, and the troops
were dispersed all round the ramparts, each regiment having its own
quarter assigned. The Spanish and forty-seventh British regiment
guarded the breach, and on their right some riflemen prolonged the
line. The eighty-seventh regiment occupied the portcullis tower and
extended along the rampart to the left.
In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on the
breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the
discharges.
The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for
sixty feet, and the whole breach offered an easy ascent, yet the
besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night were fast
augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain filled the bed
of the river, and the torrent bringing down, from the French camp,
planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, broke the palisades with
a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the
waters even injured the defences behind the breach: a new passage was
thus opened in the wall, yet such was the vigour of the besieged,
that the damage was repaired before the morning, and the troops
calmly and confidently awaited
THE ASSAULT.
The waters subsided in the night as quickly as they had risen, but
at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers glided swiftly down
the bed of the river, and as if assured of victory, arrived, without
shout or tumult, within a few yards of the walls, when, instead of
quitting the hollow, to reach the breach, they, like the torrent
of the night, continued their rapid course and dashed against the
portcullis. The British soldiers, who had hitherto been silent and
observant, as if at a spectacle which they were expected to applaud,
now arose, and with a crashing volley smote the head of the French
column! The leading officer, covered with wounds, fell against the
portcullis and gave up his sword through the bars to colonel Gough;
the French drummer, a gallant boy, who was beating the charge,
dropped lifeless by his officer’s side, and the dead and wounded
filled the hollow. The remainder of the assailants then breaking
out to the right and left, spread along the slopes of ground under
the ramparts and opened a quick irregular musketry. At the same
time, a number of men coming out of the trenches, leaped into pits
digged in front, and shot fast at the garrison, but no escalade or
diversion at the other points was made, and the storming column was
dreadfully shattered. For the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from
the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly
for the occasion, sent, at pistol-shot distance, a tempest of grape
whistling through the French masses, which were swept away in such a
dreadful manner, that they could no longer endure the destruction,
but plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while
a shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments,
passed round the wall of the town.
[Sidenote: 1812. January.]
[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence, MSS.]
In this combat the allies lost five officers and thirty-one men,
but the French dead covered all the slopes in front of the rampart,
and choked the bed of the river, and ten wounded officers, of
whom only one survived, were brought in by the breach. Skerrett,
compassionating their sufferings and admiring their bravery,
permitted Laval to fetch off the remainder; and the operations of
the siege were then suspended, for both sides suffered severely
from the weather. The rain partially ruined the French batteries,
interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies; on
the other hand the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades
of the allies and injured their retrenchments, and some vessels,
coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, were wrecked on the coast.
Nevertheless a fresh assault was hourly expected until the night of
the 4th, when, several cannon-shots being heard in the French camp,
without any bullets reaching the town, it was judged that the enemy
were destroying the guns previous to retreating. Soon afterwards
large fires were observed, and at daylight the troops issuing out
of the convent, drove the enemy from the batteries, and commenced a
skirmish with the rear-guard; but a heavy storm impeded the action;
the French conducted their retreat skilfully, and the British, after
making a few prisoners, relinquished the pursuit. Nevertheless
Laval’s misfortunes did not end here. The privations his troops had
endured in the trenches produced sickness; many men deserted, and it
was computed, at the time, that the expedition cost the French not
less than a thousand men, while the whole loss of the allies did not
exceed one hundred and fifty.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.]
Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its
defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is
not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living
it becomes a crime; colonel Skerrett has obtained the credit, but
he was not the author of the success at Tarifa. He, and lord Proby,
the second in command, were from the first impressed with a notion,
that the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned;
all their proceedings tended to that end, and they would even have
abandoned the island. At colonel Skerrett’s express desire general
Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say, the day before
the siege commenced; and during its progress he neither evinced
hopes of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some
instances he even took measures tending directly towards failure. To
whom then was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The
merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to general Campbell, the
lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and he
also engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta,
that the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade might be
secured; for he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula
who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally,
it was his imperious and even menacing orders, which prevented
colonel Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 5.]
General Campbell’s resolution is the more to be admired, because
Tarifa was, strictly speaking, not within his command, which did
not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also
to contend against general Cooke, who claimed the controul of a
garrison which was chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted
also contrary to the opinion of lord Wellington, who, always averse
to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards, as well knowing
the latter would inevitably fail, and throw the burthen on the
British in the hour of need, was in this instance more strongly
influenced, because the reports of general Cooke, founded on colonel
Skerrett’s and lord Proby’s representations, reprobated the defence
of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources, and having no
local knowledge of the place, lord Wellington judged, that the
island only could be held—that Skerrett’s detachment was not wanting
for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not
keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both, he thought
they could not retain them, while Ballesteros was in strength and
succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in
those parts; finally, that the defence of the island was the least
costly and the most certain. However, with that prudence, which
always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion, he
would not interfere from a distance, in a matter which could only be
accurately judged of on the spot.
But the island had not a single house, and was defenceless; the
rain alone, without reckoning the effects of the enemy’s shells,
would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping
could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates
and barracks, and storehouses for provisions and ammunition, would
have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was
therefore an outwork to the island, and one so capable of a good
defence that a much more powerful attack had been expected, and a
more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer; a defence
not resting on the valour of the troops alone, but upon a skilful
calculation of all the real resources, and all the chances.
[Sidenote: Intercepted despatches, 17th April, 1812.]
[Sidenote: General Campbell’s papers, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI.]
That the value of the object was worth the risk may be gathered
from this, that Soult, three months after the siege, thus expressed
himself, “The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English
and to the defenders of Cadiz, than the taking of Alicant or even
Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking
Tarifa.” And, besides the advantages already noticed as belonging
to the possession of this place, it was close to Ceuta where there
were a few British soldiers, but many French prisoners, and above
two thousand discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves; Ceuta,
which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that a French general,
a prisoner, did not hesitate to propose to the governor to give it
up to Soult as his only means of avoiding starvation. Neither would
Soult have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of
Ballesteros, were it only to command the supplies of the Campiña,
and those from Barbary which could but be brought to that port or to
Conil: the latter was however seldom frequented by the Moors, because
the run was long and precarious, whereas a favourable current always
brought their craft well to Tarifa. Swarms of French gun-boats would
therefore soon have given Soult the command of the coasting trade, if
not of the entire straits.
Tarifa then was worth the efforts made for its defence; and setting
aside the courage and devotion of the troops, without which nothing
could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to sir Charles
Smith, the captain of engineers. That officer’s vigour and capacity
overmatched the enemy’s strength without, and the weakness and
cajolement of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett
could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded
to Smith’s energy, he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed it
with some wild actions, for which it is difficult to assign a motive;
because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man, as his death
at Bergen-op-Zoom proved. But his military capacity was naught, and
his mind did not easily catch another’s enthusiasm. Tarifa was the
commentary upon Taragona.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.]
During the siege, the engineer’s works in front were constantly
impeded by colonel Skerrett; he would call off the labourers to
prepare posts of retreat, and Smith’s desire to open the north-gate,
(which had been built up,) that the troops might have egress in
case of escalade, was opposed by him, although there was no other
point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was
near the castle. On the 29th of December a shell, fired from the
eighteen-pounder in the tower of the Gusmans, having bursted too
soon, killed or wounded one of the inhabitants, and a deputation of
the citizens came to complain of the accident; Colonel Skerrett,
although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun, and
a thirty-two-pound caronade, which at four hundred yards looked into
the French batteries, to be dismounted and spiked! and it was done!
To crown this absurd conduct, he assigned the charge of the breach
entirely to the Spanish troops, and if Smith had not insisted upon
posting the forty-seventh British regiment alongside of them, this
alone would have ruined the defence; because hunger, nakedness, and
neglect, had broken the spirit of those poor men, and during the
combat general Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant
soldier.
To the British engineer, therefore, the praise of this splendid
action is chiefly due; because he saw from the first all the
resources of the place, and with equal firmness and talent developed
them, notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors; because at the
same time he, by skilful impositions, induced the enemy (whose attack
should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle
of the place) to open his trenches on the east, where the besieged,
under the appearance of weakness, had concentrated all their
strength; finally, because he repressed despondency where he failed
to infuse confidence. The second in merit was captain Mitchell, of
the artillery; because in the management of that arm for the defence
of the town, his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially
during the assault; nor can the result of this last event be taken
as the just measure of either officer’s merits, seeing that a
prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected.
In the enemy’s camp was found the French engineer’s sketch for a
renewed operation by a cautious and extensive system of mines and
breaches; but nothing was there laid down that had not been already
anticipated, and provided against by his British opponents. If then
the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can
doubt that it was, those who conceived, planned, and executed it
should have all the glory. Amongst those persons colonel Skerrett has
no right to be placed; yet, such are the errors of power, that he was
highly applauded for what he did not do, and general Campbell was
severely rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his Majesty’s
troops!
The French displayed courage but no skill. For two days, their heavy
howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the
town, and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people fled
from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells
thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east tower
with the ground, and the French were aware of its importance; but
throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior
ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them.
In the expectation that a more powerful attack would be made in the
spring, general Campbell directed casemates and splinter proofs to
be made in the island, but Skerrett’s troops were recalled to Cadiz,
which now contained nearly eight thousand British, exclusive of
fifteen hundred of these destined for Carthagena and Alicant. This
arrangement was however soon changed, because the events of the
war put Carthagena out of the French line of operations, and the
pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither
was Tarifa again attacked; lord Wellington had predicted that it
would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a
series of operations, which were calculated to change the state of
the war, and which shall be set forth in the next book.
BOOK XVI.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
Up to this period, the invasion, although diversified by occasional
disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The
tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the
land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was
England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength;
no firm barrier, no solid dike, had been opposed to its ravages, save
by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of
his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was
sliding away. By what a surprising effort of courage and judgment
he secured it shall now be shown; and as the field operations, in
this war, were always influenced more by political considerations,
than by military principles, it will be necessary first to place the
general’s situation with respect to the former in its true light.
_Political situation of king Joseph._ France, abounding in riches
and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the
Vistula; but Napoleon, resolute to perfect his continental system for
the exclusion of British goods, now found himself, in the pursuit
of that object, hastening rapidly to a new war, and one so vast,
that even his force was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already
felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to
influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, many able
French officers were recalled, and as it was known that the imperial
guards, and the Polish troops, were to withdraw from Spain, the scale
of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and
young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were
now to be expected; and in the French army there was a general, and
oppressive sense, of the enormous exertion which would be required to
bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. On the other hand,
the Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so powerful a monarch, as the
czar, rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general found
the principal basis of his calculations realized by this diversion.
He had never yet been strong enough to meet eighty thousand French
troops in battle, even under a common general; but his hopes rose
when he saw the great warrior of the age, not only turning himself
from the contest, but withdrawing from it a reserve of four hundred
thousand veterans, whose might the whole world seemed hardly able to
withstand.
The most immediate effect, however, which the approaching contest
with Russia produced in the Peninsula, was the necessity of restoring
Joseph to his former power over the French armies. While the emperor
was absent from Paris, the supreme controul of the operations could
only be placed in the hands of the monarch of Spain; yet this was
only to reproduce there, and with greater virulence, the former
jealousies and disputes. Joseph’s Spanish policy remained unchanged;
the pride of the French generals was at least equal to his, pretexts
for disputes were never wanting on either side, and the mischievous
nature of those disputes may be gathered from one example. In
November the king being pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn
collected near Toledo, for the army of Portugal, and without which
the latter could not exist; Marmont, regardless of the political
scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force,
and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch.
_Political state of Spain._ All the intrigues and corruptions and
conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. The
negotiations for the mediation of England with the colonies, were not
ended; Carlotta still pressed her claims; and the division between
the liberals and serviles, as they were called, became daily wider.
Cadiz was in 1811 the very focus of all disorder. The government
was alike weak and dishonest, and used many pitiful arts to extract
money from England. No subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going
with the fourth army to Estremadura, previous to the battle of
Albuera, the minister Bardaxi entreated the British envoy to grant a
loan, or a gift, without which, he asserted, Blake could not move;
Mr. Wellesley refused, because a large debt was already due to the
legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America
landed a million and a half of dollars!
In July, notwithstanding the victory of Albuera, the regency was
held in universal contempt, both it and the cortes were without
influence, and their conduct merited it. For although vast sums
were continually received, and every service was famished, the
treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any
further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured
towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and
all things so evidently tended towards anarchy, that Mr. Wellesley
declared “Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any
previous period of the war.”
The cortes, at first swayed by priests and lawyers, who cherished
the inquisition and were opposed to all free institutions, was now
chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party, averse to the
British influence; hence, in August a new constitution, quite opposed
to the aristocratic principle, was promulgated. With the excellencies
and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little
concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the
contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased
by it; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many
and bitter enemies, and the time and attention, which should have
been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers’ condition, was
occupied in factions, disputes, and corrupt intrigues.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I.]
That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and
vigorously laid down in the scheme of this constitution, cannot be
denied, the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept
away with a bold and just hand; but of what avail, as regarded the
war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to
be reduced to practice? What encouragement was it to the soldier, to
be told he was a free man, fighting for a constitution as well as for
national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution,
corruptly revelling in the wealth which should have clothed, and
armed, and fed him? What was nominal equality to him, when he saw
incapacity rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the
poor and patriotic oppressed? He laughed to scorn those who could
find time to form the constitution of a great empire, but could not
find time or honesty to feed, or clothe, or arm the men who were to
defend it!
The enemies of democracy soon spread many grievous reports of
misfortunes and treachery, some true, some false; and at the most
critical period of the war in Valencia, they endeavoured to raise a
popular commotion to sweep away the cortes. The monks and friars,
furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief
plotters every where; and the proceedings of Palacios, in concert
with them, were only part of a church project, commenced all over
Spain to resist the cortes. In October, Lardizabal, the other deposed
regent, published at Alicant, a manifesto, in which he accused the
cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine
of passive obedience, and asserted, that the regents only took the
oath to the cortes, because they could not count on the army or the
people at Cadiz; otherwise they would cause the king’s authority to
be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives.
This manifesto was declared treasonable, and a vessel was despatched
to bring the offender to Cadiz; but the following day it was
discovered, that the old council of Castile had also drawn up a
manifesto similar in principle, and the persons sent by the cortes
to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of
three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were
selected from the cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal.
In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it
was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter
was deferred upon divers pretexts, and meanwhile the democratic party
gained strength in the cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared
more widely diffused than it really was; because some time elapsed
before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret
policy of England was the same as their own. It was so, however,
even to the upholding of the inquisition, which it was ridiculously
asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if, while the
frame-work of tyranny existed, there could ever be wanting the will
to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put on
a smooth countenance towards the cortes. In this state of affairs,
the negotiation for the colonial mediation, was used by the Spaniards
merely as a ground for demanding loans, subsidies, and succours in
kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the
revolted colonists; the complaints of the British legation on this
point were quite disregarded. At this time also Lapeña was acquitted
of misconduct at Barosa, and would have been immediately re-employed,
if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz, and advised
general Cooke to do the same.
Mr. Wellesley seeing that the most fatal consequences to the war must
ensue, if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, had
sent Mr. Vaughan, the secretary of legation, to acquaint the British
cabinet with the facts, and to solicit a more firm and decided course
of policy. Above all things he desired to have the subsidies settled
by treaty, that the people of Spain might really know what England
had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms,
clothing, ammunition, loans, provisions, guns, stores, and even
workmen and funds, to form founderies, were demanded and obtained
by the Spanish government, and then wasted or embezzled, without
the people benefiting, or even knowing of the generosity, or rather
extravagance, with which they were supplied; while the receivers and
wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria.]
The regency question was at last seriously discussed in the cortes,
and the deputy, Capmany, who if we may believe the partizans of
Joseph, was anti-English in his heart, argued the necessity of this
change on the ground of pleasing the British. This excited great
discontent, as he probably intended, and many deputies declared
at first that they would not be dictated to by any foreign power;
but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission,
formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision
of the question, when Blake’s disaster at Valencia completed the
work. Carlotta’s agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent
and honest Arguelles was opposed to him; and the cortes although
they recognized her claim to the succession, denied her the regency,
because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from
that office.
[Sidenote: 1812.]
On the 21st of January 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four
hours, a new regency, to consist of five members, of which two
were Americans, was proclaimed. The men chosen, were the duke of
Infantado, then in England, Henry O’Donnel, admiral Villarvicencio,
Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas; and each was to have the
presidency by rotation for six months.
They commenced beneficially. O’Donnel was friendly to the British
alliance, and proposed a military feast, to restore harmony between
the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the
department of war, and finances; consulted the British generals, and
disbanding several bad regiments, incorporated the men with other
battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels,
and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent
officers, it was found, that they were five thousand in number!
Ballesteros was appointed captain-general of Andalusia and received
the command of the fourth army, whose head-quarters were prudently
removed to Algeziras; the troops there were encreased, by drafts
from Cadiz to ten or twelve thousand men, and a new army was set on
foot in Murcia. Finally, to check trading with the French a general
blockade of all the coast in their possession, from Rosas to St.
Sebastian, was declared.
But it was soon discovered that the secret object was to obtain a
loan from England, and as this did not succeed, and nothing good was
ever permanent in Spanish affairs, the old disputes again broke out.
The democratic spirit gained strength in the cortes; the anti-English
party augmented; the press abounded in libels, impugning the good
faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta; for
which however there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because
the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to lord
Liverpool. The new regency, also as violent as their predecessors
with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having
secretly organized in Gallicia an expedition against the colonies,
supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French
war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British
minister to forward this iniquitous folly.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
_Political state of Portugal._—In October all the evils before
described still existed, and were aggravated. The old disputes
remained unsettled, the return of the royal family was put off, and
the reforms in the military system, which Beresford had repaired to
Lisbon to effect, were either thwarted or retarded by the regency.
Mr. Stuart indeed forced the government to repair the bridges and
roads in Beira, to throw some provisions into the fortresses;
and, in despite of Redondo, the minister of finance, who, for the
first time, now opposed the British influence, he made the regency
substitute a military chest and commissariat, instead of the “Junta
de Viveres.” But Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of
the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that, as
the intent was to separate the money of the army from that of the
civil departments, his claims were incompatible with such an object;
and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already
more than he could manage, both were offended; and this new source of
disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until
they yielded.
Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan,
to enforce an impartial exaction of the “decima,” which was drawn
up by Nogueira, at the desire of Wellington, was so ill received
by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas
immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of
doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and
as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the
principle, would not recede from the first plan, a permanent dispute
and a permanent evil, were thus established by that pernicious
faction. In fine, not the Souzas only, but the whole regency in
their folly now imagined that the war was virtually decided in their
favour, and were intent upon driving the British away by disgusting
the general.
A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been
created conde de Vimiero, Beresford conde de Trancoso, Silveira
conde d’Amurante; and other minor rewards, of a like nature, had
been conferred on subordinate officers. These honours had however
been delayed in a marked manner, and lord Strangford, who appears
to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction, and was therefore
opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge,
made against the latter, at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed
the official return of the officers who were thus to be rewarded.
Against this accusation, which had no foundation in fact, seeing that
the report had been made, and that Forjas was not the person to whose
department it belonged, lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested,
because of the injustice; and because it was made in pursuance of a
design to remove Forjas from the government. The English general was
however thus placed in a strange position, for while his letters to
Forjas were menacing rebukes to him, and his coadjutors, for their
neglect of public affairs; and while his formal complaints of the
conduct of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was also
obliged to send other letters in support of the very persons whom he
was justly rebuking for misconduct.
In the midst of these embarrassments, an accidental event was like
to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal
to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines,
one d’Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis,
the Spanish minister, a plan for burning the British fleet in the
Tagus, which he pretended to have received orders from the French
government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils,
many persons named by d’Amblemont as implicated were, in consequence
arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had
ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to
this man by Onis and by the court of Rio Janeiro, induced him to
make farther trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward
a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and
the French government; he even produced letters from the French
ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon, and the
French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese
intendant of police.
Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons, whom
this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed lord Wellesley to
interfere; but meanwhile the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong
into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims; and amongst
others, without assigning any cause, and without any communication
with the English general, the regency seized one Borel, a clerk in
the department of the British paymaster-general. This act being at
once contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance, and insulting in
manner, raised lord Wellington’s indignation to such a pitch, that he
formally notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless
good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage,
to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves
in security under the protection of the army, as if in a hostile
country, until the further pleasure of the British prince regent
should be made known.
The political storm which had been so long gathering then seemed
ready to break, but suddenly the horizon cleared. Lord Wellington’s
letter to the prince, backed up by lord Wellesley’s vigorous
diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in
the very crisis of Borel’s case came letters, in which the prince
regent admitted, and approved of all the ameliorations and changes
proposed by the English general; and the contradiction given by
Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction, was taken as the
ground for a complete and formal retraction, by Linhares, of his
former insinuations, and insulting note relative to that gentleman’s
conduct. Principal Souza was however not dismissed, nor was Forjas’
resignation noticed, but the prince declared that he would overlook
that minister’s disobedience, and retain him in office; thus proving
that fear, not conviction, or justice, for Forjas had not been
disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly
relations with the British.
Mr. Stuart considering the submission of the prince to be a mere
nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real
authority, looked for further difficulties, and he was not mistaken:
meanwhile he made it a point of honour to defend Forjas, and
Nogueira, from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. The
present submission of the court however gave the British an imposing
influence, which rendered the Souzas’ opposition nugatory for the
moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest;
the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour; the paper
money was raised in value; the revenue was somewhat increased, and
Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the
army. The prince had however directed the regency to revive his
claim to Olivenza immediately; and it was with difficulty that
lord Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did
the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil
administration of the army rather increased, as will be shewn in the
narration of military operations which are now to be treated of.
[Sidenote: 1811. October.]
It will be remembered that after the action of El Bodon, the allied
army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad
Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by
Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than two hundred
oxen from under the guns of the place, and at the same time captured
general Renaud the governor, who had imprudently ventured out with
a weak escort. At this time Marmont had one division in Placentia,
and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid; but his
cavalry was at Peneranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and
his line of communication was organized on the old Roman road of the
Puerto de Pico, which had been repaired after the battle of Talavera.
The army of the north stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls
of which place, as well as those of Zamora, and other towns in Leon,
were being restored, that the flat country might be held with a few
troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the
enemy which had enabled lord Wellington to send Hill against Girard
at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforcements from France reached
the army of Portugal, the army of the north was again concentrated,
and would have invaded Gallicia while Bonet attacked the Asturias,
if Julian Sanchez’s exploit had not rendered it necessary first to
revictual Ciudad Rodrigo.
With this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca, in
October, by general Thiebault, who spread a report that a force
was to assemble towards Tamames, and that the convoy was for its
support. This report did not deceive lord Wellington; but he believed
that the whole army of the north and one division of the army of
Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made
arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. The
heavy rains however rendered the fords of that river impracticable;
Thiebault seized the occasion, introduced the convoy, and leaving a
new governor returned on the 2nd of November before the waters had
subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the
Vadillo, but it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was
impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed; for such
is the nature of that river that all military operations on its banks
are uncertain. It is very difficult for an army to pass it, at any
time in winter, because of the narrow roads, the depth of the fords
and the ruggedness of the banks; it will suddenly rise from rains
falling on the hills, without any previous indication in the plains,
and then the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any
temporary bridge, and render it impossible to pass except by the
stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy’s
possession.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
Early in November, Bonet, having reoccupied the Asturias, Dorsenne
marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad, as if to
conduct another convoy; but the allied troops being immediately
concentrated, passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the
French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d’España and
Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions
they had raised. But now the provisions in the country between the
Coa and the Agueda were all consumed, and the continued negligence of
the Portuguese government, with respect to the means of transport,
rendered it impossible to bring up the field magazines from the
points of water carriage to the army. Lord Wellington was therefore,
contrary to all military rules, obliged to separate his divisions in
face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry,
even to the Mondego and the valley of the Douro, or see them starved.
To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of
men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads, at
that season, together with the distance of the enemy in some measure
protected him; general Hill’s second expedition into Estremadura was
then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter;
finally Marmont, being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia,
had withdrawn Foy’s division from Placentia, and concentrated
the greatest part of his army at Toledo; all which rendered the
scattering of the allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil
consequences ensued. This war of positions had therefore turned
entirely to the advantage of the allies, lord Wellington by taking
post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos, had in a
manner paralysed three powerful armies. For Soult harassed by Hill
in Estremadura, and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed
in both quarters; and although Marmont in conjunction with Dorsenne,
had succoured Ciudad Rodrigo, the latter general’s invasion of
Gallicia had been stopped short, and his enterprises confined to the
reoccupation of the Asturias.
Meanwhile the works of Almeida were so far restored as to secure it
from a sudden attack, and in November when the army by crossing the
Agueda had occupied the attention of the French, the battering train
and siege stores were brought to that fortress, without exciting the
enemy’s attention, because they appeared to be only the armament
for the new works; a trestle bridge to throw over the Agueda was
also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by major Sturgeon
of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific
resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the
attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of
Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent
upon defending his own positions.
CHAPTER II.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
Having now brought the story of the war to that period, when, after
many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the
fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending
powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would,
ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader’s
recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have
him remember how, when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war,
had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently
broke and dispersed their armies, and drove the British auxiliaries
to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria, and the inactivity of
Joseph, rendered the emperor’s victories unavailing, and revived the
confidence of the Spaniards. How sir Arthur Wellesley, victorious on
the Douro, then marched into Spain, and, although the concentrated
force of the enemy, and the ill conduct of the Spanish government,
forced him to retreat again to Portugal as sir John Moore, from the
same causes, had been obliged to retreat to the ocean, he by his
advance relieved Gallicia, as Moore had by a like operation before
saved Andalusia, which concluded the third epoch.
How the peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still
possessed a country, extending from the Asturias, through Gallicia,
Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and including
every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona,
Barcelona, and St. Sebastian. How Wellington appreciating the
advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of
operation, then, counselled the Spaniards, and forced the Portuguese,
to adopt a defensive war; and with the more reason that England,
abounding beyond all nations in military resources, and invincible
as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior
floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to
employ her armies as well as her squadrons in the struggle. How the
Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles, and in
a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and
the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and
helpless before the enemy.
How the victorious French armies then moved onwards, in swelling
pride, until dashed against the rocks of Lisbon they receded, broken
and refluent, and the English general once more stood a conqueror on
the frontier of Spain; and had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo
he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of
the war. But being baffled, partly by skill, partly by fortune;
factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish
government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by
the follies of all three, he was reduced to a seeming inactivity; and
meanwhile the French added Taragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia
to their conquests.
These things I would have the reader reflect upon, because they
are the proofs of what it is the main object of this history to
inculcate, namely that English steel, English gold, English genius,
English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish independence;
and this not as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious!
but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand also we must
wonder at the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that
strength which could at once fight England and Austria, aim at the
conquest of the Peninsula, and the reduction of Russia at the same
moment of time, and all with good hope of success.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.]
Let it not be said that the emperor’s efforts in the war of Spain
were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch, which was unexpected
and accidental, be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be
found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809 the French army
was indeed gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian
war, from three hundred and thirty-five thousand, which Napoleon
had led into the country, to two hundred and twenty-six thousand.
But in 1810 it was again raised to three hundred and sixty-nine
thousand, and fluctuated between that number and three hundred and
thirty thousand until August 1811, when it was again raised to three
hundred and seventy-two thousand men with fifty-two thousand horses!
And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war
in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that
had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council,
been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power,
backed by the four hundred thousand men who marched to Russia, would
scarcely have been sufficient to subdue it; whereas, weak in fight
and steeped in folly, the Spaniards must have been trampled in the
dust, but for the man whose great combinations I am now about to
relate.
The nicety, the quickness, the prudence, and the audacity of
Wellington’s operations, cannot however be justly estimated without
an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His
political difficulties have been already described, and his moral
situation was simply, that of a man, who felt, that all depended upon
himself; that he must by some rapid and unexpected stroke effect in
the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet, while
the power of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England. But to
understand his local or military position, the conformation of the
country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered.
The principal French magazines were at Valladolid, and their advanced
troops were on the Tormes, from whence to the Agueda, where they held
the important point of Ciudad Rodrigo, was four long marches through
a wild forest country.
The allies’ line of communication from the Agueda to Lisbon, was
supplied by water to Raiva on the Mondego, after which the land
carriage was at least a hundred miles, through wild mountains, or
devastated valleys; it required fifteen days to bring up a convoy
from Lisbon to the army.
The line of communication with Oporto on the left flank, run through
eighty miles of very rugged country, before it reached the first
point of water carriage on the Douro.
The line of communication with Hill’s army on the right flank,
running also through a country full of strong passes and natural
obstacles, offered no resources for an army, save what were furnished
by the allies’ field magazines, which were supplied from Abrantes,
the first navigable point on the Tagus. On this line the boat-bridge
of Villa Velha was a remarkable feature, as furnishing the only
military passage over the Tagus between Abrantes and Almaraz.
The country between the Coa and the Agueda could not supply the
troops who occupied it; and the nature of the last river, and the
want of a covering position beyond, rendered it a matter of the
utmost danger and difficulty to besiege or even invest Ciudad
Rodrigo. The disadvantage which the French suffered in being so
distant from that fortress was thus balanced.
These considerations had prevented the English general from attacking
Ciudad Rodrigo in May; he had then no battering train, and Almeida
and her guns, were rendered a heap of ruins by the exploit of
Brenier. Badajos was at that period his object, because Beresford was
actually besieging it, and the recent battle of Fuentes Onoro, the
disputes of the French generals, the disorganization of Massena’s
army, and as proved by that battle, the inefficiency of the army of
the north, rendered it improbable that a serious invasion of Portugal
would be resumed on that side. And as the lines of communication with
the Mondego and the Douro, were not then completely re-established,
and the intermediate magazines small, no incursion of the enemy could
have done much mischief; and Spencer’s corps was sufficiently strong
to cover the line to Vilha Velha.
Affairs however soon changed. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence
of Marmont, and the generalship of Soult, in remaining at Llerena
after his repulse at Albuera, had rescued Badajos. Lord Wellington’s
boldness in remaining on the Caya prevented further mischief, but
the conduct of the Portuguese government, combined with the position
which Napoleon had caused Marmont to take in the valley of the
Tagus, effectually precluded a renewal of that siege; and then the
fallacious hope of finding Ciudad unprovided, brought lord Wellington
back to the Coa. This baffled the enemy’s projects, yet the position
of the army of the north, and that of Portugal, the one in front, the
other on the flank, prevented the English general from undertaking
any important operations in the field. For if he had advanced on
Salamanca, besides the natural difficulties of the country, his
communications with Hill, and even with Abrantes and Lisbon, would
have been cut by Marmont; and if he turned against Marmont on the
Tagus, Soult and Dorsenne would have closed upon his flanks.
This state of affairs not being well considered, had induced some
able officers, at the time of the Elbodon operation, to censure
the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of
Celerico, and exposed to capture the battering train then at Villa
Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and it was better
to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, than to give
up the communication with Hill which was threatened by the advance of
Foy’s two divisions on Zarza Maior.
As the French armies were reinforced after the allies came to
Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont became each equal to Wellington in the
field, and together infinitely too strong. Soult was then master of
Andalusia, and had a moveable reserve of twenty thousand men; the
army of Suchet daily gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were
reoccupied by Bonet, and the army of the centre was reorganized.
Hence, to commence the siege of either Ciudad or Badajos, in form,
was hopeless, and when the rumour of Napoleon’s arrival became rife,
the English general, whose embarrassments were hourly increasing,
looked once more to the lines of Torres Vedras as a refuge. But
when the certainty of the Russian war removed this fear, the aspect
of affairs again changed, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became
possible. For, first, there was a good battering train in Almeida,
and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of
communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened
by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself
was very weakly garrisoned and the ignorance of the French as to
the state of the allies’ preparations gave hope of a surprise. It
was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected,
and it was not the least of lord Wellington’s merits that he so
well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other
operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the general
could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric
of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments
he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French
while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the
Peninsula would be lost.
[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]
Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only seventeen
hundred men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but
in reality it was of the very greatest importance, because it was
the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else
could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the
Tagus, could not long support both the army of Portugal, and the
army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and
the king were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged,
that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would
be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect Leon, then
weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in
that province. This was the first step.
The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding
meanwhile as they could upon the country, and therefore their
distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important
occasions. Nevertheless lord Wellington thought the tempestuous
season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced
into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed when
Rodrigo fell, to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly
besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in
Elvas, under the protection of Hill’s corps, and unknown to the
enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he
hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals,
the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede
the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from
keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as
Ballesteros’ corps was now augmented, it would vex Soult’s posts on
the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and
if Badajos fell, the English general was resolved to leave a force
to cover the captured place against the army of the centre, and then
fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not for
want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before
the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the
torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided
by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo,
would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression
being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.
This was lord Wellington’s plan, and his firmness and resolution
in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were
not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements,
but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night
air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the
hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and
not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty,
and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in
arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very
scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes
the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and
their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be
known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce
that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely
distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of
the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules
of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers
were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa
and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains, above twenty
thousand men were in hospital; and deduction made for other drains,
only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and
posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture,
the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese regency by the prince
regents letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active
opposition.
[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]
But even these distresses so threatening to the general cause,
Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the
enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination
magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered, for relief,
from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the
Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida,
both armies concluded, that these guns were only to arm that
fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity
had forced the British general to adopt. No person, not even the
engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege
or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to
be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even
the quarter-master general Murray, was permitted to go home on leave,
with the full persuasion that no operation would take place before
spring.
In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions, and dry
weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during
December,) stopped the sickness, and restored about three thousand
men to the ranks; and it would be a great error to suppose, that
the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the
troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced
in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the
staff of the army was well practised, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, the
military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the
head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had,
so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon
all the business of their regiments; a privilege which increased
the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the
battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of
rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer
were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when
promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method lord
Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each
regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to
the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in
no manner weaken the military hierarchy; thus also all the daring
young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political
difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs which were
happily realized.
The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington
came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies.
That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a
new corps, under Reille, called the “_army of the Ebro_,” whose
head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in
six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison
of Badajos, and marshal Victor returned to France, discontented, for
he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war.
His divisions were given to generals Conroux, Barrois, Villatte,
Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult,
Phillipon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion
was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the
great communications with France and to reduce the Partidas, on that
line, was ordered to occupy the districts round Santander, Sebastian,
Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new
army of the Ebro: it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers; for
the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, were required for
the Russian war, and marched in December to France. And besides
these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry
regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks
of the old guard were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand,
of the very best soldiers, were withdrawn, and the maimed and
worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in
the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand.
[Sidenote: 1812. January.]
The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in
January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from
the Montaña de Santander; but as this arrangement weakened the grand
line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon
the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or
Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and
the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham
and Bonet’s division, forming together about eighteen thousand men,
were added to his army; but the former general returned to France.
These divisions however, being pressed by want, were extended from
the Asturias to Toledo, while Montbrun was near Valencia, and
meanwhile Soult’s attention was distracted by Tarifa, and by Hill’s
pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, every where occupied, were
spread over an immense tract of country; Marmont deceived by the
seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo
unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet
upon the devoted fortress.
CHAPTER III.
SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
[Sidenote: 1812. January.]
The troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about
thirty-five thousand, including cavalry; the materials for the siege
were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the
left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those
places, the hired carts and mules, were to bring up the stores to
the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa
de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns
could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their
due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found
amidst the ruins of Almeida.
On the 1st of January the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near
the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, about six miles below
Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river, above and
below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm.
The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native
carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent
road, with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was
dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on
the slightest offence. Meanwhile the place being closely examined,
it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had
fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad
Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed
an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this
redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer
placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name.
The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself,
and though the body of the place was there better covered by the
outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches, it was
more assailable according to the English general’s views; because
elsewhere the slope of the ground was such, that batteries must
have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they
could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious
process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking
over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the
latter offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to
storm fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, and opening the first
parallel along the greater Teson, to place thirty-three pieces in
counter-batteries with which to ruin the defences, and drive the
besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the
sap to construct breaching batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in
the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the
left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment
behind the principal breach.
The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack’s Portuguese,
were destined for the siege, but as the country on the right bank of
the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still
to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although there was a
very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division carrying a day’s
provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river, every twenty-four
hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on
the works. Meanwhile to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos
d’España were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy.
To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport, the English
general had previously constructed eight hundred carts drawn by
horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up
ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity
of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that
he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days, and yet hoped
to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the
clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that
quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.
The 8th of January the light division and Pack’s Portuguese forded
the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making
a circuit, took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained
quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the
enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening
the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Colborne commanding; the
fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British
regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco.
This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be at
one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting
on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt,
where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate
open.
Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder,
about forty in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken
with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, working parties
were set to labour on the right of it, because the fort itself was
instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest
continued through the night, but at day-break the parallel, six
hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, and four wide,
the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and
the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this
well-managed assault.
The 9th the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was
encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at
night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for
eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before
day-light the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk
in the front to provide earth; for the batteries were made eighteen
feet thick at top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.
On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a
thousand men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a
superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the
communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on
the 11th the third division undertook the siege.
This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the
approaches widened, but the enemy’s fire was destructive, and the
shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries,
that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the
inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with
long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a
strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the
garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men
and wounded others.
On the 12th the light division resumed the work, and the riflemen
taking advantage of a thick fog, covered themselves in pits, which
they digged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the
enemy’s gunners; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the
besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made.
The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded
the labourers, and now also the scarcity of transport baulked the
general’s operations. One third only, of the native carts, expected,
had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent;
much of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte,
and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to
succour the place. Wellington therefore changing his first plan,
resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not
quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place
without blowing in the counterscarp; in other words, to overstep the
rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time, for such was
the capricious nature of the Agueda that in one night a flood might
enable a small French force to relieve the place.
[Sidenote: Vide page 328.]
The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters,
and posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and
give battle; and it was at this time, that Hill, who was then at
Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus,
lest Marmont in despair of uniting his force in the north, in time to
save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello
Branco and Vilha Velha.
In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight
guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the
flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans
of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches.
The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches
always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief,
made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even
penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the
batteries, when a few of the workmen getting together, checked them
until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair,
together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire
from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching batteries, but at
half-past four in the evening, twenty-five heavy guns battered the
“_fausse braye_” and rampart, and two pieces were directed against
the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful
and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants’ fire with more than
fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground
far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements
of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires,
the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping
from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and
the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan
over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the
quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after
a peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment assaulted and carried
the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the
left of the attack.
The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that
it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret,
and in the night of the 15th five more guns were mounted. The 16th
at day-light the besiegers’ batteries recommenced, but at eight
o’clock a thick fog obliged them to desist, nevertheless the small
breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without
effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a
sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The
breaching battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the
riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick
off the enemy’s gunners.
