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Title: On the manner of negotiating with princes: On the uses of diplomacy; the choice of ministers and envoys; and the personal qualities necessary for success in missions abroad
Author: François de Callières
Language: English
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WITH PRINCES ***
ON THE MANNER OF
NEGOTIATING WITH
PRINCES;
on the Uses of Diplomacy; the
Choice of Ministers and Envoys;
and the Personal Qualities necessary
for Success in Missions abroad; by
MONSIEUR DE CALLIÈRES
Councillor-in-Ordinary to the King in Council, Private
Secretary to His Majesty, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of His late Majesty
entrusted with the Treaties of Peace concluded at
Ryswick, one of the Forty of the French Academy.
Published at Paris by MICHEL BRUNET at the _Mercure
Galant_, 1716; under Royal Privilege and Approval.
Translated from the French by
A. F. WHYTE
[Illustration]
Boston and New York
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO.
1919
Edinburgh: T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty
INTRODUCTION
Diplomacy is one of the highest of the political arts. In a
well-ordered commonwealth it would be held in the esteem due to a great
public service in whose hands the safety of the people largely lies;
and it would thus attract to its ranks its full share of national
ability and energy which for the most part to-day passes into other
professions. But the diplomatic service, at all times, and in almost
all countries, has suffered from lack of public appreciation: though
perhaps at no time has it had so many detractors as to-day. Its
almost unparalleled unpopularity is due to a variety of causes, some
of which are temporary and removable, while others must be permanent
in human affairs, for they were found to operate in the days when
the author of this little book shone in French diplomacy. The major
cause is public neglect; but it is also due, in no small measure, to
the prevalent confusion between policy, which is the substance, and
diplomacy proper, which is the process by which it is carried out. This
confusion exists not only in the popular mind, but even in the writings
of historians who might be expected to practise a better discernment.
Policy is the concern of governments. Responsibility therefore belongs
to the Secretary of State who directs policy and appoints the agents
of it. But the constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility
is not an unvarying reality. No one will maintain that Lord Cromer’s
success in Egypt was due to the wisdom of Whitehall, or to anything
but his own sterling qualities. Nor can a just judgment of our recent
Balkan diplomacy fail to assign a heavy share of the blame to the
incompetence of more than one ‘man on the spot.’ The truth is, that
the whole system, of which, in their different measure, Downing Street
and the embassies abroad are _both_ responsible parts, is not abreast
of the needs of the time, and will not be until Callières’s excellent
maxims become the common practice of the service.
These maxims are to be found in the little book of which a free
translation is here presented. François de Callières treats diplomacy
as the art practised by the _négotiateur_--a most apt name for the
diplomatist--in carrying out the instructions of statesmen and princes.
The very choice of the word _manière_ in his title shows that he
conceives of diplomacy as the servant, not the author, of policy; and
indeed his argument is not many pages old before he is heard insisting
that it is ‘the agent of high policy.’ Observance of this distinction
is the first condition of fruitful criticism. It is therefore worth
while, at the outset, to clear away the obscurity and confusion which
surround the subject, and thus, in some measure, to relieve both
diplomacy in general and the individual diplomatist in particular from
the burden of irrelevant and unjust criticism.
‘Secret diplomacy’ has played so large a part in recent public
discussion that the confusion between foreign policy and diplomacy
proper has only been worse confounded. And even where the critics of
diplomacy have restricted the range of their attack to the question
of the efficiency of our representation abroad, the nature of their
criticism leaves it to be supposed that diplomacy is the dazzling and
perilous craft which figures in the pages of Mr. Le Queux. The picture
of brilliant youths and cunning greybeards sedulously lying abroad for
the good of their country continues to fill the popular imagination,
though a reading of any one of the excellent memoirs of the great
diplomatists of the past would suffice to prove that Sir Henry Wotton’s
famous witticism far outran the truth. For every occasion on which
deceit has been practised, there are a dozen on which the negotiation
has followed the obvious course of a practical discussion in which
‘the application of intelligence and tact’ led to an agreement. In
substance, therefore, diplomacy demands the same qualities as any
other form of negotiation. Its true method bears a close resemblance
to a business transaction. The one essential difference between a
high commercial negotiation and a diplomatic transaction is that in
the former the contracting parties are constrained to observe certain
rules, and are bound not only by certain strict conventions but by
enforceable laws; in the latter case the parties recognise no bounds
to their claims and ambitions except those laid down by a concern for
their own convenience, or by the limits of their own military forces.
Hence the diplomatist gains an altogether fictitious eminence among
his fellow-men and assumes an excessive pride of office because he
represents a sovereign state which recognises no master.
Now a discussion of the problems raised by the unrestricted sovereignty
claimed by each nation in foreign affairs would carry this argument
far beyond the limits of diplomacy proper and must be left to those
who are now trying to find a firm basis for a League of Nations. But
since this claim is the parent cause of all armed conflict, it cannot
be entirely ignored; for as long as it persists it will exercise a
profound influence on the character of diplomacy itself, and has a
direct bearing on the question of the efficiency of the diplomatist.
The action of our representatives abroad carries with it the constant
alternative of peace and war. ‘The art of negotiating with princes,’
says Callières, ‘is so important that the fate of the greatest states
often depends upon the good or bad conduct of negotiations, and upon
the degree of capacity in the negotiators employed.’ The consciousness
that the negotiator is performing one of the functions of sovereignty
must give him a deep sense of responsibility and a constant concern for
his own efficiency. And the Home Government has the prior obligation,
in Callières’s words once more, to ‘examine with the greatest care the
natural or acquired qualities of those citizens whom they despatch on
missions to Foreign States.’
The epigram which tells us that nations have the governments they
deserve has a close bearing on this aspect of diplomacy. The main
question is the efficiency of the service, which has received but
little public attention owing to the popularity of the campaign against
the secrecy of diplomatic action. The secrecy of diplomacy is commonly
held to be the accomplice of European militarism; and many of those
who yearn for a better world after the war hope that by letting in
light upon the manœuvres of the Great Powers their evil designs may be
checked before they create those recurring crises of animosity with
which we were so familiar before the war. There is so much obvious
truth in this view that even _The Times_ acknowledged it thus: ‘Who,
then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the Chancelleries of
Europe, among the men who have too long played with human lives as
pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in formulas and
the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be conscious of the
poignant realities with which they trifle. And thus war will continue
to be made until the great masses who are the sport of professional
schemers say the word which shall bring, not eternal peace, for that
is impossible, but a determination that wars shall be fought only in a
just and righteous and vital cause’ (_The Times_, 23rd November 1912).
The justification of the growing demand for popular control of foreign
policy could not be more succinctly put.
In the customary argument against diplomatic secrecy, however, there is
some confusion of thought. It is against secret _policies_, in which
the national liability may be unlimited, that the only genuine protest
can be raised; for such policies are the very negation of democracy,
and the denial of the most fundamental of all popular rights, namely,
that the citizen shall know on what terms his country may ask him to
lay down his life. But this justification of popular control does
not presuppose the publication of diplomatic negotiations. On the
contrary, it rests on the assumption that the People and Parliament
will know where to draw the line between necessary control in matters
of principle and the equally necessary discretionary freedom of the
expert in negotiation. It follows, therefore, that the case for reform
is only weakened by those who make indiscriminate attacks against
the whole Diplomatic Service--how richly deserved in some cases, how
flagrantly unjust in others--and especially by those who profess to
believe that the machinery of diplomacy could be made to run more
smoothly by publicity. The modern Press is not so happy a commentator
as all that; and we may here recall Napoleon’s apposite reflection:
‘_Le canon a tué la féodalité: l’encre tuera la société moderne_.’ If
it is necessary for the public welfare that foreign policy should be
known and intelligently discussed by the people whom it so closely
concerns, it is just as necessary that the people should not meddle
with the actual process of diplomacy, but, having made sure of getting
the best of their public servants in their Foreign Service, should
confidently leave such transactions undisturbed in the hands of the
expert. In all the activities of government that is clearly the proper
division of labour between the common people and the expert adviser;
and in no department should it be more scrupulously observed than in
foreign affairs.
Readers of this little book--which Sir Ernest Satow recently called
‘a mine of political wisdom’--will quickly realise how much this
introductory review of modern diplomacy owes to the suggestive maxims
of François de Callières. And if they receive as much stimulus and
pleasure from the following pages as the translator has enjoyed in
preparing them, Louis Fourteenth’s plenipotentiary should gain a host
of new friends.
A. F. WHYTE.
_To His Royal Highness, Monseigneur le Duc d’Orléans, Regent of the
Kingdom._
MONSEIGNEUR,--This work, which I have the honour to present to your
Royal Highness, has for its aim: to give an idea of the personal
qualities and general knowledge necessary in all good negotiators;
to indicate to them the paths which they should follow and the rocks
which they should avoid; and to exhort those who destine themselves to
the foreign service of their country, to render themselves capable of
discharging worthily that high, important, and difficult office before
entering upon it.
The honour which the late King did me in charging me with his commands
and his full powers for foreign negotiation, and particularly for
those which led to the Treaty of Ryswick, has redoubled the attention
which I have ever paid since my youngest years to my own instruction
in the power, the rights, and the ambitions of each of the principal
monarchies and states of Europe, in their divergent interests and
the forms of their government, in the causes of their understandings
and misunderstandings, and finally in the treaties which they have
made one with another; in order to employ this knowledge to the
best advantage whenever occasion offered in the service of my King
and Country. After the loss which France has just suffered of that
great King, whose reign was so full of glory and triumph, she did
indeed need that the Hand of God, which has always upheld her in her
necessities, should continue to guide her. We had indeed to look for
Divine Help to support us during the minority of his present Majesty,
so that we might hope that the All-Powerful Hand should mould a prince
of like blood and spirit to him who has gone. The Regency needed an
intelligence of the highest order, a capacity without limit, a clear
insight into the character of persons and events, and an indefatigable
activity which would increase at every new demand made by the interests
of state--all these united in the person of a prince at once just,
lovable, beneficent, whose character might earn for him the title of a
veritable father of his country. These are the traits so strongly and
so profoundly marked in you, Monseigneur, which have brought all France
on its knees in homage before you, with full confidence and happiness,
and a glorious prestige which shall pass undimmed to our remotest
descendants as a worthy symbol of your great rule.
I am, with profound respect, and with a zealous and affectionate
attachment to your Person, Monseigneur,
Your Royal Highness’s most humble, obedient, and faithful servant,
DE CALLIÈRES.
[Sidenote: _The Art of Negotiation._]
The art of negotiation with princes is so important that the fate
of the greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct
of negotiations and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators
employed. Thus monarchs and their ministers of state cannot examine
with too great care the natural or acquired qualities of those citizens
whom they despatch on missions to foreign states to entertain there
good relations with their masters, to make treaties of peace, of
alliance, of commerce or of other kinds, or to hinder other Powers
from concluding such treaties to the prejudice of their own master;
and generally, to take charge of those interests which may be affected
by the diverse conjunctures of events. Every Christian prince must
take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his
rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and of
persuasion. It is to his interest also, to add to reason and persuasion
the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest
ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it. But above all
he must employ good labourers in his service, such indeed as know how
to employ all these methods for the best, and how to gain the hearts
and wills of men, for it is in this that the science of negotiation
principally consists.
[Sidenote: _French Neglect of Diplomacy._]
Our nation is so warlike that we can hardly conceive of any other
kind of glory or of honour than those won in the profession of arms.
Hence it is that the greater number of Frenchmen of good birth apply
themselves with zeal to the profession of arms in order that they may
gain advancement therein, but they neglect the study of the various
interests which divide Europe and which are a source of frequent wars.
This inclination and natural application in our people result in a rich
supply of good general officers, and we need have no surprise that it
is considered that no gentleman of quality can receive a high command
in the armies of the King who has not already passed through all these
stages by which a soldier may equip himself for war.
But, alas, it is not the same with our negotiators. They are indeed
rare among us because there has been in general no discipline nor
fixed rules of the foreign service of his Majesty by which good
citizens destined to become negotiators might instruct themselves in
the knowledge necessary for this kind of employment. And indeed we
find that instead of gradual promotion by degrees and by the evidence
of proved capacity and experience, as is the case in the usages of
war, one may see often men who have never left their own country, who
have never applied themselves to the study of public affairs, being
of meagre intelligence, appointed so to speak over-night to important
embassies in countries of which they know neither the interests, the
laws, the customs, the language, nor even the geographical situation.
And yet I may hazard a guess that there is perhaps no employment in
all his Majesty’s service more difficult to discharge than that of
negotiation. It demands all the penetration, all the dexterity, all
the suppleness which a man can well possess. It requires a widespread
understanding and knowledge, and above all a correct and piercing
discernment.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy an Expert Craft._]
It causes me no surprise that men who have embarked on this career for
the sake of titles and emoluments, having not the least idea of the
real duties of their post, have occasioned grave harm to the public
interest during their apprenticeship to this service. These novices
in negotiation become easily intoxicated with honours done in their
person to the dignity of their royal master. They are like the ass in
the fable who received for himself all the incense burned before the
statue of the goddess which he bore on his back. This happens above
all to those who are employed by a great monarch on missions to princes
of a lower order, for they are apt to place in their addresses the
most odious comparisons, as well as veiled threats, which are really
only a mark of weakness. Such ambassadors do not fail to bring upon
themselves the aversion of the court to which they are accredited, and
they resemble heralds of arms rather than ambassadors whose principal
aim is ever to maintain a good correspondence between their master
and the princes to whom they are accredited. In all cases they should
represent the power of their own sovereign as a means of maintaining
and increasing that of the foreign court, instead of using it as an
odious comparison designed to humiliate and contemn. These misfortunes
and many others, which are the result of the lack of capacity and
of the foolish conduct of many citizens employed by princes to deal
with public affairs abroad, occasioned in me the belief that it is by
no means impertinent to set down some observations on the manner of
negotiating with sovereigns and with their ministers, on the qualities
necessary for those who mean to adopt the profession of diplomacy,
and on the means which wise princes will take to secure a good choice
of men well adapted at once to the profession of negotiation and to
the different countries where they may be sent. But before I take my
subject in detail it is perhaps well that I should explain the use and
the necessity for princes to maintain continual negotiation in the
form of permanent embassies to all great states, both in neighbouring
countries and in those more distant, in war as well as in peace.
[Sidenote: _The Usefulness of Negotiation._]
To understand the permanent use of diplomacy and the necessity for
continual negotiations, we must think of the states of which Europe is
composed as being joined together by all kinds of necessary commerce,
in such a way that they may be regarded as members of one Republic
and that no considerable change can take place in any one of them
without affecting the condition, or disturbing the peace, of all the
others. The blunder of the smallest of sovereigns may indeed cast an
apple of discord among all the greatest Powers, because there is no
state so great which does not find it useful to have relations with
the lesser states and to seek friends among the different parties of
which even the smallest state is composed. History teems with the
results of these conflicts which often have their beginnings in small
events, easy to control or suppress at their birth, but which when
grown in magnitude became the causes of long and bloody wars which have
ravaged the principal states of Christendom. Now these actions and
reactions between one state and another oblige the sagacious monarch
and his ministers to maintain a continual process of diplomacy in all
such states for the purpose of recording events as they occur and of
reading their true meaning with diligence and exactitude. One may say
that knowledge of this kind is one of the most important and necessary
features of good government, because indeed the domestic peace of the
state depends largely upon appropriate measures taken in its foreign
service to make friends among well-disposed states, and by timely
action to resist those who cherish hostile designs. There is indeed no
prince so powerful that he can afford to neglect the assistance offered
by a good alliance, in resisting the forces of hostile powers which are
prompted by jealousy of his property to unite in a hostile coalition.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomat: An Agent of High Policy._]
Now, the enlightened and assiduous negotiator serves not only to
discover all projects and cabals by which coalitions may arise against
his prince in the country where he is sent to negotiate, but also to
dissipate their very beginnings by giving timely advice. It is easy to
destroy even the greatest enterprises at their birth; and as they often
require several springs to give them motion, it can hardly be possible
for a hostile intrigue to ripen without knowledge of it coming to the
ears of an attentive negotiator living in the place where it is being
hatched. The able negotiator will know how to profit by the various
dispositions and changes which arise in the country where he lives,
not merely in order to frustrate designs hostile to the interests of
his master, but also for the positive and fruitful purpose of bringing
to an apt result those other designs which may work to his advantage.
By his industry and application he may himself produce changes of
opinion favourable to the office which he has to discharge; indeed,
if he do but once in an apt moment catch the tide at the flood he may
confer a benefit on his prince a hundredfold greater than any expense
in treasure or personal effort which he may have put forth. Now if
a monarch should wait, before sending his envoys to countries near
and far, until important events occur--as for instance, until it is
a question of hindering the conclusion of some treaty which confers
advantage on an enemy Power, or a declaration of war against an ally
which would deprive the monarch himself of the assistance of that very
ally for other purposes--it will be found that the negotiators, sent
thus at the eleventh hour on urgent occasions, have no time to explore
the terrain or to study the habits of mind of the foreign court or to
create the necessary liaisons or to change the course of events already
in full flood, unless indeed they bring with them enormous sums whose
disbursement must weigh heavily on the treasury of their master, and
which run the risk, in truth, of being paid too late.
[Sidenote: _Cardinal Richelieu._]
Cardinal Richelieu, whom I set before me as the model for all
statesmen, to whom France owes a very great debt, maintained a system
of unbroken diplomacy in all manner of countries, and beyond question
he thus drew enormous advantage for his master. He bears witness to
this truth in his own political testament, speaking thus:--
‘The states of Europe enjoy all the advantages of continual negotiation
in the measure in which they are conducted with prudence. No one could
believe how great these advantages are who has not had experience of
them. I confess that it was not till I had had five or six years’
experience of the management of high affairs that I realised this
truth, but I am now so firmly persuaded of it that I will boldly say
that the service which a regular and unbroken system of diplomacy,
conducted both in public and in secret in all countries, even where
no immediate fruit can be gathered, is one of the first necessities
for the health and welfare of the state. I can say with truth that in
my time I have seen the face of affairs in France and in Christendom
completely changed because under the authority of his Majesty I have
been enabled to practise this principle which till my time had been
absolutely neglected by the ministers of this kingdom.’ The Cardinal
says further: ‘The light of nature teaches each of us in his private
life to maintain relations with his neighbours because as their near
presence enables them to injure so it also enables them to do us
service, just as the surroundings of a city either hinder or facilitate
the approach to it.’ And he adds: ‘The meaner sort of men confine their
outlook within the cities where they were born. But those to whom God
has given a greater light will neglect no means of improvement whether
it come from near or from far.’ The evidence of this great genius
demands all the greater consideration because the high services which
he rendered to his King by means of negotiation convincingly prove that
he speaks the truth. No considerable event occurred in Europe during
his ministry in which he did not play a great part, and he was often
the principal agent in the great movements of his time. He it was who
designed the revolution in Portugal in 1640, by which the legitimate
heir to the Crown resumed the throne. He profited by the discontent of
the Catalans who rose in revolt in that same year. He did not hesitate
to encourage negotiations even with the African Moors. Previously he
brought his labours to success in the north by persuading Gustavus
Adolphus, King of Sweden, to invade Germany, and thus to deliver her
from slavery to the House of Austria which then reigned despotically,
dethroning her princes and disposing of their states and their titles
to its own court minions. Rumour even attributes the revolution in
Bohemia to the action of Cardinal Richelieu. He formed and maintained
several leagues; he won for France many great allies who contributed
to the success of his high designs, in which the abasement of the
prodigious power of the House of Austria was always the chief; and
throughout all these designs we can trace the unbroken thread of a
well-maintained system of diplomacy, acting as the obedient and capable
agent of the great minister himself, whose profound capacity and vast
genius thus found a favourable field of action.
