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Title: Red blight
Author: Knight, Mary Lamar
Language: English
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RED
BLIGHT
Order Extra Copies From
_CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST
CRUSADE_
P. O. Box D-4
St. Louis 1, Missouri
To
_Everyone everywhere who would help to make the “lure” of freedom
so irresistible that the false promises of security, made by the
Communists, will be seen for what they are—a delusion and a fraud._
RED
BLIGHT
by
MARY LAMAR KNIGHT
[Illustration: Star symbol]
LORRIN L. MORRISON
_Publisher
Los Angeles_
COPYRIGHT, 1951
BY
MARY LAMAR KNIGHT
FIRST PRINTING
IN TWO EDITIONS:
_Paper Bound, June, 1951_
_Cloth Bound, June, 1951_
Printed in the United States of America by
LORRIN L. MORRISON, _Printing and Publishing_
1915 So. Western Ave., Los Angeles 18, Calif.
All rights reserved, including the rights of reproduction,
in whole or in part, in any form.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
The opinions expressed in this book represent only one individual’s
point of view. They are based upon what I, myself, have seen and
heard and are subject, therefore, to human error, preferences and
prejudices. I ask only that they be considered in this light, and
hope that they may serve to stimulate independent thinking and
inquiry.
What I am reporting I have experienced personally or learned from the
most reliable sources at my command. If I succeed only in a small
measure in conveying my thoughts and opinions, it is, nonetheless, a
load off my chest, and I shall sleep more easily for having made a
sincere, if limited, contribution toward a better understanding of
our present disheartening dilemma.
MARY LAMAR KNIGHT
_Table of Contents_
_Introduction_ 1
_Chapter I—Incompetence or Treachery?_ 7
_Chapter II—Yenan Interlude_ 29
_Chapter III—Communist Personalities_ 45
_Chapter IV—Communism’s Forebears_ 70
_Chapter V—Communist Propaganda_ 82
_Chapter VI—Manchuria, the Prize_ 94
_Chapter VII—The Tragedy of the Generalissimo_ 102
_Chapter VIII—Behind the Red Curtain_ 117
_Chapter IX—Quo Vadis?_ 131
_Appendix_ 151
_Bibliography_ 189
_Index_ 193
_About the Author_ 199
_Introduction_
The “lure” of Communism is the same in every country—the promise of
security and a richer life for all, with less pain and effort to
the individual from the cradle to the grave. We have only to think
clearly, however, to realize that such promises are impossible of
fulfillment in a Communist State. Never has progress been made in
that direction except where there was personal freedom, initiative
and enterprise, for these are the qualities that take civilization
forward _toward_ Perfection, instead of backward _into_ Chaos.
The theories of Marx and Engels have been used and misused by the
Soviets. As far as their present laws are concerned, the “Yassa” of
Genghis Khan would have served the purpose, had it been as well known
in the Twentieth Century as it was in the Thirteenth.
In studying the historical backgrounds of those great movements
which, at various times in the past, have churned up the quietude
of the earth, I found that they were always propelled or motivated
by extreme fanaticism. A distinctive feature of all of them seems
to be the desire to change the established order by revolution and
intrigue, as well as by military conquest. These movements are
opposed not only by the diehards, but by the believers in evolution
and slow change; not only by the wealthy and comfortable, but by the
practical men of affairs. All of this has been happening since the
beginning of history. Believers in the established order of things
always are on the defensive. Only open and direct attack stirs them
to the offensive. This last is true of the United States, and it is
also true of China. It is difficult for the rulers of peace-loving
nations to create or inspire prolonged hatred in those who must do
their bidding. This fact has been one of Stalin’s major worries with
respect to the Chinese Communists. His predecessor, Trotsky, gave
them up as impossible. “The Chinese have no capacity for sustained
mass indignation,” Trotsky has been quoted as saying. “As Communists
they are hopeless.”
Everyone who has lived in China learns to respect and to love the
Chinese people. No nation on earth has left a greater endowment
in wealth of artistic accomplishment or evolved a more workable
philosophy than has China. Even the poorest coolie is acquainted with
some of the simple lessons contained in the Classics.
As a correspondent in China for the United Press Associations, I
learned to admire the people deeply. When in 1946 I was invited
by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to
spend six months there as a consultant, without compensation, I was
delighted at the opportunity to return. Each time, I increased my
knowledge and improved my understanding of the country and made an
earnest effort to comprehend the divergent forces underlying modern
China and to gauge their effect upon the peace of the world.
The red blight, as everyone knows, is world wide, but I have focused
my attention on China because it is the part of the world I know
best. I saw the blight spread over this area with sickening rapidity
in 1936, and again in 1946.
On both my trips, I travelled slowly from Singapore through most of
the major cities to Manchuria, where I remained for a considerable
length of time. Manchuria in 1946 had changed radically from
Manchuria in 1936. The Russians had supplanted the Japanese, and two
wars in the brief span of ten years had left their tragic imprint.
The more I travelled, and the more I read and studied, the more
aware I became of the pattern underlying the great upheavals, not
only in China but throughout Eurasia. Each eruption had moved in
a cycle from tribal communism to communistic imperialism, and
then to a dictatorship so despotic that its tyranny lasted in
some instances for generations. Invariably, the dictatorship fell
into dissolution and decline, followed by desolation and chaos.
The despots engineering these movements were all nurtured on the
vast steppe-lands, and they never attempted the invasion of their
more civilized neighbors until their own strength was such that no
opposing army could match them.
Stalin, the latest of these despots, is as barbaric as his
predecessors. Certainly, no one could intimate that his methods are
even remotely civilized. He has “refined” and “distilled” their
characteristic brutality to an exacting degree. It took him fifteen
years to turn his own people from the techniques of Lenin to those of
his own fiendish thuggery. He has “conquered, bamboozled, outsmarted
and trapped” more than nine hundred million people into “political
and moral paralysis.”
Are we also going to fall victims to the machinations of this
latest of these world shakers? Will we be sucked in through fear or
blandishment? Or have we the common sense, the spiritual development
and the _will_ to save ourselves? Human nature has changed little
during the history of mankind. Our challenge now is to try to develop
our spiritual growth so that it will be commensurate with our
fantastic material growth.
A strong Nationalism made us great, as it has all nations that have
risen to world power. To maintain this power, however, requires the
intelligence and wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who, by their use of
initiative, ingenuity, enterprise and prayerful determination, made
us the Historic United States. Is it possible that recent generations
of American men and women have lost these qualities and have failed
to achieve complete maturity?
I keep asking myself: Is “civilized” man intelligent enough, in the
light of his own past experience, to stop this human tragedy now, and
perhaps for a foreseeable future? Or, will he become hopelessly and
irrevocably lost in the futile contemplation of an idyllic dream that
is ages old, but that never has become a reality, and never will.
PROLOGUE
_Oh Man, thou feeble tenant of an hour,
Debased by slavery, debauched by power;
Thy love is lust; thy friendship a cheat;
Hypocrisy thy smile; thy word deceit—
Thy nature ennobled but by name,
The very beasts might bid thee blush for shame._
LORD BYRON
CHAPTER I
_Incompetence or Treachery?_
“The greatest single mistake made in China, leading to our present
debacle, was the withdrawal of United States forces from the Peking,
Tientsin, Chingwangtao triangle in 1947.” This was done obviously at
the direction of President Truman, General George Marshall and the
State Department.
This statement comes from Major General William Arthur Worton,
Chief of Staff, Third Amphibious Corps, U. S. Marines in China,
1945-1946, but with twelve years prior experience there. He adds:
“Twenty-five thousand men easily could have maintained this important
triangle—Peking, Tientsin, Chingwangtao—which would have kept the
Chinese Communists from moving South of the Great Wall. They were
not strong at that time, and a display of American strength in
Nationalist China would have served as a deterrent to them.”
Instead, our withdrawal of U. S. forces from this strategic area
was the first show of American weakness that gave the lie to both
Nationalist and Communist Chinese, if not to the whole of Eurasia.
The Russians constantly had complained that the Americans were
occupying sovereign territory of China, but the request for us to
do so had been made in 1945 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalist Government for the purpose of disarming the Japanese and
of stabilizing the country.
General Worton, with five officers and a handful of men first moved
into the area in August, 1945, turning the civil government of China
over to the Nationalists. A month later, a force of sixty-five
thousand U. S. Marines moved in and occupied the area, and from then
on to 1947, there was relative peace and quiet.
In view of the testimony of General George C. Marshall before the
joint houses of Congress on the hypothetical issue that if we permit
Chiang’s forces to attack South China, we will be starting a global
war, I would like to quote General Worton on a similar issue.
“The occupation of Peking was not specifically in my orders,” he
says, “but I was to occupy whatever strategic territory I deemed
necessary. In the triangle previously referred to, was located the
important mining area of Kailan at Tang Shan, which supplied the
coal output of 150,000 tons per month, and the Nan Yuan, Pei Yuan
Airfields. When I determined that the Communists would go into Peking
if I did not, I decided to occupy Peking. At eleven o’clock one
evening, Chou En-lai’s agent in Tientsin informed me that if I moved
on Peking, the lives of every American Marine would be the price.
I told him I was going into Peking, just when and where our forces
would enter, and that he had better have as strong a force as I
intended to have, and that I would also be supported by an air cover.
We followed our blueprint, and not one of our men was scratched. We
had no opposition whatsoever.”
With the withdrawal of U. S. forces from this area the coal output,
supplying power as far south as Shanghai, dropped to 30,000 tons.
In Worton’s opinion, “as small a force as 15,000 troops, officered
by men acquainted with China, could have kept the Reds from crossing
into the coveted triangle.”
But Marshall was determined to withdraw our forces. “The State
Department to this day,” says Worton, “has never asked the opinion,
as far I can ascertain, of any qualified military men who spent any
length of time in China, on this subject.” He adds, “Manchuria should
have been occupied and we should have insisted on a joint occupation
force there with our allies. Any study of China and the Far East must
be predicated upon a study of our relations with China since 1784. We
have consistently held to the Open Door Policy for China and the Far
East. We went to war with Japan because Japan had seized the coastal
areas and was controlling the communication lines of China. Many men
died across the Pacific to regain China for the free world, and yet,
in the course of minutes, as time is known, we have lost China. It is
a truism of students of the Far East that, ‘As China goes, so goes
the Orient’.”
The U. S. should have taken Dairen, Port Arthur and Cheefoo, while we
were at it, and should have insisted on occupying the Kalgan Pass,
gateway to Mongolia. These rightfully belonged to the Nationalist
Government at the conclusion of the Japanese war, according to
Worton. Another disastrous move on the part of the U. S. was the
recall of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer from the China
Theater. “Wedemeyer had the complete admiration and respect of the
Chinese,” he says. “Although he had been the Generalissimo’s Chief
of Staff for nearly three years during the war, at no time had he
subordinated himself to Chiang. Wedemeyer was first, last and always
an American, and an officer in the service of his country.”
Others claim that China’s and the world’s present situation can be
attributed to any number of mistakes on the part of Chiang Kai-shek,
General Marshall and the United States Government. Ignoring the
tragedy of Yalta for the moment, one vitally important mistake Chiang
made was the decision to fly his troops into Manchuria after the war,
against the advice of General Wedemeyer. His mistake was an honest
one, because he undoubtedly felt that the United States, having gone
so far, would see him through to the end. He knew that if China were
to occupy her rightful place in the world, control of the industrial
potential of Manchuria was a “must.” In spite of the fateful decision
at Yalta, about which Chiang was informed several months later by
Ambassador Hurley, he still could not believe that Roosevelt, whom he
deeply respected and admired, would slap him in the face by giving
away Manchuria.
Truman, inheriting Roosevelt’s policy of appeasement toward Russia,
sent General Marshall to China in 1946 on the impossible mission of
forcing the Generalissimo to accept Communists into his Government.
Marshall, who at that time had the admiration and respect of the
entire United States, undoubtedly had a freer hand than any diplomat
in our history. Had he been unbiased in his judgement, the future of
China, Asia, and probably the Eurasian Continent would have been
different. He had unlimited resources to give, a neat nest egg of
$500,000,000, and the decision to spend some, all, or none of it was
his, and his alone.
When Marshall arrived in China, the Nationalist Armies were
over-extended, that is, their supply lines were stretched so long
and so thin that they could not be protected from constant Communist
raids. Chiang’s Armies held the main lines of communication, to be
sure, and all the large cities of North China and a few in Manchuria.
However, these Armies, although many of them were trained and
equipped with American arms, had little ammunition, and they were
surrounded on all sides by the Soviet-backed Communist Armies. The
Communists retained the initiative, could strike when and where they
wished, and thus succeeded in keeping their opponents paralyzed.
It was not difficult to see that the future of Chiang’s Armies was
dependent solely on aid, especially on munitions, and that no country
on earth but the United States could supply their requirements. To
shut off this aid meant strangulation and death.
Marshall’s first act was to set up a headquarters in Chungking, where
he assembled his American experts on China and started a series
of conferences with Communist and Nationalist leaders. From the
beginning, the Chinese Communists showed, by their every action, that
their only interest was in cutting off North China and Manchuria.
They had no intention whatever of joining any kind of coalition
government, over which they would not have complete control. After a
great deal of discussion, these conferences resulted in superficial
agreement on a few points of the controversy.
Prior to his return to Washington, the General decided to make a
hasty trip to Yenan, probably out of curiosity. He must have wanted
a closer look at these people whose propaganda he appeared to have
accepted as fact during the entire war. Whether this was emotional
caprice or political expediency only history can tell. We cannot
assume that he was ignorant, therefore we must assume that he knew
what he was doing.
Certainly the utterances of that period indicated that Marshall
subscribed to the idea that we were dealing with “agrarian reformers.”
In his testimony before Congress, Marshall stated flatly that he had
known all the time that the Chinese Communists were Marxists “because
they told me so,” he said. But while he was negotiating with them he
certainly gave the impression to others that he did not think they
were the same brand of Communists as were the Russians. This fact,
in itself, makes him doubly culpable, in my opinion. It is an intent
to deceive, which makes the deception all the more sinister. If he
knew all the time that the Chinese Communists were the same brand of
Communists as the Russians, and he still threw the weight of every
decision he made in China to them, then he could not possibly have
given more aid and comfort to the enemy, Stalin, had he been a member
of the Communist Party.
On Marshall’s arrival at the Airport of Yenan, he was greeted with
pomp and ceremony by every military unit the Communists could muster.
Welcomed enthusiastically by stocky Mao Tse-tung, in his coarse
homespun peasant’s garb, suave Chou En-lai, in the snappy uniform
of a three-star General, and Chu Teh, wearing a Russian soldier’s
fur-lined cape, he accompanied his colorful and grateful hosts on
an inspection of the troops. The Cadets from the Communist Military
Academy, who had hiked in some fifty or sixty miles in order to form
the Guard of Honor, were the best dressed and best outfitted of all
the troops in the Communist Army. While spartanly clad in coarse
but neat dark blue uniforms, they gave every evidence of superb
leadership and discipline. Especially trained and selected, these
Cadets became the equivalent, in Communist China, of the Soviet NKVD,
or uniformed police troops.
In marked contrast, there was a battalion of Ming Bing, or militia,
armed with spears for the occasion and lined up for the General’s
inspection. These troops were dressed in everything from long robes
to dirty white jackets and vests, and decorated with rings, bracelets
and earrings. Their long, rusty spears were topped with flowering
pompoms of dried grain. In no respect did they differ from their
forbears of two thousand years ago.
The rest of the show consisted of masses of people in the drab
dress affected by the Communists. The more colorful costumes of the
non-Communist Yenanese were conspicuous by their absence.
Marshall must have been impressed!
For quarters, or hotel accommodations, the General had been assigned
the best Yenan cave, boasting all the comforts offered by that
archaic type of dwelling. His person was safeguarded during the night
by two crack soldiers armed with ancient Chinese broadswords.
Making the most of their distinguished visitor’s sojourn among
them, Chairman Mao Tse-tung gave a banquet, followed by a Chinese
Opera. The dinner was staged in a large bare room with cracking
plaster walls. The table consisted of rough hewn boards, contrasting
strangely with the lavishness of the food. Dozens of southern style
delicacies were imported for the occasion: crisp, roasted Peking
duck; succulent sweet and sour pork; thousand-year-old eggs—the
whole washed down with copious draughts of sweet local wine. Formal
speeches of mutual friendship were followed by cries of “Gambei!” or
“Bottoms up!”
After the banquet, the entire party crossed the river to attend
the Opera. The Communists had improvised a crude bridge over which
their esteemed guest might ride, but it was so wobbly that Marshall
preferred to get out and follow his car across.
The Opera was performed in an unheated, barnlike structure. It was so
cold that the audience kept on their heavy coats and were provided,
in addition, with blankets to wrap around their feet. In spite of the
fact that charcoal braziers were placed between the stage and the
first row, the temperature in the building was close to freezing,
and the breath of the actors as they chanted their lines came out in
puffs of smoke. These performers were Spartans indeed, changing their
costumes in the draughty, unheated barn, their teeth chattering and
their tawny flesh a mass of goose pimples. The costumes, in contrast
to those seen on a Peking or a Shanghai stage, were fashioned of
rough, drab bits of cast-off apparel, crudely sewn together and
patched with whatever pieces of material could be begged, borrowed or
stolen.
The show itself, like the Ballet in Moscow, was a superb exhibition
of Chinese art, for, when shown to foreigners, it was free from
Communist propaganda. The falsetto voices of the actors sing-songed
the ancient Chinese poetry, while their bodies swayed to its rhythmic
cadence. During the performance, an usher went up and down the aisle
tossing hot towels to guests who called shrilly for them. These,
wrung out of boiling water, gave the hall a dank, slightly rancid
atmosphere, reminiscent of a river in summer. Roasted watermelon
seeds were pressed generously upon the honored guest by his Chinese
Communist hosts, who were noisily but skillfully cracking them
edgewise between their strong front teeth and spitting out the husks.
Not all the visitor’s stay, however, was passed in entertainment.
Before leaving Yenan, General Marshall sat behind locked doors with
Mao and members of the Politburo. No other American was allowed to be
present at this meeting. What was said is not known, but there were
rumors in Communist circles that the subject of the conversations had
to do with the future of Manchuria, and perhaps all of Asia.
On leaving this capital city of Communist China, Marshall returned to
the United States to make his report to President Truman.
When he came back to China, Marshall made his residence in Nanking
(the Nationalist capital at that time), but established a Northern
Headquarters in Peiping (meaning Northern Peace), in order to work
out a truce between Communists and Nationalists. The futility of
this endeavor was obvious even to the Chinese GI, who nicknamed the
Peiping Headquarters the “Temple of the Thousand Sleeping Colonels,”
and to the American GI, who dubbed it “Marshall’s Bird Sanctuary.”
If the soldiers in the lower brackets put their tongues in their
cheeks, those in the higher echelons took the mission very seriously.
They kept a very sober face, indeed. Shoulder patches were issued and
worn by all the members of the Peiping Headquarters and its truce
teams. These were called “Ballentine Beer Patches,” due to the three
rings in the emblem representing the Nationalists, the Communists and
the Americans. No doubt this symbol, to some of the homesick GI’s,
was a nostalgic reminder of the good old USA.
Truce teams, made up of one Communist, one Nationalist and one
American officer, were sent out into the field, their purpose being
to try to bring about agreement between the opposing forces. With
the Chinese Communist Army and the Nationalist Army locked in a
deadly battle for power, any action on the part of the third member,
the United States, would be likely to aid one party only at the
expense of the other. With Marshall’s preference for Mao over Chiang
Kai-shek, the “truces” forced upon the Nationalist Armies at the
most inopportune times, from a military standpoint, acted to the
advantage of the Chinese Communist Army. Because of the slowness of
their transportation and their lack of modern means of training,
the Chinese Communist Armies, as in the days of Genghis Khan, were
constantly in need of breathing spells. During these periods they
could regroup their forces, move and gather supplies, and train their
troops. Such breathing spells, provided in the form of “Cease Fire!”
commands to the Nationalist Armies, upon the insistence of Marshall,
came almost as a gift from Heaven.
As history has shown, Marshall threw the weight of every decision to
the Communists. This, combined with the mistake the Generalissimo
made in trying to hold Manchuria without American support, would
appear to be at least one of the reasons for the situation in China
today. In addition to the fact that Marshall favored the Communists,
that he acquiesced in the sellout of Manchuria, if not all of Asia,
to the Russians, the final and fatal blow was delivered to the
Nationalist Government itself. The expected help in arms, ammunition,
money and supplies from the United States was either cut off entirely
or reduced to a trickle. Too late did the Nationalist Government
recognize its precarious position and force itself to accept the fact
that, apparently, we just did not care who won the fight in China, so
long as it was not the Generalissimo.
Continued evidence to the above effect appeared from numerous
sources. In the summer of 1950, Walter H. Judd, Representative from
Minnesota, commented in public:
“Why should the Soviets think that the most important thing for
American Communists to do right after the defeat of Japan was to get
American assistance to China stopped?” To him, the answer seems to
appear obvious, in that without the right kind of outside aid, the
Chinese Government could not possibly recover. Only a handful of
people appeared to understand that, to a Chinese, the idea of putting
his country ahead of family interests, just was not his idea of
patriotism. First loyalty, always, in a Chinese family, was to that
family.
Marshall asked for patience and generosity for the European countries
saying that it had taken the South fifty years to recover from only
four years of civil war. But he did not seem to remember that Chiang
had been fighting Japan for more than eight years, coupled with a
civil war with Communists in his own country for more than twenty
years. China, too, needed a little patience and generosity from us,
just as much as Italy or Greece or France. And what would England
have done without our patience and generosity? By comparison, were
not China’s needs embarrassingly small?
One may call the Nationalist Government of China all the names
there are, synonymous with corrupt, incompetent, reactionary,
undemocratic—but in the light of what is known today about Communism
and its stated methods, aims and ambitions, which is the lesser of
the two evils—Chinese Nationalism or Soviet Internationalism?
An interesting news item came to light in a press dispatch by
International News Service, dated September 19, 1950, as follows:
“Marshall’s statement on Far Eastern Policy electrified the jammed
committee room (Senate Armed Services Committee) because it had been
accepted for years that he had authored the recommendation that
peace in China be sought through a coalition government. Before this
committee, Marshall repudiated all claims for having had anything to
do with it, much less to have authored it by saying that it had been
drawn up in the State Department while he was testifying on Capitol
Hill in the Pearl Harbor investigation.” According to the same news
dispatch: “The author of the Marshall Plan added that the Chinese
policy was issued ‘while I was on the ocean going over there’ as
President Truman’s personal representative.”
Could Marshall have meant that he had not even been consulted on such
an important matter, prior to being sent to implement that policy?
Hardly. Former Secretary of State Byrnes, in his memoirs entitled
“_Speaking Frankly_,” spoke thus frankly on this subject:
“As soon as President Truman appointed General Marshall his personal
representative in China, I asked the General to study the draft
(of policy) so that he could help prepare the final statement for
presentation to the President. The Sunday before I left for Moscow,
Under Secretary Acheson, General Marshall and members of his staff
met in my office. By the end of the morning’s discussion, we had
agreed upon the statement of policy. Thereafter the President made
no change in that policy except upon the recommendation of General
Marshall or with his approval.”
I learned from an intimate source that when Marshall left for China
he had in his pocket, documents outlining the policy of enforcing a
coalition government on Chiang Kai-shek and also a letter from the
President stating flatly:
“I understand that these documents have been shown to you and have
received your approval.” What could General Marshall think himself to
be, an ostrich with his head in the sand?
Much has happened since 1946, particularly as pertains to the
relationship between China and General Marshall. A few excerpts from
the September 15th, 1950, issue of the _Congressional Record_, Volume
96, Number 184, bring the matter further to a head. Senator William
E. Jenner from Indiana holds the floor:
“I believe the time has come to expose this whole tragic conspiracy
in which we are caught, to hew to the line of truth, and to let
the chips fall where they may.... I can assure the Senate there
is no pleasure, no pride of authorship, and no sense of personal
satisfaction in taking this stand. There is only a growing sense
of shame, of outraged decency, and of painful duty as I speak the
dictates of my conscience. Even if I have to stand and speak alone,
I am both unable and unwilling by my silence to be an accomplice
in compounding crimes that have already been committed against my
native land. Mr. President, this background is necessary because
without it we cannot understand where the appointment of General
George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense fits into the picture.
With it, we can help the disillusionment of the American people to
run its course by exposing General Marshall as a living symbol of
the swindle in which we are caught. The appointment of Marshall at
this peculiar juncture in our destiny is a last desperate attempt of
this administration to swallow up the treachery of the past in the
new treachery they are planning for the future.... Everything he has
been a party to during the past ten years has helped to betray his
solemn trust and to set the stage for the staggering Soviet victory
that is sweeping across the earth....”
Senator Jenner’s full and documented statements cover eighteen pages
of the _Record_ but interest here is centered upon those comments
bearing on China, which confirm my own first-hand information
and knowledge. He goes back to April 26, 1938, when Marshall was
appointed a member of the liaison committee created by President
Roosevelt for the coordination of policy of common concern to the
Departments of State, War and Navy. From then on, Marshall remained
one of the top-ranking policy makers in our Government. Truman was
aware of the closeness between Marshall and Roosevelt, and of their
consultations on matters of vital policy affecting our security and
the defending of our interests around the world. Was this, perhaps, a
reason for Truman’s wanting Marshall as Secretary of Defense, even as
a possible stop-gap in a Democratic political crisis?
“Marshall knew of the deceit and the duplicity that was indulged in
by President Roosevelt during the critical years of 1939, 1940 and
1941, by which we were secretly committed to go to war.... He went
along with the most criminal and outrageous betrayals of American
interests and principles in history that resulted from Teheran, Yalta
and Potsdam,” says Jenner. To anyone’s comment: “He was a soldier.
He was taking orders,” I feel urged to ask: “Does there not come a
time in everyone’s life when he has to decide whether he is first a
citizen of integrity? General of the Army Douglas MacArthur made that
decision in April, 1951, and made it unflinchingly.
“At Yalta,” Jenner adds, “the President did the age-old thing with
regard to Asia and General Marshall knew that at Potsdam, President
Truman confirmed the sellout of half the world to the Soviet Union
... this meant that American GI’s were turned into political whipping
boys, betrayed by their own Chief of Staff and used for advancing
the cause of Communism across the earth.... Marshall lent all of his
great prestige and power to the Jessup-Lattimore-Service-Acheson line
calling for a cessation of the civil war, paralyzing the Nationalist
Government and withholding aid from Chiang, while he knew that the
Russians were not only taking over Manchuria and northern China,
but were being rearmed with captured Japanese equipment and were
preparing for the eventual conquest, not only of China, but of the
whole Far East.”
Harold Lamb, historian and authority on Asiatic history, has
commented: “Curiously enough, when I began to study the Mongols
nearly thirty years ago, I found two studies of the methods of
Genghis Khan made by young American Army officers. They were George
C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur.” How differently these two men
have interpreted their research, in the light of their subsequent
actions!
Let me quote a remark or two from the March, 1951, issue of _The
American Mercury_. I have high regard for the journalistic integrity
of Walter Trohan, Washington, D. C., Bureau Manager of _The Chicago
Tribune_, and concur heartily with his comments in an article
entitled: “_The Tragedy of George Marshall_”:
“On March 19, 1950, General Marshall announced that he would not
write his memoirs for these remarkable reasons:
“‘To be of any historic importance they have got to be accurate;
that is one mustn’t omit, and make it pleasant reading. Now, if
you do put it all in, you do irreparable harm. You almost ruin a
man, but if you don’t mention that, it is not history’.”
Mr. Trohan states that these are disillusioning words, and imply that
“free men must not be told the truth; they indicate that the speaker
is in a mental purgatory for hidden sins which he has either observed
or committed; and they emphasize the graver tragedy: that an old man
who must conceal past errors from his countrymen is still exercising
powers of decision.”
Trohan asks, and so do I: “Should free men trust a leader who will
not trust them with the truth? By what right does a public servant
say to free men: ‘You trusted me with leadership, but I will not give
a true accounting because the truth might do irreparable harm’?”
Marshall has ever been quick to blame the people for the ills that
may beset them—never the leaders, as warrant a remark he made
following the debacle of the Korean war: “The basic error has always
been with the American people”—these same American people who cannot
be trusted with the truth, lest “irreparable harm” be done.
Other indications as to the stature of the man reveal themselves as
isolated vignettes. When Marshall arrived in China and was met by
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, even after he had read and suppressed
the _Wedemeyer Report_, he told his junior officer of his intention
with regard to forcing Communists on the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer
commented in all calmness:
“General, you can’t do it. It is impossible!”
To which Marshall replied in white heat: “I am going to do it, and
_you_ are going to help me!”
Marshall’s double-cross of Wedemeyer in appointing the latter
Ambassador to China in 1947 is another instance. Secretary of State
James Byrnes had told Wedemeyer to go ahead and buy his civilian
clothing, which he did, and as Wedemeyer was on the point of severing
his last connections from the Army, Marshall learned that the
Communists strongly opposed the Wedemeyer appointment and recommended
instead, J. Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University.
Without consulting with or informing General Wedemeyer, Marshall
immediately appointed Stuart, leaving Wedemeyer to find out through
second-hand sources that he was no longer Ambassador-elect to China.
A parallel action of this nature in which Marshall had a direct hand
was the midnight dismissal of General MacArthur, who learned of the
order when an aide heard it on a radio news broadcast and relayed it
to Mrs. MacArthur.
Again, with reference to Marshall’s so-called ignorance of the China
policy situation, Jonathan Daniels, in his authorized biography of
Truman, quotes Admiral William D. Leahy as saying: “I was present
when Marshall was going to China. He said he was going to tell Chiang
that he had to get along with the Communists, or get no help from us.”
Before the removal, by Truman, of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far East—one of the
greatest acts of perfidy to go down in American history—few people
realized that Marshall was not a West Pointer. This, of course, is
in no way to be held against Marshall, but, during World War I, as
General Pershing’s aide-de-camp, when Pershing was Chief of Staff, a
promotion of Marshall to a Generalship was requested of MacArthur by
Pershing.
MacArthur was willing enough, provided his military record merited
it. From Walter Trohan’s documented personal files comes information
that Marshall’s record lacked sufficient time served with troops.
“MacArthur proposed to remedy this,” says Trohan, “by giving
him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort Screven, Ga., one
of the finest regiments in the Army.” Marshall was moved up from
lieutenant-colonel to colonel, but his way to a general’s stars
appeared to be blocked forever when the Inspector General reported
that under one year of Marshall’s command the Eighth Regiment had
dropped from “one of the best to one of the worst.” It was mandatory,
therefore, that MacArthur decline the promotion. Is it any wonder,
today, that Truman’s action in removing MacArthur from the military
scene should be most pleasing to the Secretary of Defense?
Of course, this is not the whole story, for Pershing was a
persevering soldier and had no intention of giving up his
determination to see Marshall become a general. In 1936, he bypassed
the Army entirely, and went directly to the White House where he
succeeded in persuading President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to
“appoint” Marshall a general. Later, Marshall had proved himself so
“acceptable” to Roosevelt that, over the heads of “twenty senior
major generals and fourteen senior brigadier generals, Roosevelt made
him Chief of Staff.”
I believe that the “tragedy” implied by Walter Trohan concerning
Marshall lies in the current knowledge that Marshall, despite
personal bravery, even stoicism, was sadly lacking in vision to match
it. Thus, he became a willing tool in the hands of the opposition.
He trusted Russia as an ally and, contrary to the Churchill belief,
he did not care how much of Europe Stalin took, so long as we sent
Russia enough tanks and ammunition to crush the German Army. He was
easy prey to the insidious propaganda put out by Hiss, Acheson,
Lattimore, Jessup and others who, misguided or otherwise, permitted
American lives to be sacrificed to make both Europe and Asia “safe
for Communism.”
We know now what was in the _Wedemeyer Report_. Because it disagreed
with Marshall’s ideas he, personally, suppressed it. In contrast
to his decision, Wedemeyer had advocated a strong defense against
Communism in China, and had gained the Generalissimo’s complete
approval for American supervision of all aid, financial, military,
psychological—that would have been forthcoming if the report had been
approved.
Marshall, as was Pershing, is for an enormous army—for pitting
manpower, our most precious commodity, against the enemy, in place
of our superb technological and psychological know-how. General
MacArthur has shown the absurdity and the tragedy of any such
commitment on our part. Should Marshall, with Anna Rosenberg at his
side, be allowed to continue with plans to fight the Asiatic hordes
thusly, we are, indeed, doomed. May God forbid!