The 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy and the wall of the
place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers’
guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men
killed; general Borthwick the commandant of artillery was wounded
and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were
at first overpowered with grape, yet towards evening they recovered
the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant
embrasures. In the night the battery, intended for the lesser
breach, was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford
cover in the day-time.
On the 18th the besiegers’ fire was resumed with great violence.
The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became
practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it.
The sap however could make no progress, the superintending engineer
was badly wounded, and a twenty-four pounder having bursted in the
batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower
Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed
there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the
French retrenchments.
On the 19th both breaches became practicable, major Sturgeon closely
examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report;
the assault was then ordered, and the battering-guns were turned
against the artillery of the ramparts.
ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
This operation which was confided to the third and light divisions,
and Pack’s Portuguese, was organized in four parts.
1º. _The right attack._ The light company of the eighty-third and the
second caçadores which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge
on the Agueda, were directed to cross that river and escalade an
outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where
two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of
the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments posted behind the
convent of Santa Cruz and having the seventy-seventh in reserve, were
to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp; then to
escalade the “_fausse braye_,” and scour it on their left as far as
the great breach.
2º. _The centre attack or assault of the great breach._ One hundred
and eighty men protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment,
and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of
the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was
again to be supported by general Mackinnon’s brigade of the third
division.
3º. _Left attack._ The light division, posted behind the convent of
Francisco, was to send three companies of the ninety-fifth to scour
the “_fausse braye_” to the right, and so connect the left and centre
attacks. At the same time a storming party preceded by the third
caçadores carrying hay-sacks, and followed by Vandeleur’s and Andrew
Barnard’s brigades, was to make for the small breach, and when the
“_fausse braye_” was carried to detach to their right, to assist the
main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca
gate.
4º. _The false attack._ This was an escalade to be made by Pack’s
Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.
The right attack was commanded by colonel O’Toole of the caçadores.
Five hundred volunteers commanded by major Manners of the
seventy-fourth with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie of the
eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division.
Three hundred volunteers led by major George Napier of the
fifty-second with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under Mr.
Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the
light division.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 1.]
All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to
attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given,
and while lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the
lesser breach to major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco,
the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along
the whole line. Then the space between the army and the ditch was
covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the
ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of
the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the
movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch,
Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and
ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the “_fausse braye_,”
and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells,
the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the
French who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There
however they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses, made
hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and
yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers, falling
in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was
raked with grape, from two guns, flanking the top of the breach at
the distance of a few yards; thus striving and trampling alike upon
the dead and the wounded these brave men maintained the combat.
Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred
yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with
extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped
down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the “_fausse
braye_” under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom
of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took
too much to their left; but the storming party went straight to
the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthwise
across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope
rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained,
the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place,
staggered under the weight of the enemy’s fire; and such is the
instinct of self-defence, that although no man had been allowed to
load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, major
Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape-shot
which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their
bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front,
when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance
was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections, abreast,
then reached the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the
forty-third to the right, and the place was won. During this contest
which lasted only a few minutes, after the “_fausse braye_” was
passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated
violence, but when the forty-third, and the stormers of the light
division, came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the
latter bent before the storm; at the same moment, the explosion of
three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division
with a mighty effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison
indeed still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to
the castle, where Mr. Gurwood who though wounded, had been amongst
the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor’s sword.
The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for
O’Toole’s attack was also successful, and at the other side of
the town Pack’s Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered
the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the
restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses. The
town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their
officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place,
intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder every where
prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a
fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when
the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the
energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still
preserved their senses.
[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i.]
Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners,
and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above one hundred and
fifty pieces of artillery including the battering-train of Marmont’s
army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was
about twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, and of these
above six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been slain or
hurt at the breaches. General Crawfurd and general Mackinnon, the
former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many
gallant men, amongst others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it
has been felicitously said, that “three generals and seventy other
officers bad fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only
talked of Hardyman.” General Vandaleur, colonel Colborne, and a crowd
of inferior rank were wounded, and unhappily the slaughter did
not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their
escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took
place and numbers of both were blown into the air.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 8._
_Explanatory Sketch_
OF THE
SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO,
1812.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously
finished, lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the
Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres
Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the prince
regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great
ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The duration of this siege was twelve days, or half the time
originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the
inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy
fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed
than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the
labourers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have
been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises every where
to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was
caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished
from the storekeeper-general’s office in England, the profits of
the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers
eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by
England were useless.
2º. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of
Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment;
the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the
fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the
counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden
fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs
warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon
the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when
the general terminated his order for the assault, with this sentence,
“Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening,” he knew well that
it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the
breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were
bayonetted.
3º. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular
descent of sixteen feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp
spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all
loop-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there
were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide and the French had left the
temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully
defended that it was said the third division could never have carried
them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an
assertion perhaps easier made than proved.
4º. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion, has been
contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the
defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But
Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blameable
to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had
a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two
thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms,
and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of
the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high,
that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it
quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning
of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn,
he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it.
Moreover the small breach was flanked at a very short distance, by
a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was
abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on
to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external
operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont
at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that
marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in
Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand
the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men
the engineer’s art cannot be overcome by mere courage.
[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 122.]
5º. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very
disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and
helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. “The soldiers were
not to be controuled.” That excuse will however scarcely suffice
here, because colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man of a
most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrain
his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders
commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no
organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally
carried away in the increasing tumult.
CHAPTER IV.
[Sidenote: 1812. January.]
In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared, that many
of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people
Carlos d’España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who
were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the
Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.
When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches
and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision
the place quickly, for Marmont’s army was gathering at Valladolid;
that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In
the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact had indeed
spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to
Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun
recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and
the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at
Salamanca.
On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the
first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to
concentrate at Salamanca, Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun
hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and
on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about
forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence
to Ciudad, was four marches.
On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate
of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill’s troops had
reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough
to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted
twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken.
The 26th Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to
comprehend his adversary’s success, retired to Valladolid. His
divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for
Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and
Bonnet in repassing the Asturian mountains, had suffered much from
cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier who harassed
him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money
and arms to the Asturians, on one flank, and on the other flank,
Morillo who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight
from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile
Saornil’s band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo,
other losses were sustained from the Partidas on the Tietar, and
the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were
renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement.
Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Gallicia, menaced Astorga and La
Baneza, but the arrival of Bonnet at Benevente, soon obliged them to
retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira who
had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them, also
fell back to Portugal.
Marmont’s operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken
post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced
guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above
Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the
28th and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle
bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over
the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank,
the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of
the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed
for several days might have been retaken. But the greatest warriors
are the very slaves of fortune!
[Sidenote: 1812. February.]
The English general’s eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he
was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the
flooding of the rivers in Beira, would enable him to carry nearly all
his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would
impede the junction of the enemy’s force in Estremadura. Green forage
was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the
Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign in Andalusia
depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the
ground should ripen, which was the enemy’s resource, and would happen
much earlier there than in Leon.
Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon
bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen,
had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were
collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and
tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to
Alcacer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at
Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an
engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the
siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were
traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, and the suburbs
were strengthened, but the heavy storms before mentioned, impeded
these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea
and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior
operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other
obstacles were not wanting.
The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the
whole battering train by the way of Vilha Velha, and only sixteen
twenty-four pounders, and twenty spare carriages could be moved on
that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen twenty-four pounders,
then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and
admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none
of that calibre and offered eighteen pounders, which were accepted;
but when major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the
artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were
Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the
admiral refused to give guns from his own ship the Barfleur, in their
place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty
and delay, because the artillery-men were in consequence obliged
to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient
supply. However the energy of major Dickson overcame every obstacle,
and in the beginning of March the battering guns fifty-two in number,
the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcarçer do
Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled
in great numbers.
Marmont having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being
unable to measure his adversary’s talent and energy, had during
these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more
easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry
returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied the country from
Zamora and Toro, to the banks of the Tormes; and Bonnet after driving
the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca remained about
Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no
further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret
misgiving, Marmont caused general Foy to march through the Guadalupe,
by the pass of St. Vincente to ascertain whether an army could march
by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana.
This scattering of the French relieved lord Wellington from a serious
embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport, had
prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was
now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the
Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats; hence
the march to the Alemtejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and
would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his
troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards
Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now however extremely favourable
to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the
troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and
oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the
native troops; nevertheless the scarcity was so great, that rations
of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread.
The talents of lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties,
but the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into
Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be
effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground,
except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the
Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their
own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English
general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank
notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto;
and lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent
in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they
would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English
exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay
the interest punctually and faithfully however inconvenient it might
prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese
paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency;
but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by
lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that we shall find, even
in the midst of victory, the war was more than once like to stop
altogether from absolute inability to proceed.
[Sidenote: 1812. March.]
On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo,
lord Wellington who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to
the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real
designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person,
and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and
intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete
them; furnished him with six weeks provision remaining from the field
stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved stores at St.
Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d’España undertook
to transport them to the fortress.
As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the
allies’ march, general Victor Alten’s brigade of cavalry was posted
on the Yeltes, to screen the allies’ movement as long as possible,
and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and
cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers
and defiles with the enemy’s advanced parties. At the same time
Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto;
the militia, under Trant and J. Wilson, were ordered to concentrate
about Guarda; and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under
colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute
the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those
of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town
Victor Alten’s cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these
forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two
fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont’s efforts
were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his
battering train in Ciudad.
These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas which he reached
the 11th, and prepared to invest Badajos, although neither the troops
nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was ten days later
than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent
equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented two-fold.
This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious
conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in
the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates
to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for
the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which
oppression the peasants naturally endeavoured to escape by flight.
Thus, all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th
of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not
seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to
supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put
off till the 17th.
But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated,
in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in
devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr.
Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigour, to give energy to this
extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital
importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and
stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from
the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility
even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers; and
the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details
of the service himself; thus the iron-strength of his body and mind
was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he
did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature
of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his
place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would
have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive
Wellington from the contest.
CHAPTER V.
[Sidenote: 1812. March.]
The 15th the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles
from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish
boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who
had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy’s
posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light
divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton’s Portuguese; in all fifteen
thousand men.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]
Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet’s division, of five thousand
men, was at Villafranca, and Darricau with a like force was at
Zalamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore general Graham passing the
Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry,
and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde, and
Santa Martha, upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by
Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty
thousand strong, nearly five thousand including the heavy Germans
who were at Estremos being cavalry; and as the fifth division
was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about
fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were
Portuguese. Castaños had repaired to Gallicia, but the fifth Spanish
army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about four thousand
strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower Guadiana,
intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour
of Badajos.
As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches,
in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep
open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted
at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade’s
cavalry at Villafranca; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from
Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th,
and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed
the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for
Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal
would not act in conjunction with that of the south.
THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.
[Sidenote: Vol. III. Appendix, No. IX.]
This fortress has before been described. The garrison composed of
French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near five thousand
strong including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made
himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scoured the
vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off
cattle, almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his
spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and
from Lisbon to Ayamonte.
He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior
retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there
mounted; the rear of fort Cristoval was also better secured, and
a covered communication from the fort itself, to the work at the
bridge-head, was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed
on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together
with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next
the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was
without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A
“_cunette_” or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great
ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of
the Pardaleras was enclosed, and that outwork was connected with the
body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The
three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the
bridge behind the San Roque, was built up to form an inundation, two
hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the
place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been
obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months,
and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place
on the 10th and 16th of February, but Phillipon’s stores of powder
were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied
with shells.
As the former system of attack against Cristoval and the castle,
was now impracticable, lord Wellington desired to assail one of the
western fronts which would have been a scientific operation; but
the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners,
nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores
for such an attack. Indeed the want of transport had again obliged
the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard
of that fortress, and hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was
necessarily paid for, by the loss of life; or rather the crimes of
politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.
The plan finally fixed upon, was to attack the bastion of Trinidad,
because, the counter-guard there being unfinished, that bastion could
be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first
parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and
the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter-batteries there
erected, might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern
fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was
to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa
Maria bastions, were to be breached; after this all the guns were
to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be
of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming
party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the
bastions. In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although
a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there
eighteen feet deep, such was the general’s confidence in his troops,
and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved
to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.
The battering train, directed by major Dickson, consisted of
fifty-two pieces. This included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers,
for throwing Shrapnel shells, but this species of missile, much
talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by lord
Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a
common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to
injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former siege,
did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up,
for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry
and even the ordenança employed to move the battering train from
Alcacer do Sal, although well paid, deserted.
Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest
Portuguese, and there were one hundred and fifty sappers volunteers
from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of
signal bravery. The engineer’s parc was established behind the
heights of St. Michael, and the direction of the siege was given to
general Picton. General Kempt, general Colville, and general Bowes
alternately commanded in the trenches.
In the night of the 17th, eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard
of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the
Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though
the work was commenced late, a communication, four thousand feet in
length, was formed, and a parallel of six hundred yards three feet
deep, and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when
the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry
interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy
guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.
In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel
was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were
improved. On the other hand the garrison raised the parapets of the
Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags,
planted musketeers there, to gall the men in the trenches, who
replied in a like manner.
The 19th lord Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was
intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one
o’clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen
hundred infantry under general Vielland, the second in command, filed
unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San
Roque; a hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself,
and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before
them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak,
the French cavalry forming two parties had commenced a sham fight on
the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly,
and answering Portuguese, to the challenge of the picquets, were
allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then
galloped to the engineer’s parc, which was a thousand yards in rear
of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succour
soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied
upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy’s infantry
back even to the castle.
In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and
officers, the besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but colonel
Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred
entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a
high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers,
instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the
action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a
reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established
on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy’s motions.
The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labour of the works
was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was
opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local
obstacle and the flooding of the trenches, rendered the progress slow.
In the night of the 20th the parallel was extended to the left,
across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced;
but they were traced, in rear of the parallel, partly because the
ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving; partly
for safety, because the batteries were within three hundred yards
of the San Roque, and as the parallel, eighteen hundred yards long,
was only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold soldiers might
by a sudden rush have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been
placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed,
and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel to cover that
flank.
The 21st the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the
Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches, but the shoulder, made
the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen’s fire soon
sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left
flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of
three hundred men with two guns, was posted on that side in some
broken ground.
[Sidenote: La Marre’s Siege of Badajos.]
In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and
the battery against the Picurina was finished; but heavy rain again
retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to
drain the lower parts of the parallel, by cuts, made an artificial
bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged thinking the
curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up
an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the
houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to
the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was
also commenced; but the labour of digging being too great, it was
completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and
by this ingenious expedient, the garrison passed unseen between those
points.
Vauban’s maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a
siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labour, but the great
master’s art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Phillipon finding
the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for
three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the
shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive
manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would
have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which
prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately
sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the
place on that side, but these troops were distant and misfortunes
accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the
flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water sank twelve
of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the
provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns
and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the
point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided,
some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge,
the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the
communication was secured, for the rest of the siege, without any
accident.
The 23d the besieged continued to work at the entrenchments covering
the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their
platforms, when at three o’clock the rain again filled the trenches,
the earth, being completely saturated with water, fell away, the
works everywhere crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended.
The 24th the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of
the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with
ten twenty-fours, eleven eighteens, and seven five-and-a-half-inch
howitzers. The next day, at eleven o’clock, these pieces opened, but
they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismounted
and several artillery and engineer-officers were killed. Nevertheless
the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so
galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over
the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not
indicate much strength, general Kempt was charged to assault it in
the night.
The outward seeming of the Picurina was however fallacious, the
fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis,
the flanks were deep, and the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular
from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales
above; and from thence to the top there were sixteen feet of an
earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the
covered way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side, but
this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound,
narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates.
Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the
rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison
was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets. The
top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a
retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally,
some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp,
intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.
Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the
attack, general Kempt ordered two hundred, under major Rudd of the
seventy-seventh, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under
major Shaw of the seventy-fourth, to turn the fort by the right; and
one hundred from each of these bodies were directed to enter the
communication with San Roque and intercept any succours coming from
the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the
fort, and the hundred men remaining, were placed under captain Powis
of the eighty-third, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway,
Stanway, and Gips, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and
ladders, guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division,
likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the
moment of attack.
ASSAULT OF PICURINA.
The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made,
and about nine o’clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The
distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which
black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then the
assailants running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted
courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive
musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered
their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work and
strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch and the slanting
stakes at the top of the brick-work again baffled them.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2, Letter C.]
At this time, the enemy shooting fast, and dangerously, the crisis
appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against
the front; thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage
became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the
succour of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party on the
communication. The guns of Badajos, and of the castle now opened, the
guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up
by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the
shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina
sent out streams of fire, by the light of which, dark figures were
seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis first escaladed
the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales,
and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in
the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting
stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile
the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling
wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the
rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and
Oates, of the eighty-eighth, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart;
Nixon of the fifty-second was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw,
Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it
was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gaspar Thiery, the
commandant, and eighty-six men, surrendered, while some, not many,
rushing out of the gate, endeavoured to cross the inundation and were
drowned.
The French governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six
days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day
later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the
counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the
body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly
ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault,
which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and fifty men killed,
fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; and so
vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot,
or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged
on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing
to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his
soldiers’ courage, by calling to their recollection, how infinitely
worse than death it was, to be the inmate of an English hulk! an
appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized
nations, furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war, than
the prison-ships of England.
When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced
to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the
town, continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works, and a
communication with the first parallel, were established, and the
second parallel was commenced. However at day-light the redoubt
was so overwhelmed with fire, from the town, that no troops could
remain in it, and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening
the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second
parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the
counter-batteries on the right of Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire
with the town; but one of the besiegers’ guns was dismounted, and the
Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the
defences than was expected.
In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel
to the Picurina was made, and three breaching batteries were traced
out. The first to contain twelve twenty-four pounders, occupied the
space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the
right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight
eighteen pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach
the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed
on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three
Shrapnel howitzers, to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison
working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of
attack, and had set strong parties in the night, to raise the
counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the
menaced front.
At day-break these works being well furnished with gabions and
sand-bags, were lined with musqueteers, who severely galled the
workmen employed on the breaching batteries and the artillery
practice also was brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers’ guns
were dismounted; the gabions placed in front of the batteries to
protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musquetry then became
so destructive that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from
the inside.
In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the
right, with the view of raising batteries, to ruin the San Roque,
to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the
curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the moon
shone so brightly, that the labourers were quite exposed and the work
was relinquished.
On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored
and the workmen resumed their labours outside; the parallel was
then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque;
but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and
the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one
of the counter-batteries which was therefore dismantled. The enemy
had also during the night observed the tracing string, which marked
the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow
creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line
of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false
direction was discovered.
In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed, with
twenty-four pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching
battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank
of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried
by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged, for
riflemen, in front of the batteries.
The 29th a slight sally, made on the right bank of the river,
was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at the San Roque was
ruined by the enemy’s fire, and the besieged continued to raise the
counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad and to strengthen the front
attacked. On the other hand the besiegers during the night carried
the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries,
with eighteen pounders, which the next day opened against the flank
of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of
an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others.
While the siege was thus proceeding Soult having little fear for
the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing
a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals
had endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena with the view of
keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo;
but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks and forced them into
the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country
Morillo and Penne Villemur, were lying close on the lower Guadiana
waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should
advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and
delay the French marshal; for in February, general Montes being
detached, by Ballesteros, from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on
the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this
the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills,
with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while
Morillo assailed it on the right of that river. This had obliged
Soult to send troops towards Malaga, and fatally delayed his march to
Estremadura.
Meanwhile Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca
country, and it was rumoured that he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo.
Lord Wellington was somewhat disturbed by this information; he knew
indeed that the flooding of the rivers in the north, would prevent a
blockade, and he was also assured that Marmont had not yet obtained a
battering train. But the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected
the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at
St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up; the fortress had only
thirty days’ supply, Almeida was in as bad a state, and the grand
project of invading Andalusia was likely to be baulked by these
embarrassments.
On the 30th Soult’s advance from Cordova being decided, the fifth
division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the covering
army; but Power’s Portuguese brigade, with some cavalry, of the same
nation, still maintained the investment on the right bank, the siege
was urged forward very rapidly, forty-eight pieces of artillery were
in constant play, and the sap against St. Roque advanced. The enemy
was equally active, his fire was very destructive, and his progress
in raising the ravelin and counter-guard of the front attacked was
very visible.
[Sidenote: 1812. April.]
The 1st of April the sap was pushed close to the San Roque, the
Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the
flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto
resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2d the face of the
Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates
being laid open, the bullets were lost in their cavities, and the
garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the
attacked front, from the town.
In the night a new battery against the San Roque was armed, and two
officers with some sappers gliding behind that outwork, gagged the
sentinel, placed powder-barrels and a match against the dam of the
inundation, and retired undiscovered, but the explosion did not
destroy the dam, and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make
progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen
set against them slew many they were reinforced by means of a raft
with parapets, which crossed the inundation, and men also passed by
the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate.
On the 3d some guns were turned against the curtain behind the San
Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, and as a
breach there would have been useless, while the inundation remained,
the fire was soon discontinued. The two breaches in the bastion
were now greatly enlarged and the besieged assiduously laboured at
the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and
garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the
front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five
guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was
commenced on the castle hill, but outside the wall; the besiegers
therefore traced out a counter-battery, of fourteen Shrapnel
howitzers, to play upon that point during the assault.
The crisis of the siege was now approaching rapidly. The breaches
were nearly practicable, Soult, having effected a junction with
Drouet and Daricau, was advancing; and as the allies were not in
sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same
time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches, and
to fight at Albuera with the remainder. Graham therefore fell back
towards that place, and Hill having destroyed the bridge at Merida,
marched from the Upper Guadiana to Talavera Real.
Time being now, as in war it always is, a great object, the anxiety
on both sides redoubled; but Soult was still at Llerena, when on
the morning of the 5th the breaches were declared practicable, and
the assault ordered for that evening. Leith’s division was even
recalled to the camp to assist, when a careful personal examination
of the enemy’s retrenchments caused some doubt in lord Wellington’s
mind, and he delayed the storm, until a third breach, as originally
projected, should be formed in the curtain between the bastions
of Trinidad and Maria. This could not, however, be commenced
before morning, and during the night the enemy’s workmen laboured
assiduously at their retrenchments, regardless of the showers of
grape with which the besiegers’ batteries scoured the ditch and the
breach. But the 6th, the besiegers’ guns being all turned against
the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled rapidly away, in two hours a
yawning breach appeared, and Wellington, having again examined the
points of attack in person, renewed the order for the assault. Then
the soldiers eagerly made themselves ready for a combat, so fiercely
fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that
posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale; but many are
still alive who know that it is true.
The British general was so sensible of Phillipon’s firmness and of
the courage of his garrison, that he spared them the affront of a
summons, yet seeing the breach strongly entrenched, and the enemy’s
flank fire, still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis, trust
his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers
burned for the signal of attack, and as he was unwilling to lose the
service of any, to each division he gave a task such as few generals
would have the hardihood even to contemplate.
On the right Picton’s division was to file out of the trenches, to
cross the Rivillas river, and to scale the castle walls, which were
from eighteen to twenty-four feet in height, furnished with all means
of destruction, and so narrow at top, that the defenders could easily
reach and as easily overturn the ladders.
On the left, Leith’s division was to make a false attack on the
Pardaleras, and a real assault on the distant bastion of San
Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp
thirty feet high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops well
provided; for Phillipon, following his old plan, had three loaded
muskets placed beside each man, that the first fire might be quick
and deadly.
In the centre, the fourth and light divisions under general Colville,
and colonel Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches.
They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders
and axes, and were preceded by storming parties of five hundred men
each with their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to
assault the bastion of Santa Maria; the fourth division to assault
the Trinidad, and the curtain; and the columns were divided into
storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch, the
latter to keep the crest of the glacis.
Besides these attacks, major Wilson of the forty-eighth was to storm
the San Roque with the guards of the trenches, and on the other side
of the Guadiana, general Power was to make a feint on the bridge-head.
At first only one brigade, of the third division, was to have
attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed upon, a sergeant
of sappers having deserted from the enemy, informed Wellington
that there was but one communication from the castle to the town,
whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance together.
This was the outline of the plan, but many nice arrangements filled
it up, and some were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom
that all things are strictly attended to in a desperate fight. Nor
were the enemy idle, for while it was yet twilight some French
cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who
endeavoured to look into the trenches, with a view to ascertain if
an assault was intended; but the picquet on that side jumped up, and
firing as it run, drove him and his escort back into the works. Then
the darkness fell and the troops only awaited the signal.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 9._
EXPLANATORY SKETCH
_OF THE SIEGE OF_
BADAJOS
1812.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.
The night was dry but clouded, the air thick with watery exhalations
from the rivers, the ramparts, and the trenches unusually still; yet
a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former, lights were seen
to flit here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels at
times proclaimed, that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding
in Phillipon’s direful skill, watched, from their lofty station, the
approach of enemies, whom they had twice before baffled, and now
hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls; the
British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery
destruction as the others were to pour it down; and both were alike
terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions
awakened in their resolute hearts.
Former failures there were to avenge, and on either side, such
leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the
possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the
soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was, in the
British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and
recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many
incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed,
averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, like
Cæsar’s centurion who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were
heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thirsted for
spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous
power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron,
and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might, to bear down
every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.
At ten o’clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the
Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head
on the other side of the Guadiana, were to have been simultaneously
assailed, and it was hoped that the strength of the enemy would
shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of
war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division;
and a lighted carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to
where the men of the third division were drawn up, discovered their
array, and obliged them to anticipate the signal by half an hour.
Then, every thing being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the
fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against
the breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a
shout, encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently
that scarcely any resistance was made.
But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated
the commencement of a most vehement combat at the castle. There
general Kempt, for Picton hurt by a fall, in the camp, and expecting
no change in the hour, was not present, there general Kempt, I say,
led the third division; he had passed the Rivillas, in single files
by a narrow bridge, under a terrible musketry, and then reforming,
and running up the rugged hill, had reached the foot of the castle
when he fell severely wounded, and being carried back to the trenches
met Picton who hastened forward to take the command. Meanwhile his
troops spreading along the front reared their heavy ladders, some
against the lofty castle, some against the adjoining front on the
left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy
stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet,
while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with a fearful
rapidity, and in front, with pikes and bayonets, stabbed the leading
assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls; and all this
attended with deafening shouts, and the crash of breaking ladders,
and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of
the falling weights.
Still, swarming round the remaining ladders, these undaunted veterans
strove who should first climb, until all being overturned, the French
shouted victory, and the British, baffled, but untamed, fell back a
few paces, and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. Here
when the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed the heroic colonel
Ridge, springing forward, called, with a stentorian voice, on his men
to follow, and, seizing a ladder, once more raised it against the
castle, yet to the right of the former attack, where the wall was
lower, and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was
soon placed alongside of the first, by the grenadier officer Canch,
and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting
troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed, and in a manner
surprised, were driven fighting through the double gate into the
town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement, sent from the French
reserve, then came up, a sharp action followed, both sides fired
through the gate, and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man
died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much
glory.
During these events, the tumult at the breaches was such as if the
very earth had been rent asunder and its central fires were bursting
upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis, just
as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash of a single
musket discharged from the covered way as a signal shewed them that
the French were ready; yet no stir was heard, and darkness covered
the breaches. Some hay-packs were then thrown, some ladders were
placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light
division, about five hundred in all, had descended into the ditch
without opposition, when a bright flame shooting upwards displayed
all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark figures
and glittering arms, were seen on the one side, and on the other,
the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming on like
streams of burning lava; it was the touch of the magician’s wand,
for a crash of thunder followed, and with incredible violence the
storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds
of shells and powder-barrels.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]
For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch,
amazed at the terrific sight, then, with a shout that matched even
the sound of the explosion, flew down the ladders, or disdaining
their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and
nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled
the eyes, the fourth division came running in and descended with a
like fury. There were however only five ladders for both columns,
which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of
the ditch, as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad, was filled
with water from the inundation; into this watery snare the head of
the fourth division fell, and it is said that above a hundred of
the fuzileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who
followed, checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected,
turned to the left, and thus came upon the face of the unfinished
ravelin, which, being rough and broken, was mistaken for the breach,
and instantly covered with men; yet a wide and deep chasm was still
between them and the ramparts from whence came a deadly fire wasting
their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of
musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division,
whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, and whose flank
was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion
of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and
the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth
division were destined to storm.
Great was the confusion, for now the ravelin was quite crowded with
men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, others
jumped down and ran towards the breach, many also passed between the
ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got
mixed, and the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries,
also came pouring in, until the ditch was quite filled, the rear
still crowding forward, and all cheering vehemently. The enemy’s
shouts also, were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and
of grenades, the roaring of the guns from the flanks, answered by the
iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and
horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the
blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, and the
continual clatter of the muskets, made a maddening din.
Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a
whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades,
sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in
ponderous beams, which were chained together and set deep in the
ruins; and for ten feet in front, the ascent was covered with loose
planks, studded with sharp iron points, on which the feet of the
foremost being set the planks moved, and the unhappy soldiers,
falling forward on the spikes, rolled down upon the ranks behind.
Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem, and
leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every
man had several muskets; and each musket in addition to its ordinary
charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of leaden slugs,
which scattered like hail when they were discharged.
Again the assailants rushed up the breaches, and again the
sword-blades, immoveable and impassable, stopped their charge,
and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded
unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, and hundreds more were
dropping, but still the heroic officers called aloud for new trials,
and sometimes followed by many, sometimes by a few, ascended the
ruins; and so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these
charges, the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades,
willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the
others frustrated the attempt by dropping down; and men fell so fast
from the shot, that it was hard to know who went down voluntarily,
who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again.
Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades,
for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the
assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was,
would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter
would have continued.
At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, colonel Andrew Barnard
had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the other,
and preserved some degree of military array; but now the tumult was
such, that no command could be heard distinctly, except by those
close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other,
and the wounded, struggling to avoid being trampled upon, broke the
formations; order was impossible! Yet officers of all stations,
followed more or less numerously by the men, were seen to start out,
as if struck by a sudden madness, and rush into the breach, which
yawning and glittering with steel, seemed like the mouth of some huge
dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts,
colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man, whose feeble body
would have been quite unfit for war, if it had not been sustained by
an unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard,
there his soldiers gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he
lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him, in falling,
plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, and continuing
his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. But there
was no want of gallant leaders, or desperate followers.
Two hours spent in these vain efforts convinced the soldiers that
the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable; and as the opening in
the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the approach to
it impeded by deep holes, and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did
not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which
had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their
muskets, they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad,
while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots
by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked, as their
victims fell, “_Why they did not come into Badajos?_”
[Sidenote: Now lieut.-col. Shaw Kennedy.]
In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps
and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get
some shelter from the merciless fire above, and withal a sickening
stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, captain Nicholas, of the
engineers, was observed by Mr. Shaw, of the forty-third, making
incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa
Maria bastion. Shaw having collected about fifty soldiers of all
regiments joined him, and although there was a deep cut along the
foot of this breach also, it was instantly passed, and these two
young officers at the head of their gallant band, rushed up the slope
of the ruins; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent, a
concentrated fire of musketry and grape, dashed nearly the whole
dead to the earth! Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the intrepid
Shaw stood alone! After this no further effort was made at any
point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath
the enemy’s shot, which streamed without intermission; for, of the
riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early into the ditch had joined
in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross-fire of grape from the
distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from
the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell
the French musketry.
About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington,
who was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the
remainder to retire and re-form for a second assault; for he had
just then heard that the castle was taken, and thinking the enemy
would still hold out in the town, was resolved to assail the breaches
again. This retreat from the ditch was, however, not effected without
further carnage and confusion, for the French fire never slackened,
and a cry arose that the enemy were making a sally from the distant
flanks, which caused a rush towards the ladders; then the groans
and lamentations of the wounded who could not move, and expected to
be slain, increased, many officers who had not heard of the order,
endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, and some would even
have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd.
All this time the third division was lying close in the castle, and
either from a fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the
capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no
attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side
however the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the
Pardaleras, and on the right of the Guadiana, the Portuguese were
sharply engaged at the bridge; thus the town was girdled with fire,
for general Walker’s brigade having passed on during the feint on
the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente.
His troops had advanced along the banks of the river, and reached
the French guard-house, at the barrier-gate, undiscovered, for the
ripple of the waters smothered the sound of their footsteps; but just
then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out,
and the French sentinels, discovering the columns, fired. The British
troops immediately springing forward under a sharp musketry began to
hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way, while the Portuguese,
being panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders. Nevertheless
the others snatched them up again, and forcing the barrier, jumped
into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, and
there was a _cunette_, which embarrassed the column, and when the
foremost men succeeded in rearing the ladders, the latter were found
too short, for the walls were generally above thirty feet high.
Meanwhile the fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung
beneath the soldiers’ feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled
over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch,
and man after man dropped dead from the ladders.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]
Fortunately some of the defenders having been called away to aid in
recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and
the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where the
scarp was only twenty feet high, placed three ladders there under
an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion.
Some men got up, but with difficulty, for the ladders were still too
short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his
comrades and then drew others after him, until many had gained the
summit; and though the French shot heavily against them, from both
flanks and from a house in front, they thickened and could not be
driven back; half the fourth regiment entered the town itself to
dislodge the enemy from the houses, while the others pushed along the
rampart towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively
won three bastions.
In the last of these combats general Walker leaping forward, sword
in hand, at the moment when one of the enemy’s cannoneers was
discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds that it was
wonderful how he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately
after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out a mine!
At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops whom
neither the strong barrier, nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls,
nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, staggered back appalled
by a chimera of their own raising, and in this disorder a French
reserve, under general Viellande, drove on them with a firm and rapid
charge, and pitching some men over the walls, and killing others
outright, again cleansed the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There
however Leith had placed colonel Nugent with a battalion of the
thirty-eighth as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and
slaying all before them, this battalion, about two hundred strong,
arose, and with one close volley destroyed them.
Then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order
once more charged along the walls towards the breaches, but the
French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did
not yet yield; and meanwhile the detachment of the fourth regiment
which had entered the town when the San Vincente was first carried,
was strangely situated, for the streets were empty and brilliantly
illuminated, and no person was seen; yet a low buzz and whisper were
heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time
to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by
the Spaniards. However, the troops with bugles sounding, advanced
towards the great square of the town, and in their progress captured
several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; but the square
itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as
bright with lamps; a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation,
for they saw nothing but light, and heard only the low whispers close
around them, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing
thunder.
There, indeed, the fight was still plainly raging, and hence,
quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse,
by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received
with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their
movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned
by the French, other parties entered the place, desultory combats
took place in various parts, and finally general Viellande, and
Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge
with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they
all surrendered early the next morning upon summons to lord Fitzroy
Somerset, who had with great readiness pushed through the town to the
draw-bridge ere they had time to organize further resistance. But
even in the moment of ruin the night before, the noble governor had
sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult’s
army, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune.
Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished
the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike, for
hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the
violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men
were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were
displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust,
cruelty, and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans,
shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses,
the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used
in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of
Badajos! on the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers
were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than
was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed
of!
Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of these,
including seven hundred Portuguese, three thousand five hundred had
been stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more than seven
hundred men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt,
Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, the first three
severely; about six hundred men and officers fell in the escalade
of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two thousand
at the breaches, each division there losing twelve hundred! And how
deadly the strife was, at that point, may be gathered from this, the
forty-third and fifty-second regiments, of the light division, alone
lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged
at the castle!
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]
Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in
a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him consider that
the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that
some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were
crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed
to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was
endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let
any man consider this and he must admit that a British army bears
with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the French
were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and
with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any
side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the
noble emulation of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of
Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, or of O’Hare, of the ninety-fifth,
who perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with
him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who shall
describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier who was
killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? or the martial fury of
that desperate soldier of the ninety-fifth, who, in his resolution
to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there
suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their
muskets? Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of
Shaw, of Canch, or the resolution of Ferguson of the forty-third,
who having in former assaults received two deep wounds, was here,
with his hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the
third time a volunteer, and the third time wounded! Nor would I be
understood to select these as pre-eminent, many and signal were the
other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will
never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and
often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to
what they saw; but no age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to
battle than those who stormed Badajos.
When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to lord
Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the
pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss
of his gallant soldiers.
CHAPTER VI.
[Sidenote: 1812. April.]
The English general having now achieved the second part of his
project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which
would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but
the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad
Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the
works; Carlos d’España besides neglecting to provision that place,
had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity,
and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison; Almeida
was insecure, and Marmont’s army was already between the Agueda and
the Coa.
It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march
into Andalusia could take place; but the English general knowing
that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days,
hoping that Soult, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a
blow on this side of the Morena; and he was certain, that the French
general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary
armies whose operations were then in progress.
Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was
surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted
Seville the 1st of April with twelve regiments of infantry, two of
cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del
Rio and Constantino upon Llerena; and, to impose upon the allies,
general Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder
of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois’ division of
infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross
roads, at Santa de Guillena, and so reached Constantino, whence they
followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at
Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the
situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into
the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of
Monasterio; now however they advanced to Fuentes de Ovejuña, and the
allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.
On the 7th the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered
Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th they were in march to fight,
when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault,
brought the news of its fall; at the same moment their general was
apprized, by his spies, that Marmont by whom he expected to be joined
was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back
to Llerena, for the allies could then bring forty-five thousand men
into action, and the French army though strongly constituted and the
best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand.
Soult had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and
Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed
the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This
place was ten miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a
Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph’s service, aided by “_Escopeteros_”
and by the sick and convalescent men; the commandant Rignoux had
therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents.
The 6th the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the
Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments, hoping
to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on
the other side, for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin, at
Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on
Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.
To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from
detaching troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons
with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga
side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barios with the
rest of his army and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines
of Chiclana. At the same time all the smaller partidas of the Ronda
were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications,
to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish
soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and
retired to their homes.
Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballesteros with three divisions
commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince
of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from
Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side,
and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation
of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because
a large convoy, coming from Madrid, with an escort of twelve hundred
men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and
from Murcia.
On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville,
when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French
interest, led Ballesteros to believe that Soult was close at hand,
whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne
Villemur having received notice from lord Wellington that the French
would soon return, also retired to Gibraleon.
Ballesteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning
to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in
the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit
north of Ronda, by Albodonales, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela,
where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched
against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by “_Escopeteros_,” was
expected to fall at once; but after two days combat and the loss of
two hundred killed and wounded, the three thousand patriots retired,
baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for
the invaders.