[Sidenote: _Value of Diplomacy._]
It is not necessary to turn far back into the past in order to
understand what can be achieved by negotiation. We see daily around us
its definite effects in sudden revolutions favourable to this great
design of state or that, in the use of sedition in fermenting the
hatreds between nations, in causing jealous rivals to arm against one
another so that the _tertius gaudens_ may profit, in the formation of
leagues and other treaties of various kinds between monarchs whose
interests might otherwise clash, in the dissolution by crafty means
of the closest unions between states: in a word, one may say that the
art of negotiation, according as its conduct is good or evil, gives
form to great affairs and may turn a host of lesser events into a
useful influence upon the course of the greater. Indeed, we can see
in diplomacy thus conducted a greater influence in many ways upon
the conduct and fortunes of mankind than even in the laws which they
themselves have designed, for the reason that, however scrupulous
private man may be in obedience to the law, misunderstandings and
conflicts of ambition easily arise between nations, and cannot be
settled by a process of law but only by a convention between the
contending parties. It is on the occasion of such conventions that
diplomacy plays a decisive part.
It is thus easy to conclude that a small number of well-chosen
negotiators posted in the different states in Europe may render to
their sovereign and their state the greatest services; that a single
word or act may do more than the invasion of whole armies because the
crafty negotiator will know how to set in motion various forces native
to the country in which he is negotiating, and thus may spare his
master the vast expense of a campaign. Nothing can be more useful than
a timely diversion thus set on foot.
It is also of high interest to all great princes that their negotiators
should be of such character and standing as to act appropriately as
mediators in the disputes between other sovereigns and to produce
peace by the authority of their intervention. Nothing can contribute
more to the reputation, the power, and the universal respect of a
monarch, than to be served by those who themselves inspire respect
and confidence. A powerful prince who maintains a constant system of
diplomacy served by wise and instructed negotiators in the different
states of Europe, and who thus cultivates well-chosen friendships and
maintains useful sources of information, is in a position to influence
the destiny of neighbouring foreign states, to maintain peace between
all states, or to pursue war where it is favourable to his design. In
all these concerns the prosperity of his plans and the greatness of
his name depend first and last on the conduct and qualities of the
negotiators to whom he entrusts his services. So now we examine in
detail the qualities necessary for a good negotiator.
[Sidenote: _Personal Qualities of the Good Negotiator._]
God having endowed men with diverse talents, the best advice that one
can give is to take counsel with themselves before choosing their
profession. Thus he who would enter the profession of diplomacy must
examine himself to see whether he was born with the qualities necessary
for success. These qualities are an observant mind, a spirit of
application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous
amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as
they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and
most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and
subtleties which as a rule only succeed in repelling those with whom
one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration
which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the
least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within,
for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practised
negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily
to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his
duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply
even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be
able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a
tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to
those whom he meets; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable,
with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a
favourable impression upon those around him--these things are the
indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator’s profession. Their opposite,
the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create
a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all the good
negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the
longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say. He
should not endeavour to gain the reputation of being able to reply
immediately and without premeditation to every proposition which is
made, and he should take a special care not to fall into the error of
one famous foreign ambassador of our time who so loved an argument that
each time he warmed up in controversy he revealed important secrets in
order to support his opinion.
[Sidenote: _The Air of Mystery._]
But indeed there is another fault of which the negotiator must beware:
he must not fall into the error of supposing that an air of mystery, in
which secrets are made out of nothing and in which the merest bagatelle
is exalted into a great matter of state, is anything but a mark of
smallness of mind and betokens an incapacity to take the true measure
either of men or of things. Indeed, the more the negotiator clothes
himself in mystery, the less he will have means of discovering what
is happening and of acquiring the confidence of those with whom he
deals. A continual reserve is like the lock on a door which is never
turned and becomes so rusty that in the end no man can open it. The
able negotiator will of course not permit his secret to be drawn from
him except at his own time, and he should be able to disguise from
his competitor the fact that he has any secret to reveal; but in all
other matters he must remember that open dealing is the foundation of
confidence and that everything which he is not compelled by duty to
withhold ought to be freely shared with those around him. He will thus
gradually establish terms of confidence with his neighbours, from which
he may draw immense profit, for it may not infrequently happen that in
exchange for some trivial information given by himself, the negotiator
may, as it were by accident, receive important news from his colleague
in another embassy. The practised negotiator will know how to employ
the circumstances of his life and of the lives of those around him
in such a manner as to lead them naturally and without restraint to
talk of the conditions and affairs of their own country, and the more
extended his view and the wider his knowledge the more surely will he
thus gather important news every day of his life.
[Sidenote: _Dignity._]
Let it not be supposed, however, that the good negotiator requires only
the light of a high intellect, dexterity, and other fine qualities
of the mind. He must show that the ordinary sentiments of the human
heart move in him, for there is no kind of employment in which at the
same time elevation and nobility of spirit and a kindly courtesy in
little things are more necessary. An ambassador indeed resembles in a
certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order
that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the
ordinary condition of mankind and makes him in some sort the equal of
the masters of the earth by that right of representation which attaches
to his service, and by the special relations which his office gives
him with the mighty ones of the earth. He must therefore be able to
simulate a dignity even if he possess it not; but this obligation is
the rock upon which many an astute negotiator has perished because
he did not know in what dignity consisted. No negotiation was ever
assisted by open or veiled menaces merely for their own sake, and
negotiators too often confuse a proud and arrogant bearing with
that careful dignity which ought to clothe their office. To advance
pretensions or to demand excessive privileges is merely the sign of
pride and of a desire to extract from the privileged position of an
ambassador a personal and unworthy advantage, in the doing of which
an ambitious negotiator may easily and utterly compromise the whole
authority of his master. No man who enters diplomacy in a spirit of
avarice or with a desire to seek interests other than those of his
service, or merely with the desire to earn the applause of the crowd,
or to attract esteem and recompense from his master, will ever make
success in negotiation. And even if some important duty may be well
discharged in his hands, it is only to be attributed to some happy
conjuncture of events which in itself smoothed away all difficulties.
[Sidenote: _Influence of Women._]
To maintain the dignity of diplomacy the negotiator must clothe himself
in liberality and generosity of heart, even in magnificence, but all
with care and a frugality of design so that the trappings of his
office do not by their display outshine the sterling merits of his own
character and person. Let clean linen and appointments and delicacy
reign at his table. Let him frequently give banquets and diversions in
honour of the principal persons of the court in which he lives, and
even in the honour of the prince himself, if he so cares to take part.
Let him also enter into the spirit of the same diversions offered by
others, but always in a light, unconstrained, and agreeable manner,
and always with an open, good-natured, straightforward air, and with
a continual desire to give pleasure to others. If the custom of the
country in which he serves permits freedom of conversation with the
ladies of the court, he must on no account neglect any opportunity
of placing himself and his master in a favourable light in the eyes
of these ladies, for it is well known that the power of feminine
charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state. The
greatest events have sometimes followed the toss of a fan or the nod of
a head. But let him beware! Let him do all things in his power, by the
magnificence of his display, by the polish, attraction, and gallantry
of his person, to engage their pleasure, but let him beware lest he
engage his own heart. He must never forget that Love’s companions are
Indiscretion and Imprudence, and that the moment he becomes pledged to
the whim of a favoured woman, no matter how wise he may be, he runs a
grave risk of being no longer master of his own secrets. We have often
seen terrible results follow from this kind of weakness into which even
the greatest ministers are liable to fall, and we need go no further
than our own time for remarkable examples and warnings.
[Sidenote: _Power of the Purse._]
Now, as the surest way of gaining the good-will of a prince is to
gain the good graces of those who have most influence upon his mind,
a good negotiator must reinforce his own good manners, his insight of
character, and attraction of person by certain expenses which will
largely assist in opening his road before him. But these expenses must
be laid out in the proper measure. They must be made by a careful
design; and wherever large gifts are offered, the giver must take care
beforehand to know that they will be received in the right spirit and
above all that they will not be refused. I do not mean that there are
not countries where no great art is needed in the matter of giving
gifts. In such a country they are no longer gifts but bribes; but
it is always to be remembered that there is a certain delicacy to
be observed in all commerce of this kind, and that a gift presented
in the right spirit, at the right moment, by the right person, may
act with tenfold power upon him who receives it. There are various
established customs in different countries by which occasion arises
for making small presents. This kind of expense, though it occasions
but a small outlay of money, may contribute largely to the esteem in
which an ambassador is held and acquire for him friends at the court to
which he is accredited. And, indeed, the manner in which this little
custom is carried out may have an important bearing upon high policy.
And, of course, in such a matter the practised negotiator will soon
be aware that at every court there are certain persons of greater
wit than fortune who will not refuse a small gratification or secret
subsidy which may bring in large results, for the wit of these persons
enables them to maintain a confidential position at court without that
personal splendour which the rich nobleman can display. Such persons
I say may be of great use to the clever negotiator. Among amusements,
for instance, the dancers, who by the fact of their profession have
an _entrée_ less formal and in some degree more intimate with the
prince than any ambassador can perhaps possess, are often to be found
valuable agents in negotiation. Or again, it happens that a monarch
has around him certain officers of low rank entrusted with duties
which bring them in close contact both with their master and with his
minister’s mind, and a timely present aptly given may reveal important
secrets. And finally, even great ministers of state themselves may not
be inaccessible by the same means.
[Sidenote: _Secret Service._]
It frequently happens in negotiation as in war that well-chosen spies
contribute more than any other agency to the success of great plans,
and indeed it is clear that there is nothing so well adapted to upset
the best design as the sudden and premature revelation of an important
secret upon which it depends. And as there is no expense better
designed nor more necessary than that which is laid out upon a secret
service, it would be inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it.
The general will say with truth that he would sooner have one regiment
the less than a poorly equipped system of espionage, and that he would
perhaps even forgo reinforcements if he could be accurately informed
of the disposition and numbers of the enemy armies. Similarly let an
ambassador retrench all superfluous expense in order that he may have
the funds at his disposal to maintain a secret service which will
inform him of all that happens in the foreign country of his service.
Yet despite the universal acknowledged truth of what I say, most
negotiators will more readily spend vast sums on a great show of horses
and carriages, on rows of useless flunkeys, than on the payment of a
few well-chosen agents who could keep them supplied with news. In this
matter we should learn a lesson from the Spaniards, who never neglect
their secret agents--a fact which I am sure has contributed largely
to the success of their ministers in many important negotiations.
It is doubtless the success of Spanish agents which has led to the
establishment of the wise custom of the Spanish Court to give Spanish
ambassadors an extraordinary fund called _Gastos Secretos_.
[Sidenote: _The Honourable Spy._]
The ambassador has sometimes been called an honourable spy because
one of his principal occupations is to discover great secrets; and he
fails in the discharge of his duty if he does not know how to lay out
the necessary sums for this purpose. Therefore an ambassador should
be a man born with a liberal hand ready to undertake willingly large
expenses of this kind; and he must be even prepared to do it at his
own charges when the emoluments of his master are insufficient. For
as his principal aim must be to succeed, that interest should eclipse
all others in any man truly devoted to his profession and capable of
succeeding in it. But, on the other hand, the sagacious prince will
not neglect the equipment of his negotiators with every possible means
for acquiring friends and secret agents in all countries where his
interests are at stake, for these expenses well laid out bring back a
large return with usury to the prince who makes them, and do much to
smooth away the difficulties which lie in the path of his designs. And
he will soon be aware that if he does not employ this expedient his
ministers can indeed make but little progress in their negotiations. He
will win no new allies but risk losing old ones.
[Sidenote: _Courage._]
Courage is a most necessary quality in a negotiator; for, though the
law of nations should give him ample security, there are many occasions
in which he will find himself in danger, where he will have to rely
upon his own courage and resource to escape from a perilous position
without compromising the negotiation on which he is engaged. Thus no
timid man can hope to conduct secret designs to success: unforeseen
accidents will shake his faith, and in a moment of fear he may too
easily give away his secrets even by the passing expression of his
countenance and by the manner of his speech. And indeed a too great
concern for his personal safety may lead him to take measures highly
prejudicial to the duties he has to discharge. And at times when the
honour of his master is attacked his timidity may prevent him from
maintaining with the necessary vigour the dignity of his office and the
prestige of his King. A prelate who was an ambassador at Rome from King
Francis I. brought disgrace on his master because he failed to defend
him in the Consistory, where the Emperor, Charles V., attempted to cast
upon the French King the whole responsibility for the continuation of
the war, boasting falsely that he had offered to end it by a single
combat with François himself, and that the French King had refused. The
King was so furious that he gave the Emperor the lie in public, and
made known to the world his displeasure with his own ambassador for
failing to uphold the dignity of France. François there and then took
the resolution never to employ any man as French ambassador who was not
a practised swordsman, and thus he hoped to uphold the honour of his
house.
[Sidenote: _Firmness in Dispute._]
A good negotiator must not only be courageous in danger but firm in
debate. There are many men who are naturally brave, but cannot maintain
an opinion in dispute. The kind of firmness that is needed is that
which, having carefully and fully examined the matter, consents to
no compromise but pursues with constancy a resolution once adopted
till it is carried into effect. Compromise is the easy refuge of
the irresolute spirit. The lack of firmness of which I speak here
is a common fault of those who have a lively imagination for every
kind of accident which may befall, and hinders them from determining
with vigour and despatch the means by which action should be taken.
They will look at a matter on so many sides that they forget in which
direction they are travelling. This irresolution is most prejudicial
to the conduct of great affairs which demand a decisive spirit, acting
upon a careful balance of advantage and disadvantage, and pursuing the
main purpose without abatement. It is said that Cardinal Richelieu,
who perhaps took wider views than any man of his time, was somewhat
irresolute when he came to action, and that Father Joseph, the
Capuchin, a much narrower intelligence than the Cardinal, was of the
greatest value to him because, once a decision was taken, he pursued it
tenaciously, and often assisted the Cardinal in dismissing designs of
compromise by which crafty persons hoped to destroy the original plan.
[Sidenote: _Genius no Substitute for Good Manners._]
There are some geniuses born with such an elevation of character and
superiority of mind that they have a natural ascendancy over all whom
they meet. But a negotiator of this kind must take good care not to
rely too much on his own judgment in order to voice that superiority
which he has over other men, for it may earn for him a reputation for
arrogance and hardness; and just on account of his very elevation above
the level of common humanity, events may escape him, and he may be the
dupe of his own self-confidence. He must sometimes consent to meet
smaller men on their own ground.
[Sidenote: _Value of Good Faith._]
The good negotiator, moreover, will never found the success of his
mission on promises which he cannot redeem or on bad faith. It is a
capital error, which prevails widely, that a clever negotiator must
be a master of the art of deceit. Deceit indeed is but a measure of
the smallness of mind of him who employs it, and simply shows that
his intelligence is too meagrely equipped to enable him to arrive at
his ends by just and reasonable methods. No doubt the art of lying
has been practised with success in diplomacy; but unlike that honesty
which here as elsewhere is the best policy, a lie always leaves a drop
of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic success gained
by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the
defeated party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a
hatred which must always be a menace to his foe. Even if deceit were
not as despicable to every right-minded man as it is, the negotiator
will perhaps bear in mind that he will be engaged throughout life upon
the affairs of diplomacy, and that it is therefore his interest to
establish a reputation for plain and fair dealing so that men may know
that they can rely upon him; for one negotiation successfully carried
through by the honesty and high intelligence of a diplomatist will give
him a great advantage in other enterprises on which he embarks in the
future. In every country where he goes he will be received with esteem
and pleasure, and men will say of him and of his master that their
cause is too good to be served by evil means. For if the negotiator
is obliged to observe with faithfulness all the promises which he has
made, it will be at once seen that both he himself and the prince whom
he serves are to be relied on.
[Sidenote: _Perils of Deceit._]
This is surely a well-known truth and so indispensable a duty that
it would appear superfluous to recommend it. At the same time many
negotiators have been so corrupted by converse usages that they
have forgotten the uses of truth--upon which I shall make but one
observation, which is, that the prince or minister who has been
deceived by his own negotiator probably began by teaching that
negotiator the lesson of deception; or, if he did not, he suffers
because he has made the choice of a bad servant. It is not enough to
choose a clever and well-instructed man for the discharge of high
political duties. The agent in such affairs must be a man of probity
and one who loves truth, for otherwise there can be no confidence in
him. It is true that this probity is not often found joined to that
capacity for taking wide views which is so necessary to a diplomatist,
nor is it always found in a man well stored with all the necessary
knowledge which we have already described as the equipment of a good
negotiator. I may be reminded that a prince is often obliged to use
diverse instruments in order to accomplish his ends, and that there
have been men of little virtue who proved themselves great negotiators
and in whose hands high affairs of state have prospered, and that men
of this type being restrained by no scruples have more often succeeded
in delicate negotiations than have the right men who have employed none
but honest means.
[Sidenote: _Monsieur de Faber rebukes Cardinal Mazarin._]
But let it be remarked that the prince who entrusts his negotiations to
this type of diplomatist cannot count upon their good services except
as long as he himself is prosperous. In difficult times, or at moments
when disgrace seems to have fallen upon him, these master-rogues will
be the first to betray him and to take service on the side of the
strong. Here then we find the final recommendation of the necessity
of employing honest men. I am reminded of the fine reply of Monsieur
de Faber, who was Marshal of France, to Cardinal Mazarin when this
great minister wished to bring over a man of substance, who shall be
nameless, to his own party. He entrusted the delicate duty to Monsieur
de Faber, charging him to offer great promises which he admitted he was
not in a position to redeem. Monsieur de Faber refused the commission
in these words: ‘Monseigneur, you will find many men ready to carry
false messages; but you have some need of honest men to speak the
truth. I beg of you to retain me for the latter service.’
[Sidenote: _Loose Livers make Bad Negotiators._]
Finally, it is in a high degree dangerous to entrust an important
negotiation to a man of irregular life whose domestic and personal
habits are disorderly. How can one expect of such a man a greater
degree of order and of decency in public affairs than that which
he shows in his own private concerns, which ought indeed to be the
constant gauge of his capacity. If he is too fond of the gaming-table,
of the wine-glass, and of frivolous amusements, he is not to be
entrusted with the discharge of high diplomatic duty, for he will be
so unreliable that at moments when he seeks the satisfaction of his
ill-regulated desires he will be prepared to sell the highest secrets
of his master.
[Sidenote: _The Cool Head._]
A man who is naturally violent and easily carried away is ill fitted
for the conduct of negotiations; it is almost impossible for him to be
master of himself at those critical moments and unforeseen occasions
when the command of one’s temper is of importance, especially at the
acute moments of diplomatic controversy when a choleric word may poison
the minds of those with whom negotiations are in progress. It is also
difficult for any man who is easily irritated to remain master of his
own secret; for, when his anger is aroused, he will allow words to
escape him from which an adroit hearer will easily divine the essence
of his thought, and thus lead to the ruin of his plans.
Before his elevation to the cardinalate, Cardinal Mazarin was sent on
an important mission to the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan. He was
charged to discover the true feelings of the Duke on a certain matter,
and he had the cunning to inflame the Duke’s anger and thus to discover
what he would never have known if the Duke himself had maintained a
wise hold over his feelings. The Cardinal indeed had made himself
absolute master of all the outward effects which passion usually
produces, so much so that neither in his speech nor by the least change
in his countenance could one discover his real thought; and this
quality which he possessed in so high a degree contributed largely to
make him one of the greatest negotiators of his time.