Once again, in retrospect, it appears that American foreign policy
had been to support the Generalissimo as long as he fought the
Japanese, but to do nothing that might offend the Communists at any
time. For the past ten years, or more, our Government seems to have
had its bets on Communism in China—if not in all Eurasia—to win. The
facts are against any other conclusion, and we must, again, _assume_
that Marshall, the President, and the State Department know what they
are doing. And if they know what they are doing, they must be doing
it deliberately.
From 1946 through 1948, Marshall ordered destroyed all of the
reserves of ammunition earmarked for Chiang Kai-shek. These had been
stored in India and could easily have been transferred to China
at the end of the war in 1945. Marshall also ordered our military
mission to refuse further training and aid to the Nationalist armies.
On leaving China, General Marshall was overheard to remark
enthusiastically, “There is a definite liberal group among the
Communist Chinese.” This particular group included China’s “Front
Man,” Chou En-lai, Communist Foreign Minister since October, 1948,
and his assistant, Chiao Kuan-Hua, spokesman for the Communist
delegation that was entertained in late 1950 by the United Nations,
and which was housed and fed at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in New York
City.
It is not difficult to see how Marshall contributed to Chiang’s
capitulation to the Communists. How can we answer for our refusal to
accept the 30,000 Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa, initially
offered by the Generalissimo to the United Nations for combat in
Korea or in South China? We accepted units, even token ones, from
other members of the U.N., but not from Nationalist China, who is
still an official member. Of course, I know the answer is couched
in the language of “Peace, peace.” But Stalin will not be provoked
into full-scale war until Russia is ready for it, and the _danger_ of
letting Chiang attack south China is no more than a blind.
How can we have aided the Russians more, or brought greater tragedy
to ourselves than we already have by our own actions?
CHAPTER II
_Yenan Interlude_
Prior to October, 1949, the capital of Communist China was the two
thousand-year-old city of Yenan. After the capture of Peking, the
leaders established grandiose headquarters in that ancient seat of
emperors, known as “The Pearl of the Orient.” It was in the quaint
old city of Yenan, however, that the important incubation period
of these present rulers took place. Here they spent the war years,
planned their strategy to take over all of China, and cemented their
contacts with Moscow. From the cold, crude caves of this primitive
stronghold to the glittering palaces of Peking was a tremendous leap,
and doubtless it gave the conquering heroes many jolts. How often
they must have longed for that unique little city, remote and quiet,
in Shensi Province.
That those early carefree days on the edge of the Gobi Desert did
not altogether prepare them for their present responsibilities was
evidenced by the fact that after the Communists occupied Peking
the municipal government staff there was temporarily retained. The
new Communist mayor explained, “We have been living in the hills
(Yenan) and know far less about municipal government than you do.
Therefore we must learn from you.” Even Mao Tse-tung, whose word is
law all over China, has already been quoted as saying, “The task of
reconstruction is apt to be far more difficult than the achievement
of power.”
Shensi Province boasts one of the best climates in China, dry and
healthy, with many bright sunshiny days. However, it is frequently
visited by suffocating dust storms from the desert, giving the
inhabitants a yellow-powdered coating on the hair, face and
clothing. The farm lands which were owned formerly by a few of the
comparatively wealthy peasants were, in 1949, divided into little
holdings or made into cooperative farms. No all-out effort was made
to collectivize[1] the land, as in Russia.
The city of Yenan has a population of about fifty thousand, most of
whom live in caves burrowed into the clay cliffs of three converging
river valleys. Before the move to Peking, the schools and army
headquarters of the city were all underground, and only outside the
city were there many buildings of any size.
One of the most important landmarks was the International Hospital,
located on the edge of the city in a series of caves. It was called
“International” because it was supported in part by contributions
from abroad. The United States had made every effort to be helpful.
During the war, for the first time in its history, and largely
through the humanitarianism of the China Theater Commander,
Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, this hospital was one of the best
equipped, if not _the best_ equipped, in all of North China. When Mao
Tse-tung’s little five-year-old daughter fell ill with pneumonia,
penicillin was flown to her directly from General Wedemeyer’s
headquarters. Without it she would, almost certainly, have died.
The hospital was Madame Sun Yat-sen’s favorite project There she
spent many hours, allowing the patients and nurses to bask in the
radiance of her sacred person. This beguilling “Saint Elizabeth,”
after impassioned pleading, succeeded in 1945, in getting the United
States to expedite shipment of increased amounts of medical supplies
to the hospital from Communist sources. A small contingent of U. S.
soldiers was stationed in Yenan as a liaison between the Communists
and the Nationalists. These cartons and crates were opened, as a
matter of routine inspection by Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, Communist
expert and one of the American military observers there. To his
great consternation, he found that, instead of the urgently needed
medical supplies, the crates and cartons were filled to bursting
with Communist propaganda books and leaflets. Going directly to
Madame Sun, he said, “Why, Madame, I am disappointed and astonished
to find that you have abused the courtesy extended to you by the
United States Government. I find that this last shipment, instead of
containing medical supplies, is filled with nothing but Communist
propaganda!” Madame Sun blushed prettily and replied with false calm:
“I am sure that you are not aware of the _many_ kinds of medicine our
patients need here.” It goes without saying that her supplies were
cut off, then and there.
Although Communists laid great stress on the good the hospital was
doing for _all_ Chinese, the conduct and methods of admissions
smacked of the General Hospital in Moscow. Patients were classified
in three categories: The Hierarchy of the Communist Party and their
families took precedence over all; next in line were the Red Army
officers and soldiers and their families; last, least and very rarely
came the non-Communist Chinese.
Another distinguished landmark located just outside the city was the
famous “Prisoner of War School.” Here the captured Japanese soldiers
were never referred to as “prisoners,” but always as “students,” and
their compound was referred to as “The School.”
Although, during the war, the Chinese Communist Armies made great
claims about their successes against the Japanese, their primary
purpose was to capture Japanese prisoners of war with the idea
of converting them to Communism. Those who showed promise of
becoming good subjects promptly were sent to Yenan, given courteous
treatment and enrolled in the Communist School under Moscow-trained
instructors. Students who showed little aptitude or whose loyalties
were questioned were weeded out rapidly and returned to their own
troops. This last proved to be a diabolical form of punishment, for
a Japanese soldier is taught never to surrender, but to fight to the
death. The mere fact that he had allowed himself to be captured and
was returned to his own troops in good condition was clear evidence
that he was either a coward or untrustworthy. His end was often the
guard house or a bullet in the back of his head.
Graduates of the school were dispatched as spies into Manchuria or
sent back to Japan, there to scatter the red seeds of Communism. This
was referred to as going to the “Front.” When one friend would say to
another, “I haven’t seen Yashi for four or five days. Where can he
be?” the reply invariably was, “Oh, he’s gone to the Front!” Thus the
Prisoner of War School helped to spread the red gospel throughout the
Japanese-speaking areas. Its guiding spirit and conductor was Okano,
now known as Sanzo Nozako, who aspired to be the Stalin of Japan, and
who is said to be working vigorously to bring all the Japanese into
the Communist orbit.
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had appropriated
for special meetings one of the few well built halls just outside the
Walled City. On its bare walls were life-size, full length portraits
of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Chu Teh, together with a
large flag bearing the Hammer and Sickle. This hall also served as
Mao Tse-tung’s city residence. Only on the rarest occasions were
foreigners ever received here, and at such times the portraits and
flag were laboriously removed. Surrounding the hall were the best and
most productive of the local farms, which had been confiscated by the
Communist Hierarchy for their own use. Here they spent many weekends
relaxing and enjoying life.
The office where foreigners were habitually received was in a large
cave. It was decorated with life-size portraits of Stalin, Mao,
Chu Teh, Churchill, Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
placed over a grouping of small allied flags. The general atmosphere
appeared to be one of friendly cooperation based on mutual aims and
interests. When foreign visitors were present, the Chinese National
flag was displayed conspicuously over the gates of the compound, as
a token of good will, and to create the false impression that both
parties were working in harmony. On all other occasions, and in
all other places, it was considered extremely bad taste to mention
Nationalist China, Great Britain or the United States, especially
with references to any part they were taking in winning the war.
Anyone living in Yenan at that time became aware of the complete
absence of religious symbols. The ancient temples were occupied by
Communist families. Religion, as in other Communist countries, had
gone underground or disappeared. Even the tiny symbolic caves, so
revered by the Chinese as places of worship, were never used openly.
Instead, Americans often caught glimpses of Communist soldiers going
through their ritual when they thought themselves unobserved by
hostile eyes. Doubtless these little scenes reminded some of the
better informed GI’s of similar ones enacted in Moscow, where the old
peasant women braved the wrath of the NKVD and the Stalin Youth to
worship at the few churches that were allowed to remain open.
The Catholic missionaries, long distrusted by the Communists, had
been forced into a life of almost complete religious inactivity.
Their Compound, once a busy center, had become the home of the Lu
Hsun Art Academy. The old convent had been converted into dormitories
for students of both sexes. In the Chapel, Communists had torn down
the painting of Jesus, which was the first object seen on entering,
and had replaced it with a more than life-size portrait of Stalin.
The Holy Vessels and Sacred Images lay in rubble on the floor. Only
the organ was left. Here, the music students practiced American jazz
and sang “The Internationale.”
[Illustration: _Ancient Pagoda built hundreds of years ago, seen from
outskirts of Yenan. Caves at right are similar to those used to house
the Japanese Prisoners of War._]
[Illustration: _“Ballentine Beer Patches” Worn by Marshall’s workers
in Chungking._]
[Illustration: _The movie actress wife of Mao Tse-tung appears
pleased with the story she has just told General Marshall, while the
latter seems to wonder if he got the point._]
[Illustration: _Left to right: Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, Chairman
Mao Tse-tung, General Chang, (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s
propaganda chief), and General Chu Teh, shown after conference in
Yenan._]
[Illustration: _Mao has just proposed a welcoming toast to General
Marshall, and politely listens while others do likewise. The banquet
was held in Marshall’s honor._]
[Illustration: _Chinese Nationalist and American flags fly between
banner welcoming Marshall, Nationalist General Chang and Communist
Chou En-lai. Side banners say “Long Live Peace in the Far East!”_]
[Illustration: _Saturday inspection of Caves in Yenan. Last, on the
extreme far end to the right, is the cave in which Marshall was
installed._]
[Illustration: _Crowds greeting Marshall on his arrival in Yenan. At
extreme left can be seen the Ming Bing with their long spears. Note
American and Chinese Communist flag on jeep._]
[Illustration: _Left to right: Chairman Mao, Chou En-lai, Marshall,
General Chang (Nationalist), and Chu Teh. On the right are picked
troops of the Communist Military Academy._]
[Illustration: _Under Communism man still competes with the lowly
donkey. Here several are seen carrying fire wood in Yenan._]
[Illustration: _A camel caravan arriving at Yenan from the Gobi
Desert after passing through the Great Wall. The lead camel wears a
mask to frighten away evil spirits. (In photo below)—Oxen laden with
bundles and wares to be sold in the Yenan markets._]
[Illustration: _The Market Place in Yenan, run by non-Communists as
in the days of their ancestors._]
[Illustration: _Child-mother with twins in improvised home-made
tandem baby carriage._]
[Illustration: _Caves of the Communists and Red Army seen in the
distance, sheep grazing beneath them. Small house in foreground
was used for storage of food._]
Protestants suffered equal indignities. From outlying districts came
reports of religious oppression and sometimes of atrocities. American
missionaries, both by word and letter, told of the destruction not
only of churches but of agricultural and hospital activities which
had operated for many years to help _all_ Chinese, Communist and
Nationalist alike.
The population of Yenan was for the most part non-Communist. The
distinction was not difficult to note for the Communists were easily
recognized by their dull blue cloth uniforms, their bobbed haired
women wearing no make-up, and their complete lack of Chinese silks
and gay colors. The non-Communist majority were allowed to continue
their usual occupations undisturbed, as long as they minded their
own affairs. Nearly all the merchants within the Walled City were
non-Communist, and all gathered daily in the big market, as they had
done for generations, to display their wares in the open, on boards
or on the ground. When the Communists wanted anything, they forced
the merchants to cooperate by handing over a desired commodity, and
at the Communists’ own price.
Due to the Chinese and Mongolian background of most of the Communist
leaders, many of them did not, at first, wish their women to play any
political roles or to appear at public banquets with the men. With
the growing acceptance of the Russian doctrines, however, all were
considered equal, and the women worked and ate beside the men. The
female Communists tried to look as unlike the old fashioned Chinese
women as possible. Their adopted cause had emancipated them, if
emancipation meant compelling them to work as hard as the men. In
Russia, after the Revolution, the women, dressed as men, were allowed
to load and unload trucks, which the men drove. The rules for the
masses, however, did not apply to the wives of the leaders. They were
encouraged to mix freely, to wear better clothes, and to indulge
in light make-up occasionally. Moreover, it is said that they all
ate quantities of sunflower seeds in order to obtain the fine, firm
breasts for which many a Soviet woman is famous!
Tipping was not allowed in the Red realm, for it indicated class
distinction. As all classes were supposed to be equal under
Communism, any breach of this regulation was severely punished. In
Yenan, an American GI tried to express his gratitude to a young
Communist for helping him make some furniture for his cave by
offering him a package of American cigarettes. The Chinese boy
frowned and backed away. “No, thank you,” he said, “I cannot accept
anything for my services. We are all equal now.” The American
shrugged slightly and put the cigarettes on a table. A few minutes
later, when his back was turned, the Chinese boy _and_ the cigarettes
had disappeared. The following day the American soldier found the
Communist youth smoking furiously behind a pile of rubbish. He
learned later that the boy had been spied upon by other Communist
youths who, out of envy or an excess of Party zeal, had beaten
him unmercifully. After generations of accepting the traditional
“cumshaw,” or little token of appreciation, it is well nigh
impossible to convince a Chinese, Communist or otherwise, that this
time-honored custom is wrong.
During the war, all American troops stationed in Yenan lived in caves
on the level nearest the ground. This made for greater convenience
in getting in and out, in line with the wish of the Chinese
Communists to show the foreigner every courtesy. The Americans had
one small house built primarily to shelter the electric generator
they had brought with them, and here also lived the Commander of
the Americans. The generator made it possible for the Americans to
have the only electric light in Yenan. In contrast, the natives and
families of the Red Armies burned wicks in precious oil or built
small fires for occasional light. Their rule was to bed down with the
sun and to arise with the dawn.
One other building allocated to the Americans was used as a
recreation room, where the GI’s and a highly selected group of
Chinese Communists played games and had their meals in common. This
group of Communists assigned to fraternize with the Americans was
headed by a fellow named Lock Ho, meaning “Old Horse,” whose job was
to start arguments and to guide the Americans in their thinking. The
GI’s were never allowed to fraternize with any Chinese who was not
thoroughly indoctrinated, even at the Saturday night dances. Nurses
from the International Hospital, students from Yenan University,
girls and women from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, other students, teachers and members of families of the
Communists, all were completely propagandized before being permitted,
or ordered, to attend the dances. In other words, the Americans
never came in contact with any Chinese who was not fully imbued with
the tenets of Communism. Be it said to the credit of the Americans,
the Reds, despite their efforts, were never able to work on the GI’s
with any degree of success.
On hunting trips, a propaganda expert went along with the Americans,
but even this could not spoil the superb sport and the pleasure that
came from shooting an occasional wolf, mountain lion or tiger. The
pheasant coveys were numerous and the birds huge, making them much
sought-after additions to the monotonous diet. A man who was a good
shot, even with an old carbine, would bring down five to ten cocks
in a day. There were no bird dogs, but when Chu Teh, a fine shot
himself, and a tireless hunter, accompanied the group, he had his
bodyguard act as a retriever, a service the American “Imperialists”
did not have.
The jeeps and trucks of the United States Army were a source of
wonder and terror to the natives, who were entirely unfamiliar with
any motor transportation. In this connection, pregnant women proved a
special headache to the GI’s. When the donkeys or Mongol ponies, on
which the pregnant ladies were riding, shied away or stood on their
hind legs at the approach of a vehicle, the ladies naturally fell off
their mounts screaming and yelling in their high, piercing voices as
they rolled into the dust or a ditch, their bundles and belongings
flying helter skelter in all directions. Even when the Americans
drove slowly or stopped, the havoc wrought was considerable. Many of
the pregnant riders were indignant and demanded “cumshaw,” or money,
to compensate for damages to their person and pride, but fortunately
there were never any serious accidents.
Many things puzzled American soldiers in Yenan. One was how a Chinese
herdsman, driving dozens of sheep and pigs, could meet and pass,
on a narrow mountain path, another herdsman equally encumbered.
Amid ear-splitting squeals, grunts and Chinese swear words, men and
animals would pass each other without loss or mishap, each going in
his own direction, with his own animals intact! Surely no American
could accomplish such a feat.
The GI’s had constant trouble with money. The Communists manipulated
the exchange any way they wished, but always in their own favor.
Nobody knew exactly how much money he was worth at any one time.
Eager to procure all the American dollars and Nationalist currency
possible to finance trips to the South for their agents, the
Communists put up their special script in small packages to entice
the Americans to purchase them for one United States dollar. They
were counting heavily on the GI’s never-failing interest in a
“souvenir to take home.”
Every foreigner, on entering Yenan, was thoroughly briefed by the
Commander of the American Observer Group, who boarded incoming
planes. This presented a clear indication of Moscow influence. All
entrants were told never to use the word “coolie,” as it signified
class consciousness. They were not to mention the words “Reds” or
“Commies,” as these terms cast aspersions upon the dignity of their
hosts. All, Communists and non-Communists must be referred to as
“local people.”
American movies were shown almost nightly out of doors in summer.
These were so superior to the Chinese or Russian movies that the
enthusiastic natives would pull down the gates of the Compound if any
effort was made to keep them out. In the winter, however, the movies
were shown indoors, and only guests invited by the Chinese Communists
were allowed to attend. Chu Teh was on hand almost nightly and was a
particular fan of Betty Hutton’s. He returned eight times to drink in
her charms as the heroine of the picture “Texas Guinan.”
The only other movies were those supplied by the Chinese Communists.
Crude and boring, they were largely sent from the Kremlin, and were
in Russian with no Chinese sub-titles. A leader, in a sing-song
voice, gave the general idea of the picture, particularly stressing
the propaganda line it illustrated. The audience, not understanding
Russian, could hope for only slight amusement.
Even the Hierarchy gave every evidence of preferring American films.
The lavish background in the Guinan picture made a particularly deep
impression, as it was such a far cry from the way even the most
important Chinese and Red Army officers and their families lived. In
the upper tiers of mud caves, dug into the soft cliffs, they existed
as primitively as had their ancestors thousands of years before them.
Little or no furniture cluttered the Reds’ caves, and almost all
their utensils were wooden bowls and horn cups. After the Americans
and the British came, the local people salvaged the tin cans thrown
out by the visitors and had them beaten into plates and dishes,
copied faithfully from the originals by the blacksmith. Unused to
comfort, their beds were skins thrown on boards or spread on the mud
floors—a sharp contrast to the luxury of the sleeping arrangement
built for Ambassador Hurley when he was in Yenan. This crude approach
to a truly beautiful Chinese bed was seven feet long, with rope slats
for a spring, rough unbleached sheets, and a pillow filled with
bird seed, or millet. It later became the property of the American
Military Commander and was always greatly admired and coveted by the
Chinese visitors.
During these years, although life in Yenan was primitive and often
carefree, the Hierarchy never lost sight of the responsibilities that
lay ahead of them, and for these they tried to prepare themselves,
within the limits of their knowledge and capabilities. In 1946,
contrary to all Chinese Communist teachings, several American
soldiers were questioned extensively by the Communist leaders on
matters of capitalist etiquette and protocol. The Americans, amused
at their roles of male Emily Posts, accepted the challenge in the
finest American tradition. With grave faces and dressed in their
best, they gave cocktail parties, movie suppers, and even formal
sit-down dinners for the education of the distinguished members of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Table manners and light
conversation were stressed. The pupils were most appreciative of
these examples of Western culture and refinement and strove in every
way to learn their lessons and to act accordingly.
Hugely enjoying this fascinating taste of the foreign, they put
together a so-called Jazz Band and held Saturday night dances that
were entirely Western in every respect, even to a crude rendition of
“_The Saint Louis Blues_.” Eager to have everything done in proper
Western style, the Red leaders provided their teachers with a list
of Central Committee Communist Party Members, arranged according
to rank, and insisted that the best State Department protocol be
observed and practiced rigidly. They were shrewd enough to realize,
even then, that in conquering new countries, they would have to have
more than one front man. At that time, Chou En-lai was their only
polished negotiator. He alone was able to meet foreigners on an equal
footing and was therefore obliged to be their Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
The Communists in Yenan, as in all countries in the beginning of
their transition to slavery, adopted the term “New Democracy”
and made a great display of its outward form by allowing the
non-Communist peasants to “vote.” The outcome, of course, was
previously agreed upon. The balloting was merely a matter of form and
a means of convincing the people that they still were privileged to
make their own choice. The literate cast their vote by burning a hole
in the ballot with a lighted stick of punk, or incense, at the point
where the name of their candidate appeared. The illiterate dropped
a pea into a bowl or pitcher, placed in front of a picture of their
candidate. After the voting was over and the successful candidate
announced, a huge rally was held and the voter was constrained to
forget his choice, if unsuccessful, in a frenzy of dancing, shouting
and singing. After a few hours of this, the tired voter would wend
his way slowly homeward to his mud cave, or if he were a country man,
to his ancestral mud hut, often many miles away.
The roads that lead into the Walled City of Yenan are
two-thousand-year-old trails used by the descendants, both man and
beast, of those earliest travellers. Both inside and out of the city,
little has changed. The men driving the camel caravans pad softly
through the dust, their animals heavily laden with burdens of fur
and other wares to be marketed in the city. They still practice the
age-old custom of putting a mask on the lead animal’s head, to drive
away the evil spirits. Water carriers, after dragging great buckets
of the muddy liquid from the river, chant their endless “water!
water!” as they go from cave to cave in the time-honored manner.
Food vendors, squatting in the dusty lanes cooking bits of lamb and
pork, roots and herbs over tiny charcoal braziers, cry out shrilly
to the passers-by, eating occasionally from the pot with their grimy
fingers. Half-naked babies crawl nearby, whimpering to their mothers,
who pacify them by giving them sweetened tree bark on which to chew.
Donkeys, heavily laden, and round Mongolian ponies jostle dog carts
and belabored oxen. Everywhere, cotton clad coolies, bowed beneath
huge bales of firewood, coal and charcoal, shuffle along the dusty
streets. For, alas, although the rickshaw and pedicab or bicycle
rickshaw has been banned as an occupation beneath the dignity of man,
the older use of man as a beast of burden has to be accepted. For
the very poor, there is nothing else to take his place.
This, then, was Yenan in 1946. Now that the Communists have won China
and moved from the mud caves to the glamorous palaces of Peking, it
will be interesting to watch their actions.
Will they be able to carry out their plan of communizing the entire
country? And how long will this take? Will China remain China for
the Chinese or, for the first time in nearly five thousand years,
will the once free peoples of this basically democratic country be
hopelessly enthralled by the yoke of tyranny?
The Chinese have a quality that has distinguished them. This quality
is patience. The Communists too have patience, but only up to a
point. Beyond that they use force to accomplish their ends.
There are literally hundreds of languages spoken in China—each
province speaks a different dialect. Moreover, aside from travel
between major cities, there is relatively little transportation and
practically no communication between smaller cities in the interior.
In view of these facts, is it not possible that the Russians will
find their progress slow?
Will the Chinese absorb the Soviets as they did the Huns, the Mongols
and the Tartars? Time alone will give us the answers to these
questions. Time alone will prove the importance of the incubation
period spent in Yenan, and whether or not it was worth the sacrifices
made by the Reds. The die is cast. From it we shall learn what the
future holds for Asia, for Europe, and perhaps for ourselves as well.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Collectivize means controlled farming, where the peasants are
only hired hands.
CHAPTER III
_Communist Personalities_
The Central People’s Government of the Chinese Communist Party is
the ruling class. It makes the policy, enforces the laws and governs
with dictatorial power. Mao Tse-tung, at fifty-six, is Chairman and
Supreme Commander—for the time being at least. Directly responsible
to him are six Vice-Chairmen among whom is the famous Madame Sun
Yet-sen. Under these Vice-Chairmen are fifty-six Supreme and fifteen
Administrative Councilors, twenty Ministries and a political
Consultative Committee of one hundred and eighty Active Members.
Mao Tse-tung, or Chairman Mao, is a rotund little figure, rather
dejected looking, with an undistinguished face, topped by a broad
forehead and a luxuriant crop of black hair. Now installed in Peking,
he dresses less slovenly than in those earlier days in Yenan when a
sloppy appearance was considered a badge of honor.
His name, pronounced “Mout-zz-dung,” is easily mispronounced by
foreigners. Once, during the Japanese war, when Mao was in Chungking
for a short time, ostensibly to coordinate the Communist forces
with the Generalissimo’s war effort, he was consistently called
“Mousy-dung,” by Ambassador Hurley. In conferences, and with the
best intentions in the world, Hurley would keep saying, “Mr.
Mousy-dung,” this or that ..., while the Generalissimo would politely
cover his face with his hand to hide his smile and Mao would blush.
“Mousy-dung,” in a more common Chinese dialect means “the hole in
the water closet.”
Earnest and zealous, Mao, a “China for the Chinese” promoter, and
therefore basically at odds with the Russians, speaks in a distinct,
sometimes shrill, high-pitched voice. He has a habit of quoting from
his wide reading. His oratory is forceful but, like Hitler’s, not
polished. Although brilliantly educated in the Chinese Classics and
familiar with ancient Greece and Rome through translations of their
history and literature, up to the time he left Yenan he had never
learned to speak or understand English. Nearly all foreigners relied
upon his interpreter when speaking to him. In spite of this, he held
one group of reporters spellbound for nearly three hours as he talked
to them in the Foreign Office cave, gesticulating nervously and
cracking watermelon seeds endlessly between his square white teeth.
Sometimes his sober countenance and intense preoccupation would amuse
foreigners. Hurley, after long hours of serious discussions, always
through an interpreter of course, would, on leaving, bow in sweeping
Western style and invariably say in English, “Good night, you sad
little apple you,” to his politely bowing host.
Mao’s childhood was one of unusual drudgery. His father was a
peasant and a domestic tyrant. Understandably, the boy’s thoughts
were turned, at an early age, to revolution against authority and
oppression. He chopped off his pigtail in defiance of the Manchus and
joined other restless youths who had a hand in the formation of the
Chinese Communist Party. A few years later, largely through his help,
this party was joined briefly to the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, which Russia was then aiding.
Years of civil war had taught Mao the technique of guerilla warfare,
as well as the qualities necessary for leadership. He likens his
guerilla tactics to the behavior of fleas. “We attack by night,”
he says, “and wear out strong men.” In 1927 he became President of
the first Chinese Peasants Union and has never lost his standing
with it. The ignorant peasants are always impressed not only by his
rugged and often ruthless qualities, but also by his great learning
and his ability to write Chinese poetry in the classic style. In the
early days, he won their further applause by moving freely among the
people, organizing rickshaw boys into labor unions, and sometimes
pulling them about in rickshaws himself, while he talked intimately
of the glories of Communism.
Most of the activities of the Communist Party in the early days were
carried on in the South, especially around Canton. By 1934, however,
the Nationalists had gained such power that the Communists were
forced to leave the Southern province of Kiangsi for the Northern
caves of Yenan. This, the “Long March,” was a journey of thousands
of miles, travelled on foot, partly over almost impassable trails
and some of the highest mountains and largest rivers in Asia. In
three hundred and sixty-eight days, eighteen major mountain passes
were crossed, five of them snow-capped, and twenty-four rivers were
forded. At each stop that was made, the marchers ravaged villages,
impoverished the well-to-do, and persuaded the poorer peasants to
join them. They whipped up such a frenzied crusade that their ranks
were swelled by thousands. So strenuous was the journey, however,
that at its end only twenty thousand men and women were left, ten
thousand having fallen by the way. Those who survived were tough,
one may be sure. A much-quoted legend has grown up about Mao, the
stalwart leader, which tells how he stumbled along barefooted,
refusing a wounded soldier’s offer to share a pony’s back. “No,” said
Mao to the soldier, “your wounds are worse than mine. We shall suffer
and fight together. That is what makes us comrades.”
Mao’s domestic career, like his political one, has been stormy. His
first wife, a child, was forced upon him by his parents, at the
age of fourteen. In his opinion, she does not count, and he never
mentions her. His second, a school teacher’s daughter, is said to
have been shot by a Nationalist General. His third was the heroine
of the “Long March,” and Mao had just cause to be proud of her.
Tall, frail looking, clever and high spirited, she was sometimes
argumentative, behavior unheard of in a Chinese women. A female
soldier, she is said to have received many wounds in battle. She also
gave birth to a son by Mao during the “Long March,” but when the
going became too difficult and unsafe she left the child along the
way with old peasants who were unable to join the marchers.
Alas for this brave wife, when Mao met the beauteous movie actress
Lang Ping, on arriving in Yenan, she was completely forgotten. He
was so enraptured with the newcomer that he sent his wife to Moscow,
normally a reward sought after by any Communist. In this case it was
only a face-saving gesture, however, and there were rumors that the
rejected woman contracted tuberculosis and died. Mao’s new marriage
to Lang Ping caused a flutter of excitement and alarm in Yenan,
where the Communists knew and admired the courage and fortitude of
his third wife and where she was held in esteem. News of this flurry
of unrest reached the Comintern in Moscow, where the practice of
casually exchanging wives was recognized, if not encouraged. There
Mao’s conduct was dismissed lightly, and the Chinese Communists were
told that the matter was to be regarded as “personal, not a Party
affair.”
During the war, Mao lived happily in a cave in Yenan with wife Number
Four. Both dressed simply in blue uniforms padded with cotton in the
winter. In spite of this simplicity they enjoyed more privileges
than the average Communist. They ate special meals and had extra
rations of cigarettes, which Mao liked to chain-smoke. He and his
ex-movie starlet went, occasionally, to Saturday night dances given
for the Party workers. Here an improvised orchestra struggled with
Viennese waltzes, known to be Mao’s favorites, along with scattered
bits of boogie-woogie. Mao also liked Chinese translations of Russian
songs, but whatever the music, he and his wife swung into action with
genuine enthusiasm.
On the whole, Mao’s simple life adds to his popularity. A Mao-myth,
similar to the Stalin-myth, is being built up about him, and by
similar means. His picture is everywhere. His words are repeated and
his name is spoken with reverence. In 1937, Mao wrote a letter to
Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in the United States, in
which he said, in part: “We feel that when we achieve victory (in
China) this victory will be of considerable help to the struggle
of the American people for liberation.” Mao signed his letter,
“President of the Chinese Soviet Republic.”
Today, Mao is not only the most influential Communist in China,
but probably, next to Stalin, the most powerful Red on earth. With
Kremlin approval, he controls, temporarily more than four hundred
and sixty million people, which is three times the population of the
United States and double that of Russia. A typical student of the
methods of Moscow, in spite of his devotion to Confucius and Plato,
he has no compunction whatever about condemning thousands to death
upon suspicion that their loyalties are slipping. Aware of this
quality in him, Japanese and Korean Communist representatives have
declared him, “The Symbol of the struggle for emancipation of all
the peoples of the Orient.” They claim he has attained his position
of power through his sincere and idealistic solicitude for China’s
masses and his realism in bringing about reforms. His enemies,
however, intimate that his “realism” has not excluded any means to
gain his ends, from walking out of attempted peace conferences to
assassinations.
The second most important man in Communist China, now that the war
with the Chinese Nationalists is over, is Chu Teh, pronounced “Ju
Duh,” Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armies. He is
often called the “Red Heart” of Communist China, as contrasted
with Mao’s nickname of the “Red Brain.” Number Two in the Hierarchy
is a plump, jolly, genial-appearing fellow. Looking anything but a
martinet, he has a broad, disarming smile which shows a wide expanse
of pink gum. He loves to trot about chucking little children under
the chin. Born with a gold spoon in his mouth, he was a reckless
though courageous child who always wanted to be a soldier and kept
breaking away from an early existence of luxury and high living.
Rich at the outset, he became even richer through “squeeze” in a
government financial post. Son of a family of overlords, he rose
to power and wealth despite his addiction to opiates while still a
youth. His early use of opium can be laid to his parents. They spread
the thick, gooey, sweet-smelling stuff on sugar cane and gave it
to him to suck at night—a common practice of the time to still an
infant’s nocturnal wails.