When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns, by roads
leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who
was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora, on the Guadaljore
river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage,
but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on, he retired behind the
Guadalmedina river, close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two
hundred men in passing the Guadaljore.
After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was
now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains.
He had sent Digeon’s cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba, to chase the
Partidas, and had ordered Drouet’s division to take post at Fuente
Obejuna; then directing Peyreymont’s cavalry upon Usagre, he had come
himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th,
hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which had saved
Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for general Conroux was
coming up on the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards
would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely
had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near
Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very
dangerous advanced post on both sides.
Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, on the
evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont’s
cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately
conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this Anson’s brigade,
then commanded by colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night
from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant’s
brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the
retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby’s advanced guard having commenced the
action too soon, the French fell back, before Le Marchant could
intercept them, but as some heights, skirting the Llerena road,
prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order
of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road.
The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about nineteen
hundred sabres on each side, but sir Stapleton soon decided the
action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground he
kept the enemy’s attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby’s
squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the
heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the
next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French
gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several
officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were
killed in the field. The loss of the British was only fifty-six men
and officers, of which forty-five were of the fifth dragoon guards.
The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet’s infantry which had not
yet left Llerena; but after this action, that general fell back with
all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing
to fight the allies at Seville.
The duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington’s intention to
invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of
his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena,
with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final
issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival
of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington’s
plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought
two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to
form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards, who had
been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then giving over
the charge of the repairs to general Hill, who remained with two
divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura,
he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with
great cruelty.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 1.]
That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura,
but the emperor’s orders were imperative, that he should make a
diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of
March he ascertained that none of Wellington’s divisions were left on
the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced
by Carier’s brigade, was then on the Orbijo, in observation of the
Gallicians; Ferrier’s division was at Valladolid, and Foy’s in the
valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry, and
one of cavalry, had passed the mountains and concentrated on the
Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days provisions, scaling-ladders,
and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were
therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida which contained the allies’
battering train was still very incompletely fortified. Hence on the
first rumour of Marmont’s movement, lord Wellington had thrown in two
militia regiments, with a strong detachment of British artillery-men;
the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the
governor, colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences.
Of the northern militia, which had been called out before the allies
quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were
under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number
under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred under Lecor. But the
law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes
in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of
Silveira’s, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms.
All these officers save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had
been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22d
at Lamego, where general Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed
his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march
was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen;
for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an
independent general.
When Trant was assured that Marmont’s direction would be on Ciudad,
and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson,
intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received
Le Mesurier’s despatches, which induced him to make a forced march
with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge
of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that
structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where
there was a magazine; and his march was well-timed, for two French
divisions were then driving Carlos d’España over the plain beyond the
Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on
the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alter fell back from the Yeltes
before him; and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German
cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending
the spirit of lord Wellington’s orders, nor the real situation of
affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from
Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy’s marauding
parties. Carlos d’España, who had eight hundred infantry, also
retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Conception,
but on the 3d the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of
Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached
the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only two hundred men, at the very
moment Trant arrived.
The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and, being desirous
of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw
some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond
the bridge, then escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red
uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with
the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry which
happened to be in the place and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro
was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le
Mesurier sallied from the fortress, and drove back the enemy’s light
troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida, with
orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them; the
attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to
Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant, indicated
the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the
next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with
two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one
division to blockade Ciudad.
Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to
Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was
joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by
Silveira; but that general instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th,
and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then
halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry, and
four hundred cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely
six thousand raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying
force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other
heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force,
because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of
retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any
horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen
an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of
dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.
This post Trant and Wilson held, with six thousand militia and six
guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy’s marauders in
check; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the
Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress,
which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal,
and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were
still at Memoa, fifty miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus
at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the
bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every
direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner, that
the whole population fled before them. However, general Lecor, a good
soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco; he checked
the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the
stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th,
destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only
one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; and the next day when the
French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.
[Sidenote: Marmont’s Official Reports, MSS.]
[Sidenote: General Trant’s papers, MSS.]
Marmont’s divisions being now spread over the country in search
of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising
the French marshal himself in his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar’s
procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project,
which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake
with such troops; for the distance was twenty miles, and it was a
keen observation of lord Wellington’s, when Trant adverted to the
magnitude of the object, to say that, “_In war nothing is so bad
as failure and defeat_.” This would undoubtedly have been the case
here; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have
made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising
Trant, had led two brigades of infantry and four hundred cavalry up
the mountain. He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the
streets at day-break, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten
at Trant’s quarters by one drummer; this being taken up at hazard,
by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the
French marshal to fall back at the moment, when a brisk charge would
have placed every thing at his mercy, for the beating of the first
drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms.
The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only
one day’s provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank
and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their
front; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town,
and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three
or four miles of open ground and in good order, although the enemy’s
cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a
short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity,
leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was
passing the river below, forty dragoons, sent up by Bacellar, the
evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through
the rear-guard of eight hundred infantry; these last seeing the
enemy dismount to fire their carabines, and finding that the wet had
damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue
and cry.
All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed,
yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners; and
Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the
militia, and galloped into Celerico where there was nothing to
defend the magazines; instead of which he halted and permitted
the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such however was his
compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor
undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them
down and no man was killed during the whole action, although the
French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar
having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico retreated with
Trant’s people the next day towards Lamego; Wilson remained at
Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered
the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed
when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia reoccupied
Guarda.
This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because
it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shews how
trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations; for here the
English general’s extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira
were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one
side, and the rapid retreat of general Alten on the other. Again, the
French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on
the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after
a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the
accidental beating of a drum; and it is curious to find a marshal of
France personally acting as a partizan, and yet effecting nothing
against these miserable troops.
The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra,
and the most alarming reports reached lord Wellington, whose
operations it is now time to notice. When Soult’s retreat from
Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the
Tagus, and on the 11th lord Wellington, hearing of Alten’s retreat,
sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to
Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army also reached
that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in
the general panic, came to head-quarters and reported that the enemy
was master of that town; but the next hour, brought general Wilson’s
report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led
him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of
Beresford.
At this time the French army, in number about twenty-eight thousand,
was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier’s division which
remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills
overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had
heard of a convoy of provisions which lord Wellington had some days
before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it
off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French
general’s own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia
at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear,
and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both
swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and
the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only
the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads
leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames
was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who
could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont’s retreat
must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon
Coria, and the English general conceiving good hopes of falling on
him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogoa; but the
rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body
of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On
that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored
their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and
Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he
again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his
smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where
the Gallician army had done nothing.
The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English
general made the greatest exertions to revictual Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a
corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following
his original design. The first division, which had only reached
Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy’s division
had meanwhile reoccupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and
the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of
supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had
destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of
transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government
would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other
frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as
Ciudad and Almeida.
In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very
unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members
of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw
the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not
immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he
employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to
bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered
his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the
Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the
Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to
the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and
in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but
a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible
for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of
the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure
was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was
therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: 1812.]
In this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they
occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered
territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies
of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so
combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle;
yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it
were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even
thirty thousand men. This arose partly from want of union, partly
from the orders of the Emperor, whose plans the generals either did
not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore
executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally
endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was
mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion!
The expedition of Montbrun to Alicant has been fixed upon as the
chief cause of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Napoleon however did not
desire that Montbrun’s march should be held in abeyance for a week,
upon the strength of some vague rumours relative to the allies’
proceedings, and yet be finally sent at precisely the wrong period;
neither did he contemplate that general’s idle display at Alicant
after the city of Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful
as this expedition doubtless was, in various ways, the loss of Ciudad
Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the
9th of January and the 19th Ciudad was stormed; now, if he had not
been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo or Talavera, that is,
eight marches from Salamanca; and as the commencement of the siege
was not known until the 15th, even at Valladolid, he could not have
been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days
too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at the crisis of
the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should
have reached that city in December, but the latter did not arrive
before the middle of January; had he been only a week earlier, that
is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy could not have escaped,
Alicant would then have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate
defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been
acknowledged.
At this period Valencia was the most important point in the
Peninsula, and there was no apparent reason why Ciudad should be
in any immediate danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the
errors of his own generals. It is futile therefore to affirm that
Montbrun’s detachment was made on a false principle; it was on the
contrary conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating
on the important point at the decisive moment; errors, extraneous
to the original design, alone brought it within the principle of
dissemination.
The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo may be directly traced to the duke of
Ragusa’s want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison which he kept in
the place, to the Russian war which obliged the emperor to weaken the
army of the north; finally, to the extravagance of the army of the
centre. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid three thousand men
devoured and wasted daily the rations of twenty-two thousand, and the
stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep
concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Ciudad;
and if the army of the centre had been efficient, Hill would have
incurred great danger and Soult’s power been vastly augmented.
It is not Napoleon’s skill only, that has been assailed by these
writers. Lord Wellington also is blamed for not crushing Souham’s
division at Tamames between the 23d and the 26th of January; although
Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames, except with cavalry
scouts, and kept his main body at Matilla, whence one forced march
would have placed him behind the Tormes in safety! In such a shallow
manner have the important operations of this period been treated. Nor
will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear
examination.
“_Marmont instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a
phantom in Beira._” “_It was his vanity and jealousy of the duke
of Dalmatia that lost Badajos._” Such are the assertions of both
French and English writers; nevertheless the duke of Ragusa never
anticipated any success from his movement into Beira, and far from
avoiding Soult, earnestly desired to co-operate with him; moreover
this invasion of Beira, which has been regarded as a folly, was the
conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains! and it is not
difficult to shew that the emperor’s design was, notwithstanding the
ill result, capacious and solid.
Let us suppose that Marmont had aided Soult, and that the army of
the centre had also sent men. If they had made any error in their
combinations the English general would have defeated them separately;
if they had effected their junction, he would have retreated, and
Badajos would have been succoured. But then eighty thousand French
would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains, to
the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and unless they
came prepared to take Elvas, without any adequate object; for lord
Wellington could, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, have repeated
this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening
thus made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character
of weakness on the French arms, extremely injurious, since character
is half the strength of an army.
The emperor judged better; he disliked such timid operations, he
desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the
defensive and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he
said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, had called Hill
across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to
send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad
had thus by obliging the allies to defend it, given the French their
choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea; it
was for Marmont to avail himself of the occasion, not by marching
to aid Soult, who had eighty thousand excellent troops, and at the
worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid;
whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated
on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain.
Marmont’s business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position
at Salamanca, as a base of operations, and then to keep the allies
constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a
general battle. Meanwhile Soult should either take the fortresses of
the Alemtejo, or draw off Hill’s corps from Wellington, who would
then be very inferior to Marmont and yet Hill himself would be
unequal to fight Soult.
“Fix your quarters,” said the emperor, “at Salamanca, work day and
night to fortify that place—organize a new battering train—form
magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and
Almeida—harass the allies’ outposts, even daily—threaten the
frontier of Portugal in all directions, and send parties to ravage
the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and
keep the bulk of your army at Toro Zamora, Benevente, and Avila,
which are fertile districts, and from whence, in four days, you can
concentrate the whole upon Salamanca. You will thus keep the allies
in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose, while you
prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south.
Announce the approach of your new battering train, and if Wellington
marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions, Soult will be able to
relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your
army, march straight upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun
the country in various directions, and be assured he will return.
Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on
your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march
towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 2.]
Now, if Marmont had thus conceived the war himself, he could have
commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter,
written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of
that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence.
Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor’s orders, he did
nothing; but had he, as his despatch recommended, commenced his
operations in twenty-four hours, his advanced posts would have been
near Ciudad early in March, that is at the moment when the allies
were, as I have before shewn, disseminated all over Portugal, and
when only the fifth division was upon the Coa to oppose him. The
works of Almeida were then quite indefensible, and the movement upon
Badajos must have necessarily been suspended. Thus the winter season
would have passed away uselessly for the allies unless Wellington
turned to attack Marmont, which was a difficult operation in itself,
and would have been dangerous to the Alemtejo, while Soult held
Badajos, for that marshal, as we have seen, had received orders to
attack Hill with twenty thousand men. Here then the errors were
of execution, not of design, and the first part of the emperor’s
combinations was evidently just and solid. It remains to test the
second part which was to have been executed if lord Wellington
invested Badajos.
It must be remembered, that Marmont was so to hold his army, that
he could concentrate in four days; that he was to make an incursion
into Beira the moment Wellington crossed the Tagus; that Oporto was
to be menaced, Almeida to be attacked, Coimbra to be occupied. These
operations would undoubtedly have brought the allies back again at
the commencement of the siege, because the fall of Badajos could
not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long
to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader. Now
Marmont did not reach the Agueda before the 31st March, when the
siege of Badajos was approaching its conclusion; he did not storm
Almeida, nor attack Ciudad Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra, nor menace
Oporto; and yet his operation, feebly as it was executed, obliged
lord Wellington to relinquish his meditated attack on Andalusia,
and return to the assistance of Beira. Again therefore the error
was in the execution. And here we may observe how inferior in
hardihood the French general was to his adversary. Wellington with
eighteen thousand men had escaladed Badajos, a powerful fortress and
defended by an excellent governor with five thousand French veterans;
Marmont with twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm
Ciudad, although its breaches were scarcely healed, and its garrison
disaffected. Nor did he even assail Almeida, which hardly meriting
the name of a fortress, was only occupied by three thousand militia,
scarcely able to handle their arms; and yet if he had captured
Almeida, as he could scarcely have failed to do with due vigour, he
would have found a battering train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo,
and thus have again balanced the campaign.
The duke of Ragusa was averse to serving in the Peninsula, he wished
to be employed in the Russian expedition, and he had written to the
emperor to desire his recal, or that the whole of the northern
district, from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be
placed under his orders. Unless that were done, he said he could only
calculate the operations of his own troops. The other generals would
make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king’s court was in
open hostility to the French interest. The army of the north had in
retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away every thing that could
be useful to him, in the way of bridge, or battering equipages, or of
ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things.
Then he painted all the jealousies and disputes in the French
armies, and affirmed that his own force, care being had for the
posts of communication, and the watching of the army of Gallicia,
would not furnish more than thirty-four thousand men for the field;
a calculation contradicted by the imperial muster-rolls, which on
the 1st of March bore sixty thousand fighting men present with the
eagles. He also rated the allies at sixty thousand, well provided
with every thing and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of
that army gave only fifty-two thousand men including Hill’s corps;
about thirty-five thousand only could have passed the Agueda, and
their penury of means had, as we have seen, prevented them from even
holding together, on the northern frontier. In like manner he assumed
that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda, when
the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than six hundred
cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont, either
from dislike to the war, or natural want of vigour, was not equal to
his task, and it is obvious that a diversion, begun so late, and
followed up with so little energy, could have had little effect upon
the siege of Badajos; it would have been far better to have followed
his own first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult, and
retained the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo.
It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south,
and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of. The secret of
its inactivity is to be found in Marmont’s letter. Every thing at
Madrid was confusion and intrigue, waste and want of discipline; in
fine, the union of a court and an army, had destroyed the latter. Not
so at Seville. There the hand of an able general, an indefatigable
administrator were visible, and the unravelling the intricate
combinations, which produced such an apparent want of vigour in the
operations of the duke of Dalmatia, will form at once the apology for
that general, and the just eulogium of lord Wellington.
First it must be held in mind that the army of the south, so powerful
in appearance, did not furnish a proportionate number of men for
field-service, because the reinforcements, although borne on the
rolls, were for the most part retained in the northern governments.
Soult had sixty-seven thousand French and six thousand “Escopeteros”
present under arms in September; but then followed the surprise of
Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the vigorous demonstrations of Hill in
December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained
by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the
number of men, and occasioned fresh arrangements on the different
points of the circle. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia,
as in all other parts, and the inhabitants were reduced to feed on
herbs; the soldiers had only half rations of bread, and neither
reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor
clothes, had come either from France or from Madrid for a long period.
It was under these circumstances that Soult received the order to
send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. But the whole of
the Polish troops, and the skeletons of regiments, and the picked
men for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand, after being
collected at the Despeñas Peros, while Suchet was before Valencia,
had now marched to Talavera de la Reyna on the way to France; at
that moment also Ballesteros appeared, with the fourth Spanish army,
twelve thousand strong, in the Ronda, and his detachments defeated
Maransin at Cartaña, which of necessity occasioned another change
in the French dispositions. Moreover the very successes of Suchet
had at this time increased Soult’s difficulties, because all the
fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army;
and fifteen thousand men, including the garrisons of Carthagena and
Alicant, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada, where,
during the expedition to Estremadura, the French had only three
battalions and some cavalry.
Thus the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be
excluded, reduced to forty-eight thousand French sabres and bayonets
present with the eagles, and this at the very moment when its enemies
were augmented by twenty-five thousand fresh men. Soult had indeed
besides this force five thousand artillery-men and other attendant
troops, and six thousand “_Escopeteros_” were capable of taking the
field, while thirty thousand civic guards held his fortified posts.
Nevertheless he was forced to reduce all the garrisons, and even
the camp before the Isla to the lowest numbers, consistent with
safety, ere he could bring twenty-four thousand French into the field
for the succour of Badajos, and even then as we have seen, he was
upon the point of losing Seville. These things prevented him from
coming against the Alemtejo in March, when his presence with an army
would have delayed the commencement of the siege until a battle had
been fought: but he was the less fearful for the fortress because
Marmont on the 22d of February and Foy on the 28th had announced,
that if Badajos should be menaced, three divisions of the army of
Portugal, then in the valley of the Tagus, would enter Estremadura;
and these divisions uniting with Daricau’s and Drouet’s troops would
have formed an army of thirty thousand men, and consequently would
have sufficed to delay the operations of the allies. But Marmont,
having subsequently received the emperor’s orders to move into
Beira, passed the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and
thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were
intercepted, or carelessly delayed, it was not until the 8th of
April, that the duke of Dalmatia was assured of his departure for
Salamanca.
On the other hand Lord Wellington’s operations were so rapidly pushed
forward, that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No
general could suspect that such an outwork as the Picurina, would be
taken by storm without being first battered; still less that Badajos,
with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, and its celebrated
governor, would in like manner be carried before the counterscarp
was blown in, and the fire of the defences ruined. In fine, no man
accustomed to war could have divined the surpassing resolution and
surpassing fortune also, of the British general and his troops;
neither is it impertinent to observe here, that as the French never
use iron ordnance in a siege, their calculations were necessarily
formed upon the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively
weak and slow: with brass guns the breaches would have been made
three days later.
The fall of Badajos may therefore be traced partly to the Russian
war, which drew fifteen thousand men from the army of the south,
partly to the irresolution of Marmont, who did neither execute the
emperor’s plan nor his own; finally, to the too great extent of
country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed. And here
the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down
in his letter to Joseph, just before the battle of Talavera, should
not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing
possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine of every thing, save Seville
and the camp before the Isla. If beaten, he would have lost Andalusia
and fallen back on Suchet, but then the head of the French invasion,
might have been more formidable at Valencia than at Seville, and
Marmont could have renewed the battle. And such a chequered game,
lord Wellington’s political situation both in England and Portugal
being considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the
British troops remaining in the latter country. This however is a
grave and difficult matter to resolve.
In whatever light this campaign is viewed the talent of the English
general is conspicuous. That fortune aided him is true, but it was
in the manner she favours the pilot, who watching every changing
wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose.
Ascertaining with great pains the exact situation of each adversary,
he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare, and with a
nice hand had adapted his measures to the successive exigences of
the moment. The army of the centre, where disorder was paramount,
he disregarded; Marmont whose temperament was hasty he deceived by
affected slowness; and Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice
he induced the duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant
quarters, when they should have been concentrated, and each time he
gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, and again
when, using a like opportunity, to obviate the difficulties presented
by the conduct of the Portuguese government, he spread his own troops
over the country, in an unmilitary manner, that he might feed and
clothe them on their march to the Alemtejo. This he could not have
done if the French had been concentrated; neither could he have so
well concealed that march from the enemy.
In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult,
from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to
resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore
furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and
then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his
enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been
censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This
daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions
multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of
Portugal, quartered in the valley of the Tagus, could by moving into
Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; lord
Wellington had therefore with forecast of such an event, designed
that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced
march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have
obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of
Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura.
[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch of marshal Soult, 1812. MSS.]
This bold and skilful stroke was baulked by the never-ceasing
misconduct of the Portuguese government, with respect to means of
transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill’s enterprise were
thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced,
because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the
allies’ march, and had made no change in his extended quarters,
indicating a design to aid Soult; Hill also soon drove Drouet back
towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida, intercepted the line
of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But
the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in
the enemy’s papers. “So calculated,” said Soult, “was this affair
(the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had
intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of
operations and the irresolution of Marmont.”
Nor when the duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and
Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did lord Wellington’s delay
in Estremadura arise from any imprudence; he had good grounds for
believing, that the French would not attempt the latter place, and
that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the
first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the
Tormes reached him, he sent captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated
scouting officer, to watch Marmont’s proceedings. That gentleman,
in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and
both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality
predominated, very rapidly executed his mission; and the interesting
nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a
digression concerning them.
Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant of great fidelity and quickness
of apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions
of the same nature, Grant arrived in the Salamancan district, and
passing the Tormes in the night, remained, in uniform, for he never
assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp.
He thus obtained exact information of Marmont’s object, and more
especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling-ladders,
notes of which he sent to lord Wellington from day to day by Spanish
agents. However, on the third night, some peasants brought him a
general order, addressed to the French regiments, and saying, that
the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments, the
soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which
purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army.
Nothing daunted by this news, Grant consulted with the peasants,
and the next morning, before daylight, entered the village of
Huerta, which is close to a ford on the Tormes, and about six miles
from Salamanca. Here there was a French battalion, and on the
opposite side of the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of
which constantly patrolled back and forward, for the space of three
hundred yards, meeting always at the ford. When day broke the French
battalion assembled on its alarm-post, and at that moment Grant
was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house,
which hid him from the infantry, and was opposite to the ford. The
peasants standing on some loose stones and spreading their large
cloaks, covered him from the cavalry videttes, and thus he calmly
waited until the latter were separated the full extent of their beat;
then putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between
them, and receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, not
very distant, where the pursuit was baffled, and where he was soon
rejoined by Leon, who in his native dress met with no interruption.
Grant had already ascertained that the means of storming Ciudad
Rodrigo were prepared, and that the French officers openly talked of
doing so, but he desired still further to test this project, and to
discover if the march of the enemy might not finally be directed by
the pass of Perales, towards the Tagus; he wished also to ascertain
more correctly their real numbers, and therefore placed himself on a
wooded hill, near Tamames, where the road branches off to the passes,
and to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here lying perdue, until the whole French
army had passed by in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and
finding that all were directed towards Ciudad, entered Tamames after
they had passed, and discovered that they had left the greatest
part of their scaling-ladders behind, which clearly proved that the
intention of storming Ciudad Rodrigo was not real. This it was which
allayed Wellington’s fears for that fortress.
When Marmont afterwards passed the Coa, in this expedition, Grant
preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be
by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to
reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high ridge,
or rather succession of ridges, by a pass, at the lower mouth of
which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass,
this persevering officer placed himself, thinking that the dwarf
oaks, with which the hills were covered, would effectually secure
him from discovery; but from the higher ridge above, the French
detected all his movements with their glasses, in a few moments
Leon, whose lynx-eyes were always on the watch, called out “_the
French! the French!_” and pointed to the rear, whence some dragoons
came galloping up. Grant and his follower, instantly darted into the
wood for a little space, and then suddenly wheeling, rode off in a
different direction; yet at every turn new enemies appeared, and at
last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through the thickest
of the low oaks; but again they were met by infantry, who had been
detached in small parties down the sides of the pass, and were
directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers’ hats on
the ridge above. At last Leon fell exhausted, and the barbarians who
first came up, killed him in despite of his companion’s entreaties.
Grant himself they carried, without injury, to Marmont, who receiving
him with apparent kindness, invited him to dinner. The conversation
turned upon the prisoner’s exploits, and the French marshal affirmed
that he had been for a long time on the watch, that he knew all
his haunts, and his disguises, and had discovered that, only the
night before, he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other
adventures, which had not happened, for this Grant never used any
disguise; but there was another Grant, a man also very remarkable in
his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters, using
all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names caused the
actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative
for Marmont’s subsequent conduct.
Treating his prisoner as I have said, with great apparent kindness,
the French general exacted from him an especial parole, that he would
not consent to be released by the Partidas, while on his journey
through Spain to France, which secured his captive, although lord
Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief who
should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole, however harsh, was
in itself a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont, also, sent
a letter, with the escort, to the governor of Bayonne, in which,
still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he
designated his captive as a dangerous spy, who had done infinite
mischief to the French army, and whom he had only not executed on
the spot, out of respect to something resembling an uniform which
he wore at the time of his capture. He therefore desired, that at
Bayonne, he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris.
This proceeding was too little in accord with the honour of the
French army to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was
passed, Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the
contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne, in ordinary
cases, was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities, and receive
a passport to travel to Verdun, and all this was duly accomplished;
meanwhile the delivering of the fatal letter being, by certain means,
delayed, Grant, with a wonderful readiness and boldness, resolved not
to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking that he would naturally be
pursued in that direction. He judged that if the governor of Bayonne
could not recapture him at once, he would for his own security
suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought
of; judging, I say, in this acute manner, he on the instant inquired
at the hotels, if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding
that general Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he
boldly introduced himself, and asked permission to join his party.
The other readily assented; and while thus travelling, the general,
unacquainted with Marmont’s intentions, often rallied his companion
about his adventures, little thinking that he was then himself an
instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and skilful of them all.
In passing through Orleans, Grant, by a species of intuition,
discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation
to another secret agent in Paris, whose assistance would be
necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont’s double
dealing, and the expressed design to take away his life, as
equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only
given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave
of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom
he obtained money, and by his advice, avoided appearing before
the police, to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a
very public street, frequented the coffee-houses, and even visited
the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been
long established and was intimately connected with the police, had
ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot.
In this manner he passed several weeks, at the end of which, the
agent informed him that a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck,
an American, who had died suddenly, on the very day it was to have
been claimed. Seizing this occasion, Grant boldly demanded the
passport, with which he instantly departed for the mouth of the
Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to
expect more assistance there than at any other port. However, new
difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his
surprising talents, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding.
He first took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its
departure being unexpectedly delayed, he frankly explained his true
situation to the captain, who desired him to assume the character
of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor’s dress and forty
dollars, sent him to lodge the money in the American consul’s hands
as a pledge, that he would prosecute the captain for ill usage when
he reached the United States; this being the custom on such occasions
the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port
to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.
Thus provided, after waiting some days, Grant prevailed upon a
boatman, by a promise of ten Napoleons, to row him in the night
towards a small island, where, by usage, the English vessels watered
unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and
traffic without interruption. In the night the boat sailed, the masts
of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island,
and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman,
either from fear or malice, suddenly put about and returned to port.
In such a situation, some men would have striven in desperation to
force fortune, and so have perished; the spirits of others would have
sunk in despair, for the money which he had promised was all that
remained of his stock, and the boatman, notwithstanding his breach
of contract, demanded the whole; but with inexpressible coolness and
resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon instead of ten, and a rebuke
for his misconduct. The other having threatened a reference to the
police, soon found that he was no match in subtlety for his opponent,
who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the
escape of a prisoner of war, and would adduce the great price of his
boat as a proof of his guilt!
This menace was too formidable to be resisted, and Grant in a few
days engaged an old fisherman, who faithfully performed his bargain;
but now there were no English vessels near the island; however the
fisherman cast his nets and caught some fish, with which he sailed
towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship
of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her, and were
steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to,
and a boat with soldiers put off to board them; the fisherman was
steadfast and true; he called Grant his son, and the soldiers by whom
they expected to be arrested were only sent to warn them not to pass
the battery, because the English vessel they were in search of was on
the coast. The old man, who had expected this, bribed the soldiers
with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would
starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could
always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed, he was
desired to wait under the battery till night, and then depart; but
under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel, he
made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when the
darkness came, he ran her straight on board, and the intrepid officer
stood in safety on the quarter-deck.
After this Grant reached England and obtained permission to choose
a French officer of equal rank with himself, to send to France,
that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape; and
great was his astonishment to find, in the first prison he visited,
the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured
notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant,
whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities
of his understanding, soon obtained their release, and having
sent them with a sum of money to France returned himself to the
Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture
was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont’s army! Other strange
incidents of his life I could mention, were it not more fitting to
quit a digression, already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass an
occasion of noticing one adventure of this generous and spirited, and
yet gentle-minded man, who having served his country nobly and ably
in every climate, died, not long since, exhausted by the continual
hardships he had endured.
Having now shewn the prudence of lord Wellington with respect
to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of
Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence, that not skill
but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most
consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority,
by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone.
A critical scientific examination would be misplaced in a general
history, but to notice some of the leading points which involve
the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the
line of attack has been justified by the English engineers, as that
requiring least expenditure of means and time; but this has by the
French engineer been denied. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front
next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because
it had neither ravelin nor ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks,
and offered no facility of retrenching behind it; a view which is
confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak
points, did for many days imagine that this front was the true
object of the allies’ approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more
interesting question, when he affirms that the English general might
have carried Badajos by escalade and storm, on the first night of
the siege, with less difficulty than he experienced on the 7th of
April. On that night, he says, the defences were not so complete,
that the garrison was less prepared, and the surprise would have
availed somewhat; whereas at the second period the breaches were the
strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained
by the besiegers, the chances were in favour of the first period.
This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs, not
to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the
keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable has
indeed been denied by the English engineers. Colonel Jones affirms
that the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment,
and that the sword-blades in the Trinidad, might have been overturned
by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is quite at
variance with that of the officers and men engaged; it is certain
also that all the breaches were protected by the sword-blades,
and if the centre breach was not retrenched, it was rendered very
difficult of approach by the deep holes digged in front, and it was
more powerfully swept by flank fire than the others were. It is
also a mistake to suppose that no dense rush was made at the great
breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on
men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless where the
bullet strikes the man will fall. The sword-blades were fitted into
ponderous beams, and these last, chained together, were let deep into
the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag, or push them
from their places, when behind them stood resolute men, whose fire
swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the
soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear,
because, from the slope of the breach, they could only see their
own comrades of the front ranks; and then the dead bodies, and the
struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks, rendered a
simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable!
And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable
difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter, when the
application of a just science would have rendered the operation
comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge
into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English
people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence
of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace
all useful martial establishments. Expatiating in their schools and
colleges, upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless
of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient republic, to be
free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their
military system, as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which
they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the
exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war, England has to
seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like
the fiend’s progress toward Eden, her conquering course is through
chaos followed by death!
But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for
Wellington’s merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the
quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the
works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within
the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place
to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the
time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements
necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation
of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn,
these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the
choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of
how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the
valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for
seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time, or of conjunction to
accelerate the gain of his object.
Now all armies come to the siege of a town with great advantages; for
first the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants;
they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also
an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps
the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary’s time
and attack, their losses seem more numerous, in proportion to their
forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded
are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain
a fortress eventually, without the aid of a succouring army; their
ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the
contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel
more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure
retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour,
and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants
are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their
own sufferings.
The number of guns and quantity of ammunition, in a fortress, are
daily diminished; the besiegers’ means, originally calculated to
overpower the other, may be increased. Time and materials are
therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the
defence depends on the attack which may be varied, while the other
is fixed. Finally the firmness and skill of the defence generally
depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers
amongst the besiegers are capable of conducting the attack; and the
general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely, as the
chief of an army, to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a
simple governor. It follows then that fortresses must fall if the
besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art; and
when no succouring army is nigh, the time, necessary to reduce any
place, may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules
cannot be attended to, when every thing is irregular and doubtful,
when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or
difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the
greatness of the exigency, and the energy with which he acts.
This is the light in which to view the siege of Badajos. Wellington’s
object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete.
A few hours’ delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would
again have been foiled! aye! but this is war, always dangerous
and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel and armed with scythes. Was
the object worth the risk—did its gain compensate the loss of
men—was it boldly, greatly acquired? These are the true questions
and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his
mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult
had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid
and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to
Portugal. He was forming such great establishments, and contriving
such plans, as would, if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him
to hold the Peninsula, alone, should the French armies fail in all
other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of
raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of
the patriots whom discontent, or weakness of mind, or corruption,
might induce to seek a plausible excuse, for joining the invaders;
and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were
strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the
important points of Leon and Old Castile. Meanwhile the great army,
which the emperor was carrying to Russia, might or might not be
successful, but in either case, it was the only moment when an
offensive war, against his army in Spain, could have been carried on
with success.
But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted
while Badajos remained in the enemy’s possession? If Wellington had
advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have
threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre,
the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would
also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken
Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must
have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal
coming down to Badajos, could have either operated against the rear
of the allies, or against Lisbon.
Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the
allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take
it? By regular or by irreglar operations? For the first a certain
time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it
was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What then would
have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed
they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to
chase them from the Peninsula? How was it to be expected that England
would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of
final success? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in
Parliament? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments
to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain
united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of
Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic
conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then
was Wellington’s only resource. To strike without regard to rules,
trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through
the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general
who had undertaken on his own judgement to fight the battle of the
Peninsula? Was he to give force to the light declamation of the
hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every
defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British farther into
Spain! was he, at such a moment, to place the probable loss of a few
thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and
by declining the chance offered, shew that he despaired of success
himself? What if he failed? He would not have been, save the loss of
a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case,
he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what
if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of
England!
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE
OF SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS.
No. I.
SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.
_Captain Irby to Mr. Croft._
“_H. M. S. Amelia,_
“_Coruña, May 6, 1810._
“I have been cruizing for these two months past between Bayonne and
Santona.”
“In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been
a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the
westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were returning from destroying
some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were
dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted
the French troops, when we captured a vessel laden with military
stores from St. Andero.”
_Mr. Stuart to general Walker._
“_Lisbon, February 20, 1811._
“I own that from the various appointments which have lately taken
place in their armies, I forbode little advantage in the course of
the ensuing campaign; it is perhaps needful to tell you that my
fears are grounded on the nomination of the duke of Albuquerque
to Gallicia, Castaños to Estremadura, Mahi to Murcia, Coupigny to
Valencia, and the brother of O’Donnel to Catalonia.”
_Sir Howard Douglas to lord Wellington._
“_Villafranca, January 4, 1812._
“Each chief is allowed three servants, a captain two, a subaltern
one; the number of soldiers employed in this way is certainly not
_under_ the regulation, and all officers resident in the interior
likewise have this excessive indulgence. The officers’ servants never
do duty, or attend any drill or review. The cooks are in general
changed weekly, and are never present at drill or review; one cook is
allowed besides to every three serjeants. These two items certainly
take 5000 choice men from the ranks of this army.”
“Some very violent recriminations have been brought on by the
imprudent reply of the military press, to some observations published
in a Coruña paper extolling the Guerillas, and at the same time
intended to convey a censure on the conduct of the army. I have had
frequent conversations with general Abadia on the spirit of disunion
which these two papers are sowing. He has at length prohibited
the military press from publishing any thing but professional
papers. I was present when he gave the order—he engaged me in the
conversation, and I could not avoid observing, that what was lost
could only be regained by the sword, not the pen. In this I alluded
to the Asturias, where certainly reputation and public confidence
were sacrificed.”
“The truth is, the army is oppressive and expensive, as well as
inefficient, from its disorganised state, particularly in the
departments of supply; and it is a very unpleasant circumstance
to hear it generally admitted, that a Spanish corps is much more
destructive to the country than an equal French army. There are
also violent dissentions between the juntas of Leon and Gallicia:
inclosure No. 6 will shew this state of feeling.”
_Sir Howard Douglas to sir H. Wellesley._
“_Coruña, March 1, 1812._
“On the 20th ultimo I had the honour to despatch to your excellency
a copy of my letter of that date to lord Wellington, in which
I acquainted his lordship that three battalions of the army of
Gallicia are preparing for embarkation for America, and that I had
positively declined making, and would not permit the delivery of any
British arms or stores for that service. I have now discovered, that
in addition to these troops it is intended to send a division of
horse-artillery, to equip which, orders have been given to transfer
appointments from the cavalry of the army, and a demand is made for
funds to prepare the ordnance, and even to adapt to colonial service
more of the field artillery which I lately delivered for the use
of the sixth Gallician army. This measure has never been openly
avowed by the government of Cadiz, it has never been communicated to
the junta of this province by the regency. It has, I imagine, been
concealed from your excellency, and it has only come to my knowledge,
by the arrangements no longer to be hidden, which general Abadia is
making to carry it into effect.”
SECTION 2.—CATALONIA.
_Extract of a Letter from Don Antonio Rocca._
(Translated.)
“_Reus, January 20, 1811._
“While we have venal men, ignorant men, and perfidious men in our
government, no good can befal us. He must be mad who can expect our
condition to ameliorate. The venal are those who, without being
called, seemingly abandon their own affairs, and introduce themselves
into the different branches of administration with no other view
than to enrich themselves at the public expense. The ignorant are
those who think themselves wise, and who either obtain by intrigue
or accept without reluctance employments the duties of which they
are not capable of discharging. The perfidious are all those who
are indifferent spectators of this bloody struggle, and who care
not for the issue, as they will equally submit to any master. Place
no confidence, my friend, in these sort of persons, nothing can be
expected from them, and yet by an inconceivable fatality which is
attached to us, to the ruin of all parties, it would appear that the
provinces employ none but these very people. Those who commend us are
either venal or ignorant, or indifferent; at least the more we search
for the remedy, the more our evil increases.”
_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._
“_April 24, 1811._
.... “With respect to the proposed plan of admitting supplies of
grain in neutral vessels from the ports of the enemy, &c., I have no
hesitation in saying I do not see sufficient reason to justify it in
the present circumstances of this part of the Peninsula, as I have
always found bread for sale at the different places on the coast, at
the rate of about _two pounds and three quarters for the quarter of
a dollar_, at which price I yesterday bought it at Escala. And as
there has been of late more corn at Taragona than money to purchase,
I presume the latter has been the greater desideratum of the two.”
.... “The difficulty of allowing a free passage of provisions from
one part of the coast to the other would be lessened by being limited
to vessels above the size of common fishing-boats, in which I have
reason to believe considerable quantities have been carried to
Barcelona; and captain Bullen, I understand, found even a mortar in a
boat of this description.”
_General C. Doyle to captain Bullen._
“_Ripol, April, 1811._
“Can you believe that in this town, _the only fabric of arms, six
months_ have passed without a firelock being made!!! They begin
to-morrow, and give me two hundred and fifty every week, &c.”