[Sidenote: _Spanish and Italian Characters._]
A man who is master of himself and always acts with _sang-froid_ has
a great advantage over him who is of a lively and easily inflamed
nature. One may say indeed that they do not fight with equal arms;
for in order to succeed in this kind of work, one must rather listen
than speak; and the phlegmatic temper, self-restraint, a faultless
discretion and a patience which no trial can break down--these are
the servants of success. Indeed the last of these qualities, namely
patience, is one of the advantages which the Spanish nation has over
our own; for we are naturally lively, and have hardly embarked on one
affair before we desire the end in order to embark on another, thus
betraying a restlessness which continually seeks new aims. Whereas it
has been remarked that a Spanish diplomatist never acts with haste,
that he never thinks of bringing a negotiation to an end simply from
_ennui_, but to finish it with advantage and to profit from all the
favourable conjunctures which present themselves, amongst which our
impatience is his advantage. Italy has also produced a large number of
excellent negotiators who have contributed much to the high prestige
and temporal power of the Court of Rome, even to the point at which
we now see it. And we ourselves have the same superiority in the art
of negotiation over other northern nations which the Spaniards and
Italians have over us, from which it might appear that the degree
of intelligence varies in Europe with the degree of warmth of its
different climates. Now from all this it follows that a man who by
nature is strange, inconstant, and ruled by his own humours and
passions, should not enter the profession of diplomacy, but should go
to the wars. For as war destroys a great number of those who engage in
it, she is not so delicate in the choice of her subjects; she resembles
those good stomachs which can digest and assimilate with equal ease
every kind of nourishment that is given them--not indeed that a man
must not have high and excellent qualities before he can become a good
general, but because there are so many degrees of capacity in the army
that he who has not sufficient intelligence to arrive at the highest
remains half-way and may become a good subaltern or other officer whose
service is useful in his own sphere. But it is not the same with a
negotiator--if he is not adapted to his function he will often ruin
everything that is put under his charge and stain the good name of his
master with irreparable prejudice.
[Sidenote: _Adaptability._]
Not only must the negotiator be free from wayward humours and
fantasies, but he must know how to suffer fools gladly, how to
accommodate himself to the changing humours of others. He must indeed
be like Proteus of the fable, always ready to take a different figure
and posture according to occasion and need. Let him be gay and
agreeable with young princes still in the full enjoyment of daily
pleasures; let him be sage and full of counsel with those of more
serious years, and in everything let all his attention and care, all
his zeal and even his enjoyments and diversions, tend to the one sole
aim, which is to bring to success the great business in his charge.
Thus it will not always be enough that he should execute the exact
letter of his instruction; his zeal and intelligence should combine how
he may profit from all favoured conjunctures that present themselves,
and even should be able to create such favourable moments by which the
advantage of his prince may be served. There are even pressing and
important occasions where he is compelled to make a decision on the
spot, to undertake certain _démarches_ without waiting for the orders
of his master which could not arrive in time. But then he must have
sufficient penetration to foresee all the results of his own action,
and it were well also if he had acquired beforehand that degree of
confidence from his own prince which is commonly founded on a proved
capacity of good services. He may thus assure himself in moments of
sudden decision that he retains the confidence of his prince and that
his past success will plead in favour of his present actions. In the
absence of such conditions he would be a bold negotiator indeed who
entered into engagements in his master’s name without express order on
his master’s part. But on a pressing occasion he can hold such a thing
as eventually to be concluded with advantage to his prince, or at least
he may be able to prevent the matter in question from turning to his
disadvantage until he shall have received orders from him.
[Sidenote: _Wealth, Birth and Breeding._]
It is well that with all these qualities a negotiator, and especially
one who bears the title of ambassador, should be rich in order to be
able to maintain the necessary expenses of his office; but a wise
prince will not fall into the fault common to many princes, namely
that of regarding wealth as the first and most necessary quality in
an ambassador. Indeed he will serve his own interests much better by
choosing an able negotiator of mediocre fortune than one endowed with
all the wealth of the Indies but possessing a small intelligence, for
it is obvious that the rich man may not know the true use of riches,
whereas the able man will assuredly know how to employ his own ability.
And the prince should further remember that it is within his power to
equip the able man with all the necessary means, but that it is not in
his power to endow with intelligence one who does not possess it.
It is also desirable that an ambassador should be a man of birth and
breeding, especially if he is employed in any of the principal courts
of Europe, and it is by no means a negligible factor that he should
have a noble presence and a handsome face, which undoubtedly are among
the means which easily please mankind. An evil-looking person, as
General Philopoemen said, will receive many insults and suffer much
trouble, like the man who was made to hew wood and draw water because
he looked like a slave. There are of course missions sent on special
occasions where nothing is needed but a great name and the prestige
of high birth--as, for instance, in the ceremonial occasions of a
marriage, or baptism, or the offer of good wishes on the accession of
a sovereign to the throne; but when the negotiation concerns important
affairs it must be entrusted to a man, not to a gaudy image, unless
indeed the image be a puppet in the hands of some crafty colleague
who, while possessing the whole secret of negotiation and keeping in
his hands all the threads of its designs, leaves the actual public
appearance to the ignorant but high-born gentleman whose sole trouble
is to maintain a fine table and a magnificent equipage.
[Sidenote: _The Knowledge Necessary to a Negotiator._]
A man born to diplomacy and feeling himself called to the practice
of negotiation must commence his studies by a careful examination of
the position of various European states, of the principal interests
which govern their action, which divide them from one another, of the
diverse forms of government which prevail in different parts, and of
the character of those princes, soldiers, and ministers who stand in
positions of authority. In order to master the detail of such knowledge
he must have an understanding of the material power, the revenues, and
the whole dominion of each prince or each republic. He must understand
the limits of territorial sovereignty; he must inform himself of
the manner in which the government was originally established; of
the claims which each sovereign makes upon parts which he does not
possess; for these ambitions are the very material of negotiation on
those occasions when a favourable turn of events prompts the ambitious
sovereign to hope that a long-cherished desire may be realised; and,
finally, the negotiator must be able to make a clear distinction
between the rights and claims which are founded on treaty obligation
and those which rest upon pure force alone. For his own instruction
he must read with the most attentive care all public treaties, both
general and particular, which have been made between the princes and
states of Europe and in our time; he should consider the treaties
concluded between France and the House of Austria as those which
offer the principal form and model for the conduct of all the public
affairs of Christendom on account of the network of liaisons with other
sovereigns which surrounds these two great Powers. And since their
disputes took their origin in the relations and treaties existing
between the King Louis XI. and Charles, the last Duke of Burgundy, from
whom the House of Austria descends, it is vital that the negotiator of
our time should be well acquainted with all the treaties made at that
period and since; but especially all those which have been concluded
between the principal Powers of Europe beginning with the Treaty of
Westphalia right up to the present time.
[Sidenote: _Europe is his Province._]
Let him also study with understanding and open eye the modern history
of Europe. Let him read the memoirs of great men, the instructions and
despatches of all our ablest negotiators, both those which are printed
in public books and those which are stored in manuscripts in our Office
of Public Records, for these documents treat of great affairs, and
the reading of them will convey not only facts which are important
for the making of history, but also a sense of the true atmosphere
of negotiation, and will thus help to form the mind of him who reads
them and give him some clue to guide him in similar occasions on his
own career. One of the most profitable readings that I know for this
purpose is the despatch of Cardinal d’Ossat, of whose letters I make
bold to say, for a man entering upon negotiation, what Horace said to
the poets of his time regarding the works of Homer: That he should
have them in his hands night and day if he desires perfection in his
own art. In a simple and modest manner the despatches of this Cardinal
reveal the force and the address which were his great merit, and which,
in spite of the antiquity of his style, still give keen pleasure to
those who have a taste for good diplomatic writing. One may see thus
how by his ability alone, without the assistance of noble birth,
title, or other character than that of agent of his queen, Louise de
Vaudemont, widow of King Henry III., he was able gradually to conduct
the high enterprise of reconciling King Henry the Great with the Holy
See after the most famous ambassadors of the time had failed in it;
with what dexterity he escaped all the pitfalls laid for him by the
Roman Court, and all the traps which the House of Austria, then at
the height of its power, devised for his undoing. The reader will
marvel, as he turns each page, how nothing escaped his penetrating eye.
He will find even the least movements of Pope Clement VIII. and his
nephew the Cardinal recorded with care. He will see how Monseigneur
d’Ossat profited by everything, how he is firm as a rock when necessity
demands, supple as a willow at another moment, and how he possessed the
supreme art of making every man offer him as a gift that which it was
his chief design to secure.
[Sidenote: _The Study of Famous Despatches._]
Then again in the collection of manuscript despatches regarding
the negotiations of Münster, as well as in the memoirs of Cardinal
Mazarin, we may read the instructions to the French plenipotentiary,
which are indeed masterpieces of their kind, for in them the Cardinal
examines the interests of each European Power. He suggests overtures
and expedients for adjusting their differences with a capacity and
a clearness of view which is altogether surprising, and that in a
language which was not his own. His despatches on the Peace of the
Pyrenees, by means of which he conveyed to the King the results of his
conferences with Don Louis Dharo, Prime Minister of Spain, have also a
beauty of their own. We recognise in them also the superiority of his
genius and the easy ascendancy which he had gained over the spirit of
the Spanish minister with whom he was dealing. There are also other
manuscript despatches which deserve recognition. They are to be found
in great numbers in the Royal Library and in other collections of
books, as, for instance, those of De Noailles, Bishop of Acs, and of
Montluc, Bishop of Valence, in which one may also read the authentic
account of two noble and able men. We have, too, the letters of
President Jeannin, a man of great common sense and solid judgment, who
contributed largely to the consolidation of the young Republic of the
United Provinces by the twelve years’ truce which he prepared, and by
the wise counsels which he gave touching all matters of government in
that Republic. The reading of such letters as his is well designed to
form the judgment of him who will consent to read with intelligent care.
[Sidenote: _Dynastic Liaisons._]
In order to understand the principal interest of European princes, the
negotiator must add to the knowledge which we have just been describing
that of dynastic genealogies, so that he may know all the connections
and alliances, by marriage and otherwise, between different princes,
for these liaisons are often found to be the principal causes of
conflict and even of war. He must also know the laws and established
customs of the different countries, especially in all matters relating
to the succession to the throne and the prevailing habits of the court.
The study of the form of government existing in each country is very
necessary to the diplomatist, and he should not wait until his arrival
in a foreign country to study these questions; he should prepare
himself beforehand, for, unless he is equipped with a certain measure
of this knowledge, he will be like a man at sea without a compass. Our
own negotiators, who have never travelled before taking up some foreign
post and who therefore know nothing of these questions, are usually
so saturated in our own national customs and habits as to think that
those of all other nations must resemble them; the truth being that the
authority which one king has within his kingdom in no way resembles
that of the neighbouring monarch, although the superficial likeness
between royalty in every country is obvious to every eye.
[Sidenote: _England and Poland._]
There are, for instance, countries where it is not enough to be in
agreement with the prince and his ministers, because there are other
parties who share the national sovereignty with him and who have the
power to resist his decisions or to make him change them. Of this state
of affairs we have an excellent example in England, where the authority
of Parliament frequently obliges the King to make peace or war against
his own wish; or again in Poland, where the general Diets have an even
more extended power, in which one single vote in the Diet may bring to
nought the all but unanimous resolution of the assembly itself, and
thus not only defeat the deliberations of that assembly but bring to
nought the policy of the King and of the Senate. Therefore the good
negotiator in such a country will know where to find the balance of
domestic power in order to profit by it when occasion offers.
Besides the general public interests of the state there are private
and personal interests and ruling passions in princes and in their
ministers or favourites, which often play a determining part in
the direction of public policy. It is therefore necessary for the
negotiator to inform himself of the nature of these private interests
and passions influencing the spirits of those with whom he has to
negotiate, in order that he may guide his action by this knowledge
either in flattering their passions, which is the easiest way, or by
somehow finding means to deflect such personages from their original
intentions and engagements and cause them to adopt a new line of
policy. Such an enterprise carried to success would indeed be a
masterpiece of negotiation.
[Sidenote: _Testimony of the Duc de Rohan._]
That great man, the Duc de Rohan, tells us in the treatise which he
wrote upon the interests of European sovereigns, that the sovereigns
rule the people and that interest rules the sovereign; but we may add
that the passions of princes and of their ministers often overrule
their interests. We have seen many cases in which monarchs have entered
engagements most prejudicial to themselves and their state under the
influence of passion. There need be no surprise on this account, for
the nations themselves are not free from this error, and are prepared
to ruin themselves in order to satisfy hatred, vengeance, and jealousy,
the satisfaction of which is often antagonistic to their veritable
interests. Without recourse to ancient history it would be easy to
prove by modern examples that men do not act upon firm and stable
maxims of conduct; that as a rule they are governed by passion and
temperament more than by reason. The bearing of this knowledge upon
diplomacy is that since the passion and caprice of men in authority so
largely influence the destiny of their subjects, it is the duty of the
able negotiator to inform himself as accurately as possible regarding
the inclination, state of mind, and the plans of men in authority
in order that this information may be placed at the service of his
master’s interests. And we may be sure that a negotiator who has not
laboured to acquire a fund of this general and particular information
will reason falsely regarding events, affairs of state, and men, and
is liable to make false estimates and give dangerous advice to the
prince who employs him. Such knowledge is not to be found in books
alone; it is more easily to be gathered by personal communication with
those engaged in public service and by foreign travel, for, however
profoundly one may have studied the customs, the policy, or the
passions of those who govern in foreign states, everything will appear
differently when examined close at hand, and it is impossible to form
a just notion of the true character of things except by first-hand
acquaintance.
[Sidenote: _Importance of Foreign Travel._]
It is therefore desirable that before entering the profession of
diplomacy the young man should have travelled to the principal courts
of Europe, not merely like those young persons who on leaving the
academy or college go to Rome to see the beautiful palaces and the
ancient ruins, or to Venice to enjoy the opera and the courtesans; he
should indeed embark on his travels at a somewhat riper age when he is
more capable of reflection and of appreciating the form and spirit of
government in each country, and of studying the merits and faults of
princes and ministers--doing all this with the deliberate design of
returning to these countries at a future day with profit to himself
and his master. Travel conducted on these lines obliges the traveller
to keep a vigilant eye upon everything that comes under his notice. It
would be well that in certain cases they should accompany the King’s
ambassadors or envoys as travelling companions after the manner of the
Spaniards and the Italians, who regard it as an honour to accompany the
ministers of the Crown on their diplomatic journeys. There is nothing
better calculated for instruction upon the manner of events in foreign
countries or for the training of a young man to represent his own
country abroad.
[Sidenote: _Foreign Languages Indispensable._]
It is highly desirable that such novices in diplomacy should learn
foreign languages, for thus they will be protected from the bad faith
or the ignorance of interpreters, and from the grave embarrassment of
having to use them for the purpose of audiences with the sovereign.
It is obvious, too, that an interpreter may be a betrayer of secrets.
_Every one_ who enters the profession of diplomacy should know the
German, Italian, and Spanish languages as well as the Latin, ignorance
of which would be a disgrace and a shame to any public man, for it is
the common language of all Christian nations. It is also very useful
and fitting for the diplomat, on whom grave national responsibility
rests, to have such a general knowledge of science as may tend to
the development of his understanding, but he must be master of his
scientific knowledge and must not be consumed by it. He must give
science the place which it deserves, and must not merely consider it
as a reason for pride or for contempt of those who do not possess it.
While devoting himself to this study with care and attention he must
not become engrossed in it, for he who enters the public service of his
King must consider that he is destined for action and not for academic
study in his closet; and his principal care must be to instruct himself
regarding all that may affect the lives of living men rather than the
study of the dead. His professional aim is to penetrate the secrets and
hearts of men; to learn the art of handling them in such a manner as to
make them serve the great ends of his royal master.
[Sidenote: _A Rule for the Diplomatic Service._]
If one could establish a rule in France that no one should be employed
in negotiation until he had passed some such apprenticeship as this,
and had shown his capacity to profit by study and travel in rendering
a good account of the countries which he had seen; and, further, if
one could also establish the rule in the same manner that no high
command in the army can be entrusted to an officer who has not made
many campaigns, we should be more confident that the King would be well
served in his negotiations, and that by these means he would be able
to raise up around him a large number of reliable negotiators. This is
a most desirable end, for as we have seen there are many actions in
which the perfect practice of the art of negotiation is not less useful
than that of war, and that in France at the present time the art of war
stands far above that of diplomacy in public esteem.
[Sidenote: _Rewards for Service._]
But as men are not yet perfect enough to serve without hope of reward,
it is desirable that there should be in France a higher degree of
honour and fortune for those who have deserved well of their country
in diplomacy, as indeed there are in many other courts in Europe where
the King’s subjects have gained high distinction in that branch of the
public service. There are indeed countries in which the distinguished
diplomatist may hope to reach the highest place and most exalted
dignities in the realm, by which means we in France may learn to raise
the profession of diplomacy to that degree of public recognition which
it deserves, and from which the service of the King and the greatness
of the kingdom must certainly profit.
[Sidenote: _On the Choice of Diplomatists._]
The right choice of negotiators depends upon their personal quality,
their training, and to some extent their fortune, and as the endowments
of mankind vary in a wide degree, so it is found that one kind will
fit better into the office of diplomacy than another. At the same time
there are men of such wide capacity that they can be safely employed
in very different enterprises, and even in very different countries.
Such men by their adaptability, by the receptiveness of their nature,
and the pliancy of their character are well fitted for the province
of diplomacy, and quickly accommodate themselves to new surroundings.
It should be the aim of all governments to develop a whole race of
such men from whose ranks they may draw their diplomatic agents. It is
true that in any one generation there will only be a few geniuses of
the first order, and that the rank and file of the diplomatic service
will be composed of persons of a more limited type, in which case it
is all the more incumbent upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs to
exercise the greatest care in assigning ambassadors to foreign posts.
He must therefore be well acquainted with the whole service in order
to know where to lay his hand upon the appropriate person for any given
enterprise.
[Sidenote: _The Three Professions._]
There are, broadly speaking, three principal human professions. The
first is the Ecclesiastical; the second is that of the Gentlemen of
the Sword, which besides those actually serving in the army includes
courtiers and squires and other ranks of gentlemen in his Majesty’s
service; and the third is the profession of the Law, whose devotees
in France are called ‘Gentlemen of the Cloth.’ There are not many
countries where ecclesiastics can be employed in diplomacy, for one
cannot properly send them to heretical or infidel countries. At Rome,
which appears to be their home, their attachment to the Pope, and their
desire to receive honours from him as well as other benefits which
depend upon service at his Court, undoubtedly places them under the
suspicion of following too closely the Jesuitical maxims which rule
papal policy, and often operate to the prejudice of the temporal power
of other kings.
[Sidenote: _The Example of Venice._]
The Republic of Venice has shown much wisdom in this matter, for she is
so convinced of the partiality of Venetian prelates towards the Holy
See that not only does she exclude them from all diplomatic offices in
connection with the Court of Rome, but she actually excludes them from
all discussion of the political relation between Venice and Rome. It
is obvious indeed to all that a dignitary of the Church owes a divided
allegiance, and it seems probable that where his loyalty to the Church
conflicts with his loyalty to his sovereign, the former is likely to
prevail. Indeed, the more closely one examines the proper duties of a
bishop, for instance, the more firmly convinced does one become that
these duties are not compatible with those of an ambassador; for on
the one hand it is not fitting that a minister of religion should
run about the world and thus neglect those duties which should have
first claim upon him, and on the other, as we have seen, political
and ecclesiastical allegiance may come into collision with disastrous
results. And surely a state must be poorly endowed with men if it can
find nowhere but in the Church a sufficiency of adept diplomatists. I
am the last to dispute the great services which certain prelates have
rendered to the French state in the past, but I consider it useful to
be guided as a general rule by the foregoing considerations.