Chu Teh had a large family of wives, concubines and children. He was
past forty when he decided to leave them all and devote his entire
future and fortune to the revolutionary ideal that burned fanatically
within him. After squandering part of his wealth and donating the
rest to the Communist cause, he plundered public funds in order to
leave his large household well established in a comfortable residence.
Chu was persuaded that the revolution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911
had proved to be an utter failure for the masses. In his opinion,
it lacked the spark of a vigorous ideological revolution, because
it only substituted one bureaucracy for another. He longed to
modernize China and to emulate the Marxian heroes of the West. In
order to further his ambitions and to carry out his ideals, Chu
put a large foot in the mouth of tradition and, having abandoned
his family, swashbuckled into Shanghai to meet and mingle with the
Nationalist revolutionaries. These he joined temporarily, but he
was always regarded by them with a jaundiced eye. They even went
so far as to try to kill him one night when a Nationalist officer
invited him to dinner. Chu scented danger. Realizing at the same
time that his host was naive and impressionable, he flashed one
of his face-consuming smiles, followed by a rat-a-tat fire of
vitriolic conversation damning Communism. He fondled the feminine
entertainers, recited sensuous love sonnets, and generally made
himself the life of the party. It worked. His would-be murderous host
was completely captivated, and Chu escaped without a scratch! In like
fashion, by such guile and beguiling ways, Chu’s predecessors, under
Genghis Khan, performed the remarkable feat in the 13th century of
subjugating the entire country. The old party tricks are still up to
date!
A practical fellow, with more intestinal fortitude than his habits
would indicate, Chu picked up his meager belongings a little later on
and went to Germany to study the Marxian and the Russian Revolutions
with the Communists there. He moved on up the scale to Moscow,
matriculated in the Eastern Toilers’ Union, where he studied under
the best Communist teachers. When he came back to Shanghai, he
regaled his friends with what he had learned in Germany and Russia.
“I am determined to make this work in China,” he vowed. To this
end, he placed great emphasis on guerilla warfare, the people’s
self-defense corps, to suppress activities of traitors, draw out
information about the enemy, and guard military secrets. His military
tactics are the same as those of the Huns of Attila, the Mongols
of Genghis Khan and the Tartars of Tamerlane. Let the enemy be the
source of supplies—the enemy being anyone who has anything you want.
As far back as 1927, Earl Browder had been in China helping the
Communists plant the seeds for the future control of that country.
They had planned on Chiang Kai-shek playing the role of Kerensky in
Russia—that of being a temporary leader of the Chinese to be kicked
out as soon as he had defeated the warlords in southern and central
China. Chiang, however, was more than a match for them and succeeded
in blocking their “October Revolution.” He took over, on the death
of Sun Yat-sen, and ousted all of the Russian advisors and so-called
“master minds,” who had been posing as friends. The Kremlin whimpered
and licked its wounds, preparing a relentless revenge.
This was the only serious set-back they encountered until Tito
deserted and U. S. aid in 1947 saved Greece, Italy and France.
Their hatred of Chiang, therefore, was deeply rooted and they had
discredited him and his government in every way prior to their
take-over of the country when we, the U. S., failed China in 1946 and
1947.
In 1928, Chu joined forces with Mao, and together they founded the
first Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army in Kiangsi Province.
Chu became Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in China. With Mao, he
led the “Long March” to Yenan. Unlike Mao, who will stop at nothing
to gain his ends, Chu has a Robin Hood quality that makes him a
friend to the poor, with whom he is ever gaining in popularity. When
the peasants, for example, complain bitterly that the soldiers are
stealing from them (a time-honored custom among Asiatic troops),
he forces them to return the stolen goods. Often, as a matter of
discipline for other offenses, and as a demonstration to convince
the peasants of his “sincerity” as to looting, he gathers the entire
village together and gives the populace the satisfaction of seeing
the worst looters shot. “No more looting,” he says, shaking a long
bony finger. “Hereafter, when we need anything we will ‘confiscate’
it from the rich, our natural enemies, who use cheap and offensive
tactics against us.”
In spite of an occasional shooting, Chu is popular with his troops
and has been able to recruit from one to two million guerillas,
both men and women. One of the latter, a pistol-packing Amazon
named K’ang K’eching, revived his temporarily restrained love life.
Dressed as a man, this big-boned siren with platter-sized hands and
feet, approached him one day and told him she and her companions had
captured a machine gun. Would he teach her how to use it? He would,
indeed, for he was delighted with this husky bit of pulchritude. He
continued to teach her many other guerilla tricks, and from these
lessons romance flowered. The next year she became Mrs. Chu Teh, and
the newlyweds set up housekeeping in a cave in Yenan.
Sometimes, on weekends, Chu would leave his cave-office and the
headaches that beset him there. Sniffing the fresh air as though it
held an alien fragrance, and baring his buck teeth in a flash grin,
he would ask in Chinese: “What’s cooking?” This was not idle slang
with him. When soldiers in the Red Army have been rewarded for some
deed, they often use the small change they receive to buy a goose
which they roast and share with their comrades. A standing joke among
them was that since General Chu could not be rewarded—there being no
immediate superior to bestow such favor—he could always smell a goose
and thereby get himself invited to a meal. Among the soldiers he was
nicknamed “The Cook,” and not alone for his interest in the kitchen.
Once, disguised as a cook, he was cornered behind Chiang Kai-shek’s
lines. With revolvers poked into his ribs, he yelled: “Don’t shoot! I
can cook for you!” The hungry soldiers, touched to their taste buds,
hesitated for a closer inspection. When he was recognized and the cry
“kill him!” went up, Chu whipped out a concealed pistol, shot the
crier, overcame a guard and fled.
Always able to compensate by his keen wits for lack of material,
he is one of the most talented products of Moscow’s training. He
has taught his troops to use the old steppe dweller method of
getting much needed equipment from the enemy. In addition, he has
successfully augmented his supplies with material obtained from the
Japanese and the Russians. In spite of Chu’s long association with
Marx and Moscow, he probably has the interests of China at heart to
such an extent that the Moscow yoke could cause him to revolt. Chu
can be likened in the Chinese Communist Hierarchy, to Budnenie in
the Russian Soviet Army and left in political isolation after his
usefulness is over. Not a political figure, but entirely military,
Chu will never compete with Mao.
The third most important man in Communist China, who was the
Number Two during the war with Japan, is Chou En-lai. His name is
pronounced “Joe-n-lie.” Like “Mousy-dung,” the name has given rise
to considerable amusement. Chou himself, unlike Mao, never failed to
be highly entertained when Ambassador Hurley saluted him with the
familiar “Hi, Joe!”
The Party’s most polished envoy, Chou is practically the only one
capable of meeting foreign dignitaries with ease. He is wily, clever
at negotiation and, like the Property Man of Chinese drama, set the
stage for the spectacular performance before a world audience of the
talks with General Marshall in 1945. As “Chief Front Man” and one of
the directors of foreign propaganda, Chou did such a consummate job
that Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart told friends, “He presents his
case better than anyone I have ever encountered, clearly, forcefully,
urbanely.” Chou was urbane, certainly, for at a large cocktail party
he charmed the peace negotiators of all three parties, including
Stuart and Marshall. The tired “diplomats” sought respite in small
chow and small talk, and for an hour Chou showed himself the polite,
intelligent, agreeable mixer that he is. Stuart, a scholar and an
intellectual, told me in Nanking: “Whenever I cannot get a point
across to Chou, I talk the matter over with some of my students at
Yenching University. They discuss it with Chou and a solution is
arrived at immediately.”
It is no secret that the young intelligentsia of the Chinese
Communist Party were reared and fostered under Stuart’s faithful
hand, as President of Yenching University, near Peking. He gave his
best and his all to represent the United States, yet he was an old
and tired man, and his ideologies and hopes for the Chinese people
were wrapped up in a belief that the salvation of their country lay
in Socialism. The only group capable of carrying out these ideals
was the Chinese Communist Party, which, like its dictator, was
ready to prostitute Socialism and replace it with its own brand of
dictatorship.
Following the cheerful little get-togethers, the negotiators would
return to their arguments, hammer and sickle, and Chou’s charm was
abruptly turned off. On one or two occasions, however, this charm
caused the Hierarchy embarrassment. For instance, he was recalled to
the “Ivory Tower” in Yenan once because Mao felt that he had gone too
far in his talks with Marshall; that he had appeared to be making
too many concessions, even though he told a comrade he had not the
slightest intention of ever living up to any of them. Moreover, he
seemed to be getting too friendly with Marshall. Chou spent many
unhappy hours in the Chinese Communist dog house in consequence.
After he confessed, with mock solemnity, to the error of his ways
and promised “Papa Mao” to be a “good boy,” Chou was sent back to
Nanking to continue the negotiations. (Mao had to send him back
anyway, because he was the only man in the Chinese Communist Party at
the time who could do the job). To prove that he was now “reformed,”
Chou let out a series of blasts against the United States Government
that were more violent and vitriolic than any that had yet come from
Communist Headquarters. Among other things, he accused President
Truman of fomenting the civil war and of trying to turn China into an
American Colony.
As an individual, Chou En-lai appears to many by far the most
personable of all the Chinese Communist leaders. Of medium height, he
is well built and well groomed. At press interviews he has a nervous
habit of removing and replacing his black-rimmed glasses as he talks.
His broad, handsome face is distinguished by thick eyebrows and clear
cut features. He speaks English in a well-modulated, yet vibrant
and dramatic voice, undoubtedly cultivated while acting in amateur
theatricals in college in Tientsin. There he frequently took the
feminine lead, because of his facial beauty and willowy figure, and
it was there that he first learned to speak English.
I had several conversations with Chou En-lai in Nanking, always
speaking through an interpreter. Once, after several hours of
laborious questions and answers, I said: “Will you ask the General if
he came through Moscow on his return to China from Europe?” At this,
Chou threw back his head and laughed heartily. “Heck no,” he said in
plain American, “I couldn’t speak any Russian then!” I should have
realized that nearly all Chinese pretend they understand no English,
hoping they may catch you off guard.
Chou’s grandfather was a high official in the Manchu Dynasty, his
father a school teacher, and his mother an unusually well-read woman.
Reared as an intellectual, if not moneyed, aristocrat, he early
rebelled against the corruption of Chinese politicians. He went to
France in 1920, and in Paris two years later founded the Chinese
Youth Group, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning
to China, he became a secret organizer of workers in Shanghai and
Nanking, successfully engineering two revolts. Because of his
ruthlessness he was called “Executioner,” a title that certainly
belies his suave appearance.
The Nationalists always considered Chou one of their cleverest
foes, and they are said to have offered $80,000 for him once, dead
or alive. During the war he never actually soldiered, although he
“assumed” the title of “General.” He did help to organize and served
for a time with the Chinese Red Army in several minor operations
in the capacity of Chief Political Commissar. With a magnificent
flair for political education and propaganda, he won his present
outstanding position as a member of the Politburo, which rules the
Red-blighted areas wherever they may be. He learned much from Michael
Borodin, Russian-born Communist, and also from Chiang Kai-shek’s
one-time Russian advisor, Gallen, who later, as General Bleucher,
commanded the Russian Far Eastern Army.
Chou is not afraid of work. Toiling late at night, he writes articles
for the press and prepares lengthy speeches for the radio. He has
been able to convert many U. S. State Department officials to the
view that in helping Chiang, we were backing the wrong horse and
should, instead, have put our money on the Red. From Earl Browder, to
whom he wrote in 1937, we learn this: “Comrade, do you still remember
the Chinese comrades who worked with you in China ten years ago?”—in
1927!
Chou is a true turncoat and has served, back and forth, both the
Nationalists and the Communist Governments. One job he held during
the war was liaison officer between the Nationalists and Communists
in their so-called drive against the Japanese. This was a smoke
screen, for when Chiang ordered Communist troops to fight the
Japanese north of the Yangtse River, Chou violently objected. He knew
that he and the Communists would either starve or be annihilated by
the Japanese. Thereafter, the Communists pulled their anti-Japanese
punches, or did not punch at all.
As “Property Man” for the great drama being staged by the Communists,
Chou always listens to the prompting voice from the wings, the voice
of his wife. Her’s is a strong, clear voice, the one that converted
him to Communism, and the one that reminds him constantly of his
duties. He met her during one of the lowest ebbs of his erratic
life, in jail. Mrs. Chou is one of the hardest working and most
enthusiastic and important members of the Party. Not especially
pretty, she is attractive in a quiet way. In spite of illness (she
is said to have tuberculosis), she remains politically active and
influential. Like her husband, she once held a post in Chiang’s
Government, as Finance Chairman of his New Life Movement.
More favored by Moscow than either Mao, Chu or Chou, is Li Li San,
whose name is pronounced “Lee Lee Sahn.” Long ago, he and Mao
quarrelled bitterly, and Li Li San fled to Russia, there to become
close to the heart of the Comintern. Fifteen years later, this lean
and hungry-looking agitator returned as Moscow’s appointee to the
head political role in Manchuria. A rumored cause of the rift with
Mao was that Li Li was caught heading an anti-Mao secret society,
with Russian connivance. The angle of their Communism differs. Mao,
a peasant, supports the farmers, while Li Li San, with his Moscow
training, favors the city workers.
Probably few men in history have been reported dying or dead over a
long period of their lives more often than has Li Li San. Nicknamed
the “Tito of Red China,” when Tito was still dominated by Moscow, his
career followed closely that of his namesake. After quarreling with
Mao, he vanished and was presumed dead by his friends. Some years
later he reappeared, with full Russian support, as a power to be
reckoned with in the Far Eastern picture.
While in Moscow, Li Li had married a Russian woman and, in the Far
Eastern University had trained Communist agents and sent them back
to their homelands as agitators. He maintained a close liaison with
the Kremlin. As Russia’s war with Japan was nearing an end, Stalin,
ignoring Li Li’s petty dispute with Mao, sent him, with Marshal
Malinovsky’s Russian Army of Mongols, into Manchuria six days before
the Japanese surrendered. His job was to take over this “Prize of
Asia,” rich in everything the Russians or anybody else needed and
which no contester for world power could do without.
Another important military personality in the Communist picture
is Lin Piao, pronounced “Lin Bow.” A great guerilla fighter and a
natural leader of men, he is a tactical genius who served on Chiang
Kai-shek’s staff and rose to become President of the Military
Academy. A little later he left the Nationalists and threw in his lot
with the Red Army. At twenty-eight he was given command of the First
Red Army Corps, a unit that is said never to have been defeated. Lin
Piao was to the Chinese Communist Army what Zukov was to the Russian
Army, Chief of Staff and a military wizard.
Today, Lin, in his forties, has never gotten over his youthful
tendency to blush. His agreeable face has slanting eyes that trail
off into little mice tail wrinkles. He is a sloppy dresser and is
over-casual in appearance. He has a good singing voice and he and
Mao, who also fancies himself a singer, often join in duets. After a
hearty meal when all are feeling warm and rosy from the choicest wine
of the Communist vineyards, Lin likes to tune up his vocal chords and
suggest that they sing Mao’s special song, “The Hot Red Pepper.”
This is the story of the Red Pepper who sneers at all the lazy
vegetables for living such a spineless existence, especially the
fat and contented cabbage. Finally, the Red Pepper, by means of
his exceptional personality and cunning ways, incites them all to
revolution.
The theory, Mao says, is that pepper is loved by all revolutionaries
from Spain and Mexico to Russia. Lin, like many of the Communist
leaders, has never been out of China, but because of his excellent
articles in military magazines his name is familiar in both Japan and
Russia.
The Hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party has attached to it
a liaison officer originally from the Third Internationale, a
Syrian-American named Dr. Hatem. His Chinese name is Ma Hia-teh,
pronounced “Ma-High-Da,” and he is always referred to by the
Chinese as “Dr. Ma.” Fiftyish and fat, he is typically American
in appearance, resembling more than anything else a successful
businessman. Born in Buffalo, New York, he was educated in North
Carolina and in Switzerland where he is said to have received a
degree in medicine. He has been with the Communists now for about
twelve years. So completely submerged is he in Communist ideologies,
he insists he has forgotten his American name.
Proud of having an ardent foreign convert, the Communists still do
not trust Dr. Hatem politically, although they use him wherever
they need information from Americans. Because of his ingratiating
manner, he is a natural to make lonely Americans open up their hearts
to an old friend from home. He enjoys strutting about among his
Chinese and foreign friends and bragging about his connections. His
chief value to the Communists, however, is his ability to evaluate
American newscasts. In the summer of 1946, he was seen almost daily
at the fashionable Peking Hotel, immaculately groomed and wearing
well-tailored clothes. There he spent hours eating and drinking with
the foreign diplomats and correspondents.
Married to a Chinese movie actress—they all lean in that direction—he
has a son about three or four years old. Mrs. Ma is a graduate of
the Lu Hsun Art Academy, formerly the Catholic Church in Yenan, and
is accustomed to wearing silk and using cosmetics. She finds it
quite a bore to obey the Communist dictates of “cotton clothes and
no make-up,” and on several occasions she has been called down for
making a “spectacle” of herself. Being a Russian-language student and
much younger than her husband, she was constantly in the company of
a young Russian doctor who was part of the Soviet liaison group in
Yenan.
Dr. Ma is a most enthusiastic Communist worker, who has remarked many
times that he would gladly “kill for the Cause.” He has been known to
add with emphasis, “And I would just as soon kill Americans as anyone
else!” He is said, despite his loose tongue, to stand well with
Moscow because he is such a willing tool.
No panorama of Communist personalities can be complete without the
name of Madame Sun Yat-sen, famous in Chinese history as the wife
of the founder of the Revolution that overthrew the Manchu Dynasty.
Madame Sun, sister of the celebrated Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and the
slightly less illustrious Madame H. H. Kung, is known widely as “one
of the famous Soong Sisters.” The middle one of the three—Eiling,
Chingling and Meiling—Chingling is listed on the new governmental
roster as Soong Chingling, perhaps to cause less embarrassment to her
family. She is in charge of the so-called “independent liberals” in
the Party.
Under her maiden name, this clever conniver has had a somewhat stormy
career. Claiming that she shuns publicity, she has, nevertheless,
managed to stay in the limelight a large part of her life. The
daughter of Charlie Soong, a wealthy merchant who had been reared by
a missionary and educated in America, she was one of six children and
is said to have been her mother’s favorite. Chingling has been called
a pretty child and a not-so-pretty child, so that one might infer
that her beauty lies rather in her personality than in her face. As
a young girl, she was on the “dreamy” side, rather shy but highly
emotional. When she is deeply aroused over a person or a cause, she
becomes enthusiastic to the point of fanaticism, a quality that has
proved alarming and distressing to the other members of her family.
Educated in the United States, she adopted the American name of
“Rosamond,” by which her classmates at Wesleyan College, in Macon,
Georgia, called her affectionately. Her teachers said that she was
“very studious, had high ideals and was extremely interested in
moral and philosophical ideas.” No timid flower, she showed a fiery
temper when provoked. Very proud of her country and interested in its
affairs, she often said that she considered the Revolution of 1911
the “Greatest event of the Twentieth Century.”
“Rosamond’s” English was excellent, and she wrote numerous articles
for the college paper, one of which read: “When China moves, she
will move the world. The Revolution has established China in Liberty
and Equality, those two inalienable rights of the individual....”
A copy of this was sent to her father, who was so pleased with his
daughter that he forwarded to her one of the new five barred flags of
the Republic of China. On receiving it, Chingling shouted with joy,
climbed up and pulled down the dragon banner from the wall of her
bedroom, and stomped on it crying, “Down with the dragon! Up with the
flag of the Republic!”
While still in college, Chingling began a hero worship of Dr. Sun.
When she returned to China, she shocked everyone by announcing
her determination to marry him—this, although he was married to a
woman his own age who had borne him three sons, of whom Dr. Sun Fo
undoubtedly is the best known. Subsequently she became his secretary
and, with skill and determination, aided by her youth and beauty, she
finally overcame all obstacles and, in 1915, became the second Madame
Sun Yet-sen. Basking in all the excitement and publicity she so
“abhorred,” she wrote to a classmate back at Wesleyan, “Being married
to Dr. Sun is just like going to school all over again, only there
are no examinations to take!”
The marriage lasted until Dr. Sun’s death, in 1925. They had the
usual ups and downs, but she reported to her friends from time to
time that “it never lacks excitement.” The Revolution inspired by
her husband, Communistic in its original structure, shifted back and
forth from reactionary to conservative to reactionary.
On the death of Dr. Sun, the reins of the revolution were put
into the hands of Madame Sun’s brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek.
Never in harmony, politically or emotionally, Chiang and Mme. Sun
had had many violent disagreements. Finally, in 1927, two years
after her husband’s death, she confirmed her leftist sympathy by
going to Moscow. There she remained for three years, studying
Communist doctrines in the World Anti-Imperialist League. In
self-justification, she claimed that the Nationalist Government had
distorted the meaning of her husband’s original ideas, that they had
always been similar to those of the Russian Revolution.
Again, in 1930, Mme. Sun, the former Soong Chingling, burst into
print in an angry tirade against the Generalissimo. On January 22nd
of that year, she sent a cable to the Anti-Imperialist League in
Berlin, saying: “Reactionary forces in the Nationalist Government
are combining with the Imperialists in brutal repression against the
Chinese masses. They have degenerated into Imperialist tools and
attempted to provoke war with Russia.”
Feeling ever closer to the Communists and farther, ideologically,
from the rest of her family, she chose the anniversary of the
eightieth birthday of her predecessor, the first Madame Sun, to
take her stand, in 1946, in favor of the Chinese Communists and
the Soviets. Her stinging speech was headlined in every Chinese
newspaper and many abroad. There could be no doubt now that she was
a full-fledged militant Communist, willing to use the powers of her
brilliant mind and persuasive personality to the utmost.
Today, nearing sixty, she is third Vice-Chairman of the Communist
Party, and her influence is, perhaps, the strongest and most forceful
of any women member, so global are her contacts. Soon after her
“elevation” to the third Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
early in 1950, she said: “China will continue to follow the policy
of leaning to one side, to the side led by the great Soviet Union
under the leadership of the mighty Stalin: the side of peace and
construction.”
A current rumor, despite denials, is to the effect that Mme. Sun may
be having another change of ideas and ideals and is, therefore, not
in the good graces of General Mao who, like his mentors, Stalin and
Genghis Khan, hates a turncoat.
In appearance, Madame Sun is not unattractive. She dresses simply,
preferring plain silks without the elaborate trimmings so dearly
loved by her sisters. She wears her neat, black hair parted in the
center and drawn back smoothly from her face to form a large, soft
“bun” at the nape of her neck. She speaks in a quiet voice and says
exactly what she thinks.
At the Shanghai Opera one evening in 1946, Madame Wei Tao-ming, wife
of the then Chinese Ambassador to the United States, was seated just
behind her. Madame Sun, who was flanked on either side by well-known
Chinese and American Communists, turned around at each intermission
to chat with Madame Wei, who had been one of the youngest and most
devout revolutionaries. I learned the subject of the conversations
that evening when we returned to Madame Wei’s temporary home in the
Avenue Lafayette. Livid with rage, Madame Wei said to me:
“Do you know what she kept saying to me, over and over again?”
Naturally I could not have known and said as much. Madame Wei
continued:
“She berated me bitterly for not being nicer to the Communists! Me,
of all people, who was one of the first and hardest working fighters
in her husband’s own revolution! She said, ‘You’re going to regret it
one day, if you do not change your attitude. They are in the driver’s
seat, and they are going to stay there’!”
I had never seen Madame Wei so beside herself with anger. This
was just four years before it was generally acknowledged that
the Communists were in full authority, and the period of tenure
is a matter of conjecture. Madame Sun, apparently, had seen the
handwriting on the wall and had interpreted it correctly.
* * * * *
While there are many other Communist personalities aside from those
discussed in the foregoing pages, to mention them all would do no
service to this story. Those included are the ones whose names appear
most frequently in the press and on the radio. To know them and their
ways is to know the spirit and the methods of the unholy movement to
which they subscribe.
CHAPTER IV
_Communism’s Forebears_
Who are these people who have conquered most of Europe and Asia and
openly flaunt their determination to conquer the world? Where did
they come from? How have they been able to enslave approximately nine
hundred million people? Do they really have the secrets of the A and
H bombs? Will they use them to fulfill their diabolical schemes? And
when?
The answers to these questions are vital to all people—to every
American, man, woman and child. Not even in the days of Genghis
Khan was there such a tremendous upheaval over so vast an area of
the earth’s surface, as the one we are witnessing, as we pass the
half-way mark of the Twentieth Century.
Long before Moses was found in the bullrushes, the people who lived
in the Northern steppe lands sucked hardship from their mothers’
breasts and grew into sturdy savages, mortally feared by their
neighbors. They were Asiatics, that is, they belonged to the Yellow
Race, the best known tribes of which are the Huns, the Mongols and
the Tartars. Today, “Mongol” is the common name given to people
comprising nearly all of Central Asia. Destiny gave a strange role to
these fearless nomads. Blood-thirsty and aggressive, time and again
they burst the seams of their homelands and overran most of Europe
and Asia. Each time they rose to world conquest, the pattern followed
was the same. Guided by the genius of a merciless and brilliant
individual, the dominant tribe or clan ran the full gamut from
tribal communism, necessary in the early days for self-preservation
and mutual benefit, to communistic imperialism. As the tribes grew
larger and more powerful, and the value of the spoils increased
enormously, several leaders struggled for complete control. This
struggle ended in a period of despotic dictatorship, when one man
gained supreme power and wielded it ruthlessly. The period of
oppression lasted, at various times in the past, anywhere from a
few years to a few hundred years, depending upon the foresight and
strategy of the rulers. Invariably, the dictatorship disintegrated,
and the empires fell into dissolution and decline, followed by
desolation and chaos. The method by which each nomad chieftain rose
to power was strikingly similar. He would consistently strengthen his
armies and trap his victims by guile, trickery, infiltration, and
every known deceit.
Succession to the leadership of the clan, tribe or nation was not
necessarily hereditary. It could pass from father to son or outside
the family, just as in the Soviet Hierarchy today succession
passes from Party member to Party member. Then, as now, it was the
strongest physically, and the cunningest mentally, who always assumed
leadership.
These primitive conquerors had several great advantages over their
more civilized neighbors. One was their extraordinary physical
stamina. The weeding out of the weak began practically at birth.
Children, weaned from mother’s milk, were fed on mare’s milk for a
few years and then were left to care for themselves as best they
could.
As clans gathered around the open fires, where all the food was
cooked in huge pots, the strongest men ate first; the aged and women
next; and the children were left to fight over the bones and scraps.
Food was abundant in the spring when mutton, game and fish were
available. In the early winter the hordes lived largely on millet,
and fermented mare’s milk. The latter had a high alcoholic content
and was quite “heady” for the younger children. By the end of the
winter, the clansmen were reduced to foraging and making raids on the
herds of other tribes. The old and weak were left to perish. Only the
hardiest survived.
Another great advantage of the militant nomads over their victims
was their ability to ride the horse. Everywhere else in the ancient
world, this animal was used only to draw the heavy war chariots.
The Mongols, fearing nothing, mastered the horse and became expert
cavalrymen. The resulting mobility was a tremendous asset in warfare.
Without the horse, the Mongols would never have been able to conquer
such vast territories. Learning to ride as children of three or four,
they were superb horsemen in their early manhood and hunted with
consummate skill. When they appeared upon the horizon in a cloud of
dust and with a clatter of hooves, it was only a matter of minutes
before each dropped down like an eagle upon his prey.
Of even more strategic importance was their conception of the fifth
column. Poor always, in comparison with their neighbors, whose lands
and goods they coveted, they—like their Russian descendants—developed
a technique of boring from within. Ahead of them were sent
humble-looking barterers or beggars, who easily bribed and cajoled
their way inside the walls of a city. At the critical moment, the
unfortunate citizens would find their gates open and hordes of wild
tribesmen bursting in upon them with bloodcurdling yells.
Whether at home or in the field, these nomads lived in yurts, or
domelike tents, made of felt and mounted on wooden carts, drawn by
oxen. They spent most of their days on horseback, hunting, fishing
and constantly fighting among themselves and with neighboring clans.
Often they remained in the saddle for days, eating little or no food.
Between each major conquest, there were long periods when fighting
was confined to the steppe lands. It was only when an outstanding
genius appeared that they attempted the invasion of the more
civilized countries—Europe, China or the Near East—which, throughout
the ages, were constantly on the defensive against them.
One of the first of these tribes that grew to world power was led
by Attila the Hun, in the Fifth Century. Slashing and murdering his
way through Europe, he terrorized the entire continent and captured
the greatest city of antiquity, Rome. Earlier, when Rome fell to the
Goths, the citizens though that surely the end of the world had come.
It was not until the Huns attacked, however, that they felt the full
fury of Asiatic destruction and torture.
Attila was a typical Mongol of his day. Shaggy-headed, dirty and
disheveled, his gorilla-like appearance evoked as much terror as if
he had been a wild animal. With as little regard for human suffering
as for the priceless treasures of Rome, he was lustful only for
power, wine and women. He is said to have kept a huge harem, and,
like his followers, to have left countless children by captured
slaves all over Europe and Asia. Because of his merciless brutality,
plundering and rape, he was called by his victims, “The Scourge of
God.”
In 451 A. D., Attila was finally defeated, and while celebrating the
addition of a new beauty to his harem, he died. He had taken from the
world, by force, everything he wanted, because he knew no other way
to get it. His vast and powerful empire collapsed like a house of
cards and fell into utter ruin.
Approximately seven hundred years later came the most brilliant, the
most destructive, and the most incredible of all the forerunners of
Communism, Genghis Khan. He conquered not only the major part of
Europe and almost all of Northern Asia, but also established powerful
dynasties in Persia and China.
Born in 1162 A. D., Genghis Khan, at thirteen, succeeded his
father as Chief of the Yakka Mongols. A robust lad, he was tall
and broad-shouldered. His eyes set far apart, unlike those of the
Mongols, did not slant and were a curious shade of green. He had high
cheekbones and a sloping forehead beneath abundant red hair, which he
wore in long braids down his back. His was a striking personality. He
was as different from the other members of his horde in appearance as
he was in mentality.
In his early years, Genghis wore the simple clothing of his
tribesmen, consisting of skins sewn together with sinews. Frequently
he greased his body to keep out the cold and moisture when it was
necessary to sleep in the snow. He ate raw meat, and drank mare’s
milk and sometimes blood which he let from the veins of his horses’
legs. Mentally the equal of any Caucasian, he undoubtedly had
European blood in his veins. Perhaps that of a Princess, who knows?
Although this despot had an ungovernable temper and a wrath that
could terrorize the strongest, he also had the capacity to make firm
and lasting friends and loyal followers. He spoke thoughtfully and
deliberately and is said to have remarked many times, “Monasteries
and Temples breed mildness of character, but it is only the fierce
and warlike who dominate mankind.” His eloquence could spellbind the
masses.
He was an expert with the bow and arrow. His physical strength
made him the leader of the wrestlers. He had been known to pick up
an opponent, hold him high above his head, then break his back as
though it were a bamboo reed! He enjoyed wrestling matches only when
they rivaled the Roman gladiators, when the bones of the weaker
adversaries were broken and crushed. He despised weakness of any
kind, for he himself was a match for any man, and he had never been
bested at any sport. Born of a race unwashed and illiterate, he
raised his tribe of unknown barbarians to a position of world renown.
Believing firmly that the Mongols were the natural masters of the
world, he also was convinced that he had been chosen by Destiny
to lead and control them. Thus impelled, this amazing barbarian,
starting with only a tribe of wild nomads, finally conquered
everything from Armenia to Korea, and from Tibet to the Volga River.
After Genghis Khan had subdued all of China, he settled down and
developed into a typical oriental potentate. He lived in splendor
on the present site of Peking, a far cry from his earlier primitive
tent on the Gobi desert. Just so, in 1949, Mao Tse-tung sprang from
the mud caves of Yenan to the palaces of Peking as China’s Number One
dictator. Here, in this ancient city, Genghis, as Emperor, surrounded
himself with courtiers and officials, as well as with wives,
concubines and slaves.
He held high court and worked on affairs of state in a high pavilion
of white felt, lined with treasured silk. Here also he entertained
his friends and kept a silver table on which sat vessels of fermented
mare’s milk and bowls of meat and fruit for their pleasure. Dressed
in a lavishly embroidered robe and wearing a long and flaming beard,
he sat at state functions on a dais at the far end of the pavilion.