[Note. The italics and notes of admiration are in the original.]
_Admiral Freemantle to captain Codrington._
“_Mahon, May 19, 1811._
“The uncertainty of every thing connected with Spanish affairs is
such, that I am tired of writing and explaining all that arises from
their inconsistency and want of energy.
“Until eight o’clock I had understood that the intendant had procured
one thousand quintals of biscuit for the army at Taragona, which
number I find on inquiry has dwindled to fifty-seven bags. I have
therefore been under the necessity of sending five hundred bags,
which we can very ill spare, from our own stores, with a proportion
of rice. I cannot tell you how much I have been worried and annoyed
the last three days, particularly as I feel the very great importance
Taragona is to the Spaniards, and how much this island is connected
with the event of the fall of that fortress. The intendant here has
wrote that he has sent two hundred and thirty-two bags of bread. You
will have the goodness to explain that only fifty-seven were procured
by him, which I have engaged to pay for, and that all the rest comes
immediately from our own stores, and are consequently at the disposal
of the British authorities at Taragona.”
_Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Pellew to captain
Codrington._
“_H.M. Ship Caledonia, July 22, 1811._
“The indecision, inactivity, and apparent disunion amongst the
Spanish leaders has been the great cause of failure throughout the
whole of this arduous contest, and is especially observable in the
late events in Catalonia; nor until the patriots are directed by pure
military councils and more energy and decision, can I permit myself
to think that any effectual stand can be made against the invaders.”
_Sir Edward Pellew to captain Codrington._
“_August 2, 1811._
“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, &c. The
information therein conveyed affords me a very melancholy view of the
affairs of the patriots, and gives me little reason to hope better
things from their future exertions.”....“A despatch which reached me
by the same opportunity from the superior junta of Catalonia contains
a proposal for occupying a position on the coast as a naval depôt,
and the selection of Palamos is presented to my choice. It does
not appear to me that the junta possesses at present resources for
defending any such position, and from the measures being submitted to
my determination, it seems to be expected that I should provide means
of defending them while employed in securing themselves in their
new station.” “Yet whilst the noble spirit of this ill-fated people
remains unsubdued, it would not be just to expect a total failure,
although the loss of all confidence between them and the privileged
orders, and the want of leaders among themselves who possess either
skill or competency to guide them, afford but a very precarious
prospect of their doing anything effectual to stop the invaders.”
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_November 1, 1811._
“By a letter from captain Strong it seems the people of Cadagues in
the early part of October openly refused assistance to the governor
of the Medas islands, declaring that they only acknowledged the
strongest party, and therefore paid their subscriptions to the
French; and that upon the Bustard’s going with a party of Spanish
troops to enforce obedience, they rang the alarm-bell as the signal
for the approach of an enemy, and sent to Rosas for assistance.”
_Extract of a Letter from captain Codrington to
E. H. Locker, esq._
“_February 7, 1812._
“Whilst the French pay the poor, who serve their purpose, at the
expense of the rich, the Spaniards deal out severity to the lower
classes, and oblige them to serve without pay and without clothes;
and the debauched and profligate of higher life are in many instances
rewarded, for imbecility, ignorance, and indifference to the fate of
their country never yet exceeded, without one single example being
made of the many traitors which have been discovered in the persons
of priests, officers of rank, or what are termed gentlemen.”
_Captain Codrington to general Lacy._
“_February 18, 1812._
“Being an eye-witness of the discontent of the people, which has
arisen from their being partially disarmed, and knowing how fatal
have been the consequences which have followed these practices
on former occasions, I must own I cannot offer to the admiral my
conviction of all that benefit arising from his good intentions in
which I should otherwise have confided. The officers and men of
the French army are walking about this part of the coast unarmed,
because _the juntas and justices have concealed the muskets they had_
at their disposal, and refused the people permission to attack the
enemy. In the mean time the poor people, whose hearts are burning
with patriotism, are starving for want of bread, and the richer
citizens of this devoted country are supplying the enemy with corn
and other species of provisions.”
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_Villa Nueva, February 22, 1812._
“I fear things are going on very ill in this principality from the
sudden change in the system of general Lacy, and the consequent
destruction of that confidence on the part of the people which was
certainly the cause of his former successes. Nor can there be any
doubt of the sound reason which guides the conduct of the Catalans
on this occasion; for the mode in which general Lacy effected the
dishonourable breach of faith of which they complain, bespeaks a mind
practised in deception. He ordered the patriotic companies to be
sent to particular points in subdivisions, at which points general
Sarsfield was to take forcible possession of them, and attach
them to different corps of the regular army. And the discovery of
this treachery was made by the letter to general Sarsfield falling
by mistake, into the hands of the officer who commanded the whole
division of patriotic companies. In the meantime the discontent of
the people gains ground with their sufferings, and instead of the
Spanish army being increased by the late arbitrary mandate according
to its avowed object, and not less probably in consequence of the
late extraordinary conduct of general Sarsfield, many of the Catalan
soldiers have actually passed over to the enemy.”
“The letter of the baron de Eroles in the gazette No. 10, shews that
he was again deceived in the promised support of general Sarsfield
on the 24th, and I am told he says publicly it was part of a settled
plan to sacrifice him and his whole division.”
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_Villa Nueva de Sitjes, February 22, 1812._
“Nothing but a total change can produce permanent good; for the
villanies of the intendant and commissary departments are so
thoroughly organized, that not one link of the chain can be left with
safety. I have good reason to think that even the money furnished by
England is so employed in the traffic of corn, by the individuals
through whose hands it passes, as to be the direct means of supplying
the enemy.”
_Captain Codrington to Mr. H. Wellesley._
“_March 1, 1812._
“The change of the regency will I trust produce a radical change of
that diabolical system by which plunder has been openly licensed,
and despotism and injustice towards the people, and even treachery
itself, in those of a higher class, have hitherto passed with
impunity.”
SECTION 3.—VALENCIA AND MURCIA.
_The councillor of state, Mariano Orquijo, to king Joseph._
“_Madrid, Decembre 4, 1810._
“Je viens de voir le proviseur et vicaire général qui fut arrêté à
Logrogne par les insurgés. Son opinion prononcée en faveur de V. M.
lui a attiré toutes sortes de mauvais traitemens et de disgraces,
mais enfin il est parvenu à se sauver de Valence. Il m’a rapporté
que l’esprit public de cette capitale a beaucoup changé depuis que
le général Caro (frère de Romana) s’est livré aux vexations et aux
dilapidations de toute espèce, et que son opinion est qu’on n’y
éprouvera aucune résistance. L’Archevêque de Valence, qui jouit à
présent d’une grande influence, lui a souvent parlé en secret d’une
manière favorable de V. M. et de ses ministres. C’est à l’Archevêque
qu’il est redevable de son evasion. Ce prélat m’ayant connu ainsi
que à M. de Montarco dans d’autres tems le chargea de nous voir.
Le général Bassecourt n’était nullement considéré. Le proviseur
ajoute, qu’à Alicant d’où il est parti le 14 Novembre, tout était
rempli, de réfugiés de Cadiz. D’après tout ce qu’il m’a dit, je conte
qu’aussitôt la prise de Tortoze, Valence se rendra sans coup férir.
J’ai renvoyé ce proviseur à Monsieur de Santa Fé qui l’a protégé en
sa qualité de ministre des affaires ecclesiastiques et qui fut très
sensible au malheur qui lui arriva à Logrogne.”
_General Doyle to Mr. Stuart._
“_March 8, 1811._
“There is a strong French party in Valencia. It is a sad thing
that we cannot _sacar Partido_ of that kingdom, in which are more
resources than in all the other provinces of Spain. With my head
I answer for it that in one month two thousand cavalry and twenty
thousand infantry, independent of the existing army, which is one
thousand five hundred effective cavalry and eleven thousand infantry,
could be raised, and there is money enough within the city to pay
them for six months, and without looking elsewhere for assistance
to clothe them. There is abundance of cloth, and provisions in
abundance, yet Valencia is doing nothing! and this time so precious,
while Massena draining all the rest of the Peninsula gives us time
to organize. We want a Robespierre in the government, and another in
every province!!”
_Colonel Roche to Mr. Stuart._
“_Carthagena, June 20, 1811_.
“After three years leaving them to themselves, this army (the
Murcian) is everywhere in a worse state absolutely than it was in the
commencement of the revolution.”
“The fact is that the Spaniards have no confidence in their general,
nor he in them, and thus Freire apprehends if he fights his people
will disperse. Valencia, with an immense population and great
resources, is doing little. Bassecour retired to Cuença. The same
indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevails through the country, and I
see little stimulus produced by the establishment of the cortes; that
feeling of enthusiasm which existed is fast dying away. The thing in
the world most agreeable to the Spaniards at this moment would be to
be allowed to be neuter, and that England and France should fight the
battle and pay all the expenses.”
_Captain Codrington to the honourable H. Wellesley._
“_September 8, 1811._
“After ascertaining that much art was employed to disgust the army
with general Blake, and at the same time to prejudice the people
against their officers, I relied upon the purity of my motives, and
opened the subject to the general with the candour and freedom it
required. I had great satisfaction in finding him well aware of all
that was passing, and upon his guard as to the consequences. Upon my
mentioning that certain hand-bills were posted up, he produced and
gave me the enclosed copies. He told me that upon obtaining them he
went to the marquis of Palacios, who, necessarily agreeing in their
evil tendency, consented to accompany the general to the palace of
the archbishop, where I trust measures were adopted to prevent a
repetition of the misconduct of the Padre Igual and his numerous
bigoted coadjutors. I submitted to the general’s attention the fatal
effects of his quitting this part of the Peninsula, while the minds
of the people were in such a state of fermentation, and allowing the
supreme authority to revert to the marquis of Palacios. He assured
me that he clearly saw the danger which would arise from it; he had
determined on no account to do so until the marquis was removed by
the government from his present situation.”
_Mr. Tupper’s report to sir H. Wellesley._
(Extract.)
“_January 27, 1812._
“The scandalous behaviour of the members of the junta will have more
influence upon the public mind, will dishearten the people even more
than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of the army. For seeing
their representatives return to their respective districts, it will
give an example to follow that all is lost, and having no authority
to protect them or to look to, the people have no other resource left
than to submit to the yoke of the enemy.”
_Extracts from Mr. Tupper’s report to sir Henry Wellesley
from 22 to 27 January, 1812._
“Blake with his immense resources remained altogether inactive, and
contented himself with observing the movements of the enemy, and his
progress in fortifying himself under the walls of the city.”
“With Blake’s approbation I had raised a corps of about one hundred
and eighty men to act as guerillas, and by beginning a plan of
offensive operations I expected to see the example followed. I
also demanded the direction of the chief battery, that of Santa
Catalina, from whence the French camp might be much annoyed, and for
the space of thirty successive days caused the French considerable
damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this battery, that of St.
Joseph contiguous to it, and that of the Puente del Mar, every thing
else remained in a state of complete inactivity. Blake, lulled
into a state of confidence that the enemy would not attack without
reinforcements, had taken no measures whatever.”
“The junta of Valencia was composed of members, as per list enclosed,
of which only the first remained, the others having before retired
and shamefully gone to their respective homes; but upon the fall of
the capital where they had their property, those remaining sent in
their resignation to Mahi, and without being competent to do so, gave
up the only representative authority of the province which had been
confided to them, and have thus thrown the whole country into a state
of anarchy, abandoning it altogether to the will of the enemy; yet I
am persuaded the spirit of the people is the same, great resources
are left in the province, immense riches still remain in the
churches, convents, diezmos, &c., &c.”————“I am however sorry to say
that since the fall of the capital, nay, since the battle of the 26th
ultimo, not a single step has been taken, and at this moment outside
the walls of Alicant the province does not exist.——Mahi has objected
to Padre Rico, the only man in my opinion, and in that of every body,
capable of giving activity and soul to the resources of the country.”
.... “I am sorry to inform your excellency that after repeated
interviews with Mahi and the intendant Rivas, on the subject of the
commission I had proposed, I am now clearly of the opinion from the
repeated delays and studied objections that no authority will be
established.”————“ In short nothing has been done, and nothing will
be done.”————
“I am firmly of opinion that the people now in authority are
disposed, by leaving public affairs in their present abandoned
state, to submit to the French yoke.”————“On the 16th ultimo, when
Montbrun made his appearance, the Ayuntamiento desired the Syndico
Personeso to give a petition in the name of the people to enter
into a capitulation; he refused; but I am informed there was some
arrangement between the governor and the Ayuntamiento, the members
whereof remain in office notwithstanding their traitorous conduct on
the 16th.”
SECTION 4.—ANDALUSIA.
_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._
“_9th May, 1810._
“Nothing new here; the regency and the junta are as usual more
asleep than awake, and I can augur nothing good from the government
remaining in such hands—let their intentions be ever so good.
Nothing but the assembly of the cortes, and from thence springing up
a revolutionary system, overturning abuses and interesting the people
in their own cause by solid and permanent, instead of contingent
and prospective reforms, calling forth talents if to be found for
the chief situations, and inforcing vigour and rousing enthusiasm.
Nothing but some great change (such as we might in the beginning have
assisted in bringing about) can carry on this war to any good result.
The people are obstinate in their hatred of the French, and from that
alone spring the fits of patriotism and loyalty which keep alive the
flame in some place or another. That it is so one cannot doubt from
the effects, but it is never to be met with where one is, at least I
have never yet seen enthusiasm though I have heard of it. Hence the
bulk of the people seem to be completely indifferent to what is going
on, and all seem most unwilling to submit to the deprivation of any
comfort, and to the sacrifices which a state of siege requires. They
would be very well pleased to have any thing done for them, and to
see the enemy driven away, that they might go to eat strawberries
at Chiclana, and they are much disposed to blame our inactivity,
especially that of the navy, in permitting the enemy to have advanced
so near on the point of Trocadero. The destruction of these two
forts at first was certainly a great error in admiral Purvis; had
they been kept up and well garrisoned, as they support one another,
it would have been a very tedious operation to have reduced them.
Meanwhile you will hear that the improvidence of the junta, and their
denial of any such risk to Mr. Wellesley, placed the bread provision
of the town in much too precarious a situation; in short, they
completely deceived him by their assurances of the most ample means
of subsistence, and both flour and wheat have been sent away since he
came.”
_Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._
“_Isla de Leon, February 5, 1811._
“Blake is becoming very unpopular, and I think his reign will be
short. He is supposed to be by no means partial to the English. I
know not whether you will approve of the appointments to Estremadura
and Gallicia, but I am sure you will be surprised to hear that
general Mahi is appointed to command the army of the centre. I
communicated confidentially to general Blake the copy of the letter
which you forwarded to me from general Walker, taking care to conceal
general Walker’s name, so that Blake was fully apprised of our
opinion of general Mahi previously to his appointment of him to the
command in Murcia.”
_Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._
“_Cadiz, February 27. 1811._
“It grieves me to see from day to day how little is done by the
Spaniards, and how little is likely to be done. The cortes have not
given a new impulse to the war as was expected. They look to their
regency for plans of reform for their armies, and their regency is
worse than any former government. Blake, of whom I know that you as
well as the world in general have a good opinion, does nothing. He
refuses to reform abuses that are pointed out to him, passes his days
in deliberation upon questions of no moment, and is in my opinion
decidedly adverse to the English. Whittingham’s plan, (disciplining
a separate corps,) which was approved of before his arrival, he has
endeavoured by every kind of trick to reject or render useless.”
“The cortes is full of priests, who, united with the Catalans,
are for preserving the old routine of business, and adverse to
every thing that can give energy and vigour to the operations of
government. Fanaticism and personal interest direct their opinions;
Arguelles and his party are anxious that something should be done to
remedy the disgraceful state of their armies. I have no doubt but
that they would remove the present government, though the friends of
Blake, if there was any chance of the Catalan party permitting them
to elect a better.”
“Be assured, my dear Stuart, that the cortes is, as at present
constituted, any thing but revolutionary or jacobinical. They love
their monarchy, and are anxious to maintain the inquisition in all
its forms, the only branch of government to which they seem disposed
to communicate any energy. If there is not soon some new spirit
infused into the cortes, it will become an overgrown junta, meddling
with every paltry detail of police, and neglecting the safety of
their country—and the regency will be content to reign (very badly)
over Cadiz and the Isla.”
_Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._
“_Cadiz, August 5, 1811._
“The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press
has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the
English.”
“The regency and cortes have lost all influence every where, and
the distress for money added to the general depression here after
the campaign in Estremadura may possibly throw us into a state of
anarchy.”
“I am somewhat alarmed by the state of the Serranos de Ronda; the
Spanish generals have been quarrelling, and the peasants declare they
are tired of the abuses committed there, and that it is reported they
mean to capitulate with the French.”
_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._
“_Isla de Leon, April 24, 1811._
“The Spanish government has published an official narrative of the
expedition (Barosa) full of misrepresentations and blinking the
question of the cause of failure entirely—this has obliged me to
add something to what I wrote before to Mr. Wellesley. There are
some instances of impudence supporting falsehood beyond example. The
_proud_ Spaniard is no less _vain_ I think.”
_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._
“_Isla, May 6, 1811._
“The government here supported by the cortes seemed to be determined
to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly
brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington’s
great efforts they are playing Buonaparte’s game so positively that I
despair of any great good.”
_Colonel Austin to Mr. Stuart._
“_Faro, March 24, 1811._
“Whether Ballesteros is authorized by his government to pursue the
steps he has taken, I know not, but I certainly cannot but consider
them as just and necessary. The junta de Seville is a mere farce
supported at an immense expense without the least utility or benefit,
and preserving in its train a number of idle characters who ought to
be employed in the defence of the nation, but who now only add to its
burthens. I have had many negotiations with the junta, and though I
have always kept up appearances through policy, yet I have found, in
the room of the honour and candour which ought to characterize it,
nothing but chicanery and dissimulation.”
_General Carrol to Mr. Stuart._
“_Olivenza, April 29, 1811._
“Would to Heaven that the Spanish armies, or, more properly speaking,
the skeletons of the Spanish armies were under his lordship’s
(Wellington’s) command; we might in that case do great things, but
alas! our pride seems to increase with our misfortunes, and is only
equalled by our ignorance!”
_Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellesley._
“_July 13, 1811._
“I have endeavoured to throw together the numbers, &c. of the
different guerillas, &c., which clearly demonstrate the false
exaggerations circulated respecting that description of force;
though their appearance in different parts has most unreasonably
encreased the alarm of the enemy and proportionable confidence of
the Spaniards, they cannot be calculated to exceed in the aggregate
twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the utmost.”
Note. Here follows a list of the Partidas with their numbers and
stations too long to insert.
_Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._
“_Cadiz, July 31, 1811._
“Nothing can be more wretched than the state of affairs here; the
regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want of
talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement:
the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any
money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than
they have been at any time since the commencement of the war.”
_Extract from the manifesto of the Spanish regency._
“_January 23, 1812._
“There have reached the government the cries of the armies which
defend us, depicting their painful privations; the groans of the
inhabitants of districts, ready to fall under the yoke of the
barbarous invaders; the complaints of the provinces already occupied,
always loyal though oppressed and laid waste.”
“Cease now, and henceforward, all personal pretensions; the
ill-understood feelings of interest dictated by provincial spirit;
exemptions unjustly demanded at this period of desolation, writings
which, while they ought to create the most ardent patriotism, to
unite and enlighten the nation, appear inspired by the enemy for the
purpose of enslaving it.”
SECTION 5.
PRIVATEERS.
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_Arens de Mar, August 23, 1811._
“I have numberless complaints of the Spanish privateers that come
upon the coast, and I am sure it would be a benefit to the country
if they were all deprived of their commission. They do nothing but
plunder the inhabitants of those places which are occasionally
overrun by the French armies, and who embrace the opportunity of
their absence to carry on a little trade with other parts of the
Peninsula.”
_Ditto to sir H. Wellesley._
“_Valencia, September 8, 1811._
“I trust some decisive measures will be taken to abolish altogether
a system of privateering nothing short of piracy; and in which the
vessels from Gibraltar seem to take the lead. I have great reason to
believe that they plunder the unfortunate vessels of all countries
by hoisting whatever colours may answer their purposes of assumed
national hostility; and as we never hear of their attacking each
other, I have no doubt that the British and French flags are often
united in furtherance of this predatory warfare. The numberless
complaints which I receive from all parts of the coast, and the
difficulty of trading betwixt Catalonia and Valencia, on account
of the privateers which swarm in these seas, drive many into an
intercourse with Barcelona and other places in the occupation of the
enemy, in order to get a livelihood.”
_Ditto to admiral Penrose, Valencia._
“The depredations of the Gibraltar privateers have been carried on
to such an extent, in all parts of the Mediterranean, as to bring
serious reflections upon the British flag.”
SECTION 6.
FRENCH PRISONERS AT CABRERA.
_Captain Codrington to E. Locker, Esq._
“_September 18, 1811._
“I cannot at all events think it a wise measure to receive into
colonel Whittingham’s corps the prisoners at Cabrera, who have long
ago withstood the offers of general Roche, _when naked as they were
born, and fighting for each other’s miserable rations to prolong an
existence inconceivably wretched_, in hopes of rejoining the French.”
_Sir H. Wellesley to captain Codrington._
“_October 10, 1811._
“With regard to the French prisoners at Cabrera, I procured from
the Spanish government long since an order to the governor of the
Balearic Islands to suspend all negotiations with the French on that
subject, and not on any account to consent to exchange them.”
* * * * *
No. II.
SECTION 1.
SIEGE OF TARAGONA.
_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._
“_Taragona_, _May 15, 1811._
“During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected
arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most
extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But
from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an
example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance
stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security
which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me
to expect.”
“A well planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the
backwardness of some of the officers employed in it.”——“I had the
satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did
his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from
the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he
attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the
shipping.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811._
“Leaving Taragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the
forenoon of the 17th.”——“From thence general Doyle wrote to general
O’Donnel an account of the situation of Taragona and of my detaining
captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement
which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival
off Murviedro, we found general O’Donnel had already ordered the
embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry and two hundred
and eleven artillery-men.”——“Delivering to general O’Donnel two
thousand stand of arms, accoutrements, and clothing to enable him to
bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply
the place of the regular soldiers; thus detached from his army, we
proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which
means the troops of general Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry
for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps
of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active
warfare.”
“At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for
Taragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillery
men and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, &c. sent
in the Paloma Spanish corvette from Carthagena in company with a
Spanish transport from Cadiz deeply laden with similar supplies.”
“After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms,
&c. for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the conde
of Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with
his brother, although, on account of his wound, he was very unfit
for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination
on the part of general O’Donnel to commit to my protection, for
the succour of Taragona, another division of his best troops under
general Miranda, consisting of four thousand men, whilst he himself
would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the
Ebro.”
“The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalonian army had
heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so
extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome,
because the less expected, and the admiration which was thus created
in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part
of the enemy.”
“I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of
Taragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if
general Suchet should unfortunately be obliged to raise the siege,
and for re-embarking and restoring to general O’Donnel whatever may
remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he
exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower
and strength of his army. He even went so far as to declare, in the
presence of general Miranda, the principal officer of his staff,
general Doyle, captain Adam, captain White, and myself, that he
considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of
Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign
his command for that particular account.”
“It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I
did most distinctly warn general O’Donnel, that I would in no case
answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo
Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew
that, in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded
by people whose advice and whose conduct was in no case to be relied
on.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Blake, Taragona, June 22, 1811._
“I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case
of the enemy gaining the Puerto, general Sarsfield should retire
to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to
assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through
colonel Green, from general Contreras, that although he had heard
of such a disposition being made by general Sarsfield, and assented
to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or
approbation.”——“I understand that an order had arrived in the morning
from the marquis of Campo Verde for general Velasco to take the
command of the Puerto, and for general Sarsfield to join his army,
that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about
three o’clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it,
and that general Velasco only arrived in time to find the Spanish
troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded
and the French assaulting the place.”
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_Mattaro, November 1, 1811._
“Having stated in a letter to sir Charles Cotton, on the 22d June
last, that I understand general Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto
and embarked without the knowledge of general Contreras, (which
indeed was the substance of a message sent me by general Contreras
himself,) I owe it to an officer of general Sarsfield’s high military
character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by
general Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave
to enclose in justification of my present opinion; 1st, a passport
sent by general Contreras to general Sarsfield in consequence as he
alleged of an order from the marquis of Campo Verde. 2d. An extract
from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any
knowledge of the passports. 3d. A letter from general Contreras to
general Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting
to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such
a critical moment, in which he says ‘that he cannot send him a copy
of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence
is necessary at the head-quarters to assist in the operations about
to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a
moment to lose.’ 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same
day by general Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that
general Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge!!!”
_General Doyle to colonel Roche._
“_June 23, 1811._
“Is it possible to conceive any thing so absurd, and I could almost
say _wicked_, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of
Cartagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments _they sent
with such a parade of their patriotism to relieve Taragona_. Two
thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the
daily destruction of arms by the enemy’s fire and the getting out of
repair from constant use.”
_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._
“_Off Taragona, June 23, 1811._
“Another regiment arrived from Carthagena yesterday under convoy of
the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from
them by colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as
being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent
them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place
without arms, I have sent the Termagant to Carthagena, to endeavour
to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the
troops belonging to that place.”
_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._
(Extract.)
“_June 29, 1811._
“The Regulus with five transports including a victualler arrived
with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf
was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the
forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon
colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon
the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed
in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the
Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison,
it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable,
would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short
time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion
was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in
perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the
evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel
Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the
squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his
determination to cut his way out and join the marquis of Campo Verde
_the instant the enemy’s breaching battery should open_, and which
he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed
the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town,
although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie.”
_Extracts from general Contreras’ report._
(Translated.)
“I saw myself reduced to my own garrison.” “I considered if my force
was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most
heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves.
I recollected however that I _had still eight thousand of the best
and most experienced troops in Spain_.” “All conspired against this
poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come
back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily
renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a
division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and
went to join Campo Verde.
“An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who
commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand
what I wished him to do. _I replied that if he would disembark and
enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he
merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to
defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice,
since I would neither command nor counsel him._ The 27th the English
commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front
attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to
resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the
place they came to succour.
“_This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the
worst of all_; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that
they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only
resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my
coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders
the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion
of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.”
_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._
“_12th July, 1811._
“The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence
of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important
fortress.”
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_12th July, 1811._
“The marquis blames generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter
retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full
credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy
beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him.”
_Ditto to Mr. Wellesley._
(Extract.)
“_20th July, 1811._
“The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce
material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it,
without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their
due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion
of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting
the arms for which I sent to Carthagena will show how far colonel
Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that
occasion.”
“To enable you to form a correct opinion of general Contreras I must
refer you to general Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service,
the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations
in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through
him. It does not appear to me that he ever visited the works himself,
or it would not have fallen to the lot of captain Adams and myself
to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and
a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond
the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the
Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing
the gun-boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less
than twelve guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon general
Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery,
he talked of _inquiring into it to-morrow_.”
“It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of
the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in
the events of every passing day from the first investment of the
place.”——“I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid
of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a
sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so
grossly misconducted themselves.”
SECTION 2.
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_29th July, 1811._
“Had colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed general
Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessor of continuing at the
head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the
captain-general instead of retiring to Peniscola with the money and
arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious
source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence.”
_Ditto to Don F. Savartes, vocal of the Junta._
“_28th July, 1811._
“————Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola,
I have opened the letter from the junta to him.”——“Had I not in this
instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent,
the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have
been too late to execute their object.”
_Captain Thomas to captain Codrington._
(Extract.)
“_H.M.S. Undaunted, off Arens, 7th Oct. 1811._
“Having observed, in the Catalonia Gazette of the 24th of September,
the copy of a letter said to be written by colonel Green to
his excellency general Lacy, relative to our operations on the
Medas Islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of
our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and
astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request
you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner
the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this
letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say
that colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English
officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability
of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the
expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only.
But immediately after, in the hearing of all, did declare it to be
his opinion that the island was not tenable.
“As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the
larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time
and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy
to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford
our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to
fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has
appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood,
it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my
opinion have quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have
been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted.
I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores.
“If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most
extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be
sufficient. As an act of courtesy to colonel Green, on landing the
marines I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from
him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before
the expedition sailed, on your informing me that general Lacy had
offered some Spanish troops, and asking how many I thought would be
necessary, my answer was ‘about forty;’ and I have no hesitation in
declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the
castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this
occasion.
SECTION 3.
_Captain Codrington’s orders to captain Adam of the
Invincible._
“_July 1st, 1811._
“You are hereby directed, in consequence of a representation made
to me by general Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the
Spanish frigates Prueba, Diana, and Astrea, which the general reports
to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure,
archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and
ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together
with the officers and soldiers which were saved from Taragona, and
which are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them
you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here,
and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience.”
_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._
“_Villa Nueva, 3d July, 1811._
“I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure
had not the whole conduct both of the Prueba and Diana made their
captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates
remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the
batteries of the enemy on the 22d of last month, and never attempted
to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then
sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did
not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children,
and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of general
Contreras, after I had already sent above two thousand to this place;
and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the
captain of the Prueba refused to receive some wounded officers.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_18th July, 1811._
“I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to
by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which
I have had to communicate with upon the coast, with exception of
the Astrea frigate and the Paloma corvette. In the others I have
seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate
the distresses of their countrymen.”——“I have heard also that the
Algesiras, which lately arrived at Arens, has landed the stores and
ammunition, with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling
into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!”
SECTION 4.
_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._
“_12th July, 1811._
“General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of
those who have escaped the enemy.”
“He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts
that if he were captain-general he would raise forty thousand men and
clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting
rhodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the
main spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an
army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake
the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the
principality.”
_Captain Codrington to sir H. Wellesley._
“_September 1, 1811._
“The affair of general Milans” (namely, the sending of corn to
Barcelona under his passport) “which I mentioned to you in my last
private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however
to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers
reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena
for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to
Barcelona. The _fact_ of the punishment is I believe truly stated,
but the _cause_ no less falsely, enterely as I suspect with the view
of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General
Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to
the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as
they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me
that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to general Milans
himself.”
SECTION 5.
_Extract from a minute made by captain Codrington._
“_Mattaro, July 6, 1811._
“Colonel O’Ronan, aid-du-camp to the marquis of Campo Verde, arrived,
and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march
to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry
not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the
horses on the beach. Colonel O’Ronan said this determination was the
result of a junta, composed of the marquis, general St. Juan, general
Caro, general Miranda, the general of artillery, brigadier Santa
Cruz, Velasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed
and discussed a long time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote,
that he rose from his seat and said, ‘any officer who could give
such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and
his division would stand or fall with the principality.’ Every other
officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards
appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield), who thought with
Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the
other generals. _In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the
principality._
“I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I
felt a duty to general O’Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to
the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account
to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned
in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect.”——“The
colonel, who could not venture on shore again lest he should be
murdered by the inhabitants of Mattaro, for having been the bearer of
a commission to arrest brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to
the marquis my answer.”
_Extract from a minute of information given by the baron
d’Eroles._
“_July 9, 1811._
“The baron d’Eroles was appointed captain-general of Catalonia by
the junta of general officers, of which the marquis of Campo Verde
was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that
so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there
was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the
moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in
full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the
dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would
do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and
confusion. In this state things were when general Lacy arrived.
The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his
aid-du-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but
that he was resolved to support general Lacy in his command, not only
with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that
he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice.”
_Extract from general Doyle’s Letter after seeing the above._
“The Valencian division, that is to say, two thousand four hundred
of the four thousand three hundred soldiers who disembarked in this
province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda
says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis’s
determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they
would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the
conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this
letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame.”
_Captain Codrington to the marquis of Campo Verde._
“_Blake, July 5, 1811._
“I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out
of Taragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when
I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and
dissolved the contract.”
_Extracted from captain Codrington’s papers._
“Minute of a conference betwixt generals Caro and Miranda with
general Doyle and myself this day.
“_July 9, 1811._
“About eight o’clock generals Caro and Miranda came on board the
Blake. After being seated in the cabin with general Doyle and myself,
general Caro begged general Doyle would explain to me, that they were
come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the
division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I
desired to know what promise general Caro understood me to have made?
He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia.
I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them
if they should ever join the marquis of Campo Verde, although I had
deeply pledged myself to restore them to general O’Donnel if they
joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was very confident
would be decisive of its success. I then referred general Miranda to
a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through general Doyle,
on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was
ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation
from general O’Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General
Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which general Doyle,
to whom he had shewn those instructions jointly with myself, after
leaving Taragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how
he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing
that he was therein positively ordered ‘desembarear en la plaza de
Tarragona,’ general Doyle stopped.
“_General Miranda._ ‘Ah! but read on.’
“_General Doyle._ ‘No, sir, there is the positive proof of your
receiving such an order.’
“_General Miranda._ ‘Well, but read on.’
“_General Doyle_. ‘No, sir. This (_pointing to the paper_) is the
positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to
establish, because you positively denied it.’
“Upon this general Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, ‘he was
not aware of there being any such order.’ And general Miranda again
requested general Doyle would read on.
“_General Doyle._ ‘For what purpose?’
“_General Miranda._ ‘To prove that I was not to shut myself up with
the division in the plaza de Taragona.’
“_General Doyle._ ‘There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that,
for it was a part of the very stipulation made by captain Codrington
when he strongly pledged himself to general O’Donnel.’
“General Doyle continued,——‘And now, general Caro, that we have
proved to you that general Miranda _had_ orders to land in Taragona,
and that captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had
imagined, I must inform you that he has been eight days upon the
coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for
other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and
he desires me to add that in consideration of what is due to the
liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by general O’Donnel and
Valencia in aid of Taragona, but not at all on account of any pledge
he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in
re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so
bound by his word of honour.’”
_Mr. Wellesley to lord Wellesley._
“_July 28._
“The morning of 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the
British squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva,
five thousand French infantry and five hundred cavalry surprised the
place by a night-march, and seized all the property of Taragona,
which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand
dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no
violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed
to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th
went to Igualada to join Campo Verde.”
“Desertion in the army at Mataro has been carried to a most
alarming extent since the fall of Taragona; the first night
fifteen hundred men disappeared, nearly three hundred cavalry had
likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be
attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part
of the officers.”————“The only division that keeps together in any
tolerable order is that of general Sarsfield, of about two thousand
men.”————“He had however disputes with Eroles, and the people called
for the latter to lead them.”
* * * * *
No. III.
SECTION 1.
POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH.
SPANISH MINISTER’S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH
GENERALS.
_From the councillor of state, Mariano Luis Orquijo, to
king Joseph._
“_Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810._
“SIRE,—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le duc de
Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune
somme d’argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances
le demanderait, jusqu’à ce que les dépenses de l’armée des régimens
qu’on lève et des employés de la province, &c., furent pleinement
couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans le
cas que cette détermination ne fut pas suivie.”
“_Madrid, 3 Agosto de 1810._
“Le général Sebastiani a fait voir au commissaire royale à Grenade,
un ordre du duc de Dalmatie, qui lui enjoint de la manière la plus
expresse, de le mettre en état d’arrestation si pour le 1er Août lui
et le préfet de Malaga ne mettent au pouvoir de Sebastiani quatre
millions de réaux. L’exorbitance de cette somme, pour une province
qui a déjà payé son contingent, et le court terme de huit jours
designé pour le payement, donnent à croire que cette somme une fois
livrée on en demandera une plus forte. Selon toutes les apparences,
et d’après les conversations particulières, il s’agit de profiter de
l’absence du roi pour mettre les Andalousies sur le même pied que
les provinces de Biscaye, Burgos, &c. Il se peut néanmoins qu’on ait
voulu inspirer ces craintes dans des idées tout-à-fait différentes.
Quoiqu’il en soit il serait scandaleux de voir un commissaire qui
représente la personne du roi arrêté dans une de ses provinces.”
_From Mariano Luis Orquijo to king Joseph._
“_Madrid, 7 Août, 1810._
“Monsieur d’Aranza m’écrit en dâte du 22 Août dans une lettre
particulière les paroles suivantes, en les soulignant pour mieux
fixer l’attention: ‘_Le maréchal Soult est très content, mais il ne
fera usage de son autorité que pour le bien: il aime le roi et la
nation: ce pays lui plait beaucoup_.’”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Madrid, 13 Août, 1810._
“Parmi les lettres que m’a porté le courrier d’Andalousie arrivé
hier, j’en remarque une de monsieur Aranza écrite dans un stile
étudié et que je soupçonne redigée d’accord avec le duc de Dalmatie.
C’est un panégyrique à la louange de ce maréchal dans lequel monsieur
d’Aranza porte aux nues l’intelligence et la zêle du duc de Dalmatie
dans la partie administrative; la considération qu’il donne aux
autorités espagnoles; son extrême adresse à manier les esprits, et
l’habilité de ses dispositions militaires, dans un pays couvert
d’insurgés. M. d’Aranza termine en formant le vœu que le maréchal ne
soit aucunement troublé dans l’exécution de ses plans, et que le sort
de l’Andalousie soit mis entièrement a sa discretion.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Madrid, le 23 Août, 1810._
“Par ma correspondance avec l’Andalousie j’ai appris; de Cordone:
que M. Angulo à reçu les lettres qui l’appellent à Madrid, et
qu’il se dispose à suivre le grand convoi sorti de Seville le 11
du courant. De Seville: qu’un corsaire Française s’étant emparé
d’un paquebot qui allait de Cadiz à Alicante, on y avait trouvé
entr’autres depêches une lettre de Campmany, grand partisan des
Anglais, et un des Coryphées de la revolution. Il avouait à son ami,
don Anselmo Rodriguez de Ribas, intendant de l’armée du centre, qui
s’était plaint à lui des excès que commettaient certaines juntes,
que Cadiz n’offrait pas un spectacle moins digne de pitié: que les
Anglais qu’il avait appris à connaître s’arrogaient peu à peu toute
l’autorité: que le commerce libre accordé aux ports d’Amerique
excitait à Cadiz un mécontentement général, et que Venegas allait au
Méxique en qualité de viceroi: il parle en outre de l’arrestation de
plusieurs personnes connues, et de la de considération dans laquelle
est tombée la régence.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Madrid, 27 Septembre, 1810._
“Le maréchal Victor permet le passage à beaucoup de femmes qui
veulent se réunir a leurs maris, les femmes en contant les choses
telles qu’elles sont, détruisent bien des erreurs dans lesquelles
on a généralement été entrainé par le gouvernement actuel. L’ennemi
permit ces jours derniers l’entrée dans l’île à plusieurs femmes qui
voulaient passer par Chiclanes pour se réunir à leurs parents, mais
dernièrement elles furent contenus à coups de canon, et un boulet
emporta la tête de celui qui les accompagnait. Le gouvernement
Anglais preside à toutes les opérations, et crainte cette espèce des
communications.”