[Sidenote: _The Ambassador a Man of Peace._]
The best diplomatist will usually be found to be a man of good birth,
sometimes a knight trained to the profession of arms, and it has
occasionally been found that a good general officer has served with
success as an ambassador, especially at a time when the military
affairs of either state were prominent subjects of negotiation. But
diplomacy is not to be regarded as linked with war, for, although war
arises out of policy, it is to be regarded as nothing more than a means
to an end in itself. Therefore the ambassador should be a man of peace;
for in most cases, and certainly wherever the foreign court is inclined
towards peace, it is best to send a diplomatist who works by persuasion
and is an adept in winning the good graces of those around him. In
either case it will be observed that the public interests will be best
served by appointing a professional diplomatist who by long experience
has acquired a high aptitude for the peculiar office of diplomacy.
Neither the soldier nor the courtier can hope to discharge the duties
of diplomacy with success unless they have taken pains to instruct
themselves in public policy, and in all that region of knowledge which
I have already described as necessary for the negotiator.
[Sidenote: _Lawyer Diplomats._]
It is true that sometimes a lawyer diplomat has made a great success
of negotiation, especially in countries where the final responsibility
for public policy lay with public assemblies which could be moved by
adroit speech, but in general the training of a lawyer breeds habits
and dispositions of mind which are not favourable to the practice
of diplomacy. And though it be true that success in the law-courts
depends largely upon a knowledge of human nature and an ability to
exploit it--both of which are factors in diplomacy--it is none the less
true that the occupation of the lawyer, which is to split hairs about
nothing, is not a good preparation for the treatment of grave public
affairs in the region of diplomacy. If this be true of the advocate or
barrister, it is still more true of the magistrate and judge. The habit
of mind engendered by presiding over a court of law, in which the judge
himself is supreme, tends to exclude those faculties of suppleness and
adaptability which are necessary in diplomacy, and the almost ludicrous
assumption of dignity by a judge would certainly appear as arrogance in
diplomatic circles. I do not say that there have not been great lawyers
and great judges who were endowed with high diplomatic qualities, but
again I place these considerations before my readers in the belief that
the more closely they are observed the more surely will they lead to
efficiency in the diplomatic profession.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy demands Professional Training._]
Let me further emphasise my conviction, which, alas, is not yet shared
even by ministers of state in France, that diplomacy is a profession by
itself which deserves the same preparation and assiduity of attention
that men give to other recognised professions. The qualities of a
diplomatist and the knowledge necessary to him cannot, indeed, all
be acquired. The diplomatic genius is born, not made. But there are
many qualities which may be developed with practice, and the greater
part of the necessary knowledge can only be acquired by constant
application to the subject. In this sense diplomacy is certainly a
profession itself capable of occupying a man’s whole career, and those
who think to embark upon a diplomatic mission as a pleasant diversion
from their common task only prepare disappointment for themselves and
disaster for the cause which they serve. The veriest fool would not
entrust the command of an army to a man whose sole badge of merit was
his successful eloquence in a court of law or his adroit practice of
the courtier’s art in the palace. All are agreed that military command
must be earned by long service in the army. In the same manner it
should be regarded as folly to entrust the conduct of negotiations to
an untrained amateur unless he has conspicuously shown in some other
walk of life the qualities and knowledge necessary for the practice of
diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _Fatality of Bad Appointments._]
It often happens that there are men in public life who have won a
reputation for themselves without earning it. That is possible in the
political world, which has many camp followers and hangers-on of all
kinds, and there is always a risk that a minister in search of an
ambassador for a foreign post will use the occasion to pay an old
debt to some powerful patrician family or to some blackmailer behind
the scenes. Those who take the responsibility of appointing to high
diplomatic offices persons of this character are responsible before
God and man for all the injuries which may thereby accrue to the
public interest. It cannot be too plainly stated that, while in many
cases where trouble has arisen the negotiator himself is to blame,
the true responsibility must rest with the minister at home, who not
only devises the policy itself but chooses the instruments of it. It
is therefore one of the highest maxims of good government that the
public interest must be supreme, and that therefore both the prince
himself and his ministers must steel themselves to resist the pressure
of friends and relations who seek employment for unworthy persons.
In diplomacy, above all things, since peace and war and the welfare
of nations depend upon it, the best minds, the most sagacious and
instructed of public servants should be appointed to the principal
foreign posts regardless of the personal affairs of the prince himself
or the party attachments of the chosen ambassadors.
[Sidenote: ‘_We have fools in Florence, but we do not export them._’]
Nothing should stand in the way of the creation of a vigilant,
sagacious, and high-minded diplomatic service. Men of small minds
should content themselves with employment at home, where their errors
may easily be repaired, for errors committed abroad are too often
irreparable. The late Duke of Tuscany, who was a remarkably wise and
enlightened prince, once complained to the Venetian ambassador, who
stayed over-night with him on his journey to Rome, that the Republic
of Venice had sent as resident at his court a person of no value,
possessing neither judgment nor knowledge, nor even any attractive
personal quality. ‘I am not surprised,’ said the ambassador in reply;
‘we have many fools in Venice.’ Whereupon the Grand Duke retorted: ‘We
also have fools in Florence, but we take care not to export them.’
The Duke’s remarks show how important it is in every respect to choose
the right man for the diplomatic service, and, in order to give the
Foreign Minister an adequate freedom of choice, his diplomatic service
should contain men of different characters and a wide variety of
accomplishments. Thus he will not be compelled to send an unsuitable
man merely because he was the only one available. He should have
most careful regard in this choice to the type of government and the
religion which prevails in the foreign country in question. There used
to be a jest current in Paris on this very subject. The French King had
sent a bishop to Constantinople and an heretic to Rome, and it was said
that the one had gone to convert the Grand Turk and the other to be
converted by the Pope!
[Sidenote: _The Persona Ingrata._]
Apart from any higher consideration, it is a mere measure of prudence
to avoid sending an envoy who may be presumed to be a _persona ingrata_
at the foreign court, for he will certainly, whether he will or not,
create a prejudice against his own country and will be quite unable to
meet his competitors in diplomacy on equal terms, for he will start
with the handicap of unpopularity. The Foreign Minister, therefore,
should not wait until matters go wrong at a foreign capital, but should
be in a position, when each appointment is made, to know the character
of the new ambassador, and thus to veto a bad appointment. This, alas,
is not by any means always the case. I do not need to enter upon a
minute examination of the faults to avoid and the virtues to encourage
in the complete diplomat. I have already said enough to show where
my opinion lies in a general way. I will only add one or two further
considerations. I said a few moments ago that loose living is a great
handicap in diplomacy; but, since there is no rule which has not some
exception, let me point out that a too abstemious negotiator will miss
many opportunities of finding out what is going on. Especially in the
northern countries the diplomat who loves a glass will quickly make
friends among ministers, though, to be sure, he should drink in such a
manner as not to lose control of his own faculties while endeavouring
to loosen the self-control of others.
[Sidenote: _The Nation judged by its Servants._]
In diplomacy a nation is judged by its ministers, and its whole
reputation may rest upon the popularity or unpopularity of an
ambassador. In this respect the personal conduct of the ambassador
and his staff is almost as important as the policy with which he is
charged, for the success of the policy will depend largely upon the
actual relations which exist between the two nations. The ambassador
is, as it were, the very embodiment of these relations, and if a
proper adept in his profession will know how to turn every occasion to
advantage. I need not repeat my tale of the qualities and practices
by which such advantage may be drawn from the current of events, but
I may perhaps point out that obviously men of birth and breeding are
better able to discharge the kind of function which I have described.
Their rank will command a certain respect, and the qualities usually
inherited by those of good birth should stand them in good stead at a
foreign court. At the same time such qualities must not be regarded as
more than a foundation. They cannot in themselves equip a diplomatist
for his office. He must by assiduous application acquire the other
necessary qualities, for there is no man more liable to suspicion than
he who plumes himself on an experience which he does not possess.
Further, it is usually unwise to entrust important negotiations
to young men, who are commonly presumptuous and vain as well as
indiscreet. Old age is equally inappropriate. The best time of life is
its prime, in which you find experience, discretion, and moderation,
combined with vigour.
[Sidenote: _Men of Letters._]
Other things being equal, I prefer a man of letters before one who has
not made a habit of study, for his reading will give him a certain
equipment which he might otherwise lack. It will adorn his conversation
and supply him with the necessary historic setting in which to
place his own negotiations; whereas an ignorant man will be able to
quote nothing but the will of his master, and will thus present his
argument in a naked and unattractive form. It must be obvious that the
knowledge gained in a lifetime of reading is an important adjunct in
diplomacy, and above all, the reading of history is to be preferred,
for without it the negotiator will be unable to understand the meaning
of historical allusions made by other diplomatists, and may thus miss
the whole point at some important turn in negotiations. And since it is
not enough to think aright, the diplomatist must be able to translate
his thoughts into the right language, and conversely he must be able to
pierce behind the language of others to their true thoughts. It may
often happen that an historical allusion will reveal the purpose of a
minister’s mind far better than any direct argument. Herein lies the
importance of culture in diplomacy. The name of orator has sometimes
been given to ambassadors because in certain past times they have
been in the habit of delivering their instructions in the form of an
eloquent address; but diplomatic eloquence is a very different thing
from that of Parliament or the Bar. An ambassador’s speeches should
contain more sense than words, and he should studiously avoid every
affectation. His aim should be to arouse the minds of his hearers by a
sympathetic touch, after which it will be easy to deliver his message
in an appropriate way. He should therefore at the outset think rather
of what is in their minds than of immediately expressing what is in his
own. It is in this that true eloquence consists, and indeed the words I
have just used are the beginning and end of all diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _The Fitting Mode of Address._]
In general his mode of address, whether he speak to the sovereign or
to his ministers, should be moderate and reserved. He should not raise
his voice but should maintain the ordinary conversational tone, at
once simple and dignified, revealing an innate respect both for his
own high office and for the person whom he is addressing. He should,
above all things, avoid the prolix, pompous approach which is natural
to princes who attach more importance to ceremonial than to the essence
of any matter. But if the ambassador be called upon to deliver his
message to a Senate or a Parliament, he will bear in mind that the
means for gaining the good graces of an individual and of an assembly
are by no means the same. In such public speech he may permit himself a
certain freedom of rhetoric, but even here he must beware of prolonging
his speech beyond a tolerable limit. The reply of the Spartans to
ambassadors from the Isle of Samos stands as a warning for all times
against prolixity: ‘We have forgotten the beginning of your harangue;
we paid no heed to the middle of it, and nothing has given us pleasure
in it except the end.’ God forbid that any French negotiator should
receive so damning a rebuff!
[Sidenote: _The Well-Stored Mind._]
Even at the best of times a man of good sense will not rely entirely on
his native wit. He will find that knowledge of historical precedents
will often act as a lever with which to remove obstacles from his
path. Such knowledge of history, and particularly the true aptitude
in applying it to current events, cannot be learned except by long
experience. Even in those cases where success has attended the
efforts of an amateur diplomatist, the example must be regarded as an
exception, for it is a commonplace of human experience that skilled
work requires a skilled workman. The more important the business on
hand, the more vital it is that ministers of state should ensure for
themselves the services of trained men. I am well aware that even the
greatest courts sometimes neglect this vital precaution, and fill their
embassies with improper persons, mainly because the minister or the
prince had not sufficient strength of mind to resist appeals made on
illegitimate grounds such as that of family influence. It will usually
be found that the real expert does not push himself or his claims, and
that the superior minds in diplomacy, as in other walks of life, are
not found crying their wares at every street corner, but must be sought
out with care in their own closets. It is also to be observed that in
previous times the profession of diplomacy stood too low in public
esteem to attract the services of first-class men--partly because
higher emoluments were to be earned elsewhere, and partly on account of
the prolonged absence from home which diplomatic service entails.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy an Honourable Exile._]
If diplomacy be a labour in exile, the state should see to it that
it is at least an honourable exile. To counteract this drawback, the
home government should so reform the system of diplomacy that it may
offer attractions to the most ambitious as well as to the most refined
spirits. There is no reason why not merely honour but adequate daily
recompense for his services should not be offered to the diplomatists
from the very beginning of their career. Having regard to the expenses
which fall upon the diplomatists of all ranks in their service abroad,
and in maintaining the honour of their own profession and their
country, the prince will be well advised to pay good salaries and in
other ways to mark his esteem of the diplomatic profession. Thus and
thus alone can a prince gather round him a diplomatic bodyguard worthy
of the name. If he follows this advice, his diplomatic service will
quickly outstrip all others and a deeper mutual confidence will arise
between himself and his diplomatic agents upon which the success of all
his negotiations will rest secure. No diplomatist is less to be envied
than he who finds himself at a foreign court bereft of the confidence
of his own.
[Sidenote: _Value of a Well-Equipped Service._]
Now the equipment of the state in diplomacy will be incomplete unless
the diplomatic service contains within its ranks so large a number of
practised and seasoned diplomatists that the King may be able to retain
several of them at his side as special advisers in foreign affairs. In
every campaign the true commander will take as much trouble for his
reserves as for his first line of attack, and similarly the position
of reserves in diplomacy has a great importance, for it means not only
that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will have at his elbow a number
of skilled diplomatists to assist him in a moment of crisis, but also
that when one of the embassies abroad suddenly falls vacant his choice
of a successor will not be too narrowly restricted. He thus will be
able to avoid the fatal practice, which has prevailed too often in
recent French history, of having to choose an ambassador haphazard at
the last moment from among the courtiers and hangers-on at the palace.
[Sidenote: _The Right Man in the Right Place._]
The nature of the business on hand must largely govern the choice of
the ambassador who is appointed to carry it out, and if the diplomatic
service be large enough and varied enough it will certainly contain
within its ranks many different characters showing a wide variety of
aptitude. Thus in all those secret negotiations which are so necessary
in order to prepare the ground for treaties it is often found that the
ambassador himself is not the best person to employ. It may be highly
embarrassing for him to attempt to combine such secret negotiations
with the ordinary duties of his office, and therefore a clever man who
is not yet clothed with the prestige of high office is a more proper
agent for this kind of secret traffic. The very fact that the high
public position of an ambassador is apt to make the court and the
general public familiar with his person and his face is certainly a
drawback to his employment on more secret affairs, and though it is
true, as we have said, that part of the business of an ambassador is
that of an honourable spy, he should beware of doing any of the spying
himself. Most of the great events in recent diplomatic history have
been prepared by ministers sent in secret. The Peace of Münster, one
of the most intricate negotiations I have ever known, was not really
the work of that vast concourse of ambassadors and envoys which met
there and appended their signatures to the document. The essential
clauses of that treaty were discussed and drawn up by a secret agent of
Duke Maximilian of Bavaria sitting at a table in Paris with Cardinal
Mazarin. In a similar fashion the Peace of the Pyrenees was concluded
as the result of secret negotiations at Lyons between Cardinal Mazarin
and Pimentel, the secret envoy of the Spanish King; and finally, the
Peace of Ryswick, to which I was a party throughout the negotiation,
was devised by the same secret diplomacy before its public ratification
in Holland in the year 1697.
[Sidenote: _Each Embassy a Miniature of the Whole Service._]
Now the bearing of these considerations upon the organisation of
diplomacy is fairly clear. If it is only a question of maintaining
good relations between one state and another and of rendering a more
or less correct account of all that happens at a foreign court, a
diplomatist with a couple of secretaries will suffice, and indeed
in ordinary times it is undoubtedly better not to have more than one
diplomatist of the same rank at any foreign court. But it is equally
obvious that there are occasions when it is of the highest advantage to
maintain a more elaborately equipped mission at a foreign court, and
even to send two or three diplomatists of higher rank to assist in the
conduct of negotiations and in the other activities of diplomacy. This
is of course true whenever a peace conference is about to meet, for
negotiations of that character require great preparation beforehand,
and it would be impossible for a single diplomatist to overtake all
the work which is necessary in such circumstances together with the
manifold duties of his own office. In a certain sense the embassy
itself should be a reproduction in miniature of the whole diplomatic
service.
[Sidenote: _Variety of Talent._]
There is undoubtedly room in all the larger embassies for a great
variety of talent, which will find an appropriate field of action if
the head of the mission is wise enough to give the younger men their
chance. For instance, it sometimes happens that an embassy will find
it is in a country distracted by civil war, and then the best practice
of the ambassador will be severely tested. If he has encouraged his
juniors to form relationships of various kinds with different parties
in the country for the purpose of acquiring information, he will find
that on the outbreak even of so distracting a commotion as civil war he
has the means within his own embassy of keeping touch with both sides
in the dispute. Naturally he will find it a difficult and delicate task
not to be embroiled with either side; but he will certainly find all
his previous trouble amply repaid by the fulness of the information
which he receives from both sides. On no account should he allow
prejudice regarding social rank or political opinion to stand in the
way of the formation of useful relations between members of his staff
and different parties in the country. He himself is debarred from
such action, and indeed if he were alone with nothing but one or two
secretaries to assist him, it would be quite impossible for him to
know what was passing in either camp, and he would have to rely on
second-hand information which he was not in a position to test. Still
worse would be his case if, having become the personal friend of the
chief of one of the parties, he should find the other party coming into
power, and thereafter treating him as an enemy.
[Sidenote: _Merit the only Standard._]
Such considerations must ever be borne in mind by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs. But least of all men should he be influenced by
regard for rank, social station, or political opinion in his choice of
attachés and other persons in any rank in diplomacy. Especially where
he is about to despatch an embassy to a state under popular government,
he will remember that the ambassador will require many agents to keep
him in touch with all the different parties. It is therefore to be
observed that those embassies which are sent to popularly governed
states must be chosen with greater care and equipped with a more varied
staff than those despatched to a foreign court where the government
rests entirely in the hands of the King.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomatic Hierarchy: Ambassadors._]
Before discussing in detail the duties of negotiators, I shall
describe the different titles which they receive, and the functions
and privileges attached to their office. Negotiators are of two
kinds: of the first and second order. Those of the first order are
Ambassadors Extraordinary and Ambassadors Ordinary. Those of the second
are Envoys Extraordinary and Residents. Ambassadors extraordinary
receive certain honours and distinctions not accorded to ambassadors
ordinary. The ambassadors extraordinary of crowned heads are lodged
and entertained in France for three days, by order of the King, in
residences set aside for them, while ambassadors ordinary are not so
entertained by the King, though in other respects they enjoy the same
honour and privileges as the former. These privileges consist in the
enjoyment under international law of immunity and security, in the
right to remain covered before the King in public audiences because
they represent their masters, in the privilege of being borne in the
King’s coach, and of driving their own coaches into the inner court of
the Louvre. They have still their own dais in the audience-chamber,
while their wives have a seat by the Queen; and they are permitted to
drape the driving seat of their coaches with a special saddle cloth. In
France the ambassadors of the Dukes of Savoy enjoyed the same honours
as those of the crowned heads of Europe. Abroad the King’s ambassadors
enjoy different ceremonial rights according to the customs established
in different courts. The French ambassador in Rome, for instance,
gives his hand to the ambassadors of certain crowned heads and of
Venice, but there are certain ambassadors of other sovereigns who do
not receive this courtesy, though at other courts it is accorded to
them by the French ambassador. The French ambassador takes first rank
in all ceremonies in Rome after the ambassador of the Emperor. These
two ambassadors receive the same salary, and are treated otherwise on
a footing of equality. There are several courts at which the French
ambassadors give their hand to certain princes of equality in the
country: in Spain, for instance, we find the Grandees; in London, the
Peers of the Realm; in Sweden and in Poland the Senators and Grand
Officers; but to the negotiators of the rank of envoy this courtesy is
not accorded. The King does not send an ambassador to the Electorates
of Germany, but conducts his negotiation with them merely by means of
envoys.