With him on a low bench sat Bourtai, his favorite wife. She was the
real love of his life, and he claimed only the children born by her
as his own. The Empress was small and dainty, with beautiful features
and long hair braided with jewels and heavy coins. She was the mother
of three sons who were destined to rule at a later period a domain
larger than Rome’s. Other wives and concubines grouped themselves at
his left, on lower platforms. His nobles sat on benches around the
walls of the building, wearing long coats, bound around with enormous
bright-colored silken girdles, and large, uptilted felt hats. In the
center of the pavilion glowed a great fire made of thorns and dung.
There was utter silence when Genghis spoke. His word was absolute
law. It is said, “Any who disobeyed his word was like a stone dropped
into deep water, or as an arrow among the reeds.”
Genghis Khan was almost as superstitious as he was brilliant.
Believing that the character of every animal was in its heart, he
hunted lions and tigers with great zest, preferring to capture them
alive. He tore them open with his bare hands, pulled out the heart,
and ate it while it was still throbbing. Convinced that this gave him
the courage of a savage beast, he compelled his men to follow his
example.
A military genius, he is known as the greatest guerilla fighter in
history, but his real life work was the molding together of his
vast hordes into a disciplined, well equipped, highly trained, and
completely organized army. He used the forced labor of subjugated
people—a significant parallel to the present day methods of Stalin,
who, in order to increase the efficiency of his armies, drafted
into them German scientists, artisans and technicians, as well as
thousands of humbler laborers.
Genghis acquired, ultimately, over four hundred thousand warriors,
countless elephant and camel trains loaded with the wealth of
Croesus, and multitudes of armed slaves. “Unmatched in human valor,”
it is said, “his hordes overcame the terrors of barren wastes, of
mountains and seas, the severities of climate and the ravages of
famine and pestilence. No dangers could appall them, no prayer for
mercy could move them.”
Genghis Khan was the symbol of a new power in history. The ability of
one man to alter human civilization began with him and ended with his
grandson Kublai Khan, when the Mongol empires began to crack. It did
not reappear again until the rise of Stalin to power.
The vast empires that Genghis established, with their accompanying
devastation, was not all that he achieved. Had this been so, he would
have been merely another Attila destroying with little or no definite
purpose. His genius for organization and his clever statesmanship
made him the model of kings, although he could not read or write when
he drew up the incomparable “Yassa,” or code of conduct. This curious
document, not unlike the dictates of Stalin, had three main purposes:
to ensure absolute obedience to Genghis Khan; to bind together all
the nomad clans for the purpose of making war; and to punish swiftly
and mercilessly, anyone who violated the law, civil, military or
political. With the “Yassa,” he and his heirs ruled their empires
for three generations. The lash of its ruthless authority held it
together.
Genghis died in 1227 A. D., leaving the greatest empires and the
most destructive armies the world had ever known to that day. Not
until the advent of the Tartars, a few centuries later, did another
Asiatic tribe rise to world power. Led by fearless Tamerlane, they
also laid waste everything in their path, in the savage manner of
their predecessors. Once again the pattern was repeated. It is
characteristic of the empires built by the steppe nomads that they
were not the result of gradual development and expansion, but the
product of a rapid growth under the leadership of a single powerful
man. These men all seem to have had an evil genius for political
intrigue, for exacting fanatical loyalty among their followers, and
for devising ways to conquer many times their own numbers.
The aim of each of these Asiatic conquerors was to control the vast
area of the world from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe. They
planned the overthrow, by force and violence, if need be, of all
other governments and peoples in their path. Czarist Russia, in
1905, achieved the geographical empires of Genghis Khan, actually
peopled by descendants of the same racial elements. Had they not been
defeated subsequently by the Japanese, the Czars and their successors
probably would have controlled all of China. In this new grouping
of mankind, however, it was the half-Tartar Russians and not the
Mongols, who were the dominant military factor. Today, the ruling
power comes from Moscow, and not from the Mongolian East, except for
the infusion of Chinese blood that has resulted from seven hundred
years of constant conflict with the Celestial Empire.
With the discovery of America and her tremendous natural resources,
the lust for world dominion has increased. Today, Stalin has
ambitions for global mastery. His first tools of conquest are the
Communists in every country. In February, 1947, as the Communist
Convention in London, delegates from thirty-two countries met
to reaffirm their pledges to support the Communist Party. These
Communists are not members of a political party in the American
sense; they are sinister and potentially powerful weapons of the
Soviet Government.
Everywhere today, the “New Democracy,” or early Communism, has
followed the pattern of the rise of each Asiatic despot. It repeated
itself in Moscow in the early Twenties at the death of Lenin, when
Stalin and Trotsky struggled for power. China, today, is passing from
the first stage, the period of self-denial, of sharing the wealth, of
submitting to rigid discipline and purification for “The Cause”—the
Sackcloth and Ashes stage. The Chinese Communists are beginning to
experience the progressive steps of disillusionment, apprehension and
abject terror, as was the lot of millions of Russian peasants during
the infamous Thirties.
The great and overpowering tragedy of Communism is that at no stage
or time has it ever been the shining Utopia that hypnotizes the
credulous common man and woman and some of the dreamers in high
places in our own government. It would appear that neither Marx
nor Engels understood human psychology or analyzed intelligently
the lessons of history, for Socialism, in suppressing individual
initiative, inevitably leads to I-Don’t-Care-ism. An economy based on
share-and-share-alike, without regard to individual effort, failed in
Russia because it put a premium on mediocrity and deprived man of the
fruits of his own labor. It had to be replaced with “Stakhanovitism,”
or piece work, which the American labor unions have fought constantly
in their march toward Socialism. The Russians found that the only
way to make men exert themselves without the incentive of reward
was through fear of punishment. Thus Socialism has to be enforced by
police methods to be at all effective. What is this but dictatorship?
Socialism, Communism, Stateism—these can no more be separated from
each other than can the component parts of homogenized milk.
Communist leaders, motivated by the promise of power, insist that
world revolution is inevitable. The Chinese Communists, for many
years, repeated an ancient legend. They said: “The Mongols still are
waiting in their felt tents, for the issue to be decided. They are
gathering around their yurt fires and chanting together: ‘When that
which is harder than rock and stronger than the storm winds shall
fail, the Empires of the North Court and the Empires of the South
Court shall cease to be; when the White Tsar is no more, and the Son
of Heaven has vanished, then the campfires of Genghis Khan will be
seen again, and his empire shall stretch over all the earth’.” That
prophesy is being fulfilled.
CHAPTER V
_Communist Propaganda_
Propaganda, thanks to a better understanding of mass psychology,
has become in the past few years almost an exact science as well as
an art In the hands of the Communists it is a powerful weapon, so
subtle that, as in shadow boxing, one cannot judge the exact position
of the enemy. With wily cleverness, it has perverted the meanings
of cherished words, so that great national masses of people are no
longer aware of their rightful connotations.
We, in the United States, for instance, think of Democracy as the
dictionary defines it: “Government in which the supreme power
is retained by the people.” The Communists have distorted this
by adopting the term “New Democracy,” to represent a Communist
controlled state, that is, a dictatorship.
Freedom, a beautiful word, has also been distorted. In a Western
democracy, it means “liberation from slavery,” that is, the
opportunity to work, live and play where, when and how one chooses,
in open competition. In a Communist State, none of these things
is possible. There can be no freedom where full regimentation is
required. The Soviet’s claim of freeing the peasants from onerous
landlords and the workers from grasping capitalists is only a blind.
Any poor Chinese on the street soon sadly learns that these are being
replaced by more oppressive masters, the Soviet Commissars.
Security is another wonderful word, and the Communists have been
quick to realize its universal appeal. However, they use it in a
purely economic sense, deliberately ignoring any but material values.
Their type of security can be promised only at the price of personal
freedom. It is already in operation in all penitentiaries, where the
life-term convict is fed, clothed, cared for when ill, sheltered,
entertained and protected from the harsh conditions of economic
competition. He need not worry about any of these things. Yet it is
a generally accepted fact that he would gladly and immediately trade
all of the benefits he receives from his prison incarceration for the
one little matter of Freedom.
[Illustration: _The Chinese Commissar, in the footsteps of his
Russian counterpart, reads to his military unit the daily propaganda
bulletin._]
[Illustration: _Communist Propaganda Poster captions_: HAPPY ARE
THOSE WHO WORK FOR THE PEOPLE!]
[Illustration: DRAW WATER AGAINST THE DROUGHT! _Another propaganda
poster._]
[Illustration: _Non-Communists looking at bulletin reporting expected
visit of General Marshall to Yenan. Bulletin is put out by Communist
Cultural Committee for Mass Education._]
[Illustration: _Communist propaganda poster_: PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE!]
[Illustration: _Communist propaganda picture showing how to_ RESCUE
THE WOUNDED!]
Besides twisting the meaning of words, the Communists have subtly
changed long accepted human values and relationships. By distortion
of Truth, and constant repetition of the Party Line, they gradually
paralyze all individual thinking and destroy the will to resist.
Russian propaganda is far more effective than was the German, and
their Chinese henchmen have had to modify it slightly to adapt it for
use in their country. By false promises, intimidation and persuasion,
the Communists lulled the weakened opposition and made the conquest
of China easier. When necessary, they never hesitated to use terror
and brutality. By these two means they have established a vast web of
control over the entire land of nearly five hundred million people.
The Chinese Communists have found it expedient to have two types of
propaganda: one which is directed at foreigners and follows strictly
the Moscow line; the other maintained for domestic consumption. The
home propaganda concentrates on Chinese affairs and plays down the
foreign and international angles. Slogans, or catch phrases, are
evident everywhere, on billboards, in handbills, on posters, in the
press and on the air channels. In this way, the slogans are repeated
over and over again, until everyone becomes thoroughly familiar with
them. Throughout China are heard the shouts of the victors—SERVE THE
PEOPLE! PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE! RESCUE THE WOUNDED! BEAR SONS FOR THE
PEOPLE! The latter is one of the most surprising in a land that has
an annual death rate of a million from starvation and is presently
suffering from the worst famine in years!
The slogans are often illustrated and used as picture posters.
Gay and colorful, they frequently show a prosperous looking group
standing or sitting before an enormous basket overflowing with
luscious fruits and vegetables. The caption: HAPPY ARE THOSE WHO
WORK FOR THE PEOPLE! Billboards and handbills in villages and towns
are, of necessity, simple and elementary, while in Shanghai and
other large cities they are more elaborate and sometimes quite
sophisticated.
As in Germany before the war, and in Russia today, the Chinese
concentrate on the children. These are often separated from their
families when they are very young and sent to special schools away
from their homes. The Chinese Communists, like the Soviets, are
making every effort to destroy family life and ties, since family
loyalty competes with their training program. The first and only
loyalty must be to the State. In some schools, youngsters have been
given new textbooks which begin with the verse:
“I do not love my Mama. I do not love my Papa. I love only my Country
and Mao Tse-tung.” Other books show pictures of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders and characterize them as
enemies of the State who are “to be killed on sight.”
Children, otherwise well brought up and, prior to the new schooling,
devoted to their families, return to their homes and face their
parents with: “We don’t love you any more. We are leaving home and
will fight the Nationalists ourselves, wherever we find them!”
Some of the propaganda is directed against foreigners, especially
Americans. The children are taught to repeat little songs in which
Americans are called “greedy and vicious capitalists,” and they are
shown cartoons depicting Americans as two-headed pigs being kicked
out of China.
The effect of such systematic mind-poisoning is shown in an incident
that happened in North China just before the Communists took over.
An American on a business trip watched a Chinese woman, carrying a
baby and a large bundle, attempt to cross a narrow bridge over a
little river. A tiny girl, barely old enough to walk, clung to the
mother’s skirts. The planking of the bridge was wobbly and narrow.
Realizing they could not all cross at once, the woman loosened the
child’s hands and told her: “Wait there and I’ll come back for you.”
Then, with the bundle and baby, she crossed the poorly constructed
span. The American, trying to be a good Samaritan, went toward the
stranded little girl to offer to take her across. At his approach
she screamed in terror and ran from him. Catching up with her, he
talked to her in a quiet voice for some minutes. Soon the youngster
dried her tears, accepted the man’s arms, and was carried to safety.
The mother turning to go back for the child, cried out in alarm at
seeing her in the arms of the American. With the realization that the
man meant no harm, she appeared amazed at his courtesy.
Among the near illiterate, speeches are the most effective means of
propaganda, and the Chinese Red Armies have large doses of these
inflicted upon them. The soldiers, following the example of their
Russian comrades, are briefed on when to clap and when to cheer. Like
any college football crowd, they dutifully follow the cheer leaders.
The Communists are especially proud of their so-called “Educational
Program” for soldiers, and they claim that thirty per cent of the
time allotted to military training is devoted to “cultural” and
political work. As a result of attendance at daily classes, over
eighty per cent of the troops are reported able to read elementary
Chinese characters, giving them enough background to understand
simplified Communist newspapers. These “newspapers” are filled with
news strictly censored by the leaders, and the characters learned
in school are those that enable them to read only what the posters
and textbooks say. No effort is wasted on superfluous, non-political
knowledge.
Bestowing tides as a reward is another Moscow-inspired incentive for
the soldiers, as well as for the illiterate populace. This device
is also used to encourage labor production and to throw a smoke
screen over exploitation. Labor “Heroes” and “Heroines” are greatly
admired in all Red-blighted areas, and any Communist who studies and
works hard has a chance to be thus honored and to obtain the coveted
material reward or special privilege that accompanies the title.
Russian propaganda, when modified for the Chinese, is slanted so
that it may not offend them too greatly while they are still being
taken over, that is, during the transition period of persuasion and
deception. Shortly after the capture of Tientsin, an enormous picture
of Stalin appeared beside that of Mao Tse-tung in Min Yuan Park.
The people milling around in great throngs stared up at it, some in
wonderment. One of them finally remarked, “Who is that other man?
He is not Chinese, he is a foreigner.” In order to keep the surface
smooth at first and to cause no undue alarm or suspicion among the
people, the next day Mao hung alone.
The capture of Tientsin and Peking was accomplished with
comparatively little fighting except on the outskirts of both cities.
The plans for taking Peking had been well thought out. Secret agents,
for years, had been “persuading” the people and softening up the
Nationalist troops. The actual capture was cunningly timed. The
Chinese New Year was chosen, with due respect to superstition, by the
incoming lords of the land. They allowed the people to spend three
days making their customary friendly calls upon each other, in the
ancient manner, and settling up their bills and accounts. Farmers
poured into the cities with supplies of meat and vegetables, and
the Communists bided their time while the citizenry, ate, drank and
made merry. In the Chinese calendar 1949 was the Year of the Rat, and
1950 ushered in the Year of the Cow. Time-honored superstition has it
that when, in the passage of years, the tail of the Rat touches the
horn of the Cow, times will be good, luck will change and the future
will be successful. The Chinese were all congratulating themselves
over their coming good year when the Communists, after waiting for
the psychological moment, marched their armies in and took over the
ancient capital.
The new masters gave the populace various choices of “surrender”
terms, although they did not use the expression “surrendering.”
First, the vanquished were politely invited to “Come out and join us,
for we are all brothers now.” This invitation was called the “Peking
way.” When anyone showed reluctance to accept, the “Tientsin way” was
tried. This method involved pressure, first psychological, then if
that failed, material, and finally if there was still any hesitation,
physical, in the form of more or less severe beatings. In other
words, the same old formula was at work—persuasion and then force.
The Chinese Communists, after the fall of the entire country,
copied from their Soviet comrades the trick of inviting all the
industrialists, financiers and scientists who had fled to Canton,
Hong Kong and elsewhere to return to their Northern homes, where
they could continue to operate their businesses as before. So in
1946 Stalin invited all the White Russians living in China to return
to the USSR. The old birdie in the cage trick! Persuaded that they
were going to receive fair treatment, many of the expatriate Russians
gladly gave up their jobs and homes in Shanghai and Tientsin and
spent their last dollars on passage to Siberia. No word was ever
heard from many of them, but gradually a few letters appeared,
smuggled in through Chinese friends, which told of great suffering.
A few of the hardiest escaped and returned, all with the same
story—Siberia, the salt mines, death. What happened to their Chinese
counterparts who heeded the siren song of the victors of Peking we do
not know, but we can guess.
Communist propaganda is apparent in practically every aspect of
Chinese life. Only the Opera and the Russian Ballet appear to have
remained relatively free from taint. The Reds are tremendously
proud of both of these world renowned examples of creative art and
make a great show of claiming that they are always performed in
the “original.” However, when put on before strictly indoctrinated
audiences, propaganda appears in the shape of Party line
interpretations of dances, songs and long curtain speeches. The
audience is never allowed to forget for a moment that it is there to
be instructed as well as entertained.
The basic purpose of Communist propaganda, of course, is to make
conquest as easy as possible. The Party line is fed to the people
like opium, and it dulls their senses and makes them docile. When
persuasion proves inadequate, threats and brutality are resorted
to, for in a Totalitarian State no one can remain on the fence.
Only through complete unity, voluntary or forced, can such a state
survive. It is impossible for anyone to remain non-political.
Should both persuasion and force fail, the Communists then resort
to a method which represents an all time low in evil—the use of
poisonous drugs to draw out false confessions from their victims.
This is called the “biodynamic” treatment. The drugs, “actedon”
and “mescaline” are used to paralyze the brain, then to cause its
disintegration. The doses are administered in coffee, and the victim,
with nothing else to eat or drink, consumes large quantities, which
are generously supplied, unaware of the effect being produced on
his mind and body. When the personality has been sufficiently
disintegrated or “split” by these drugs—when the sufferer has been
driven crazy—a skilled psychiatrist can put the pieces together
at his will and gradually evolve a completely new personality. In
other words, when the physical breakdown of the individual has been
accomplished, his mental collapse is brought about by the use of
these fiendish drugs.
The Communists say, “The average person can be made to give in
through brutality and fear, but in complicated cases the combination
of neurology, or brain study, chemistry and psychiatry must be used.”
Preparing the victim valuable enough for this process often takes as
long as three or four months, during which time he is jailed and kept
in solitary confinement. Frequently dozens of doctors, scientists,
and assistants are worn out in the process of treatment. It is so
diabolical that the Communists say they use it only in exceptional
cases where they feel that the results warrant a demonstration to
the public at large of their complete mastery over man.
The world now knows that this was the treatment administered in
1949 to Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the Catholic church,
Budapest; to Michael Shipkov, Bulgarian Translator for the U. S.
Legation in Sofia; and again in 1950 to Robert A. Vogeler, American
business executive in Hungary. This same heinous method has been
repeated in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Eastern Germany and
undoubtedly elsewhere throughout the world, though actual reports of
every case have not, as yet, come into print.
The use of hypnotism as a propaganda weapon and as a device for
manipulating victims also has not been overlooked by the Communists.
Dr. G. H. Estabrooks, Chairman of the Department of Psychology at
Colgate University, who has pioneered in developing hypnotism’s
wartime uses, says:
“With the Twentieth Century’s revived interest in psychology,
hypnotism has been brought to the status of a full-fledged science.”
“A person,” continues Estabrooks, “can be hypnotized against his will
or without his knowledge.”
“A foreign agent working in a hospital or a doctor in his own office
could,” he avers, “over a period of time, place thousands of people
under his power by means of fake physical examinations.”
For instance, he explains how in wartime this masked manoeuver could
enable a junior medical officer to take over the reins of the U. S.
Army and lead it into total defeat.
Hypnotism, we now know, was used in addition to drugs by the Nazis to
obtain a “confession” from Van der Lubbe at the Reichstag Trial and
also by the Soviet Union to demoralize Cardinal Mindszenty, Robert
Vogeler and others.
Mao Tse-tung, like all Moscow-trained speakers and others of their
ilk, is fully aware of the power of hypnosis over large audiences. In
the early days of victory, he spellbound his listeners not alone by
words but also by the strength of his mesmeric will.
“Make up your minds! We abhor fence straddlers. There is no middle of
the road! Not in all China, not in all the universe,” he continued.
“One must be either on the side of Imperialism or on the side of
Communism!”
In a speech commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Chinese
Communist Party, Mao, addressing a mass meeting early in 1950, said:
“Internationally, China belongs to the anti-imperialist front. To
Russia we proudly look for genuine, friendly aid, and to no other
country. The second world war, with the Soviet Union as the principle
fighting force, defeated the great Imperialist powers, Germany and
Japan. It weakened England and France, and left only one Imperialist
country in the world—the United States of America! Even _she_
suffered great losses. Her economy was smashed and her domestic
crisis is acute! There is great unrest in the country, and the people
have no leader. They are fighting among themselves. And yet she
thinks _she_ can enslave the world! She is nothing but a weakling!
By aiding Chiang Kai-shek, she is responsible for the slaughter of
millions of Chinese!”
An outburst of applause and cries of “Ding How!” (Good! Good!)
greeted his words.
Mao continued, waving his arms: “In China, some Imperialism still
exists in our ‘New Democracy,’ but we will work steadfastly for
a complete Communist Society. Our tools are the People’s Army,
Police and Communist Court. Under the leadership of the working
class, we will unite to form our own dictatorship over the lackeys
of foreign Imperialism. We will drive them out like dogs, howling
through the streets! Let us establish a People’s Dictatorship over
the reactionaries, to be known throughout the world as the People’s
Democratic Dictatorship. Let us raise China from an agricultural
country by eliminating all classes, and realizing the state of
universal fraternity!”
Another storm of applause from the duped audience followed these
closing words, along with shrill cries of “Long live our People’s
Dictatorship! Long live our Chairman Mao! Long live our Comrade
Stalin!”
CHAPTER VI
_Manchuria, the Prize_
Manchuria is the home of the Manchus who conquered China and ruled
it until 1911. It is the Prize, the bone of contention over which
the bloodiest battles have been fought, and the one area in all Asia
without which neither the Communists nor the Nationalists could hope
to become a world power.
Studded with Japanese industrial plants, Manchuria is known as the
Pittsburgh of China, due to the fact that here both coal and iron
are mined close together. Here, also, is contained seventy per cent
of the industrial potential of all China. A rugged, windy land,
much like our American prairie states, it is one of the few places
in Asia that has a food surplus and serves as the granary of that
vast region. Farmers, using shaggy Mongol ponies, till broad fields
of soybeans, millet, corn, wheat and opium poppies. With the great
abundance of grain, the people are able to produce beef and mutton
for export.
Even before the Japanese occupation, Manchuria was a thriving center,
and the conquerors, with characteristic efficiency, speeded its
industrial and agricultural development during the fourteen years
of their occupation. They developed the largest coal, iron and gold
mines in Eastern Asia. From Manchuria alone they obtained more gold
than from any other source, in addition to five million tons of iron
and steel and thirty million tons of coal every year.
The great cities in Manchuria, of which Mukden is the capital,
were modernized. New railroad lines were built into the outlying
districts, and thousands of workers, heretofore purely agricultural,
were taught to work in factories. For the first time, modern hotels
and apartments covered city blocks, and Mukden undoubtedly boasted
more bathtubs, per capita, than any other city in Asia, with the
possible exception of Shanghai.
The Generalissimo had believed that Manchuria, when it was liberated,
would become a part of the Nationalist Government. He had sent
occupation troops there, had incorporated it into his rightful
territory, and at the end of the war had already started repairing
the damage caused by the final phase of the fighting. He was unaware
of the fact that Roosevelt had promised Manchuria to Russia as her
price for entering the war against Japan. He still firmly believed
in Roosevelt’s friendship, because Roosevelt had promised that _all_
Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese would be returned to
China.
Although Russia kept a tight rein on the Prize, she did everything
she could to help and encourage the Chinese Communists. Immediately
upon entering the war, she began to supply them with arms and
ammunition captured from the Japanese. At first this was done
stealthily by the simple ruse of allowing the Chinese Communists
to “find” these supplies themselves. After V-J Day Russia made no
attempt to hide from the world her interest in, and her support of,
the Chinese Communist regime. Besides supplying arms and propaganda
material, she assisted her lusty child by hampering, in every way,
the liberation of the Nationalist troops held by the Japanese. Since
then she has continued to work closely with the Chinese Reds. Li Li
San, the Kremlin’s Chinese agent, is in command. Russia, therefore,
takes everything she desires for herself, first.
Russian Armies in the East are composed of Asiatics, closely related
geographically, racially and politically to the Chinese Communists.
In behavior they are as clumsy and vindicative as their forebears
under Genghis Khan. Many peace-loving Chinese, after experiencing Red
domination, cried out, “Six months under the Communists are worse
than fourteen years under the Japs.”
As an example of what happens when these people overrun a country,
let us examine Manchuria at close range. Russian troops taking over
the country from the Japanese stripped nearly all the factories of
machinery, but with characteristic inefficiency. When a machine to
be sent to Russia was dismantled, no effort was made to keep the
pieces together in numbered crates so they could be reassembled in
another location. On the contrary, the machines were broken down in
mass and the jumbled parts loaded into trucks or freight cars with no
regard whatever to system. Where a machine could not be brought out
through doors or windows, the whole side of a wall was pushed out and
the rubble left where it fell. Completely ignorant of the delicate
mechanism of precision instruments, they permitted them to be left
out in the rain and snow to rust into utter uselessness. Somewhere
east of the Urals, the Russians must have a tremendous pile of scrap,
if it is not scattered along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
This inability to appreciate and handle machinery may throw some
light on Russia’s frantic desire to acquire machine tools, at almost
any cost. Incidentally, the same wanton disregard of everything
technical applies to the looting of Eastern Europe.
Not only were Manchuria’s factories moved out bodily, piled onto
freight cars and, in a desultory manner, slowly moved into Siberia,
but what the troops were unable to take with them, they maliciously
destroyed. Aside from the Kremlin-activated seizure of the factories,
the primitive soldiers of the occupying forces, as well as just
common bandits, stripped Manchuria’s cities of everything that
could, by any remote chance, be useful to them. Both Chinese and
Russians followed the age old Mongolian custom and gleefully stole or
destroyed all personal property that they could get their hands on.
Even fixtures fastened to the walls were pulled out, and door knobs,
pipes and plumbing appliances were removed and turned over to the
government to be made into ammunition.
The Nationalist troops that the Generalissimo had moved in right
after V-J Day found it well-nigh impossible to defend Manchurian
property. The Chinese Communists used guerrilla warfare almost
exclusively against the villagers, their tactics being to terrorize,
kill and destroy before help could come from the Nationalist troops.
“Sack and pillage” kept the people in constant panic. In an endeavor
to isolate and defeat the Nationalists, the Communists tore up all
the railroads. Peasants were conscripted to dig up hundreds of miles
of railway track. They burned the ties, levelled the roadbeds, hid
or carried away the rails, and demolished the drainage structures.
Practically all the bridges were destroyed by explosives, all signal
towers and sidetrack mechanisms were wrecked, and every other
wanton damage that fiendish ingenuity could conceive or devise was
inflicted. As a final gesture of brutality, captured locomotive
engineers who were known to have Nationalist sympathies had their
hands cut off.
This kind of fighting completely destroyed the economy of Manchuria.
From being a food and industrial surplus area, she became
poverty-stricken. The people, living in barren houses without
furniture or utensils of any kind, were reduced to the level of
their primitive ancestors. Water became the scarcest of commodities
and, with the reservoirs destroyed, had to be brought up from the
dirty rivers in buckets. City transportation was at a premium. It
ranged from the luxury of a pedicab, to ancient carriage bodies
or automobile chassis, hauled by men, tiny ponies and dogs. A few
families found a new use for the bathtub which they had been able
to salvage. Mounted on rickety wheels, it was used as a public
conveyance, and men, women and children sat huddled together in it.
Sometimes a huge umbrella, Chinese or foreign, protected them from a
scorching sun or a driving rain. It made a grotesque picture indeed!
With the disruption of transportation and the commandeering of
much of the foodstuffs for the troops, obtaining food became the
major problem of the people of Manchuria. Starvation stalked the
cities. Mukden families were reduced to eating dung. So precious
was this commodity that every horse wore a contraption under his
tail resembling a large, crude dust pan to preserve even minute
droppings. The very poor mixed mud with the dung, and after baking
the concoction in the sun used it as food. Hawkers sold it on the
streets.
Just as the Mongols under Genghis Khan burned, looted and tortured
when they invaded Cathay, so the modern Mongols have behaved in
like manner. Some of the more decent among them were so outraged by
these tactics that they deserted and joined the Nationalists. One,
a Colonel, told how he had been ordered to round up bandits and
drive them at bayonet point into villages. Here they were allowed to
pillage, burn and rape to their hearts’ content. While this was being
done, the Communists would remain hidden a short distance away. After
the terror had subsided somewhat, when the village was reduced to
a shambles and the inhabitants were all but insane, the Communists
soldiers would rush in and shoot the bandits, ostensibly to rescue
the villagers. This technique seldom failed to swell the Communist
ranks. All who resisted conversion were, of course, subjected to more
drastic treatment.
Another ex-Communist told of teaching little boys of ten and twelve
to use knives and pistols to murder members of their own families
who refused to cooperate with the Reds. The child criminals became
fugitives and were forced to join the guerrillas in the hills.
Many of the well-to-do managed to get away, where, no one knew, but
the poor, aged and helpless were not exempt from the senseless fury
of the Mongol hordes. They were used at times as object lessons to
demonstrate the pitiless power of the Red Terror. According to an
eye witness, the hands of women and children were sometimes smashed
with mallets and left dangling like raw hamburgers. These utterly
miserable creatures wandered insanely through the streets, moaning
pitifully and gradually dying from loss of blood, infection and
unendurable pain.
At other times, the Communists tied bombs around the bodies of men
and women, carted them to thickly populated areas, lighted the fuses
and left them to explode. This invariably happened at night, when
the effect was more terrifying. These human torches were supposed
to be the unreliable Quislings. The method of their disposal by the
Reds shows how the latter are running true to form. In the days of
Genghis Khan a Quisling was despised. When he had served his purpose,
he was taken out and his throat was slit. As an example, there is
the story of the Battle of Samarkand, when thirty thousand Kankali
Turks, seeing that the victory was going against them, and hoping
to save their lives, deserted to the Mongols. They were received in
a friendly manner and shown every courtesy. Equipped with Mongol
military dress and weapons, they felt welcome and honored. But, alas,
after being royally wined and dined, they were massacred to a man.
Like Stalin, the Mongols had utter contempt for such people.
Conquering armies, however, sometimes get a dose of their own
medicine, and, when they do, it is apt to be fatal. At least it
proved so in the case of the forty Russian soldiers who looted a
Japanese hospital near Mukden. Finding a large vat of alcohol in the
basement, they spent a riotous night, drinking and carousing. The
next morning an officer found all forty of them dead. Evidently they
had never heard of “rubbing” alcohol.
Today, in Manchuria, the Chinese Communists, aided by Russian
technicians and advisors, are rebuilding the country for their
own advantage. It is said that Stalin will use Manchuria as an
experimental training station for Communism. He now controls the
reconstructed railways in and out of this highly strategic area and
requires banks to give them fifty to sixty per cent of their loans
for industrial developments. Some private businesses were told that
they would not be molested, provided they would do all they could to
boost production under Communist supervision. During the last three
years of civil war in China, the Manchurian farmers turned over
4,500,000 tons of grain to the Communists. In spite of this, they are
being urged to PRODUCE FOR THE PEOPLE!—to raise more and more grain
to be exported to Siberia. In Russia’s grandiose scheme of developing
Siberia with Chinese slave labor, the wealth of Manchuria is her
greatest industrial asset.
In contrast to Stalin’s close personal supervision of Manchuria,
experts seem agreed that he will leave China pretty much alone, for
the time being, and let Mao and other leaders of the moment believe
that they are solidifying their positions. Sometime within the next
one, two or three years, he may “liquidate” or “retire” them all and
replace them with the out-and-out Russian Commissars. How soon Stalin
will be able to accomplish this, time alone will tell.
CHAPTER VII
_The Tragedy of the Generalissimo_
Any account of conditions in China today would be incomplete without
mentioning the Nationalist Government and what it attempted to
achieve.
The political and social revolution inside China has been in progress
many years, and these years have been turbulent ones. The Chinese,
largely illiterate, were for a long time completely isolated. Many
believed that China was the entire world and that a “foreigner” was a
Chinese from another province. Patriotism was felt by them only where
the home and family were concerned.
In 1911, Dr. Sun Yet-sen led a successful revolution and overthrew
the Manchu Dynasty. Desiring to make China a modern republic, he
proclaimed as his aim: “To dedicate the few score perishable years of
our life to the laying of an imperishable foundation for our Nation.”
To this end he gave his life.
The educated Chinese then began the creation of a modern, unified and
democratic country. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, co-founder of the
revolution of 1911, became its second leader in 1925, on the death of
Dr. Sun. China knew no other leader until 1949.