“_Valladolid, le 11 Août, 1810._
“SIRE,—Je suis arrivé a Valladolid, où je n’ai pas trouvé le général
Kellermann. Il parait que les Espagnols out cerné un détachement de
Français qui se trouve à la Puebla de Sanabria, et que ce général y
eu allé pour le débloquer. Les guerrilles ont été hier aux portes
de Valladolid, et il y à cinq a six jours que soixante dix Français
ont été détruits à Villalon; la terreur s’est emparée de tous les
esprits, et l’on croit que trois cent hommes ne suffisent pas pour
faire paner un courrier: malgré cela, je parterai demain, escorté par
deux cent hommes avec un convoi de prisonniers de Ciudad Rodrigo,
donc le nombre n’est pas considérable, parcequ’ici on leur accorde la
liberté moyennant une somme qu’on règle avec le général Kellermann
pour les frais de la guerre.
“Toutes les autorités du pays sont venues me visiter, et me consulter
sur la conduite qu’elles doivent tenir depuis les derniers ordres
du général Kellermann pour qu’elles n’obeinent ni ne correspondent
avec d’autre autorité que la sienne. C’est la chancellerie qui se
trouve plus embarrassée que toute autre, parce-qu’elle ne peut
concilier l’administrat de la justice au nom de votre majesté avec
l’impossibilité de correspondre avec son ministre.
“Je n’ai pas reçu le moindre égard du général Dufrene qui est à la
place du général Kellermann. Il ne m’a pas visité, ni même accorde
un factionnaire; tout le monde s’en est apperçu, et cette conduite
a confirmé l’opinion que l’on a conçue que votre majesté ne règne
point dans ce pays. J’ai tâché de detruire une idée qui décourage les
véritables sujets de votre majesté, et soutient les espérances de ses
ennemis. Les généraux ne s’apperçoivent pas du mal qu’ils produisent
en ferant croire que le service de l’empereur, et ses intérêts
peuvent être en contradiction avec ceux de votre majesté.
“Si le général Dufrene s’était borné à ne rien faire pour faciliter
mon voyage, j’aurai moins de motifs de plainte contre lui, mais il a
retenu l’escorte de cavalerie que le général Tilly m’avait donnée. De
toutes les manières, Sire, je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir
pour accélérer mon voyage, et répondre à la confiance avec laquelle
votre majesté a daigné me distinguer.
“LE MARQUIS ALMENARA.”
_Orquijo to Joseph, relating his conference with the French
ambassador._
(Extract.)
“_Madrid, Août 22, 1810._
“Je lui dis de s’adresser sur ces deux points au ministre des
relations extérieures, il me répondit qu’un désagrément qu’on
éprouvait avec lui était l’obligation de lui donner à tout bout
de champ des notes écrites, qu’à Vittoria il l’avait compromis en
présentant à votre majesté ces notes comme officielles, que le
bon vieux duc (ce sont ses propres expressions) étourdissait dans
l’instant, qu’il n’entendait point, ou ne voulait point entendre
ce qu’on lui disait, et qu’il demandait qu’on lui donnat par écrit
ce qui n’était pas nécessaire d’écrire. Je lui répétais toujours
qu’il devait s’adresser au duc puisque c’était le seul canal par
lequel il devait diriger ses demandes, que je ne me mélais point de
ces affaires, et que je n’en entretiendrais votre majesté à moins
que votre majesté ne m’en parlat la première, mais comme simple
particulier je l’assurai de l’inviolabilité des promesses de votre
majesté et de ses idées liberales. L’ambassadeur ajouta que dans la
matinée du jour de St. Napoleon, et les jours suivants, le général
Belliard, Borelli, et leurs alentours avaient parlé fort mal des
expressions de votre majesté sur ses premiers devoirs, et qu’il ne
doutait pas qu’ils n’en eussent écrit à Paris; qu’il n’avait pas pu
se dispenser de transmettre à sa cour ces paroles; mais qu’il les
avait présentés comme une conséquence du premier discours tenu par
votre majesté et une nuance nécessaire pour adoucir le mauvais effêt
qu’avait produit ici l’article du Moniteur sur les mots de l’empereur
au duc de Berg. Je le lui avais présenté de cette manière en sortant
de l’appartement de votre majesté, et je lui montrai en même temps
un rapport venu de la Navarre dans lequel on dépeignait le facheux
étât de ce royaume en proie aux excès des bandes de brigands et
aux dilapidations des gouvernemens militaires. Si l’ambassadeur a
écrit dans ces termes comme il me l’a dit, autant par honneur que
par attachement à votre majesté, à son pays et au notre, il a bien
rempli ses devoirs. Quoiqu’il en soit, je me lui cru obligé de donner
connaissance à votre majesté de ces faits ainsi que de la surprise
que, selon l’ambassadeur, a causé à l’empereur et au ministère
Français le silence du duc de Santa Fé qui ne s’explique sur rien.
L’ambassadeur se plaint d’avoir été compromis par lui, car à sa
demande et en consequence des conversations fréquentes qu’il eut avec
lui pendant les trois jours qu’il passa à Madrid, il écrivit à sa
cour que le duc de Santa Fé était chargé de négocier sur la situation
de votre majesté et celle de notre pays, que l’ambassadeur lui-même
disait ne pouvoir pas durer. C’est à la lettre ce que c’est dit entre
l’ambassadeur et moi.” &c. &c.
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Madrid, le 13 Novembre, 1810._
“Monsieur Pereyra a reçu du maréchal Soult une réponse extrêmement
aigre. Ce commissaire royal persiste dans son opinion que les mesures
indiquées par le duc de Dalmatie pour l’approvisionnement de l’armée
ne rempliront pas le but qu’il se propose; mais le maréchal veut
être obéi. D’un autre côté le général Sebastiani l’a contraint à lui
donner onze cent mille réaux. Placé entre ces deux écueils, Monsieur
Pereyra a perdu courage et demande à votre majesté de le rappeller à
Madrid. Le général Dufour a pris le commandement de Grenade.
“MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Madrid, 19 de Decembre, 1810._
“Monsieur le comte de Montarco était le 11 courant a Manzanares,
il m’écrit que les habitans de la Manche se plaignent de ce que
les troupes qui retrouvent dans la province ne les protégent pas
autant que leur nombre le leur permet, que les brigands viennent
leur enlever leurs grains pour les transporter dans les royaumes
de Valence et de Murcie, ou dans l’Estremadoure. Ils craignent une
disette et désirent ardemmement qu’il se forme de grands dépôts
de grains dans des places à l’abri des incursions des partis
d’insurgés. Les commandants des troupes Françaises sont d’une
exigence et d’une hauteur insupportables, et les rapports faits au
comte de Montarco par toutes les autorités légales du pays confirment
complettement ceux que l’intendant de la Manche ne cesse de faire aux
divers ministères depuis plusieurs mois.”
“_Madrid, le 15 Février, 1811._
“SIRE,—Le préfet de Santander me remêt, en dâte du 16 Janvier,
copie des offices qu’il a reçus pour la réunion de cette province au
gouvernement militaire de Biscaye. J’ai l’honneur de les mettre sous
les yeux de votre majesté en lui observant que cette mesure a été
prise sur la proposition du général Caffarelli.
“On a demandé au préfet de Santander un état des employés civils
et militaires, des moines, du clergé, et des appointemens dont ils
jouissent. Il croit en conséquence que des attributions ainsi que
celles des employés seront nulles des que la province sera gouvernée
à l’instar de celle de Biscaye. Il ajoute que lui et les chefs
principaux de l’administration sont décidés à ne travailler que sous
les ordres de votre majesté et demandent avec instance que votre
majesté ne les abandonne pas.
“Le sous-préfet de Logrogne me dit en dâte du 22 Janvier que
l’opinion publique s’est améliorée depuis qu’on y a appris les
nouvelles du Portugal, et qu’on y connait le peu de moyens de defense
qu’offre Valence dans le désordre extrême qui y règne. La Riofa ne
renferme plus de bandes complettes d’insurgés, mais on y trouve
encore quelques brigands épars et des voleurs de grands chemins.
“MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.”
SECTION 2.
(Relating to Joseph’s abdication.)
_Vindication of the King._
_Le ministre secrétaire d’état à monsieur le duc de Santa Fé,
et en son absence à monsieur le marquis d’Almenara._
_Palais de Madrid, le 12 Septembre, 1810, Pars._
EXCELLENCE,—Le courrier de cabinet, Don Martin Estenoz, qui partit
de Paris le 22 Juillet, a remis les lettres écrites par V. E. le
même jour et les copies de celles que vous envoyâtes le 19 Juin par
le courrier Alvarez, qui furent interceptées. Le roi les a lues
avec la plus grande attention, et après s’être bien pénétré des
communications faites à V. E. au nom de l’empereur, par monsieur le
due de Cadore, et les observations particulières de ce ministre, S.
M. desirant détruire d’un seul trait, les craintes et la défiance
que des personnes, tout au moins mal instruites, se sont efforcées
d’inspirer, m’a ordonné d’entrer en explication sur tous les points
dont elles traitent. Mais je dois avant tout faire connaître à V. E.
que le roi s’est montré satisfait de la juste interprétation donnée
à ses idées, et à ses sentimens dans la réponse que V. E. a faite
au duc de Cadore, relativement à la protection dont S. M. I. désire
que le commerce Français jouisse dans les réglemens des douanes,
en offrant d’assurer une faveur réciproque dans ses états aux
productions d’Espagne. L’empereur ne peut ignorer les vues liberales
de son auguste frère, et si S. M. I. a été exactement informée sur ce
point, elle saura que, dès son avénement au trône, le roi a écarté
bien des obstacles opposés à l’industrie française qu’il s’agit de
favoriser encore par de nouvelles dispositions.
Il est bien douloureux pour le roi d’avoir à se justifier de
plusieurs imputations auxquelles on a dû croire puisqu’on les
a communiquées a V. E. L’une d’elles est que le roi a rendu à
leurs propriétaires, ou disposé à son gré, d’une partie des biens
confisqués par l’empereur. Cela supposerait de la part de S. M. un
oubli de la parole donnée a l’empereur de ne se mêler en aucune
manière de ces confiscations: mais c’est un infame imposture, et son
auteur mérite un chatiment exemplaire. Qu’on cite une propriété un
pouce de terrain confisqué par l’empereur, et dont on ait disposé:
on ne le pourra point si dans une pure question de fait on en
impose ainsi a l’empereur, que sera ce lorsqu’on ne parle que par
conjectures et présomption? Le roi porte à un si haut degré son
respect pour les décrets de confiscations de S. M. I. qu’ayant besoin
d’un des édifices qui y sont compris pour y placer des établissemens
publics, il n’a même pas voulu s’en servir provisoirement. S. M.
n’a-t-elle pas, en conséquence, le droit de réclamer, pour son
honneur, la punition de ses detracteurs? S. M. I. s’est expliquée sur
la direction donnée à la guerre et la manière dont elle a été faite.
L’empereur écrivit au roi pour lui représenter la lenteur des
opérations, et l’inaction des armées. Aussitôt S. M. entreprit
la conquête de l’Andalousie. Le duc de Cadore a dit à V. E. que
la soumission de cette province était illusoire, puisqu’elle se
trouve inondée de partis d’insurgés et de bandes de brigands.
Qu’on considère la vaste étendue de l’Andalusie; le petit nombre
de troupes françaises que l’obstination de Cadiz permêt d’y
repandre; les pièges de toute espèce que tendent les Anglais et
leurs continuelles attaques: qu’on parcoure l’histoire de toutes
les guerres contre l’Angleterre et l’on verra qu’indépendamment des
vingt mille Espagnols constamment stationés à St. Rocq, il était
encore nécessaire d’entretenir sur cette côté un nombre considérable
de troupes pour les opposer aux entreprises partielles de l’ennemi.
Si ces précautions étaient indispensables dans un tems de calme
et de tranquillité, qu’elles doivent être les espérances et les
moyens de l’Angleterre dans l’agitation actuelle de l’Espagne et
la nature de la guerre dont elle est le théâtre? Le roi peut dire
avec verité que la conquête militaire et morale de l’Andalousie est
son ouvrage, et que ses paroles, sa conduite, et les sages mesures
qu’il a prises, out preparé la tranquillité dont elle jouit. S. M.
y a organisé des gardes civiques chargées de défendre leurs foyers,
et malgré le voisinage de cette province avec l’Estremadure et les
instigations continuelles de la junte de Cadiz et des Anglais,
l’Andalousie renferme beaucoups moins de partis ou de bandes
d’insurgés que la Castille, la Biscaye, et la Navarre, qui ont été
placés sous le régime militaire. Enfin l’on trouve en Andalousie une
organisation complette de compagnies de Miguelettes, qui veillent a
la tranquillité des villes et à la sûreté des chemins. Leurs services
sont tellement utiles que le maréchal duc de Dalmatie a donné le plus
de développement possible à cette institution.
Si l’Andalousie n’est pas entièrement pacifiée, si la junte de Cadiz
existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence,
on doit l’attribuer en grande partie aux machinations et aux traines
ourdies par la junte et l’Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur
connaissance le décret du 8 Février qui établit des gouvernemens
militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l’Aragon, et la Catalogne.
Quelques gouverneurs français ayant traité ces provinces comme si
elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie, les membres de
la junte de Cadiz et les Anglais en profitèrent pour souffler de
nouveau le feu de la discorde et refuter les expressions du roi
qui répétait sans cesse, ‘Que la nation conserverait son intégrité
et son indépendance: que ses institutions s’amélioreraient sous
la protection d’un trône soutenu par les relations intimes du roi
avec l’empereur; qu’elle n’aurait à combattre que l’ennemi qui
voulait s’arroger l’empire exclusif des mers.’ Voila le sens qu’on
a toujours donné en Espagne aux mots indépendance et intégrité.
Ce langage est celui dont s’est servi S. M. I. non seulement avec
les Espagnols, mais à la face de l’univers: il ne peut donc être
odieux ni criminel dans la bouche du roi. Mais combien n’est-il
pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent
s’obstiner à prolonger l’insurrection d’Espagne à l’annihiler ou la
détruire plutôt qu’à la soumettre! car dans plusieurs endroits on ne
se contente pas d’exclure toute idée de l’autorité du roi en faisant
administrer la justice au nom de l’empereur, mais ce qui est pire,
on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Valencia
prêtassent serment de fidélité et d’obéissance à S. M. I. comme si la
nation Espagnole n’avait pas de roi.
Monsieur le due de Cadore se plaint de l’indulgence dont on en a usé
en Andalousie; S. M. a montré contre ses ennemis, dans les champs de
Talavera et Ocana, toute la fermeté de son caractère; mais serait-il
juste, conviendrait-il à ses intérêts et aux vues de l’empereur, que
S. M. deployât de la rigueur contre des vaincus, des prisonniers qui
doivent être ses sujets? Si le maréchal Ney eut suivi ce généreux
exemple dans les villes de Galice où il fut reçu à bras ouverts,
et n’eut pas au contraire opprimé et saccagé cette province, elle
serait heureuse et soumise, et non livrée aux maux de l’insurrection
comme tant d’autres à qui l’on a fait éprouver le même sort. Cette
conduite de S. M. dans des pays soumis est vraisemblablement ce
que le duc de Cadore appelle des graces accordées aux insurgés de
préférence aux personnes attachées à la cause du roi. Les insurgés
n’ont obtenu d’autres graces que elles qui leur furent offertes dans
les proclamations pour dissiper l’erreur dans laquelle les Anglais
les avaient induits. Si le sequestre mis sur les biens invendus
de quelques habitans ou réfugiés, a été levé posterieurement, cet
exemple d’indulgence a eu d’heureux résultats, puisqu’il a attiré
un grand nombre de personnes á l’obéissance du roi: et qu’on ne
croye pas que ces individus n’aient point subi le chatiment qui leur
était dû pour le retard qu’ils ont mis à se soumettre, car s’ils
possedaient des billets royaux, il les ont perdues pour ne les avoir
pas présenté à tems au timbre sec; et s’ils sont porteurs d’autres
titres de créances sur l’état, ils doivent, pour les valider,
solliciter un décret particulier.
Les avantages de la formation des corps Espagnols sont à la portée
de tout le monde: leur présence a influé plus qu’on ne pense
sur l’heureuse issue de la bataille d’Ocaña et de l’expédition
d’Andalousie. En y admettant un grand nombre d’officiers, on est
parvenu à éloigner de l’insurrection des hommes inquiets qui seraient
devenus chefs de brigands, et tout en avouant que la désertion a eu
lieu parmi les soldats, et qu’il en est resulté quelques maux, on
peut hardiment affirmer que la somme des biens est infiniment plus
grande, et qu’il n’y a pas de moyens qu’on ne doive employer pour
faire revenir de son égarement une nation de douze millions d’âmes
qu’il n’est pas facile d’assujettir par la force des bayonnettes, et
dont on veut d’ailleurs faire une amie et une alliée.
On a parlé du mauvais emploi des ressources de l’Espagne, et du
dénuement dans lequel ont été laissées les troupes françaises. Les
soldats ont eu en Espagne des vivres en abondance: les hôpitaux
français ont été les mieux pourvus, il a fallu pour cela exiger des
contributions extraordinaires et des emprunts forcés, et vaincre le
grand obstacle de l’interceptation des communications de province à
province, et souvent de ville à ville. L’Espagne se trouve divisé
en gouvernemens militaires de sorte que S. M. est à peine maître
de la capitale et de sa banlieue: n’est ce donc point par une
espèce de miracle qu’elle y fait subsister des troupes, et qu’elle
y soutient des hôpitaux. Les gouverneurs français imposent, il est
vrai, des contributions extraordinaires sur leurs provinces, mais
ils les vexent et les ruinent, et certes ce n’est pas là le moyen de
les maintenir dans l’obéissance, ni un exemple bien attrayant pour
les provinces soulevées: cette ressource est d’ailleurs précaire
et insuffisante comme le prouvera bientôt l’expérience. S. M. se
flatte de ce que les intentions de l’empereur en faveur de la nation
seraient mieux remplies et ses troupes mieux dirigées, si toutes
celles qui sont en Espagne étaient sous ses ordres, et si les
propositions qu’il a faites à son auguste frère étaient acceptées.
Le duc de Cadore a évalue à plusieurs millions les confiscations
de marchandises anglaises, et l’enlévement de l’argenterie des
églises et des couvents qu’on aurait dû faire en Andalousie. Les
confiscations eurent lieu par ordre des généraux français à leur
entrée dans chaque ville, et si leur valeur fut exagerée, dans le
principe, pour donner plus d’éclat aux entreprises militaires, on
reconnut dès qu’on en vint à l’examen l’erreur dans laquelle on
était tombé; et dans le fait comment ne pas apperçevoir qu’après la
bataille d’Ocaña l’invasion d’Andalousie devant être prévue, chacun
avait grand soin de faire refluer les marchandises confiscables
sur les points les plus capables de resistance, afin de les mettre
hors de la portée du vainqueur. L’argenterie d’église a beaucoup
d’apparence et fort peu de valeur. On a pris dans les couvents, où il
en restait très peu, ainsi que dans les églises toute celle qui n’a
pas été jugée nécessaire pour la decence du culte, et comme le roi ne
voulait ni ravager ni détruire, mais bien pacifier et conserver, il a
dû régler sa conduite sur ce principe.
Monsieur le duc de Cadore parle de dépenses, c’est vraiment une
fatalité qu’il soit si mal informé de faits généralement connus. Le
trésor public est ouvert à quiconque voudra s’assurer de la vérité.
On y verra que S. M. a reçu à peine chaque mois le cinquième de
l’assignation de la liste civile: qu’il a dû se reduire à la plus
stricte économie, et que non seulement il s’est vu faute de pouvoir
donner aux acteurs une légère avance, dans l’obligation de supprimer
le théâtre Italien qui était son unique délassement, mais encore de
vendre sa vaisselle platte, et de se défaire des choses les plus
nécessaires a l’ornement de sa cour. Aussi dans le repas que S. M.
donna, à l’occasion de la fête de l’empereur, à ses ministres, aux
grands officiers de la couronne, et à l’ambassadeur de France, la
table fut elle servie en fayence semblable à celle qu’ avait S.
M. au camp de Boulogne. Certainement l’embarras et la confusion
que cette excessive simplicité causait au roi n’aura pas échappé à
l’ambassadeur. Au milieu de tant de privations, et dans une situation
aussi contraire à sa dignité S. M. a la douleur de voir que ses
ministres, le conseil d’état, les tribunaux de la capitale, et les
employés civils, qui sont en petit nombre, ne perçoivent pas leur
traitement depuis plus de sept mois. Ce sont là les faveurs que S. M.
a dispensés avec tant de prodigalité. Le roi a donné, il est vrai,
quelques cédules aux officiers de sa maison, et à quelques individus
attachés à sa personne, pour les aider à acheter des biens nationaux:
on donne à ces bienfaits le nom de prodigalité, et d’un autre côté
l’on se plaint de l’abandon dans lequel S. M. laisse d’autres
individus, ce qui serait incompatible avec la façon de penser du roi
et la connaissances de ses devoirs comme homme et comme monarque.
C’est l’unique chose dont le roi puisse disposer dans la situation
où il se trouve et outre le but politique de ces donations, S. M. a
cru que c’était le seul moyen d’assurer à ces individus une médiocre
existence, et encore sa prévoyance à cet égard a-t-elle été trompée,
car les revenues des terres et des biens qui se trouvent dans les
personnes soumises au gouvernement militaire dont les limites
s’étendent jusqu’aux portes de Madrid, où ne se payent pas, tant
est grande la misère des fermiers, où les biens ne s’afferment pas
de crainte d’extorsions de la part des gouverneurs, où, enfin, les
revenus se trouvent absorbés par les contributions extraordinaires.
Les faits sont evidens, ils parlent d’eux-mêmes, et toute personne
impartiale peut en faire l’examen.
Mais il faut qu’elle soit de meilleure foi que celle qui a voulu
imputer à S. M. l’aliénation des biens confisqués par l’empereur,
et les griefs auxquels on vient de répondre. S. M. pourrait, à
bien plus juste titre, se plaindre de la conduite des gouverneurs
Français: de celle du général Dufour, par exemple, qui a exigé des
dix membres dont il composa à sa manière ce conseil de Navarre
qu’on s’est vu bientôt obligé de dissoudre, qu’ils rédigeassent
une adresse à l’empereur dans laquelle ils demandaient à S. M. I.
un code des lois, et se mettaient à sa discrétion. Trois de ces
membres réfusèrent de signer, les autres cédèrent à la violence.
S. M. pourrait citer encore une foule d’actes qui out exaspéré les
esprits, fourni des armes à l’insurrection, et donné aux Anglais
des prétextes pour supposer des projets qui n’existent pas, et
rendre la guerre interminable. Qu’on compte le nombre des bandes
de brigands et d’insurgés en Espagne, et l’on verra combien il
s’est accru depuis l’institution des gouvernemens militaires. S.
M. ne peut elle se plaindre avec autant de justice de la situation
équivoque dans laquelle elle se trouve? qu’on en juge par le fait
suivant. Le nouveau ministre de finances venait d’entrer en fonction,
et il s’agissait déjà de réunir les plus forts capitalistes de la
place pour les engager à avancer une bonne somme d’argent, lorsque
le payeur de l’armée, monsieur Crouchart, et l’intendant-général,
monsieur Denniers, assurèrent au ministre que des employés venaient
de Paris avec des lettres cachetées qu’ils avaient l’ordre de
n’ouvrir qu’à Madrid. On prétendit aussitôt qu’ils devaient se
charger de l’administration civile, que les rentrées seraient
invariablement affectées à l’entretien et à la solde de l’armée,
et le surplus seulement, à la liste civile. C’était annoncer la
dissolution de l’état. Des bruits de cette nature répandus dans
toute la ville par les employés français parvenus à la connaissance
de l’ambassadeur de S. M. I. et appuyés par des malveillans qui
abondent toujours dans les capitales surtout à la suite des guerres
d’opinions, ne pouvait produire que de malheureux effets. La
confiance de ce petit nombre d’hommes qui aurait pu faire des avances
s’eteignit à l’instant, et toutes les portes furent fermées. S. M.
ignorait l’arrivée des nouveaux employés du trésor de France, et il
n’a connu comme le dernier de ses sujets, le contenu des lettres dont
ils étaient porteurs qu’à leurs ouvertures.
Dans cet état de choses il est facile de se faire l’idée de la
confiance que peut inspirer le roi, et lorsque S. M. se trouve
hors d’état de faire le bonheur du pays qu’il doit gouverner et de
concourir à la réalisation des vues de son auguste frère: qu’il
voit enfin sa dignité avilée, doit on s’étonner qu’il ait manifesté
l’impossibilité de vivre plus long temps dans une situation aussi
précaire? Monsieur le duc de Cadore tout en reconnaissant les hautes
qualités du roi, a prétendu, que les personnes qui approchent S.
M. lui ont conseillé et lui conseillent sans cesse de se maintenir
dans l’indépendance de la France, et que ce principe se suivait
avec trop de rigueur. Monsieur le duc de Cadore sait que S. M. dans
aucune époque de sa longue et glorieuse carrière n’a eu besoin de
conseils et ne s’est soumis à aucune influence, surtout s’il s’est
agi de détruire son système inaltérable d’amitié sincère et éternelle
avec son auguste frère l’empereur; d’alliance et de bienveillance
affectueuse envers la nation Espagnole à la tête de laquelle il
est placé, et dont il s’efforcera de conserver la splendeur et le
bien-être, avec l’indépendance et l’intégrité de territoire. Les
vœux les plus constants de son cœur sont que les deux nations unies
entr’elles par les mêmes liens que leur monarques concourent d’une
manière uniforme à la félicité commune en forçant leur ennemie à
abandonner le sceptre des mers.’
Le prince don Fernando, ajoute le duc de Cadore, se prêterait à céder
les provinces qui conviennent à l’empereur et à toutes les conditions
qu’il voudrait lui imposer. Le roi ne veut entrer en comparaison avec
personne; mais il observera que ce ne fut pas dans ces sentimens
ni dans cette croyance qu’il accepta la couronne d’Espagne en
déposant celle de Naples: que l’empereur ni la France ne devraient
avoir confiances en des offres que la nation repousserait, et qui
ne pourrait avoir d’ailleurs qu’une exécution passagère; car comme
le sait très bien monsieur le duc de Cadore, les nations humiliées
dissimulent leur haine en attendant le moment favorable de venger
leurs outrages. Une semblable conduite serait incompatible avec le
façon de penser du roi, avec son noble caractère et celui de la
nation que S. M. gouverne. Elle est diamétralement en opposition
avec les assurances données par S. M. I. à la nation Espagnole
‘qu’il était nécessaire pour son bonheur qu’elle se régénérat sous
sa dynastie, et sous le prince qu’elle lui donnait égal en tout
à son auguste personne.’ A cette occasion le duc de Cadore parle
du peu d’avantages que rapporte à la France la guerre d’Espagne
en proportion des sacrifices immenses qu’elle a faits. Certes le
roi ne les ignore pas, et sa reconnaissance éclatera quand S. M.
se trouvera en état de les récompenser. Dans ce moment cela lui
est impossible; mais S. M. I. pourrait mettre le comble à ses bons
offices en s’offrant pour garant de l’emprunt ouvert en Hollande sous
les mêmes conditions que celui de Prusse, ou du moins en lui donnant
son assentiment, comme à celui d’Autriche. S. M. I. se convaincra
facilement que les liens du sang, les rélations les plus intimes
et les plus sûres d’une étroite amitié entre les deux nations, et
enfin la position même de ces armées seront les meilleurs garants de
l’exactitude des remboursements quelques sacrifices qu’ils exigent.
Quant aux avantages futurs que promettent les sacrifices actuels
de la France, ce serait faire injure aux lumières du duc de Cadore
que de la fatiguer en les lui developpant. Lorsque S. M. I. crut
nécessaire l’établissement en Espagne de sa dynastie, l’expérience
lui avait démontré que survenant des troubles dans le nord, il ne
pouvait jamais compter sans ce changement, sur la sûreté d’une
des plus importantes frontières de son empire. Un siècle d’amitié
presque non interrompue depuis le regne en Espagne et en France de
la maison de Bourbon, le pacte de famille et la tournure différente
que prirent les relations entre les deux pays après l’exclusion de
la maison d’Autriche, sont les témoignages les plus authentiques de
l’utilité des efforts et des sacrifices de la France pendant six
ans, au commencement du siècle dernier. La résistance opiniâtre de
presque toute l’Europe et surtout celle de l’Angleterre, qu’elle
renouvelle dans cette guerre avec un plus grand developpement de
moyens démontrent l’importance de cet événement pour la France.
Ses meilleurs écrivains politiques ont indiqué avec la plus grande
clarté les avantages qui en ont resulté pour le commerce Français
et les richesses qu’il a procurées à la nation. Que ne doit elle
pas attendre aujourd’hui de la réunion des deux couronnes dans
la même famille, de l’analogie de leurs codes politiques et de
leurs institutions, des qualités d’un roi sage et éclairé qui aime
tendrement son auguste frère et la France, et qui est pénétré de
la nécessité d’abattre l’orgueil de l’Angleterre! n’est ce pas le
plus grand fruit qu’elle puisse retirer de cette resolution et de
tels résultats ne valent ils pas les sacrifices momentanées qu’elle
s’impose?
Il a été bien sensible pour S. M. que les rapports mensongers de
personnes peu interessées à l’union et a l’amitié des deux frères
et des deux pays, ayant pu inspirer à S. M. I. un seul instant de
doutes. Quoique le roi a déjà écrit à l’empereur son auguste frère,
S. M. veut que V. E. ou en votre absence le marquis d’Almenara,
remette une copie de cette lettre à monsieur le duc de Cadore,
dans l’espérance que V. E. developpera à S. M. I. avec sa sagacité
ordinaire les causes qui ont influé sur la conduite du roi dans les
affaires d’Espagne, que S. E. lui dépeindra l’état véritable de la
nation, et qu’elle contribuera de cette manière à l’éxécution des
intentions des deux monarques qui n’ont été, et qui ne peuvent être
que les mêmes.
Le ministre secrétaire d’état,
(Signé) MARIANO LUIS D’ORQUIJO.
_Letters from king Joseph to his ministers._
_10 Février, 1811._
Je suis peiné que l’empereur ait cru nécessaire d’employer des
formes diplomatiques avec moi et même avec la reine. Qu’il me fasse
clairement connoître sa volonté et je n’aurai rien de plus agréable
que de m’y conformer puisqu’elle ne peut être ni compatible avec mon
honneur qui me paroit inséparable du sien, comme mon intérêt. Le fait
est que je désire complaire, à la fois, à l’empereur et à mon frère;
il m’a fait reconnoître roi de Naples, roi d’Espagne, et a garanti
mon existence politique sans que je l’aie demandé. Je n’ai pas
sollicité le trône j’y suis monté parce-qu’il l’a voulu, aujourd’hui
l’empereur désire-t-il que je rentrois dans la retraite. Je suis
d’autant plus prêt à le faire que les événemens de trois années out
levé bien des scrupules et empêcher venir bien des regrets.
J’ai dû croire que l’empereur vouloit que je quittâsse l’Espagne
dès que j’ai vu graduellement mon existence y devenir humiliant,
impossible, et qu’il doit savoir que je ne puis pas supporter
long-temps de me voir degradé: dans ce cas je désire partir pour
France. L’ordre publique sera assuré ici, je m’entendrai avec mon
frère, ou pour mieux dire je lui porterai moi-même mon blanc-seing.
Je m’abandonne entièrement à sa justice et à ses sentimens paternels
pour ma famille, aussi point de négociations particulières; je
rétourne dès ce moment à l’empereur tous les droits qu’il m’a
transmis sur l’Espagne si son ambassadeur juge que je puisse partir
demain pour Morfontaine, et s’il eu autorisé à croire que l’empereur
verra ce parti sans déplaisir.
L’empereur veut-il réellement que je reste au trône d’Espagne? Je
reste quelques qui soient les désagrémens indépendant de la volonté
qui m’y attendent. Mais il faut que je n’éprouve que ceux qu’il
ne peut m’éviter; je le répéte jamais les intérêts politiques ne
me diviseront avec lui, qu’il me fasse connoître sa volonté. Si
l’empereur venir ici, tout s’arrangera entre nous; s’il ne vient
pas en Espagne, qu’il me laisse aller le voir à Paris. S’il juge ce
voyage inopportun, qu’il rende mon existence tolerable pendant la
guerre: il sait mieux que personne ce qu’il doit faire pour cela.
Il faut un changement marqué dans tout, avancer ou reculer, vous
connoissez l’état actuel; j’ignore comment je pourrai gagner le mois
nécessaire pour connoître la determination de l’empereur.
(The following abdication, by Joseph, was drawn up but never made
public.)
L’expérience de trois années nous ayant convaincu que l’ordre social
ne peut être recomposé en Espagne qu’en cumulant dans les mêmes mains
les droits de souverainté dont nous sommes investés, et les moyens
de force et de puissance militaire dont dispose notre august frère
l’empereur des Français, de qui nous tenons les droits que nous
exerçons aujourd’hui sur la monarchie Espagnole, nous avons résolu de
notre pleine et libre volonté de rétrocéder à notre frère l’empereur
des Français les droits qu’il nous a remis et en vertu des quels nous
sommes entré dans ce royaume en 1808 à la suite de la constitution
que nous avons signée à Bayonne dans la même année.
C’est pourquoi par les presents signées de notre main nous declarons
céder, transporter, et remettre à notre dit frère l’empereur des
Français, tous les droits qu’il nous transmis en 1808 sur la
monarchie d’Espagne et des Indes dans toute leur integrité et tels
qu’il les reçut lui même du roi Charles Quatre.
Nous entendons que la présente rétrocession n’ait de force et valeur
que ce l’époque ou nous aurons pleine et entière connoissance de
l’acceptation de la présente rétrocession de la part de notre
frère l’empereur des Français: et comme nous ne sommes portés à
cet acte par aucune considération particulière, mais par l’unique
considération que nous avons exprimée plus haut et qu’en quittant
le trône d’Espagne nous n’avons en vue que le plus grand bien du
peuple Espagnol que nous ne pourrons pas rendre aussi heureux que
nous voudrions, et que nous n’avons d’autre ambition que celle de
rentrer dans la vie privée et dans la retraite la plus absolue. Nous
nous abandonnons entièrement à la justice de notre frère l’empereur
des Français pour le sort des personnes qui nous sont attachées au
sentimens de la gloire qui garantit ses efforts pour le bonheur de
l’Espagne et à ses sentimens paternels pour nos enfans, pour la
reine, notre épouse, et pour nous.
Nous nous engagerons à faire revêtir de toutes les formes qui
pourroient paroître plus authentiques le présent acte écrit, rédigé,
et signé de notre propre main. Ayant jugé que le plus grand secret
était indispensable jusqu’à ce que nous ayons connoissance de
l’acceptation de S. M. l’empereur des Français, roi d’Italie.
Fait à Madrid, etc. etc.
_Paris, 1811._
Depuis la conversation que j’ai eu avec vous sur ma position, elle
ne s’est pas améliorée; elle est telle aujourd’hui que je me voir
forcé d’embrasser le seul pratique qui me reste à prendre, celui de
la rétraite la plus absolue en France. Je serois déjà parti si je
ne venois d’être instruit que S. M. l’empereur qui a sû que j’avois
donné ordre d’acheter ou de louer une terre a cent lieues de Paris,
avoit disapprouvé cette demarche, et qu’il trouvait plus convenable,
si je persistois dans ma resolution, qui je me rendisse à ma terre de
Morfontaine après vous avoir prévenu de ma détermination, et avoir
assuré ici l’ordre publique après mon départ. Je dirai en partant que
je vais m’entendre avec l’empereur pour les affaires d’Espagne, et je
ferois les mêmes dispositions par rapport aux provinces qui entourent
Madrid que je fit lorsqu’il y a un an je partis pour l’expedition
d’Andalousie; cet état dura six mois sans nul désordre, et je ne
doute pas que les choses n’aillent de la même manière et ne donnent
le tems à l’empereur de prendre les dispositions définitives.
Je suis prêt à rendre l’empereur les droits qu’il me rémit à Bayonne
sur la monarchie d’Espagne et des Indes si ma position ici ne change
pas; parceque je dois croire que c’est le désir de l’empereur
puisqu’il est impossible qu’il veuille que je reste roi d’Espagne, et
qu’il m’ôte tous les moyens d’existence. Il en peut être malheureux
que l’empereur ait voulu me reconnoître roi de Naples, il y a six ans
lorsqu’à la tête de ses troupes je fis la conquête de ce royaume; ce
fut malgré moi, et mes instances pour rester au commandement de son
armée avec la simple qualité de son lieutenant furent le sujet d’une
lettre dont je me rappelle très-bien.
Lorsqu’en 1808 je fus proclamé roi d’Espagne, je l’ignorois encore;
cependant arrivé à Bayonne je fis tout ce que voulus l’empereur, je
signerais une constitution, je le signai appuyée par sa garantie.
Les événemens n’ayant pas répondu a nos espérances est ce ma faute?
Est celui qui en est le plus victim qui doit en porter la peine?
Cependant tant que la guerre dure je me suis soumis a tout ce que
l’on a voulu, mais je ne puis pas l’impossible; je ne puis pas rester
ici plus longtems si l’empereur ne vient à mon secours. En ordonnant
qu’il soit versé dans mon trésor à Madrid un million de francs par
mois, les autres provinces doivent contribuer aux besoins de la
capitale. Les troupes françoises qui sont dans les provinces du
centre (elles sont peu nombreuses) doivent être soldées par le trésor
de France.
A la pacification générale l’empereur exigera des indemnités;
s’entendrer alors il posséde de fait presque toutes les provinces
aujourd’hui, il sera bien le maître de ne les évacuer qu’à mesure
qu’il croira que l’Espagne aura satisfait aux obligations qu’il
lui aura imposées. En résume je suis prêt à faire la volonté de
l’empereur pourvu que je la connoîsse.
1º. Veut-il que je reste roi d’Espagne, je reste dès qu’il m’en donne
la possibilité, et je supporte tous les gouvernemens militaires qu’il
a établis puisqu’il les croit indispensables pendant la guerre.
2º. Préféreroit-il que je rentrasse dans la sein de ma famille à
Morfontaine d’abord et l’hiver dans le midi. Je suis prêt à partir
dès que je connoîtrai sa volonté. J’ajoute de plus que le parti de la
retraite me conviendra beaucoup plus que l’autre dès que je saurai
qu’il lui convient. Je suis sur alors qu’il aura quelques bontés pour
les Français qui se sont attachés à mon soit, et que je ne serai pas
à même de rendre aussi heureux qu’ils le méritent. Quant à moi, à la
reine, et à mes enfans, l’empereur me faisant payer mon traitement
de prince Français, nous en aurons assez, mon intention étant de
vivre dans la retraite en m’occupant de l’education des mes enfans,
laissant a l’empereur le soin de leur établissemens, car je ne doute
pas si ce projet se verifie que je ne retrouve le cœur de mon frère,
et que dans les intervalles où il se rappellera qu’il est homme, il
ne trouve encore quelque consolation en retrouvant mon cœur pour lui
aussi jeune qu’il y a trente ans.