[Sidenote: _Envoys Extraordinary._]
Envoys extraordinary are public ministers who do not possess the right
of presentation which attaches alone to the title of ambassador, but
they enjoy the same security and immunity under the law of nations.
They do not make a state entry into a foreign capital in the manner
of ambassadors, but are presented in audiences to the King by the
diplomatic usher, who fetches them from their private residence in
one of the King’s coaches; they speak to his Majesty standing and
uncovered, the King himself being seated and covered. The Emperor on
the other hand receives the envoys of the King standing and covered,
and remains in this condition throughout the entire audience, the
envoy alone of all those present standing uncovered.... The title of
plenipotentiary is sometimes given to envoys as well as to ambassadors
according to the occasion. For instance, the ministers whom the King
maintains at the Diet of Ratisbon receive the title of plenipotentiary
although they are not ambassadors. Residents are also public ministers,
but this title has been somewhat degraded since the distinction was
drawn both at the French Court and at the Court of the Emperor between
them and envoys, with the result that nearly all foreign negotiators in
France who bore the title of resident have relinquished it by order of
their masters, and have assumed that of envoy extraordinary. None the
less the title is still found in Rome and in other courts and republics
where the residents are treated as envoys.
[Sidenote: _Secret Envoys._]
There are certain secret envoys who are only received in private
audiences but enjoy the same immunity as public envoys, and from the
moment in which they present their credentials are recognised as public
ministers. There are also secretaries and agents attached to the court
for various forms of public business, but they are not received in
audience by the King in France; they do all their business with the
Secretary of State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and though
themselves not recorded as ministers have also enjoyed the protection
and immunity under international law which is accorded to foreign
ambassadors. No subject of the King can be received as minister or
representative of a foreign prince, nor can they conduct his affairs in
France except as agents of the Secretary of State, the only exception
being the ambassador from Malta, who is usually a French Member of
the Order, and to whom the King accords the right to remain covered in
public audience as representative of the Grand Master of the Order, who
himself is recognised as possessing sovereign rights.
[Sidenote: _Agents of Small States._]
Only princes and sovereign states have the right to clothe their
messengers with the character of ambassador, envoy, or resident. The
agents of small states or of the free states are called deputies; they
are not public ministers, and they are subject to the jurisdiction of
the country like any private citizen; they do not enjoy immunity under
the law of nations, though by custom deputies from provinces and from
free cities are accorded immunity and security in practice during their
deputation as a proof of the good faith of the prince in negotiation.
In the same manner private citizens provided with passports may travel
free from molestation. There are certain states in Italy which, though
neither sovereign Powers nor subject to another sovereign, have yet
conserved the right to send deputies with the title of ambassador to
the sovereign under whose sway they live. These are the cities of
Bologna and Ferrara, which send diplomatic deputations to the Pope
in this manner, and the city of Messina, which retained the right of
sending ambassadors to the King of Spain before the last rising. There
are similarly several Spanish cities which do not now retain this
right. These ambassadors of states or subject provinces resemble in
some manner those whom the Roman people used to receive from their own
free provinces, from the cities and colonies subject to Roman rule,
to whom the name of _Legati_ was given, a name which still occurs in
all Latin diplomatic documents. There are certain free cities, such as
Hamburg and Lübeck, which send commissaries to certain princes; but as
a rule they are merely commercial agents engaged upon such matters of
business as the purchase and sale of merchandise and the conditions of
letters of exchange.
[Sidenote: _Precedence._]
Now although the position of an ambassador extraordinary is something
more honourable than that of the ambassador ordinary they are
practically treated alike if there is an equality between the princes
whom they represent. The title of extraordinary gives no other
superiority over the ambassador ordinary except in pure matters of
precedence. Envoys extraordinary and residents stand in somewhat of the
same relation, that is to say, that the resident of a prince of higher
rank takes precedence over an envoy extraordinary of a prince of lesser
rank. It is not, however, the same between ambassadors and envoys.
The envoy of a crowned head must yield the place of honour to the
ambassador of a lesser sovereign as in the following example. An envoy
of the Emperor at the French Court some years ago took his seat at a
public entertainment in the place which was reserved for the ambassador
ordinary of the Duke of Savoy, and asserted his right to it on the
ground of the difference in rank between their respective masters; but
the dispute was decided in favour of the ambassador as holding superior
rank without regard to the difference in the rank of their respective
princes; and the envoy of the Emperor was obliged to leave the position
which he had taken and yield it to the ambassador of Savoy.
[Sidenote: _The Title of Excellency._]
The title of excellency has been given to ambassadors extraordinary
and ordinary, but it is not accorded to envoys unless they claim it on
some other ground, as, for instance, that they are ministers of state
or senators, or other high officers at a royal court. This title of
excellency is not in common use at the French Court, as it is in Spain,
Italy, and Germany, and the kingdoms of the north, and you will only
find foreigners in France addressing the King’s ministers or other
officers of the court with that title. But foreign negotiators of all
kinds are addressed by that title as a mark of courtesy to the rank
which they hold.
[Sidenote: _Legates, Nuncios, and Internuncios._]
The Court of Rome has three different degrees of titles by which to
mark the rank of her ministers in foreign courts. The first is that of
_Legato a latere_, the second is that of Ordinary or Extraordinary
Nuncio, and the third is the Internuncio. The first of these is always
a cardinal, to whom as a rule the Pope gives very wide powers both
for the affairs of papal diplomacy and for the administration of
dispensations and other privileges of the Holy See. They are received
at all Catholic Courts with extraordinary honours: in France at their
presentation they are attended by the princes of the blood; they
remain seated and covered in audience with the King, whereas both
ambassadors and even papal nuncios speak to him standing. These legates
have a further honour accorded neither to nuncios nor ambassadors in
France, namely the right to eat at the King’s table at the banquet of
reception given by his Majesty in their honour. The Cross is carried
before them to mark their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, however,
is strictly limited in France, and is recognised in certain specified
cases for the verification of Papal Bulls at the Parliament of Paris,
to which they must present them before attempting to put them into
force. Nuncios both ordinary and extraordinary are usually prelates of
the rank of archbishop or bishop. They are received and presented by
a prince of the royal blood at their first and final audiences with
the King, no difference being made between the nuncio extraordinary
and the nuncio ordinary except that the former takes precedence of
the latter if there are two present in the same Chamber. None the less
the prelates of the Court of Rome prefer the title of nuncio ordinary
at the Courts of France, Spain, and of the Emperor, because it is a
shorter and a surer road to the cardinal’s hat, which is the goal of
their aspirations. As regards their appointment, when the Pope desires
to send a nuncio ordinary to the French Court, he presents the French
ambassador in Rome with a list of several dignitaries of the Church,
from which the King may exclude those who are not agreeable to him.
The papal nuncios in France give their hand to the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, but not to bishops or archbishops received on
ceremonial visits. They have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction in France
in the sense in which they possess it in Vienna, in Spain, in Portugal,
in Poland, and in many other Catholic states, where they are recognised
as valid judges in various cases, and have the power of dispensation in
the same way as the archbishops or the diocesan bishop. In France they
are only entitled to receive the confession of faith of those whom the
King has nominated to bishoprics and to inquire regarding their life
and habits.
[Sidenote: _Diplomatic Privileges._]
Ambassadors, envoys, and residents all possess the right to exercise
freely the religion of their King, and to admit to such ordinances
their own nationals living in the foreign country. In matters of
law diplomatists of rank are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
judges of that foreign country where they reside, and both they and
their household enjoy what is called extra-territoriality, their
embassy being regarded as it were the house of the King himself, and
as being an asylum for his nationals. But this privilege carries its
corresponding duty. No blame can be too severe for those ministers
abroad who abuse this right of asylum in sheltering under their roof
evilly disposed persons, either those condemned to death for crime, or
those who are engaged upon any business which renders them unworthy of
the protection of the King. The sagacious diplomat will not compromise
the authority of his master for any such odious reason as the attempt
to confer immunity upon a criminal. It must suffice for him that his
own right of asylum is kept inviolate, and he must never employ it
except on extraordinary occasions in his master’s service, and never
indeed for his own private profit. On the other hand, the King must
expressly forbid his judges, bailiffs, or private citizens to violate
the law of nations in the person of a foreign envoy, who is always
recognised as under the protection of international law. And wherever
insult is offered to a foreign envoy, the prince himself must repair it
without fail in the same manner in which he would expect return for a
like insult to his own minister abroad.
[Sidenote: _Abuse of Immunity._]
It sometimes occurs that ministers abuse the right of free passage,
which they possess for their own provisions and the equipment necessary
for their establishment, to carry on a clandestine trade from which
they draw large profits by lending their name to fraud. This kind
of profit is utterly unworthy of the public minister, and makes his
name stink in the nostrils of the King to whom he is sent as well as
to his own prince. A wise minister may be well content to enjoy the
large privileges to which he is entitled in every foreign country
without attempting to abuse them for his own private profit, or by
countenancing any fraud which is committed under the protection of his
name. The Spanish Government was obliged a few years ago severely to
regulate these privileges for all foreign envoys residing in Madrid,
and the Republic of Genoa found it necessary to adopt the same somewhat
humiliating precautions in order to prevent diplomatists from engaging
in illicit traffic. The privileges conferred by the law of nations upon
envoys abroad permit full freedom in their proper duty of labouring to
discover all that passes in the council-chamber of his Majesty, and
to take steps to form close relations with those best able to supply
this information, but they are not to be interpreted as covering any
attempt to form a conspiracy against the public peace; for the same
international right which covers the person of a diplomatist must also
be held to cover the peace and security of the kingdom to which he is
accredited. Therefore the diplomatist will be on his guard against any
action which may seem to lend the authority of his name or office to
revolutionary plots or to other hostile acts against the peace of the
realm. Should he neglect this precaution, he may find himself treated
as an enemy.
[Sidenote: _Henry IV. and the Duke of Savoy._]
Charles Emanuel the first Duke of Savoy maintained certain connections
in France with some of the principal peers at the Court of Henry IV.,
and engaged with them in plots and cabals. He attended the French Court
under the pretext of paying his respects to the King, but in reality
with the intention of spreading his own influence and fortifying
his own designs, which were to prevent Henry IV. from forcing him
to restore the Marquisate of Saluse which he had usurped. The King
discovered the Duke’s intrigue, and held a cabinet meeting on the
matter. The Council was of opinion that the Duke had come under a false
show of friendship in order to disturb the peace of the realm, that the
King was therefore fully within his rights in laying hands upon him
as upon an enemy, that in consequence of his own acts the Duke could
claim no immunity, and that therefore the King would be justified in
preventing him from leaving France until he had restored the marquisate
in question. But the King did not agree with his ministers, but said:
‘The Duke came to visit me on my parole. If he has failed in his duty
I do not wish to imitate so evil an example, and I have so fine a
precedent in my own house that I am compelled to follow it rather than
to follow the Duke.’ In this he spoke of Francis I., who in a similar
case gave the Emperor Charles V. a free passage through France without
insisting that he should relinquish the Duchy of Milan; and although
several of the King’s counsellors at that time were of opinion that
he should profit by the opportunity to compel the Emperor to restore
the duchy, which indeed he had several times promised to do, Francis
I. preferred to maintain his own honour above every other interest.
Henry IV. acted on the same principle; he permitted the Duke of Savoy
to depart unmolested after heaping honours and entertainments upon him,
but the moment the Duke had returned to his own Court the King demanded
the restitution of the Marquisate of Saluse according to his promise.
The Duke refused, whereupon the King invaded Savoy, occupied the whole
duchy, and compelled him to keep his word, not only to the extent of
the marquisate but of several other parts which he was compelled to
cede to the King by a treaty concluded at Lyons, on the 17th January
1601.
[Sidenote: _Reparation for Abuse of Immunity._]
Those who think that one may lay forcible hands upon a sovereign
who has broken his word will easily persuade themselves that in a
similar case no international law can protect the person of a mere
minister; but those who are really well instructed in the law of
nations and in the question of sovereign rights are of opinion that a
foreign envoy being subject to the laws of the country where he lives
it is not possible to put into motion against him the machinery of
domestic justice, that the only redress for wrongs done by him is an
appeal to his master, and that if his master refuses reparation the
responsibility must lie with him and not on his minister abroad who
merely executes his order. This privilege, be it remembered, extends
not merely to the ambassadors themselves but often to their servants,
as is illustrated in the following example.
[Sidenote: _The Merargue Conspiracy._]
King Henry IV., whom one may take as a model for princes, was warned
by the Duke de Guise of the Merargue Conspiracy in which a Provençal
squire named Merargue had entered into an arrangement with Dom
Balthazar de Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, to hand over the city
of Marseilles to the Spaniards at a moment of profound peace. The
King arrested not only Merargue, but also the private secretary to
the Spanish ambassador, a man named Bruneau. Both were convicted of
conspiracy. Merargue was executed, and the King handed over the private
secretary to his own ambassador, saying that he would be glad to see
Bruneau sent across the frontier, though he himself reserved the right
to demand satisfaction from the Spanish King for Bruneau’s misdemeanour.
[Sidenote: _Immunity a Function of Sovereignty._]
Now if princes had the right to proceed against foreign envoys at their
courts, the latter would never feel themselves secure, because then it
would be easy to get rid of any of them on flimsy pretexts, and the
precedent once set up in a good case would surely be followed in many
cases where nothing but idle suspicion could be brought against the
envoy in question. This indeed would be the end of all diplomacy. Of
course it is true that a minister who breaks faith cannot expect others
to keep faith with him, especially if he is engaged upon conspiracies
or any of those practices against the prince and safety of the realm
of which I have spoken. But even in such a case the wise prince will
not break the law of nations, which should always be respected. He
will rather use his good offices at the court whence the erring envoy
came in order to have him withdrawn. At the same time it is always
permissible to place a watch upon a faithless ambassador, in order to
hinder him in practices which would otherwise do harm to the state,
and of course on the other part a wise ambassador will certainly avoid
falling into such intrigues, for the very protection which he enjoys
under the law of nations is a guarantee of his person and of his good
behaviour. Benefits under it are reciprocal, and the reciprocal duties
which it imposes should be scrupulously observed. If they are not, no
law of nations can guarantee an intriguing ambassador for ever against
the fury of the populace once they are aroused by suspicion.
[Sidenote: _Its Abuse undermines True Diplomacy._]
On all these grounds the minister is to be pitied who receives commands
from his master to form cabals in a foreign state, and he will need all
his skill and courage to carry out such commands without being trapped
in the process. It has been truly said that there is no service which
a prince may not expect from good subjects and faithful ministers, but
such obedience cannot be held to cover any action against the laws of
God or of justice, which do not countenance for one moment attempts
on the life of a prince, or against the security of the state, or any
other unfriendly act committed under cover of the protecting title of
ambassador. A good ambassador will always discourage plans of this
kind, and if his master persists in them he may and should demand his
recall, and retire into obscurity, jealously guarding his sovereign’s
evil secret. In justice to most reigning sovereigns it must be said
that few of them engage in designs of this kind. The vast majority of
intrigues and cabals are made in their name in foreign states, or are
suggested to them by their ministers or by astute diplomatists, who
undertake to carry them out, and through them to confer great benefits
upon the prince himself. But these diplomatists are often the first to
fall into traps set by their own hand, and are then objects of pity to
no man. Numerous examples of this kind can be quoted, and I think no
one will challenge the truth of my observation when I say that in nine
cases out of ten diplomatists who give such advice are actuated more
by personal ambition or petty spite than by the true interests of the
nation they serve.
[Sidenote: _Secret Service No Abuse of Immunity._]
But let me not be misunderstood, there is all the difference between
the attempt to debauch the subjects of a sovereign prince in order to
ensnare them in conspiracy against him, and the legitimate endeavour to
use every opportunity for acquiring information. The latter practice
has always been permissible, and indeed is a necessary part of
diplomacy. No criticism can fall upon a foreign envoy who successfully
adopts the practice; the only culprit in such a case is the citizen of
a foreign state who from corrupt motives sells information abroad.
Apart from considerations of international law the interest of the
public peace demands the preservation of the privileges of foreign
envoys, for otherwise wars would be even more frequent than they
are, because no prince would permit insults to his ministers to go
unavenged. They are rightly resented, and the prince may pay heavily in
his own peace of mind and the repose of his subjects for a moment of
passion. He need do no more, however, than demand satisfaction for the
bad conduct of any foreign envoy, and if he has just cause of complaint
he will probably receive it. In any case the dismissal or recall of an
ambassador will be read as a pointed lesson to all his colleagues in
diplomacy, who will then understand that the price of evil conduct is
the humiliation of dismissal.
[Sidenote: _The Credentials of an Ambassador._]
When an ambassador is sent to a foreign court, his master gives him a
letter addressed to the foreign prince requesting him to give the same
credence to the bearer of the letter as to its writer. This despatch is
called a letter of credence, which thus establishes the identity of its
bearer and stands as the hall-mark of his office. In France there are
two sorts of letters of credence: one called _Lettre de Cachet_, which
is despatched and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and sometimes also called _Lettre de la Chancellerie_. The
other is written by the hand of one of the royal private secretaries,
and signed by the King himself; it is countersigned by any minister,
and is usually handed direct in private audience to the foreign prince
to whom it is addressed. The former type of letter is presented in
ceremonial public audience. When a negotiator is appointed by his
prince to a free state or an assembly, which for this purpose is
treated as though it were a court, he does not receive letters of
credence, but his character and identity are fully established in his
full powers, which he must exchange with ministers on arriving. The
document known as full powers is an authorisation by the prince to his
representative abroad to undertake all kinds of public business, the
results of which the sovereign himself agrees to accept by the proxy of
his minister; but as a rule in such full powers the particular matter
under discussion is carefully specified, and the authority to act is
confined to it.
[Sidenote: _Full Powers._]
There are two kinds of full powers: one deriving directly from
the sovereign and the other from his deputies, that is to say,
his ministers of state who have sufficient authority to nominate
plenipotentiaries in his absence. Such powers are particularly
desirable where the states lie far apart from one another. In such
negotiations as those between the Court of Madrid and the Low
Countries, or the different Italian states, the advantage of this
procedure is obvious.... Passports are of course merely letters which
establish the identity and good faith of the person as distinct from
the representative of state, and they are given even in time of war in
order to secure a safe passage between countries at war for ministers
engaged upon negotiation which may lead to peace....
[Sidenote: _Instructions._]
The instruction is a written document containing a statement of the
principal intentions of the prince or the state; it is to be regarded
as a general aid to memory and a general guide to conduct. It is
secret and must be retained under the control of him who receives it,
though of course there are occasions on which he will receive the
command to communicate specific portions of it to a foreign minister
or a foreign prince. Such communication is regarded as a rule as a
mark of special confidence, but on the other hand it often happens
that two instructions are given, one the ostensible, that is to say
it is drawn up in such terms that it can be shown to other princes,
and the other secret, which contains the true and final intentions of
the prince himself. But even the latter type of instruction is subject
to alteration by the daily despatches which the negotiator receives
from home, and which ought to be read as so many new instructions
drawn up in accordance with the reports which he has transmitted to
his own court. It follows therefore that the manner of reports which
a negotiator despatches to his home government will have a large
influence upon the type of instruction which he receives from time to
time.