In the beginning, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Parties were
one and the same. They were _the_ Revolutionary Party. An admirer of
the United States and Great Britain, Dr. Sun first requested their
help in reorganizing and revitalizing his country, but they refused.
With no alternative, he was forced to accept the aid of Russian
revolutionaries who jumped at the chance to tie China up with their
own impending revolution. Working with the famous Communist, Adolph
Joffe, Dr. Sun drew up the policy of the new government. However,
not all the Chinese revolutionaries were radical. Some were moderate
liberals, and many were wealthy conservatives who desired only a
more modern setup than the Manchus had. Among the latter the Soong
family is certainly the best known. This family cleverly safeguarded
its future by marrying one of its charming daughters, Chingling, to
Dr. Sun Yat-sen; another, Meiling, to Chiang Kai-shek; and a third,
Eiling, to Dr. H. H. Kung, a 75th lineal descendant of Confucius.
This last was of definite psychological significance, as it united
the mighty Soong family with that of China’s most revered Saint.
When Chiang Kai-shek inherited the mantle of Sun Yat-sen, he
determined to carry out the policy of the revolution. His actions
followed his words. Enormous progress was made during the so-called
“Golden Decade,” between 1927 and 1937. China made a beginning toward
industrialization and economic stability and improved her educational
facilities.
This was the age of enormous industrial expansion. Railroads were
constructed, telephone lines built, and even radio was introduced.
Electricity and power plants were created, and merchants did a
flourishing business. Tourist trade was at its height, and Chinese
and American importers were cooperating harmoniously. Everyone
_seemed_ to be better off than before, the poor as well as the rich.
Chinese Communist Party Koumintang
1910 Period of +————————————+ 1910
1912 | | Dr. Sun Yat-Sen 1911
1914 Socialist | | Republican
1916 Activity | | Regime 1912
1918 |_Revolution_| Kuomintang
| _and_ | Government
1920 Birth of Chinese |_Warlordism_|
1922 Communist Party | | 1921
| | Period of
| | Cooperation
1924 Period of | | Death of Dr. Sun,
1926 | | Advent of
1928 Russian | | Chiang Kai-shek
1930 +————+ +—————+ 1927
1932 Interference |
1934 _Single | Party_ Hide and
1936 “Long March” | Seek Period
+————+ +—————+
|_Revolution_|
1938 Marco Polo | _and_ |
Bridge |_Civil War_ | Reconciliation 1937
+————+ +—————+ Period of Mixed
1940 “Yenan | | Civil War,
1942 Interlude” | | Cooperation and
1944 | | Anti-Japanese
| | Activities
| | 1945
1946 Period of | | End of
American +————+ +—————+ Japanese War
1948 Interference | |
|_Civil War_ | 1949
1950 USSR and British | | Retreat to
Recognition | | Formosa 1950
_Chart showing origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the
Nationalist Party, or Koumintang (KMT), as the latter frequently was
called_
Thousands of Chinese enthusiastically took part in helping to build
this New China, and every effort was made to instill a real spirit of
Nationalism in the hearts of the people. To quote the Generalissimo,
“If the National Revolution should fail, China, as a nation, would
have nothing to rely upon. Should this happen, not only would China
cease to rank as one of the Four Powers of the world, but she would
be at the mercy of other countries.”
The period of progress, unhappily, was short lived. It had become
obvious to the Japanese war lords that a patriotic, united China
might, on the one hand, prove an insurmountable obstacle to their
own plan to conquer and control all of Asia. On the other hand, it
would be too sweet a plum to pass up! Twice during the Thirties they
shelled Shanghai and in 1939 launched a full scale war of aggression.
All of the cities along the coast were captured, and the Chinese were
forced to move far inland.
Led by the Generalissimo, thousands of Chinese moved whole libraries,
printing presses, government records and valuables laboriously up
the Yangtse River to the city of Chungking. Every kind of river
craft was used from a few modern boats to small sampans, junks and
home-made rafts pushed by hand. All had to be either lifted out of
the water and carried around the rapids in the river or be abandoned.
Many families travelled on foot, each member carrying a bundle on
his back. Even children of four and five had their small belongings
wrapped in a large scarf and tied to the end of a stick slung over
their shoulders. The road along the river valley became lined with
food vendors and shoemakers who did a big business in woven straw
sandals. Professors, surrounded by their students carrying modern
books or ancient Chinese written scrolls, conducted classes during
their periods of rest. United with their leader against a foreign
enemy, the people of China revered and respected the Generalissimo.
At last the long procession of uprooted patriots reached its
destination, Chungking, and here Chiang set up his military
headquarters and conducted his affairs of State. The Japanese, unable
to reach the city by land, attacked almost nightly by air. Without
anti-aircraft guns or planes of their own, the Chinese suffered
terrible civilian casualties. A great part of the city was burned by
incendiary bombs.
On the ruins of the old city, Madame Chiang Kai-shek proceeded
to build a model village, with schools, nurseries, libraries and
churches such as she had known in America. The project proved a
wonderful morale builder. Everybody for miles around took part in the
construction of the unique little city, and it became the center of a
broader undertaking known as “The New Life Movement.”
In this new village, personal habits of cleanliness and sanitation
were taught and ways of being mutually helpful suggested. Concerts
and community singing were held almost nightly. The Generalissimo,
wishing to emphasize unselfish cooperation, expressed the philosophy
of the movement in four simple words: “Honesty, Industry, Sincerity
and Justice.” There developed, among these people at least, a feeling
of pride and unity that was well on the way to becoming national
patriotism. This new spirit of oneness in the face of common danger
was greater than at any time since Emperor Chin caused the Great Wall
to be built in 214 B. C. to keep the Huns from invading his Empire.
The Generalissimo’s gallant stand against the modern war machines
and trappings of the Japanese added shining pages to the history of
China. History will record a full realization of the importance of
his contributions to the United States in World War II. After Pearl
Harbor, while the Japanese won many military successes against the
Americans and the British, Chiang’s determination to stay in the
fight saved countless American lives. The Japanese were forced to
keep a million and a half of their best troops in China, although
these were needed desperately in the East Indies and the Islands of
the Pacific, where they were trying to stop the Allied advance under
General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. We in the United States, for
the first time, became dimly aware of what a capable and relentless
foe the Japanese could be and of the tremendous battle the Chinese
had long been fighting.
The Chinese have never been a warlike nation. Their industrial
development was comparable to that of Europe in the Middle Ages.
Therefore, their political and economic structures were totally
unable to meet the demands of a modern military struggle with
Japan. Regardless of how little they had, however, they fought
doggedly against increasing odds. When all surface communication
with the outside world was cut off, their resistance forces burrowed
underground.
Several times the Japanese offered the Generalissimo very attractive
peace terms, but he resolutely declined them. He had promised to
stick with his Allies to the end, to give them his _full_ assistance
to achieve a decisive victory. His confidence in Roosevelt was
complete, and, like a great many Americans, British and others,
Chiang believed Roosevelt incapable of injustice. He was undoubtedly
familiar with the discussions at the Cairo Conference when Roosevelt,
in mock seriousness, said to Churchill:
“I think all of the Chinese territory liberated from the Japanese
during the war should be returned to China, including Hong Kong.”
Churchill, jumping to his feet, said emphatically, “I will never
permit the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese!”
“Then I will take the matter up, personally, with your King!” said
Roosevelt.
“The King of England has no authority to give away Imperial
Territory,” shouted Churchill. “I alone hold that power!”
Roosevelt laughed heartily. He always enjoyed baiting Churchill,
because the latter was so hot tempered and quick to jump whenever he
was goaded.
Chiang took Roosevelt seriously.
During the years of the Japanese war, the Generalissimo also had to
contend with the Communists. The Chinese Red Armies, while giving lip
service to anti-Japanese activity, were in fact so placed militarily
as to be facing the Nationalist troops, rather than the Japanese!
It is true that the Communists made a number of raids on isolated
Japanese posts, but this they did with the purpose of capturing
soldiers whom they could then indoctrinate with Communist propaganda.
Naturally the Japanese resented these raids and retaliated.
Consequently, there were skirmishes now and then, but they were of
little importance. The fact still remains that the Japanese fought
their major war against the Generalissimo’s Armies. Wherever and
whenever possible, the Chinese Communist Armies helped the enemy by
attacking Nationalist-held towns and lines of communication.
The Japanese surrender, when it finally came, was received with great
jubilation throughout China and the world. It was indeed a triumphant
hour for the Generalissimo. Now, at long last, he was in a position
to undertake a peaceful rehabilitation of his country and to pick up
where he had left off when the Japanese struck. He could go forward
with his program of political and social reforms and establish, first
of all, a sound economy. The stage was set for his dreams to become
a reality—the dream that China would take her rightful place in the
world of democratic nations.
Although the American Ambassador, General Patrick J. Hurley, had told
Chiang of the decision at Yalta to give Manchuria to Russia as her
price for entering the war against Japan, the Generalissimo believed
so firmly in the good will and friendship of Roosevelt that he was
sure he would be supported in his effort to regain this important
Northern province. Therefore, as soon after the Japanese surrender as
possible, he sent troops to occupy and try to hold Manchuria. There
his army found itself confronted by the Russian Mongolian Army bent
on the same mission.
At home, likewise, the Generalissimo was faced with ever-increasing
problems. The Allied and Japanese bombing had caused great
destruction, not unlike that in Europe. Villages had to be rebuilt,
factories and lines of communication restored. Millions of displaced
Chinese were waiting patiently to be returned to their homes.
Approximately three and a half million Japanese soldiers and
civilians were ready for repatriation.
With great courage, inexhaustible patience and amazing wisdom, Chiang
Kai-shek began his program of reconstruction and rehabilitation. He
little realized that his three great Allies—Russia, England and the
United States—had plotted behind his back to snatch from his hands,
in his moment of victory, the one area that could change China from
a backward agricultural country into a modern and powerful nation.
Without Manchuria Chiang was lost. This was the juicy bone that first
the Japanese, then the Communists or the Generalissimo had to have
to complete their growth as a modern power. Without it each would be
rendered impotent.
Chiang Kai-shek had fought for eight years to prevent the spread of
Japanese totalitarianism in China. Now he was confronted with a much
more vicious brand, Communist totalitarianism. He commented, “The
Japanese were a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of
the bone.”
Many people wonder why the Nationalist Armies were so ineffective and
why so many of them went over to the Communists without even putting
up a fight. Certainly the bulk of the Chinese are not disposed to
Communism. They just want an opportunity to feed, clothe and shelter
their families. Most of them do not understand Communism or any other
political philosophy. Some accepted the new leadership through sheer
inertia. Some of them leaned toward it in protest against stupid and
oppressive government police measures, corrupt practices and bad
administration. Squeeze, or graft as we call it, was never a crime in
China. The Chinese people have no sense of political right or wrong,
no convictions about political truths as the Western world recognizes
them. As one Chinese General put it, “To take from the government is
no crime.” Indeed the principal weakness of the Generalissimo was the
very fact that he surrounded himself with men who did not hesitate to
take all they could get from the government.
Chiang showed the same loyalty to those who surrounded him and
supported him, including members of his own and his wife’s families,
as President Truman, for instance, has demonstrated in his loyalty
to the Pendergast machine and others who have done his bidding.
The Generalissimo’s honesty and personal integrity have never been
questioned by those who know him best, and who were in constant
association with him during the Japanese war. General Wedemeyer
has attested to this statement and he was the American Chief of
Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and knew him intimately. For us to say his
Nationalist Government was corrupt and deserved to fall, amounts to
the pot calling the kettle black. Such a situation exists today in
Washington, D. C.
Feeding the armies was Chiang’s greatest problem. The government at
first gave a lump sum to the army commanders, but many of these were
unscrupulous rascals who kept most of it for themselves, allocating
a small remainder to subordinates, who passed a still smaller
proportion on down through the lower levels to the unprotected
soldier. This was a century-old practice in China, and the hungry
soldier was reduced to stealing or appropriating his food from the
peasant merchants. Naturally there was always trouble between the
soldiers and the merchants, with no love lost between the two. The
latter lost their profits, and the soldiers reasoned that they were
at least entitled to food from the people they were fighting to
protect. It became increasingly easy for the Chinese Communists to
win converts. They went with those who offered them food.
In spite of this tragic situation, the Generalissimo, with the same
patience and strength that had made his war leadership outstanding,
continued to hold the loyalty of a great number of his people. Long
after his flight to Formosa, rich and poor, officer and soldier
continued to fight for his principles. For example, as the Communists
entered Peking, there was desperate street fighting. The commander
of a battalion told his men, “We are greatly outnumbered. I cannot
keep you from going over to the other side, but I have fought the
Communists for eight years and I will not give up now!” Inspired
by his brave stand, most of his men remained with him and formed an
obstacle to the Communist advance. Finally, after an hour of hopeless
fighting, and when all his men had been killed, the battalion
commander manned the last machine gun himself and turned it full
force on the solid front of Communist troops advancing toward him.
The Generalissimo had many such brave soldiers who fought to the
death in his armies. Not all those loyal to Chiang were soldiers. In
Canton, after the Communists took over, they held a great celebration
featuring a long victory parade. This stopped every few miles and put
on a little skit which showed the Generalissimo on his knees, with
his hands tied behind his back, confessing his sins to the Communist
leaders who laughed uproariously! The actor who impersonated Chiang
received numerous threatening letters. When he reported this to his
Soviet boss, he was told to disregard the threats and was ordered to
continue his role. A few days later the actor was shot. Even behind
the Red Curtain there are still snipers about. In fact there is every
reason to believe that active guerrilla bands are on the prowl.
In Kwangsi Province, the Southern Province of General Li Tsun-jen,
pronounced “Lee Tzun-ren,” the villagers found that if they did not
cooperate with the Communists, they would be shot. On the other hand,
if they did, they took the chance of meeting a similar fate at the
hands of Nationalist guerrillas for collaborating with the enemy.
Undoubtedly this situation existed in many other places.
Many of those who knew the Generalissimo best believed that despite
the corruption that surrounded him he would go down in history as a
man of integrity and high purpose. Tribute is paid him by General
Wedemeyer when he says, “There are few people who can speak more
authoritatively than I can concerning the sincerity and Christian
humility of the Generalissimo. I had frequent, almost daily, contacts
with him for nearly a year. I can vouch for his unselfish devotion to
the Chinese people and for his earnest desire to provide a democratic
way of life within China. Surely his loyalty and his faithful
cooperation during the war fully merit our lasting friendship.”
Our assistance was denied to Chiang, and the outcome of our most
grievous mistakes will be judged by future historians. Not only the
United States, but some of the Chinese themselves, selfishly withheld
the aid they could have given their leader and their country. In
1946, fifty of the wealthiest Chinese were called in and asked if
they would each donate a large portion of their enormous fortunes,
which together ran into the billions, to their government. Bowing and
nodding their heads, they listened politely, but not one of them was
willing to sacrifice his future security or even to jeopardize it
against such stupendous odds.
Support of the State still is a secondary consideration to the
Chinese. Their principal loyalty—financial, filial, and political—is
to their own family. As in the ancient days, the poor, the sick and
the destitute can claim the protection of their nearest relative.
No matter how distant the relationship, they are given food and
shelter. Be it said to their credit, there are very few asylums or
orphanages in China. The family takes care of its own.
Perhaps this idea was in Chiang’s mind when he refused the enticing
peace terms offered him by the Japanese at Hankow. A devout scholar,
he quoted Confucius: “The men of old, when they wished their virtues
to shine throughout the land, first had to govern their states
well. To govern their states well, they had to establish harmony in
their families. To establish harmony in their families, they had to
discipline themselves and set their minds in order. To set their
minds in order, they had to make their purpose sincere. To make their
purpose sincere, they had to extend their knowledge to the utmost.
Such knowledge is acquired through a careful investigation of things.
For, with things investigated, knowledge becomes complete. With
knowledge complete, the purpose becomes sincere. With the purpose
sincere, the mind is set in order, and there is real self-discipline.
With self-discipline, the family achieves harmony. With harmony in
the family, the state becomes well governed. With the state well
governed, there is peace throughout the land.”
With due respect for what the Generalissimo attempted to do in China
and what he has accomplished on Formosa, I would like to quote one
paragraph from a scholarly article entitled: “_What Americans Don’t
Know About Asia_,” appearing in the June 4, 1951, issue of _Life
Magazine_, written by James Michener, Pulitzer Prize author of
“_Tales of the South Pacific_”:
“To appreciate the greatness of our loss (of China) one must
visit Formosa. This island today is the bright spot of Asia. The
Nationalist government, shaken to its withers by the debacle on the
mainland, has matured astonishingly in the chastisement of defeat.
It has established an enlightened commonwealth. Nowhere in Asia is
the food problem more fairly handled. Nowhere are justice, human
safety and property—those universal measures of good government—so
respected and secured. The American cannot visit this island without
one lament filling his mind: _this_ might have been China today.”
Let us, in the United States, so _act_ in the moments left of the
immediate and perilous hours of this half-way-mark of the Twentieth
Century to preclude a similar “chastisement of defeat.” May it never
be said, by some lone survivor of an atomic attack, tossed upon a
distant isle, the beauty, dignity and grandeur of which is strangely
familiar, yet defies Paradise itself: “_This_ might have been
America.”
CHAPTER VIII
_Behind the Red Curtain_
Immediately after the Communists gained control of China and occupied
it from North to South, Russian technicians and advisors poured into
the country. Everyone was asking: “What are the Russians doing in
China?”
From a few foreigners and Chinese, who had made an early escape from
behind the Red Curtain, and from letters later smuggled out of the
country, came the revealing truth. Some of the informants had lived
under the Communist yoke for as long as eight and nine months, and
among these was a United Press correspondent, Chang Kuo Sin.
“The Russians,” he said “began at once to fit China into the
political-military bloc of Soviet dominated States which, by the
end of 1949, extended from the Danube River to the Pacific Ocean.
Their organization was beyond anything China had ever seen, and it
certainly proved that they had been planning it for a long time.
I was frankly shocked by the influence they seemed to have on the
Chinese, from the very beginning.
“The ‘Big Noses,’ as the Chinese called the Russians,” he continued,
“took over as fast as they could. They tried to make a good
impression on the Chinese by moving right in with them. They ate
Chinese food and fumbled with chopsticks, and even wore Chinese
Communist uniforms made for them in Russia. They had already learned
to speak Chinese and to write a certain number of characters before
they arrived. Also, they had been taught some of the old Chinese
customs, such as raising the rice bowl as a gesture of friendly
greeting.
“The Russians brought in about seventy railroad engineers to
supervise the rebuilding of the railroads and bridges damaged by the
war. They were especially interested in everything military and sent
movie units around to make films of Chinese strategic areas. A friend
of mine, who saw them taking pictures, told me that Chinese officers,
who had been trained in Russia, were showing them all of the defenses
of the country.”
The original plan, in 1950, was to attack Formosa before the typhoon
season began in June. The Russians knew then what the world knows now
from the 1951 release of Dean Acheson’s diplomatic report of December
23, 1949, that we had written off Formosa as of no importance to
our Pacific defenses. Acheson tried, in vain, to involve Lieutenant
General Wedemeyer in this act of treachery. Acheson testified,
June 1, 1951, that the State Department prepared the report after
Wedemeyer, then Assistant Chief of Staff, suggested to the State
Department that it use the _Voice of America_ to “minimize” any
damage that might result from the fall of Formosa. But we know
from the complete _Wedemeyer Report_ that the General advocated
unequivocal defense of Formosa as being of definite strategic
importance in our chain of defenses in the Pacific. MacArthur and
Wedemeyer both had warned that the fall of Formosa would leave Japan,
Okinawa and the Philippines outflanked. The following is an account
of how the enemy planned to take Formosa with an offensive beginning
June, 1950.
Chang Kuo Sin reported: “We are given to understand that the island
will be taken by the biggest land, sea and air force that has yet
been launched against any place within the Russian orbit. They
will muster hundreds of fighting planes and thirty warships, plus
thousands of troops for this invasion. The warships, of course,
include many that went over to the Communists from the Nationalist
forces.”
The Chinese correspondent was not the only one who watched with
alarm the preparations for the invasion of Formosa. From every side
came evidence of the size and strength of the forces assembling
for the attack. The British, after recognition of the Communist
Government, and in order to protect their investments, were forced
into the distasteful position of giving them, by court order, ninety
airplanes. Worth twenty million dollars, these planes belonged to
the airline companies owned by the picturesque American flyer Claire
L. Chennault, whose famous “Flying Tiger” raids on the Japanese
added brilliant pages to American military history. This high-handed
transfer of American-made planes, probably the best in the world
outside those in use by the U. S. Air Force, to the Communists by
the British was cause for alarm in official circles. The planes will
undoubtedly wind up under the direct control of the Kremlin, whether
or not they are used for the initial air assault on Formosa.
The ground forces were nominally to be under the command of the Mayor
of Shanghai, who was said to have marshalled a picked force of one
hundred and eighty thousand troops for the invasion. Their training
in beach landings and personal combat was supervised by the Russians,
and many of their special weapons are said to have been of Soviet
make. The Mayor, a pawn of the Russians, was content to leave the
military strategy entirely in the hands of his more than helpful
allies.
Russian engineers were busy at every port from which the invasion
might be launched. After forcing those already on the job to resign,
they hired shipbuilders and began work on the dockyards, repairing
the damage caused by Nationalist bombings. They assembled ships of
different sizes and made them ready for invasion day. So we see that
the Russians were well occupied in Shanghai.
The fact that American troops were withdrawn by the State Department
from occupation in South Korea a few months earlier, left that
country a more logical target of opportunity to begin their
aggressive action. This explains why the Formosa attack was not made
as originally scheduled in 1950.
In Canton the Russians were busy moving complete factories to
Siberia, just as they had done earlier in Manchuria. This, they
said, was to save them from Nationalist bombs. The real reason was
that they needed them to build up Siberia industrially. Most of
the Southern factories produced cement, cotton cloth or chemicals,
vitally needed to support the large Siberian populace. It mattered
little to the Russians that China needed these same commodities
for herself. When workers complained that they could not live
without their jobs, the Communist bosses said: “Well, then, come
along with your plant and bring your family.” When the workers,
usually encumbered with large families, would ask hopefully about
transportation, they would always receive the same reply: “Can’t you
walk? We did on the ‘Long March.’ You can, too.”
The Chinese are always desperately in need of doctors, and the
Communists, right after taking over the country, allowed the
physicians to go about their business unmolested, provided they did
not discuss politics. So great was the demand for medical services
that outrageous fees were charged. The Communists permitted this
situation to continue, as it kept the doctors happy. With a flood
raging in China and plague beginning to show itself, doctors were a
priceless commodity. Even Russian doctors and scientists were brought
in and added to the Ministry of Health in China.
Although the flood of 1950 was the worst one in years, it did not
stop the Russians from sending food out of the country and into
Siberia. The Chinese granaries were empty, and everyone was hungry.
In Shanghai alone there were reported at least a hundred and twenty
thousand foodless and homeless refugees, and no agency was able to do
anything for them. It became dangerous for the average citizen, poor
though he might be, to go out in the streets at night. Every morning
a number of dead bodies were found piled up against the walls of
buildings.
Mao Tse-tung, his slogans still promising “Abundance for All,”
ordered a part of the army to work on the cooperative farms and
offered handsome rewards for boosting food production. In Peking
the worried Chinese Communists admitted that there were some nine
million people dead or dying in those areas, but that they were
unable to halt the shipments out of the country. Starving beggars in
filthy rags, a not unusual sight in China during the famine and flood
seasons, died by the score on the streets of Nanking and Shanghai,
where they had come with the faint hope of finding work. These
were the stronger ones; the weaker were never able to leave their
villages, or else they fell along the way.
“Food is the one vital concern here,” said a letter from Peking. “Any
kind of food. Even if you have money there is very little to buy, and
everybody is poor down to the bone. We are thoroughly sick of the
whole situation, but what can we do? Our friends are sent to jail if
they complain about anything, sometimes even if they voice an opinion
about the Communists that is not flattering.
“The beautiful lawns and gardens in the public parks and surrounding
the homes of wealthy families have been plowed up and planted with
vegetables. When this is not done within a reasonable length of time,
soldiers enter, armed with guns, and ask politely: ‘You would like
to have your gardens Produce for the People, would you not?’ In any
case, the owner is lucky if he is permitted to keep a small share
of what he is able to raise. After the gardens are taken over, it
is a matter of the Camel in the Arab’s tent. Next, the valuables
in the house are removed, to be sent out of the country in return
for dollars and pounds. Then the troops or Party officers quarter
themselves comfortably in the house, and if there is the slightest
difficulty, the owners are forced out.”
Another letter said, “It is considered very bad taste, if not
dangerous, to appear well off, and when I go to market I wear my
oldest clothes to avoid being conspicuous. Only the Communist
Hierarchy go about dressed in furs and finery, and they never go out
except in shiny limousines.”
Adding to the difficulty of obtaining food and other necessities,
Communists, for propaganda reasons, had put the pedicabs and
rickshaws off some of the streets in the larger cities. The price of
gasoline went up so high that no one could use his car, even if he
still had one. Thus transportation became another severe problem.
Only a few crowded, rickety busses still operated, and these were
almost impossible to board. They were so packed that people clung
tightly to each other at the doors, somewhat reminiscent of rush-hour
in the New York subway. Those not able to get on the vehicles
dog-trotted along behind. The busses never ran on any schedule, and
the driver, if given a large enough bribe, would even change the
route at a moment’s notice.
From a Chinese refugee now living in San Francisco, I learned that
Peking families, as well as others in the Northern area, were sending
their children out of the country on the pretext of aiding their
fathers in business. “We try to make the Communists feel that we are
cooperating with them wholeheartedly. Then, when we are sure that we
have their confidence and that it is safe, we ask them if we may
send our son or daughter to Hong Kong for business reasons or, better
still, on work for the Party. If they are lucky enough to get away,
they may have to stay in Hong Kong three or four months before they
can book passage on a ship. When we hear, via the grapevine, that
they are safe on board, we do not care what becomes of us.”
A tragic letter from a former military attaché in Washington during
the war told of the fall of Shanghai and the stampede of hundreds of
people trying to get away from the Communists. “The conquerors closed
the gates of the city during most of the day and night to prevent
crowds from trying to reach the railway stations or river banks and
wharves. Steamships anchored in mid-stream to protect themselves from
the mobs that tried to board them. Had everyone been successful in
the attempt, the ships would have capsized. It was necessary to go
out in small sampans and junks. Ropes with knots tied at intervals,
to which people could cling, were thrown over the sides of the ships.
I saw one father fasten a rope to his three children, and then the
family tried to scale the ship’s side. Suddenly, when they were all
about half-way up, the child at the top slipped or let go, pushing
the other children with him as he fell. The parents screamed wildly
and jumped into the churning, muddy water after them. Their cries
were heart rending.”
In talking to Americans and Chinese who have returned to the United
States, I caught many interesting and authoritative glimpses of life
behind the Red Curtain. For instance, as with Stalin in Moscow, no
one in China seemed to know where in Peking Chairman Mao lived. Some
said he had taken over the Wagon Lits Hotel, others that he had a
place in the country. Some said he appeared on the streets rarely,
although he was seen at official gatherings now and then. At one
such affair, Mao displayed a batch of letters, supposed to have been
received from non-Communists, telling how pleased they were at the
way the Communists had taken over and how courteous they had been.
The tone of all these letters was flattering and to the effect that
the non-Communists were impressed with their new masters. What Mao
did not know, or did not mention, of course, was that the letters had
been written and signed under duress and that, later, the writers had
pleaded with friends going out of the country to tell those to whom
the letters were addressed that nothing could be further from the
truth.
The Communists strictly censored all mail coming into China,
especially from the United States. Many letters were confiscated when
they contained names and information about people the Reds wished to
add to their files, and almost always when there was money in them.
Mao and Chou En-lai were said to be on very good terms with a number
of Russian advisors. All called each other by their first names. The
Chinese also were copying Russian ways with surprising alacrity. I
learned that one of the most popular of the adopted Moscow customs
was wife-swapping, or free love. In the New Democracy marriage was
performed and terminated merely by mutual consent, Russian style.
There was no exchange of vows when mating was done for the Cause,
no priest or magistrate to pronounce the pair man and wife or to
separate them later. Mrs. Chou En-lai told me very frankly in 1946
that she had never been legally married to her well-known husband.
“The New Democracy did away with all that,” she said. “We did away
with ceremonies. They are foolish and we don’t need them. Such things
are for you Imperialists!”
Such laxity in marital affairs has long been the accepted custom in
Russia, and indeed the Russian official often finds himself going
even further, sometimes involuntarily. A Soviet army officer arriving
at the Shanghai Airport not long ago looked around for his wife. She
was nowhere in sight. A good looking blonde walked up to him and
asked, “Are you Colonel Kovicov?” “I am,” he replied, a little taken
aback. He had never seen her before and felt a faint chill when she
said, “I am your wife now, on Party orders.” He knew then that he was
under suspicion.
Another high official in Russia returned home from an arduous day in
the Politburo and found that his “wife” had been replaced by a new
and not so pretty one. “Who are you?” he asked rather sadly, and she
replied, “You know who I am. I am the wife assigned to go with you to
China.” It developed that this woman spoke Chinese fluently, a talent
not possessed by the deposed mate. One may also infer that she was
more adept at spying.
Furs, silks, cosmetics and some jewelry were said to have been
brought into China at times by the Russians as rewards for faithful
service, and many a smart Party woman already had a neat nest egg
laid away in clothes and other commodities, such as the Communist
“unmentionable” one, money.
Americans who admire China and the Chinese will be disheartened by
a letter written by a retired colonel in the United States Army and
an old China hand. “The campaign of hatred stirred up against the
United States is impossible to realize unless you are right here on
the spot,” he wrote. “We are constantly branded as the worst enemies
China ever had. All the people who spent their lives here working
for China and the Chinese are called spies or tools of Imperialism.
At first they were polite and assured us that we could do business
as usual. Later we felt that we were being eased out, and finally we
were kicked out. We are all suspected of being agents of the American
Government and can never go out on the street without being jostled,
jeered at and spat upon. Many of us in Shanghai have been beaten,
jailed and fined huge sums before being released. Two men I know have
been taken out of their houses at night and beaten up. I don’t know
how much longer we will be able to stay here, but you can expect us
as soon as we can get away. I have plenty to tell when I do get home!
It is difficult to leave, as everyone has to have a Chinese vouch
for his good behavior before he can go. This Chinese friend actually
becomes a hostage, and any criticism of the Communist Government on
the part of the American may endanger his life.”
A correspondent in Shanghai was one of the Americans who was sure
that it would be possible to “do business” with the Communists. He
wrote a letter to the effect that “things really are not going to
be as bad as people are inclined to believe. They have assured me
that my office will not be molested and that they are very anxious
to do business with the foreigners.” A few days after the Reds took
Shanghai, they locked him up in that same office and confiscated his
business. He was allowed to return to the States, but, like everyone
else, had to leave his Chinese hostage behind him. When his American
ship stopped at Hong Kong, he talked to the press. A few days later,
when his ship was in mid-ocean, he received a radio message saying
in effect: “Make no statements about China. Authorities holding me
responsible.”
American missionaries fared no better than the businessmen. Many
churches were sealed officially as they were considered “private
organizations” which, under Communism, cannot exist. Christian
pastors of all faiths were made to register with the police and were
questioned for hours as to their attitudes toward the Russians and
the Chinese Communists. They were told plainly that although the
Communists “guaranteed” them freedom of religious _belief_—that is, a
man could believe anything he wished if he did not talk about it—they
intended to eliminate all freedom of religious _action_—that is, no
gathering together for the purpose of worship would be tolerated. And
this was in late 1948 and early 1949!
So much for the Americans. How did the British fare after recognizing
the Communist Government? Once feared and respected throughout the
Orient and now huddled together on their little island of Hong Kong,
they were forced to eat humble pie from the hands of the Communists
sitting on the front steps of their one-time imperial domain. At
stake was their one billion, two hundred million dollar investment,
the key to what was left of their Empire in the Far East.
A correspondent from Hong Kong wrote, “The city is packed with
refugees, Chinese, British and Americans. It is terribly expensive.