Enfin j’aime mieux vivre sujet de l’empereur en France que de rester
en Espagne roi nominal, parceque je serai bon sujet en France, et
mauvais roi en Espagne, et que je veux rester digne de l’empereur, de
la France, et de moi-même.
_Marquis of Almenara to the minister secretary of state.
Translated from a deciphered Spanish letter._
_Fontainebleau, Novembre 4, 1810._
“This government is very uneasy about the military operations in
Portugal, from whence they receive no accounts except through
England, described therefore factitiously and with the strongest
hopes of resisting the French forces that oppose their army. This
problem will probably be already solved and its conclusion will
decide what is interesting to Spain. It is therefore very important
that our government should write all it knows, and what will prove
that it takes part in what belongs to both countries, because here
I am often asked what is said in Madrid on this subject, and people
are surprised that we limit ourselves entirely to the urgent points
of our negotiation. This explains the proofs of affection which the
prince royal of Sweden desired that the king should give to the
emperor, being convinced that the letters of his majesty, written in
his own familiar style when he explains his sentiments, produce a
great sensation with the emperor.”
SECTION 3.
_Letters from the prince de Neufchatel to king Joseph._
_Paris, 28 Janvier, 1811._
SIRE,—J’ai l’honneur de prévenir votre majesté que l’empereur par
sa décision du 21 Janvier a fixé les traitemens extraordinaires qui
pourront être payés en Espagne à date du 1^{er} de l’année 1811, dans
l’arrondissement des armées du midi, du nord, de l’Arragon, &c. Ces
traitemens sont détermines ainsi qu’il suit.
_Savoir_:
Fr. par mois.
Les généraux gouverneurs dans les quatre gouvernemens
comprises dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du nord 4000
Le général chef de l’état major-général de l’armée 3000
Généraux de division 1800
Généraux de brigade, inspecteurs aux revues et
commissaires ordonnateurs 1200
Adjudans commandans, colonels, et sous-inspecteurs
aux revues 750
Officiers de santé principaux 500
Chefs de bataillons, d’escadrons, commissaires de guerre,
et chefs d’administration des différens services 400
Commandans de place occupant dans } capitaines 400
l’armée un grade inférieur à ceux ci-dessus } lieutenans et }
désignées, savoir } sous-lieuts. } 300
Au moyen de ces indemnités il ne sera rien alloué au-dessus des
sommes fixées ni pour dépenses de bureaux ou de table, ni pour frais
extraordinaires de quelque nature qu’ils soient et sous quelque
prétexte que ce puisse être, et cette décision n’a aucun effet
rétroactif. J’écris à MM. les maréchaux et généraux commandant en
Espagne, pour leur faire connoître que, d’après les intentions de
l’empereur, tout militaire Français qui à l’avenir aurait exigé
ou reçu des traitemens extraordinaires plus forts que ceux fixés
par la décision du 21 Janvier, et qui s’en serait fait payer sans
une ordonnance régulière des intendans généraux ou commissaires
ordonnateurs, sera suspendu de ses fonctions et qu’il en sera rendu
compte dans les vingt-quatre heures pour prendre les ordres de
l’empereur. Votre majesté jugera sans doute convenable de donner ses
ordres au général Belliard pour que cette disposition soit suivie
dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre. Je prie votre majesté
d’agréer l’hommage de mon respect.
_Paris, 14 Février, 1811._
SIRE,—L’empereur ne m’a encore donné aucun ordre relatif à l’objet
de la lettre apportée par votre aide-de-camp le colonel Clermont
Tonnere. On pense que Valence ne se soumettra que par l’approche
d’une armée, et après la prise de Tarragone le corps du général
Suchet sera disponible.—Les affaires paroissent s’améliorer en
Portugal, le duc d’Istrie va établir l’ordre dans le nord de
l’Espagne. J’envoye mon aide-de-camp le colonel Le Jeune voir l’état
des choses à Grénade, Malaga, Cadiz et Badajos. Je prie votre
majesté d’avoir des bontés pour lui. L’empereur est en bonne santé,
l’imperatrice est bientôt à terme, et nous esperons un roi des
Romains. L’empereur affermit de plus en plus le grand empire. Votre
majesté le seconde mais nous apprécions ses peines et ses privations.
Une nouvelle armée de deux-cent-milles hommes se forme dans le nord
de la France, et l’empereur est en position d’en imposer à qui
tenteroit de contrarier ses grandes conceptions, tout est bien et va
bien en France.
_Paris, le 11 Avril, 1811._
SIRE,—J’ai eu l’honneur de mander votre majesté, que l’empereur
avoit donné des ordres pour qu’il lui fut envoyé chaque mois cent
mille francs, et je lui ai fait connoître combien il étoit important
que les troupes destinées pour l’Andalusie y arrivassent sans retard.
L’empereur pense qu’il seroit utile de chercher à tirer parti de
bons Espagnole pour réunir de vrais cortez qui pourroient avoir de
l’influence sur les esprits: l’intégrité de l’Espagne peut encore
être maintenue si les cortez operoient une réaction dans l’opinion:
le Perou et le Méxique se sont déjà déclarés independant, et toutes
les autres colonies sont échapper à l’Espagne: les vrais Espagnols
doivent savoir combien les Anglais les maltraitent. On voit par les
gazettes Anglaises que les cortez rassemblés dans l’île de Leon ne
furent qu’une miserable canaille et des gens obscures qui n’ont
autre projet que d’aller végéter dans les tavernes de Londres il ne
peut y avoir rien à faire avec de pareils hommes. Sa majesté trouve
qu’il y auroit un grand avantage à former des cortez tirer de toutes
les provinces de l’Espagne occupées par les armées françaises. Une
discussion éclairée qui s’établiroit auroit beaucoup d’influence
sur les esprits. L’empereur est oblige d’abandonner le projet qu’il
avoit de s’entendre avec les cortez de l’île de Leon, puisque ce
n’est qu’un composé de gens sans aveu: ce ne seroit donc qu’avec des
cortez formé d’hommes tirés de toutes les parties de l’Espagne qu’on
pourroit éclairer l’opinion des Espagnols qui aiment leur pays.
L’ambassadeur de l’empereur a transmis des plaintes sur votre
major-général. Votre majesté commande l’armée du centre. Par
conséquent la hiérarchie militaire ne peut pas permettre qu’il
s’écarte de ses devoirs. Si je correspond souvent avec le général
Belliard, c’est que votre majesté est un général roi, et que je dois
lui éviter des détails qu’un major-général lui soumet.
Aucun village d’Espagne n’a été réuni à la France, et l’empereur
tient à ce que votre majesté ait en Espagne toute la considération
qui lui est due. Tout depend encore du parti qu’on peut tirer de la
nation. Ce qu’il y a de certain, c’est que les Anglais n’ont qu’un
but; celui de ruiner la péninsule, de la détruire, parcequ’ils
sentent bien qu’elle doit finir par appartenir à la France ou à
un prince de la maison de l’empereur, et qu’ils trouvent un grand
avantage à diviser un pays qu’il savent ne pouvoir gardes.
Je présente à votre majesté l’hommage avec mon respect.
Le Prince Neufchatel, Major-Général,
ALEXANDRE.
_Paris, ce 6 Mai, 1811._
SIRE,—J’ai montré à l’empereur la lettre de votre majesté, en date
du 21 Avril par laqu’elle elle fait connoître qu’elle se met en
route pour Paris: l’empereur ne s’attendoit pas à cette resolution;
votre majesté lui ayant promis de ne pas quitter l’Espagne sans être
convenu à l’avance des mesures à prendre et qu’exige une pareille
détermination. L’empereur trouve que dans ces circonstances le départ
de votre majesté devoit être précédé de l’évacuation de l’Andalousie
afin de concentrer les armées. Car dans la position des choses, le
départ de votre majesté va donner une secousse défavorable à la
situation des armées de l’empereur. Si votre majesté avoit quitté
l’Espagne au mois de Janvier, où les armées étoient en position
sans agir, cela auroit eu moins d’inconvenient. Dans ce moment
votre arrivée met l’empereur dans de grandes inquiétudes, en vous
considérant comme roi d’Espagne, et comme général-en-chef, l’empereur
voit que votre retour sera interprété selon l’esprit et la tournure
que les Anglais voudront y donner, et fera un mauvais effet; qu’il
est pénible que votre majesté se soit portée à cette démarche dont
il ne peut résulter aucun avantage, et qui peut avoir beaucoup
d’inconvenients, car dans ce moment d’agitation, l’Espagne va se
trouver sans chef. Votre majesté ne voulant pas rester à Madrid,
l’empereur trouve qu’il auroit été très utile qu’elle allât passer la
revue de l’armée de Portugal ou de l’armée d’Andalousie; l’influence
de votre majesté auroit surtout été bien utile pour procurer à
l’armée de Portugal tout ce qui lui est nécessaire. L’empereur,
sire, est dans une grande anxiété de savoir à qui vous avez donné
le commandement de l’armée du centre; si vous avez prévenu le duc
de Dalmatie de votre départ, et qui étant aux mains avec l’ennemi
trouvera ses embarras augmentés, n’ayant aucune direction sur ses
derrières. S’il étoit possible que votre majesté reçut cette lettre
encore en Espagne, l’empereur m’ordonne d’engager votre majesté à
sentir les inconvéniens de son retour si contraire aux circonstances.
L’empereur n’a aucune nouvelle ni de l’armée d’Andalousie ni de
l’armée du centre. J’expédie à votre majesté un de mes aides-de-camp.
Etc. etc.
ALEXANDRE.
_Paris, le 1 Juin, 1811._
SIRE,—L’empereur a examiné attentivement les observations que votre
majesté lui a adressées, et me prescrit de me rendre auprès d’elle
pour avoir l’honneur de lui donner connoissance de ce qu’il juge le
plus convenable sur les divers points qui en sont l’objet. L’empereur
pense, sire, que votre majesté peut partir de Paris quand elle le
jugera à-propos, et même sans attendre son retour, si cela entrait
dans les intentions de votre majesté. L’armée du centre en Espagne
est pleinement entièrement sous les ordres de votre majesté, le
général Belliard ne doit point prendre le titre de major-général,
mais celui que lui ont toujours attribué les ordres émanées de
l’empereur, _de chef d’état-major de l’armée du centre_. Si votre
majesté n’est pas content de ce général, je vous engage, sire, à en
proposer un autre qui ait votre confiance. C’est à votre majesté,
sire, qu’il appartient de suspendre, de renvoyer, de traduire même
à des commissions militaires quand il y a lieu, les généraux et
officiers de l’armée du centre; d’administrer les provinces comprises
dans l’arrondissement de cette armée comme votre majesté le jugera le
plus convenable au bien du service. A l’armée du nord de l’Espagne,
l’empereur a besoin d’un maréchal qui soit chargé du commandement
des troupes stationées dans les provinces formant l’arrondissement
de cette armée. Le maréchal duc d’Istrie exerce maintenant ce
commandement; dans le cas, sire, où ce maréchal ne conviendroit
pas à V. M. l’empereur ne serait pas éloigné de le remplacer par
le maréchal Jourdan, si cette disposition étoit agréable à votre
majesté et à ce maréchal. Mais l’empereur ne juge pas qu’on puisse
rien changer à l’organisation de l’armée du nord; il est essentiel
que cette organisation reste telle qu’elle est, si ce n’est de mettre
cette armée sous les ordres d’un maréchal français qui posséde
d’avantage la confiance de votre majesté. Dans les gouvernemens
qui forment l’arrondissement de cette armée, c’est au nom de votre
majesté, sire, que la justice doit se rendre; le commandant doit
envoyer des rapports journaliers à V. M. l’intendant-général M.
Dudon doit envoyer à V. M. l’état de la perception des contributions
et de leur emploi. L’empereur pense que V. M. doit avoir auprès du
général-en-chef de l’armée du nord un commissaire Espagnol pour
veiller à ce que le quart du revenu des provinces de l’arrondissement
de cette armée, soit versé à Madrid pour le service de votre majesté
et pour sécourir l’armée du centre. L’empereur consent à ce que
toutes les fois que les provinces auraient les moyens nécessaires
pour se garder et se garantir des incursions des guerillas, elles
puissent rentrer entièrement sous l’administration Espagnole en ne
fournissant que ce qui sera convenu. Quant à l’armée du midi de
l’Espagne, l’empereur approuve qu’ ainsi qu’ à l’armée du nord, le
maréchal qui commande envoie des rapports à V. M. et l’instruire de
tout ce qui se passe; les budgets en recettes et en dépenses des
différentes provinces de l’armée du midi, doivent aussi être envoyés
à votre majesté, qui y tiendra un commissaire pour percevoir le quart
des revenues.
La même méthode sera pareillement appliquée à l’armée d’Arragon.
L’empereur, sire, satisfait aussi aux désirs exprimés par V. M. Quant
à ce qui concerne le commandement général de ses armées en Espagne,
sa majesté ne croit pas pouvoir donner un tel commandement qui doit
être simple et un; votre M. sentira qu’il est dans la nature des
choses qu’un maréchal résident à Madrid et dirigeant les opérations
voudrait en avoir la gloire avec la responsibilité, et que dans ce
cas, les commandans des armées du midi et de Portugal se croyant
moins réellement sous les ordres de votre M. que sous de son chef
d’état-major, pourraient ne pas obéir, ou exécuter ce qui leur serait
prescrit. Mais indépendamment du commandement de l’armée du centre,
V. M. sire, aurait le commandement des troupes qui entreraient dans
l’arrondissement de cette armée. Si l’armée du Midi se repliait sur
l’armée du centre, elle serait dès-lors sous les ordres de V. M. et
il en serait de même pour l’armée de centre.
Dans celles des armées ou V. M. se rendrait, elle aurait les honneurs
du commandement; mais, sire, l’empereur juge très important de ne
rien changer au commandement militaire ni à l’armée du nord, ni à
l’armée d’Arragon, ni aux armées du midi et de Portugal, excepté
ce qu’il est nécessaire d’établir pour que V. M. ait des rapports
de tout ce qui se passe, connaisse tout et puisse se servir de ces
relations, dans sa position centrale, pour instruire les autres
généraux: sa majesté pense que cette communication de renseignemens,
d’observations, de conseils, peut même avoir lieu par le canal du
ministre de la guerre de V. M. L’empereur désire, sire, que V. M.
veuille bien corresponds directement avec moi par des lettres signés
de sa main; j’aurai l’honneur d’adresser directement les miennes à
V. M. L’empereur désire également qu’elle s’en reserve l’ouverture
et fasse connaître ensuite à son chef d’état-major ce qu’elle jugera
convenable. Je prie votre M. de vouloir bien donner ses ordres pour
que tous les comptes rendus en états de situation me soient adressés,
que les rapports soient très exacts et que je sois instruit de tout
ce qui peut intéresser le service de l’empereur comme cela est
d’usage dans une armée. D’après les ordres de l’empereur une somme
de cinq cent mille francs par mois sera envoyée à V. M. jusqu’au 1er
Juillet, et à compter du 1er Juillet, cet envoi sera d’un million par
mois pendant le reste de l’année.
L’empereur, sire, me prescrit d’avoir l’honneur de concerter avec
votre majesté les mesures qu’elle jugera convenables à l’organization
de l’armée du centre ainsi que pour en retirer les généraux qui
ne conviendraient pas à votre majesté, faire des examples de ceux
qui auroient commis des dilapidations, leur faire restituer les
sommes qu’ils auraient dilapidées; enfin, sire, l’empereur se repose
essentiellement sur votre majesté du soin de maintenir les officiers
de son armée dans la discipline convenable et de faire des examples,
et il désire que V. M. envoie journellement des rapports détaillés
sur tout ce qui est important. Votre majesté, sire, reconnaîtra dans
ces dispositions que le désir de l’empereur est de faire tout ce
qui peut donner un nouvel éclat à l’entrée de V. M. en Espagne, en
maintenant d’ailleurs dans leur intégrité, ainsi que sa majesté le
gage indispensable, l’organisation de l’armée d’Andalousie et des
autres armées de l’Espagne. &c.
_Observations faites par le roi d’Espagne sur la lettre du
major-général, de la 1ère Juin, 1811._
Le roi demande.
1º. Que messrs. les maréchaux commandant-en-chef les armées de
l’empereur, à l’armée du nord, du Portugal, de midi, et de l’Arragon,
ne puissent augmenter les impôts existant à ce jour, =ni= lever
aucune contribution extraordinaire sans l’autorization du roi, ou de
l’empereur.
2º. Le roi désire que le maréchal Jourdan remplace le maréchal due
d’Istrie dans le commandement de l’armée du nord.
3º. Que les maréchaux commandant les armées de l’empereur et les
intendans général ne puissent vendre aucune bien national ou communal
sans l’autorization du roi; qu’il en soit de même pour les plombs et
vif argent appartenant à l’état.
4º. Que les administrations Espagnoles dans l’arrondissement des
armées du nord, du midi, de l’Arragon, resteront telles qu’elles
sont, et que si des changemens paroissent utiles, ils seront demandés
au roi.
5º. Qu’il soit specifié que le quart des revenues des provinces
occupées par les armées de l’empereur, en Espagne, sera versé net
dans le trésor du roi à Madrid, et que les trois autre quartes seront
employés aux besoin de l’armée dans les dites provinces, et en
payement des traitemens des administrations Espagnoles.
6º. Le roi se trouvant avoir l’honneur du commandement près des
armées ou il se trouve, pense qu’il est dans les intentions de
votre majesté qu’il puisse voir et réunir les autorités Espagnoles
comme bon lui semblera pour leur parler dans l’intérêt des affaires
d’Espagne: ce que le roi trouve utile de faire dans les lieux où il
l’arrêtera pour se rendre à Madrid.
7º. Il paroit entendu que le maréchal commandant l’armée de Portugal
rendra compte au roi des toutes les opérations, aussi que doivent le
faire les autres maréchaux.
8º. Le roi trouve utile pour les intérêts des affaires d’Espagne
de pouvoir s’attacher des officiers Espagnols ou autres qui
se trouveroient parmi les prisonniers, et qui par des motifs
particuliers il jugeroit convenable d’employer.
9º. Le roi de Westphalie qui ne peut pas recruter les régimens qu’il
a en Espagne est disposé à mettre le petit nombre d’hommes qui
restent aux drapeaux à la disposition du roi d’Espagne pour être à la
solde et à son service; le roi d’Espagne les placeroit utilement dans
la guarde.
10º. Le roi désire que le général Maurice Mathieu remplace le général
Lorge.
11º. Qu’il ne reste à Madrid que l’administration nécessaire pour
l’armée du centre, et que cette grande quantité d’administrateurs
appartenant à l’administration générale qui n’existe plus à Madrid
soit envoyée à Burgos ou en France.
12º. Que la solde des troupes françaises faisant partie de l’armée du
centre continue n’être payée par le trésor de France.
13º. Sa majesté conservera le général Belliard comme chef de son état
major.
14º. Le roi désire pouvoir prendre toutes les mesures politiques
qu’il jugera convenable, et faire toutes autres dispositions à
l’égard de cortez en se conformant aux vues contenues dans la lettre
que j’ai écrite d’après l’ordre de V. M. pour cet objet.
15º. Sur les 500,000 francs que V. M. met à la disposition du roi à
Madrid on en retient 100,000 francs pour l’arrière. Le roi demande
que cette somme soit pour le service courant.
_Paris, le 17 Juin, 1811._
SIRE,—L’empereur m’ordonne de vous envoyer la copie de la lettre que
j’adresse au duc d’Istrie: j’écris à-peu-près dans les mêmes termes
aux autres commandants. Je n’ai pas encore vu le maréchal Jourdan; je
le verrai demain et immédiatement après il partira pour Madrid, où
l’empereur apprendra avec plaisir qu’il est employé comme gouverneur.
Le duc de Raguse mande qu’il est en marche sur le Tage. L’empereur
désire que V. M. donne ses ordres pour qu’on lui procure tous les
secours dont il peut avoir besoin: il a avec lui vingt-huit mille
bayonnettes, trois mille hommes de cavalerie, et trent-six pièces
de canon. L’empereur désire que V. M. puisse l’appuyer avec dixhuit
cent chevaux, quinze à dixhuit pièces de canon et deux à trois mille
hommes d’infanterie: ce corps pourroit être placé à proximité afin
de pouvoir rejoindre et aider le duc de Raguse, s’il devoit donner
bataille aux Anglais. L’empereur verroit avec plaisir, Sire, qu’après
votre arrivée à Madrid vous vous rendissiez à l’armée de Portugal,
pour la passer en revue, l’animer, et prendre dans vôtre revue l’état
des emplois vacans.
J’écris au duc de Raguse que si l’on pouvoit retrancher Alcantara
et faire une tête de pont sur la rive droite, ce seroit une bonne
opération. Si l’armée de Portugal arrivoit à tems pour sécourir
l’armée du midi devant Badajoz, le petit corps de reserve dont je
viens de parler ci-dessus à votre majesté ne pourroit être que de la
plus grande utilité.
Le siège de Tarragone a déjà attiré une partie des bandes qui étoient
dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre. Deux divisions de l’armée
de reserve que forme l’empereur arriveront l’une à Pampelune, l’autre
à Vittoria vers le 14 Juillet: cela mettra à même d’envoyer encore
aux armées du midi et de Portugal environ douze milles hommes qui
sont en Navarre, et qui passeront par Madrid.
L’Empereur ne peut qu’engager votre majesté à envoyer à l’armée du
midi tout ce qui lui appartient, car c’est là que se portent les
grands coups et qu’ont lieu les opérations les plus importantes.
&c. &c.
ALEXANDRE.
_To the duke of Istria._
_Paris, Juin 1811._
J’ai prevénu, monsieur le maréchal, le général Monthion, les généraux
Caffarelli et Dorsenne directement les dispositions dont je vais
vous entretenir, et qui ont rapport aux intentions de l’empereur
rélativement au rétour de roi d’Espagne dans ses états.
Le roi commande en chef l’armée du centre, mais l’intention de
l’empereur est que vous correspondiez avec S. M. C. en lui faissant
le rapport de ce qui se passe afin de la mettre à même de connoître
l’ensemble des événemens en Espagne comme les autres généraux en
chef ont l’ordre d’en agir de même, le roi sera dans le cas de
pouvoir comme point central vous faire faire des communications qui
contribueront au succès des armes de l’empereur.
S. M. I. m’ordonne aussi de vous faire connaître, M. le duc, que
son intention est que pendant le voyage du roi dans son rétour à
Madrid, tous les honneurs lui soient rendus dans les gouvernemens et
dans l’arrondissement de l’armée du nord comme si S. M. commandait
cette armée. Le roi donnera l’ordre et recevra les honneurs du
commandement. Les gouverneurs l’accompagneront dans leur gouvernement
et lui feront fournir toutes les escortes qui lui seront nécessaires.
Il est à présumer que le roi séjournera quelque tems à Vittoria et à
Burgos, et qu’il profitera de son séjour pour rassembler les notables
du pays les éclairer sur la situation des affaires, et améliorer
l’esprit public. Vous seconderez, mons. le maréchal, les mesures
que le roi pourra prendre pour rendre les villes et les villages
responsibles des abus qui se commettent sur leur territoire. Vous
agirez de même si le roi accorde le pardon à quelques bandes de
guerillas qui se rendraient. Vous devez aider de tous vos moyens les
mesures que S. M. prendra pour le rétablissement de l’ordre et de
la tranquillité publique. Du reste les troupes composant l’armée du
nord doivent rester sous le commandement respectif de leurs chefs
et vos ordres doivent continuer à être exécutés sans qu’aucun ordre
de qui que ce soit puisse les changer. Quant à l’administration du
pays, elle doit continuer à marcher dans la direction donnée par les
instructions et les ordres de l’empereur; les fonds doivent être
destinées aux besoins de l’armée, à l’entretien des hôpitaux, et vous
devez défendre et empêcher toute espèce d’abus. Le roi ayant plus
particulièrement encore que vous, les moyens de connaître les abus
qu’ont lieu, l’empereur ordonne que vous profiteriez des lumières
que le roi pourra vous donner à cet égard pour les réprimer. Il est
nécessaire, monsieur le duc, que vous me fassiez connaître le budjet
des ressources et des dépenses afin de savoir la partie des revenues
qui pourront être versés à Madrid, dans la caisse du gouvernement
pour le service du roi et pour l’armée du centre.
Je n’ai pas besoin de vous répéter que la justice doit se rendre au
nom du roi; cela a toujours dû avoir lieu; le droit de faire grace ne
vous appartient pas pour les individus condamnés par les tribunaux;
vous n’êtes autorisé qu’à suspendre l’exécution dans les cas que vous
jugerez graciables. Le droit de faire grace n’appartient qu’au roi.
Vous n’avez pas non plus le droit de nommer à aucune place du clergé;
le roi y nomme dans toutes les parties de son royaume.
Si le roi juge à-propos de tenir près de vous et des gouverneurs un
commissaire Espagnol pour connaître les recettes et les dépenses,
vous devez donner à ce commissaire les renseignemens dont il aura
besoin pour remplir sa mission. Vous aurez soin, monsieur le
maréchal, de me rendre compte journellement de ce qui se sera fait
pendant le séjour du roi afin que j’en informe l’empereur.
&c. &c.
_Paris, le 24 Août, 1811._
SIRE,—J’ai l’honneur d’informer votre majesté que d’après les ordres
de l’empereur, je viens de faire connaître à M. le maréchal duc de
Raguse que l’armée de Portugal doit prendre désormais sa ligne de
communication sur Madrid; je lui mande que c’est là que doit être
son centre de dépôt, et que toute opération que l’ennemi ferait sur
la Coa ne peut déranger cette ligne; que si l’ennemi veut prendre
l’offensive il ne peut la prendre que dans l’Andalousie parceque de
ce côté il a un objet à remplir, qui est de faire lever le siège
de Cadiz, tandis que ses efforts dans le nord s’avença-t-il même
jusqu’à Valladolid, n’aboutiraient à rien puisque les troupes que
nous avons dans ces provinces en se repliant lui opposeraient une
armée considérable et qu’alors l’armée de Portugal devrait faire
pour l’armée du nord ce qu’elle ferait pour l’armée du midi. Je le
préviens que l’objet important est que sa ligne d’opérations soit sur
Talavera et Madrid parceque son armée est spécialement destinée à
protéger celle du midi. Je lui fais observer que l’armée de Portugal
étant attaquée de front, son mouvement de retraite est encore sur
Madrid parceque dans tous les cas possibles ce doit être sa ligne
d’opérations, qu’il faut donc que tous les dépôts quelconques
appartinant à l’armée de Portugal soient dirigés sur Talavera et
Madrid. Je donne l’ordre impératif au général Dorsenne de faire
partir dans les 24 heures tous les dépôts et détachemens qu’il a
appartenant à l’armée de Portugal; tout ce qui est en état de servir
sera dirigé en gros détachemens par Avila sur Placentia, et quant aux
hommes qui ne sont pas pour le moment en état de servir, le général
Dorsenne les fera diriger sur Madrid, et aura soin d’en informer à
l’avance votre majesté, de manière qu’il ne lui restera plus un seul
homme appartenant à l’armée de Portugal, sauf la garnison de Ciudad
Rodrigo qu’il fera relever et rejoindre aussitôt après l’arrivée des
renforts qui vont se rendre à l’armée du nord.
&c. &c.
_Boulogne, le 20 Sept. 1811._
SIRE,—L’empereur m’a demandé si j’avois reponse à la lettre que
j’ai eu l’honneur d’adresser à V. M. en lui rendant compte de la
reddition de Figueras. L’empereur m’ordonne d’annoncer à V. M. que
son intention est d’étendre à toute la rive gauche de l’Ebre la
mesure qu’elle à jugé devoir adopter pour la Catalogne. L’empereur
pense que V. M. temoin de la resistance qui éprouvent les armées et
des sacrifices des toutes espèces que la France est obligé de faire,
est trop juste pour ne point apprécier les motifs de la conduite
de l’Empereur, et je suis autorisé à assurer V. M. des sentimens
d’intérêt et d’amitié qui continuent à animer l’empereur pour V. M.
mais il ne pouvent pas faire negliger à S. M. I. et R. ce qu’elle
doit à la sureté de son empire et à la gloire de son règne.
&c. &c.
* * * * *
No. IV.
SECTION 1.
CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.
EXTRACT FROM MR. CANNING’S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR.
STUART AND MR. DUFF, 1808.
_To Mr. Stuart._
“You are to enter into no political engagements.”
_To James Duff, Esq_.
“_July 26, 1808._
“You will embark on board his majesty’s ship, Stately; on board
of that ship are embarked to the amount of one million of Spanish
dollars, three-fourths in dollars and one-fourth in bars, which sum
is consigned to your care and is destined by his majesty for the use
of the kingdom of Andalusia and the provinces of Spain connected with
them.”
“His majesty has no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary
assistance which he furnishes to Spain.”
“Military stores to a considerable amount are now actually shipping
for Cadiz, and the articles required for the clothing of the
Andalusian army will follow.”
“It was only by a direct but secret understanding with the government
of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable
amount of dollars has been collected in England.”
“Each province of Spain made its own application with reference to
the full amount of its own immediate necessities, and to the full
measure of its own intended exertions, but without taking into
consideration that similar necessities and similar exertions lead
to similar demands from other parts, and that though each separate
demand might in itself be reasonably supposed to come within the
limits of the means of Great Britain, yet that the whole together
occasion a call for _specie_, such as never before was made upon this
country at any period of its existence.”
“In the course of the present year it is publicly notorious that a
subsidy is paid by Great Britain to Sweden of one million two hundred
thousand pounds, the whole of which, or nearly the whole, must be
remitted in specie, amounting to at least seven million dollars.
One million of dollars has already been sent to Gihon, another to
Coruña _in part_ of the respective demands of the principality of
Asturias and the kingdom of Gallicia, and the remainder of these
demands as already brought forward would require not less than
eight million dollars more to satisfy them.”——“An application from
Portugal has also been received for an aid, which will amount to
about twelve or thirteen hundred thousand dollars, one million as has
been stated goes in the ship with you to Cadiz, and the remainder
of the Andalusian demand would require between three and four
millions of dollars more. Here, therefore, there are not less than
three-and-twenty millions of dollars, of which near sixteen millions
for Spain and Portugal required to be suddenly drawn from the British
treasury.”
“In addition to this drain it is also to be considered that the
British armies are at the same moment sent forth in aid of the same
cause, and that every article of expence to be incurred by them on
foreign service in whatever country they may be employed, must be
defrayed by remittances in silver.”[1]——“You will be particularly
careful in entering upon the explanation with the junta of Seville,
to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value
of the exertions now making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish
nation, or to lay the ground for restraining or limiting those
exertions within any other bounds than those which are prescribed by
the limits of the actual means of the country.”
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Note by Editor.—Nevertheless sir John Moore had only £25,000
in his military chest, and sir David Baird only £8,000 which were
given him by sir John Moore.
_Admiral De Courcy to Mr. Stuart, October 21, 1808._
“Mr. Frere will have told you that the Semiramis has brought a
million of dollars in order to lie at his disposal, besides £50,000
in dollars, which are to be presented to the army of the marquis
of Romana.”——“In the meantime the British troops remain in their
transports at Coruna, uncertain whether they shall be invited to
the war, and without a shilling to defray their expences.”
_Mr. Canning to Mr. Stuart._
_July 27, 1808._
“Already the deputy from Coruna has added to his original demand
for two millions of dollars, a further demand for three millions on
learning from the Asturian deputies that the demand from Asturias
had amounted to five millions in the first instance. Both profess in
conversation to include a provision for the interests of Leon and
of Old Castile in the demand. But this has not prevented a direct
application from Leon.”
“It is besides of no small disadvantage that the deputies from the
Asturias and Gallicia having left Spain at so early a period are
really not competent to furnish information or advice upon the more
advanced state of things in that country.”——“I have already stated
to you that in applications for succours, there is an under-ground
appearance of rivalry, which with every disposition to do every
thing that can be done for Spain, imposes a necessity of perpetual
caution with respect to the particular demands of each province. The
Asturians having been rebuked by their constituents for not having
applied for pecuniary aid as quickly as the Gallicians are bent upon
repairing this fault, and the Gallician having been commended for
promptitude, is ambitious of acquiring new credit by increasing the
amount of his demand. Whatever the ulterior demands, these several
provinces have to make, will be made with infinitely more effect
through you and Mr. Hunter respectively, as they will then come
accompanied with some detailed and intelligible exposition of the
grounds and objects of each particular application.”
_Mr. Stuart’s despatches to Mr. Canning._
_Coruna, July 22, 1808._
“Accounts of advantages in the quarters, which from the present
state of things can have little or no communication with this place,
appear to be numerous in proportion as the north of Spain is barren
of events agreeable to the existing government; and I am disposed to
consider unauthenticated reports of success in Catalonia, Valencia,
Murcia, and Andalusia, to be a mode of concealing or palliating
disasters in Leon, Castile, and the Montaña.”
_July 24, 1808._
“One thousand men, under de Ponte, is the utmost force the Asturias
have yet organized or sent into the field, and the contingents of
Leon are very trifling.
“Thirty thousand men, of which twenty thousand are regular troops
under Blake, were united to ten thousand Castilian recruits under
Cuesta. They went to Rio Seco to march against Burgos, and cut off
Bessieres’ retreat to France, but they lost seven thousand men at Rio
Seco.
“The Estremadura army under Gallegos is at Almaraz, consisting of
twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but the
battle of Rio Seco has cut the communication which had been before
kept up to Andalusia.”
_Abstract of information sent to Mr. Canning by Mr. Stuart._
_July 26, 1808._
“The 29th of May the inhabitants of Coruna appointed a provisional
junta of forty members taken from the notables of the place, and
this junta despatched circulars to the seven provinces of St. Jago,
Betanços, Coruna, Mondonedo, Orense, Lugo, and Tuy, desiring that
deputies from each should come to Coruña to form a junta for Gallicia
entire. Seven persons came and immediately seized the government
and dissolved the local junta; the troops marched to the frontier,
deputies went to England, and all seemed to proceed well until
contributions were demanded. Then the provinces demurred saying,
their deputies were empowered only to signify their approbation of
what had past, but not to seize the government, and St. Jago insisted
upon sending more deputies, and having additional votes as being of
more consequence. It was then arranged that two deputies from each
province should be sent to Coruña with more power. The archbishop
and a Mr. Friere came from St. Jago, and others were arriving when
the first deputation resolved not to submit, and declared the second
to be an ordinary junta, chosen for the mere purpose of raising
money, and subordinate to themselves. The archbishop and the bishop
of Orense refused to act in such a capacity; but a letter from the
latter painting the true state of things being intercepted, he was
arrested and confined in the citadel. A body of troops was sent to
St. Jago, it was uncertain whether to seize the archbishop or to
awe the people; but Mr. Stuart was secretly assured it was for the
former purpose. The archbishop thought so also and came immediately
to Coruña. This transaction was studiously concealed from the English
envoy but he penetrated the secret. The people were discontented at
this usurpation of the junta of seven, but the lavish succours sent
to them by Mr. Canning and the presence of Mr. Stuart induced them to
submit, as thinking the junta were supported by England.
“This junta of seven adopted no measures in common with any
neighbouring province, but willingly entered into close alliance with
the insurgents of Portugal as one independent state with another; and
they withheld any share of the English supplies for the armies of
Asturias and Leon.
“The archbishop was an intriguing dangerous man, and secretly wrote
to Blake to march with the army against the junta, his letter being
intercepted six voted to arrest him, but the seventh with the
assistance of Mr. Stuart persuaded them to avoid so violent a measure
as tending towards a civil commotion. Tumults however did take place,
and the English naval officers were requested and consented to quell
a riot, and it proved that they had more influence over the people
than the junta.
“In August the archbishop was commanded to leave Coruña, he obeyed,
and the bishop of Orense was after some resistance made a member of
the junta.”
_Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning_.
“_August 7._
“There is no common plan, and consequently no concert in their
proceedings. No province shares the succour granted by Great Britain
with its neighbour, although that advantage may not be useful to
themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St.
Andero on the coast of Biscay, and the Asturians have in vain asked
for artillery from the depôts of Gallicia.
“The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians have
remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have
afforded a reasonable relief to the army of Blake.
“The money brought by the Pluto for the province of Leon which has
not raised a man and was till this moment in the hands of the French,
remains unemployed in the port where it was landed. Estremadura is
said to have nine thousand cavalry, which are of little service since
the French quitted that province. Yet they have not sent a man to
Blake who cannot prudently stir from his present position without
cavalry. General Cuesta also has deprived him of six hundred horse
and his flying artillery with which he has actually quitted Salamanca
on his way to join the Estremadura army.”
_Ditto to Ditto_.
(Abstract.)
“_August 12._
“The duke of Infantado reached Blake’s quarters, after escaping from
France. Blake gave him his confidence and sent him to Madrid to form
a council of war, and to persuade Cuesta to send two thousand cavalry
to the army of Gallicia. The junta did not approve of this; they
suspected Infantado as a double dealer and in the French interest.
“After Baylen, the juntas of Seville and Murcia wished to establish a
despotism, differing in nothing from that of Charles III. and Charles
IV. save that Florida Blanca was to be the head of a regency. But
in the north they were all for liberty, and put forward the British
constitution as a model. The army spoke of Infantado as regent,
but the civilians disliked him. All the English guns sent out for
Gallicia went by mistake to the Asturias, the succours were absurdly
distributed and every thing was in confusion.”
_Mr. Stuart to Mr. Canning_.
“_Coruna, August 9._
“I am placed at the very extremity of the kingdom where I cannot
possibly obtain any sort of information respecting other provinces,
and my presence has very materially contributed to cherish the
project of separation from the rest of the peninsula in the minds of
the Gallicians.
“Besides the constant communication of the navy with the junta, a
military mission is placed here consisting of several persons who
communicate regularly with the government and the admiralty, and
whose correspondence with England being a mere duplicate of my own
renders the one or the other perfectly useless.
“The packet instead of coming weekly only arrived every fortnight,
being sent to Gihon to carry home Mr. Hunter’s letters, who I
understand has no order to report to me!
“The admiral having no official notice of my situation here on the
part of government, cannot be expected to detach vessels for the
purpose of sending my despatches at a time when he is occupied in
sending his own accounts of the events taking place in Spain to the
admiralty.”
SECTION 2.
LORD WELLESLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART.
(Extracts.)
“_January 5, 1810._
“In return for these liberal supplies, his majesty is entitled to
claim from the Portuguese government every assistance which can
be afforded to the British commander and troops, a faithful and
judicious application of the funds granted for the support of so
large a portion of the Portuguese force, which must otherwise be
supplied from the exclusive resources of Portugal.”