[Sidenote: _Oral Instructions._]
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may prefer not to put the instructions
and intentions of his royal master into writing but to deliver them
orally, because then he has a greater freedom of interpretation
according to circumstances as they arise, than he would have if he
were bound by the written word. There is further a danger that such
instructions when committed to paper may be wittingly or unwittingly
left in the hands of some foreign diplomatist belonging to the opposite
party. The risks thus incurred are too obvious to need any emphasis of
mine. Whereas if the instructions be left in oral form, they can at
least be repudiated if a dangerous situation were to arise from their
being made known to an enemy prince. There are of course occasions
where it is impossible not to commit to writing instructions given to
a plenipotentiary, but it is a good rule in all negotiation to delay
the issue of formal and binding instructions to as late a date in the
negotiations as possible, so that the general lines upon which it is
likely to proceed may be present to the mind of the minister who draws
them up for the guidance of the ambassador.
It is not permissible without a serious violation of the law of nations
to compel a minister to show his instructions in order to prove his
good faith, nor is it permissible for a minister to communicate it in
any form without an express command from his master, for he can fully
rely on his letter of credence to establish both his identity and his
good faith; besides which he is equipped with full powers in which the
business of his negotiation is always fully described.
[Sidenote: _Discretionary Freedom._]
Now such instructions may be as judicious and astute as can be
imagined, but their use will lie in the wise interpretation by
the diplomatist himself; and, as I have pointed out, the really
able negotiator will always know how best to execute his master’s
commands so that the instructions received from him may be drawn up
on information which is both up-to-date and adequate. Thus it is that
while the final responsibility for all success or failure in diplomacy
would seem to rest upon the King and his ministers at home, it is none
the less true that since these ministers can only act upon information
from abroad, the influence which an enlightened diplomatist can
exercise upon the actions and designs of the home government is very
large. Incapable men acting abroad will make nothing even of the most
brilliant instructions; capable men by the accuracy and sagacity of
their reports and suggestions can do much to improve even the most
mediocre instructions, and therefore the responsibility for diplomatic
action is in reality shared in about equal degree between the home
government and its servants abroad. The home government cannot know
when the opportunity for appropriate action will arise, and therefore
the reports on foreign situations which are transmitted in despatches
from diplomats abroad ought to be so designed as to present as far as
possible an intelligent description of events.
[Sidenote: _Value of the Trained Mind._]
What an astonishing diversity and inequality there is in the conduct of
men. No one, not even a minister of state, would think of building a
house without the assistance of the best architect and the best workmen
whom he could find; but it is the commonest occurrence to find that
those who are charged with the transaction of very important state
business, upon which the weal or woe of the whole realm depends, never
think of entrusting it to trained minds, but give it to the first
comer, whether he be a cunning architect or a mere hewer of stone.
Therefore ministers and other persons in authority are culpable in
a high degree if they do not secure for the foreign service of the
state the most capable and sagacious men. For the errors in diplomacy
sometimes bring more calamitous results than mistakes in other walks
of life, and unless the negotiator can intelligently discern the
coming event, he may plunge himself, his master, and his native land in
irretrievable disaster.
[Sidenote: _Incompetence the Parent of Disaster._]
It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity
wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to
remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency
is sorely needed. Faults in domestic policy are often more easily
remedied than mistakes in foreign policy. There are many factors in
foreign affairs which lie beyond the control of the ministers of any
given state, and all foreign action requires greater circumspection,
greater knowledge, and far greater sagacity than is demanded in home
affairs. Therefore the government cannot exercise too great a care in
its choice of men to serve abroad. In making such a choice the Foreign
Minister must set his face like a flint against all family influence
and private pressure, for nepotism is the damnation of diplomacy. He is
in some sense the guarantor to his Majesty of those whom he presents
as diplomatists. Their good success will do him honour, their failure
will fall with redoubled force upon his head, and may require herculean
efforts by him in order to repair the damage it has caused. Hence it
is of the first interest, both for the Foreign Minister himself and
for the well-being of the state, to see that the high public offices
of diplomacy are not filled by the intrigues and personal cabals
which reign at every court, and which often place in the King’s hands
unworthy instruments of his policy.
[Sidenote: _The Diplomatist prepares Himself for a Foreign Mission._]
Now when a diplomatist has been appointed to a foreign post his
first care should be to ask for the despatches of his predecessor
in order that he may inform himself exactly of the state of affairs
with which he will have to deal. He will thus be able to pick up the
thread and to make use both of the knowledge and of the different
personal relationships which have gathered round the embassy during
his predecessor’s term of office. And as all public affairs are like a
great network, one linked with another, it is of the first importance
that a diplomatist proceeding to a foreign post should be a complete
master of recent history both in regard to his own state and in regard
to the relations which exist between the country of his new service
and all neighbouring countries. Therefore, when the newly appointed
diplomatist has read with care the despatches of his predecessor, he
should make notes upon them, endeavouring to foresee the difficulties
which he will meet both in such trivial matters as a novel ceremonial,
or in the more weighty business of state, so that he may be able to
discuss them with his own Foreign Minister, and thus receive what
enlightenment he can.
[Sidenote: _He must study his own Foreign Office._]
Now, no matter how far-seeing a minister may be, it is impossible
for him to foresee everything or to give such ample and at the same
time precise instructions to his negotiators as to guide them in all
circumstances which may arise. It is therefore of the first importance
that the newly appointed diplomatist travelling to a far country should
devote all his time before his departure to the discovery of the real
intentions and designs of his own Foreign Office. In a word, he should
saturate his mind with the thoughts of his master. He should not only
consult those who have discharged diplomatic duties at the foreign
court to which he is about to proceed, but should make it his especial
care to keep touch with those who have lived in the country in any
quality whatsoever, and to acquire from them all the knowledge which
they may possess. Even the humblest of such persons may be able to give
him information which will help him to regulate his conduct abroad.
And before his departure he should certainly strike up an acquaintance
with the ambassador representing the country to which he is about
to proceed, in order that he may get from him private letters of
recommendation, and further, in order that he may persuade him of his
own earnest desire to do all in his power to establish good relations
between the two states. He should let it be known to the foreign
ambassador in question that he will lose no opportunity of bearing
witness to the success of his mission and to the esteem which he has
won at home. In so doing he will be able rapidly to acquire new and
powerful friends in his new sphere of labour. For it is a commonplace
of human experience that men will do as they are done by: reciprocity
is the surest foundation of friendship.
[Sidenote: _Choice of a Staff._]
The careful diplomatist will pay the same attention to the choice
of his domestics as to more important subjects. Those about him
must do him credit. A well-ordered household served by reliable and
well-mannered persons is a good advertisement, both of the ambassador
and of the country whence he comes, and in order that they may have no
excuse for ill-regulated conduct, he should set a high example before
them in his own person. His choice of a private secretary is perhaps
the most important of all, for if he be light-headed, frivolous or
indiscreet, he may do his master irreparable harm; and if he be a
person liable to get into debt, his embarrassment may be the cause
of very serious trouble. Some years ago the private secretary of a
French ambassador sold the private cipher of the embassy for a large
sum in order to wipe out his debts. Thus the ambassador’s despatches
were intercepted and read, with very grave results upon the relations
between the two countries, in spite of the fact that the obvious
interest of both lay in the same direction. The necessity for having
faithful and able men as secretaries has given rise to the belief that
it would be very useful to establish them in rank as a part of the
public service of the King, and thus to restore a custom which was
abolished some time ago in France. It would be a desirable practice,
for thereby a large body of men might be trained in the diplomatic
service of the Crown from whom ambassadors and envoys could be drawn.
This is the practice in several foreign countries, and there is no
doubt that it leads to the improvement of the whole diplomatic service.
For if the secretaries and attachés are selected and paid by the King’s
government they will tend to acquire a careful efficiency and _esprit
de corps_ which will be the best protection for his secrets. And it
is obvious that as long as the choice of such persons is left to the
personal decision of the ambassador alone there is always a risk that
he will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to command the services
of good men. Thus the adequate payment and proper official recognition
of such junior diplomatists is a necessary part of any true reform of
the foreign service, and it would certainly be a great relief to most
ambassadors to take the responsibility of choice off their shoulders
as well as the burden of paying secretaries for their services. The
state will certainly be well repaid if such a policy as I suggest
be adopted, for diplomacy will then become the school in which good
workmen will rapidly learn the use of their tools.
[Sidenote: _First Steps at the Foreign Court._]
On arrival at a foreign court a negotiator should make himself and
his mission known to the proper authorities at the earliest possible
moment, and request a private audience with the prince in order that he
may establish contact immediately, and thus prepare the way for good
relations between his master and the foreign sovereign. When he has
taken the necessary steps for this purpose he should be in no hurry to
embark upon any important steps but should rather study the _terrain_.
For this purpose he should remain a watchful, silent observer of the
habits of the court and of the government, and if he be in a country
where the prince is really the ruler, he should study with the greatest
assiduity the whole life and habits of the latter; for policy is not
merely a matter of high impersonal design, it is a vast complexity in
which the inclinations, the judgments, the virtues and the vices of
the prince himself will play a large part. Occasions will constantly
arise in which the adroit negotiator who has equipped himself with this
knowledge will be able to use it with the highest possible effect.
And he should test his own conclusions by comparing notes discreetly
with other foreign negotiators of the same court, especially if they
have had a long residence there. Up to a certain point co-operation
between foreign ambassadors is not only permissible but desirable
and necessary. And since no prince, not even the most autocratic,
discharges the duties of government entirely by himself without
confiding in one or more favoured ministers, the negotiator should
make it his business to know much of the ministers and confidants
surrounding the King who have his fullest confidence, for in the same
manner as described above personal qualities, opinions, passions,
likes, and dislikes are all relevant subjects of study, and should be
carefully observed by every negotiator who means business.
[Sidenote: _Relations with Colleagues._]
When a foreign envoy arrives at a court and has been received by
the prince, he should inform all the other members of the Corps
Diplomatique either by a squire of his suite or by a secretary. They
will then pay him their first visit, but he will receive no visits
until he has gone through the formality of announcing to each in turn
his own arrival; and at a court where there are ambassadors of several
kings, each on arrival should pay his respects first of all to the
French ambassador, who everywhere takes first rank. The Spaniards,
who adopted every form of chicane for a whole century in order to
avoid the recognition of French precedence, which for that matter is
an immemorial right of the French King, finally recognised it by the
public declaration, made by Philip IV. to his Majesty in 1662 by the
Marquis de la Fuente, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, which arose out
of the violent dispute in London between the Count d’Estrade and the
Baron de Vatville, after which no Spanish ambassador would consent to
be present at any ceremony attended by the French ambassador. Various
other attempts have been made to dispute French supremacy, but with no
result....
[Sidenote: _Report of First Impressions._]
After he has fully informed himself of all such matters and placed
himself in such a position as to know immediately whether the prince
has changed his mind or transferred his confidence from one servant to
another, he should set all these things down faithfully in a despatch
to his home government, presenting a full picture of the court as he
sees it, and at the same time setting down the conclusions which he has
drawn from his observations. He should not fail to indicate the methods
by which he proposes to act, or the means he proposes to use, in order
to carry out the commands which he has received. At the same time he
will not fail to keep his own knowledge up to date, and to use it for
finding and keeping open every possible avenue of approach to the
prince to whom he is accredited, or to his ministers and favourites.
There is no doubt that the surest and best way in which the negotiator
can establish good relations is to prove to both courts that their
union is of great mutual advantage. It is the essential design of
diplomacy to confer such a mutual advantage, and to carry policy to
success by securing the co-operation in it of those who might otherwise
be its opponents. Success won by force or by fraud stands upon a weak
foundation. Diplomatic success, on the other hand, won by methods which
confer reciprocal benefits on both parties, must be regarded not only
as firmly founded, but as the sure promise of other successes to come.
I am not so foolish as to suppose, however, that this method can be
applied in every situation. There are times when it is necessary for
the negotiator to exploit the hatreds, passions, and jealousies of
those with whom he deals, and therefore occasion will arise when it
is easier and more fruitful to appeal to prejudice rather than to any
estimate of the true and permanent interests of those concerned. As we
have observed above, both kings and nations often plunge into reckless
courses of policy under the impulse of passion, and as a rule throw
overboard all consideration of their veritable interests.
[Sidenote: _Character and Whims of the Foreign Prince._]
The high elevation of crowned heads does not prevent them from being
human; and indeed in some ways it lays them open to certain weaknesses
of which lesser men by reason of their position are largely free. There
is a certain pride of position, a certain arrogant self-esteem, which
is only to be found in highly placed persons, and which is most marked
in kings and ministers. On this account, and on account of the actual
power their exalted position puts into their hands, kings are open to
persuasion and flattery in a way in which men of lower degree cannot
be approached. This consideration must ever be in the mind of the good
negotiator, who should therefore strive to divest himself of his own
feelings and prejudices, and place himself in the position of the King
so that he may understand completely the desires and whims which guide
his actions. And when he has done so he should say to himself: ‘Now, if
I were in the place of this prince, wielding his power, subject to his
passions and prejudices, what effect would my mission and my arguments
have upon me?’ The more often he thus puts himself in the position
of others, the more subtle and effective will his arguments be. And
it is of course not only in matters of opinion that this use of the
imagination is valuable, it is more particularly in all those personal
aspects where the power to give pleasure by flattery or any other means
is effective.
[Sidenote: _The Use of Compliments._]
No one will forget that crowned heads, and even their ministers
themselves, are accustomed from birth to the submission of those
around them, to receive their respect and praise. This unbroken
experience of the obedience of others is apt to make them very
sensitive to criticism, and unwilling to listen to contradiction.
There are few princes to whom it is easy to speak the truth, and
since it is not part of the business of the negotiator except on rare
occasions to speak home truths at a foreign court, he will avoid as
far as possible everything which may wound the royal pride which is
the natural result of the manner in which princes are reared. On the
other hand, he will never give empty praise nor applaud a reprehensible
act, and where praise is given as it is deserved, the negotiator must
know how to clothe it in chaste and dignified language. And since
princes are accustomed to hear their praise sung constantly, they
become connoisseurs in praise and good judges of a timely compliment.
It is the higher art of the subtle courtier to know how to deliver
a well-turned compliment to his King, and above all, if the King is
endowed with real intelligence, never to praise him for qualities which
he does not possess. Any fool can earn the esteem of a prince who is
also a fool by indiscriminate praise. Wise men will rely on their own
merits and on the good sense of the King wherever they have the good
fortune to serve a monarch so endowed. To praise a King for those
things which are inherent in his position, such as riches, spacious
mansions, and fine clothes, is merely stupidity. A King who is worth
praising will only value your praise if it is given to qualities which
he knows to be praiseworthy. In this matter the negotiator must be
sufficiently worldly-wise always to remember that the good favour of
the ladies of the court is to be won by different means than that
of his Majesty or the ministers. And since, as I have pointed out
elsewhere, the approach to the King and his ministers may perhaps be
most easily made through feminine influence, the negotiator will study
carefully the character and weaknesses of all the ladies at the court
so as to keep these useful and attractive avenues open for his use.
[Sidenote: _Craft at the Card-table._]
The methods of giving pleasure, as I say, must vary. One of the most
illustrious and sagacious ambassadors of our time, a friend of my
own, neglected nothing, but he used to say that there was no surer
road to the good-will of a sovereign than to allow him to win at the
card-table, and that many a great enterprise had been conducted to
success by the little pile of gold coins which passed from him to his
royal opponent at the gaming-table. My friend used to say in jest that
he had played the fool at foreign card-tables in order to prove that he
was a wise man at home! His jest bore a truth within it which I hope
every negotiator will lay to heart....
[Sidenote: _Common-sense Pleas._]
The pleas which I have set out above are, I believe, applicable in
most situations, but of course there are variations to be observed. It
is not always easy for a negotiator on leaving home to remember how
great a difference there is between his own court and that to which he
proceeds. For whether the foreign country which is his new home stands
on equal terms with his own or whether it be a Power of lower station
in the world, the vast differences in national outlook between them
must be fully understood before the negotiator can make any progress.
It is therefore his first business, whatever be the magnitude and
splendour of the court to which he is accredited, to win the general
favour by showing a genuine and sincere interest in the welfare of his
new associates, and in all the customs of the court and the habits of
the people; and on his arrival he should show himself ready to share
information both with his new colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique,
and with the ministers of the King to whom he is sent. Let me lay some
insistence on this. It will be observed that if a negotiator has the
reputation of speaking freely on many subjects, it is not improbable
that those who have secrets to reveal may speak the more freely to
him. A negotiator of my acquaintance to whom I look with high regard
once said: ‘Diplomacy is like a chain of ten links in which perhaps
only one is missing to make it complete: it is the business of the
diplomat to supply the tenth link.’ This is true, and I believe that
the diplomatist who is least enwrapped in secrecy will most quickly
and surely discover it. It is therefore important that the negotiator,
being well equipped with all kinds of information, should be guided
by a sound judgment in the use of it. He should realise that in all
information there are only one or two items which are of the first
importance, and that therefore the freedom with which he uses the rest
need not in any way imperil his master’s plans. The more freely he can
share such information, and the more carefully he bestows his praise
upon individuals, the more surely will men say of him that he is a
reliable person, and will turn to him in moments of crisis.
[Sidenote: _The Clockmaker’s Patience._]
Every right-minded man desires to stand well in the eyes of those with
whom he transacts business, and therefore he will give some trouble to
all those devices for securing the good-will of men to which I have
referred. If he finds in the course of his work that the prince himself
or any one of his ministers is ill-disposed towards him or intractable
in discussion, he must not on that account allow himself to imitate the
fault, but must redouble his efforts in the contrary direction. Indeed
he must behave as a good watchmaker would when his clock has gone out
of order: he must labour to remove the difficulty, or at all events to
circumvent its results. He must not be led aside by his own feelings.
Prejudice is a great misinterpreter’s house in all public affairs.
[Sidenote: _A High Ideal._]
It might seem that the ideal which I now set up for the negotiator is
one too high for any man to reach. It is true that no man can ever
carry out his instructions without a fault, but unless he has before
him an ideal as a guide he will find himself plunged in the midst of
distracting affairs without any rule for his own conduct. Therefore I
place before him these considerations: that despite all disappointments
and exasperations he must act with _sang-froid_; he must work with
patience to remove all obstacles that lie in his path, whether they are
placed there by accident or act of God or by the evil design of men; he
must preserve a calm and resolute mind when the conjunctures of events
seem to conspire against him; and finally, he must remember that if
once he permit his own personal or outrageous feelings to guide his
conduct in negotiation he is on the sure and straight road to disaster.
In a word, when events and men are unkind he must never despair of
being able to change them, nor again when they smile upon his efforts
must he cherish the illusion that their good favour will endure for
ever.