As much as three thousand Hong Kong dollars down payment is required
before you can rent a room, and everything else is sky high. It is
dreadfully hot, there are few parks or out-of-door places to sit,
and almost nowhere to eat. The Communists are everywhere. They have
closed most of the bookstores except those run by the Communists,
and these carry nothing, of course, except books and magazines about
Communism. Even the British bookstores are forced to carry Party
literature. It was impossible to get a doctor when my wife was sick,
as the Communists will not issue licenses to practice to any but
British doctors, and they are so busy with the care of both Chinese
and foreigners that they are worn out. With such overcrowding, many
are sick, as you can imagine. I wish I could send my family home, but
it is impossible. It takes many weeks or months to get reservations.
We are just trapped!”
Thus the Lion’s mighty roar, that once thundered throughout the
world, was reduced to a whimpering sniffle. Everywhere the British,
especially in the foreign office in London, were embarrassed at
the turn of events. Dr. Cheng Tien-shi, the Chinese Nationalist
Government’s ambassador to Great Britain, was called in and told
that England had recognized the Chinese Communist Government and that
his office must be vacated. With Confucian calm the elderly Chinese
gentleman faced the youthful Minister of State, Hector McNeil.
The latter fingered his tie, cleared his throat and, shifting his
feet uneasily, read the announcement in a strained voice. Sitting
down with McNeil, Cheng recalled the days when it was fashionable
to praise Chiang Kai-shek for his magnificent stand against the
Japanese. He quoted Mark Anthony’s speech over the dead body of
Caesar:
“_But yesterday the word of Caesar might
Have stood against the world. Now lies he there,
And none so poor to do him reverence._”
Several times McNeil referred deferentially to Cheng, who is one of
the greatest living Chinese philosophers, as “Mr. Ambassador.” At
length, the gentle old man asked politely, “How can you still call
me ‘Mr. Ambassador?’” McNeil replied, “Once an Ambassador, always an
Ambassador.” The Chinese scholar hesitated a moment and then said,
“In my country, we have a similar saying, ‘Once a friend, always a
friend.’ Homage to force and violence is a dangerous thing. If you
worship Caesar, you will die by Caesar. Why must you bury us while we
are still very much alive? One day you will need us again.”
CHAPTER IX
_Quo Vadis?_
The dangers facing the United States and the countries friendly to
us are becoming increasingly serious. We must recognize the fact
that, as individuals, we are as responsible for what is happening
today as were the people living peacefully at one time under Hitler,
Hirohito and Stalin, and whom we heartily condemn for having allowed
disastrous conditions to develop and get beyond their control.
Concerning the forces building up around us and the world today,
we are still far too apathetic and complacent. Much of the
responsibility for this must, of necessity, be placed upon our
leadership. We know that America is the one bastion of freedom left
in the world today, and that continued strength in it reflects the
hope of the world—that is, of the free peoples of the world as well
as those behind iron curtains everywhere who now know the true
meaning of slavery which was sold to them in the guise of “security.”
Remaining strong entails a price. What is it? To me, above all, it
requires faith in God, faith in our fellow man and faith in ourselves
and other individuals of personal integrity. Meanwhile, we must
first keep strong our foundations of initiative, self-reliance and
individual responsibility for our actions with respect to our duties
to our own country.
Unfortunately many people in America have believed the Henry Wallace
theory that it was an “over-abundance” or “excessive production”
which brought on the depression of the Thirties, or that has or
ever could, cause any depression. But this is not true. Economists
tell us today that “misdirected production, plus misdirected and
over-stimulated consumption” aided our previous downfall, and that
it was an abuse of our credit, both at home and abroad. But what
does this mean? Was part of our trouble then, as now, caused by too
many loans to foreign countries for goods bought here, and an abuse
of credit to consumers (you and me) here at home? This did bring on
the boom of the late Twenties and also the terrific maladjustment
which the depression of the Thirties should have corrected, but
which it could not, under the circumstances existing then. The
“over-abundance” or “excess savings” theory—that we had so much that
we could well afford to give it away—is dangerously misleading. It
was invented to justify unwise, if not calculated, giving to foreign
countries with the resultant weakening of our own country to a point
where Social Security and many other “social laws,” including the
limitation of productive effort were adopted as expediencies here at
home. Outright charity to people has, throughout history, tended to
destroy their moral fiber. Proud people will not, moreover, accept
charity and will be determined to work out their own salvation.
Finland is just such an example. Contrast that country’s attitude
with France today, and even with England.
Our country, America, has always been a philanthropic one. No one,
in his right mind, could or ever has, questioned the humanitarian
feelings of the American body politic, but unless our assistance is
selective and well timed, it cannot bring permanent relief, nor can
it accomplish worthwhile objectives.
There are some who say that America has always had a hit-or-miss
approach to most of her problems, and that Lady Luck has been on
our side. This also is not quite so. In the 19th Century, we had
a relatively free competitive society—not perfect, of course, but
the best we’d ever had. The laws which govern human nature under a
government of limited powers, such as we had under the Constitution
before we began changing it, operated then. During that period these
laws governing human nature were patterned on a system of checks and
balances, remarkably similar to those dictated by God to Moses at
Mount Sinai. The hit-or-miss approach became apparent only when we
began to turn to government “to relieve us from our mistakes under
freedom.”
We know that this nation came into being after the victory of
the War of Independence. At this time, a Constitution was drawn
up and ratified by the states. But there is more to it than
that. A confusion in terms always has led to a misunderstanding
in definition. There are some who feel quite strongly that
“democracy” is a principle, and was never intended to become a
form of government. The word “democracy” does not appear once
in our Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Declaration of
Independence. In our Salute to the Flag, known by every school boy
and girl in America, it is the “Republic” for which we stand—not a
“Democracy.” Of course the words are used almost interchangeably in
the encyclopedia, and we know that the purest form of democracy
envisions the realistic participation in the government on the part
of all the governed. Town meetings were typical of this in the past,
but as our society became more complex, it was found impractical
to hold these, and as a result, representatives were selected, and
a Republic evolved. It all boiled down to what might be called a
practicing democracy, because people do have the opportunity today
to make their desires known as to how and by whom they will be
governed—that is, however, on condition that they express themselves
at the voting polls.
The framers of our Constitution sought to give each department of
government its due share of power, and to prevent any one of them
from making itself supreme. In his “_Back to the Republic_,” Harry
E. Atwood comments: “Almost daily Russia is spoken of as ‘the new
republic.’ That phrase is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of a
drunken man as a new example of temperance. To speak of Mexico as a
‘republic’ is as inaccurate as it would be to speak of fanaticism as
a new form of reverence. To call Communist China a ‘republic’ is as
far-fetched as it would be to speak of insomnia as a new form of rest
... for at the present time, these are all types of democracy, they
are not republics....”
In the “_Federalist_,” James Madison said of our government: “The
true distinction between these forms (democracy and republic) is that
in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person.
In a republic they assemble and administer it by their representative
agents.... The first question that offers itself is whether the
general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican? It
is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius
of the American people.”
We know from the experiences of other nations that perfection in
government never has been found _via_ the route of mob rule. If
we think otherwise we play right into the hands of the Communists
and all others who oppose our government. Unethical procedure
in any established order is brought about little by little. The
theory of lesser concessions is always active. In our trend toward
paternalism in government we must constantly guard against the ogre
of an established bureaucracy, a denying to the individual those
“inalienable rights” of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,”
so definitely vouchsafed to him in the Republican form of government
which was established in this country “under God.” With any
impairment of our system of checks and balances, all power to protect
every man’s God-given rights is rendered impotent.
Everywhere people are expressing the thought that, “Things just
can’t go on like this,” and “What is going to happen?” Is there
then, a sense of impending judgment in the very atmosphere itself?
Let me illustrate the theory of lesser concessions mentioned above.
Back in September, 1932, during a campaign speech at Sioux City,
President Roosevelt accused the Hoover administration of being the
greatest spendthrift in U. S. history; that bureaus and bureaucrats
had been retained at the taxpayers’ expense, and then he proceeded
to out-Hoover Hoover with alphabetical agencies to the point where
cartoonists branded us “alphabetical goofs.”
The Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson, has
compiled some interesting statistics:
“Expended by all Presidents up to Lincoln $ 1,795,319,694
“Expended by Lincoln (including the
Civil War) 3,252,380,410
“Spent by Johnson thru Taft 19,373,146,217
“Wilson (including World War I) 47,938,260,143
“Warren G. Harding 6,667,235,429
“Calvin Coolidge 18,585,549,115
“Herbert Hoover 15,490,476,636
“Franklin D. Roosevelt (including eight
years of peace) 67,518,746,001
“Total expended by all Presidents from
the beginning to July 1, 1945 $179,630,113,645
“Total spent by Harry S. Truman from
July 1, 1945, to September 1, 1949 $191,081,394,191”
With constantly rising taxes and increased government spending, the
dollar bill soon will be worthless, as will be the paper on which it
is printed. A mathematician figuring hurriedly on his cuff, comments:
“We’ll be back to where the South was in 1865, with its worthless
Confederate money.” Why? Little by little our executive branch has
usurped the functions of Congress, under the flimsy guise of a
so-called “mandate” from us, the people. Unless we become _aware_ of
what we have permitted to happen in our midst, and elect people to
Congress who will make the government their servant and not their
master, we will soon be where the Germans were under Hitler, the
Italians under Mussolini, and where the Russians are today, under
Stalin—and the British to a lesser degree, under their socialist
regime.
For the first time in global history, the forces are drawn between
two distinct ways of life—Christianity and Barbarism. Through the
cobwebs of confusion and the roadblocks of distortion we now know
that our one enemy is Stalin and his particular brand of thuggery.
Modern, civilized peoples throughout the universe, including those
behind the iron curtain, have but one common enemy—Communism. If we
do indeed believe what we profess, as Christians, to believe, “Man
cannot serve God and Mammon,” how can we expect a United Nations to
succeed in anything so long as the head of the Communist Governments,
the world over, is represented in its midst?
All doubt and uncertainty has been dispelled as to who, where and
how our enemy operates. In China we have seen the Communist system
operate to the complete disintegration of human rights. Here in
the United States we do not know precisely how many Communists are
among us, or exactly where and how they connive. We are told on
good authority (J. Edgar Hoover) that they are growing in strength
and numbers as well as going underground, but we are unable to put
our fingers on enough of them. Communism operates and succeeds by
deception here as in the early phases of China’s recent history.
It bores from within. Frequently its voice is soft and seductive,
like the voice of Delilah, and equally treacherous. As we have seen
though, once it has the situation in hand, it does not hesitate to
use brute force.
In contrast, what we call Democracy makes its mistakes openly for
all to see and endeavor to correct. Democracy, to us, means complete
personal liberty, the right to live, work and play how, when and
where one chooses, in open competition, and is maintained by a
process of checks and balances or trial and error. We who live in
this atmosphere of free enterprise, take these things for granted,
while treason catches us off guard. Until we recognize this, we will
continue to be at the mercy of organized political traitors both
foreign and domestic. We can no longer afford to assume a casual
attitude, even though history reveals that the Communism of Stalin,
like other world shaking movements in the past, if given sufficient
time, will fall of its own weight.
“Well,” you may ask: “If Communism is going to fall anyway, (or be
pushed), why bother to do anything about it now?” The answer is
simple. We must do something about it now because generations, even
centuries, may elapse before it collapses without help other than
human intervention. In the meantime, what will happen to us and
to our children? Do we realize the long period of humiliation and
degradation, with increasing controls by the Communists, that this
means?
War, a global holocaust, in the not too distant future seems a much
more likely turn of events. We know that Russia is expanding and
improving her military force, including long range submarines and
airplanes as well as ultra-destructive weapons. She has more planes
than the United States and other democracies put together. We are
told that Russia is making A bombs and has already had at least one
atomic explosion behind the Iron Curtain. The H bomb is a logical
sequel. She is capable, we understand, of delivering a surprise
atomic attack against any part of the United States, while we have no
sure defense against such an attack. Her submarine fleet rapidly is
being patterned after Germany’s and this, with her other combat ships
will make her the third greatest Naval Power. She has an army of two
and one-half million uniformed troops and thousands of undercover
agents to act as spies or scouts. We know that she is on a complete
war footing, just as England was during the latter days of World War
II and as we made an attempt to be.
This is grave food for thought. If our most responsible leaders are
assured that Russia is intending to attack us within a short time,
then should we not prepare and attack first, trying with the initial
blow, so to paralyze the enemy that she will be unable to retaliate.
This would be a terrible decision to have to make, and we may not
have the chance, but we must give it serious thought.
As long as Russia feels that she is winning the cold war, however,
she would be a fool to start a hot one she might lose. I do not
believe that she would even let herself be goaded into it. When
she is ready to strike, she will strike, of that we may be sure.
It may be possible that the men in the Kremlin are hesitant about
upsetting their present position, fearing counter-revolution at home
and abroad. Perhaps the mighty armada is for propaganda purposes
and to hold the Red Empire together. If this is so, we must never
relax our own efforts behind the Iron Curtains everywhere in order to
enlist the support of the unhappy 90 per cent of the enslaved people,
without whose help we cannot hope to defeat the Soviet Union. Our
most powerful secret weapon is not the A or the H bomb, but this same
overwhelming majority of victims who fought and won a revolution only
to find that they had been sold down the river at the moment of their
victory.
These terrorized victims in every country are our most powerful
potential allies, and we must do all in our power to make them
understand that we are in sympathy with them—with their hopes and
prayers for liberation—and that the only thing we reject is Communist
despotism. All peoples who are denied the basic freedoms of speech,
press, religion, assembly—immediately become enormous whispering
galleries. There is greater “lure” in suppressed facts and ideas than
there is in political propaganda. Even the threat of death will not
keep people from reading forbidden material when they are hungry for
news from those who may be sympathetic to their plight. But all this
would take well-trained counter espionage, and it would cost money.
It would make sense to me if, first of all, we saw to it that our
homeland was protected—but not by an armed camp or maintained by a
disproportionate amount of military might that would hamstring our
economy or deprive us of too many of our liberties. Our military
forces should be trained and equipped to provide a reasonable degree
of military security for the United States. Then, bring about this
same type of coordination in Canada and the Latin American countries,
thereby creating a modicum of safety throughout the Western
Hemisphere.
In doing the above, we’d be licked before we started unless we
made assurance doubly sure that we, the people, knew beyond all
possibility of doubt, what was going on and why. Once we are
possessed of complete understanding, and support the purpose for
which we may be called upon to make the greatest sacrifices of our
lives—even including our lives if need be—our objectives will thus
be constantly in view. We know this would require a rebirth or a
resurgence of courageous leadership, honesty and integrity—and an old
fashioned “patriotism” too long lacking in our leaders. But are not
these qualities still inherent within us? They were, certainly, until
clever and sinister propaganda infiltrated our very marrow.
To go a step further. We know that we cannot stop with our own
Western Hemisphere. Our thinking and our responsibility is now
global. There’s “no hidin’ place” anywhere. Therefore we must improve
our position, militarily, economically and psychologically throughout
Europe and Asia by helping nations and peoples there to help
themselves to keep their few remaining freedoms. Of course we have to
protect certain sea and air routes to and from our best sources of
raw materials.
To me, it is sheer nonsense to give, indiscriminately, whether it
be money or military aid, without stipulating that we get something
for it. To do otherwise is contrary to individual human nature, and
yet as a nation, we have given billions in money and material—not
to mention thousands of lives in Korea—without demanding anything
in return. To keep on throwing good money, things and men into the
hopper will bring no permanent relief, nor will it accomplish any
outright objective.
We need oil from the Middle East, uranium from the Belgian Congo,
or anywhere else we can get it, and we need tin and rubber from
southeast Asia, plus other important things. But if we are cut
off and cannot get them, then we can use our almost unprecedented
ingenuity in the department of synthetics. Germany demonstrated what
can be accomplished with ersatz.
I agree heartily with Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer, and others,
who have not expressed their views openly, or who have so indicated
and been severely reprimanded for it, that we must have areas of
operation such as the British Isles, Formosa, the African coast,
Philippines, Japan, the Scandinavian Peninsula, Denmark, Iberian
Peninsula and Saudi Arabia. These could be held or taken, if need be,
with a minimum of manpower, for we know our weapons are far superior
to those of our enemy, both in mechanics and quality, while their
manpower is far in excess of anything that we can muster. From these
so-called “islands” it would be possible for the allied forces to
rain ultimate death and destruction on the enemy, and without them we
are powerless to strike except from long range.
To those who, like General Marshall, insist that we must have
an enormous land army, or armies, to go in and occupy conquered
territory so as to be able to control the people, I give this answer,
or make this suggestion. Why not establish colonies of people of
all nationalities, who would be charged with responsibilities of
teaching people how to produce or earn a living and to study forms
of government suitable for creating small civil communities that
could be transplanted into any conquered territory after organized
resistance had been broken by the military? This would be entirely
within the realm of possibility, and it would definitely conserve our
most precious potential—manpower.
It has been said that: “Every despotism has an especially known
and hostile instinct for whatever keeps up human dignity and
independence. Materialism is the sister doctrine of every tyranny,
whether of the one or of the many. To crush what is spiritual, moral,
human in a man by specializing him; to form more wheels of the great
social machine, instead of perfecting individuals ... is the dominant
drift of our epoch.... The test of every religious, political or
educational system, is what it does to man. If it injures his
intelligence, it is bad. If it injures his character, it is vicious.
If it injures his conscience, it is criminal.”
Expediency is the voice of danger. We must do away with the false
idea that immediate and temporary gain is a substitute for moral
principle. We can recognize, as did Thomas Jefferson, that:
“Whenever a man casts a longing eye on office, a rottenness begins
in his conduct.” We must become aware that slavery develops in
direct proportion as government control becomes a substitute for
self-control and responsibility. Search for the solution at the
spiritual instead of the material level.
Aristotle, the philosopher, has told us: “There are a million ways
to be wrong, but only one way to be right.” A principle is a very
tangible “element” that we treasure as an active force of life or
nature or—God. If we know, in our hearts, that a thing is _right_,
even though the results of such thought or action may not become
evident within the span of our own lifetime, and we go ahead and
sacrifice the principle for expediency, ours is a crime far greater
than that which was committed by the hand that “all the perfumes of
Arabia could not sweeten!”
This is the day of the individual. Only you and I, as independent
units, can right the wrongs that have beset our nation and the world.
This is encouraging, isn’t it? Dean Russell tells us: “Fortunately
for the cause of freedom, it is only as an individual that you or I
can do anything at all. This is the voluntary way of accomplishing
a desired objective. It is the only method that is in accord with
freedom.” The opposite side of the coin is that people who have
agreed to accept a bad idea band themselves together to force—by
vote or otherwise—their ideas upon other people. It may all be
perfectly legal, but it is dishonest. We are at perfect liberty to
vote ourselves into serfdom. But it is very dangerous to believe that
freedom automatically is safe because the individual vote has become
so popular in America, where the “democratic” way prevails. When
we vote money into our pockets, old age pensions, farm subsidies,
price parities and a million other “props” to lean on, we are voting
paralysis to our brains and slavery to our physical beings.
It is a dangerous thing to do, but I would like to make one
prediction. Each day we live we draw nearer to a climax in human
history. The immediate future is dark. Bitter conflicts at home
and abroad are on the horizon. I believe that the armies of all
nations will, during the next two years, be drawn inevitably toward
the countries in and around the Great Pyramid of Egypt. The crisis
precipitated in Iran over the nationalization of her oil industry,
makes this highly probable, in my opinion. Let me substantiate
further.
Toward the end of 1949, England received warning from Iran on this
impending move, for she believed that only a violent act on her part
could meet this extreme emergency. London correspondent Kenneth de
Courcy, cabling to _Intelligence Digest_ on April 1, 1951, stated:
“More than a year ago, a prominent Persian statesman gave Britain
his final confidential warning. He said that only drastic action
could save the situation. A Persian statesman flew to America and
remained there for several days in an effort to lay all the facts
before Mr. Truman. Attempt after attempt was made to arrange a
meeting. The envoy, although carrying high credentials, was refused
an interview. The Persian statesman had been one of his country’s
most important and successful Prime Ministers. His prestige and
influence were considerable....”
De Courcy concluded:
“The Persian situation has now been allowed to deteriorate to such
an extent that no politician there dares oppose the popular movement
which has been whipped up by the extremely clever work of Soviet
agents. Some of the highest officials, moreover, are on Russia’s
payroll, and this has been allowed to happen right under our noses.”
On Saturday morning, June 2, 1951, the following headline appeared in
_The Los Angeles Times_:
“TRUMAN INTERVENES IN IRAN OIL ROW.” The Associated Press dispatch
datelined Tehran, June 1, 1951, continued in part:
“President Truman took a hand personally today in the
British-Iranian oil dispute by sending letters to Premier Mohammed
Mossadegh and Prime Minister Attlee reportedly urging moderation on
both sides. The unusual move by the President indicated the extreme
seriousness with which the U. S. government views the oil crisis.”
A member of Iran’s Senate who declined to reveal his name, was quoted
by _The Los Angeles Times_ article as saying:
“Why should Truman belittle himself by sending such a message?”
In my humble opinion, therefore, World War III began on June 25,
1950. Our entry into it was two days later. There will be no peace,
of any importance, as I see it, until 1953 or thereabouts. I say
this with a heavy heart. This war that is so pointless and was so
unnecessary, had its birth in our Administration’s betrayal of China.
It will have its death on a bloody battlefield in Palestine.
What a heritage we have, on the one hand, and what means for
destruction on the other! How far we are today from Chaos, no man
knows. It may be far later than we think. Until the time of greater
enlightenment we know that a strong and forceful public opinion can
be the result only of strong and forceful individual opinions. We
are not, as yet, God-like creatures, but by making a supreme and
prayerful effort we might become more nearly creatures like God. One
small voice crying in the wilderness can be doubled and quadrupled
into millions until, finally, it becomes the deafening roar of all
freedom-loving peoples the world over.
“The journey of a thousand miles,” the Chinese say, “begins with
just one step.” If each of us will take that one step now, toward a
better understanding of how to protect our country from its enemies,
both within and without, America will remain the light to which the
whole world turns in the blackness of its oppression. And let us each
remember that, as individuals, “it is better to light one candle,
than to curse the darkness.”
In the words of our own beloved National Anthem:
_“Oh! thus be it ever, when free men shall stand
Between their loved homes and the war’s desolation!_
_Blest with victory and peace, may the Heaven rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation._
_Then conquer we must, for our cause it is just,
And this be our motto: ‘In God is our trust.’_
_And the Star-Spangled Banner in triumph_ SHALL _wave
O’er the land of the Free and the home of the Brave!”_
EPILOGUE
Deep in the Siberian mine,
Keep your patience proud;
The bitter toil shall not be lost,
The rebel thought unbowed.
The sister of misfortune, Hope,
In the under-darkness dumb
Speaks joyful courage to your heart:
The day desired will come...
The heavy-hanging chains will fall,
The walls will crumble at a word;
And Freedom greet you in the light,
And brothers give you back the sword.
ALEXANDER SERGEYEVICH PUSHKIN
_Appendix_
THE WEDEMEYER REPORT ON CHINA AND KOREA
_Submitted to_
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
_September 9, 1947_
_by_
ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
_Lieutenant General, United States Army_
Paragraphs which have been deleted for security reasons
are indicated by asterisks.
[Illustration: Decoration]
PART I—GENERAL STATEMENT
China’s history is replete with examples of encroachment, arbitrary
action, special privilege, exploitation, and usurpation of territory
on the part of foreign powers. Continued foreign infiltration,
penetration or efforts to obtain spheres of influence in China,
including Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa), could be interpreted only
as a direct infringement and violation of China’s sovereignty and a
contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is mandatory that the United States and those other nations
subscribing to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
should combine their efforts to insure the unimpeded march of all
peoples toward goals that recognize the dignity of man and his civil
rights and, further, definitely provide the opportunity to express
freely how and by whom they will be governed.
Those goals and the lofty aims of freedom-loving peoples are
jeopardized today by forces as sinister as those that operated in
Europe and Asia during the ten years leading to World War II. The
pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration
tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy
and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and
leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of
the people—all the techniques skillfully designed and ruthlessly
implemented in order to create favorable conditions for the
imposition of totalitarian ideologies. This pattern is present in
the Far East, particularly in the areas contiguous to Siberia.
If the United Nations is to have real effect in establishing economic
stability and in maintaining world peace, these developments merit
high priority on the United Nations’ agenda for study and action.
Events of the past two years demonstrate the futility of appeasement
based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet
Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude,
except as tactical expedients. Soviet practice in the countries
already occupied or dominated completes the mosaic of aggressive
expansion through ruthless secret police methods and through an
increasing political and economic enslavement of peoples. Soviet
literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a
definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of Nazism in its
ambitious scope and dangerous implications. Therefore in attempting
a solution to the problem presented in the Far East, as well as in
other troubled areas of the world, every possible opportunity must be
used to seize the initiative in order to create and maintain bulwarks
of freedom.
Notwithstanding all the corruption and incompetence that one notes
in China, it is a certainty that the bulk of the people are not
disposed to a Communist political and economic structure. Some
have become affiliated with Communism in indignant protest against
oppressive police measures, corrupt practices, and maladministration
of National Government officials. Some have lost all hope for China
under existing leadership and turn to the Communists in despair. Some
accept a new leadership by mere inertia.
Indirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the
Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian re-entry into
Manchuria, and later by withholding aid from the National Government.
There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In the one case we
were concentrating maximum Allied strength against the Japanese in
order to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In
the other, we were withholding unqualified support from a government
within which corruption and incompetence were so prevalent that it
was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States
had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in
the accomplishment of world-wide plans for postwar rehabilitation.
Our own participation in those plans has already afforded assistance
to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a
degree unparalleled in humanitarian history.
Gradually it has become apparent that the World War II objectives for
which we and others made tremendous sacrifices are not being fully
attained, and that there remains in the world a force presenting even
greater dangers to world peace than did the Nazi militarists and the
Japanese jingoists. Consequently the United States made the decision
in the Spring of 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey with a view to
protecting their sovereignties, which were threatened by the direct
or inspired activities of the Soviet Union. Charges of unilateral
action and circumvention of the United Nations were made by members
of that organization. In the light of its purposes and principles
such criticism seemed plausible. The United States promptly declared
its intention of referring the matter to the United Nations when that
organization would be ready to assume responsibility.
It follows that the United Nations should be informed of contemplated
action with regard to China. If the recommendations of this report
are approved, the United States should suggest to China that
she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the
United States for material assistance and advisory aid in order to
facilitate China’s postwar rehabilitation and economic recovery.
This will demonstrate that the United Nations is not being
circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon
China’s sovereignty, but contrary-wise is cooperating constructively
in the interest of peace and stability in the Far East, concomitantly
in the world.
The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that
prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a
Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists may soon gain military
control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a government.
Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize
Manchuria and conclude a “mutual support agreement” with a _de
facto_ Manchurian government of the Chinese Communists. In that
event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support agreement
with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar
agreement with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult
situation for China, the United States and the United Nations.
Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.
The United Nations might take immediate action to bring about
cessation of hostilities in Manchuria as a prelude to the
establishment of a Guardianship or Trusteeship. The Guardianship
might consist of China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great
Britain and France. This should be attempted promptly and could
be initiated only by China. Should one of the nations refuse to
participate in Manchurian Guardianship, China might then request the
General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Trusteeship,
under the provisions of the Charter.
Initially China might interpret Guardianship or Trusteeship as an
infringement upon her sovereignty. But the urgency of the matter
should encourage a realistic view of the situation. If these steps
are not taken by China, Manchuria may be drawn into the Soviet orbit,
despite United States aid, and lost, perhaps permanently, to China.
The economic deterioration and the incompetence and corruption in the
political and military organizations in China should be considered
against an all-inclusive background lest there be disproportionate
emphasis upon defects. Comity requires that cognizance be taken of
the following.
Unlike other Powers since VJ-Day, China has never been free to
devote full attention to internal problems that were greatly
confounded by eight years of war. The current civil war has imposed
an overwhelming financial and economic burden at a time when
resources and energies have been dissipated and when, in any event,
they would have been strained to the utmost to meet the problems of
recovery.
The National Government has consistently, since 1927, opposed
Communism. Today the same political leader and same civil and
military officials are determined to prevent their country from
becoming a Communist-dominated State or Soviet satellite.
Although the Japanese offered increasingly favorable surrender terms
during the course of the war, China elected to remain steadfast with
her Allies. If China had accepted surrender terms, approximately a
million Japanese would have been released for employment against
American forces in the Pacific.
I was assured by the Generalissimo that China would support to the
limit of her ability an American program for the stabilization of
the Far East. He stated categorically that, regardless of moral
encouragement or material aid received from the United States, he
is determined to oppose Communism and to create a democratic form
of government in consonance with Doctor Sun Yat-sen’s principles.
He stated further that he plans to make sweeping reforms in the
government including the removal of incompetent and corrupt
officials. He stated that some progress has been made along these
lines but, with spiraling inflation, economic distress, and civil
war, it has been difficult to accomplish fully these objectives.
He emphasized that, when the Communist problem is solved, he could
drastically reduce the Army and concentrate upon political and
economic reforms. I retain the conviction that the Generalissimo is
sincere in his desire to attain these objectives. I am not certain
that he has today sufficient determination to do so if this requires
absolute overruling of the political and military cliques surrounding
him. Yet, if realistic United States aid is to prove effective in
stabilizing the situation in China and in coping with the dangerous
expansion of Communism, that determination must be established.
Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward
stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued
existence of an unpopular repressive government would render any
aid ineffective. Further, United States prestige in the Far East
would suffer heavily, and wavering elements might turn away from the
existing government to Communism.
In China and Korea, the political, economic, and psychological
problems are inextricably mingled. All of them are complex and
are becoming increasingly difficult of solution. Each has been
studied assiduously in compliance with your directive. Each will be
discussed in the course of this report. However, it is recognized
that a continued global appraisal is mandatory in order to preclude
disproportionate or untimely assistance to any specific area.
The following three postulates of United States foreign policy are
pertinent to indicate the background of my investigations, analyses,
and report:
The United States will continue support of the United Nations in the
attainment of its lofty aims, accepting the possible development
that the Soviet Union or other nations may not actively participate.
Moral support will be given to nations and peoples that have
established political and economic structures compatible with our
own, or that give convincing evidence of their desire to do so.
Material aid may be given to those same nations and peoples in
order to accelerate postwar rehabilitation and to develop economic
stability, provided:
That such aid shall be used for the purposes intended.
That there is continuing evidence that they are taking effective
steps to help themselves, or are firmly committed to do so.
That such aid shall not jeopardize American economy and shall
conform to an integrated program that involves other international
commitments and contributes to the attainment of political,
economic, and psychological objectives of the United States.
PART II—CHINA
POLITICAL
Although the Chinese people are unanimous in their desire for
peace at almost any cost, there seems to be no possibility of
its realization under existing circumstances. On one side is the
Kuomingtang, whose reactionary leadership, repression and corruption
have caused a loss of popular faith in the government. On the other
side, bound ideologically to the Soviet Union, are the Chinese
Communists, whose eventual aim is admittedly a Communist state in
China. Some reports indicate that Communist measures of land reform
have gained for them the support of the majority of peasants in
areas under their control, while others indicate that their ruthless
tactics of land distribution and terrorism have alienated the
majority of such peasants. They have, however, successfully organized
many rural areas against the National Government. Moderate groups
are caught between Kuomintang misrule and repression and ruthless
Communist totalitarianism. Minority parties lack dynamic leadership
and sizable following. Neither the moderates, many of whom are in
the Kuomingtang, nor the minority parties are able to make their
influence felt because of National Government repression. Existing
provincial opposition leading to possible separatist movements would
probably crystallize only if collapse of the government were imminent.
Soviet actions, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Sino-Soviet
treaty of 1945 and its related documents, have strengthened the
Chinese Communist position in Manchuria, with political, economic
and military repercussions on the National Government’s position
both in Manchuria and in China proper, and have made more difficult
peace and stability in China. The present trend points toward a
gradual disintegration of the National Government’s control, with the
ultimate possibility of a Communist-dominated China.
Steps taken by the Chinese Government toward governmental
reorganization in mid-April, 1947, aroused hopes of improvement
in the political situation. However, the reorganization resulted
in little change. Reactionary influences continue to mold
important policies even though the Generalissimo remains the
principal determinative force in the government. Since the April
reorganization, the most significant change has been the appointment
of General Chen Cheng to head the civil and militant administration
in Manchuria. Projected steps include elections in the Fall for
the formation of a constitutional government, but, under present
conditions, they are not expected to result in a government more
representative than the present regime.