“I am commanded to signify to you the expectation that the
extraordinary efforts of his majesty’s government for the aid of
Portugal, and the consequent pressure upon the British resources,
will be met with corresponding exertions on the part of the regency,
and that all local and temporary prejudices will be submitted to the
urgent necessity of placing the finances of the kingdom in that state
which may render them available for its defence in the approaching
danger. You will direct your immediate and vigilant attention to
this most important object, nor will you refrain from offering, or
even from urging, your advice on any occasion which may open the
prospect of effecting any useful reduction in the civil charges, or
augmentation in the revenues or military resources of the country.”
“In addition to these arrangements his majesty will expect to receive
regular monthly accounts of the expenditure of the sums applicable
to the military charges of Portugal, under the orders issued to lord
Wellington, as well as accurate returns of the state and condition of
the several corps receiving British pay.”————“It is also desirable
that his majesty should be acquainted with the state and condition
of that part of the Portuguese force which is to be maintained from
the revenues of Portugal.”————“The crisis demands the most unreserved
confidence and communication between his majesty’s ministers and
the local government of the prince regent. No jealousy or suspicion
should be harboured under such a pressure of common danger; the great
sacrifices which we have made for the interests of our ally must not
be frustrated by any consideration inferior to the main purpose of
our mutual security, nor must we now hesitate to take the lead in
any measures necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share
of their own efforts and resources for the accomplishment of their
own safety.”
“The governing-power in Spain does not derive its authority from the
appointment of the sovereign, the disposition of some of its leading
members is at least equivocal, and its conduct has not satisfied any
expectations either of the Spanish nation or of the allies.”————“In
Spain, the assembly of the cortes is the only remedy to which that
country can resort for the purpose of investing the government with a
regular force or a national spirit, nor can any hope be entertained
of a sufficient exertion of the military resources of Spain, until a
governing power shall be so framed as to unite a due representation
of the crown with a just security for the interests and welfare of
all the estates of the realm.”————
SECTION 3.
CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.
_Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart_.
“_Viseu, March 30, 1810._
“I don’t understand the arrangements which government have made
of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered
them as part of this army, and from the arrangements which I made
with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay,
and all the money procured at Cadiz for bills was applicable to
the service in this country. Their instructions to general Graham
alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire
him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from
the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that they should feed our
troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be, that we
shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops
at Cadiz so much part of my army, that I had written to my brother
to desire to have his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from
Cadiz when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into
Portugal at least the troops which I had sent there. But I consider
this now to be out of the question.”
_General Graham to Mr. Stuart_.
“_Isla, May 22, 1810._
“I add this note merely as a postscript to my last, to tell you that
lord Liverpool has decided the doubt, by declaring this a part of
lord Wellington’s army, but saying it is the wish of government that
though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the
present. This is odd enough. I mean that it should not have been left
to his judgement to decide where I was to be employed; one would
think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than
people in England.”
* * * * *
No. V.
SECTION 1.
MARMONT AND DORSENNE’S OPERATIONS.
_Intercepted letter from Foy to Girard, translated from the
cypher_.
“_Truxillo, 20 Août, 1811._
“MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,—Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec quarante mille
hommes; son avant-garde occupe la Sierra de Francia. On assure que
l’artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette
place. C’est approvisionnée pour trois mois. Marmont va se porter
vers le nord pour se réunir avec l’armée commandée par le général
Dorsenne et attaquer l’ennemi. Ma division partira le vingt six
pour passer le Tage et suivre le mouvement de Marmont. Huit mille
hommes de l’armée du centre nous remplaceront à Placentia et au Pont
d’Almaraz.
“Monsieur le maréchal due de Raguse me charge de vous écrire que
c’est à vous à contenir quatre mille Espagnols qui sont en ce moment
réunis devant Truxillo.” &c. &c.
“FOY.”
_Intercepted letter from general Wattier to the general commanding
at Ciudad Rodrigo_.
(Extract.)
“_Salamanca, Septembre 1, 1811._
“L’armée Espagnol de Galice, honteusement chassée de ses positions
de la Baneza et de Puente de Orvigo et poursuivie par l’avant-garde
au delà de Villa Franca, s’est retirée en grande hâte sur la Coruñe.
Le général-en-chef après avoir nettoyé ces parages, vient ici sous
six jours avec vingt-cinq mille hommes de la garde, et nous irons
tous ensemble voir s’il plait à ces illustres Anglais de nous
attendre, et de nous permettre de rompre quelques lances avec eux.
Le duc de Raguse à qui j’envoie de vos nouvelles est autour de vous
à Baños, Val de Fuentes, Placentia, &c., et nous agirons de concert
avec lui.”
_Intercepted letter from Marmont to Girard_.
“_Placencia, 7embre, 1811._
“GÉNÉRAL,—Je vous ai écrit pour vous prier de faire passer une
lettre que j’addressai au maréchal duc de Dalmatie. Les Anglais out
réuni toutes leurs forces auprès de Rodrigo, les corps Espagnols
même qui étoient sur la rive gauche du Tage passent en ce moment
cette rivière; vous n’avez presque personne devant vous. Il serait
extrêmement important que pendant que la presque totalité de l’armée
va se porter sur Rodrigo vous puissiez faire un mouvement pour opérer
une diversion utile et rapeller un portion de la force ennemie de
votre côté. J’ignore quelles sont vos instructions, mais je ne doute
pas que ce mouvement n’entre dans les intentions du duc de Dalmatie.”
_Du maréchal Marmont au général de division Foy._
“_Talavera, Octobre 21, 1811._
“GÉNÉRAL,—Je reçois seulement dans ce moment votre lettre du 18^{me}
avec la copie de celle du général d’Aultanne. Pour instruction
générale vous ne devez obéir à aucun ordre qui vous serait donné
au nom du roi lorsqu’elles sont contraires à mes intentions
particulières. Ne vous départez jamais de ces dispositions. L’armée
de Portugal ne doit point servir aux escortes, ni à la communication
de l’armée du midi,—nos troupes auront bien assez de courses à
faire pour assurer la rentré de nos approvisionnemens. Le roi a paru
désirer que je n’occupe point Illescas, à cause de son voisinage
de Madrid; par ce motif et plus encore en raison de l’éloignement
et du service pénible des troupes, je ne veux point l’occuper. Mon
intention était de ne point occuper Aranjuez; mais puisque les
ministres du roi out pris la mesure inconsiderée d’ordonner la
vente des magazins, ne perdez pas un seul instant pour envoyer un
détachement occuper Aranjuez, où le préfet de Toledo fera faire
le plus de biscuit possible. Prenez la même mesure pour tous les
points où il y a des magazins.—Emparez vous en,—et que personne
n’y touche.—L’empereur a indiqué la province de Toledo et non la
préfecture; ainsi ce sont les réssources de toute la province qui
nous sont affectés.—Emparez vous en,—et que le préfet administre
tous le pays. Dites bien au préfet qu’à quelque titre que ce soit
aucun des réssources en blé, argent de quelque source qu’elles
préviennent ne doit être distraits pour Madrid, et qu’elles doivent
toutes être conservés pour l’armée de Portugal. À la fin du mois la
division de dragons arrivera dans les environs de Tolede.—J’espère
qu’elle éloignera les guerillas. Dans le cas ou ils resteroient dans
le voisinage on leur donnera la chasse. Voyez à obtenir du préfet de
Tolede qu’il fasse un effort extraordinaire pour envoyer à Talavera
le blé et l’orge qui lui out été demandés, attendu que comme ici on
est obligé de faire des expéditions en avant, nous sommes dans un
besoin très pressant. Je désirerois rentrer dans la possession de
tout le blé qui a été vendu. On renverroit les acheteurs par devant
le gouvernement Espagnol pour être indemnisées,—s’il y a possibilité
engagez le préfet à prendre des mesures conservatoires en attendant
que je prenne un arrête à cet égard sur le rapport que vous me ferez.
Je me rends à Madrid où je passerai deux jours dans l’espérance
d’éclairer le roi sur la conduite que ses véritables intérêts lui
commandent de tenir envers l’armée française. De là je me rends à
Tolede. Je n’ai pas besoin de vous recommander, général, d’envoyer à
Aranjuez un officier sage et ferme, qui exécute ponctuellement les
ordres qui lui seroient donnés, qui se fasse obéir et qui mette le
plus grand soin à faire respecter l’habitation du roi.”
_Intercepted letter in cypher from general Montbrun to the
governor of Ciudad Rodrigo._
_Val de Fuentes, Septembre, 1811._
Je reçu le—du courant, mon cher général votre réponse du—à la
lettre que je vous écrivis le—, et je m’empressai d’en communiquer
le continue à S. E. le maréchal duc de Ragusa, qui me charge de
me mettre en communication avec vous. Je m’en acquitterai avec
plaisir puisque c’en est toujours un nouveau pour moi de récevoir
de vos nouvelles. Je vous annonce qu’un approvisionnement très
considérable se prépare à Salamanque par les soins du général-en-chef
Dorsenne, le maréchal, sur lequel vous pouvez compter aussi fait
des preparatifs pour vous envoyer des vivres. Tous les convois
partiront sous bonne escorte, et se mettront en marche d’après ce
que je presume du—au—du courant au plus tard. Dans tous les cas ne
vous impatientez pas. Nous sommes prêts à venir à votre sécours de
toutes les manières. Vous ne sauriez trop de votre côté nous mettre
au courant de la force de la position et enfin vous ne pourriez nous
donner trop de détails sur l’armée Anglo-Portugaise.
Je reçois à l’instant le billet que vouz avez écrit hier au général
Boyer, par lequel vous nous faites connoître que d’après tous les
renseignemens que vouz avez obtenus, vouz croyez que les sept
divisions Anglaises sont dans vos parages. Il importe de s’en assurer
positivement de connoître leur position, et, s’il est possible, leur
composition. II parait que vous n’avez pas beaucoup de monde dans
votre place sur qui vous puissiez compter. Proposez à l’homme que
je vous envoie d’aller reconnoître les Anglais à Gallegos et Fuente
Guinaldo, et de révenir par El Bodon, et vous me le renverriez
ensuite. Dites lui que je le paierai bien s’il veut faire cette
tournée, mais s’il s’y refuse je vous prie de ne pas l’y contraindre.
&c., &c.
_General Walker to lord Wellington._
“_Coruna, September 4, 1811._
“I saw the whole of the troops with him (general Abadia) in and
about a league in front of Astorga, having their advanced posts
on the Esla, the whole not amounting to above seven thousand men,
independent of a reserve of about fifteen hundred near Foncebadon
and Bembibre or on the road from Lugo. The force of the enemy in his
front when collected being estimated at about thirteen thousand men.
The wretched situation of the Gallician troops, in want almost of
every thing, one-third part at least without shoes, and dependent
on the precarious subsistence that can day by day be collected,
certainly does credit to their patience and good inclination.”
————“In consequence of this movement, (Abadia’s retreat,) the
great road by Manzanal and Bembibre being left open or nearly so,
the French pushed forward on it so rapidly that shortly after my
arrival here (Coruña) intelligence was received of their having
got possession of the important pass of Villa Franca, and that the
Gallician troops thus cut off from it, had been obliged to make their
retreat by the Valdes Orres. Without any correct information of the
force of the enemy, and the entrance of Gallicia thus left entirely
in his hands, a very considerable alarm was for some time occasioned
here, of which I took every advantage to urge upon the junta the
necessity of a full compliance with the recommendation and wishes
of the general to enable him to put the troops in such a state of
equipment as might render them, either for defence or attack, in
every way disposable in his hands; and at the same time to put Coruña
into temporary security by withdrawing to it all the guns (amounting
to no less than fifteen hundred) of the indefensible arsenal of
Ferrol, which would otherwise become a sure depôt for the enemy in
any attack he might contemplate on this place, and who might not
otherwise venture to bring with him heavy artillery on so distant an
excursion.”
SECTION 2.
_Official letters from the prince of Neufchatel to marshal
Marmont, extracted from the duke of Rovigo’s Memoirs._
“_Paris, le 21 Novembre, 1811._
“L’empereur me charge de vous faire connaître, monsieur le maréchal,
que l’objet le plus important en ce moment est la prise de Valence.
L’empereur ordonne que vous fassiez partir un corps de troupes qui,
réuni aux forces que le roi détachera de l’armée du centre, se dirige
sur Valence pour appuyer l’armée du maréchal Suchet jusqu’à ce qu’on
soit maître de cette place.
“Faites exécuter sans délai cette disposition de concert avec S.
M. le roi d’Espagne, et instruisez-moi de ce que vous aurez fait a
cet égard. Nous sommes instruits que les Anglais ont vingt mille
malades, et qu’ils n’ont pas vingt mille hommes sous les armes, en
sorte qu’ils ne peuvent rien entreprendre; l’intention de l’empereur
est donc que douze mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie et sapeurs,
marchent de suite sur Valence, que vous détachiez même trois à quatre
mille hommes sur les derrières, et que vous, monsieur le maréchal,
soyez en mesure de soutenir la prise de Valence. Cette place prise,
le Portugal sera près de sa chute, parcequ’alors, dans la bonne
saison, l’armée de Portugal sera augmentée de vingt-cinq mille
hommes de l’armée du midi et de quinze mille du corps du général
Reille, de manière à réunir plus de quatre-vingt mille hommes. Dans
cette situation, vous recevriez l’ordre de vous porter sur Elvas, et
de vous emparer de tout l’Alemtejo dans le même temps que l’armée
du nord se porterait sur la Coa avec une armée de quarantre mille
hommes. L’équipage de pont qui existe à Badajoz servirait à jeter
des ponts sur le Tage; l’ennemi serait hors d’état de rien opposer
à une pareille force, qui offre toutes les chances de succès sans
presenter aucun danger. C’est donc Valence qu’il faut prendre. Le 6
Novembre nous étions maîtres d’un faubourg; il y a lieu d’espérer que
la place prise en Décembre, ce qui vous mettrait, monsieur le duc,
à portée de vous trouver devant Elvas dans le courant de Janvier.
Envoyez moi votre avis sur ce plan d’opérations, afin qu’après avoir
reçu l’avis de la prise de Valence, l’empereur puisse vous donner des
ordres positifs.
“Le prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général.”
(Signé) “ALEXANDRE.”
“_Paris, le 15 Février, 1812._
“Sa majesté n’est pas satisfaite de la direction que vous donnez à la
guerre. Vouz avez la supériorité sur l’ennemi, et au lieu de prendre
l’initiative, vous ne cessez de la reçevoir. Quand le général Hill
marche sur l’armée du midi avec quinze mille hommes c’est ce qui peut
vous arriver de plus heureux; cette armée est assez forte et assez
bien organisée pour ne rien craindre d’armée Anglaise, aurait-elle
quatre ou cinq divisions réunies.
“Aujourd’-hui l’ennemi suppose que vous allez faire le siège de
Rodrigo; il approche le général Hill de sa droite afin de pouvoir
le faire venir à lui à grandes marches, et vous livrer bataille
réunis, si vous voulez reprendre Rodrigo. C’est donc au duc de
Dalmatie à tenir vingt mille hommes pour le contenir et l’empêcher
de faire ce mouvement, et si général Hill passe le Tage, de se
porter à sa suite, ou dans l’Alemtejo. Vous avez le double de la
lettre que l’empereur m’a ordonné d’écrire au duc de Dalmatie le
10 de ce mois, en réponse à la demande qu’il vous avait faite de
porter des troupes dans le midi; c’est vous, monsieur le maréchal,
qui deviez lui écrire pour lui demander de porter un grand corps de
troupes vers la Guadiana, pour maintenir le général Hill dans le
midi et l’empêcher de se réunir à lord Wellington.... Les Anglais
connaîssent assez l’honneur français pour comprendre que ce succès
(la prise de Rodrigo) peut devenir un affront pour eux, et qu’au lieu
d’améliorer leur position, l’occupation de Ciudad Rodrigo les met
dans l’obligation de défendre cette place. Ils nous rendent maîtres
du choix du champ de bataille, puisque vous les forcez à venir au
sécours de cette place et à combattre dans une position si loin de
la mer.... Je ne puis que vous répéter les ordres de l’empereur.
Prenez votre quartier-général à Salamanque, travaillez avec activité
à fortifier cette ville, réunissez-y un nouvel équipage du siège
pour servir à armer la ville, formez-y des approvisionnemens, faites
faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les Anglais, placez deux
fortes avant gardes qui menacent, l’une Rodrigo, et l’autre Almeida;
menacez les autres directions sur la frontière de Portugal, envoyez
des partis qui ravagent quelques villages, enfin employez tout ce
qui peut tenir l’ennemie sur le qui-vive. Faites réparer les routes
de Porto et d’Almeida. Tenez votre armée vers Toro, Benavente. La
province d’Avila a même de bonnes parties où l’on trouverait des
ressources. Dans cette situation qui est aussi simple que formidable,
vous reposez vos troupes, vous formez des magasins, et avec de
simples démonstrations bien combinées, qui mettent vos avant-postes
à même de tirer journellement des coups de fusil avec l’ennemi, vous
aurez barre sur les Anglais, qui ne pourront vous observer.... Ce
n’est donc pas à vous, monsieur le duc, à vous disséminer en faveur
de l’armée du midi. Lorsque vous avez été prendre le commandement
de votre armée elle venait d’éprouver un échec par sa retraite de
Portugal; ce pays était ravagé, les hôpitaux et les magasins de
l’ennemi étaient à Lisbonne; vos troupes étaient fatiguées, dégoutées
par les marches forcées, sans artillerie, sans train d’équipages.
Badajoz était attaqué depuis long temps; une bataille dans le midi
n’avait pu faire lever le siège de cette place. Que deviez vous faire
alors? Vous portez sur Almeida pour menacer Lisbonne? Non, parceque
votre armée n’avait pas d’artillerie, pas de train d’équipages, et
qu’elle était fatiguée. L’ennemi à cette position, n’aurait pas cru
à cette menace; il aurait laissé approcher jusqu’à Coimbre, aurait
près Badajos, et ensuite serait venu sur vous. Vous avez donc fait
à cette époque ce qu’il fallait faire; vous avez marché rapidement
au secours de Badajoz; l’ennemi avait barre sur vous, et l’art de la
guerre était de vous y commettre. Le siège a été levé, et l’ennemi
est rentré en Portugal; c’est ce qu’il y avait à faire. .... Dans
ce moment, monsieur le duc, votre position est simple et claire,
et ne demande pas de combinaisons d’esprit. Placez vos troupes de
manière qu’en quatre marches elles puissent se réunir et se grouper
sur Salamanque; ayez-y votre quartier-général; que vos ordres, vos
dispositions annoncent à l’ennemi que la grosse artillerie arrive
à Salamanque, que vous y former des magasins.... Si Wellington se
dirige sur Badajoz, laissez le aller; réunissez aussitôt votre armée,
et marcher droit sur Almeida; poussez des partis sur Coïmbre, et
soyez persuadé que Wellington reviendra bien vîte sur vous.
“Ecrivez au duc de Dalmatie et sollicitez le roi de lui écrire
également, pour qu’il exécute les ordres impératifs que je lui donne,
de porter un corps de vingt mille hommes pour forcer le général Hill
à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage. Ne pensez donc plus, monsieur
le maréchal, à aller dans le midi et marchez droit sur le Portugal,
si lord Wellington fait la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche
du Tage.... Profitez du moment où vos troupes se réunissent pour
bien organiser et mettre de l’ordre dans le nord. Qu’on travaille
jour et nuit à fortifier Salamanque qu’on y fasse venir de grosses
pièces, qu’on fasse l’équipage de siège; enfin qu’on forme des
magasins de subsistances. Vous sentirez, monsieur le maréchal,
qu’en suivant ces directions et en mettant pour les exécuter toute
l’activité convenable, vous tiendrez l’ennemi en échec.... En
recevant l’initiative au lieu de la donner, en ne songeant qu’ à
l’armée du midi qui n’a pas besoin de vous, puisqu’elle est forte
de quatre-vingt mille hommes des meilleures troupes de l’Europe,
en ayant des sollicitudes pour les pays qui ne sont pas sous votre
commandement et abandonnant les Asturies et les provinces qui vous
regardent, un combat que vous éprouveriez serait une calamité qui se
ferait sentir dans toute l’Espagne. Un échec de l’armée du midi la
conduirait sur Madrid ou sur Valence et ne serait pas de même nature.
“Je vous le répète, vous êtes le maître de conserver barre sur
lord Wellington, en placant votre quartier-général à Salamanque,
en occupant en force cette position, et poussant de fortes
reconnaissances sur les débouches. Je ne pourrais que vous rédire
ce que je vous ai déjà expliqué ci-dessus. Si Badajoz était cerné
seulement par deux ou trois divisions Anglaises, le duc de Dalmatie
le débloquerait; mais alors lord Wellington, affaibli, vous mettrait
à même de vous porter dans l’intérieur du Portugal, ce qui secourrait
plus efficacement Badajoz que toute autre opération.... Je donne
l’ordre que tout ce qu’il sera possible de fournir vous soit
fourni pour completer votre artillerie et pour armer Salamanque.
Vingt-quatre heures après la réception de cette lettre l’empereur
pense que vous partirez pour Salamanque, à moins d’événemens
inattendus; que vous changerez une avant-garde d’occuper les
débouches sur Rodrigo, et une autre sur Almeida; que vous aurez dans
la main au moins la valeur d’une division; que vous ferez revenir la
cavalerie et artillerie qui sont à la division du Tage.... Réunissez
surtout votre cavalerie, dont vous n’avez pas de trop et donc vous
avez tant de besoin....”
“_Valladolid, le 23 Février, 1812._
“_Au Prince de Neuchâtel._
“MONSEIGNEUR,—J’ignore si sa majesté aura daigné accueillir d’une
manière favorable la demande que j’ai eu l’honneur d’adresser à
votre altesse pour supplier l’empereur de me permettre de faire
sous ses yeux la campagne qui va s’ouvrir; mais qu’elle que soit sa
décision, je regarde comme mon devoir de lui faire connaître, au
moment où il semble prêt à s’éloigner, la situation des choses dans
cette partie de l’Espagne.
“D’après les derniers arrangemens arrêtés par sa majesté, l’armée de
Portugal n’a plus le moyen de remplir la tâche qui lui est imposée,
et je serais coupable, si, en ce moment, je cachais la verité. La
frontière se trouve très affaiblie par le départ des troupes qui
ont été rappelées par la prise de Rodrigo, qui met l’ennemi à même
d’entrer dans le cœur de la Castille en commençant un mouvement
offensif; ensuite par l’immense étendue de pays que l’armée est dans
le devoir d’occuper, ce qui rend toujours son rassemblement lent et
difficile, tandis qu’il y a peu de temps elle était toute réunie et
disponible.
“Les sept divisions qui la composent s’éleveront, lorsqu’elles
auront reçu les régimens de marche annoncés, à quarante-quatre mille
hommes d’infanterie environ; il faut au moins cinq mille hommes pour
occuper les points fortifiés et les communications qui ne peuvent
être abandonnés; il faut à peu près pareille force pour observer
l’Esla et la couvrir contre l’armée de Galice, qui évidemment, dans
le cas d’un mouvement offensif des Anglais, se porterait à Bénavente
et à Astorga. Ainsi, à supposer que toute l’armée soit réunie entre
le Duero et la Tormes, sa force ne peut s’élever qu’à trente-trois
ou trente-quatre mille hommes, tandis que l’ennemi peut présenter
aujourd’hui une masse de plus de soixante mille hommes, dont plus de
moitié Anglais, bien outillés et bien pourvus de toutes choses: et
cependant que de chances pour que les divisions du Tage se trouvent
en arrière! Qu’elles n’aient pu être ralliées promptement, et soient
separées de l’armée pendant les momens les plus importans de la
campagne; alors la masse de nos forces réunies ne s’éleverait pas à
plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes. Sa majesté suppose, il est vrai,
que, dans ce pas l’armée du nord soutiendrait celle de Portugal par
deux divisions; mais l’empereur peut-il être persuadé que, dans
l’ordre de chose actuel, ces troupes arriveront promptement et à
temps?
“L’ennemi parait en offensive: celui qui doit le combattre prépare
ses moyens; celui qui doit agir hypothétiquement attend sans
inquiétude, et laisse écouler en pure perte un temps précieux;
l’ennemi marche à moi, je réunis mes troupes d’une manière méthodique
et précise, je sais à un jour près le moment où le plus grand nombre
au moins sera en ligne, à qu’elle époque les autres seront en liaison
avec moi, et, d’après cet état de choses, je me détermine à agir ou
à temporiser; mais ces calculs, je ne puis les faire que pour des
troupes qui sont purement et simplement à mes ordes. Pour celles qui
n’y sont pas, que de lenteurs! que d’incertitudes et de temps perdu.
J’annonce la marche de l’ennemi et je demande des secours, on me
répond par des observations; ma lettre n’est parvenue que lentement
parceque les communications sont difficiles dans ce pays; la réponse
et ma réplique vient de même, et l’ennemi sera sur moi. Mais comment
pourrai-je même d’avance faire des calculs raisonnables sur les
mouvemens de troupes dont je ne connais ni la force ni l’emplacement?
Lorsque je ne sais rien de la situation du pays ni des besoins de
troupes qu’on y éprouve. Je ne puis raisonner que sur ce qui est à
mes ordres, et puisque les troupes qui n’y sont pas me sont cependant
nécessaires pour combattre, et sont comptées comme partie de la force
que je dois opposer à l’ennemi, je puis en fausse position, et je
n’ai les moyens de rien faire méthodiquement et avec connaissance de
cause.
“Si l’on considère combien il faut de prévoyance pour exécuter
le plus petit mouvement en Espagne, on doit se convaincre de la
nécessité qu’il y a de donner d’avance mille ordres préparatoires
sans lesquels les mouvemens rapides sont impossibles. Ainsi les
troupes du nord m’étant étrangères habituellement, et m’étant
cependant indispensables pour combattre, le succès de toutes mes
opérations est dépendant du plus ou du moins de prévoyance et
d’activité d’un autre chef: je ne puis donc pas être responsable des
événemens.
“Mais il ne faut pas seulement considérer l’état des choses pour la
défensive du nord, il faut la considérer pour celle du midi. Si lord
Wellington porte six divisions sur la rive gauche du Tage le duc de
Dalmatie a besoin d’un puissant secours; si dans ce cas, l’armée du
nord ne fournit pas de troupes pour réléver une partie d’armée de
Portugal dans quelques-uns des postes qu’elle doit évacuer alors
momentanement, mais qu’il est important de tenir, et pour la sûreté
du pays et pour maintenir la Galice et observer les deux divisions
ennemies qui seraient sur l’Agueda, et qui feraient sans doute
quelques demonstrations offensives; si dis-je l’armée du nord ne
vient pas à son aide, l’armée de Portugal, trop faible, ne pourra
pas faire un détachement d’une force convenable, et Badajoz tombera.
Certes, il faut des ordres pour obtenir de l’armée du nord un
mouvement dans cette hypothèse, et le temps utile pour agir; si on
s’en tenait à des propositions et à des négociations, ce temps, qu’on
ne pourrait remplacer, serait perdu en vaines discussions. Je suis
autorisé à croire ce résultat.
“L’armée de Portugal est en ce moment la principale armée d’Espagne;
c’est à elle à couvrir l’Espagne contre les entreprises des Anglais;
pour pouvoir manœuvrer, il faut qu’elle ait des points d’appui, des
places, des forts, des têtes-de-pont, etc.
“Il faut pour cela du matériel d’artillerie, et je n’ai ni canons ni
munitions à y appliquer, tandis que les établissemens de l’armée du
nord en sont tout remplis; j’en demanderai, on m’en promettra, mais
en résultat je n’obtiendrai rien.
“Après avoir discuté la question militaire, je dirai un mot de
l’administration. Le pays donné à l’armée de Portugal a des products
présumés le tiers de ceux des cinq gouvernemens.
“L’armée de Portugal est beaucoup plus nombreuse que l’armée du
nord; le pays qu’elle occupe est insoumis; on n’arrache rien qu’avec
la force, et les troupes de l’armée du nord ont semblé prendre à
tâche, en l’évacuant, d’en enléver toutes les ressources. Les autres
gouvernemens, malgré les guérillas, sont encore dans la soumission,
et acquittent les contributions sans qu’il soit besoin de contrainte.
D’après cela il y a une immense différence dans le sort de l’une et
de l’autre et comme tout doit tendre au même but, que partout ce
sont les soldats de l’empereur, que tous les efforts doivent avoir
pour objet le succès des opérations, ne serait-il pas juste que les
ressources de tous ces pays fussent partagées proportionnellement aux
besoins de chacun; et comment y parvenir sans une autorité unique?
“Je crois avoir demontré que, pour une bonne défensive du nord, le
général de l’armée de Portugal doit avoir toujours à ses ordres les
troupes et le territoire de l’armée du nord, puisque ces troupes sont
appelées à combattre avec les siennes, et que les ressources de ce
territoire doivent être en partie consacrées à les entretenir.
“Je passe maintenant à ce qui regarde le midi de l’Espagne. Une
des tâches de l’armée de Portugal est de soutenir l’armée du midi,
d’avoir l’œil sur Badajoz et de couvrir Madrid; et pour cela, il
faut qu’un corps assez nombreux occupe la vallée du Tage; mais ce
corps ne pourra subsister et ne pourra préparer des ressources pour
d’autres troupes qui s’y rendraient pour le soutenir, s’il n’a pas un
territoire productif, et ce territoire, quel autre peut-il être que
l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre? Quelle ville peut offrir des
ressources et des moyens dans la vallée du Tage si ce n’est Madrid?
Cependant aujourd’hui l’armée de Portugal ne possède sur le nord du
Tage, qu’un désert qui ne lui offre aucune espèce de moyens, ni pour
les hommes ni pour les chevaux, et elle ne rencontre de la part des
autorités de Madrid, que haine, qu’animosité. L’armée du centre, qui
n’est rien, possède à elle seule un territoire plus fertile, plus
étendu que celui qui est accordé pour toute l’armée de Portugal;
cette vallée ne peut s’exploiter faute de troupes, et tout le monde
s’oppose à ce que nous en tirions des ressources. Cependant si les
bords du Tage étaient évacués par suite de la disette, personne à
Madrid ne voudrait en apprécier la véritable raison, et tout le monde
accuserait l’armée de Portugal de découvrir cette ville.
“Il existe, il faut le dire, une haine, une animosité envers les
Français, qu’il est impossible d’exprimer, dans le gouvernement
espagnol. Il existe un désordre à Madrid qui présente le spectacle
le plus révoltant. Si les subsistances employées en de fausses
consommations dans cette ville eussent été consacrées à former un
magasin de ressources pour l’armée de Portugal, les troupes qui sont
sur le Tage seraient dans l’abondance et pourvues pour long-temps;
on consomme 22 mille rations par jour à Madrid, et il n’y a pas
3,000 hommes: c’est qu’on donne et laisse prendre à tout le monde,
excepté à ceux qui servent. Mais bien plus, je le répete, c’est un
crime que d’aller prendre ce que l’armée du centre ne peut elle-même
ramasser. Il est vrai qu’il parait assez conséquent que ceux qui,
depuis deux ans, trompent le roi, habillent et arment chaque jour des
soldats qui, au bout de deux jours, vont se joindre à nos ennemis, et
semblent en vérité avoir ainsi consacré un mode régulier decrutement
des bandes que nous avons sur les bras, s’occupent de leur réserver
des moyens de subsistances à nos dépens.
“La seule communication carrossable entre la gauche et le reste de
l’armée de Portugal est par la province de Ségovie, et le mouvement
des troupes et des convois ne peut avoir lieu avec facilité,
parceque, quoique ce pays soit excellent et plein de ressources, les
autorités de l’armée du centre refusent de prendre aucune disposition
pour assurer leurs subsistances.
“Si l’armée de Portugal peut être affranchie du devoir de sécourir
le midi, de couvrir Madrid, elle peut se concentrer dans la
Vieille-Castille, et elle s’en trouvera bien; alors tout lui
devient facile; mais si elle doit au contraire remplir cette double
tâche, elle ne le peut qu’en occupant la vallée du Tage, et dans
cette vallée elle ne peut avoir les ressources nécessaires pour y
vivre, pour y manœuvrer, pour y préparer des moyens suffisans pour
toutes les troupes qu’il faudra y envoyer, qu’en possédant tout
l’arrondissement de l’armée du centre et Madrid. Ce territoire doit
conserver les troupes qui l’occupent à présent, afin qu’en marchant à
l’ennemi, l’armée ne soit obligée de laisser personne en arrière mais
qu’au contraire elle en tire quelque secours pour sa communication.
Elle a besoin surtout d’être délivrée des obstacles que fait naître
sans cesse un gouvernement veritablement ennemi des armes françaises;
quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du roi, il parait qu’il ne
peut rien contre l’intérêt et les passions de ceux qui l’environnent;
il semble également que jusqu’à présent il n’a rien pu contre les
désordres qui out lieu à Madrid, contre l’anarchie qui règne à
l’armée du centre. Il peut y avoir de grandes raisons en politique
pour que le roi réside à Madrid, mais il y a mille raisons positives
et de sûreté pour les armes françaises, qui sembleraient devoir lui
faire choisir un autre séjour. Et en effet, ou le roi est général
et commandant des armées, et dans ce cas il doit être au milieu des
troupes, voir leurs besoins, pourvoir à tout, et être responsable;
ou il est étranger à toutes les opérations, et alors, autant pour sa
tranquillité personnelle que pour laisser plus de liberté dans les
opérations, il doit s’éloigner du pays qui en est le théâtre et des
lieux qui servent de points d’appui aux mouvemens de l’armée.
“La guerre d’Espagne est difficile dans son essence, mais cette
difficulté est augmentée de beaucoup par la division des commandemens
et par le grande dimunition des troupes que cette division rend
encore plus funeste. Si cette division a déjà fait tant de mal,
lorsque l’empereur, étant à Paris, s’occupant sans cesse de ses
armées de la péninsule, pouvait en partie remédier à tout, on doit
fremir du résultat infallible de ce système, suivi avec diminution de
moyens, lorsque l’empereur s’eloigne de trois cents lieues.
“Monseigneur, je vous ai exposé toutes les raisons qui me semblent
démontrer jusqu’à l’évidence la nécessité de réunir sous la même
autorité toutes les troupes et tout le pays, depuis Bayonne jusques
et y compris Madrid et la Manche; en cela, je n’ai été guidé que par
mon amour ardent pour la gloire de nos armes et par ma conscience.
Si l’empereur ne trouvait pas convenable d’adopter ce système j’ose
le supplier de me donner un successeur dans le commandement qu’il
m’avait confié. J’ai la confiance et le sentiment de pouvoir faire
autant qu’un autre, mais tout restant dans la situation actuelle la
charge est au-dessus de mes forces. De quelques difficultés que soit
le commandement général, quelqu’imposante que soit la responsabilité
qui l’accompagne, elles me paraissent beaucoup moindres que celles
que ma position entraine en ce moment.
“Quelque flatteur que soit un grand commandement, il n’a de prix
à mes yeux que lorsqu’il est accompagné des moyens de bien-faire:
lorsque ceux-ci me sont enlevés, alors tout me paraît préférable, et
mon ambition se réduit à servir en soldat. Je donnerai ma vie sans
regret, mais je ne puis rester dans la cruelle position de n’avoir
pour résultat de mes efforts et de mes soins de tous les momens, que
la triste perspective d’attacher mon nom à des événemens facheux et
peu dignes de la gloire de nos armes.
“(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE RAGUSE.”
_Joseph to Napoleon._
_Madrid, May 18, 1812._
SIRE,—Il y a aujourd’hui un mois et demi que j’ai reçu la lettre
du prince de Neufchatel en dâte du 16 Mars dernier, qui m’annonce
que votre majesté impériale et royale me confiait le commandement de
ses armées en Espagne, et me prévenait que les généraux-en-chef des
armées du Nord, de Portugal, du midi, et de l’Arragon recevaient les
ordres convenables.
Depuis cette époque il m’a été impossible de remplir les intentions
de V. M. impériale et royale. Le général-en-chef de l’armée du nord
s’est refusé à m’envoyer aucune rapport disant, et écrivant qu’il
n’avait aucun ordre à cet égard. M. le maréchal commandant en chef
l’armée du midi n’a encore répondu à aucune des lettres que je
lui ai écrites ou fait écrire depuis cette époque. M. le maréchal
commandant-en-chef l’armée d’Arragon ne m’envoye aucune rapport, et
reste entièrement isolé de moi. M. le maréchal commandant-en-chef
l’armée de Portugal m’a fait beaucoup de demandes auxquelles il
savait parfaitement que je ne pouvais satisfaire, comme celles des
troupes de l’armée du nord, des vivres, &c. Sa conduite est tellement
indécente qu’elle n’est pas concevable. V. M. I. et R. pourra en
juger par mes dépêches au prince de Neufchatel.————Sire, en acceptant
le commandement des armées françaises à l’époque ou je l’ai reçu,
j’ai cru remplir un devoir que tous les liens qui m’attachent à V.
M. I. et R. et à la France m’imposaient parceque j’ai pensé pouvoir
être utile, mais j’étais persuadé que V. M. I. et R. me confiant un
dépôt si précieux les généraux-en-chef s’empresseraient d’obéir à
la volonté de V. M. Il n’en est pas ainsi, je m’adresse donc à elle
pour qu’elle veuille bien écrire ou faire écrire aux généraux-en-chef
qu’elle est sa volonté pour qu’elle leur fasse déclarer que leur
désobeissance à mes ordres les mettrait dans le cas d’être renvoyés
en France où ils trouveraient un juge juste mais sévère dans V. M.
I. et R. Si V. majesté ne trouve pas le moyen de persuader à ces
messieurs que sa volonté est que je sois obéi, je la supplie de
considérer que le role auquel je suis exposé est indigne de mon
caractère et du nom de V. M. Si la guerre du nord a lieu, je ne
puis être utile ici qu’autant que je suis obéi, et je ne puis être
obéi qu’autant que ces messieurs sauront que j’ai le droit de les
remplacer; je ne puis infliger, moi, d’autre punition que celle là
à un général-en-chef. Si je ne suis pas obéi, et que V. M. aille au
nord, l’Espagne sera évacué honteusement par les troupes impériales,
et le nom que je porte aura présidé inutilement à cette époque
désastreuse.
Le mal est grand, mais il n’est au-dessus ni de mon devouement ni
de mon courage. C’est à votre majesté à les rendre efficaces par
la force dont il est indispensable qu’elle m’entoure; le salut des
armées impériales et de l’Espagne independent.
* * * * *
No. VI.
TARIFA.
[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different
officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark
different sources of information.]
SECTION 1.
_Number and conduct of the French._
A.
“As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted
letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact,
concurred in stating that the troops employed _exceeded nine thousand
men_!”