[Sidenote: _The Negotiator’s Twofold Function._]
The functions of a minister despatched on a mission to a foreign
country fall into two principal categories: the first to conduct
the business of his master, and the second to discover the business
of others. The first of these concerns the prince or his ministers
of state, or at all events those deputies to whom are entrusted
the examination of his proposals. In all these different kinds of
negotiation he must seek success principally by his straightforward
and honest procedure, for if he attempts to succeed by subtlety or by
a sense of superiority over those with whom he is engaged he may very
likely deceive himself. There is no prince or state which does not
possess some shrewd envoy to discern its real interests. And indeed,
even among people who seem to be the least refined, there are often
those who know their own interests best, and follow them with the most
constancy. Therefore the negotiator, no matter how able he may be, must
not attempt to teach such persons their own business, but he should
exhaust all the resources of his mind and wit to prove to them the
great advantage of the proposals which he has to make.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy a Commerce in Benefits._]
An ancient philosopher once said that friendship between men is
nothing but a commerce in which each seeks his own interest. The
same is true or even truer of the liaisons and treaties which bind
one sovereign to another, for there is no durable treaty which is not
founded on reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not
satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the
seeds of its own dissolution. Thus the great secret of negotiation is
to bring out prominently the common advantage to both parties of any
proposal, and so to link these advantages that they may appear equally
balanced to both parties. For this purpose when negotiations are on
foot between two sovereigns, one the greater and the other the less,
the more powerful of these two should make the first advance, and even
undertake a large outlay of money to bring about the union of interests
with his lesser neighbour, for his own self-interest will show him
that he has really the greater object and the larger advantages in
view, and that any benefits he may confer or subsidies which he may
grant to his weaker ally will be readily repaid by the success of
his designs. Now, as we have said, the secret of negotiation is to
harmonise the interests of the parties concerned. It is clear that if a
negotiator excludes the honest and straightforward method of reason and
persuasion, and adopts on the contrary a haughty and menacing manner,
then obviously he must be followed by an army ready to invade the
country in which he has put forth such provocative claims. Without such
a display of force his claims will fall to the ground, even though by
advantageous arguments they might have prevailed with the prince whom
he addressed, and who might have accepted them had they been proposed
in a different manner. When a prince or a state is powerful enough to
dictate to his neighbours the art of negotiation loses its value, for
then there is need for nothing but a mere statement of the prince’s
will; but when there is a balance of force an independent prince
will only decide to favour one of the two parties of a dispute if he
discerns advantages to himself and good results to the prosperity of
his realm.
[Sidenote: _Harmony the Ideal State._]
A prince who has no powerful enemies can easily impose tribute on all
neighbouring Powers, but a prince whose aim is self-aggrandisement
and who has powerful enemies must seek allies among the lesser states
in order to increase those friendly to him; and if possible he should
be able to prove his power by the benefits which an alliance with
him can confer upon them. Therefore the principal function of the
negotiator is to bring about a harmonised union between his master and
the sovereign to whom he is sent, or else to maintain and increase
existing alliances by every means in his power. He must labour to
remove misunderstandings, to prevent subjects of dispute from arising,
and generally to maintain in that foreign country the honour and
interests of his prince. This includes the protection and patronage
of his subjects, assistance to their business enterprises, and the
promotion of good relations between them and the subjects of the
foreign prince to whose court he is accredited. He must always assume
that there is no prince nor state in the world which does not desire to
avoid a condition of crisis, and that those princes who love to fish
in troubled waters will never lack the means to stir them up, but that
the storms which such men conjure up are apt to overwhelm them, so that
the wise negotiator will do all he can to avoid giving provocation,
and will conduct himself in such a manner that no one will be able to
impute reckless motives to him.
[Sidenote: _The Search for Information._]
His second function being the discovery of all that is happening at
court and in the cabinet, he should first of all take steps to learn
from his predecessor all that he knows regarding the state of affairs
in the country to which he is about to proceed and to acquire from
him those hints and suggestions which may be of use. He should take
up the friends and acquaintances left behind by his predecessor, and
should add to them by making new ones. It would be no bad practice in
this matter to imitate the established rule of the Venetian Republic,
which obliges an ambassador returning from a foreign court to render a
detailed account in writing of the country, both for the information of
the public and for the instruction of his successor at the embassy. The
diplomatists of Venice have drawn great advantage from this practice,
and it has been often remarked that there are no better instructed
negotiators in Europe than those of Venice.
[Sidenote: _Freemasonry of Diplomacy._]
The discovery of the course of events and the trend of policy in a
foreign country is most natural when one knows both the personnel and
the political habits of the country, and a negotiator for the first
time in such a country must neglect no source of information. In
addition to those mentioned above, he may very probably find that his
colleagues in the Corps Diplomatique will be of use to him, for since
the whole diplomatic body works for the same end, namely to discover
what is happening, there may arise--there often indeed does arise--a
freemasonry of diplomacy by which one colleague informs another of
coming events which a lucky chance has enabled him to discern. Such
collaboration is possible in all cases except those in which their
sovereigns are at variance. As regards the information which can be
drawn from the people of the country itself, the surest and shortest
method is to make a confidant of some one already in the counsels of
the foreign prince, but this must be done only by such means as will
enable the negotiator to keep a check upon his correspondent, and
thus prevent any damage to his master’s plans. This action is very
necessary, for in diplomacy as in war there are such things as double
spies paid by both parties. The cleverest of these will begin by giving
true information and good advice in order the more thoroughly to
deceive the negotiator at a later date. There have even been princes
subtle enough to see the advantage of permitting their confidants to
behave thus, and I know of cases where the confidant of a sovereign,
under the appearance of a secret liaison with a foreign envoy, gave
the latter true and false information at the same time, and thus
effectively masked the designs of his master. An ambassador must always
be on his guard against such deception.
[Sidenote: _The Foolish Dutchman._]
There was in England in 1671 a Dutch ambassador who was so easily
persuaded by certain privy counsellors of King Charles II. that their
master had no intention to go to war with the States General that in
his despatches home he gave the most explicit assurance that there was
nothing to fear from England, treating with ridicule the opinion that
London had resolved to attack them; and we have since learned that
these English counsellors had been deliberately detailed by the King to
play upon the credulity of the Dutch ambassador. There have been in
our time ambassadors of other countries who have done the same.
[Sidenote: _All News must be tested._]
Now the astute negotiator will not likely believe everything he hears,
nor accept advice which he cannot test; he must examine the origin of
information, as well as the interest and the motives of those who offer
it him. He must attempt to discover the means by which they themselves
have acquired it, and he must compare it with other information to see
whether it tallies with that part which he knows to be true. There are
many signs by which a discerning and penetrating mind will be able to
read the truth by placing each link of information in contact with
another. For this purpose no rules can be drawn up for the guidance
of a diplomat in such a matter, for unless a man be born with such
qualities he cannot acquire them, and to those who do not possess them
I might as well speak to the deaf as write these observations.
[Sidenote: _The Flair for Secrets._]
A negotiator can discover national secrets by frequenting the company
of those in authority, and there is not a court in the world where
ministers or others are not open to various kinds of approach, either
because they are indiscreet and often say more than they should, or
because they are discontented and ready to reveal secrets in order
to satisfy their jealousy. And even the most practised and reliable
ministers are not always on their guard. I have seen highly trained and
well-proven statesmen who none the less in the course of conversation,
and by other signs, allowed expressions to escape them which gave
important clues to their policy. And there are courtiers at every court
who, though not members of the King’s Council, know by long practice
how to discover a secret, and who are always prepared to reveal it
in order to show their own importance and their penetration. It is
almost impossible to conceal from an active, observant, and enlightened
negotiator any important design of public policy, for no departure of
state can ever be made without great preparation which entails the
sharing of many secrets by many persons, and this is a danger against
which it is almost impossible to guard even by those who take the
greatest precautions.
[Sidenote: _On the Transmission of Information._]
Now in the transmission of information of this kind the negotiator must
give an exact account of all the circumstances surrounding it, that
is to say, how and by whom he acquired it; and he should accompany it
with his own comments and conjectures in order that the prince may be
fully informed, and may be able to judge whether the conclusions drawn
from all the circumstances are well or ill founded. There are certain
things which a clever minister will discover for himself, and of
which he must give an exact account to his master, for such knowledge
is often a sure clue even to the most secret designs. Thus he can by
his own observation discover the passions and ruling interests of the
prince to whose court he is sent: whether he is ambitious, painstaking,
or observant; whether he is warlike or prefers peace; whether he is
the real ruler of the country, and if not by whom he is ruled; and in
general what are the principal inclinations and the interests of those
who have most influence over him. He must also inform himself exactly
of the state of the military forces both on land and sea, of the number
and strength of fortified places, whether they are always kept in a
high state of efficiency and well supplied with ammunition, of the
condition of the sea-ports, of his vessels of war, and of his arsenals,
of the number of troops which he can put into the field at once, both
of cavalry and of infantry, without stripping his fortresses bare of
their garrisons. He must know the state of public opinion, whether it
is well disposed or discontented; he must keep in his hands the threads
of every great intrigue, knowing all the factions and parties into
which opinion is divided; he must know the leanings of ministers and
other persons in authority in such matters as religion. He should not
even neglect the observation of the King’s personal household, of the
manner in which his domestic affairs are conducted, of his outlay, both
on his household and on his military establishments, of the time spent
in them, etc. He must know the alliances, both offensive and defensive,
concluded with other Powers, especially those which appear hostile in
design; he must be able to describe at any moment the attitude of all
the principal states towards the court to which he is accredited, and
to give an account of the diplomatic relations which exist between them.
[Sidenote: _Action Appropriate to Democratic States._]
He must pay the prince assiduous attention, and thus acquire a
sufficient familiarity with him to be able to see and speak to him
frequently without ceremony, so that he may be always in a position to
know what is going on, and to insinuate into the prince’s mind what is
favourable to his master’s design. If he lives in a democratic state he
must attend the Diet and other popular assemblies. He must keep open
house and a well-garnished table to attract the deputies, and thus both
by his honesty and by his presence gain the ear of the ablest and most
authoritative politicians, who may be able to defeat a hostile design
or support a favourable one. If people of this kind have a freedom of
_entrée_ to the ambassador, a good table will greatly assist in the
discovery of all that is going on, and the expense laid out upon it is
not merely honourable but extraordinarily useful if only the negotiator
himself knows how to profit from it.
[Sidenote: _The Value of Good Cheer._]
Indeed it is in the nature of things that good cheer is a great
conciliator, that it fosters familiarity, and promotes a freedom of
exchange between the guests, while the warmth of wine will often
lead to the discovery of important secrets. There are several other
functions for the employment of public ministers, as for instance
that of informing a prince of good or evil tidings regarding his own
master, or that of conveying compliments or condolences in a similar
case to the prince himself. A negotiator who knows his business will
not neglect even the least of such opportunities, and he will perform
his function in such a manner as to show that his master is truly
interested in all that passes at the foreign court. Indeed the best
negotiator is he who forestalls even the orders of his own master, and
shows himself so apt a negotiator of his intentions that he is able to
act in advance of each event of the kind, and thus present his master’s
sentiments in appropriate language before any other foreign diplomatist
has even begun to consider the matter. And when he actually receives
his master’s orders on the subject, should they turn out to be of a
somewhat different character than the expressions he has already used,
his own adroitness will enable him to bridge the apparent difference.
The diplomatist’s functions cease automatically on the death of his
master or on the death of the prince to whom he is accredited, and are
not revived until new letters of credence are received. They also come
to an end on his withdrawal or upon a declaration of war, but it should
be noted that the privileges attached to the office of ambassador under
the law of nations continue unbroken, notwithstanding any declaration
of war or other interpretation of his functions, and these privileges
remain in force until he reaches his own national territory.
[Sidenote: _The Conduct of Negotiations._]
Diplomacy is a matter for orally conducted and for written
communications. The first is the common method where one is dealing
with a royal court, the second is usual in republics and those states
in which assemblies, such as the Diet of the Empire of Switzerland, are
the repositories of power. It is always the custom where states are
assembled in France to exchange statements of policy in writing. But it
is always more advantageous for the practised diplomatist to negotiate
face to face, because by that means he can discover the true intentions
of those with whom he is dealing. His own skill will then enable him
both to act and to speak in an appropriate and apt fashion. Most men
in handling public affairs pay more attention to what they themselves
say than to what is said to them. Their minds are so full of their
own notions that they can think of nothing but of obtaining the ears
of others for them, and will hardly be prevailed on to listen to the
statements of other people. This fault is peculiar to those lively and
impatient nations like ours, who find it difficult to bridle impetuous
temperaments. It has often been noticed that in ordinary conversation
Frenchmen speak all at one time, and interrupt one another incessantly,
without attempting to hear what each has to say.
[Sidenote: _The Apt Listener._]
One of the most necessary qualities in a good negotiator is to be an
apt listener; to find a skilful yet trivial reply to all questions put
to him, and to be in no hurry to declare either his own policy, still
less his own feelings; and on opening negotiations he should be careful
not to reveal the full extent of his design except in so far as it is
necessary to explore the ground; and he should govern his own conduct
as much by what he observes in the faces of others as by what he hears
from their lips. One of the great secrets of diplomacy is to sift the
real from the trivial, and so to speak, to distil drop by drop into
the minds of your competitors those causes and arguments which you
wish them to adopt. By this means your influence will spread gradually
through their minds almost unawares. In acting thus the negotiator
will bear in mind that the majority of men will never enter upon a
vast undertaking, even though advantageous to themselves, without they
can see beforehand the whole length of the journey upon which they
are asked to embark. Its magnitude will deter them. But if they can
be brought to take successfully one step after another they will find
themselves at the end of the journey almost unawares. Herein is to be
found the importance of not revealing vast designs except to a few
chosen spirits whose minds are properly attuned to them.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy a Bowling Green._]
A truth of this kind applies to friend and foe alike. Thus in the
approach to difficult negotiations the true dexterity of diplomacy,
like a good bowler using the run of the green, consists in finding the
existing bias of the matter. As Epictetus, the ancient philosopher,
said in his manual: ‘There are in every matter two handles, the one by
which it is easy to carry, the other difficult. Do not take it by the
difficult end, for if you do so you will neither be able to lift it
nor carry it. But if you take it by the right side you will carry it
without trouble.’ Now the easiest way to find the right bias is to make
each proposition which you put forward appear as a statement of the
interests of those with whom you are negotiating, for since diplomacy
is the attempt to find a basis of common action or agreement, it is
obvious that the more the opposing party can be brought to see your
designs in their own light and to accept them thus, the more surely
will their co-operation for any action be fruitful alike to themselves
and to you.
[Sidenote: _The Bias of Human Nature._]
Now, of course there are few men who will entirely divest themselves
of their own sentiments in favour of those of others, or who will
confess that they were wrong, especially if the matter be conducted in
an acrimonious discussion in which the negotiator meets all arguments
freely by contradiction. But none the less the astute diplomatist will
know how to exploit human nature in such a manner as to cause even the
most stiff-necked opponents gradually to relax their hold upon certain
opinions; and this may be most easily attained by abandoning the
approach which caused the original dispute, and taking up the matter
from another aspect. Thus by flattery of his _amour-propre_, or by some
other device which may put him in a good humour, the competitor in a
negotiation may be brought to consider the matter in a new light, and
to accept at the end of the negotiation that which he repudiated with
violence at its commencement. And, however unreasonable the majority of
mankind is, it will always be observed that men retain so much respect
for reason that they will always hope to be judged by the other man
as acting upon reasonable grounds. The negotiator will know how to
exploit this subtle form of intellectual pride. And especially where
there is more than one party to the negotiation the astute diplomatist
will be able to exploit the foibles of each of the other two parties,
and yet to flatter each in turn for his reasonable and statesmanlike
attitude.
[Sidenote: _Ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte._]
Above all, at the commencement of a negotiation, as I have said, it is
necessary in any long and complicated business to present the matter
in hand in its easiest and most advantageous light, and so to speak to
insinuate all parties into it so that they may be well launched upon
the whole enterprise before they are aware of its magnitude. For this
purpose the negotiator must appear as an agreeable, enlightened, and
far-seeing person; he must beware of trying to pass himself off too
conspicuously as a crafty or adroit manipulator. The essence of skill
lies in concealing it, and the negotiator must ever strive to leave
an impression upon his fellow diplomatists of his sincerity and good
faith. And he should beware of attempting to force a decision, or to
ride roughshod over difficulties that are raised, for if he behaves
thus he will not fail to draw upon himself the aversion of those with
whom he is dealing, and thus to bring prejudice upon his master’s
designs. It would be better for him to pass for less enlightened than
he really is, and he should attempt to carry his own policy to success
by good and solid reasons rather than by pouring contempt upon the
policy of others. The opposite fault is equally to be avoided. The
negotiator must not let himself pass under the influence of other men,
especially of those powerful personalities whose wont it is to sway the
minds of all whom they meet.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy does not thrive upon Menaces._]
The more powerful the prince, the more suave should his diplomatist
be, for since power of that kind is likely to awaken jealousy in his
neighbours, the diplomat should let it speak for itself, and rather
use his own powers of persuasion by means of moderation to support
the just rights of his prince than to vaunt his power or the extent
of his dominions. Menaces always do harm to negotiation, and they
frequently push one party to extremities to which they would not have
resorted without provocation. It is well known that injured vanity
frequently drives men into courses which a sober estimate of their
own interests would lead them to avoid. Of course when a prince has
real subjects of complaint against another, especially against an
inferior, in circumstances where it is necessary to make an example
of the delinquent, the blow must fall immediately after the threat
is given, so that the delinquent cannot be in a position, either by
the delays of diplomacy or by any other means, to shield himself from
just punishment. The longer the delay is between the threat and its
fulfilment, the more likely it is that the culprit will be able to form
alliances with other Powers, and thus avoid the just chastisement of
the prince whom he has wronged.
[Sidenote: _The Good Christian._]
The wise and enlightened negotiator must of course be a good Christian,
and he must let his character appear in all his speeches, in his way
of living, and must forbid evil and loose-living persons to cross his
threshold. Justice and modesty should govern all his actions; he should
be respectful to princes; affable and approachable with his equals;
considerate to his inferiors, and civil and honest with everybody.
[Sidenote: _At Home in the Foreign Country._]
He must fall into the ways and customs of the country where he lives
without showing repugnance or expressing contempt for them, as is
frequently done by diplomatists who lose no opportunity of praising
their own country and decrying all others. The diplomatist must
bear in mind once for all that he is not authorised to demand that
a whole nation shall conform to his way of living, and that it is
more reasonable, and in the long run greatly to his own comfort, to
accommodate himself to foreign ways of living. He should beware of
criticising the form of government or the personal conduct of the
prince to whom he is accredited. On the contrary he should always
praise that which is praiseworthy without affectation and without
flattery, and if he properly understands his own function he will
quickly discover that there is no nation or state which has not many
good points, excellent laws, charming customs as well as bad ones; and
he will quickly discover that it is easy to single out the good points,
and that there is no profit to be had in denouncing the bad ones, for
the very good reason that nothing the diplomatist can say or do will
alter the domestic habits or laws of the country in which he lives. He
should take a pride in knowing the history of the country, so that he
may be able to give the prince pleasure by praising the great feats
of his ancestors, as well as for his own benefit to interpret current
events in the light of the historical movements of the past. When it
becomes known that the negotiator possesses such knowledge and uses
it aptly, his credit will certainly rise, and if he is adroit enough
to turn his conversations at court to those subjects of which he is a
master, he will find that his diplomatic task is greatly assisted, and
that the pleasure he gives to those around him is amply repaid to him
in the smoothness of negotiation.