ECONOMIC
Under the impact of civil strife and inflation, the Chinese
economy is disintegrating. The most probable outcome of present
trends would be, not sudden collapse, but a continued and creeping
paralysis and consequent decline in the authority and power of the
National Government. The past ten years of war have caused serious
deterioration of transportation and communication facilities, mines,
utilities and industries. Notwithstanding some commendable efforts
and large amounts of economic aid; their overall capabilities
are scarcely half those of the prewar period. With disruption of
transportation facilities and the loss of much of North China and
Manchuria, important resources of those rich areas are no longer
available for the rehabilitation and support of China’s economy.
Inflation in China has been diffused slowly through an enormous
population without causing the immediate dislocation which would
have occurred in a highly industrialized economy. The rural people,
80 per cent of the total Chinese population of 450 millions, barter
foodstuffs for local handicraft products without suffering a drastic
cut in living standards. Thus, local economies exist in many parts of
China, largely insulated from the disruption of urban industry. Some
local economies are under the control of Communists, and some are
loosely under the control of provincial authorities.
The principal cause of the hyper-inflation is the long-continued
deficit in the national budget. Present revenue collections, plus
the profits of nationalized enterprises, cover only one-third of
governmental expenditures, which are approximately 70 per cent
military, and an increasing proportion of the budget is financed
by the issuance of new currency. In the first six months of 1947
note-issue was tripled but rice prices increased seven-fold. Thus
prices and governmental expenditures spiral upwards, with price
increases occurring faster than new currency can be printed. With
further price increases, budget revisions will undoubtedly be
necessary. The most urgent economic need of Nationalist China is a
reduction of the military budget.
China’s external official assets amounted to $327 million (US) on
July 30, 1947. Privately-held foreign exchange assets are at least
$600 million and may total $1500 million, but no serious attempt has
been made to mobilize these private resources for rehabilitation
purposes. Private Chinese assets located in China include probably
$200 million in gold, and about $75 million in US currency notes.
Although China has not exhausted her foreign official assets, and
probably will not do so at the present rates of imports and exports
until early 1949, the continuing deficit in her external balance of
payments is a serious problem.
Disparity between the prices of export goods in China and in world
markets at unrealistic official exchange rates has greatly penalized
exports, as have disproportionate increases in wages and other costs.
Despite rigorous trade and exchange controls, imports have greatly
exceeded exports, and there consistently has been a heavy adverse
trade balance.
China’s food harvests this year are expected to be significantly
larger than last year’s fairly good returns. This moderately
encouraging situation with regard to crops is among the few favorable
factors which can be found in China’s current economic situation.
Under inflationary conditions, long-term investment is unattractive
for both Chinese and foreign capital. Private Chinese funds tends to
go into short-term advances, hoarding of commodities, and capital
flight The entire psychology is speculative and inflationary,
preventing ordinary business planning and handicapping industrial
recovery.
Foreign business enterprises in China are adversely affected by
the inefficient and corrupt administration of exchange and import
controls, discriminatory application of tax laws, the increasing
role of government trading agencies and the trend towards state
ownership of industries. The Chinese Government has taken some steps
toward improvement but generally has been apathetic in its efforts.
Between 1944 and 1947, the anti-inflationary measure on which the
Chinese Government placed most reliance was the public sale of gold
borrowed from the United States. The intention was to absorb paper
currency, and thus reduce the effective demand for goods. Under the
circumstance of continued large deficits, however, the only effect of
the gold sales program was to retard slightly the price inflation and
dissipate dollar assets.
A program to stabilize the economic situation was undertaken in
February, 1947. The measures included a wage freeze, a system of
limited rationing to essential workers in a few cities, and the sale
of government bonds. The effect of this program has been slight, and
the wage freeze has been abandoned. In August, 1947, the unrealistic
official rate of exchange was replaced, for proceeds of exports
and remittances, by a free market in foreign exchange. This step
is expected to stimulate exports, but it is too early to determine
whether it will be effective.
The issuance of a new silver currency has been proposed as a future
measure to combat inflation. If the government continued to finance
budgetary deficits by unbacked note issue, the silver would probably
go into hoards and the price inflation would continue. The effect
would be no more than that of the gold sales in 1944-1947, namely,
a slight and temporary retardation of the inflationary spiral. The
proposal could be carried out, moreover, only through a loan from the
United States of at least $200 million in silver.
In the construction field, China has prepared plans for
reconstruction of communications, mines and industries. Some
progress has been made in implementing them, notably in the partial
rehabilitation of certain railroads and in the textile industry.
Constructive results have been handicapped by a lack of funds,
equipment and experienced management, supervisory and technical
personnel.
On August 1, 1947, the State Council approved a “Plan for Economic
Reform.” This appears to be an omnibus of plans covering all phases
of Chinese economic reconstruction but its effectiveness cannot yet
be determined.
SOCIAL—CULTURAL
Public education has been one of the chief victims of war and social
and economic disruption. Schoolhouses, textbooks and other equipment
have been destroyed and the cost of replacing my considerable portion
cannot now be met. Teachers, like other public servants, have seen
the purchasing power of a month’s salary shrink to the market value
of a few days’ rice ration. This applies to the entire educational
system, from primary schools, which provide a medium to combat the
nation’s grievous illiteracy, to universities, from which must come
the nation’s professional men, technicians and administrators. The
universities have suffered in an additional and no less serious
respect—traditional academic freedom. Students participating in
protest demonstrations have been severely and at times brutally
punished by National Government agents without pretense of trial or
public evidence of the sedition charged. Faculty members have often
been dismissed or refused employment with no evidence of professional
unfitness, patently because they were politically objectionable to
government officials. Somewhat similarly, periodicals have been
closed down “for reasons of military security” without stated
charges, and permitted to reopen only after new managements have
been imposed. Resumption of educational and other public welfare
activities on anything like the desired scale can be accomplished
only by restraint of officialdom’s abuses, and when the nation’s
economy is stabilized sufficiently to defray the cost of such vital
activities.
MILITARY
The overall military position of the National Government has
deteriorated in the past several months and the current military
situation favors Communist forces. The Generalissimo has never
wavered in his contention that he is fighting for national
independence against forces of an armed rebellion nor has he been
completely convinced that the Communist problem can be resolved
except by force of arms. Although the Nationalist Army has a
preponderance of force, the tactical initiative rests with the
Communists. Their hit-and-run tactics, adapted to their mission of
destruction at points or in areas of their own selection, give them
a decided advantage over Nationalists, who must defend many critical
areas including connecting lines of communication. Obviously large
numbers of Nationalist troops involved in such defensive roles are
immobilized whereas Communist tactics permit almost complete freedom
of action. The Nationalists’ position is precarious in Manchuria,
where they occupy only a slender finger of territory. Their control
is strongly disputed in Shantung and Hopei Provinces where the
Communists make frequent dislocating attacks against isolated
garrisons.
In order to improve materially the current military situation, the
Nationalist forces must first stabilize the fronts and then regain
the initiative. Further, since the government is supporting the civil
war with approximately seventy per cent of its national budget, it
is evident that steps taken to alleviate the situation must point
toward an improvement in the effectiveness of the armed forces with
a concomitant program of social, political and economic reforms,
including a decrease in the size of the military establishment.
Whereas some rather ineffective steps have been taken to reorganize
and revitalize the command structure, and more sweeping reforms are
projected, the effectiveness of the Nationalist Army requires a sound
program of equipment and improved logistical support. The present
industrial potential of China is inadequate to support military
forces effectively. Chinese forces under present conditions cannot
cope successfully with internal strife or fulfill China’s obligations
as a member of the family of nations. Hence outside aid, in the form
of munitions (most urgently ammunition) and technical assistance,
is essential before any plan of operations can be undertaken with a
reasonable prospect of success. Military advice is now available to
the Nationalists on a General Staff level through American military
advisory groups. The Generalissimo expressed to me repeatedly a
strong desire to have this advice and supervision extended in scope
to include field forces, training centers and particularly logistical
agencies.
Extension of military aid by the United States to the National
Government might possibly be followed by similar aid from the Soviet
Union to the Chinese Communists, either openly or covertly—the latter
course seems more likely. An arena of conflicting ideologies might
be created as in 1935 in Spain. There is always the possibility that
such developments in this area, as in Europe and the Middle East,
might precipitate a third world war.
PART III—KOREA
POLITICAL
The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out
the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a
Provisional Korean Government to be followed by a Four-Power
Trusteeship over Korea. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission,
established in accordance with that Agreement, reached a deadlock
in 1946 in the effort to implement the Moscow Agreement due to
Soviet opposition to consultations with the Commission by all Korean
democratic parties and social organizations, as provided for in
that Agreement. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the extreme
rightist groups in the United States zone from consultations and
subsequently from participation in the new government thus ensuring
a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to
such consultations have been based on the rightist groups’ openly
expressed opposition to trusteeship, while the United States has
taken the position that to disqualify these groups would deprive a
large section of the Korean people of an opportunity to express views
regarding their government.
A resumption of the Joint Commission meetings in May, 1947, following
an exchange of notes between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister
Molotov, resulted in a further deadlock on the same issue, although
these notes had established a formula which would have permitted
participation in consultation by the rightist groups in question.
After the Soviet Government failed to reply to Secretary Marshall’s
note of August 12, requesting the submission by the Commission of
a joint status report or separate reports by each Delegation, the
United States Delegation, on August 20, transmitted a unilateral
report to Washington. An American proposal then made to China, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union for a Four-Power Conference to
discuss Korea has been agreed to by China and the United Kingdom, but
has been rejected by the Soviet Union.
Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet
establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea and by the
machinations in South Korea of Communist groups, openly hostile to
the United States.
* * * * *
The latter, in accordance with their directives, are endeavoring
to turn over to Koreans as rapidly as possible full administrative
responsibility in governmental departments. In consequence with this
plan they have organized an interim Korean legislative assembly and
in general, are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of
government in South Korea.
ECONOMIC
South Korea, basically an agricultural area, does not have the
overall economic resources to sustain its economy without external
assistance. The soil depleted, and imports of food as well as
fertilizer are required. The latter has normally come from North
Korea, as have most of the electric power, timber, anthracite, and
other basic products.
The economic dependence of South Korea upon North Korea, and of Korea
as a whole, in prewar years, upon trade with Japan and Manchuria,
cannot be too strongly emphasized. Division of the country at the 38°
North parallel and prevention of all except smuggling trade between
North and South Korea have reduced the Korean economy to its lowest
level in many years. Prospects for developing sizeable exports are
slight. Food exports cannot be anticipated on any scale for several
years, and then only with increased use of artificial fertilizer.
South Korea’s few manufacturing industries, which have been operating
at possibly 20 per cent of prewar production, are now reducing their
output or closing down. In part this is a natural result of ten years
of deferred maintenance and war-time abuse, but lack of raw materials
and essential repair parts, and a gross deficiency of competent
management and technical personnel are the principal factors.
A runaway inflation has not yet occurred in South Korea, because
the Military Government has restrained the issuance of currency by
keeping governmental expenditures and local occupation costs at
reasonable levels; because cannibalization and the use of Japanese
stocks have kept some industries going; and because the forcible
collection of rice at harvest time has brought in sufficient food
to maintain—with imports provided by the United States—an adequate
official ration in the cities. Highly inflationary factors such as
the exhaustion of raw material stocks, cumulative breakdowns in
public services and transportation, and the cutting of power supply
from the North might occur simultaneously. The South Korean economic
outlook is, therefore, most grave.
A five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and
requiring United States financing at a cost of $647 million, has
been proposed by the Military Government. A review of preliminary
estimates indicates that the proposed annual rehabilitation cost
would be substantially greater than the relief program of $137
million which was tentatively approved for fiscal 1948, but later
reduced to $92.7 million. These preliminary estimates of costs and
the merits of individual projects need careful review. It is not
considered feasible to make South Korea self-sustaining. If the
United States elects to remain in South Korea, support of that area
should be on a relief basis.
SOCIAL—CULTURAL
Since the Japanese were expelled, the Korean people have vehemently
and unceasingly pressed for restoration of their ancient culture.
There is particular zeal for public education. Individual and
collective efforts to reduce illiteracy have produced results meeting
the praise of American Military Government officials. There will be
materially better results when there are more school buildings, more
trained teachers and advisors, and many more textbooks in the Korean
language. Current American activities aim at adult visual education
on a modest but reasonably effective scale. South Korea’s health
and public-welfare work are at present fully as effective as under
Japanese administration and considerably more so in the prevention of
serious diseases. Even the Koreans’ eagerness for improvement cannot
immediately overcome the unquestionable need for large funds for
social betterment.
MILITARY
The military situation in Korea, stemming from political and
economic disputes which in turn are accentuated by the artificial
barrier along the 38° North parallel, is potentially dangerous
to United States strategic interests. Large-scale Communist
inspired or abetted riots and revolutionary activities in the
South are a constant threat. However, American forces supplemented
by quasi-military Korean units are adequate to cope with such
trouble or disorder except in the currently improbable event of an
outright Soviet-controlled invasion. Whereas American and Soviet
forces engaged in occupation duties in South Korea and North Korea
respectively are approximately equal, each comprising less than
50,000 troops, the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People’s
(Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the
United States-organized Constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with
Japanese small arms. The North Korean People’s Army constitutes a
potential military threat to South Korea, since there is strong
possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces,
and thus induce our own withdrawal. This probably will take place
just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet
government and its armed forces which they have created, are strong
enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry
out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.
It appears advisable that the United States organize, equip, and
train a South Korean Force, similar to the former Philippine Scouts.
This force should be under the control of the United States military
commander and, initially should be officered throughout by Americans,
with a program for replacement by Korean officers. It should be
of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North. It
would counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s Army
when American and Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea, possibly
preclude the forcible establishment of a Communist government, and
thus contribute toward a free and independent Korea.
PART IV—CONCLUSIONS
The peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples in the world are
jeopardized today by developments as portentous as those leading to
World War II.
The Soviet Union and her satellites give no evidence of a
conciliatory or cooperative attitude in these developments. The
United States is compelled, therefore to initiate realistic lines of
action in order to create and maintain bulwarks of freedom, and to
protect United States strategic interests.
The bulk of the Chinese and Korean peoples are not disposed to
Communism and they are not concerned with ideologies. They desire
food, shelter, and the opportunity to live in peace.
CHINA
The spreading internecine struggle within China threatens world
peace. Repeated American efforts to mediate have proved unavailing.
It is apparent that positive steps are required to end hostilities
immediately. The most logical approach to this very complex and
ominous situation would be to refer the matter to the United Nations.
A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the
interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed
hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United
States regards as vital to the peace of the world.
The Communists have the tactical initiative in the overall military
situation. The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious,
and in Shantung and Hopei Provinces strongly disputed. Continued
deterioration of the situation may result in the early establishment
of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the
evolution of a Communist-dominated China.
China is suffering increasingly from disintegration. Her requirements
for rehabilitation are large. Her most urgent needs include
governmental reorganization and reforms, reduction of the military
budget and external assistance.
A program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition
to Communist expansion, and would contribute to gradual development
of stability in China.
Due to excesses and oppressions by government police agencies basic
freedoms of the people are being jeopardized. Maladministration
and corruption cause a loss of confidence in the government. Until
drastic political and economic reforms are undertaken United States
aid cannot accomplish its purpose.
Even so, criticism of results achieved by the National Government in
efforts for improvement should be tempered by a recognition of the
handicaps imposed on China by eight years of war, the burden of her
opposition to Communism, and her sacrifices for the Allied cause.
A United States program of assistance could best be implemented
under the supervision of American advisors in specified economic
and military fields. Such a program can be undertaken only if China
requests advisory aid as well as material assistance.
KOREA
The situation in Korea, in its political, economic and psychological
aspects, is strongly and adversely influenced by the artificial
barrier of the 38° North parallel separating agricultural South Korea
from the more industrialized North Korea.
The South Korean economic position is grave. Agriculture is
debilitated and there are few other resources.
The establishment of a self-sustaining economy in South Korea is not
feasible. Accordingly, United States aid should include a minimum of
capital investment and should consist chiefly of items required for
support on a relief basis.
Korean Communist agents are creating unrest and fomenting disorder in
South Korea.
* * * * *
Since the United States-Soviet Joint Commission meetings have
twice ended in deadlock, and offer no real hope of success, the
United Nations now seems to be the appropriate medium through which
a Provisional Korean Government, functioning under a Four-Power
Trusteeship, can be established.
The United States may be confronted with a situation requiring
decision concerning continued occupation in South Korea should the
Soviet Union withdraw her occupation forces. This could reasonably be
expected to occur when the Soviet-created puppet government and its
armed forces are sufficiently well established to carry out Communist
objectives without the presence of Soviet troops.
The creation of an American controlled and officered Korean Scout
Force, sufficient in strength to cope with the threat from the North,
is required to prevent the forcible establishment of a Communist
government after the United States and Soviet Union withdraw their
occupation forces.
PART V—RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended:
That the United States Government provide as early as practicable
moral, advisory, and material support to China and South Korea in
order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world
in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations,
and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests
against militant forces which now threaten them.
That United States policies and actions suggested in this report
be thoroughly integrated by appropriate government agencies with
other international commitments. It is recognized that any foreign
assistance extended must avoid jeopardizing the American economy.
CHINA
That China be advised that the United States is favorably disposed
to continue aid designated to protect China’s territorial integrity
and to facilitate her recovery, under agreements to be negotiated
by representatives of the two government, with the following
stipulations:
That China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the
United States for increasing material and advisory assistance.
That China request the United Nations to take immediate action to
bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that
Manchuria be placed under a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing
that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations
Charter.
That China make effective use of her own resources in a program for
economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading
to reduction of budgetary deficits.
That China give continuing evidence that the urgently required
political and military reforms are being implemented.
That China accept American advisors as responsible representatives
of the United States Government in specified military and economic
fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner
for which it is intended.
KOREA
That the United States continue efforts for the early establishment
of a Provisional Korean Government in consonance with the Moscow
Agreement and meanwhile provide necessary support of the political,
economic and military position of South Korea.
APPENDIX E TO PART III—KOREA
POLITICAL
_Resumé of United States Policy Toward Korea_
The first treaty between the United States and Korea, signed in 1882,
provided that if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with
either Government, the other would exert its good offices to bring
about an “amicable agreement.” During the early period of United
States-Korean relations the United States considered Korea as an
independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations,
although that nation was actually under Chinese suzerainty. Prior to
the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, when efforts were made to gain the
support of the United States to avert war, the United States took
the position that, while it stood for peace, it would do nothing
which might cause it to assume responsibility for settlement of
the dispute. Under the treaty ending the war, China relinquished
suzerainty over Korea, which was in turn assumed by Japan. Therefore,
the United States continued its policy of non-interference in Korean
internal affairs and in 1899 denied a Korean request for American
initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing
Korea’s integrity. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05,
President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States could
not intervene to preserve Korea’s integrity since the Koreans were
unable “to strike one blow in their own defense.” When Japan forced
the Korean Emperor to agree to Japanese control of the administration
of Korean affairs, the Emperor appealed to the United States, under
the good offices clause of the United States-Korean Treaty of 1882,
but his appeal was denied. Nor did the United States protest Japanese
formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Thus, with little or no effort
on the part of the United States to oppose such a development, Korea
passed from the suzerainty of China to that of Japan and thence
to the status of a Japanese colony. Efforts of Korean exiles to
introduce Korea’s case at the Paris Peace Conference and at the
Washington Conference of 1921-22 were rebuffed, but these exiles
continued their efforts to further the cause of Korean independence,
some of them in the United States. With the outbreak of World War II,
the question of Korean independence was revived and Korean exiles in
the United States and China began to agitate for Korean independence
and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, agreement
was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the
Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent “in due course.”
This phrase caused great resentment among the Koreans who felt that
they should be given immediate independence upon the defeat of Japan.
This resentment was increased when the decision was reached at the
Moscow Conference in December, 1945, that Korea would be placed
under a Four-Power Trusteeship (the Soviet Union, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and China) for a period of up to five years.
A tentative agreement in this regard had previously been reached
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the end
of the war was imminent agreement was reached between the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China that Soviet
forces accept the Japanese surrender in Korea north of the 38° North
parallel, while the American forces would accept such surrender south
of that line. This arbitrary line, originally serving as a marker
of military responsibility, soon became a complete barrier to free
movement between North and South Korea. It has resulted in separation
of the country into two parts, an economically unstable division
which has seriously blocked efforts to establish a unified Korea.
_Current Political Situation_
The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out
the Moscow Agreement of December, 1945, for the formation of a
Provisional Korean Government. The United States-Soviet Joint
Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, held
its first meeting March 8, 1946, but finally adjourned on May
28, 1946, without having reached an agreement looking toward the
implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. The failure
of the Joint Commission arose from the unwillingness of the Soviet
Delegation to agree to consultation with the Commission of all
Korean groups, as provided for in the Moscow agreement, to assist in
the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Soviet motives
have been to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups in the
American-occupied zone of Korea from consultation and subsequently
from participation in the new government. Had the Soviet Delegation
been successful the result would have been a Communist-dominated
government in Korea. Soviet objections to consultation with these
rightist groups have been based on the latter’s openly expressed
opposition to trusteeship. The American Delegation has taken the
stand that criticism of trusteeship did not disqualify Korean groups
from participation in consultation, since to do so would deprive
a considerable section of the Korean people of an opportunity to
be heard in regard to the formation of the Provisional Korean
Government. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State
and the Soviet Foreign Minister in April and May, 1947, resulted
in a resumption of the meetings of the Joint Commission on May 21,
1947, under a formula which provided for consultation by all Korean
groups which were prepared to sign a declaration that they would
not, after such signing, “foment or instigate active opposition”
to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the
Moscow Agreement. After repeated sessions of the Joint Commission a
deadlock was again reached in July, the Soviet Delegation returning
to its position of the previous year and the American Delegation
insisting upon the implementation of the formula set forth in the
Marshall-Molotov letters, which guaranteed wide-scale participation
of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation
and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans. Further meetings
of the Commission having produced no results, Secretary Marshall
addressed another note to Foreign Minister Molotov on August 12,
requesting that the Commission submit by August 21, 1947, a joint
status report or that each Delegation submit separate reports. No
reply having been received to this note and the Soviet Delegation
refusing to participate in a joint report, the American Delegation
on August 20 transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. Since
the receipt of this report, the Secretary of State has addressed
identical notes to China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union
proposing a Four Power Conference for a settlement of the Korean
situation. China and the United Kingdom have indicated their
willingness to participate in such a conference. The Soviet Union has
declined.
Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet
establishment of a Communist state in North Korea and by its
encouragement of the activities of Communist and Communist-dominated
organizations in South Korea hostile to the United States.
* * * * *
The rightist groups are probably the best organized parties in South
Korea. They command a majority of the Korean Interim Legislative
Assembly and, if elections were held under present conditions would
gain control of any government established in South Korea by such
elections. The American authorities in South Korea are endeavoring
to turn over to the Koreans as rapidly as possible administrative
responsibility in the various departments of the United States
Military Government, have organized a half-elected and half-appointed
Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and in general are striving to
carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea.
_Military Government Directive and Steps Taken to Implement Same_
The Directive under which the United States Military Government now
operates in Korea sets forth three basic United States objectives:
(1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from
all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United
Nations (2) to insure that the National Government so established
shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely
expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans
in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system
necessary for an independent democratic state. The Directive points
out that the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, in
accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates the establishment
of a Provisional Korean Government to assist the United States-Soviet
Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government, the creation
of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the
United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union for a period of up to
five years and the complete independence of Korea at the earliest
possible moment, with subsequent membership in the United Nations.
The Directive goes on to state that the American occupation of South
Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of the
basic American objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it
contributes to that end.
As a result of Soviet obstruction and tactics designed to eliminate
the majority of the rightist groups from participation in the
new government to be established for all of Korea, the American
military authorities in South Korea have been unable to proceed
with the initial steps required for the establishment of a
Provisional Korean Government. As required by the Directive, the
American authorities have made considerable progress in utilizing
qualified Koreans in posts in local and provincial administration
and in the administration of the United States zones as a whole.
American personnel remains in the provincial administrations only
in an advisory capacity and all administrative posts are filled
by Koreans. In the overall administration of South Korea, all
Government departments are now headed by Korean officials and
Americans are utilized only in an advisory capacity, although
important controversial matters may be referred either to the United
States Military Governor or the Commanding General of the United
States Occupation Forces for final decision. American military
personnel in the Military Government are being replaced as rapidly
as possible by American civilians. A Korean Interim Legislative
Assembly was established in December, 1946, half of its membership
being selected by the United States Commanding General from a list
of Koreans recommended by Korean groups and half being elected
as representatives of the various provinces and municipalities.
Presently under consideration by this Assembly is a program for
land reform in South Korea and the Assembly has recently adopted
a general election law providing for election of officials to an
Interim South Korean Government according to certain stipulated rules
and regulations. In accordance with the Directive, the United States
military authorities have permitted full freedom of expression to
all political groups, except in those cases when the activities of
certain Communist-dominated groups were clearly prejudicial to the
security of American military occupation.
* * * * *
In seeking to attain the cultural objectives set forth in the
Directive, the United States occupational authorities have caused
funds to be set aside for training courses in industry and
agriculture, have encouraged the establishment of teacher training
schools and of summer and winter institutes for the reeducation
of teachers and have in general devoted their efforts to the
restoration of schools, the enforcement of new system of education
and expansion of school facilities. They have also encouraged the
formation of various committees for the purpose of democratizing
the Korean educational administration. The implementation of these
programs has been handicapped by lack of funds. Culturally, as well
as politically, efforts have been made to carry out a process of
“Koreanization” looking toward a free and independent Korea.
It should be pointed out that the Directive itself necessarily allows
latitude of interpretation and execution and that the American
authorities in Korea have functioned within the framework of that
Directive.
* * * * *
Also, the failure to implement the badly needed land reform program
has been due to the desire to await the unification of North and
South Korea, at which time a Provisional Korean Government would be
in a position to carry out a uniform program of this kind for the
entire nation. Now that unification appears to be a matter for the
indefinite future, plans are being made to carry out such a program
at the earliest possible moment.
_Obstructions to Realizations of United States Objectives_
The chief obstructions to the realization of United States objectives
in Korea have been the division of that country by the 38° North
parallel barrier and the lack of Soviet cooperation in carrying out
the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. Behind the
38° North parallel the Soviet Union has established a Democratic
Front Government modelled along Soviet lines and has eliminated
all political parties of a non-Communist character. North Korean
Communist groups have thus been able to encourage and assist the
activities of the Democratic Front and other Communist-dominated
leftist groups in South Korea hostile to the United States by the
infiltration of agents from North Korea into the American zone
of occupation. The Soviet refusal in the United States-Soviet
Joint Commission to consult with all Korean political and social
organizations, as the first step in the formation of a Provisional
Korean Government, has so far made it impossible to realize American
objectives in Korea—the establishment of a self-governing, sovereign
Korea, independent of foreign control and fully representative of the
freely expressed will of the Korean people.
Other obstructions to the realization of American objectives in Korea
have come from sources within the United States zone of occupation:
* * * * *
2. Similarly, extreme leftist groups have endeavored to foment
hostility to the United States and opposition to the attainment of
American objectives in Korea. Such groups have been particularly
active among Korean peasants in opposing the rice collection program
instituted by the United States Military Government for the purpose
of ensuring sufficient food for the urban areas.
_Implication of Withdrawal of All United States Assistance or
Continuing Present United States Policy_
The American occupation forces in Korea could not remain in that
country if all assistance to South Korea were stopped, since the
cessation of all aid would lead to an early economic breakdown and
to the outbreak of riots and disorder throughout the United States
zone of occupation. The withdrawal of American military forces
from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea
either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean
military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The
end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist
regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with
these results would cost the United States an immense loss on moral
prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious
repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration
of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the
Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important
in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating
opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close
proximity to the Soviet Union.
Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the
United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing
the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea, the matter
be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that
the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United States
in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean
problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek,
by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem,
but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations
will require that the United States make a decision regarding its
future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall
organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and
whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a government.
A continuation of present American policies will serve to give
notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East
that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet
intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon
the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea.
A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the
Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent
her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations,
including the ice-free ports in South Korea.
APPENDIX F TO PART III—KOREA
ECONOMIC
South Korea has few resources except agricultural land. This area
formerly obtained much of its anthracite, electric power, timber,
fertilizer, and other chemical products from North Korea, and
bituminous coal and food from Manchuria, but must now obtain these
essential items (except electric power) as well as raw materials and
repair parts for her industries, from other external sources.
_Coal_—The whole of Korea, particularly South Korea, lacks coal No
bituminous deposits are known and existing coal deposits are of
a law-grade anthracite. The coal runs high in ash, and tends to
disintegrate to powder. The largest producing mine in South Korea,
constituting in fact 50 per cent of the production, is located at
Sam Chok on the east coast. Production involves costly rail-sea-rail
distribution. This coal can be and is being used in thermal plants
by pulverizing and mixing with oil, but its use is costly and
maintenance of boiler equipment is heavy. In any case, bituminous
coal must be imported for the operation of the railways and most of
the industries.
_Electric Power_—Because of the unfavorable coal situation, South
Korea is at the mercy of North Korea with respect to electric power
because virtually all of the large hydroelectric installations are
in North Korea. In 1945 there was a total of 1,240,000 kilowatts of
installed capacity, 90 per cent of it hydroelectric and in North
Korea. Some of the capacity in North Korea has been removed by the
Russians. At the present time South Korea depends on North Korea
sources for 75 per cent of its power requirements in the winter
months when stream flow for its hydroelectric plants is low, and 50
per cent to 60 per cent during the rainy summer months. Conditions
will be critical during the coming winter. Minimum peak requirements
are estimated at 200,000 kilowatts and only 110,000 kilowatts are
in sight including the area’s own generating capacity of 60,000
kilowatts—and that only if rehabilitation materials are received—plus
50,000 kilowatts from North Korea, which is all the Russians profess
to be able to deliver. If North Korea power were cut off, all
industrial production in South Korea would have to be suspended,
and remaining locally generated energy rationed for military and
emergency use. Any new plants to correct this deficiency or permit
any revival of industry would require four to five years to complete,
and would still be dependent upon imported coal or oil, or upon a
considerable expansion of the low quality anthracite production.
There is no reasonable solution to this dilemma other than to unite
North and South Korea.
_Forestry_—The forest situation in South Korea is unfavorable. Before
the war, effective programs of reforestation and erosion control were
under way, but dining the war the annual cut averaged 168 million
cubic feet as compared with annual estimated growth of only 113
million cubic feet. Furthermore, over two-thirds of South Korean
requirements of lumber, fuel wood, and pulp were formerly supplied by
North Korea. With this source cut off and coal imports and production
drastically reduced, hills and mountains around the Urge cities have
been literally denuded. Unless North and South Korea are united or
substantial imports are provided, the needs of South Korea for fuel
wood, lumber, railroad ties, and telephone and telegraph poles, make
it inevitable that overcutting and denuding of forest land in South
Korea will continue, with resulting increased erosion and flood
damage to agricultural land.
_Mineral Resources_—Mineral resources of Korea are varied and rather
extensive, but with a few exceptions are of low grade. There is a
large deposit—over one billion metric tons—of low grade (35 per cent
magnetic) iron ore at Musan in Northeastern Korea which the Japanese
mined extensively before and during the war. Capacities are said to
have been developed for the production of over 800,000 tons of pig
iron and 350,000 tons of steel annually, but operations were possible
only by large imports of bituminous coal from Manchuria and Japan.
In both North and South Korea, gold and copper were also mined, the
latter as an adjunct of the former, and some lead and zinc, and a
large quantity of graphite, the latter, however, of low quality.
There is enough developed tungsten production in South Korea to make
it an important export commodity.
_Industries_—The prospects for Korean industry, even in the event
of early unification, are not bright. Before 1931 Japan exploited
Korea primarily as a source of raw materials, rice and cheap labor.
Thereafter Korea became Japan’s bridgehead to the Asiatic mainland,
and with Manchuria, was developed as the mainland portion of
Japan’s war potential. By 1938 there were 7,000 factories, mostly
small, employing 183,000 workers, principally in the production
of chemicals, textiles and processed foods. Main industrial
concentrations were in the north, near hydroelectric power plants
and the larger mineral deposits. This rather impressive industrial
plant was not damaged by bombing, but it would be a mistake to assume
therefore that Korea possesses a ready-made industrial plant which
could quickly be turned to full and efficient peacetime operations.