_Extracts from colonel Skerrett’s despatch._
“The enemy’s force employed in the siege is stated at _ten thousand,
probably this is in some degree exaggerated_.”
B.
“The fact of the enemy, with _eleven thousand experienced soldiers_,
not having made another effort after his assault of the 31st, &c.”
_Lord Wellington’s despatch._
“_January 19, 1812._
“By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th December, I learn
that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of _about five thousand
men_ on the 20th December, covering their operation against that
place by another corps at Vejer.”
_Conduct of the French._
A.
“There was not, on the part of the leading French officer (an old
lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followers, any appearance of panic
or perturbation. Their advance was serene, steady, and silent, worthy
of the 5th corps, of their Austrian laurels, of their ‘_vielles
moustaches_.’”
SECTION 2.
_Conduct of the Spanish soldiers._
B.
“At the assault general Copons himself was the only person who shewed
his head above the parapet. The precaution of outflanking him by
three companies of the 47th regiment remedied the chance of evil,
which so lamentable a want of chivalry might have occasioned, but the
knights of older times were probably better fed than were our poor
distressed friends.”
SECTION 3.
_Conduct of colonel Skerrett._
A.
“It is necessary to advert to the 18-pounder mounted on the Gusmans’
tower, as Southey’s History contains some strange misrepresentation
on the subject.” “The French made the 18-pounder an early object
of attack, but they did not succeed in crushing it. Unfortunately
one of the spherical case shot, not precisely fitting its old and
worn calibre, burst in passing over the town, and killed or wounded
a person in the street. This produced some alarm and complaint
amongst the inhabitants for a moment, and in the first feeling of
that moment, Skerrett, with characteristic impetuosity, directed
the gun to be placed ‘_hors de service_.’ There was no ambiguity in
his command, ‘_Let it be spiked_.’” “Had he referred the case to
the commanding officer of artillery, the order would not have been
executed, means would have been found to remove the first impression
and tranquillize the people, without the sacrifice of the gun which
might have added materially to the offensive powers of the garrison,
particularly if the siege had been prolonged.”
B.
“On the 29th of December, colonel Skerrett with a rare activity,
dismounted a 32-pound carronade, that looked into the enemy’s
batteries at the distance of about four hundred yards, and he
succeeded in spiking and knocking off the trunnion of an 18-pounder,
borrowed from the Stately. This gun was mounted on the tower of the
Gusmans.”
_General Campbell to lord Liverpool._
“_January 3, 1812._
“Annexed is a letter received last night from colonel Skerrett; and,
notwithstanding the despondency therein expressed, which has been
equally so in other letters that I have received from him, my opinion
remains the same as formerly.”
A.
“At the crisis produced by Skerrett’s desire to retire from the town,
and desire to leave the island also, general Campbell sent express
instructions that the town should not be abandoned without the
concurrence of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers;
and accompanied these instructions with a positive command that every
officer and soldier belonging to Gibraltar should, in future, be
stationed in the island, to insure at all events the preservation of
that port.”
SECTION 4.
_Sir C. Smith’s conduct._
“Smith never tolerated the idea of surrender—never admitted the
possibility of defeat.”
“Comprehending from the first the resources and capabilities of
his post, and with a sort of intuition anticipating his assailant,
he covered the weak points while he concealed its strength; and so
conducted the skirmish which preceded the investment, that he, as it
were, dictated the whole plan of attack, and in reality pointed out
with his finger the position of the breaching battery.”
“Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been
duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and
more brilliant.”
SECTION 5.
(Extracts.)
_Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool._
“_January 9, 1812._
“From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it
appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be
equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the
island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett’s
detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that
the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without
which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if
they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to
retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them
with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of
Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their
neighbourhood to protect them.”
_Lord Wellington to major-general Cooke._
“_February 1, 1812._
“SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and
of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had,
with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which
you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I
conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of
state with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty
to recal colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a
proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient
that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From
the report of colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information
which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders
that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject
is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right
to expect that his majesty’s officers and troops will perform
their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect
that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town
of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in
every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely
cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace infinitely
to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is
useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you
should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding
the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under
colonel Skerrett.”
_Ditto to Ditto._
“_February 25, 1812._
“I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my
opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith’s letter
throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be
the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a
small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of
Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island
depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide
only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to
me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring,
and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison
that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon
either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar
you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I
made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send
a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for
purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I
conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such
detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the
governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not
to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not
obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa
permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place
which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the
rules of his majesty’s service, the senior officer should command the
whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the
island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the
governor of Gibraltar.”
_Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege._
“Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes
of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his
characteristic and never failing sagacity seems to have suggested
to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed.
A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation
and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island,
but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity in
fact of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts
to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter,
half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from
bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against
an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring
heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution,
and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original
and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether
frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz
and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that,
had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of
Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian
coast, would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the
struggle in the south of Spain was over.”
_General Campbell to lord Liverpool._
“_Gibraltar, April 2, 1812._
“MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
lordship’s letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to
refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the
report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove
that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight
grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of
colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed
the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut
off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the
Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first
of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole
mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of
what remained in the town: the enemy’s batteries being completely
kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle
of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion
respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that
of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps
as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general
Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when
he authorised him to abandon his post, for the major-general was
unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to
expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should
not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my
lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any
other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon
me, as having taken up the position; I am happy, however, that its
capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and
that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa
has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply
concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military
stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my
authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this
additional force.
“After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded
I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification
for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but
I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the
prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers,
they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty’s arms must
have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on
that occasion, I have only to observe that, considering the post of
Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively
for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were
appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this
with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances, added
to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in
my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for ‘precise
orders,’ shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord,
I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa
from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter,
unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not,
according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have
heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington, who was of
the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance
in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion
formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I
trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in
declaring, without reserve, that if I had not retained the command
the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our
enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free
communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report
that I have made the necessary communication with major-general
Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa
shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me,
in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington,
as he has not received orders to that effect, nor has he the means
at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is
aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case
of need.” &c. &c.————P.S. “Should your lordship wish any further
information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring
to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose
and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me.”
_Extract from captain C. F. Smith’s report._
“_Tarifa, December 14, 1811._
“I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the
resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a
good and ultimately successful defence.”
_Ditto ditto._
“_December 24, 1811._
“My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable,
and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent
in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an
outwork.”
* * * * *
No. VII.
STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.
[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of
officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The
Roman characters mark different sources of information.]
SECTION 1.—CIUDAD RODRIGO.
A.
“The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the
convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and to major
Napier,[2] commanding the storming-party of the light division, the
spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, _‘Now
do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive
at the breach without noise or confusion?_’ He was answered, ‘_Yes,
perfectly_.’ Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, ‘Why
don’t you load?’ He answered, ‘No, if we can’t do the business
without loading we shall not do it at all.’ The duke of Wellington
immediately said, ‘Leave him alone.’
————“The caçadores under colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to
throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and
the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait
for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered,
had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his
gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to any thing
they were ordered to do.
“The troops jumped into the ditch; the ‘_fausse braye_’ was faced
with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of
the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained.
Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn
hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with
a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined major Napier,
captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43d, and some other
officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the
breach together.”
————“Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder,
formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart, and led them
against the enemy.”
“The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended,
that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely
exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when
colonel M‘Leod of the forty-third poured a heavy flank fire upon the
enemy defending it.”
FOOTNOTE:
[2] Brother to the author of this work.
B.
“The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry
to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the
glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy
fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face
of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer
officer called out, ‘_You are wrong, this is the way to the breach,
or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack_.’”
————“We ascended the breach of the fausse braye, and then the breach
of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders.”
————“We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the
entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede
our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayonetted, amongst the
number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach.”
————“Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked
by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about
two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting
they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped
all their firelocks.”
————“No individual could claim being the first that entered the
breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The
forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in
fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for
the point of attack.
“Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by
major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left, the forty-third
to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and
drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it
arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy’s defences
were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried,
and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were
loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly
upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into
the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so
as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force
it without some other aid than a front attack.”
————“The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot
described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the
trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove
the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third
division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired
a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on
the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to
impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a
front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment
the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly
carried.”
_Abstract of the journal of general Harvey, Portuguese
service._
“I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The
great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division
opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was
a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there
was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the
ramparts.”
SECTION 2.
BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA.
C.
“An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after,
‘that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the
intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in
absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which
was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of
the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through
the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate.’”
D.
ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.
“For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch
only _five ladders_ were placed, and those five ladders were close
to each other. The _advance_ (or storming-party) of the eighth
division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no
part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first
great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that
explosion took place; but observe that although the _advance_ of the
light division preceded the _advance_ of the fourth division, I only
mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch
sooner than the _head_ of the fourth division, for the main bodies of
the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the
ditch at the same time.
“I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously
attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault,
therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there
were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach
in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it,
and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the
approach to it was made extremely difficult by _deep cuts_, and I
think it passed unobserved except by a straggling few.”
————“I consider that ‘_chevaux de frise_’ were placed upon the summit
of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at day-break.
The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty
of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which
to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field,
where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from
the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the
curtain.”
_Extract from a memoir by captain Barney, Chasseurs Britanniques,
acting engineer at the siege._
“The explosion of the ‘_Bariques foudroyantes_’ resembled
‘_fougasses_,’ and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to
pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire,
who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he
seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive
position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On
examining this breach at day-light I found a Portuguese grenadier,
whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this
breach.”
————“Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire
diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to
the attack of general Picton, and found but _two ladders_, one only
just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several
of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had
the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have
been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of
the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from
the castle I met general Picton, and told him the castle was full of
men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered
sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be
kept towards Christoval.”————“Passing in front of the battery where
lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till
I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the
prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the
breach. The enemy’s fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party
knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just
come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached
the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible,
and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such
numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them.”
“Here I also found but _three ladders_, one broken so as to render it
useless. On arriving at the _curtain-breach_, some men of the light
division assisted me in removing from the top _the chevaux de frise
of sword-blades and pikes_.”
_Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by
captain Edward P. Hopkins, fourth regiment._
“The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a
stockade and a ‘_chevaux de frise_’ concealing a guard-house on the
covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place,
followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. ‘That is at the
breaches,’ was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety
to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were
equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French
soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting
the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said,
‘_now is the time_;’ the column instantly moved to the face of the
gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us,
and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two
companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down,
and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence
did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who
occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders
moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was
instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow
of two men entering abreast.”————“The engineer officer was by this
time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss
was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.”
————“The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several
ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment
amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too
short.”————“The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every
way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, &c. together with an
_enfilading_ fire.
“We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place
being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly
placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three
persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in
at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant
death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for
one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure.”
“Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper
was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker,
at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the
right,” &c. &c.
“The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel
Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the
town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the
town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing
for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares
were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with
numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable, not
a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buz and whisper
around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently
open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene
of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the
bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and
officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots
came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors.
We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort
of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to
take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made
several prisoners leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges
in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying
from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners,
ammunition, &c., we moved from the square with the intention of
forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards
them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss.
We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came
up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter.
He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had failed, but
that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period
rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the
square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was
victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French
officers of rank, their wives, and children, ran into the square in
a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels
and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of
these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I
believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now
unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed
all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the
loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon
for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in
the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with
plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I
saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with
a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand
from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned
round and said, damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman. An
officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for
the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of these insane
drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we
have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a
more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some
in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money,
plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the
soldiers.”
* * * * *
No. VIII.
SECTION 1.
ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND
MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.
_Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general
Trant._
“_Almeida, March 28, 1812._
“When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found
not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want
of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a
single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened
in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in
an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only
one front of my covered way pallisaded, and the face of one of my
ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout
the whole of the nearly repaired fronts not being more than one-third
or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been
remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts,
the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with
a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our
powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb proofs; we
have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of
the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with pallisades, but
the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to
complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those
essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though
the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being
secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if
the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops.”
_Extract from a memoir of general Trant._
“Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from
Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five
thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and
he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with
regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted,
had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room-door,
in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case
on the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation
I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own
servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said
such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were
assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat
to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer
who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry
at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side
more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without
their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town,
must have captured Wilson’s and my militia divisions without losing
probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and
he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace.
I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few
dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant Marmont
drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he
expected infantry.”
_Lord Wellington to sir N. Trant._
“_Castello Branco, April 17, 1812._
“DEAR SIR,—I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford
received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that
of the 12th from general Bacellar this morning. We shall move on
as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are
collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care
of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or
in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous
position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should
prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the
Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose
a letter for the commissary there and one for don Carlos d’Espagna.
Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to
Celerico. Shew this letter to general Bacellar: I don’t write to him
as I have no Portuguese with me.” &c. &c.
“WELLINGTON.”
_Ditto to ditto._
“_Pedrogao, April 1812._
“DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see
by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and
that of general Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened,
and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops
ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned
if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that
principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree
with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can
only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you
have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early
decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which
you made for the retreat from it.
“As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt
to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing about it.
I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz. that
the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war,
particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in
particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You
could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost
your division and that of general Wilson. I give you my opinion very
freely upon your plans and operations as you have written me upon
them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the
difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that
both you and general Wilson did every thing that officers should do
with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of
the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day;
and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each
other.” &c. &c.
“WELLINGTON.”
SECTION 2.
FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND
MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.
_Translated. Extracts from Soult’s intercepted despatches._
“_Seville, April 14, 1812._
“I enclose copies of a letter from the duke of Ragusa, dated 22d
February, and another from general Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th
February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry
and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if
Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards,
marched into Old Castile at the moment when they knew that all the
English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I,
in virtue of your highness’s (Berthier’s) orders, had sent five
regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments
to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained
in the valley of the Tagus the enemy would not have attacked Badajos,
where they could have been fought to advantage.
“The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which
have been reduced by fifteen thousand men, as I have stated above,
and not even a military demonstration has been made, much less
succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege,
and did not.”——“Badajos fell by a ‘_coup de fortune_,’ because it
was not in human foresight to think that five thousand men defending
the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where
no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with
twenty-four thousand men strongly organized.
“If I had received your highness’s letter when I was before the
English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically
inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably
have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in
Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications
cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard
in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened
my communications with New Castile, Grenada, or Malaga. I have,
however, prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own
ground—Andalusia.
“The emperor, of course, cannot foresee all things, and in his orders
naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such
occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira
with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with
my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was
practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington
had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the
English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition.
“General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the
sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton’s cavalry two
thousand five hundred strong, with thirty guns. This corps pushed
my right wing to Granja and Azagua at the ‘_debouche_’ of Fuente
Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, twelve
hundred cavalry under Erskine, and twelve guns, moved on my extreme
right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer.
“Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth
division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps; and I am
assured he has also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made round
the place eighteen thousand men.
“The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus
with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to
Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington
thirty thousand men, and some make him as high as forty thousand,
at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of
Portugal had joined me with twenty-five thousand men, Badajos would
have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the
English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and
besides the loss I should have suffered, I could not have got back in
time to save my troops in Andalusia.
“The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering
in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted
state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into
Portugal. So measured, indeed, were their operations, that it is to
be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the
system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont.
“Your highness tells me I ‘should not have left Hill after his last
movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take
my magazines:’ I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard
at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La
Lerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it
can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege
Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain, which would not
let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army
of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained
the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for
on the 22d February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those
three divisions under Foy, which he destined to send to the aid of
Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties
which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat
the enemy’s projects.
“If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will
see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February,
forty thousand men; I had only thirty-five thousand, including the
garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me twenty-four
thousand, the rest being employed before Cadiz at Seville, in Grenada
and Murcia, and against Ballesteros. You must consider that fifteen
days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments
of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in
all fifteen thousand men; and since two years I have sent many other
skeleton regiments to France, being more than fifteen thousand men
changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received
the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are
borne on the states: besides which, I have four thousand men unfit
for the field, who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ
them in the posts. Ballesteros has, besides the army of Murcia, ten
thousand men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the
fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been
engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicant and
Carthagena, they had fifteen thousand men. Suchet’s operations have
certainly produced great results, but for _the moment_ have hurt
me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a
moment when I have only three battalions and four hundred cavalry to
oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste
to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz,
Gibraltar, and on the ocean could also at any time descend with ten
or twelve thousand men on any part of my line, and I want at least as
many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of
having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army
was not strong enough, though excellent in quality.
“I cannot hold twenty thousand men, as your highness desires, on
the Guadiana, unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of
Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river,
all my right under d’Erlon, _i.e._ nine regiments of infantry and
four of cavalry, and twelve guns, shall march into the interior of
Estremadura, and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and,
if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English
corps left in Alemtejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the
valley of the Tagus against Madrid.
“Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear
directed to invade Andalusia so far as to have obliged me to
unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz,
Graham has come to Llerena, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an
affair and lost sixty men.” “I have ordered d’Erlon to repass the
Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if
not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not
commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!”
* * * * *
No. IX.
SECTION 1.
SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT
PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN.
October 1, 1811.—Cavalry.
Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.
British 3571 1114 947 298 5930
Portuguese 1373 256 1140 — 2769
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 4944 1370 2087 298 8699
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 29530 17974 2663 1684 51851
Portuguese 23689 6009 1707 75 31480
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 53219 23983 4370 1759 83331
-------------------------------------------
General Total, including serjeants, 58263 sabres and bayonets in the
field.
January 8, 1812.—Cavalry.
British 4949 841 741 — 6531
Portuguese 613 43 275 — 391
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 5562 884 1016 — 7462
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 30222 11414 2827 — 14463
Portuguese 20455 4849 2360 51 27715
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 50677 16263 5187 51 72178
-------------------------------------------
General Total, including sergeants, 56239 sabres and bayonets in the
field.
Note. The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so
great that one division was suppressed.
April 5, 1812.—Cavalry.
Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.
British 4299 564 755 3 6048
Portuguese 347 9 492 — 808
------------------------------------------
Total Cavalry 4646 573 1247 3 6896
------------------------------------------
Infantry.
British 26897 11452 2779 2 40703
Portuguese 20224 5532 1507 18 27281
-------------------------------------------
Total
Infantry 47121 16984 4286 20 67984
-------------------------------------------
Sabres and bayonets 51767
Field artillery-men 1980
Gunners in the batteries 900
-----
General Total 54647
-----
Note. The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two
Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes.
TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, APRIL, 1812.
British.
Light division 2679
Third division 2882
Fourth division 2579
Fifth division 2896
---- 11036
Portuguese.
Hamilton’s division 4685
Light division 858
Third division 976
Fourth division 2384
Fifth division 1845
---- 10748
-----
Total 21,784
------
ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812.
Cavalry under general Hill.—Left Wing.
British 783
Portuguese 347
---- 1130
Infantry ditto.
British 6156
Portuguese 2385
---- 8541
-----
Total under general Hill 9671
-----
Cavalry under general Graham.—Right Wing.
British 3517
Portuguese —
---- 3517
Infantry ditto.
British 10154
Portuguese 5896
----- 16050
-----
Total under general Graham 19567
-----
General Total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillery-men
and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos,
29238 sabres and bayonets.
SECTION 2.
SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT
BADAJOS, 1812.
ASSAULT.
_British Loss._
Killed. Wounded.
Generals — 5
Staff 1 11
Officers. Soldiers.
Artillery 2 20
Engineers 5 5
-- --
Total 7 25
-- --
Light division.--_Line._
Officers. Soldiers. Total.
43d 18 329 347 } 670
52d 18 305 323 }
95th, 1st bat. 14 179 193
95th, 3d bat. 8 56 64
-- --- ---
Total 58 849 927
-- --- ---
Third division.
5th 4 41 45 }
45th 14 83 97 }
74th 7 47 54 }
77th 3 10 13 } 490
83d 8 62 70 }
88th 10 135 145 }
94th 2 154 173 }
-- --- ---
48 442 490
-- --- ---
Fourth division.
Officers. Soldiers. Total.
7th 17 163 180
23rd 17 134 151
27th 15 170 185
40th 16 124 140
48th 19 154 173
-- --- ---
84 745 829
-- --- ---
Fifth division.
1st 2 — 2
4th 17 213 230
9th — — —
30th 6 126 132
38th 5 37 42
44th 9 95 104
-- --- ---
39 471 510
-- --- ---
60th[3] 4 30 34
Brunswick Oels[3] 2 33 35
FOOTNOTE:
[3] These regiments were attached by companies to the third,
fourth, and fifth divisions.
Total British loss at the assault.
Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.
51 40 560 killed }
213 153 1983 wounded } 3022
— 1 21 missing }
Total Portuguese loss at the assault.
8 6 141 killed }
45 32 468 wounded } 730
— — 30 missing }
--- --- ---- ----
Grand Total 317 232 3203 3752
--- --- ---- ----
British loss during the whole siege.
Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.
60 45 715 killed }
251 178 2578 wounded } 3860
— 1 32 missing }
Portuguese loss during the whole siege.
12 6 137 killed }
55 38 687 wounded } 965
— — 30 missing }
--- --- ---- ----
General Total 378 268 4179 4825
--- --- ---- ----
SECTION 3.--SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT
PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS
Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Pris. Men. Horses.
August 1811 262,276 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 00 354,418 35,348
Reinforcements train 13,190
in March 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 00 18,423 3,929
------------------------------------------------------
Total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 00 372,841 52,467
------------------------------------------------------
January 1812 258,156 41,049 22,805 5,434 42,056 00 324,933 42,348
------------------------------------------------------
April 1812 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,314 33,504 ” 286,440 40,161
Reserve 4,038 157 36 35 865 ” 4,939 192
at Bayonne
------------------------------------------------------
Total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 ” 291,379 40,653
------------------------------------------------------
_Observation._--In September 1811 an army of reserve, consisting of
two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all
20,287 under arms, was formed for the armée du midi.
1st August, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
1,195 }
Armée du Midi 50,597 10,008 32,043 5,359 11,836 94,508 ----- } 4,608
3,413 }
3,236 }
du centre 16,540 3,729 391 64 1,781 18,712 ----- } 3,793
557 }
6,692 }
de Portugal 38,392 5,826 7,901 3,100 10,424 56,733 ----- } 8,926
2,334 }
3,667 }
d’Aragon 45,102 5,718 1,397 388 5,458 51,957 ----- } 6,106
2,439 }
3,531 }
du Nord 88,092 11,020 7,617 1,805 6,654 102,413 ----- } 12,825
4,294 }
1,268 }
de Catalogne 23,553 1,368 1,153 153 5,305 30,095 ----- } 1,521
253 }
-----------------------------------------------------------
35,348 }
Total 262,270 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 354,418 ----- } 48,538
13,190 }
Reinforcements 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 18,423 3,929
-----------------------------------------------------------
39,277 }
General total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 372,841 ----- } 52,467
13,190 }
-----------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS.
15th August, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
12,797 3,193 3,944 14 1,189 17,613 3,179
-------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS.
16th May, 1811.--Fifth battalion.
2,887 239 361 ” 380 3,725 239
1st March, 1812.
4,893 44 ” ” 478 5,034 44
-------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
15th December, 1811.
1,764 19 ” ” 130 1,956 19
-------------------------------------------------------
Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811.
Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp.Pris. Men. Horses.
9,251 }
Armée du Midi 66,912 11,757 7,539 2,232 13,398 ” 88,033 ---- } 12,644
train 3,393 }
5,196 }
du centre 19,125 6,262 511 84 1,685 ” 21,321 ---- } 5,749
553 }
6,909 }
de Portugal 50,167 11,662 1,283 858 10,012 ” 61,462 ---- } 11,615
4,706 }
3,322 }
d’Aragon 28,966 5,303 6,583 308 4,424 ” 39,953 ---- } 5,282
1,960 }
6,769 }
du Nord 87,913 10,821 6,201 1,069 9,414 ” 10,528 ---- } 10,955
4,186 }
1,150 }
de Catalogne 26,954 1,365 993 168 11,186 ” 39,241 ----- } 1,439
289 }
Total 280,017 47,270 23,110 4,717 50,119 ” 353,538 37,684
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reinforcements 9,232 689 1,226 10,458 516
-----------------------------------------------------------
General Total 289,249 47,959 23,110 4,717 51,345 ” 363,996 38,200
-----------------------------------------------------------
15th April, 1812.
Under arms. Detached. Effective.
Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.
Armée du Midi 55,797 11,014 2,498 70 6,065 64,360 11,714
du centre 19,148 3,293 144 51 624 19,916 4,044
de Portugal 56,937 8,108 4,394 2,278 7,706 69,037 10,386
d’Aragon 14,786 3,269 2,695 658 1,467 18,948 8,927
de l’Ebre 16,830 1,873 21 6 3,425 20,276 1,879
de Catalogne 28,924 1,259 1,163 49 5,540 35,627 1,308
du Nord 48,232 7,074 1,309 72 8,677 58,276 7,213
--------------------------------------------------------
Total 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,814 33,534 286,440 40,461
Reserve a
Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 4,939 192
-------------------------------------------------------
Grand total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 291,379 40,653
-------------------------------------------------------
END OF VOL. IV.
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peace determined ‘to fight all his battles over again,’ and he
fights them in a style interesting and graphic. The remarks on the
decisive termination of the Battle of Waterloo are striking and
convincing; and to them and the whole book we refer our readers for
much amusement and information.”——_The Age._
* * * * *
THE HISTORY
OF THE
KING’S GERMAN LEGION,
FROM THE PERIOD OF ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1803, TO THAT OF ITS
DISSOLUTION IN 1816.
_Compiled from Manuscript Documents._
BY N. LUDLOW BEAMISH, Esq. F.R.S.late Major unattached.
Vol. I. 8vo. with coloured plates; price 20_s._ boards; to be
completed in two volumes.
“Of the late war we have had histories, partial or complete, in
countless abundance; but we have not seen one, displaying more
moderation, more diligence in investigating the truth, or more
shrewdness in deciding between conflicting statements. Though
professedly merely a history of the services of the German Legion,
it is, in fact, a history of the entire war; for, from ‘what
glorious and well-foughten field,’ can we record the absence of
German Chivalry? The work is not like others we could name—a mere
compilation from newspapers and magazines. Major Beamish has left
no source of information unexplored; and the access he obtained
to manuscript journals has enabled him to intersperse his general
narrative with interesting personal anecdotes, that render this
volume as delightful for those who read for amusement, as those who
read for profit.”——_Athenæum._
“We are altogether much pleased with the volume, and heartily
recommend it to the British public.”——_Literary Gazette._
* * * * *
AN ESSAY
ON THE
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION
OF
MILITARY BRIDGES,
_AND THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS_.
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
K.S.C., D.C.L., F.R.S., &c. &c.
The Second Edition, containing much additional Matter and Plates,
8vo. price 20_s._ boards.
* * * * *
NAVAL EVOLUTIONS;
A MEMOIR,
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
K.S.C. &c. &c.
Refuting Mr. CLERK’S claims to the manœuvre of breaking the Line
during Lord Rodney’s Engagement on the 12th of April, 1782.
Also,
REMARKS ON MR. CLERK’S WORK ON NAVAL TACTICS,
AND ON
NAVAL EVOLUTIONS IN GENERAL.
In 8vo. with plates, price 10_s._
* * * * *
TRACTS ON VAULTS AND BRIDGES;
CONTAINING
OBSERVATIONS ON THE VARIOUS FORMS OF VAULTS,
ON THE TAKING DOWN AND REBUILDING
LONDON BRIDGE;
And
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ARCHES:
Illustrated by extensive Tables of Bridges. Also, containing the
PRINCIPLES OF PENDANT BRIDGES,
With reference to the Properties of the Catenary, applied to the
Menai Bridge, and a Theoretical Investigation of the Catenary.
BY SAMUAL WARE.
With 20 copper-plates and 10 wood-cuts, royal 8vo. price 20_s._ boards.
_This book will be found of the highest importance to Military as well
as Civil Engineers, being the only practical work on the subject of
Suspension Bridges._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR,
A DESIGN FOR A TUNNEL UNDER THE THAMES, from Horslydown to St.
Katharine’s, with Letter-press Description. Price 3s.
ALSO, BY THE SAME AUTHOR,
REMARKS ON THEATRES; and on the Propriety of _Vaulting them
with Brick and Stone_: with Observations on the CONSTRUCTION OF
DOMES; and the Vaults of the Free and Accepted Masons. With 3
copper-plates, royal 8vo. sewed, price 6_s._
* * * * *
HAVERHILL;
OR,
MEMOIRS OF AN OFFICER IN THE ARMY OF WOLFE.
BY JAMES ATHEARN JONES.
Three vol. post 8vo. price £1: 11: 6 boards.
“The author of Haverhill is evidently an informed man, an original
thinker, an acute observer, and a vigorous writer. He is no
imitator; he thinks for himself; he puts his trust in his own
feelings, and writes as he thinks and feels; he is no mere literary
echo. The fruit with which he presents us is indigenous, and bears
the aroma, fresh and fragrant, of its own native soil. Those
portions of the book which are really matters of history cannot
well be surpassed. They teem with ‘thoughts that breathe and words
that burn.’ We recommend it to all that desire to admire, and be
instructed as well as amused.”——_Athenæum._
“It is to the full as earnest and impressive, and conceived in
nearly as philosophical a spirit as _Lawrie Todd_, while it is more
full of adventure, character, and historical details.”——_Atlas._
* * * * *
ATTILA,
A Tragedy;
AND OTHER POEMS,
Post 8vo. price 10_s._ 6_d._ boards.
“This is a volume of very sweet poetry.”——_Metropolitan._
“The eminent qualities which it exhibits of dramatic poetry, and
the probability which it affords that the same talents stimulated
by the prospect of a fair estimate on the stage, might add to the
rich store of our permanent acting drama.”——_Old England._
“The Author of Attila is a man who has seen much, and has brought
to aid him, in writing the above, talents of a high character,
much observation, and keen insight into the characters of men, and
vigorous powers of imagination.”——_Weekly Visitor._
* * * * *
LA COQUETTERIE;
OR,
SKETCHES OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.
“_La Coquetterie? c’est ce que les hommes méprisent et ce qui les
attire._”——DE GENLIS.
Three vol. post 8vo. price £1: 7: 0 boards.
“To delineate continental character and domestic manners has
been the chief aim of the Author of La Coquetterie; and a long
residence abroad, and intimacy with his subject, have enabled him
to complete the picture which he sketched in imagination. We have
seldom met with a work in which the characters converse, and act,
and live with more elegance and genteel ease. The work is certainly
clever.”——_Athenæum._
“It is decidedly original, and not in style only, but in plot,
character, and incidents. There is a lively and earnest tone
pervading the book, and an interest thrown into the persons and
actions of nearly all the dramatis personæ, that pleases us far
more than most novels of this class. We like and recommend the
work, both for its purpose, its moral, and its characters, with
some of whom we had well nigh fallen in love.”——_National Omnibus._
* * * * *
LENT LECTURES.
I. On the Life of Christ. II. On the Life of St. Paul. III. On the
Lord’s Prayer. IV. On the Liturgy of the Church of England.
V. On the Creeds and Sacraments of the Church of
England.
Preached in the Church of St. Mary, Bryanston Square,
BY THE REVEREND T. F. DIBDIN, D.D. RECTOR.
Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty, and Editor of the Sunday Library.
Two vols, post 8vo. price 1_l._ 1_s._ bound in cloth.
“These lectures, some of them the earliest pulpit productions of
the Author, display much ability and often eloquence. In principle
Dr. Dibdin shews himself to be a true and loyal son of the church,
whose excellencies he warmly defends, while he allows that, as in
every earthly thing, evils may have crept in which it would be wise
to reform, especially at this crisis now threatened by clamour,
misrepresentation, and violence.”——_Literary Gazette._
* * * * *
NEW VOLUME OF
BAMPTON LECTURES.
The Analogy of Revelation and Science established in a Series of
Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in the
Year 1833.
BY FREDERICK NOLAN, LL.D., F.R.S.
Vicar of Prittlewell, Essex, and formerly Student of Exeter College,
Oxford.
One thick volume 8vo. price 15_s._
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
THE TIME OF THE
MILLENIUM INVESTIGATED;
AND
ITS NATURE DETERMINED ON SCRIPTURAL GROUNDS.
One vol. 8vo. price 8_s._ boards.
SUPPLEMENT TO AN INQUIRY INTO THE
INTEGRITY OF THE GREEK VULGATE;
OR,
RECEIVED TEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT;
Containing the Vindication of the Principles employed in its Defence.
A
HARMONICAL GRAMMAR
OF THE
GREEK LANGUAGE.
8vo. sewed, price 4s.
Ditto of the Latin. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the French. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the Italian. 8vo. price 4_s._
Ditto of the Spanish. 8vo. price 4_s._
Printed verbatim from a Harmonical Grammar of the principal ancient
and modern languages. Each language is treated upon a _uniform
plan_, and analyzed on new and simple principles; short and
comprehensive rules are given, for attaining a just pronunciation,
for determining the gender, and inflecting the noun and verb;
together with a Syntax and Prosody, fully exemplified, and a
classed vocabulary of the most useful and necessary words.
THE EXPECTATIONS FORMED BY THE ASSYRIANS, THAT A GREAT DELIVERER
WOULD APPEAR, ABOUT THE TIME OF OUR LORD’S ADVENT, DEMONSTRATED.
8vo. price 10_s._ boards.
_And all the other Works of the same Author._
* * * * *
MOMENTS OF IDLENESS;
OR,
A PEEP INTO THE WORLD WE CALL “_OURS_.”
“Il y en a qui ne font rien,—il y en a d’autres qui font des riens.”
In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._
“Will prove a pleasant source of mental employment at a leisure
hour.”——_Monthly Review._
“The author is clever and thinks, which is what very few people
actually achieve.”——_New Monthly Magazine._
“He is worth any man’s perusal (we have read him every bit); and,
besides many striking reflections, gives numerous evidences of a
benevolent and social disposition.”——_True Sun._
“This is a very remarkable volume, and it is one of great merit;
and he who devotes to it his ‘Moments of Idleness’ will be idle
no longer, or then it will be his own fault. We have seldom met,
indeed, with a volume containing so many and such substantial
materials for thinking, in so small a compass, and combining at the
same time so much intellectual employment with so much literary
amusement.”——_Liverpool Chronicle._
* * * * *
WALTER;
OR,
A WORD MORE TO THE WISE.
“Still he comes,
Summer or winter, frost or rain. I’ve seen
The snow upon a level with the hedge,
Yet there was Master Walter.”
_Hunchback, Act_ 1. _Scene_ 2.
BY THE AUTHOR OF “MOMENTS OF IDLENESS.”
In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7_s._
* * * * *
A TREATISE
ON THE
GAME OF WHIST,
BY THE LATE
ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY,
Author of Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific, &c.
_Second Edition._ 18mo. boards, price 2_s._
“The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most
plain, and what the Author considers the most safe principles. I
have limited my endeavours to the most necessary instructions,
classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate
heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily
remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I
have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my
endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the
rationality of them intelligible, than to furnish a young player
with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go blindly right.”
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Footnote [3] has two anchors on page 587.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
when a predominant preference was found in the original book.
To save space in the wide tables in Note IX of the Appendix, the
heading ‘Hospital.’ has been abbreviated to ‘Hosp.’.
In those sections of the Appendix that are French documents, some
corrections to accents have been made silently; primarily é for e,
and e for é. Incorrect grammar and spelling have been left unchanged.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Table of Contents:
Pg iii: ‘on the Orbigo’ replaced by ‘on the Orvigo’.
Pg iii: ‘General Leval’ replaced by ‘General Laval’.
Pg v: ‘the mili ary force’ replaced by ‘the military force’.
Main text:
Pg 5: ‘by sea to St. Ander’ replaced by ‘by sea to Santander’.
Pg 13: ‘he surprized some’ replaced by ‘he surprised some’.
Pg 33: ‘embarrasments thus’ replaced by ‘embarrassments thus’.
Pg 48: ‘and Legre rivers’ replaced by ‘and Segre rivers’.
Pg 51: ‘to war down’ replaced by ‘to wear down’.
Pg 61: ‘Promothean touch’ replaced by ‘Promethean touch’.
Pg 135: ‘commucating with the alledged’ replaced by
‘communicating with the alleged’.
Pg 141: ‘were they all’ replaced by ‘where they all’.
Pg 162: ‘the admistration’ replaced by ‘the administration’.
Pg 164: ‘Mr. Suart and’ replaced by ‘Mr. Stuart and’.
Pg 169: ‘acknowleged that’ replaced by ‘acknowledged that’.
Pg 169: ‘a proponderance to’ replaced by ‘a preponderance to’.
Pg 170: ‘Rio Janeiro’ replaced by ‘Rio de Janeiro’.
Pg 196: ‘aid-du-camp’ replaced by ‘aide-de-camp’.
Pg 231: ‘Miunte reports of’ replaced by ‘Minute reports of’.
Pg 243: ‘Aldea Ponte’ replaced by ‘Aldea de Ponte’.
Pg 245: ‘behind the Soita’ replaced by ‘behind Soita’.
Pg 268: ‘which caanot now’ replaced by ‘which cannot now’.
Pg 296, image caption: ‘The Seige’ replaced by ‘The Siege’.
Pg 309: ‘also an artifical’ replaced by ‘also an artificial’.
Pg 310: ‘and Catalayud to’ replaced by ‘and Calatayud to’.
Pg 314: ‘were straightened’ replaced by ‘were straitened’.
Pg 319: ‘a confidental’ replaced by ‘a confidential’.
Pg 319: ‘the Guadalquiver’ replaced by ‘the Guadalquivir’.
Pg 330, image caption: ‘SEIGE of’ replaced by ‘SIEGE of’.
Pg 342: ‘at Bergem-op-Zoon’ replaced by ‘at Bergen-op-Zoom’.
Pg 345: ‘from the Pyrennees’ replaced by ‘from the Pyrenees’.
Pg 373: ‘round St. Ander’ replaced by ‘round Santander’.
Pg 373: ‘de St. Ander’ replaced by ‘de Santander’.
Pg 383: missing ‘3º.’ inserted before ‘Left attack’.
Pg 388: ‘all loop-hooled’ replaced by ‘all loop-holed’.
Pg 403: ‘third divison’ replaced by ‘third division’.
Pg 419: ‘unususally still’ replaced by ‘unusually still’.
Pg 425: ‘semed like the’ replaced by ‘seemed like the’.
Pg 438: ‘Fuentes Overjuña’ replaced by ‘Fuente Obejuna’.
Pg 472: ‘not be irrelevent’ replaced by ‘not be irrelevant’.
Pg 502: ‘circnmstances, and’ replaced by ‘circumstances, and’.
Pg 549: ‘September 1’ replaced by ‘Septembre 1’.
Pg 572: ‘were loop-holded’ replaced by ‘were loop-holed’.
Pg 588: ‘13,190 train’ replaced by ‘train 13,190’.
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