[Sidenote: _The Secret of Success._]
The diplomatist must, however, bear constantly in mind both at work
and at play the aims which he is supposed to be serving in the
foreign country, and should subordinate his personal pleasure and
all his occupations to their pursuit. In this matter the two chief
aims which the able negotiator places before himself are, as I have
said, to conduct the affairs of his master to a prosperous issue, and
to spare no pains to discover the designs of others. And since the
means to be employed in both cases are the same, namely by acquiring
the esteem, friendship, and confidence of the prince himself and of
those in authority around him, there is no surer way of employing
them than by becoming personally agreeable. It is marvellous how a
_persona grata_ may contrive to uproot even the deepest suspicions
and wipe out the memory of the gravest insults. If the diplomatist
be looked upon with disfavour at the court he is not a true servant
of his master’s interests; for one who is out of favour will not be
in a position to know what is going on, and will therefore be but a
poor guide to his home government in assisting them to frame their
policy. The responsibility for placing the wrong kind of diplomatist
in a good position rests of course with the minister who appoints him,
but there are many cases in which an ill-fitting appointment has been
redeemed by the dauntless assiduity and unfailing courtesy of the
diplomatist himself; but since this imposes an unnecessary strain upon
the ambassador, the Foreign Minister should ever have a care to appoint
suitable men to all foreign posts.
[Sidenote: _Support from Home._]
I have already described those characteristics which compose
suitability; I will but add here that no diplomatist can succeed in
his foreign task unless he is well supported by his own government
and given every opportunity to understand its policy. By this means
he will be in a position to exploit every situation as far as may
be to advantage, and he will also be able to deny false rumours set
afloat by the enemy. This support from his home government implies
a complimentary application on his part, for it is of the highest
importance that he should keep himself apprised of all contemporary
movements in his own country; that he should know intimately the
personal character both of the sovereign and of his Foreign Minister,
so that in moments of doubt he may be able to guess shrewdly what is
in the mind of those who employ him. Without such knowledge he will
certainly go astray, and without a constant contact with his home
government the conduct of diplomacy cannot possibly prosper in his
hands.
[Sidenote: _Good Faith the Best Weapon._]
As regards the relations which the diplomatist maintains in a foreign
country, we must observe that while his success will partly depend upon
his affability to all men, he must use the utmost discretion in all
his more intimate relationships, and, above all, he should try to form
professional friendships on the basis of mutual advantage and respect.
There is no permanence in a relationship begun by promises which cannot
be redeemed, and therefore, as I have said before, the use of deceit
in diplomacy is of necessity restricted, for there is no curse which
comes quicker to roost than a lie which has been found out. Beyond the
fact that a lie is unworthy of a great minister, it actually does more
harm than good to policy because, though it may confer success to-day,
it will create an atmosphere of suspicion which will make success
impossible to-morrow. No doubt an ambassador will receive a great deal
of information which it is his duty to transmit; but if he is not in
a position to test it he will merely pass it on without comment or
guarantee of its truth. In general it should be the highest aim of
the diplomatist to gain such a reputation for good faith with his own
government and also abroad that they will place reliance both upon his
information and upon the advice which he gives.
[Sidenote: _The Value of a Candid Report._]
In this respect he should take good care in reporting the course
of negotiations to his master from time to time not to hold out
prospects of success before success itself is in his grasp. It is much
better that he should depict the difficulties of the case and the
improbability of success even when he is virtually sure in his own
mind that he will succeed. He will acquire vastly greater credit by
success in an undertaking of which he himself promises little than
he will in one upon which he has reported favourably throughout. It
is always good for the credit of a negotiator if good reports of him
arrive from different sources, for such independent proof of the value
of a diplomatist’s services must be highly prized by every prince, and
will redound to the benefit of the diplomatist himself. It is obvious
that the more successful he is in the relationships which he forms at
a foreign court, the more surely will the diplomatist receive such
independent testimony to his merit. But let him not seek such testimony
by unworthy means. For this purpose he should neither bribe the
servants of others, nor take natives of a foreign court into his own
service. It is too obvious that they will probably be spies.
[Sidenote: _On Accepting Gifts._]
He himself ought never to consent to accept gifts from a foreign court
except with the express knowledge and permission of his master, or
in such cases as are commonly permitted by the usage of the court,
such as those given on the arrival or departure of an ambassador. He
who receives gifts on any other condition may be accused of selling
himself, and therefore of betraying the prince whom he serves. Unless
he preserves his independence he cannot possibly represent his own
master or maintain the high dignity of his office. This dignity must
be kept beyond suspicion. It is indispensable to every ambassador,
though it need not be carried out at all times and at all places,
for the diplomatist will readily understand that at certain times
he can win the good grace of those around him by living in an easy,
affable, and familiar manner among his friends. To wrap oneself in
official dignity at all times is mere preposterous arrogance, and the
diplomatist who behaves thus will repel rather than attract.
[Sidenote: _The Tale of Don Estevan de Gamarre._]
There are many important occasions when the diplomatist will require
all his wit and all his prudence. It will often happen that he has to
tell bad news or give unpalatable advice to a prince accustomed to be
flattered by his ministers, who for various private reasons usually
conceal bad news from him. Let me give an example of what I mean: Don
Estevan de Gamarre had served the King of Spain for many years with
zeal and fidelity both in war and in diplomacy, particularly in the
Low Countries where he had been ambassador for a long time. He had a
relative in the King’s Council fully disposed to put the ambassador’s
services in the best light, and yet he received no reward, while
late-comers of all kinds received advancement to high offices both at
home and abroad. He resolved to go to Madrid to discover the cause of
his evil fortune. He complained to his relative the minister, giving a
number of instances in which important services which he had rendered
had been passed over and forgotten. The minister having heard him,
quietly replied that he had no one to blame but himself, and that if
he had been as good a courtier as he was a brilliant diplomatist and
faithful subject, he would have received the same advancement as those
whose deserts were less, but that his sincerity was an obstacle to his
good fortune, for his despatches were always full of distasteful truths
which set the King’s teeth on edge.
[Sidenote: _The King’s Teeth on Edge._]
For instance, when the French gained a victory he told the story
faithfully and without regard for Spanish feelings in his despatches.
Or if they set siege to a town, he would predict its certain fall
unless help were sent. Or in another case, where an ally had expressed
displeasure because the Spanish Court seemed likely not to keep faith
with it, he insisted that the King should keep his word in language
which was neither diplomatic nor persuasive, and all the while other
Spanish negotiators in other parts of France, with better eye to their
own interests, were informing the King that the French were decadent,
that their armies were undisciplined and quite incapable of effective
campaigning, and so on: to which the minister himself added that the
King in Council could not too highly reward those who sent such good
news, nor too readily forget a man like himself who never wrote
anything but the unpalatable truth.
[Sidenote: _Deceit in Favour in Madrid._]
Thereupon Don Estevan de Gamarre, in his surprise at this picture of
the Court of Spain drawn for him by his relative, replied: ‘Apparently
fortune in Madrid favours the deceiver and the favour of the Court may
be won by mendacity. I have no longer any qualms about my future.’ He
then returned to the Low Countries, where he profited so easily by
the advice of his relative, that, to employ a Spanish term, he won
several _mercedes_, and he saw his own affairs prosper in the measure
in which he succeeded in inventing reasons why the affairs of the
enemy must come to nought. From this one may conclude that the Court
of Spain wished to be deceived, and gave its ambassadors a free rein
to make their own fortunes at the expense of the true interests of the
monarchy. There is a moral here both for ministers at home and for
ambassadors abroad, on which I need not insist. The truth requires two
agents, one to tell and another to hear.
[Sidenote: _On Treaties and their Ratifications._]
Between sovereign states there are many kinds of treaty, the principal
of which are treaties of peace, armistices, commercial treaties, and
those which regulate alliances or guarantee neutrality. There are
both public and secret treaties. There are even contingent treaties,
so called because their success depends upon future events. When the
ministers of two equal Powers sign a treaty they make two copies of it
which are called a double instrument. In each copy the ambassador who
draws it up places the name of his own prince at the head and signs his
in order at the foot, thereby indicating that neither he nor his master
relinquishes his claim to the first place in Europe. And since all new
treaties are based upon the precedent of old ones, and probably refer
to measures taken under previous treaties, they are always drawn up in
the same form, and often in the same number of articles. Now in drawing
up a treaty it is the duty of the enlightened diplomat to see that the
statement of policy contained in the document in hand does not conflict
with or injure some other enterprise of his government. He must also
see that the conditions are laid down so clearly that they cannot be
subject to diverse interpretations. It is obvious from this that the
negotiator must be master of the language in which the negotiation
is conducted, and especially that in which the treaty itself is
written, otherwise he will find himself in endless difficulties and
complications. The meaning of a treaty may easily turn on a single
word, and unless the diplomatist is thoroughly at home in the language
in question he will not be in a position to judge whether the words
proposed to be used are suitable. Ignorance of foreign languages
indeed is perhaps the most serious drawback with which diplomacy
can be afflicted. Now though princes and sovereign states entrust
negotiations to diplomatists armed with full powers, none the less
they never conclude or sign treaties except upon their own explicit
ratification given with their own hand and sealed with their own seal,
and the treaties are never published until they have been ratified, and
cannot take effect until they are published except in cases specially
provided for, where certain articles and sometimes the whole treaty is
deliberately kept secret.
[Sidenote: _On Writing Despatches._]
While the art of handling a foreign court is the principal part of
diplomacy, it is no less important that the diplomatist himself
should be able to give an exact and faithful account in writing of
his own court, both in respect of the negotiations in his charge and
in respect of all other business which arises. The letters which a
diplomatist writes to his prince are called despatches, and should be
stripped of verbiage, preambles, and other vain and useless ornaments.
They should give a complete account of his actions, beginning with
his first _démarche_ on arrival at the foreign court, describing in
detail the manner in which he was received, and thereafter proceeding
to report step by step the ways in which he proposes to arrive at an
understanding of all that goes on around him. Thus the despatches of a
really adept diplomatist will present a picture of the foreign country,
in which he will describe not only the course of the negotiations which
he himself conducts, but a great variety of other matters which form
the essential background and setting of his political action.
[Sidenote: _A Portrait Gallery._]
It will contain the portraits not only of the King himself but of all
his ministers, and indeed of all those persons who have influence upon
the course of public affairs. Thus the able diplomatist can place his
master in command of all the material necessary for a true judgment of
the foreign country, and the more successfully he carries out this part
of his duties, the more surely will he make his master feel as though
he himself had lived abroad and watched the scenes which are described.
In present circumstances all French diplomatists, both ambassadors
and envoys, are permitted the honour of communicating direct with the
King in order to give account of their stewardship abroad, whereas
in previous times they were only allowed to transmit their reports
through a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The latter procedure
undoubtedly caused them to be more circumspect both in the matter and
in the style of their despatches. This is to be regretted, for there is
nothing more important than that the diplomatist living abroad should
feel himself able to write with candour, freedom, and force, in all
his efforts to describe the land in which he lives.
[Sidenote: _Qualities of a Good Despatch._]
The best despatches are those written in a clear and concise manner,
unadorned by useless epithets, or by anything which may becloud the
clarity of the argument. Simplicity is the first essential, and
diplomatists should take the greatest care to avoid all affectations
such as a pretence of wit or the learned overweight of scientific
disquisitions. Facts and events should be set down in their true order,
and in such a manner as to enable the proper deductions to be made from
them. They should be placed in their right setting to indicate both the
circumstances and the motives which guide the action of foreign courts.
Indeed, a despatch which merely recites facts, without discussing them
in the light of the motives and policy of persons in authority, is
nothing more than an empty court chronicle. The right kind of despatch
need not be long, for even the fullest discussion of motive and
circumstance can be presented in a compact form; and the more compact
and clear it is, the more certainly will it carry conviction to the
reader.
[Sidenote: _On Keeping a Diary._]
This leads me to suggest that the diplomatist will find it useful to
make a daily note of the principal points of which he must render an
account, and he should make a special practice of sitting down at his
desk immediately he comes from a royal audience, and writing out
to the best of his recollection exactly what was said, how it was
said, and how it was received. This diary, which is a valuable part
of diplomatic equipment, will greatly assist him in composing his
despatches, and will give him a means of correcting his own memory
at any later date. He should draw up his despatches in the form of
separate short articles, each to a single special point, for if he were
to present his despatch in one unwieldy, unbroken paragraph it might
never be read. A shrewd old negotiator of my acquaintance said with
truth that a despatch written in an orderly fashion and in several
short clear paragraphs was like a palace lighted by many windows so
that there was not a dark corner in it.
[Sidenote: _Orderly Archives._]
Besides his diary, the negotiator should keep an exact minute of
all the despatches which he writes, and should preserve them in
chronological order for easy reference. He should do the same with
those which he receives. A properly organised registry is a good thing
for the negotiator. There are certain negotiators who on sitting at
their desks at night write down everything which they have learnt or
guessed during the day, so that they may always be ready to supply
from this journal the raw material, so to speak, of their judgments
of events. It is sometimes wise to follow the practice of the Roman
Court, and to devote separate letters, separately sealed, to each of
the principal subjects on which despatches are being sent. This is
especially the case where it is necessary to supply an ambassador with
instructions upon several different points, for he may be required
to produce his instructions to the Foreign Minister, and it would be
well that he should be able to do so regarding points at issue without
revealing the instructions he has received on other subjects.
When important negotiations are on hand no expense should be spared in
keeping an efficient service of couriers, though on the other hand the
young diplomatist should beware of sending anything by special courier
which is not of the very first importance....
[Sidenote: _Discretion in Despatch Writing._]
It is for the negotiator himself to make up his mind how freely he
may write regarding the persons and events of a foreign country. It
would be wise for him to make up his mind to the extent to which he
can rely on the good faith either of his own King or of his Foreign
Minister, for it is conceivable that the despatches which he writes may
be shown to the prince or the ministers described in them. In this,
as in many other matters, the diplomatist must know the characters
both of the personage whom he describes and of the personages to whom
his despatches are addressed. As he sits at his desk composing his
despatch he should remember how important a link he is between two
great nations; how much may turn upon the manner in which he presents
his reading of events to his own government, and therefore how vital
and far-reaching are the interests confided to his hands. Remembering
this he will instruct his secretary and the attachés of his embassy to
act as the eyes and ears of his diplomacy, and to imitate his example
by keeping a careful daily record of impressions, events, and persons.
By comparing notes with his subordinates he will be able all the better
to carry out one of his principal duties, which is to distinguish with
care between doubtful and true information.
[Sidenote: _News in its Proper Setting._]
It often happens that news is most uncertain at the moment when it is
most important. He should therefore take care to transmit it in the
proper setting of all its attendant circumstances, so that the prince
may have some material by which to judge whether the advice of his
ambassador is well founded. There is no doubt that in crises of this
kind the habit of private correspondence between the Foreign Minister
and the King and his ministers abroad is of the utmost use, for it
enables them to discuss all questions with a freedom which is denied
to despatches of a more formal kind; and it will often place the home
government in possession of knowledge which will be of the utmost value
to them. And since a true judgment of events in one country will often
depend upon what is happening in others, a diplomatist in foreign parts
will ever keep in touch with his colleagues in other foreign countries,
so that he may be informed of the course of events elsewhere. This
co-operation between ambassadors abroad is one of the most useful
features in diplomacy.
[Sidenote: _Ciphers._]
As secrecy is the very soul of diplomacy, the art of writing letters
in cipher has been invented in order to disguise the written message,
but unless the cipher is unusually clever the industry of men, whose
wits are sharpened by necessity and by self-interest, will not fail to
discover the key to it. Indeed, to such a pitch has this been brought
that there are now men who are known as professional decipherers,
though in all probability, as I believe, their reputation rests
largely upon the ineptitude of poor ciphers rather than upon their
discovery of a good cipher. For as a matter of fact experience shows
that a well-made and well-guarded cipher is practically undiscoverable
except by some betrayal, that is to say, that the wits even of the
cleverest student of ciphers will fail to pierce its secret unless
aided by corruption. It is therefore the duty of the ambassador, having
satisfied himself that the ciphers of his government are adroitly
made, to take all means for their due protection, and especially to
satisfy himself that the staff of his embassy understand not only the
use of the cipher itself, but the extreme importance of guarding it
from unauthorised eyes. And certainly the ambassador ought not to adopt
the indolent practice, of which I have known one or two cases, where
the less important part of a despatch was written _en clair_, and the
ambassador himself added the vital part in cipher. Action of that kind
is a masterpiece of futility, for it leads directly to the compromise
of the cipher itself. For if the letter fall into enemy hands it will
not be difficult for a clever spy to divine the manner of the sentence
in cipher from the context written _en clair_.
In a word, the ambassador and his staff should guard a cipher as they
would the inmost secrets of their own hearts. A really effective cipher
is literally worth far more than its weight in gold.
[Sidenote: _General Duties._]
It is the duty of ministers residing at foreign courts to take steps
to see that nothing is there published contrary to the honour or
reputation of their sovereign, and to take all measures necessary to
prevent the circulation of stories and rumours prejudicial to his
interests. The ambassador must take care to protect the interests of
all his master’s subjects, both in such matters as the free exercise
of their religion, in which he should even offer his embassy as an
asylum for those who are persecuted, and in other matters, acting as a
mediator between his fellow-countrymen on occasions of dispute. At need
he should be ready to assist them and in all ways to live among them on
terms of easy yet dignified friendship. And, on the other hand, persons
of position on visiting a foreign country should never neglect to pay
their respects to their own ambassador, and it is also the ambassador’s
duty to remind them of their duty towards the foreign court itself.
If they are persons of court standing, they will be guilty of a
gross breach of etiquette unless they take the proper steps to make
themselves known to the sovereign. And on all kinds of public festivity
he should make it his especial care to see that the members of his own
national colony take their proper share in them and are accorded their
due rights. The better his relations are with his countrymen living
abroad, the more surely will he discover how large are the reciprocal
benefits to be gained thus, for it will often happen that unofficial
persons receive information as it were by accident which may be of the
utmost importance to the ambassador in his negotiations. Unless good
relations exist between him and them he may remain in ignorance of
important facts.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _These Precepts the Fruit of Experience._]
In the foregoing observations I have done no more than give a sketch
of the qualities and duties of the diplomatist. Of necessity there is
much that is lacking in these fugitive notes; but I think I may claim
that all diplomatists of experience will approve of the advice I have
given, and will declare that the more my precepts are observed in the
practice of diplomacy, the more surely will success attend the policy
of our nation. If I have laid stress upon the essentials rather than
upon the form and circumstance of diplomatic work, if I have also
spoken with candour, both regarding the duties of the minister at home
and of his agents in foreign parts, it is because I believe that a
knowledge of the truth is the necessary forerunner of fruitful reform.
[Sidenote: _Diplomacy Rich in Opportunity._]
My final word to diplomatists, young and old, is that in normal
times they may reasonably expect that where they have given proof of
sterling merit in negotiation, their services will be recognised and
honours conferred upon them, and in such matters the higher honour is
undoubtedly to find oneself entrusted with ever more important affairs
of state. But if the diplomatist should lack such recognition, he
may find his own recompense in the satisfaction of having faithfully
and efficiently discharged the duties laid upon him. It has often
been said that the public service is an ungrateful task in which a
man must find his chief recompense within himself. If I am held to
agree to this, I cannot allow it to be used as a discouragement to
young men of good birth and ability from entering my own profession.
Disappointment awaits us in all walks of life, but in no profession are
disappointments so amply outweighed by rich opportunities as in the
practice of diplomacy.
Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the
Edinburgh University Press
Transcriber’s Notes
In this file, text in _italics_ is indicated by underscores, and text
in SMALL CAPS is in uppercase.
The following alterations were made to the text as printed:
Page 79: “ceremonial vists” changed to “ceremonial visits”
80: “whereever insult is offered” changed to “wherever insult is
offered”
81: “illicit traffic The privileges” changed to “illicit traffic. The
privileges”
101: “tranferred his confidence” changed to “transferred his confidence”
105: “Craft at the Card Table” changed to “Craft at the Card-table”
133: There was not originally a paragraph break on this page; one was
introduced by the transcriber so that the sidenote could be correctly
positioned.
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