Production, at perhaps 20 per cent of capacity, was restored after
the occupation, but output has dwindled as stocks of raw materials
have been exhausted, and as machinery has stopped functioning
for lack of spare parts and competent maintenance and operating
personnel. The dearth of competent administrative supervisory and
technical personnel, practically all of whom were formerly Japanese
and are now evacuated, is the outstanding deficiency in Korean
industries, power, and transportation systems. The unification of
North and South Korea would make some of the required raw materials
available, and spare parts may eventually be obtainable from Japan,
but the serious deficiency of competent personnel is an unresolved
problem.
_Railways_—Korea has an excellent standard-gauge railway system
including a double-track main line from Pusan on the southeast coast
to Antung on the Manchurian border, which adequately serves the
country with the exception of the eastern half of Kangwon Province.
However, trackage, rolling stock except locomotives, and railway
communications are badly in need of rehabilitation as a result of
years of undermaintenance because of wartime shortages of materials.
The railways in common with the country as a whole have been
badly crippled by the evacuation of the Japanese administrative,
supervisory, and technical personnel. The right-of-way is excellently
engineered and constructed and characterized by a profusion of
concrete and masonry structures, but all of the seven million ties
in South Korea will require replacement within the next seven
years, and quantities of rails and fishplates are also needed. One
hundred and one new locomotives of the 2-8-0 type have been provided
by the Military Government, but much of the other rolling stock
requires overhaul. Railway communications also require considerable
rehabilitation.
_Highways_—There are no modern roads in Korea. The highways of South
Korea are practically nonoperable for automotive traffic except from
Seoul to Inchon, Kaisong, and Chunchon. Practically all supplies must
be distributed throughout Korea by rail.
_Shipping_—The only shipping of South Korea consists of eight Baltic
vessels, and 12 LST’s, operated by the Military Government coast-wise
and for some trade with Japan.
_Ports_—There are two major ports in South Korea; Pusan, an excellent
deep-water port with four large piers at the Southeast end of the
peninsula, and Inchon, west of Seoul, a much smaller tidal-basin
port which can accommodate four three-quarter-thousand-ton ships at
dockside in the basin and larger trans-Pacific cargo and passenger
vessels in the anchorage outside. Two other deep-water ports,
Masan and Yosu, were mined and are little used at present. Mukko
on the east coast is the export terminal for Sam Chok, the largest
anthracite mining area in South Korea. The other ports of Mokpo,
Pohang, Chinhae, and Kunsan are limited by unfavorable factors of
nigh tidal range, and a lack of berths and port clearance facilities.
In North Korea, there are two first-class warm water commercial and
naval ports at Wonsan and Chungjin on the east coast, the latter
particularly desirable from a Russian viewpoint, and other ports
Oongki, Rashin, Eungjin, Chinnanpo, and Simhu, the latter two
handicapped by the 25- to 30- foot tides of the Yellow Sea.
_Withdrawal of Japanese Personnel_
As disastrous in its effects on Korean economy as the division of
Korea’s people and resources by the 38° North parallel, was the
evacuation of all Japanese personnel, except 500 retained in North
Korea, after VJ-Day. The 700,000 Japanese formerly resident in Korea
dominated all elements of the economy and supplied management and
technical personnel even to the mechanic class. Koreans were denied
opportunities or positions of consequence in all phases of political
and economic life. It is no reflection on the individuals concerned
to note that a former Korean stationmaster at Pusan is now head of
the railways, or that a vocational school graduate is in responsible
charge of a large hydroelectric plant not far from Seoul. It is
however, an indication of an almost fatal deficiency in South Korean
economy. The ultimate solution is not readily apparent.
_Disinvestment_
The process of disinvestment probably began in South Korea during the
late thirties when the Japanese decided to put all new capital into
war production and permit nonwar facilities to depreciate. Capital
goods provided by the Japanese for maintenance and development in
South Korea went with few exceptions to war plants such as the
submarine shop at Pusan, and to the strategic transport services
linking Japan with the Manchuria-North Korea industrial complex.
This meant that facilities such as the north-south railroad from
Pusan to Antung on the Manchurian border received the main portion
of construction materials available. Other industrial establishments
in South Korea were converted to war production or allowed to
deteriorate. The supply of fertilizer, essential to rice culture in
the exhausted paddies of South Korea, was drastically reduced in the
early forties as a result of the conversion of North Korean nitrogen
fixation plants to the manufacture of explosives. Exploitation of
South Korea’s meager forest resources resulted in severe erosion and
the destruction of crops and utilities through flooding The Japanese
also depleted Korean stock-piles and withdrew skilled labor for Army
service, or for the mines and factories of Manchuria and the Japanese
islands. During two years of military government, the process of
disinvestment has continued.
The possibility of South Korea financing a program of investment
and rehabilitation out of the proceeds of exports is not worth
considering in detail. Although South Korea is primarily
agricultural, it is unlikely that it will be able to export
foodstuff, even under the most favorable circumstances. Deterioration
of agriculture, due to accumulated soil deficiencies and erosion,
and an increase of population from 15 to 20 million since 1940
indicate that no export surplus of food can be expected in the next
several years. The only exports which may be derived from South Korea
are small amounts of such minerals as tungsten, gold and copper,
some ginseng root, and marine products such as agar-agar. The most
optimistic estimate is $10 million worth of exports by 1950. Much
more than $10 million earned by Korean exports will be needed to
finance essential raw material imports, and there is no prospect of
any capital development out of current production.
_Inflation_
The Korean inflation is not as serious as the Chinese inflation
in rate of price increase, but its causes are less susceptible to
control by measures taken within Korea. Price increases have been
due to physical inability to produce goods, and not to unrestrained
issuance of paper currency. Prices of consumers’ goods in various
categories have risen 200 to 700 times over the 1937 level. The
official rise price, however, has risen only 70 times, and about
80 per cent of the calorie requirement for the urban population
is available at the official price. A runaway inflation has not
yet occurred in South Korea, because (_a_) the Military Government
has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental
expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels, and
(_b_) because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have
kept some industry going, and (_c_) the forcible collection of rice
at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain, with
“disease an unrest” imports, an adequate official ration in the
cities without the use of large inflationary payments to the farmers.
Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material
stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation,
and the cutting of power supply from the North, might occur
simultaneously. The Korean economic outlook is, therefore, more grave
than in China or Japan, where governmental fiscal policies as well as
low production, are the main causes of inflation. Korea, lacking raw
materials and skilled labor, is not in a position to be saved from
a disastrous and chaotic hyper-inflation by the efforts of its own
people combined with correct policy decisions. A breakdown could be
forestalled only by external provision of large amounts of consumers’
goods and transportation equipment.
_Agriculture and Fisheries_
_Agriculture_—Over three-quarters of the total population of South
Korea are farmers. The total area of land under cultivation in
1946 was 6,033,000 acres, or about 2½ acres per farm household.
Approximately 15 per cent of agricultural land was formerly owned by
Japanese, but title thereto remains with the Military Government and
will eventually pass to Koreans. In the projected land reforms an
additional 60 per cent of land, which is tenant-operated, would be
involved. The Military Government has not proceeded with land reform
even with regard to Japanese-held land, in the view that such reform
should not precede establishment of an interim Korean Government.
After VJ-Day the influx of over two and a half million Koreans from
Japan, China, and North Korea into South Korea, coupled with almost
complete lack of commercial fertilizers as well as severe floods,
resulted in a severe food shortage. Farmers have been reluctant to
double-crop soils already depleted because of a lack of fertilizer,
and have preferred to conserve land for rice, the best money crop. In
1946 the average planted acreage was only 79 per cent of the 1935-39
average, and production of grains and pulses was only 71 per cent.
In the past, about 36 per cent of the population and 36 per cent
of the food production of Korea were located north of the 38°
North parallel. However, postwar population movements, plus the
availability of more commercial fertilizers in North Korea (where
almost all of Korea’s large chemical plants are located), has changed
this situation. Only about 30 per cent of Korea’s population is now
north of the 38° North parallel, but that area accounts for around 38
per cent of food production.
Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently
represented more than half the total value of agricultural
production. During the 1930’s the rice crop averaged about
100,000,000 bushels annually. Forty per cent or more was exported
each year to Japan accounting generally for about one-third of the
total gross value of exports. This was by no means voluntary on
the part of the Korean people. In line with Japanese policy, farm
tenancy increased from less than 40 per cent in 1910 to more than 75
per cent in 1945. This facilitated grain collections, for landlords
usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60
per cent of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans preferred rice
to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from
3.62 bushels in 1915-19 to 2.0 bushels in 1939-45, a decline of 44
per cent. This deficiency was partly made up by imports of Manchurian
millet and soya beans, but underconsumption was nevertheless chronic.
To meet the food crisis in South Korea and to rehabilitate
agriculture the Military Government developed program to import
foodstuffs to prevent starvation and to assure Korean urban residents
at least a subsistence diet until indigenous production could be
increased to meet minimum food needs; and a fertilizer import
program designed to restore depleted soils and increase agricultural
production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past.
In 1945 the Military Government’s attempt to institute a compulsory
system of rice collection for rationing to non-self-suppliers was
largely unsuccessful. In 1946, a poor crop year due to floods, the
Military Government collected 87,428 tons of rice, or about one-sixth
of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production
to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea,
180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn, and flour were imported into
South Korea by the Military Government from May through December,
1946.
A program for the collection of the rice in 1946 was given highest
priority by the Military Government, as one of the most important
ways to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check
the inflationary spiral. This program was fully supported by all
agencies, and it succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric
tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30 per cent of the
total 1946 production.
This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of
275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with U. S. funds during the
first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to
stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to
non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over
300 grams (1,050 calories) per person per day.
_Fisheries_—Fishing was one of the important prewar Korean
industries, ranking sixth in the world. It is second in importance,
only to agriculture in the economic structure of the country. The
industry was, however, largely dependent upon Japan for imports of
fisheries supplies and, has deteriorated seriously since this source
has been cut off. Consumption of fish products has decreased from
a prewar average of 47 pounds per capita per year to 32 pounds.
Korea needs additional fisheries supplies, boats, manila line, nets,
trawls, ammonia for refrigeration, tin plate for canning, salt and
sugar for canning. Fears are expressed that if such supplies are
not forthcoming and fishing operations considerably expanded, the
Japanese will enter claims for fishing grounds now reserved for the
Koreans.
_Foreign Trade_
The total volume of Korea’s external trade grew from 660,000,000 yen
in 1910 to more than 2,400,000,000 yen in 1939. With respect to the
principal categories of its trade, i. e., foodstuffs, textiles and
fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items. Korea was
consistently a net importer; of all, except for foodstuffs. Food
exports however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset
imports of textiles and fibers.
From 1910 to 1945, Korea’s external trade was almost wholly absorbed
by the Japanese Empire and the prime factor during the entire
period was the export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the value of 41
Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for
approximately 64 per cent. Although by 1939 the relative importance
of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures,
of the 55 net export products in that year, rice still made up
one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately
preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to
rice, averaging from 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent of all net export
commodities. Other exports individually were of minor significance.
Korea’s principal imports historically have reflected its dependence
on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufacturers, machinery,
automotive equipment, textiles, and fibers, and specialized products.
Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of
the term is small in amount. During the period August 15, 1945,
through June 30, 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the
area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about
$25,000,000 represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea
and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private
traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents mainly commodities
imported by agencies of the United State Government as a part of the
Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the
War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 UNRRA
supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus Foreign
Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of government-owned
minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000.
The Military Government is endeavoring to encourage such trade as
will reduce the area’s dependence upon American funds. Credits
realized from South Korea exports, unless balanced in kind by imports
approved as essential, are to be used to purchase commodities similar
to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import
by the Military Government. On July 15, 1947, Korea was declared open
to small numbers of foreign businessmen, who might desire to develop
trade possibilities within the framework established by the military
authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hong Kong and
Macao, and some critically needed materials have been obtained by
barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the
Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of
tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton.
All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and
China has imposed conditions which make legitimate trade virtually
out of the question. Actually, a growing smuggling trade is going
on both with Japan and China, and via Hong Kong and Macao. An
essential step for promoting Korea’s trade on a sound basis would be
development of an efficient customs service.
_United States Investment in Rehabilitation_
There is one basic policy question which overhangs all financial and
economic programs for Korea: How long will the occupation of South
Korea continue on a unilateral basis? Until this question is answered
in terms of months or years, no satisfactory decision can be made on
United States financial or developmental programs for the area. The
characteristics of the South Korean economy are such that there is
no compromise which provides effective utilization of dollars, and
at the same time leaves open the decision concerning the duration
of the occupation. If a serious decline in the living standard, and
possibly economic disintegration are to be avoided, South Korea must
have (_a_) unification with North Korea, or (_b_) substantial relief
supplies, or (_c_) relief and rehabilitation supplies of $200 to $300
million a year for several years. The third alternative would provide
a possible basis for an indefinite continuance of occupation. The
capital investment in a permanently separate South Korea would be
wasteful, and the likelihood of a stable economy resulting therefrom
would be in doubt for some years. South Korea is a depleted and
eroded country with no minerals worth mentioning; an agriculture
dependent on nitrate input, and a backward people. In terms of the
needs of the East Asia area, an investment in rehabilitation and
industrialization, which would permit South Korea to subsist on its
own industrial output at its standards of the past 10 years with a
minimum of relief, could be justified only by political and strategic
consideration of the highest order.
A consideration affecting the duration of the occupation of Korea,
and hence the type of economic program, is the estimated length of
the occupation in Japan. General MacArthur has indicated his desire
for a United Nations, or other international administration to take
responsibility in Japan soon after the peace treaty is signed.
There would be obvious difficulties in any long-term occupation and
rehabilitation program for South Korea, initiated at a time when
the occupation of Japan was about to be relinquished by the United
States. Apart from the problem of tactical forces in Japan to back
up the Korean occupation, there would be communication and supply
problems. There might he political objection to the occupation of
liberated Korea after the termination of occupation in defeated Japan.
The United States Military Government in Korea has recommended
a five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and
requiring U. S. financing for a deficit of $647 million. The
estimates indicate that the proposed rehabilitation of the Korean
economy would cost more per year for the first three years, than the
relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for
fiscal 1948, but reduced in July, 1947, to $92.7 million.
A feature of the proposed rehabilitation program is an expenditure
of $35 million to provide a chemical fertilizer industry and the
supporting power installations, roughly duplicating the installations
in North Korea which formerly supplied the fertilizer needs of
South Korea. An additional amount of approximately $85 million
is included in the five-year rehabilitation program to cover the
cost of fertilizer imports, pending the completion of the plants.
Other items in the program are investment in coal mining to provide
low-grade anthracite for briquetting, and to provide for the
development and reconstruction of the transportation, textile and
fisheries industries. There is no assurance, however, that (_a_) $35
million fertilizer industry would meet the estimated requirements,
or reach capacity production in the time allotted. The suitability
of low-grade anthracite dust as the basic energy source for a
considerable industrial establishment in South Korea has not been
tested, and (_b_) there are no reliable estimates of the reserves of
this fuel, and no evidence of this fuel, and no evidence that the
mines and railroads could be developed to fit the prescribed time
schedule.
In the event that it is decided to continue a one-nation occupation
of South Korea for some years, the least costly program would be
one designed to provide, not capital goods, but raw materials and
fertilizer in sufficient quantity to stabilize the economy at a
satisfactory standard of living as measured by a prewar Japanese and
potential North Korean living standards. In this way, the risk of an
experiment in industrialization without resources would be avoided.
A relief program of the type envisaged might cost the United States
about $150 million a year, in addition to the present military
occupation costs which are in the neighborhood of $200 million a
year. It would be necessary frankly to recognize this as a relief
program which held no prospect of financial return, and no prospect
of making South Korea a self sufficient economy.
_Industrial Survey_
A comprehensive industrial survey of South Korea would not be
warranted. The industrial elements and capabilities as well as
weaknesses of that area are all too evident. Should Korea be
reunited, and the United States bear a responsibility in the economic
rehabilitation of the country, an industrial survey wholly or in
part by qualified United States Government personnel is indicated.
If, however, it be made by private consultants, they should clearly
understand that the survey must be realistic and reflect the economic
needs and capabilities of the country. Foreign consultants and
construction firms do themselves and their own country as well as the
country concerned, a disservice in recommending projects for which
there is not complete economic justification.
APPENDIX G TO PART III—KOREA
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
Because Japan had administered and developed Korea uniformly for
Japanese and not Korean purposes, and in particular had persistently
suppressed the people’s historic culture, once the region was freed
of the Japanese, its people undertook a re-Koreanization program
with feverish activity. Since VJ-Day, their own labors in behalf of
education, for example, apart from the contributions of American
authorities have been determined and surprisingly effective. In that
short time it is estimated that total illiteracy has been cut from 75
to 44 per cent (to 25 per cent in a most favored area), a commendable
record even when one notes warningly that the degree of literacy thus
attained is necessarily a modest one permitting little more in some
cases than ability to read a ballot. Although there are today more
children in school in South Korea than were in school in all Korea
during the Japanese rule, popular education is but begun, whether
one considers primary or secondary schooling. Its advancement calls
for buildings, texts and other equipment, teachers and advisors, and
these requirements call for money.
The program of the educational group in our own Military Government
is well designed but promoted within tight financial limits The same
can be said for adult educational work of the United States Office
of Civil Information. It operates through local libraries whose
pictures, posters, periodicals, and other exhibits reach a great many
urban visitors, and through a special train which moves periodically
among the villages, presenting well-attended educational picture
shows and distributing eagerly read farm weeklies and newspapers. Of
many lacks the worst is of picture films.
Korean newspapers are numerous but for the most part are primarily
political organs. Only by hastening education in the Korean language,
long suppressed by Japan, can there be prompt development of adult
education; there is present need for increased educational and
cultural activities to occupy the attention of young people who
presently have insufficient employment.
American health advisers report good progress in prevention of such
serious diseases as smallpox and typhus, scant progress in the fight
on chronic maladies. Institutional welfare work is insufficient but
no more so than under Japan.
In general, one notes abundant energy among Korean leaders and a
great desire for mass improvement socially and culturally as well as
in other fields; it merits greater financial encouragement than thus
far has been available.
APPENDIX H TO PART III—KOREA
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID
_Military Situation_
In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to
instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North
parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that
line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States
and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier
to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more
industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly
political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of
occupation.
The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military
responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV
Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops
and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.
There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American
occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean
uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with
a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean
Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal
to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency.
The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order
in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters
with police stations in principal towns and villages.
* * * * *
The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the
United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of
major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized
to augment American guards on United States Army installations.
It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its
efficiency is low by American standards.
North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength
in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into
two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized
Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There
is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate
figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s
(Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained
but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These
forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with
Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military
threat to South Korea.
Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated
by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and
revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose
additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the
American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility,
however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by
troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports
from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops
are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle
conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and
equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.
Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North
Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future,
infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean
Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted
riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should
this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining
order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed
or controlled invasion.
_Strategic Importance_
The political, social, economic, and military situations in South
Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would
constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria,
North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States
strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best
interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military
neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its
occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.
So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the
United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the
world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United
States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East,
but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation
Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese
people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States
policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding
Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements
for Japan.
Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies
a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity
to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the
United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or
bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East,
present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability
as they could not be maintained there within our present military
capabilities.
There are three possible courses of action with reference to United
States Occupation Forces in Korea:
They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea
to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by
the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an
unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.
They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be
unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and
would subject United States to international censure.
They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.
Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North
Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created
are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied
upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of
Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be
to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean
armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United
States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia,
Yugoslavia, and Albania.
There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will
withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable
and thus induce our own withdrawal.
_Military Aid to Korea_
The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned
over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in
South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American
Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the
face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for
and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate
a military government which looks toward the future political
independence of Korea together with its economic and social
rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose
of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their
realization.
The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable
South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation
against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum
military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support
of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military
forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including
carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles,
telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.
Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training,
and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines
of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the
control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be
officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement
and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient
strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will
become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea
is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.
Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing
ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two
parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated
nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the
experience and industrial potential to create or support its own
armed forces.
An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve
to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist)
Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from
Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a
Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable
for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.
_Conclusions_
United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North
Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a
Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s
(Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a
contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military
position.
There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to
General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order,
though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from
General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean
forces.
A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to
dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological
threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.
The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring
permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base
to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as
they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed
forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently
well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives
without the actual presence of Soviet troops.
_Recommendations_
It is recommended that:
United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with
the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many
guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.
Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the
achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:
Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National
Police and Korean Coast Guard.
The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace
the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the
threat from the North.
Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.
Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.
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_Soong Sisters, The_, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co.,
Garden City, N. Y., 1942.
_Speaking Frankly_, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947.
_Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism_, by Boris Souvarine,
Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939.
_Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism_, by Max Eastman, W. W.
Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940.
_Study in History, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols.
I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University
Press, 1946.
T
_Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and
Co., N. Y., 1928.
_Tinder Box of Asia, The_, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran
and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932.
_Together_, by Katherine Tupper Marshall, Tupper & Love, Inc., N.
Y., Atlanta, 1946.
_Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea
Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1908.
W
_War in the East_, by Charles A’Court Repington, John Murray,
London, 1905.
_We’re in This with Russia_, by Wallace Carroll, Houghton Mifflin
Co., Boston, 1942.
_Index_
A
Acheson, 19, 26, 118.
_American Mercury_, 23.
Atwood, Harry E., 134.
Anti-Imperialist League, 67
Aristotle, 144.
Attila, the Hun, 73, 74.
Attlee, Prime Minister, 146.
B
“Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16.
“Big Noses,” 117.
Bleucher, General, 59.
Borodin, Michael, 59.
Bourtai, 76.
(See _also_ Genghis Khan, favorite wife of)
Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60.
Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24.
C
Cairo Conference, 108.
Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121.
Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119.
Checfoo, 9.
Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130.
Chennault, Claire L., 119.
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106;
building of model village by, 106, (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116,
contributions of, to the U. S., 103;
“Golden Decade” of, 104;
mistakes of, 10;
tragedy of, 103-116.
Chinese Communist Party, 45;
Central Committee of, 32;
Central People’s Government, 45;
Personalities, 45-68;
young intelligentsia of, 57.
Chinese New Year, 87.
Chingwangtao, 7.
Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125;
family of, 59;
wife of, 60, 126;
“Executioner,” 59.
Chungking, 45, 105, 106;
destruction of, by Japanese, 106;
model village in, 106.
Churchill, 26, 33, 108.
Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56;
as a movie “fan,” 40;
family of, 51;
hunting prowess of, 40;
wives of, 51, 54.
Comintern, 49.
Communism, the “lure” of, 1;
forebears of, 70-81.
Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93;
(See _also_ Propaganda, Communist)
Confucius, 50, 115.
Courcy, Kenneth de, 145.
“Cumshaw,” 36.
D
Dairen, 9.
Daniels, Jonathan, 25.
Drugs, “actedon,” 90;
“mescaline,” 90;
use of, 90, 91;
on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of)
on Michael Shipkov, 91;
on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Democracy, as a principle, 133.
E
England, 139.
Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Eurasia, 7.
F
Fifth Column, conception of, 72.
Finland, 132.
Foundation for Economic Education, 136.
Formosa, 112, 115, 118;
invasion of, 118-120.
France, 132.
Free love, 125.
G
Gallen, 59.
Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105,
106, 108, 109;
favorite wife of, 76;
“Scourge of God,” 74;
superstitions of, 77;
Yassa of, 1, 78.
Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45.
H
Hankow, 115.
Hatem, Dr., 63, 64;
family of, 63, 64. (See _also_ Ma Hia-teh).
Hiss, 26.
Hirohito, 131.
Hitler, 46, 131, 136.
Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129;
treatment of British in, 129.
Hoover administration, 135, 136.
Hoover, J. Edgar, 137.
Huns, 70, 73.
Hutton, Betty, 40.
Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109.
Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.);
on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92;
on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of);
on Van der Lubbe, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
I
International News Service, 18.
International Hospital, 30, 37.
(See _also_ Yenan).
J
Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115.
Jefferson, Thomas, 142.
Jenner, William E., 20, 22.
Jessup, 26.
Joffe, Adolph, 104.
Judd, Walter H., 17.
K
Kalgan Pass, 9.
Kung, H. H., Madame, 64.
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Kung, H. H., Dr., 104.
Kwangsi Province, 113.
L
Lamb, Harold, 22.
Lattimore, 26.
Lehey, William D., 25.
Lesser concessions, theory of, 135.
Li Li San, 61, 96;
wife of, 61.
_Life Magazine_, 115.
Lin Piao, 62.
Li Tsun-jen, General, 113.
“Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121.
Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64.
M
MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107.
Madison, James, 134.
Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64.
(See _also_ Hatem, Dr.).
Malinovsky, Marshall, 61.
Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76,
92, 102, 121, 125;
daughter of, 30;
son of, 46;
wives of, 48;
heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49;
Lang Ping, 48, 49;
Myth, 49;
propaganda speech by, 92, 93.
Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102;
as granary of Asia, 94;
occupation of, by Japanese, 94;
stripping of, by Communists, 96.
Manchus, 94, 104.
Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126.
Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24,
28, 56;
at a Chinese opera, 14;
at a Communist banquet, 14;
in conference with Mao, 15;
preference for Mao, 16;
visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15.
McNeil, Hector, 130.
Michener, James, 115.
Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of).
Ming Bing, 13.
Min Yuan Park, 87.
Missionaries, Catholic, 34;
Protestants, 35.
Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101.
Mongolia, 9.
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146.
Moses, 70, 133.
Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44.
Mukden, 95, 99.
N
Nanking, 16, 56, 58.
Nan Yuan, 8.
Nationalist, 9, 11;
(See _also_ Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of).
“New Democracy,” 82;
marriage under the, 125-126.
New Life Movement, 61, 106.
Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107.
O
Open Door Policy, 9.
Opera, Chinese, 14;
Shanghai, 68.
P
Peace terms, Japanese, 108.
Pei Yuan, 8.
Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122;
capture of, 87, 122;
famine in, 122.
Personalities, Communist, 45-69.
Plato, 50
Politburo, 15.
Port Arthur, 9.
“Prisoners of War School,” 32;
(See _also_ Yenan).
Propaganda, Communist, 82-93;
against Americans, 85;
basic purpose of, 82;
distortion of terms in, 82, 83;
Democracy, 82;
Freedom, 82, 83;
Security, 83;
Truth, 83;
for children, 84, 85;
newspapers as, 86;
opera as, 89;
posters as, 84;
slogans as, 84;
speeches as, 86;
by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93;
titles as reward, 87;
types of, two, 83.
Q
Quislings, 100.
Quo Vadis, 131-148.
R
Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130.
Republic, discussion of, 133, 134.
Rosenberg, Anna, 27.
Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135.
“Rosamond,” 65.
Russell, Dean, 143.
Russia, war potential, 138, 139.
Russian advisors, 117.
S
Samarkand, Battle of, 100.
Sanzo Nosako, 33.
Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124;
Mayor of, 119;
Russians in, 120;
treatment of Americans in, 127.
Shensi Province, 29.
Shipkov, Michael, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
Soong, Charlie, 65;
family, 65, 104;
Sisters, 64, 104.
“Stakhanovitism,” 80.
Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131.
State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42.
Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56.
Sun Fo, 66.
Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69;
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103;
revolution of, 51.
T
Tamerlane, 53, 78.
Tang Shan, 8.
Tartars, 63, 70, 78.
Tientsin, 7, 87, 88.
Tipping, prohibition against, 36;
“cumshaw,” 36.
Trans-Siberian Railway, 97.
Trohan, Walter, 23, 25.
Trotsky, 2.
Truce teams, 16.
Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111.
U
United States, 7, 8, 16, 117.
Urals, 96, 97.
V
Vogeler, Robert A., 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of).
V-J Day, 95, 97.
_Voice of America_, 118.
W
Wallace, Henry, 131.
Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142.
Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69.
Wesleyan College, 65.
Wife swapping, 125.
Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8.
Y
Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22.
Yangtse River, 60, 105.
“Yassa,” 1, 78.
Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31.
Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64;
International Hospital in, 30;
Market place in, 35;
“Prisoner of War School,” 32.
Yenching University, 24, 56, 57.
Z
Zukov, 62.
About the Author...
Mary Lamar Knight, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer,
graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on
a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full
years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that
time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in
the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity
she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied
fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics.
She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers
as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the
first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the
guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty
of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and
studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the
international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men
who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own
destruction.
During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the
late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia,
has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on
a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and
nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention
to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls”
and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she
was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to
join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish
Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to
invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to
their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author
embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter.
Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the
principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of
Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today.
The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics,
the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so
successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring
countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight
had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now
immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China
again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall
Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the
men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer,
Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai
and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire
American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling
international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents
in RED BLIGHT.
In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this
vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many
outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as
a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling
or ruining the earth.
Among Miss Knight’s published works are: _On My Own_, an
autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); _Spies versus Censors_ (Reader’s
Digest, May, 1946) and _Red Realm in China_ (Reader’s Digest,
February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to _We
Cover the World_, the first symposium of foreign correspondents
(Prentice-Hall).
The author is available for personal appearances and speaking
engagements. (Fees are variable.)
A Note on KOREA ...
_By Mary Lamar Knight_
Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although
it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important,
but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest
tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas
MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue
the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited
had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General
Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.
The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean
Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese
Communists to determine how far the United States and the United
Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick
from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area
from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once
having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South
Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely.
We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th
parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss
of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist
fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration
of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea
to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position
to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or
otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a
permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean
patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a
question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t
make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t
any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and
self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the
border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to
the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six
days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known
that Japan was ready to surrender.
For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the
questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s,
and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little
Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic
example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot
defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only
prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can
we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have
paid?
There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines
and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not.
Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we
can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as
if they were our enemies”?
But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a
knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States
the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic
removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far
East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have
far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us
larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain.
Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal
by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had
appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must
go’.”
The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of
opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on
the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this.
There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are
playing international politics, to obtain and control world power.
MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in
their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply
sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington,
to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing
to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort
toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved
manifesto.
On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (_Intelligence
Digest_—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:
“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war.
Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a
different objective; while each high commander seems to have a
private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the
powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising
that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world.
Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await
decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions
are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public
opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public
opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not
yet been convinced of this....
“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the
Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the
flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist
forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments
are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which
by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable
and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from
outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West
will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war
until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of
influence.”
To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,”
but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting
for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop
Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government
be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa
and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese
accept such a treaty.
Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or
Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of
Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time
is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over,
for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.
Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman
has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be
bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us
first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear
of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on
the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at
conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far
greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.
The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve
only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950,
when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding
that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean
war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin
remain within the United Nations, this international body politic
will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give
aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military
aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member
of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea
to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others
are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be
very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another
faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean
war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was
openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did
we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the
peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different
today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the
enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever
played with flesh and blood pawns.
It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented
from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he
stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him
from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their
own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered
in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but
for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a
long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace
military emergency.
Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951,
J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard
core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital
industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most
effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States.
Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know
that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents
operating in every department of our national life, operating to
destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range
attack.
To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty
thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an
almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still
constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God
forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement
will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks.
Your First Step....
“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says
a Chinese proverb.
Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step”
individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in
which we live.
You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong
direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have
resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared
war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed
the seventy thousand mark.
Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of
Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts
must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts!
Now _you_ can take _your_ first step in the right direction by
helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is
engulfing the earth. You can do this by placing RED BLIGHT into the
hands of as many people as possible.
RED BLIGHT is bound in two editions: Paper bound, $1.50 per copy;
Cloth Bound, $2.50 per copy. Please use the coupon below for placing
your order.
LORRIN L. MORRISON, _Publisher_,
1915 South Western Avenue,
Los Angeles 18, California.
Enclosed please find remittance in the amount of $.......... for
which please send .... copy/ies of the .......... Bound Edition of
RED BLIGHT, by _Mary Lamar Knight_, as indicated in Remittance Advice
column below.
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Transcriber’s Notes
pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he
pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao
pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic
pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan
pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning
pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven
pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army.
pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid
pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment
pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical
pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s
pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius
pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease
pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate
pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China
from Europe?
pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred
pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World
pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist
to: Anti
pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality
pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early
pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled
pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous
pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration
pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It
pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country
pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation
pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically
pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented
pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran
pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry
pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar
pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political
pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically
pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous
pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance
pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war,
pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s
pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946
pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as
pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall
pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half
pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice
pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation
pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0
pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous
pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams
pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and
pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian
pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted
pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country
pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall
pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic
pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s
pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington
pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page
number from 143 to 144
pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central
pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after:
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106
pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism
pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News
Service
pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism
pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen
pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism
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